

CaseMan Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1" - 57 of 7911 (0.7%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones

Created: 2/24/2009 11:51:19 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that FD-302s are usually used in the criminal investigative area. Classified or intelligence information is usually memorialized in an EC. He knows of no rules or guidelines concerning when a written record of an interview must be prepared, and says for example, that if an agent gets nothing out of an interview, he may elect not to memorialize it, but a good agent will probably put something in writing so stating. He believes it is more a matter of common sense.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he was aware of the ECs from the Behavioral Analysis Unit - (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) relating to the disputes between the military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the interrogation of (b)(1). He helped (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) write up an EC stating Military Liaison and Detainee Unit's concurrence with Behavioral Analysis Unit. He saw the military's strategy concerning several detainees, of their protocols, and aware of the issues and conflicts (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was also aware and was communicating such things to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C). (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not necessarily disagree with the military's approach, but he does know what works and what does not. He believes that inexperienced military interrogators were using inappropriate techniques there. His concern was more with effectiveness than with other considerations.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was aware that before his time as program manager for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a number of problems were created by the military's representation to their chain of command that the Behavioral Analysis Unit agreed with the interrogation plan for #63. When Federal Bureau of Investigation and MLDU personnel in particular found out about this, there was a VTC during which (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) raised that issue. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that David Nahmias and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) primary contacts at DOJ.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that he recalled having discussions concerning the legality of	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Determined	interrogation techniques with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman in Office of the General Counsel - FBI. In essence, the message was follow Federal Bureau of Investigation protocols, do not become involved in or partake in any of the coercive or more aggressive techniques that are utilized. While the military had their own rules, if the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel saw such techniques, they were to report them.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that the military had control over U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel were guests.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says it was not clear to him what detainee interview conduct, beyond Federal Bureau of Investigation approved conduct, was to be reported and what was not to be reported. However, if something happened that caused an agent to leave the interview, he would have to report that to his OSC and explain why he had to leave.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says it is a fair characterization to say that after the disputes relating to the interrogation plan for #63, things at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba settled down and the arrangement was that the military did what they were allowed to do, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation did what they were allowed to do. At no time while he has worked at Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ has an agent said he needed to leave an interview, although he has seen e-mails saying they saw this or that, but recalls no particulars.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) has heard that standard operating procedure for captured terrorists is to allege abuse. He thinks that this teaching was included in an Al-Qaeda training manual that has been found. It is the same disinformation technique he has learned from our military.	(b)(6) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that documents referring to "U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Task Force" and Bagram or Afghanistan relate to the early days before MLDU was formed, and the people involved called themselves the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Task Force before the group was renamed as Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. It does not mean that Federal Bureau of Investigation work in Afghanistan was being done by personnel deployed to or with responsibility for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) does not recognize the name Garrabrant in the context of Afghanistan. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I

To Be Determined	(b)(1)	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
To Be Determined	There are two Fly Teams, which are counter-terrorism rapid reaction groups of about 16 Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel each. If something bad happens in CONUS or overseas, they are the first responders to go anywhere anytime with investigative capabilities. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that he has been contacted twice by United States Army Criminal Investigative Division in one case but is not sure if United States Army Criminal Investigative Division was looking at Federal Bureau of Investigation agents as subjects or as witnesses: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) at Hostage Rescue Team concerning an allegation of abuse in Afghanistan, and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) in each instance, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) contacted OGC, they were subsequently interviewed by United States Army Criminal Investigative Division as witnesses, and they had no knowledge re abuses alleged. Document bates 7450OGC-7451OGC relates to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) request to Office of the General Counsel - FBI. To the extent that the interviews occurred, that would have occurred under the auspices of the Inspection Division or Office of the General Counsel - FBI. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that he believes — as a law enforcement agent — that taking a detainee up in a helicopter and threatening to throw him out the door is torture and clearly illegal. He is less clear if the person is an enemy combatant, and is not comfortable saying whether that would be illegal or illegal. Feels there is lots of gray area there, but is clear that he does not believe that was an effective strategy. His understanding was that this incident at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was beyond what was allowed as an enhanced Department of Defense interrogation technique and was not allowed by Department of Defense. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation discussed this incident in the letter that T.J. Harrington sent to General Donald J. Ryder at Department of Defense.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
To Be Determined	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that if he saw Department of Defense personnel acting in a clearly unlawful manner, he would report it up his chain of command, but if he saw something that fell within a range of enhanced techniques, he would not necessarily report - e.g., loud music. It is a judgment call. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) never himself saw or was told anything about what might be	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I

	<p>detainee abuse. Personnel deployed to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had their own chain of command, and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was just a HQ program manager outside of that chain. To the extent he has heard about "goofy" things like the flag, or a female taking off her blouse, or the menstrual blood incident, he is not sure how much of it came from reading reports in the media, or rumor, or coffee talk, other open source info, or how much he heard from those in that chain of command. But he believes it was not from someone coming to him and telling they had a concern.</p>	
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believes the mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Afghanistan has been "outstanding," and the kinds of work done there probably represents the future of the Federal Bureau of Investigation - gathering actionable intelligence right on the battlefield with the military. In U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the detainees held for years there do not have operational intelligence value, but may still have techniques and plans information value. *</p>	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1</p>
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) now in San Francisco, would be able to answer much more fully than he the kinds of questions we have asked, especially re early days at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, since he was the first guy in the door.</p>	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1</p>
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had no direct conversations with Valerie E. Caproni on detainee issues. He may have spoken to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p>	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1</p>
Sun 04/16/1995	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that his EOD is 4/16/1995. Chicago Division until 8/2003, violent crime and fugitive task forces, member of SWAT team, some overseas work after 9/11. Transferred to HQ as a supervisor to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI in 8/2003, assigned to MLDU. Oversaw the Federal Bureau of Investigation's U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba program until about February 2004, during which time he made three short trips down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He handled the program management - operational and logistical issues - including personnel, equipment, and distribution of information obtained there. In February 2004, he was sent TDY to Afghanistan, first as Deputy OSC and later as OSC. He served there from about 2/22/2004 thru 6/1/2004. While he was D/OSC, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the OSC. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) became OSC in mid or late April.</p>	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1</p>
08/??/2003	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that he made three trips to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during his time as U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba program manager. He was the first U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba program manager. Before that the management was not</p>	<p>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</p> <p>Interview 1</p>

	as well-defined and for a time it was run out of the Miami Division office, and then out of headquarters, before assignment to Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as OSC about the same time (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	
08/7/2003	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived at HQ as program manager in around August 2003. * (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) says he as U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba program manager did not provide instructions or guidance concerning what they should do if agents saw something during interrogations of detainees that was not consistent with Federal Bureau of Investigation policy and practice. That would a function of the OSC there. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) does not know what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told his agents on the ground. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1
11/7/2003 - 02/7/2004	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) says there are ongoing, periodic White House-chaired detainee working group meetings chaired by National Security Council personnel, and he attended such meetings in the winter of November 2003 and February 2004. These are attended by Department of Defense, Department of Justice, State Dept., and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) representatives. Department of Justice's reps at times were David Nahmias and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Related to detainee policy issues generally as well as particular detainees. Does not recall any discussion as to the different schools of thought on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques. When (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) left for Afghanistan, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) took his place in these meetings. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1
11/7/2003 - 02/7/2004	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) says that at the White House-chaired detainee working group meetings chaired by National Security Council personnel that he attended, issues related to transfer of detainees to third countries were discussed - both as to release of detainees and their transfer for prosecution or further detention elsewhere. Department of Justice asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide information summaries and recommendations about particular detainees in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba coming up for some kind of action, for example, when Department of Defense would say we want to release him but want input from Federal Bureau of Investigation through Department of Justice and the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) before doing that. The four categories of action concerning detainees were: continued detention at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; release; transfer for continued detention to another country, the country of his origin; and out (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). Does not recall. Key issues were the extent of his continued intelligence value and degree of threat the individual presented. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit's policy in its recommendations was to err if at all on the side of continued detention. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1

OIG-INTV-00133

11/7/2003 - 02/7/2004	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) says that at the White House-chaired detainee working group meetings chaired by National Security Council personnel that he attended, he recalls that issues related to the transfer of about 7 to 9 Moroccan detainees to either Morocco or Spain were discussed for possible prosecution in those countries. He handled many such detainees and probably detainees from Syria, Jordan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China (Uighers). The Chinese considered them terrorists and there was a concern that China was going to torture them. Does not know outcome of that issue. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1
11/7/2003 - 02/7/2004	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) says that he does not recall, at the White House-chaired detainee working group meetings or any other meetings he attended, any other discussion about the fact that they were going to be sending a person to a country, and what if any assurances they had that the person would not be tortured in that country. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1
Fri 12/05/2003	12/5/2003 e-mail (00712CBI) from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to Gary M. Bald, Arthur M. Cummings, Frankie Battle concerning military interrogators impersonating Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believes this was the first time this problem had come up, and that he was acting unit chief at the time because (b)(6) (b)(7) (b)(6) (b)(7) was out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) thinks (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) wrote an EC about this and he was forwarding it up, that he may heard about this from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned of it when some military person allowed an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to read a Department of Defense e-mail referring to this. (b)(6) (b)(7) (b)(6) (b)(7) does not believe it was learned that the impersonators were then torturing the detainee or using enhanced techniques on him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) believes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's information on this was "pretty solid." Arthur M. Cummings at the time was section chief of International Terrorism Operations Section 1. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was a supervisor down in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1
Fri 12/05/2003	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) is not certain what happened as a result of his 12/5/2003 e-mail or the EC, but believes that T.J. Harrington wrote a letter to General Donald J. Ryder, and that the letter included this issue. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also believes that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) addressed this issue with military supervisors at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and expressed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's concern about this. As a result, the military management there - possibly General Geoffrey D. Miller or Steve Rodriguez (the Defense Intelligence Agency chief) - told (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) they would not do it any more, and he knows of no further	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Interview 1

OIG-INTV-00133

	impersonation there by military personnel. He does not recall, but suggests that (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) might, whether they learned that this was an approved military technique, or that it should never have happened and will make sure it does not happen again. *	
??/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that he has been contacted by United States Army Criminal Investigative Division investigators asking to interview two Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel concerning allegations of abuse by military personnel. He forwarded those requests to Office of the General Counsel - FBI and the agents' chains of command, and then passed OGC's information to United States Army Criminal Investigative Division. He recalls e-mails in which he sought guidance on how to handle the requests.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that as D/OSC and then OSC, he was in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Afghanistan and working with military and intelligence community members in developing actionable intelligence with a nexus to counter-terrorism or US interests worldwide. The majority of his time was at Bagram, while (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was in Kabul. When military was going out on a mission and needed Federal Bureau of Investigation support, either in the form of interviewers or evidence collection in Sensitive Site Exploitations, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would make sure that Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel were assigned on those missions. Information collected by Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel would not be limited to counter-terrorism matters, but would extend to tactical or force protection information, which they would give to the military. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel did a number of Sensitive Site Exploitations, they also interviewed what were called "PUCs" - "Persons Under Control" *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a similar close working relationship (b)(1) *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	PUC is the military's formal term for a detainee. In Afghanistan, the terms were inter-changeable. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	The interviews in Afghanistan in which Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel participated included some in which only Federal Bureau of Investigation interrogators were present and some in which both Federal Bureau of Investigation and military personnel were present, depending on	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I

	who the PUC was. Less than 25% of (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) own time was spent conducting or participating in such interviews. *	
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that all of the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Bagram and in Kandahar did both Sensitive Site Exploitations as well as interviews of detainees. The names of the agents he supervised in Afghanistan (with current assignments): (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Mobile); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Phoenix); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Tampa); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (Houston and Fly Team); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (Washington Field Office); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Fly Team); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NY); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NY); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Las Vegas); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Fly Team); (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (Fly Team); TT; (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ITA; (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) plus some evidence technicians. The TTAs probably did not do interviews. A TTA is a technically trained agent. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that during Sensitive Site Exploitations, the military personnel would secure the village, and Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel would follow and conduct "tactical" or "street" interviews of the groups of people gathered by the military and restrained in flexicuffs, in order to determine who the people were and serve as a screening process. In the military, these would be called "battlefield" interrogations. These interviews would usually not be memorialized in any writing. For those detained and questioned elsewhere at greater length, written summaries would not always be prepared. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that during joint interviews with another agency, there was generally an informal case-by-case agreement with the other agency concerning who was going to write the summary of the interview in order to avoid duplicative effort. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that most Federal Bureau of Investigation interviews in Afghanistan occurred at formalized detention centers, usually either at Kandahar Collection Point or the Bagram Collection Point. The Bagram Collection Point is basically a jail on the Bagram Air Force Base. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	Off-the-tape discussion of detention of personnel at Bagram Air Force Base other than in the Bagram Collection Point. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that he was given the assignment to go over to Afghanistan by and his direct report was (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) after approval by Gary M. Bald. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reported back to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI through Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. While	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1

	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	was deputy, he reported back through (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	save he did not have a deputy for part of his time as OSC, and when he did, his deputy was (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
			Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	knew going in to the Afghanistan assignment that part of their work would relate to joint interviews with military personnel. No one briefed him on the differences between military interrogation techniques and Federal Bureau of Investigation techniques, but he had been the program manager for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba so he put that information out and told his agents the "rules of the road" for the assignment. As U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba program manager working out of DC, he dealt with that issue daily. He was aware of the difference in style between military and Federal Bureau of Investigation approaches, and the kind of training received by military interrogators and their techniques, and was obviously aware of his limitations as an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
			Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	says that Frankie Battle was the Section Chief of Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the Assistant Section Chief. So the chain of command administratively as to Afghanistan would go to Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) up to Frankie Battle and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to the Counter Terrorism Division - FBI - AD Gary M. Bald and DAD T.J. Harrington. Operationally, the chain of command is Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, International Terrorism Operations Section 1, to a different DAD, to Gary M. Bald. Follow up question - who is that other DAD? *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
			Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	says that in Afghanistan, the military personnel were well aware of the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel's skill set in rapport-based interrogation. As of April 2004 or so, the military would not invite the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in to interviews in which they thought there would be a conflict between Federal Bureau of Investigation rules and military rules. If there was a joint interview, it was understood going in what the Federal Bureau of Investigation could and could not do. He would assume, but does not know, that there was a similar understanding at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
			Interview 1
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	says that at no time while he was in Afghanistan did any agent come to him and express concern about what had occurred in a detainee interview. To the extent that (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) participated in interviews, he never saw anything that troubled him in terms of detainee treatment, did not see any physical evidence of prior abuse, and none of the detainees	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
			Interview 1

	complained to him about the way they had been treated by Americans. *	
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that during his time in Afghanistan he never saw or was told about Federal Bureau of Investigation agents being involved in or observing interrogation techniques actually happening that went beyond Federal Bureau of Investigation guidelines. However, he knew that the military had separate rules governing what was allowed even if he did not know the details of what those allowable enhanced techniques were. Recalls a letter from General Barlow [??] saying -- after Abu Ghraib Prison arose -- that the military was not going to do those things in Afghanistan that had been alleged as having occurred at Abu Ghraib Prison. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
02/??/2004 - 06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that it was a common occurrence for a detainee to be interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, then the military, or by the military, then by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was not concerned about the issue of the Federal Bureau of Investigation getting the benefit of prior Department of Defense "rough stuff." In his view, it was like coming in to interview someone after he had been questioned for three days by the Chicago police. He would not be concerned if he knew that the military was going to use enhanced techniques, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was then going to use rapport-based techniques to try to get the detainee to talk, including telling the detainee he should talk to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because if not he'll be turned over to the military for further questioning. He is not aware this ever happened. He agrees there might be a perception problem for the Federal Bureau of Investigation if the military interrogators beat a detainee in the morning and the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel question him in the afternoon and obtained information because of what the military personnel had done. This for him is a "what if" of the kind (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) raised. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did consider the possible negative effect of enhanced military techniques on the rapport Federal Bureau of Investigation previously developed with a detainee. Federal Bureau of Investigation tried to get to a detainee immediately after capture. Believes the military is gradually seeing the benefits of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's approach. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I
04/??/2004	(b)(1)	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview I

	(b)(1)	
04/77/2004 - 03/77/2004		Interview 1
04/77/2004 - 03/77/2004		Interview 1
04/77/2004 - 03/77/2004		Interview 1
04/77/2004 - 03/77/2004		Interview 1

b6 Per FBI
b7C

b6 Per FBI
b7C

b6 Per FBI
b7C

04/??/2004 - 05/??/2004	(b)(1)	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
05/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that his Military Liaison and Detainee Unit has provided documents in response to Office of the Inspector General requests or in response to congressional inquiries since spring 2004, and that during the summer there was a mass e-mailing by the Inspections Division - FBI to Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel asking if anyone had observations information about detainee abuse at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As to Afghanistan, while he did communicate by e-mail with his supervisors who wanted him to let them know if there were any problems, no one has contacted him in a formal way such as an interview setting, or even in an informal way by phone or e-mail asking about what he had observed or heard about in Afghanistan. He responded in the negative to the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba e-mail, but believes that the e-mail related to that as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. He has never reported any observed or reported detainee abuse.	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
05/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that prior to the spring of 2004, there was concern at Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ with agents being involved at all in joint interviews due to the concern about detainee treatment. While he was in Afghanistan, he received guidance from HQ to make sure that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were not involved, and it became clearer that they were to report actions beyond those allowed under Federal Bureau of Investigation rules. It had been clear that they were to report "abuse," but was not as clear as to reporting less severe "enhanced techniques." He is not sure what (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told his personnel at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I
06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that when he left Afghanistan in June 2004, his successor there as OSC was (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) with (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as his D/OSC. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) is now (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) supervisor at Liberty Crossing building as Assistant Section Chief	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Interview I

	Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit is a part of Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI. *	
06/??/2004	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) says that since he returned from Afghanistan, he has worked in the program management for Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel deployed to that country. Starting in fall 2004, he became acting MLDU chief, and held that position until about a week ago (3/9/2005). As acting unit chief, he handled and was involved in all Federal Bureau of Investigation deployment programs to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan and Iraq. As to Iraq, his work was logistical only - another unit handled the operational aspects. The new unit chief is (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). Before (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) became acting unit chief, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had served in that position. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
??/??/2005	Michael B. Steinbach says that no one from military investigative groups has asked him questions about his experiences in Afghanistan. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1
03/??/2005	The current OSC in Afghanistan is (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and he has been in that position since about March 1. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) speaks to personnel in Afghanistan daily and spoke to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) twice the day of the interview. *	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Interview 1