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Counterterrorism Division
OPORD 1015

Originator: SSA [redacted] HRT/Operational Support Squad SSA/CIRG
Drafted by: SSA [redacted] HRT [redacted]

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Administrative: This OPOED supports the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) plan for integration of FBI assets with Department of Defense (DoD) and [redacted] in Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct exploitation of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) personnel, documents and electronic media.

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Note: This document sets forth the conceptual detail to enable FBI personnel to exploit IIS sites and personnel. This document, its annexes, and contents are not approved for outside dissemination or reproduction without the approval of the originator, and should be afforded suitable protection. Operational details outlined in this plan should not be discussed outside of controlled environments.

Draft until signed by the approving official.

Date prepared: 01/28/2003.


- Annexes:
- Annex A - Admin
 - Annex B - Medical
 - Annex C - WMD/HAZMAT
 - Annex D - Logistics
 - Annex E - Document Exploitation/Evidence
 - Annex F - Communications
 - Annex G - Document Exploitation Command Post Operations


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SC Frahm, CTD	UC [redacted] RDLU
SC Arena, CTD	[redacted] HSPU

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Approval Official:


Robert S. Mueller, III
Director, FBI


Date

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FBI CTD OPORD 1015
01/28/2003

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I. MISSION AND FBI DIRECTOR'S INTENT.

A. Mission: The FBI will deploy a task-organized exploitation unit to fully exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) sites and personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in the United States, or operations against U.S. personnel or interests outside the Iraq theater of operations (ITO), and to gather intelligence related to other matters of U.S. national security.

B. FBI Director's Intent:

1. Exploit to the greatest extent possible, all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) sites; especially *IIS Headquarters, Department 4/4s, (the Americas and Japan Department)* to obtain the following information:

- a. Source files and documents.
- b. Access to personnel with knowledge of and access to these files/information.
- c. Identification of IIS Intelligence Officers (IOs) that have served in the United States since 1990.
- d. Identification of sources/agents operated by IIS in the United States.
- e. Identification of co-optees, saboteurs, surrogates, and terrorists operating within the United States.

2. Provide document exploitation (DOCEX) support to deployed military units and other government agencies (OGAs) in furtherance of the FBI's counterintelligence (CI) and counterterrorism (CT) missions.

II. SITUATION.

A. Synopsis/Threat Assessment.

(Drafter's Note): The FBI has requested that on or before 02/15/2003, USCENTCOM J-2 provide a current threat assessment and situation report regarding enemy/friendly forces to the FBI for inclusion in this OPORD. The FBI POC for this information is SSA [redacted]

[redacted] P: [redacted] JWICS [redacted] The information requested is, but not limited to:

1. Weather and Light Data
2. Terrain

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3. Location of sites identified for exploitation
4. Threat Level and Activity
5. Strength
6. Probable Courses of Action

B. Friendly Assets.

1. Mission of Next Higher Unit:

a. **DoD Intelligence Exploitation Base - South (IEB-S).** On order of the USCENTCOM J2X, the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other DoD units and assets with Defense Humint Services (DHS) augmentation, will deploy to the ITO to establish the IEB-S in southern Iraq. The J2X will manage, coordinate, and deconflict Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations in support of the Combatant Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and other identified requirements throughout the ITO. The J2X provides intelligence support to USCENTCOM and its subordinate commands through the management, coordination and deconfliction of national and service CI/HUMINT assets, to include exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), displaced persons (DPs), captured documents and equipment from sensitive sites. Exploitation of documents and equipment will occur primarily in the Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC) and Joint Media Exploitation Center (JMEC).

Composition of IEB-S, when fully manned, will be approximately 350 personnel. Of this number, a significant amount will be dedicated to force protection and logistical support of the U.S. military and personnel from other government agencies (OGAs) involved in exploitation efforts:

b. **FBIHQ-Counterterrorism Division (CTD).** Will designate points of contact (POCs), both Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) and Intelligence Operations Specialists (IOSs), to whom deployed FBI personnel will transmit intelligence collected by other agencies and investigation conducted in ITO. CTD will assist supporting units (including CIRG, RDLU, HMRU, CRU) in obtaining necessary funding to support the mission. CTD will also provide administrative support for FBI personnel deployed within the ITO.

c. **FBI Liaison (LNO) to Joint Forces Special Operations**

(S) Component Command (JFSOCC) and to [redacted] Five FBI personnel
(S) will [redacted] from the Iraqi
Operations Group (IOG) on a secure U.S. military compound. The duties of the FBI

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(S) LNO will be to serve as the FBI command and control (C2) entity and to coordinate with the major staff components of JFSOCC and [redacted] Additionally, the LNO will act as a conduit for information between FBIHQ - SIOC, DoD, OGA, and deployed FBI personnel throughout the ITO. All information directed into or out of the ITO will flow through the LNO. The LNO will also facilitate requests for information (RFIs) originating from JFSOCC, CENTCOM, and [redacted] to the FBI. b1

(S) d. FBI Mutla, Document Seizure Team (DST). A team of seven, consisting of six CIRG personnel (1 SSA/5 SAs) and one SA Arab linguist, will forward deploy to co-locate with [redacted] and DoD Special Operations Forces (SOF) at a forward operating base (FOB) in Mutla, Kuwait. The DST will be responsible for the collection of intelligence materials from IISHQ as stated above in Section I. b1

e. FBI Mutla/DOCEX. Ten FBI personnel with expertise in document exploitation (DOCEX) and long-range communications will be located in Kuwait. They will perform rapid triage and processing of the intelligence information seized from IISHQ by the FBI DST element for rapid electronic transmission to FBIHQ for analysis and dissemination.

f. FBI Hydra/DOCEX. A team of four, consisting of two DOCEX (one agent and one IOS), one Electronics Technicians (ET) and one Technically Trained Agent (TTA) SSA from the Crisis Response Unit (CRU), will establish and maintain a T-1 communications link with FBIHQ. This link will be used by DOCEX personnel for transmission of intelligence in the event that seized documents are initially examined at Hydra Base, Jordan.

g. Intelligence Exploitation Base - South (IEB-S). IEB-S will be staffed following the completion of the Mutla DOCEX mission. Eight DOCEX personnel from the Mutla operation will transfer to IEB-S. This team will support and assist the military and OGA forces at IEB-S with the processing of collected materials. Items meeting the criteria of the FBI's triage list will be processed as evidence and electronic versions will be transmitted to LNO via CRU's secure T-1 communications link for dissemination to FBIHQ. With specific FBIHQ approval, these team members will move forward with the IEB-S into southern Iraq approximately sixty days after the initiation of operations.

h. Joint Interrogation Facility-North (JIF-N). The military has offered to provide between three and five billets for FBI personnel within JIF-N, which will initially stand up in southeastern Turkey. The FBI will deploy a minimum-sized team of three agents (one DOCEX team leader, one CART SA; one CRU SA.) to further assess viability in the JIF-N. This team will support and assist military and OGA forces at JIF-N

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with the interviewing of enemy prisoners of war (EPW's) and the processing of collected intelligence materials. Items meeting the criteria of the FBI's triage list or of intelligence value will be processed as evidence and electronic versions will be transmitted to LNO for dissemination to FBIHQ.

III. EXECUTION.

- (S) A. Concept of the Operation. The FBI will deploy several elements to FOBs to accomplish the mission, among them the Mutla DST and DOCEX teams, which will co-locate with [redacted] and DoD SOF personnel at FOB Mutla, Kuwait. The Hydra DOCEX team (Jordan) will deploy to and operate from FOB Hydra Base. C2 will be provided by the LNO element in Qatar. Designated personnel from Mutla DOCEX will transition to duties in the IEB-S once DOCEX support is no longer needed to support the DST. The Mutla DOCEX element will coordinate with [redacted] and be in position to conduct triage, scanning, and processing of seized documents and electronic media captured by the DST. The seized information will be relayed by Mutla DOCEX to FBIHQ via a T-1 secure communications link. Hydra DOCEX will have a T-1 secure communications link established with FBIHQ for transmission of data in the event that seized documents are transported to Hydra Base instead of Mutla Base. FBI personnel from DOCEX and CRU will be co-located with [redacted] personnel in Hydra Base and are responsible for establishing and maintaining a T-1 link with FBIHQ. If it becomes apparent that seized documents will be transported to Hydra Base instead of Mutla Base the DOCEX team from FOB Mutla will be transported to Hydra Base [redacted] between Kuwait and Jordan.

The FBI personnel will be in the ITO to support Sensitive Site Exploitations (SSEs) once U.S. ground combat forces have moved into/through Iraq. FBI exploitation teams will not conduct SSEs prior to deployment of U.S. ground combat forces into Iraq. All FBI personnel will deploy to the FOBs prior to ground combat in Iraq. FBI personnel will not conduct SSEs without specific FBIHQ approval.

- (S) The DST will be prepared to deploy along with DoD [redacted] elements from the FOBs to facilitate the timely exploitation of documents and electronic media. These areas will be physically secured by tactical elements prior to introduction of FBI exploitation teams. The FBI and [redacted] will coordinate closely with DoD regarding force protection issues.

- (S) The LNO will interface with DoD and [redacted] counterparts and assist in the overall coordination and support of FBI personnel deployed within the ITO. Additionally, they will provide FBIHQ (ITF - SIOC, JFSOCC LNO, etc.) with daily situation reports (SITREPS) on matters of importance to the FBI's mission.

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(S) Based on the dynamic situation following the commencement of operations, FBIHQ will reevaluate the FBI assets needed within the ITO to assist with the processing of information resulting from the [] and DoD SSEs. FBIHQ will determine if FBI assets should continue to operate in conjunction with the CIA and the IEB-S or if some/all FBI assets should be redeployed elsewhere within the ITO or redeployed to the United States. If FBIHQ decides to reduce the size of its forward deployed personnel, RDLU logistics personnel will coordinate redeployment issues. b1

This OPORD will be executed in five phases:

Phase I: Pre-Deployment Preparation.

All FBI personnel selected for the initial deployment have been identified. These personnel have provided the following information.

1. Passport data (Passport number and type [diplomatic or official], place/date of issue, date of expiration).
2. Office of assignment/Division with contact numbers to include all work (switchboard, direct, pager, cell) and home numbers.
3. Blood Type.
4. Investigative expertise/specialties (e.g., IT, DT, SWAT, BMT, Paramedic, ERT, Hazmat trained [specify level obtained through FBI e.g., Hazmat Technician, Hazmat Operations, etc.], CART trained, etc.).
5. D/POB.
6. SSN.
7. Next of kin and contact information for same.
8. Type of weapon (pistol) to be carried (make/model and serial #).
9. Copy of most recent shot records.
10. Medical history to include any existing medical conditions requiring treatment with prescription drugs (identify medications).
11. Identification of any current or recurring physical problems that may prevent person's ability to perform investigative duties in an austere environment.
12. If corrective lenses are worn, details concerning the prescription and assurance that person has a minimum of two pair of eyeglasses with current prescription.
13. Prior military experience or other specialized skills not captured above.

All personnel deploying overseas will attend pre-deployment training at the FBI Academy. During this training, personnel will confirm the status of their official passports and visas (Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates) and will be issued clothing/equipment (ANNEX D Logistics). Medical screening will be provided, to include providing necessary immunizations at designated FBI medical facilities (FBIHQ Health Services)

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(S) and FBI Academy), and [redacted] The training to be conducted will include Weapons of Mass Destruction/Hazardous Materials (WMD/HAZMAT) training, improvised explosive device (IED) recognition, firearms qualifications (handgun) and firearms familiarization with the M-4/M-16 carbine. b1

Phase II: Deployment to FOB.

(S) On 01/23/2003, three members of the DST deployed with operational equipment to Kuwait via a [redacted]. This advance party is charged with establishing liaison and conducting detailed planning with [redacted] counterparts. The deployment date of other FBI personnel will be determined based on operational requirements but must occur in conjunction with DIA assets. This is expected to occur on or about 02/15/2003. b1

Phase III: Forward Deployment of DST, JIF-N, IEB-S Personnel from FOB.

(S) FBI personnel assigned to the DST, JIF-N, and the IEB-S will remain co-located with their supporting elements in the FOBs until authorization has been given by [redacted] and DoD elements to move into Iraq. FBI personnel with the DST and IEB-S will ensure that specific FBIHQ authorization has been granted prior to their movement into Iraq. The FBI LNO element in Qatar will coordinate. b1

Phase IV: Conduct Sustained Operations.

FBI personnel will work within their assigned teams under the direct supervision and control of the designated team leader identified by FBIHQ prior to their deployment. Each FBI team will generate a daily standardized SITREP for dissemination to the LNO in Qatar (ANNEX G Document Exploitation Command Post Operations). The LNO in Qatar will collate and disseminate the SITREPs to the following: HRT Operational Support Squad (SSA [redacted]), the Communications Analysis Section (SC [redacted]), SIOC (Iraq Task Force) and Middle Eastern Unit (MEU). Requests for additional support such as resupply, procurement of equipment, investigative materials, etc. shall be coordinated through the LNO in Qatar. Initial TDY personnel will be deployed in 60-90 day rotations, with follow-on tours lasting 45 days. b6 b7C

Phase V: Redeployment and refit. TBD

C. Subunit/Individual Tasks.

1. Document Seizure Team (DST) (SSA [redacted] SAs [redacted]) b6 b7C

a. SSA [redacted] is designated as the DST Team Leader.

b. SA [redacted] is designated DST Assistant Team Leader.

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(S) c. [redacted] for deployment of three person advance [redacted] to Mutla Base on 01/23/2003.

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d. Coordinate with RDLU for preparation of pallets for shipment with advance element.

e. On 01/22/2003, Finance Division provided SSA [redacted] with \$150,000.00 to purchase operational vehicles in Kuwait.

(S) f. DST personnel will abide by all [redacted] policies, including those dealing with administrative, security and weapons issues.

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(S) g. Conduct detailed mission planning/rehearsals with [redacted] and DoD counterparts when established at Mutla Base and forward these plans directly to FBIHQ for approval. Utilize LNO at Qatar when established.

h. Maintain daily secure communication with HRT and FBIHQ. Utilize LNO at Qatar when established.

(S) i. On order by FBIHQ, the DST will move from Mutla Base to Baghdad in concert with [redacted] and DoD SOF to seize documents in Department 4/4S Americas and Japan Department, IISHQ.

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(S) j. Be prepared to assist [redacted] DoD in other matters of national security in which the FBI has an investigative or intelligence interest.

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2. DOCEX Mutla:

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a. SA [redacted] is designated Mutla DOCEX Team Leader.

- Brief all personnel regarding the mission and priorities of work.

(S) - Coordinate closely with Team Leader of DST and [redacted]

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- Coordinate triage, scanning, and exploitation of documents and electronic media.

- On order by FBIHQ, relocate from Mutla Base to Camp Doha, Kuwait to assume DOCEX responsibilities at IEB-S.

Team members B - H will relocate from Mutla Base to Camp Doha, Kuwait to assume DOCEX responsibilities at IEB-S along with SA [redacted]

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b. SA [redacted] DOCEX - Assist in the overall triage, scanning and exploitation of documents and electronic media as directed by SA [redacted]

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c. IRS [redacted] DOCEX - Assist in the overall triage, scanning and exploitation of documents and electronic media as directed by SA [redacted]

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d. Language Specialist [redacted] DOCEX - Will assume all translation tasks as assigned by DOCEX Team Leader.

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(S) e. SSA [redacted] CRU - will [redacted] DoD communications personnel in order to establish and maintain a T-1 link back to FBIHQ.

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- Coordinate with SA [redacted] (DOCEX Team Leader) and CART personnel regarding communications requirements to support DOCEX mission.

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f. SSA [redacted] - Same as SSA [redacted]

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g. SA [] CART - Assist in the exploitation of all electronic media captured by the DST. Coordinate all efforts through DOCEX TL []
- Coordinate with SSA [] IEB-S, regarding communications requirements and equipment.

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h. SA [] CART - Same as SA []
Team members I and J will return to the United States upon completion of the DOCEX Mutla mission.

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i. IRS [] Assist in the overall triage, scanning and exploitation of documents and electronic media as directed by SA []

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j. CS [] - Same as IRS []

3. DOCEX Hydra (Jordan):

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a. SA [] DOCEX, is designated Hydra DOCEX Team Leader.
- Sign for "pool weapons" for issue as needed.

(S)

- Brief all personnel regarding the mission and priorities of work.
- Coordinate closely with Team Leader of DST and []
- On order by FBIHQ, relocate from Hydra to JIF-N to assume DOCEX responsibilities in JIF-N.

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b. IOS [] DOCEX, will complete duties assigned by SA []

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c. UC [] CRU

- With ET [] establish secure T-1 link to FBIHQ for transmission of documents and electronic media seized by DST.

(S)

- Coordinate with [] regarding work and living space at Hydra Base.
- Coordinate with [] for adequate work space to allow the addition of up to eight FBI CART/DOCEX personnel if required (will only occur if the seized documents are sent to Jordan instead of Kuwait).

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- Maintain daily secure communication with LNO Qatar and Mutla DOCEX.
- Coordinate movement of assets to JIF-N or IEB-S if presence at DOCEX Hydra is deemed unnecessary (if DST does not return materials to Hydra).

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d. ET [] - Assist UC [] with communications requirements identified above.

4. Intelligence Exploitation Base - South (IEB-S): FBI presence to be established following completion of DST mission.

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a. SA [] - Team Leader. Coordinate closely with DoD MI and DIA personnel.

- Maintain daily secure contact with FBI LNO in Qatar.
- Coordinate triage, scanning, and exploitation of documents and electronic media.

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b. SA [] DOCEX - Assist in the overall triage, scanning and exploitation of documents and electronic media as directed by SA []

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- c. IRS [redacted] DOCEX - same as above.
- d. SA [redacted] CART - Assist in the exploitation of all electronic media captured by U.S. Forces. Coordinate all efforts through IEB-S TL [redacted]
- e. SA [redacted] CART - Same as above.
- f. SSA [redacted] CRU - Coordinate with DoD communications personnel to establish and maintain T-1 link between IEB-S and FBIHQ.
 - Coordinate with SA [redacted] and CART personnel regarding communications requirements to support DOCEX/CART mission.
- g. ET [redacted] CRU - Same as above.
- h. LS [redacted] DOCEX - Assume all translation tasks as assigned by SA [redacted]

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5. Joint Interrogation Facility - North (JIF-N): FBI presence to be established if deemed appropriate. Staffing will consist of one DOCEX SA, one CART SA, and one CRU SSA.

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- a. SA [redacted] - Team Leader. Coordinate closely with DoD MI and DIA personnel.
 - Maintain daily secure contact with FBI LNO in Qatar.
 - Coordinate triage, scanning, and exploitation of documents and electronic media.

6. FBI Liaison (LNO) Element/Command and Control Qatar:

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a. SSA [redacted] - On-Scene Commander and primary interface with (S) [redacted] and JFSOCC planners. b1

- Primary responsibility is ensuring overall safety of mission.
- Ensure that secure communications are maintained with Mutla DOCEX, Hydra DOCEX, DST, IEB-S, JIF-N, and FBIHQ.

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b. SA [redacted] TFOS (assisting DOCEX)

- Assist in the overall dissemination of intelligence as directed by SSA Leadbetter. Handle administrative duties as assigned.

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c. IOS [redacted] DOCEX - Same as above.
d. ET [redacted] CRU - Establish and maintain secure communications with DOCEX Mutla, DOCEX Hydra, DST, IEB-S, JIF-N, and FBIHQ (telephone, GroupWise, FBINET, etc.).

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e. SSA [redacted] RDLU - Coordinate all logistical issues related to deployment.

7. Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit (RDLU):

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- a. UC [redacted] and SSA [redacted] Conduct coordination and initiate requisitions to acquire and issue the necessary equipment to FBI personnel deploying overseas in support of (ISO) OPORD 1015.

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(S) b. SSA [redacted] - Arrange for transportation of personnel and equipment into the ITO via DoD [redacted] commercial charter or Bureau air assets. Coordinate with Aviation Special Operations Section (ASOS) regarding capabilities for transportation of FBI personnel and/or equipment to staging areas in Kuwait and Jordan.

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c. SSA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] - Draw six M-4/M-16 type weapons and 20 9mm handguns for issue as necessary to deployed personnel. Weapons will be identified by serial number and signed over to SA [redacted] from the DOCEX Mutla contingent. Pistols will have holsters and magazine pouches.

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d. UC [redacted] or designated representative - Prepare logistics annex (ANNEX D - Logistics).

(S) 8. Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). Per CTD, conduct direct liaison and planning efforts with DoD and [redacted] until production and dissemination of an approved OPORD. Coordinate and task other FBI Divisions/Units providing support to OPORD 1015. HRT will coordinate with other FBI units regarding pre-deployment training to be conducted by FBI personnel.

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9. Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU). Develop and implement a curriculum of WMD training to be provided to deploying personnel. Coordinate closely with WMD personnel at HRT for assistance in development and implementation of this training curriculum. Identify Hazardous Material Officers (HMO) to be prepared to deploy into the ITO upon request of FBIHQ to support deployed FBI personnel if Hazardous Materials Officers/Safety Officers become necessary. Prepare WMD Annex (ANNEX C - WMD).

(S) 10. Crisis Response Unit (CRU). Conduct planning and coordination with CIRG, DoD, and [redacted] to determine requirements to establish and maintain robust communications connectivity from the DST, Mutla and Hydra DOCEX, IEB-S, JIF-N, and LNO Qatar. Coordinate with DoD for establishment of and access to a JWICS account by deployed FBI personnel. Prepare communications annex (ANNEX F - Communications).

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(S) 11. Health Programs Services Unit (HPSU). Coordinate directly with DoD and [redacted] regarding necessary immunizations and medications required for deploying FBI personnel and advise HRT and RDLU of necessary support requirements; assist institution of recommendations. Prepare Medical Annex (ANNEX B - Medical) for inclusion in final OPORD and provide to HRT.

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(S) [redacted] regarding immunizations for deploying FBI personnel, to include smallpox and anthrax.

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(S) D. Coordinating Instructions: All FBI personnel co-located with [redacted] elements in Kuwait or Jordan will abide by all relevant [redacted] policies including those dealing with administrative, security and weapons issues. b1

1. Deployment to FOBs:
 - a. DST - Three person advance departed 01/23/2003 for Mutla Base
 - b. DOCEX Mutla TBD
 - c. DOCEX Jordan TBD
 - d. FBI LNO Qatar TBD
 - e. IEB - S TBD
 - f. JIF-N TBD
2. Time of departure and return TBD
3. ICS Locations (JOC, TOC, SIOC, etc)
4. Methods of movement (See Annices)
5. Routes TBD
6. Rally Points/Holding Areas TBD
7. Rehearsals TBD
8. Inspections TBD
9. Debriefings TBD
10. Deadly Force Policy. FBI Deadly Force policy in effect.

POLICY TEXT

- A. Defense of Life - Agents may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the Agents have probable cause to believe that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the Agents or other persons.
- B. Fleeing Subject - Deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject if there is probable cause to believe: (1) the subject has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury or death, and (2) the subject's escape would pose an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the Agents or other persons.
- C. Verbal Warnings - If feasible, and if to do so would not increase the danger to the Agent or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the Agent shall be given prior to the use of deadly force.
- D. Warning Shots - No warning shots are to be fired by Agents.

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- E. Vehicles - Weapons may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. Weapons may be fired at the driver or other occupant of a moving motor vehicle only when the Agents have probable cause to believe that the subject poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the Agents or others, and the use of deadly force does not create a danger to the public that outweighs the likely benefits of its use.

DEFINITIONS

- A. Deadly Force - Force that is likely to cause death or serious physical injury.
- B. Necessity - In evaluating the necessity to use deadly force, two factors are relevant: 1) The presence of an *imminent danger* to the Agents or others; and 2) The *absence of safe alternatives* to the use of deadly force. Deadly force is never permissible under this policy when the sole purpose is to prevent the escape of a suspect.
1. *Imminent Danger* : "Imminent" does not mean "immediate" or "instantaneous", but that an action is pending. Thus, a subject may pose an imminent danger even if he is not at that very moment pointing a weapon at the Agent. For example, imminent danger may exist if Agents have probable cause to believe any of the following:
- a. The subject possesses a weapon, or is attempting to gain access to a weapon, under circumstances indicating an intention to use it against the Agents or others; or,
 - b. The subject is armed and running to gain the tactical advantage of cover; or,
 - c. A subject with the capability of inflicting death or serious physical injury—otherwise incapacitating Agents—without a deadly weapon, is demonstrating an intention to do so; or,
 - d. The subject is attempting to escape from the vicinity of a violent confrontation in which he inflicted or attempted the infliction of death or serious physical injury.
2. *Absence of a safe alternative* : Agents are not required to use or consider alternatives that increase danger to themselves or to others. If a safe alternative

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to the use of deadly force is likely to achieve the purpose of averting the imminent danger, deadly force is not necessary.

APPLICATION OF DEADLY FORCE

1. When the decision is made to use deadly force, Agents may continue its application until the subject surrenders or no longer poses an imminent danger.
2. When deadly force is permissible under this policy, attempts to shoot to cause minor injury are unrealistic and can prove dangerous to Agents and others because they are unlikely to achieve the intended purpose of bringing an imminent danger to a timely halt.
3. Even when deadly force is permissible, Agents should assess whether its use creates a danger to third parties that outweighs the likely benefits of its use.

END OF POLICY TEXT

11. Annexes.

- Annex A - Admin
- Annex B - Medical
- Annex C - Chem/Bio protection
- Annex D - Logistics
- Annex E - Document Exploitation/Evidence
- Annex F - Communications
- Annex G - Document Exploitation Command Post Operations

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

- A. Lodging and Rations. TR#, Per Diem for lodging and M&IE, (ANNEX A - Admin).
- B. Uniform/equipment common to all and special equipment. Uniform for all personnel will be civilian work clothes (i.e. cargo pants/t-shirts, etc., if deemed appropriate by the IEB SSA). Desert battle dress uniforms (DBDUs) may be worn as dictated for force protection issues, etc. All personnel will travel with their official or diplomatic passport, copy of DoD travel orders, metal identification tags with name/SSN/blood type (ANNEX A - Admin).
- C. Vehicle Support (ANNEX D - Logistics).
- D. Method of handling injured personnel (ANNEX B - Medical).
- E. Handling/Transfer of evidence. (ANNEX E - Evidence)
- F. Aircraft Support (ANNEX D - Logistics).
- G. WMD/HMRU Support (ANNEX C - WMD/HAZMAT).

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- H. Weapons. All SAs deploying to the IEBs may carry their Bureau approved pistol or gun vault-issued weapon when in ITO. These weapons will be transported on either FBI or DoD aircraft. If traveling with weapons on DoD aircraft, weapons and ammunition will be secured separate from the passengers and reissued upon arrival into Iraq. All weapons must be designated by make, model and serial number on the aircraft manifest.

V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

A. Signal

1. Frequencies and call signs (ANNEX F - Communications)
2. Within the unit
3. With higher headquarters and other units
4. Pyrotechnics and signals including hand/arm signals (ANNEX F - Communications)
5. Codewords and reports required (ANNEX F - Communications)

B. Command

1. Chain of Command and Location of Key Personnel - TBD

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