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Case: FBI in Military Zones Created: 2/24/2009 12:16:23 PM

	where those techniques were used. Pasquale D'Amuro said he learned about this from	
	concluded that Federal Bureau of Investigation should not be involved in the interviews	
•	(b)(1) When Pasquale D'Anturo learned about this, he	-1
	(b)(1)	•
34:15 - 35:00, 50:25-35	techniques (O/(1)	
at 23:50 - 30:28, 33:50,	Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense wanted to employ certain interview	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1	Pasquale D'Amuro said it came to light that when certain HVT were captured, the Central	ТоВе
	document did not include anything about detainee interviews, just documentary intell. *	
	Investigation's deployment to Afghanistan to military zones. Pasquale D'Amoro thinks this	
at 16:00 -17:55	the Pederal Bureau of Investigation and military related to the Federal Bureau of	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview	Pasquate D'Amuro said Rollice handled any formal agreement or communication between	ТоВе
	Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation jointly participated. *	
	investigation. This was the document exploitation group military, Central Intelligence	
	homes that had been vacated during attacks to obtain intelligence re. Al Qaeda and 9/11	
at 14:30	agents to Afghanistan attached to military components conducting searches of caves and	Determined
Pat D'Aniuro Interview I	Pasquale D'Amuro said the initial plan was to deploy Federal Bureau of Investigation	ТоВе
at 8:40	Also reported to to Dale Watson (EAD for CT/CI) and Tim Caruso (DEAD for CT/CI).	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview	Pasquale D'Anniro said as Chief Inspector he had direct access to Robert S. Mueller, III.	To Be
	Afghanistan deployment.	
at 7:50 - 8:30	threat briefings to Robert S. Mueller, III and John Ashcroft. It then included the	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1	As part of being the Inspector in charge of the 9/11 attacks, Pasquale D'Amuro gave daily	ToBe
Saurce(j)	Date & Section 1 Control of the Cont	Date &

discussions (b)(1) subjects for many years, for example, agents who had investigated KSM and Abu Zayn discussed at this meeting, at which Michael Chertoff and (b)(6) were present, and that he used against US special forces in training and - except for this last techniques cloth off and then start all over again. Pasquale D'Amuro was told these techniques were cloth over a detainer's face and dripping water so the detainer could not breath, took the it was ever used, Department of Justice hadn't yet decided whether to approve - i.e., using noise, constant light, and another techniques that was discussed - but he does not know if techniques, but does recall techniques included sleep deprivation, white noise, constant opinion from John Ashcroft whether these techniques could legally be used - DNR all more comfortable saying it was the Central Intelligence Agency) had requested a legal Pasquale D'Amuro learned that the agency and or the military (later he clarified he felt recalled having a discussion with Robert S. Mueller, III, and then he went over to meet with Michael Chertoff, Alice Fisher, and maybe (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in Michael Chertoff's office when he heard the agency and Department of Defense wanted to use these techniques, he individuals because Federal Bureau of Investigation had agents who had investigated these he would guess Department of Justice may not have authorized waterboarding as a he was the AD - [which means from 1/02 to 11/02.]. He also said that, if he HAD to say, could not give an exact date for the meeting but to the best of his recollection it was while needed. He thinks his exact words to Robert S. Mueller, III were "we don't do that." He previously. /He said "we" didn't believe these techniques would provide the intell we numerous people in Al Quida to cooperate in the E. Africa bombing investigations and Abidin Muhammed Hussein abu Zubaida for years, and had been successful in flipping Federal Bureau of Investigation not get involved in interviews where these techniques were Robert S. Mueller, III -- probably later same day -- and he told him he recommended the technique to be used.)) Once he heard what was being done to detainees, he spoke to (waterboarding) -- Department of Justice had decided could be done legally. (Later in the said he told Mueller that, someday there will be a lot of people sitting at green felt tables being used. Federal Bureau of Investigation would love to get access to these these nterview Pasquale D'Amuro specifically stated that some of the particular techniques were He said that,

	coming up with every HVT that they obtained, the issue again would arise, who is going	
at 35:40-37:55	_	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1	_	To Be
	because everyone thought the people would ask for attorneys and not talk to us anyway. We also thought there would be a taint problem even if we got access after the techniques were done outside of our presence, so that would not work either.	
	techniques were going to be used, we would not participate. He said he suggested giving Federal Bureau of Investigation access before the techniques would be used, but we lost	
	Mueller, III and Tenet trying to discuss how Federal Bureau of Investigation could	•
	continued through the picking up of the HVTs like Zayn Abidin Muhammed Hussein abu Zubaida and KSM. Pasmule D'Amuro said be recalled having a meeting with Robert S.	·
	saying we really would like the opportunity to have agents with the knowledge and background about the HVTs to get involved with those interviews. Those convergations	
	Department of Justice. He said he was being kind of "boastful" or "voiceful" (???) in	
	sat in those briefings. He also briefed the White House at times. So there were	
	others from Department of Justice were coming over for briefings, and I either provided or	
	a few other conversations. He did not know all the techniques that may be were being	
at 30:35 - 33:20.	also	Determined
Pat D'Amuro Interview J	uly one the particular meeting in Michael Chertoff's office re.	ТоВе
	the Director agreed with me.	
	circulate. He said he took some criticism from agents who wanted very much to	
	would come out and this gives al queda the opinion of the US it wants to be able to	•
٠	position. Pasquale D'Amuro said he also thought this was wrong. He fully anticipated this	
	interviews, but they also may be called upon to testify and we cannot have them in that	
	that type of activity." Yes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has arents who do intell	

at 44:50 - 46:30	(b)(1) whose name he can't recall, after a white house briefing,	Determined
Pat D'Anuro Interview i	usie D'Ainuro recalls one other conversation with George Tenet and another (b)(1)	To Be
Pat D'Amuro Interview 1 at 39:00 - 44:20	Pasquale D'Amuro said that there were several reasons for his argument against Federal Bureau of Investigation involvement in the interviews. One problem with Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in these techniques was giglio — if these agents were called to testify later in their careers, would they be asked about whether they ever had participated in the use of coercive techniques? A second problem was moral — Pasquale D'Amuro thought these techniques were wrong. Another problem was, despite the claim that these interviews were for intell rather than for criminal prosecution, at the end of the day, what was the USG going to do with these HVDs? Prosecution, even in the military tribunal context, would require some standard of evidence. He said the use of these techniques was not necessary: in the investigations into prior terrorist acts — East Africa bombings, first WTC, USS Cole — the Federal Burcau of Investigation had successfully obtained information through cooperation by those who eventually flipped without the use of these techniques. And Pasquale D'Amuro said the techniques were not going to be effective. He said the individuals came from parts of the world where much worse was done to them than these interview techniques. And they expected the US to use these harsh techniques. What they did NOT expect was to treat them as human beings, and then, when you know your subject matter and catch them in lies, when you vet out the information, you can eventually get them to tell them the truth. If you use the special techniques long enough, people will start telling you things just to get you to stop doing the technique to them — we wanted accurate info.	To Be Determined
	to conduct the interview and what techniques were going to be utilized." Pasquale D'Annuro said he recalled a conversation with Larry Thompson while riding back from the White House, where Pasquale D'Annuro and Larry Thompson had attended a deputies' meeting, during which Pasquale D'Annuro again was making the case for the value of having Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewers who had been investigating these people for years involved, and he said the impression he got from what Larry Thompson was saying was that problems already were arising from the use of these special techniques.	•

To Be Pasquale Determined these tecl reiteratec technique	ined	To Be Pasquate Determined Fisher an was to di interview be able to participal Bureau o several y who was Muhamn could ne before th Investiga was raise	
Pasquale D'Amuro said there came a time when he heard that agents were noticing some of these techniques at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; when that happened we reiterated our instructions that agents are not to participate in any part of of these types of techniques. (b)(1),(b)(5)(b) later told him that an individual in U.S. Naval Base Chantanamo Bay. Cuba had been subjected to bright lights poise sleen deprivation but	Pasquale D'Amuro said the way he took the meeting in Chertoff's office was that Department of Justice was "very familiar" with what techniques were going to be utilized, but there was not a discussion of all the techniques — they didn't focus on that particular issue. He said that he thought Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher probably did know more about the techniques, but he said he didn't know what their knowledge was.	Pasquate D'Amuro said that the purpose of the meeting in Chertoff's office, at which Alice Fisher and Chertoff and he were present, was not to discuss the techniques; the purpose was to discuss how the Federal Bureau of Investigation could get involved in the interviews of some of the HVTs, because "we" felt so strongly that is would add value to be able to obtain info because we knew the subjects so well. So we discussed, how can we participate in interviews when these techniques are being used. As examples of Federal Bureau of Investigation "value added," Mike (sp?) Frank Peligrino had worked KSM for several years, he knew more about him than anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency who was going to interview him ((b)(1),(b)(6)(b) had a lot of knowledge about Zayn Abidin Muhammed Hussein abu Zubaida. But, because the info obtained from these techniques could never be used in court, and because we were not going to be given access first, before these techniques were used, the decision was always, no, Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot participate. It wasn't a single decision but an ongoing decision that was raised repeatedly when new HVTs were captured, shvays with the same result.	we were discussing the interviews with HVTs and this (b)(1) agent, where we we could be interviews with HVTs and how we could possibly work something out where we could have access to the detainees before the special techniques would take place. Pasquale D'Annuro says they had the discussion, but nothing ever changed. Once it was decided that the techniques were going to be utilized, we had difficulty going back in to conduct interviews. Pasquale D'Annuro says Tenet was possibly considering how this could be done, but it was never worked out.
cing some of ned we see types of	be utilized, particular know more	which Alice e purpose the the bow can we of Federal d KSM for Agency Agency Zayn Abidin techniques is first, ou of cision that esuft.	agent, where york something york something es would take anged. Once it going back in ging how this
Pat D'Amuro Interview I at 58:05 - 1:00:25	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1 at 55:05 - 55:54	Pat D'Amuro Interview I at \$0:40 ~ 54:46	

	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) turned the situation around, got the detainee to be given a prayer rug, etc.,	
	and got him to flip, to cooperate, Pasquale D'Amuro thinks he was a body guard for UBL.	
	and now the military decided to prosecute this detainee. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) obtained four	
	voluntary confessions from detainees, all of whom the military now wants to prosecute in	
	military courts. *	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said he is unaware of any of these techniques being used in Afghanistan	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	in interviews in which Federal Bureau of Investigation was participating. * (CPI) Note:	at 1:01:50
	What Techniques?)	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said, in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuha, when a detainee was	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	ID'd as potentially having a lot of knowledge of CT issues or intell about UBL, that usually	at 1:03-1:04:05
	when we sent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C or someone with more specialized knowledge. He said one of]
	the generals (Michael E. Dunleavy) who ran U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	
	asked it (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could stay down there for one year, and we said no we can't do that	
	*	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro DNR Behavioral Analysis Unit agents communicating concerns about	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	techniques actually or planned to be used on detainees in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo	at 1:07:55 - 1:09"05
	Bay, Cuba, but does recall reiterating the "do not participate in those interviews "policy,	
	that Andrew G. Arena and others would have reiterated that policy, in response to agents	
	asking to be allowed to participate in those interviews. The response was, no, there are	
	reasons we are not going to be participating in those interviews.	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said the interrogation of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was one that	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have mentioned to him, but DNR any specifics.	at 1:09:19
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said he DNR conversations with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman about	Pat D'Amuro Interview I
Determined	interview techniques at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	at 1:09:45
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said he DNR Larry A. Mefford advising him that Behavioral Analysis	Pat D'Amuro Interview I
Determined	Unit agents were concerned about interrogation techniques they were aware of at U.S.	at 1:11:05 - 1:11:50
	Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba but that Larry A. Mefford "regularly" went around	
	him and brought info directly to Bruce J. Gebhardt or Robert S. Mueller, III.	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro says he may have had a discussion with Andrew G. Arena in May or	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	June of 2003 about putting out written guidance that agents were not to participate in any	at 1:13:53 - 1:14:35

	activity "like that" and agents should be so informed, but DNR if Andrew G. Arena put something like that out	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said he has heard, after the fact, that there may have been memos by	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	agents raising issues about possible witnessing criminal acts and what should they do, but	at 1:15:00 - 16:20
	he was totally unaware of that at the time this may have been something Larry A.	
	Mefford failed to bring to his attention.	
То Ве	When asked if he was aware whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Department of	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	Justice ever tried to raise the issue of efficacy to the White House or other part of the	at 1:17:21 - 1:21:44
	Executive Branch to try to "overrule" the agency's approach or the military's approach, to	
	try to get the use of these ineffective interrogation techniques out of the picture, Pasquale	
	D'Amuro said he thought the Administration and White House was well aware of this, but	
	he has no specific evidence to support that. He may have had a conversation with Robert	
	S. Mueller, III in which Mueller said "we're going to lose that battle" regarding the	
	techniques and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's desire to conduct those interviews.	
	Pasquale D'Amuro said something sticks in his mind that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) from the	
	White House, was involved in working with John Ashcroft and Department of Justice on	
	the issue of the techniques and was aware of what was taking place	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro recalls a conversation with Valerie E. Caproni, perhaps in early Spring	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	of 04, when she asked me some questions that's where I remember first hearing about	at 1:22:18
	some documentation by agents questioning some of what was being done.	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro says that Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher made it clear that the	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	Central Intelligence Agency had asked Department of Justice for a legal opinion about the	at 1:23:25 - 1:24:06
·	use of these techniques.	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that at the meeting with Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher, he was	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	very vocal in trying to get the Federal Bureau of Investigation involved in those interviews,	at 1:24:50
	and he thought it was important to raise all the issues relevant to that.	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that, what kept coming back (from the military? (PD) was that, if	Pat D'Amuro Interview I
Determined	the Federal Bureau of Investigation did it these HVT interviews, the detainees would just	at 1:27:45
	lawyer up and not talk, so "we going to do it our way."	
		Pat D'Amuro Interview 1

. [Determined	Federal Bureau of Investigation was going to try to participate in the interview of (b)(6),(b)(7)	at 1:30:23 - 1:32:15
		(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) at the beginning. Pasquale D'Amuro said this	<u> </u>
		was one where they were trying to make it work. Pasquale D'Amuro said (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	
1		and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were the two agents deployed. They "hooked up" with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	ĺ
ļ		(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) The (b)(1) personnel who was	
		going to participate in the interview, for some reason, was not on the plane with (b)(6),(b)(7)(
		(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) he later	
		arrived to the location where they went (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) took care of	
		(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (cleaned his wound, cleaned him up after	
		he had defecated on himself, helped to feed him), and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	
		(b)(6),(b)(7) started to talk with them about things, started to provide some intelligence.	_
		which $(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)$ documented through agency channels. Once the $(b)(1)$	
		(b)(1) arrived on scene, the decision was made to use the techniques, and we kept saying:	
		"Wait a minute. He's talking to us already. He's already got a relationship that is starting	
		to build with $(b)(6),(b)(7)$ and $(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)$ Let us continue to talk to him." And the	
		answer was "no. we are going to start with the techniques." Pasquale D'Amuro said that,	
		once the (b)(1) made this decision to use these techniques and start	
		that kind of interview with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) he instructed —	
		through the section — that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) should "come home do not	
		participate in the interviews." *	
(1.)(0)(1.)(7)(0)	To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that, shortly after the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Determined	interview involving (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) described above, he told	at 1:32:20 - 1:33:45
		Robert S. Mueller, III that "we should sit down with them and try to resolve this," and that	
		led to the meeting with Tenet and the (b)(1) agent at the White	
		House described above. Pasquale D'Amuro thinks this meeting took place in 2002.	
	ТоВе	Pasquale D'Amuro says that another consequence of these techniques is that it makes it all	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
	Determined	the more difficult to develop sources and cooperators when people hear this type of	at 1:35:06
		activity is on-going, in his opinion, it makes the job more difficult.	7.714
	To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that agents should never have even been put in the position to	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
	Determined	observe these techniques, because we made it very clear they are to avoid those types of activities. *	at 1:36:29
			·

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To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that, at the time, he was asking, "what is the end game? Are they	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	going to be prosecuted by the military, by the federal courts?" Pasquale D'Amuro said the	at 1:44:10 - 1:46:20
	answers "were not there." So, in another discussion with Robert S. Mueller, III or with	
	Department of Justice officials, possibly (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Pasquale D'Amuro said, let's not go	
	down the road where we eliminate tools in our arsenal." [I.e., by using techniques that	
	would make evidence inadmissible.]	
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro said that, right after 9/11, the role of Department of Justice was	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
Determined	"minimized." Prosecution and law enforcement took a "way back seat."	at 1:46:25 - 1:47:05
To Be	Pasquale D'Amuro says the Federal Bureau of Investigation has long been involved in	Pat D'Amuro Interview I
Determined	terrorist prevention, not just after the fact enforcement, especially the NY office he	at 1:48:30 - 1:50:45
	pointed to the Blind Sheik and the prevention of the potential bombing of the UN, the	
	Lincoln Tunnel, and the Federal Building, and the Ramsey Yousey and the prevention of	
	the hombing of 11 jumbo jet airliners over the Pacific ocean. He said the E. Africa	
	prosecutions was put on for the world to see, and it was done properly, legally, and above	
	board, and the world saw these people killed not only Americans but innocent Muslims	
	and that is the way we should be going forward. The rest of the world looks at us, and	
	using these techniques comes back to hurt us b/c when detainees get out, they are going to	
	use it to generate additional terrorist attacks.	
10/??/2001	Pasquale D'Amuro was in a briefing, mid to late Oct. 2001, where they learned hostilities	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
	were commencing in Afgh, and he said he suggested to Robert S. Mueller, III that Federal	at 10:30-13:45
	Bureau of Investigation should have agents ready to deploy to collect intelligence. He said	
	he knew significant intell would be collected including documents and material being	
	collected, some terrorist subjects would be there, maybe would be killed so Federal Bureau	
	of Investigation should know that. He said he recommended to Robert S. Mueller, III to to	
	coordinate with the military to get agents deployed. He said Robert S. Mueller, III thought	
	it was a good idea. Mike Rollince, who was section chief for international terrorism, and	
	Dale Watson, who was AD for CT, were tasked with following up with that. It was a	
	month or so later, or maybe a few months later, when the first Federal Bureau of	
Thu	Investigation people were actually going in to Afghanistan. *know Pasquale D'Amuro said he left the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 3/31/05. At the time	Pat D'Amuro Interview 1
03/31/2005	he was AD in charge of the NY Field Office. He had been in that position since 8/3/03.	at 3:42 7:25
03:31/2003	ine was 120 in charge of the 141 fred Office. The had been in that position since 6/3/03.	at 3.74 1.43

 Prior to that he was EAD CT/Cl, which he held since Nov. 02. Prior to that he was AD for	
CT since Jan or Feb of 02. Prior to that, I was in the NY Field office when, in Oct 2001	
when I was asked to come to DC as Inspector in Charge of the 9/11 investigation.	