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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/15/2004

To: Director's Office

From: Counterterrorism
MDLU/ Fly Team/ Operational Response Section
Contact: UC [redacted]

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Drafted By: [redacted]

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(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (Pending)

Title: (U) CTORS/MLDU
FBIHQ-AFGHANISTAN

Synopsis: (U) To provide a mission overview of the FBI-Afghanistan Detachment based on CTD Afghanistan Assessment Team (AAT) finding and to set priorities and recommendations.

~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Reference: (U) [redacted]

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Enclosure(s): (U) Annex A, SSE Mission Approval Checklist; Annex B, CT Intelligence Summary; Annex C, FBI convoy movement and emergency action plans for Afghanistan

Details: Background of U.S. Role In Afghanistan

(U) ~~(S)~~ Since the Fall 2001, the United States Government's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has focused much of its attention in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom which began by uprooting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and destroying Al Qaeda's base of operations, continues to date. The role the United States plays today in Afghanistan falls along two distinct

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lines: militarily to defeat the insurgents, and diplomatically to assist in the rebuilding of a democratic government in Afghanistan. Militarily, the U.S. led coalition, Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF76), has a clearly defined role to defeat those insurgents who continue to wage war in Afghanistan and ensure the stability of the Afghan Government. CJTF76's operational theater is roughly the eastern portion of Afghanistan to the border of Pakistan. The U.S. military has approximately 18,000 personnel committed to this cause. Headquarters for CJTF76 is Bagram Air Field (BAF), which is approximately 50 miles north of the capital city of Kabul. CJTF76 elements include conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the U.S. and several other nations. The western portion of Afghanistan falls under the military control of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), a multinational peace keeping force rarely involved in offensive operations. ISAF headquarters is based in Kabul.

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~~(S)~~ CJTF76 has identified the enemy, collectively referred to as Anti-Coalition Militants (ACMs), as three groups, that is, Al Qaeda (AQ), Taliban (TB), and Hizbi-e-Gulbuddin (HIG). Though distinct groups with varying goals, these groups are united in their overriding focus to overthrow the current Afghan Government and rid Afghanistan of Western influence. While relatively small in number, ACMs continue to wage war and make Afghanistan a dangerous and volatile environment for civilians and coalition forces alike. In addition to ACMs, and often closely aligned with them, are various regional drug and war lords who continue to create instability for the central Afghanistan government and must also be dealt with by CJTF76 and coalition forces.

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Historical FBI Presence in Afghanistan.

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(U) (S) Since late 2001, the FBI has sent personnel TDY to Afghanistan. Initially, FBI personnel only played a part in the interviews of AQ and TB detainees captured by coalition forces. The overriding mission FBI agents were tasked with was to obtain actionable intelligence on threats to the U.S. or U.S. interests. HRT also sent a small number of personnel at varying times who were assigned to High Value Target (HVT)/Medium Value Target (MVT) fusions cells. The Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) was formed as an entity within CTD and tasked to oversee the newly created FBI mission in Afghanistan. In February 2004, the FBI expanded its contingent in Afghanistan and positioned qualified investigators with more forward deployed military units to assist in the collection of intelligence [redacted] CTD approval for SAs to be deployed in Operation Mountain Storm based on a specific DOD request).

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CTD Assessment of FBI-Afghanistan Team Mission

(S) In June, 2004, at the direction of the Assistant Director CTD, a CTD Afghan Assessment Team (AAT) arrived in Afghanistan to reevaluate the role of FBI personnel in-theater. This AAT was comprised of ITOS1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings, CTORS Acting Assistant Section Chief [redacted] CTD Fly Team Unit Chief [redacted] and MLDU Investigative Analyst [redacted].

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(S) The team traveled to BAF, Kandahar Air Field (KAF), and Kabul where it met with military commanders [redacted] and FBI personnel TDY'd to Afghanistan. AAT personnel also traveled to several military [redacted] bases.

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(S) The AAT discussed past, current and projected use of FBI assets with various U.S. government entities and queried each as to their vision of the FBI role in Afghanistan. Upon its return to FBIHQ, AAT personnel met with members of MLDU, as well as former FBI On Scene Commanders. After further consultation with FBI CTD management this paper was prepared in order to clearly confirm and define the FBI mission in Afghanistan for the present and foreseeable future.

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FBI-Afghanistan Mission Statement

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~~(S)~~ The primary mission of the FBI Afghanistan Team (FBI AT) is the collection of actionable threat intelligence which may have a possible nexus to the United States, its citizens and interests. This primary goal remains in line with the FBI's top priority to prevent acts of terror at home or abroad. FBI Special Agents have the skill sets which make them uniquely qualified above all other U.S. Government personnel to gather this strategic intelligence through interviews, traditional evidence collection procedures, source development and other general criminal investigative skills. The early infusion of FBI expertise in the Afghan theater has resulted in the identification of intelligence critical to ongoing proactive FBI CT investigations, to include the identification of U.S. based terrorist associates and/or conspirators. It has also demonstrated the ability of the FBI to provide valuable, specialized assistance to various civilian and DOD organizations engaged in the GWOT. A number of priorities have been identified within the above stated CT mission. These priorities are delineated as follows:

- 1) The interview of detainees or Persons Under Custody (PUCs) and other individuals of interest. Many of these individuals have knowledge of or are affiliated with Global Terrorism networks operating outside the tribal borders of Afghanistan.
- 2) The support of specialized military operations targeting the capture of Al Qaeda members, and affiliates, with a view toward the collection of actionable strategic intelligence with a nexus to the U.S. Homeland.
- 3) The establishment and continued close liaison with all coalition forces, DOD elements (e.g., Bagram based DOCEX), DOS elements, [redacted] the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), and any other intelligence gathering/processing entity, in an effort to ensure that any threat intelligence with a U.S. nexus is passed immediately and effectively to the U.S. Intelligence Community.
- 4) Support of the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell in Afghanistan (CEXC-A).

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(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 09/15/2004

(S) 5) Support of [redacted] operations and missions with a view toward preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests.

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6) Counterterrorism training assistance to the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and other coalition forces, with the expectation that the USG will, in turn, receive a direct benefit in the form of a close working relationship between Afghan and USG counterterrorism agencies.

1) Interview of Detainees:

(U) To the extent possible, FBI Agents conduct interviews of Persons Under Custody (PUCs), and other individuals, to obtain actionable intelligence to be used in the war against terrorism, and in particular, to detect, disrupt and prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests.

(S) ~~(S)~~ DOD houses PUCs at the Bagram Collection Point (BCP), the Kandahar Collection Point (KCP) and at various other smaller holding facilities. With limited resources, the FBI attempts to review intake and background intelligence on PUCs to identify those who may have strategic intelligence which fits within the context of the FBI CT mission. FBI Special Agents utilize rapport based, long term interview strategies to conduct interviews of detainees in order to obtain actionable intelligence. Many interviews are conducted jointly with [redacted] Military interrogators, however, all FBI personnel are fully briefed on existing FBI policy regarding treatment of detainees and admonished to use only those interview methods allowable within the U.S. legal system.

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2) Support of Specialized Military Operations:

(U) ~~(S)~~ The primary focus of CJTF76 is to kill or capture ACMS and defeat AQ and the TB network in Afghanistan. The majority of ACMS operate within small cells embedded amongst the civilian population. Therefore, the military must resort to unconventional tactics to identify targets and accomplish its mission. Among other varied techniques, tactical intelligence

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from human sources (HUMINT) and electronic sources (SIGINT) is crucial to this mission. U.S. Forces in the field are focused on identifying and developing this intelligence. Intelligence of a strategic nature, which is often located alongside battlefield or tactical intelligence, is often considered to be of secondary importance by U.S. Forces, if it is identified at all. Soldiers in combat rarely think as investigators. While this tactical focus is understandable it fails to recognize the importance of detecting and disrupting the terrorist threat to the U.S. Homeland. Bits of pocket litter, or seemingly irrelevant documents lying about Afghan homes and compounds, have produced a relative windfall of U.S. based actionable intelligence. However, FBI personnel must be in a position to identify this information, properly collect it, and ensure that it is expeditiously forwarded to the appropriate U.S. intelligence agency.

(U) (S) Specifically, the FBI Afghanistan Team (AT) accomplishes the goal of timely strategic intelligence collection by embedding agents with CJTF76 units during the execution of operational missions defined as Sensitive Site Exploitations (SSE) and/or forward staged interrogations. Present FBI CTD policy requires that the FBI Agent in Charge (AIC), AT, collect specific and articulable facts pertaining to any proposed SSE and provide this information to the AD CTD for approval prior to any FBI participation.

(U) (S) Both CJTF76 and the FBI recognize that Special Agents are not trained to be combat troops. Therefore, FBI SAs are not authorized to enter active combat areas until such time as the U.S. Military ground commander determines the location to be secure. FBI personnel are not to be utilized in offensive combat operations and are limited strictly to intelligence collection, interrogations, source development, and in an advisory capacity in regard to the processing of any site where intelligence (evidence) and/or PUCs that have a possible nexus to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are located.

(S) (S) The only exception to the preapproval requirement for SSEs, applies to HRT personnel embedded with Task Force Omaha. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and because of the time constraints associated with the mission,

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HRT personnel are authorized to deploy without CTD preapproval. However, HRT personnel still follow the same SSE guidelines regarding participation in offensive operations and make every effort to report their status prior to departure or as soon as practical thereafter to the AIC AT.

(U) In order to track the results of efforts by the FBI AT, the following procedure has been implemented:

1) The daily situation report (SITREP) issued by the AIC lists the daily, weekly, and monthly total of approved SSE missions (20 since January, '04) and sets forth the initial result(s) of the most recently concluded mission, to include the collection of information of a possible strategic value (actionable Intel. has been collected during 11 SSE missions to date).

2) The Military Liaison Detainee Unit (MLDU), CTORS, tracks the number of investigative leads developed by the FBI AT which have been forwarded to ITOS 1 for action (over 100 CONUS related telephone numbers and addresses have been forwarded to ITOS 1).

3) The ITOS 1, ETIU desk, will, on a monthly basis, track the status of all FBI AT developed leads forwarded to the field for action.

4) The MLDU will publish a monthly report detailing the number of FBI AT missions monthly and year to date, the number of actionable leads developed as a result of these missions, and a brief summary of the current status of those leads set to the field by ITOS 1, ETIU.

3) The Establishment of Liaison With All Coalition Forces:

(U) ~~(S)~~ The AAT determined that a number of ISAF military and governmental organizations are actively collecting intelligence throughout Afghanistan. There is a glaring lack of interchange between many of these collectors, as well as a lack of focus on the collection of information that may have a nexus to the terrorist threat beyond the Afghanistan theater, most notably with a U.S. nexus. It is therefore critical that the FBI make every effort to maintain contact with these different

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organizations, most of which rotate their personnel out of Afghanistan annually or more frequently.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Specifically, the FBI AT has identified the following positions and/or individuals critical to the effective conduct of the FBI AT's mission, and has established a flexible schedule for contacting these persons on a regular basis:

CG U.S. forces, Bagram (currently Lt. Gen. Olsen)

Deputy CG/Operations, Bagram (currently Brig. Gen. Dan Jacoby)

Deputy CG/Admin., Bagram (currently Brig. Gen. Bernard Chapeau)

CO DOCEX, Bagram (currently Col. [redacted])

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CO, 25th ID J2 (currently Lt. Col. [redacted])

OIC, Bagram Collection Point (currently Maj. [redacted])

Chief, Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF), Bagram

CENTCOM Liaison, Bagram

COMTECH/DOCEX, Bagram (currently [redacted])

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Person Under Control (PUC) Officer Navy Lt. [redacted]
[redacted] JTF 76, BCP, Bagram

CJTF 76 Air Operations POC, Bagram

Staff Judge Advocate, Bagram (currently Maj. [redacted])
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OIC, CEXC-A, Bagram (currently USMC Capt. [redacted])
[redacted]

CJTF 76 JOC Security Officer (currently Army Capt. [redacted])
[redacted]

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Defense Humint Services (DHS) OIC, Bagram, Army Lt.
Col. [redacted]

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(currently [redacted])

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U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Kabul
(currently [redacted])

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U.S. Embassy Consul

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CO Allied Command Counterintelligence, Kabul
(currently Lt. Col. [redacted])

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Head of Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Secret
Service (currently General Naimat Jallily)

DEA Country Liaison, Kabul (currently [redacted])

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Afghanistan National Directorate of Security (NDS),
Kabul

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~~(S)~~ Only through the regular appearance of FBI
personnel and the sincere offer of assistance, can the FBI and
the U.S. Intelligence Community achieve any degree of success in
sharing in the collection of intelligence with various ISAF
members. Assisting, yet complicating, this equation are a host
of other entities such as the U.S. Embassy Regional Security
Officer, [redacted] DEA, numerous U.S. Military groups stationed
throughout the country, as well as the organizations in charge of

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a number of PUC detention facilities and the BAF based Document Exploitation Center (DOCEX). Sharing in the collection of intelligence throughout Afghanistan is a daunting task, particularly in a country where travel, in itself, is difficult and risky and the collectors are widely disbursed.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The BAF based DOCEX is designated by military order to be the principal collection/analysis point for all material collected in-theater. The FBI does not officially participate in the BAF DOCEX, however, efforts by the FBI AT to develop a relationship with BAF DOCEX have proven highly successfully. DOCEX officials have re prioritized their approach to reviewing collected material with a view toward identifying and relaying to the FBI AT any information that appears to have a nexus to the U.S. As an example of this improved relationship

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[redacted] While DOCEX is deemed to be the principal collector of in-theater material, DOCEX personnel willingly admit that they are vastly understaffed and would welcome whatever assistance the FBI could provide. In particular, this operation is in dire need of translation and analytical skills.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Recommendation - In order to improve the identification and flow of intelligence with a U.S. nexus the AAT recommends that an FBI analyst be assigned to FBI Bagram in order to assist the DOCEX facility.

4) Support of the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell:

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(U) FBI SABTs provide experience and advanced investigative skills not available within the DoD structure. These skills can be applied to the processing of post blast scenes, the collection and documentation of critical components and evidence, the location and the interview of suspected bomb makers, and the effective search of suspected bomb making locations while reducing the inherent risk.

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6) Provide Training to the Government of Afghanistan (GOA):

(U) The Government of Afghanistan has expressed a desire for training at every level of its security forces. This desire, supported fully by the U.S. Department of State, is to transform a service formally modeled on the Soviet system of a closed, autocratic society, to that which will support and work within a progressive, democratic system.

(S)

~~(S)~~ It is the position of the [redacted] that the training of NDS should be a [redacted]. The AAT concurs with this opinion. The training mission, which is already ongoing, will only expand as an FBI Legat is established and the Afghan Government grows. The benefits of this type of training are known. The relationships developed between the FBI and Afghan officers will reap rewards for the U.S. Government [redacted]

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AAT Summary:

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~~(S)~~ The Afghanistan theater is large and collection efforts are divided between a number of organizations with little coordination and varying priorities. There is a strong, justifiable need for FBI Agents in Afghanistan to conduct counterintelligence investigations regarding unaddressed or under addressed issues pertaining to CT matters which transcend Afghan borders. These matters fall well within the Bureau's counterterrorism mission. The FBI will not be in a position to fully exploit actionable intelligence or emerging threats unless personnel are on the ground at the point of collection. There is

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no substitute for access to raw intelligence at the point of collection.

(U) ~~(S)~~ **Conclusion** - As the role of FBI-Afghanistan is critical and falls within the Bureau's CT mission, a commitment to provide the necessary resources is appropriate. This commitment will require logistical and personnel enhancements and should be reviewed at regular intervals to assure that the maximum product is being attained while providing for the security and well being of FBI personnel. After extensive research by MLDU personnel, armored vehicles have been identified and purchased. Delivery is expected within weeks. An improved communications package, which will increase efficiency and safety, is being developed. With the exception of the need for one FBI analyst in Bagram, the current staffing level of [REDACTED] is deemed sufficient, but should be regularly monitored. With few exceptions, personnel should be rotated through the Afghanistan theater no less than every 90 days, while the AIC and DAIC should be rotated on a 6 month basis in order to ensure continuity. Personnel should be selected based upon several criteria, to include, prior tactical or military experience, health and preparedness to deal with an inhospitable climate and extended work hours, and the ability to work compatibly with others. The AAT also recommends that FBI CTD continue to be represented in theater. The presence of CTD personnel will ensure that HQ concerns are properly addressed, including the timely and correct submission of reports and intelligence. Personnel assigned to the MLDU should regularly conduct on-site reviews to further ensure that logistical and administrative matters are properly addressed.

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(S) ~~(S)~~ By embedding FBI personnel with military [REDACTED] elements in a semi permissive and often hostile environment, the FBI has embarked on a new mission. While the FBI's role in Iraq bears some similarity, there are a number of unique and entirely new challenges in Afghanistan. The possible benefits, however, justify the commitment. It is broadly accepted that the command element of AQ has established itself in the wild tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. To fully address the terrorist threat against the U.S., terrorism's leadership must be

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located and dismantled. We must be where the terrorists are. Just as organized crime or drug smuggling investigations need to transcend borders to be successful so does the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts. The AAT believes that the methods employed in the collection of actionable intelligence from detainees, sources, and through physical evidence are the same proven methods used by Special Agents in all criminal investigations. No other national asset has the skill sets or experience that FBI Special Agents possess in this area. Therefore, the AAT believes the FBI is uniquely qualified for this mission and strongly recommends that the FBI remain a lead agency in the strategic intelligence collection process in Afghanistan.

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ANNEX A

Mission Approval Checklist

TIER I MISSION

For FBI approval purposes a SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION (SSE) will be defined as:

Whenever FBI personnel participate in an operational mission which has as its primary objective the capture of individuals determined to support or participate in anti-coalition activities or the recovery of items deemed to contain information of tactical or strategic intelligence value and where there exists the possibility of encountering hostilities.

Any mission falling within the above definition will require prior authorization from FBIHQ before any FBI personnel may participate.

In order to submit a request for SSE participation the following mission specifics will be required:

1. Date, time and location of the SSE.
2. The nature of the target i.e. Al Qaeda supporter, Taliban commander, foreign fighter, etc. If the target is of a material nature then the items likely to be recovered and their strategic intelligence value.
3. The military component conducting the SSE including the force protection elements (air assets, armored vehicles, etc).
4. The means of transportation and duration of the SSE. If SAs are to RON in the field, justification for the RON.
5. The FBI personnel involved in the SSE.
6. The purpose and other details to justify the need for FBI to participate in the SSE. In particular, articulable facts need to be presented which explain the CT nexus the FBI would like to exploit or the intelligence value of the mission.

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TIER II MISSION

Whenever FBI personnel seek or have been requested to provide assistance of an investigative (to include interviews), forensic, or training nature to DOD, other USG agencies, or Afghan Government entities, at a location outside of a secure USG base or facility, prior authorization must first be obtained from the FBI-Afghanistan Agent In Charge (AIC).

Every effort should be made to provide the AIC with as much of the above SSE preapproval information as possible as set forth in the Tier I missions.

TIER III MISSION

Whenever FBI personnel seek or have been requested to provide assistance of an investigative (to include interviews), forensic, or training nature to DOD, other USG agencies, or Afghan Government entities at a location within a secure USG base of facility, FBI personnel will keep the FBI-Afghanistan AIC regularly briefed on developments and intelligence obtained.

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Annex C

Ground Convoy Movement Checklist
Semi-Permissive Environments

Prior to any ground convoy or force protection mission taking place in a semi or non-permissive environment, essential pre-mission guidelines should be considered prior to executing the mission. The checklist guidelines set out below help the AIC/DAIC develop an operational plan for any type of ground movement.

Pre-Mission Planning:

Mission

- a. What is the mission?
- b. Mission worth the risk?

Personnel Available

- a. Enough personnel to safely conduct the mission?
- b. Are other unknown personnel entities involved?
Capabilities? Military Escort Available?

Vehicles Available

- a. What type of signature to be presented?
- b. Armored? Low Visibility Vehicles, Indigenous?
- c. Are non FBI vehicles involved and what are there capabilities or limitations?

Command and Control

- a. Who is over all in charge?
- b. Individual Vehicle Commanders identified?
- c. Communications capabilities? Intra-Team, SATCOM?
- d. Emergency Response Contingencies?

Intelligence

- a. New risks or enemy tactics? Current Threat Level?

Route Planning

- a. Primary and secondary routes?
- b. Time of travel? Maximize Randomness.
- c. GPS, Maps, Falcon View? Each vehicle should be able to independently navigate if necessary.

Pre-Mission Checks:

Vehicle Checks - Fluid levels, Tire Pressure, Spare Tire and appropriate Jack, VS 17 Panel, American Flag Panel, spare vehicle equipment, Water/MRE's, Glint Tape, spare ammunition and ordinance, smart cards.

Team Leader Brief - Mission, Vehicle order and pax position (Profile people based on skills and where they sit), ID vehicle commanders, Total Pax, Movement Tenets (Speed, Distance, Check Points, Formations), Weapons and Equipment

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Checks.

Route Briefing and Alternates: Route to be taken, Choke Points and Areas of Concern.

Communications - Channels (primary, secondary, others), Intra Team radio and SAT Comm checks, Falcon View checks, Iridium Checks, loss comms plan, radio checks and commands.

Contingencies - Vehicle break down, Bump Plans, route blockage, medical and medivac procedures, IED or ambush Immediate Action-Drill's, bump plans, Go/No Go criteria, Known U.S. Hard Points along route.

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