

OIG-INTV-000719

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 2" - 11 of 7882 (0.1%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones  
Created: 2/25/2009 3:35:33 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s) #
To Be Determined	[redacted] states that 5496 is a draft letter that he saw in late 2002. It was written for the Attorney General John Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert S. Mueller, III to elicit assistance from the [redacted] in dealing with [redacted]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation provided the facts in the document, but someone at Department of Justice may have reformatting them into the draft.	[redacted] Interview 2 13:00-20:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] DNK the basis for the statement on 5497 that the environment at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has created "complacency in the detainees." [redacted] did believe that different debriefing models than were being used by Department of Defense with #63 would enhance his productivity. However, [redacted] did not know at the time exactly what debriefing models had been used on [redacted] or [redacted]. He DNK whether anyone at Federal Bureau of Investigation knew specifically what techniques had been used with [redacted] (b)(1). [redacted] (b)(1) stated he believed that traditional Federal Bureau of Investigation interrogating techniques would be better than what Department of Defense was doing with #63.	[redacted] Interview 2 20:00-27:00
To Be Determined	The Federal Bureau of Investigation was in on the request (b)(1). [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) did not know then what he knows now about what techniques were used on [redacted] (b)(1).	[redacted] Interview 2 27:03-44:00

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

b6 Per FBI  
b7C

	(b)(1) wanted (b)(1). (b)(1) He thought the Department of Defense methods would preclude trying #63 in court or before a military tribunal, that his admissions would be "suspect at best," and that a voluntary statement would be more effective than one obtained by pressure or duress. Department of Justice counterpart on this proposal was David Nahmlas. contacts at Counterterrorism Center were and	
To Be Determined	DNK why (b)(1) (b)(1) He knows Department of Defense continued with its obnoxious approach. To summarize understanding of 5496-8: 1) wanted (b)(1) because Department of Defense methods were ineffective. 2) The (b)(1) and 3) DNK what methods had been used on (b)(1)	Interview 2:44:00-50:00
To Be Determined	was aware that there were disputes between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and regarding the sharing of information gained from He DNK specific information about Federal Bureau of investigation being concerned about the methods being used on abu Zubaida in April 2002.	Interview 2:50:00-52:00
To Be Determined	DNK whether (b)(1) but it would not have been the type of issue to be addressed there. The Policy Coordinating Committee addressed broader policy issues.	Interview 2:52:00-53:00
To Be Determined	DNK who raised the issue of whether #63 would ever be prosecuted in a court.	Interview 2:53:00
To Be Determined	recalled that may have called him about (b)(1) but he DNK what he said to or what instructions he might have given. Generally the Federal Bureau of Investigation told its agents to stay away from such facilities. He DNK other calls about techniques in Afghanistan.	Interview 2:58:00-1:03:00
To Be Determined	recalls that there was a period when, due to personnel shortages, there were no OSCs in Afghanistan. Those functions were performed by unit (Military Liaison and Detainee Unit). Before came to MLDU in June 2002, those functions would have been performed out of the New York Field Office - FBI.	Interview 2:1:03:00-1:05:00

b6 Per FBI  
b7Cb6 Per FBI  
b7Cb6 Per FBI  
b7C

10/7/2002	[redacted] DNR telling [redacted] that as long as 63 was not being tortured [redacted] could continue to participate in his interrogation by Department of Defense. He likely would have discussed any concerns raised by [redacted] with David Nahmias. [redacted] DNR the proposal to "wait a week" after a Defense Humint Services interview before the Federal Bureau of Investigation would interview 63.	Interview 2 56:00-58:00
Fri 11/15/2002	015612 is an 11/15/02 CTF memo that was a response to the Department of Defense interrogation plan for #63 [redacted] Department of Defense was impatient with the progress Federal Bureau of Investigation was making with #63. The Federal Bureau of Investigation said it would stick with its time-tested techniques. A Department of Defense interrogation plan was prepared under the supervision of Lt. Col. [redacted] and this was CTF's response. [redacted] would have discussed this with David Nahmias at the time because David Nahmias was the primary Department of Justice point of contact for issues relating to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	Interview 2 5:50-11:30

b6 Per FBI  
b7C