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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/28/2004

To: Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism

Operational Response Section

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(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) DARKENING CLOUDS;
MAJOR CASE 199;
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) To summarize the results of the 10/26/2004 debriefing of a previous Iraq Deployment On-Scene Commander (OSC) and two Deputy On-Scene Commanders and recommendations for future Iraq deployments.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) On 10/26/2004, Counterterrorism Division (CTD) held a Post-Deployment debriefing with one previous Iraq On-Scene Commander ASAC [redacted] (Jan 2004 - Jun 2004) and Deputy On-Scene Commanders (DOSC) SSA [redacted] (Jan 2004 - July 2004) and SSA [redacted] (July 2004 - October 2004). They provided feedback to representatives of numerous units and programs within the FBI with responsibility for various portions of the Iraq mission. In addition to the feedback, modifications to the rotation were recommended.

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~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

(U) ~~(S)~~ The CT Operational Response Section (CTORS), CTD, in conjunction with the CIRG Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit (RDLU), are responsible for the administrative, staffing and logistical matters concerning the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). The CTORS works jointly with and in support of International Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS) II which has oversight responsibility for all FBI counterterrorism operations in Iraq.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The current FBI mission priorities within the ITO remain fairly consistent and are as follows: 1) interviews of High Value Detainees (HVDs); 2) document exploitation (DocEx); 3) assisting the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi authorities with terrorist investigations, to include crime scene processing; and 4) support of specialized [REDACTED] to include Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSEs). The nature of the operation, however, has evolved during each rotation, to include the addition of the Terrorist Financing mission and the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO). FBI CTD intends to remain on the forefront of these changes in its planning for future FBI CTD deployments.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The following is a list of topics covered during the debriefing. Contained within is a summary of the information provided by the OSC/DOSCs related to the missions and operations in Iraq.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 1. Iraq Mission

Discussion: Mission guidance was not specific enough and did not evolve with the changing dynamics within the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO). The OSC/DOSCs felt that the Iraq mission needed to be revisited every 60-90 days to ensure that the command component within the ITO and FBIHQ were operating within the same framework. A clearly defined mission would give the OSC clear guidance in his/her day to day operations. This would dictate to the OSC how best to prioritize missions in country and allocate resources to those priorities. The FBI mission then needs to be shared, understood and de-conflicted with Senior level officials within the Department of Defense (DOD) and OGA. This revised mission statement would provide these entities with clear guidance on how and what missions the FBI will conduct in-country and what types of investigative/operational assistance the FBI would provide. This would ensure that DOD support is not just implied but

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

clearly spelled out. This would in turn facilitate needed support in logistical and operational areas.

Recommendations: ITOS II agreed to do a periodic review of the Iraq mission statement and mission specific goals and objectives every 60-90 days.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 2. Staffing Issues

Discussion: Investigative and Support personnel deploying to Iraq should be selected on the basis of experience, maturity and investigative background rather than just volunteering.

Recommendations: FBIHQ should make clear to SACs that such deployments are extremely important to CTD operations and that it is important that the best and most experienced Agents and support personnel are allowed to participate. It was suggested that the role of the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) be re-engineered and expanded to include an analytical and investigative component. Units from the Laboratory Division and the Technical Response Unit would be added to CIRG as well as in house linguistic support to facilitate constant and consistent ready deployment posture to any region of the world

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b7E

[REDACTED]. Inherent within this new organization would be unit cohesion and an in place command and control structure. Additionally, this would minimize the need to utilize field office resources on a recurring basis and affix accountability for operations overseas which fall outside the purview of Legat operations. This plan would also allow for the centralized control of CTD resources deployed worldwide.

(U) ~~(S)~~ 3. Logistics

Discussion: [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

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b2
b7E

Recommendations: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ 4. Hostage Rescue Team / Security Issues

Discussion: Security issues surfaced beginning with Rotation 2 and continued until January/February of 2004, with a substantial amount of progress after those dates. Critical shortfalls in the area of armored vehicles and military compatible communications and loosely defined mission parameters were identified as contributing factors in putting FBI personnel at greater risk in an already dangerous environment.

Recommendation: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7E

[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ 5. Communications

Discussion: [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

Recommendation: [REDACTED]

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b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ 6. Operational/Investigative Issues

Topic: Document Exploitation (DOCEX)

Discussion: The importance of the Document Exploitation (DOCEX) mission was reiterated and it was viewed as one of the most productive initiatives. There was a consensus that the DOCEX mission should involve more FBI resources to include linguists and CART personnel.

Recommendation: [REDACTED]

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b7E

Topic: Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO)

~~Discussion:~~ The RCLO has taken immense strides in its last two rotations and there are efforts currently underway in the U.S. to identify victims of abuse by Saddam Hussein's regime and memorialize their experiences by FBI agents. In Iraq, RCLO members are working closely with Iraqi prosecutors and making substantial progress in interviewing of subjects, victims and witnesses of Iraqi atrocities committed by the former regime. The BOC has offered work space to the RCLO until the Embassy is fully functional and continues to house and provide logistical and material support to the effort.

Recommendations: It is obvious to all parties that DOJ and the State Department are not abiding by the original agreements that created the RCLO. The FBI has not only taken the lead investigative role but has rolled this criminal matter into its CTD mission. Eventhough the material support and logistical assistance promised by DOJ and the State Department have been limited at best, its has been the individual initiative of the Agents on the ground in Iraq that has made this operation a success.

Topic: Terrorist Financing Operation Section (TFOS)

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

Discussion: TFOS is a critical element in any CTD operation and is especially true in the ITO where outside resources are directly funding terrorist operations. Currently the TFOS mission has been on standby in Iraq as all parties reevaluate where best TFOS personnel can fit in and be most productive. The military views the terrorist financing issue as a priority and is currently being worked on within the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).

Recommendations: ITOS II will coordinate with TFOS and develop a comprehensive investigative and staffing plan for the ITO.

Topic: Sensitive Site Exploitations (SSE)

Discussion: The consensus was that CTD should develop a formalized SSE Protocol. There were no issues with the existing SSE approval process nor were there any instances of the process delaying or hindering any SSE operations. There have been incidences where communication problems between outlying areas may have slowed the process but those issues have since been addressed.

Recommendations: The Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) has developed several initiatives to standardize the SSE approval process in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, MLDU has developed Standard Operating procedures for conducting SSEs and is training Tier 1 and 2 Special Operations Forces on SSE and evidence collection protocols.

Topic: FBIHQ Substantive Unit Support

Discussion: The communication flow between the BOC and FBIHQ has been described as excellent. There has never been a problem and constant dialogue happens on a daily basis. FBIHQ was very supportive of the day to day needs and issues of the BOC.

Recommendation: There should be a clear delineation in the roles and responsibilities of FBIHQ CTD units. Units should either have programmatic responsibilities or operational responsibilities not both. When units are placed in this situation of program management and running day to day operations there is no one addressing "bigger picture" issues to include policy issues that are never addressed.

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

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(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 10/28/2004

b2

(U) ~~(S)~~ 7. Final Recommendations

Discussion:

a. The FBI needs to take full advantage of relationships established with DOD Special Mission Units, particularly the Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC). This unit is at the forefront on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and is not bogged down in the attrition of indigenous insurgents and former regime elements. Embedding in this type of organization maximizes our likelihood of FBI contact with detainees who may have information relevant to FBI domestic responsibilities regarding the GWOT. There should also be consideration of assigning a full time FBI LNO to the JSOC.

b. The creation of a more comprehensive version of CIRG, which contains not only a tactical component (HRT) but an analytic, linguistic and investigative component as well should be considered. Transferring TRU deployment ~~communications to this new entity, would centralize command~~ and control, minimize the need to tap field office resources on a recurring basis, allow for more specialized training for all who are engaged in worldwide deployments, and affix accountability for operations overseas which fall outside the purview of the Legat program.

c. CTD senior management who are tasked with oversight for FBI operations in the ITO should visit the ITO on a periodic basis to develop firsthand knowledge to assist in decision making and policy development.

d. The FBI should send the best and most experienced Agent and support personnel to Iraq. SAC's should be mandated to support the CTD mission regardless of some degradation in the Field office investigative capability.

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