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DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/MJS
ON 12-09-2009

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/11/2003

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/11/2003

To: Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism

Fly Team, Operational Response Section

Contact: [REDACTED] UC [REDACTED]

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b7C

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199E-HQ-1404383

Title: Darkening Clouds;
MC 199
IT-Iraq

Synopsis: To establish guidelines and protocols for all FBI operational activity in Iraq.

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: ~~(S)~~ 199E-HQ-1404383 serial 204

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ During the month of July 2003, ASC [REDACTED] and UC [REDACTED] conducted an on-scene inspection of the Iraq Task Force (ITF) in Doha, Qatar and Baghdad, Iraq. The primary purpose of the assessment was to evaluate and assess the current situation in Iraq and make any necessary adjustments to the mission and direction of the ITF. Three months after the major thrust of the military campaign in Iraq had concluded, the circumstances and investigative imperatives had changed to a large degree and necessitated a transition in the focus of the ITF.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Based on the findings of ASC [REDACTED] and UC [REDACTED] in consultation with CTD management the following policy is outlined specifically for ITF.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ The ITF was initially created in order to expeditiously exploit any intelligence available as the United States and coalition forces moved into Iraq. The concept was to conduct document seizure missions of designated sensitive sites in Iraq primarily known Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS) locations and to immediately triage those documents in the ITO in an effort to identify any threat to the US or US interests. Ancillary components of the ITF mission were to exploit any computer media obtained and to thoroughly interview any captured IIS personnel.

(U) ~~(S)~~ As of 7/9/2003, all documents obtained by the FBI through Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), or any other means, for which the FBI was responsible for the initial processing via established DoD protocols, had been processed and provided to DoD. Interviews of IIS personnel continue.

~~(S)~~ The ITO remains an extremely dangerous and volatile environment where communications are difficult, and logistical and support structures are limited. The scope of terrorism, intelligence and criminal priorities for the FBI continue to increase. Based on the on-scene inspection, as well as input from the current On-Scene Commander and the International Terrorism Operations Section II, the current priorities for the ITF are delineated as follows:

- 1) Interviews of High Value Detainees (HVD) and individuals of interest;
- 2) Assist U.S. Government Doc-Ex activities;
- 3) Assist Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi Authorities with terrorist investigations, including crime scene processing;
- 4) Support of specialized DoD Operations, as defined herein.

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Interviews of High Value Detainees

(U) ~~(S)~~ In addition to former high level regime members, other individuals from a variety of categories can be designated as HVD's. These include indicted FBI fugitives and individuals who may have recently entered Iraq to perpetrate acts of terrorism, and have been taken into custody.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The interviews of these HVD's for reasons of prevention, prosecution, intelligence gathering and background are a high priority for the US Government and the FBI. Approximately 92 HVD's are currently detained by DoD in a compound at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). Typically it requires multiple interviews, over a period of time, in order to glean all possible information and intelligence from these HVD's. This is complicated by the need for Arabic language translators to facilitate each interview and, in many instances, for subject matter expertise on the part of the interviewer in order to be fully effective.

Assist in Doc Ex Activities

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has been tasked by the Administration and DoD to locate WMD in Iraq. To accomplish this, the ISG has created an analytical element to receive, analyze and exploit all intelligence from all sources within the ITO. This includes volumes of information derived from past and ongoing interviews of sources, assets and HVD's, as well as some SIGINT, and all document exploitation.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Due to its enormous mandate, the ISG will only action WMD driven information and intelligence. In the process of searching for WMD, other tremendously important information will be discovered by the ISG. The FBI must be in a position to immediately receive and action all information of investigative and intelligence import to the FBI; or there is tremendous risk that any opportunity to exploit this information will be lost.

(U) ~~(S)~~ This is especially critical regarding the document exploitation component of the ISG. Beginning in July 2003, when all DoD document exploitation in the ITO was placed under the purview of the ISG, two Central Media Processing Centers (CMPC) were established - one in Baghdad and one in Doha, Qatar. These two centers evolved from what had previously been the DoD/DIA driven DocEx effort.

(U) ~~(S)~~ These two centers are responsible for processing all of the documents and computer media acquired in Iraq. In mid-July 2003, in Baghdad alone, there were over 200 batches of documents that filled a 10,000 square foot warehouse at the CMPC Baghdad. A batch can consist of 2 documents or 250 boxes of documents, a large quantity of which have not been properly catalogued due to the frenetic combat conditions under which most of these documents were seized during the initial weeks of hostilities.

(U) ~~(S)~~ It is necessary for the FBI to integrate into the ISG analytical element in Iraq, as well as the CMPC in both Baghdad and Doha. This assures FBI access to virtually all intelligence and information available to the USIC in Iraq.

Assist Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi Authorities with terrorist investigations, including crime scene processing.

(U) ~~(S)~~ There are multiple indicators, to include continuous intelligence reporting and recent terrorist acts, that indicate an influx of radical Islamic terrorists into the ITO is occurring at an alarming rate. Currently there are four bomb scene investigations ongoing in the ITO, requiring a majority of the investigative resources. The requested resources include, investigators, bomb technicians, explosive experts, and on scene evidence collection.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Proactive interviews, intelligence gathering and sharing, assistance to other government agencies and the vetting of threat reporting are occurring on a daily basis. These efforts directly subscribe to the FBI mandate of preventing future acts of terrorism.

(S) Support of specialized DoD [] Operations, to include SSE's and the capture of FBI fugitives.

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(S) ~~(S)~~ Numerous proactive tactical operations are occurring within the ITO by DoD []. These operations often have a direct bearing on the furtherance of the FBI's counterintelligence (CI) and counterterrorism (CT) mission.

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Often these operations are the only opportunity to obtain information directly relating to ongoing FBI investigations and CT and CI mandates.

(S) After a case by case review, and with the specific approval of the FBI OSC, and AD Counterterrorism, FBI Agents will support these operations to facilitate the timely exploitation of documents and electronic media. These exploited items will be processed through established standard operational procedures (SOP's). These areas will be physically secured by DOD prior to introduction of FBI exploitation teams. The FBI is not to participate in proactive combat operations and will not enter on scene until it is secure. For safety reasons, FBI Agents will travel under the force protection of DOD. All aspects of any operation where the FBI provides a supporting role will be closely coordinated [redacted] and DOD prior to integration. These operations are designated as SSE's. FBI participation in SSE's has been previously approved via Operation Order 1015 located in file 199E-HQ-1404383 Serial 204. b1

(U) (S) The OSC also has the authority, upon receiving approval from the AD, CTD to assign FBI agents to DoD special operational group known as Task Force 20, soon to be renamed Task Force 121. This integration, or fusion, has been requested on several occasions by DoD command staff to the OSC in the ITO. FBI personnel bring investigative experience, investigative resources, and subject matter expertise, that greatly enhances the ability of Task Force 20 to locate and apprehend HVT's, and disrupt terrorist operations and cells. Conversely, Task Force 20 provides the FBI the ability to safely conduct significant CT and CI investigations in a dangerous environment with no reliable civilian infrastructures. Often these investigations are dynamic and produce perishable intelligence that requires subject matter expertise and investigative experience in order to identify opportunities in a timely manner. This full-time integration has proven successful in both Afghanistan and Yemen. FBI agent personnel will not conduct any supportive role with Task Force 20, outside secure DoD facilities without the specific authority of the FBI OSC and the AD CT. Again to reiterate the FBI is not to participate in proactive combat operations.

Command and Control:

(U) (S) The On-Scene Commander (OSC) is in command of the FBI assets in theater and will be faced with a myriad of operational matters whereupon decisions will have to be made daily. The OSC will be responsible for approving all FBI reports to FBI Headquarters, will approve all requests for substantial

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resource enhancements, and will be responsible for all in theater fiscal matters. No FBI personnel will travel off BIAP without the approval of the OSC or the Deputy OSC. Although the OSC has necessary operational latitude, no investigative efforts outside the scope of this document shall be undertaken without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

(U) The FBI Deadly Force policy is in effect for all agents operating in the ITO. This policy has been completely articulated in Operation Order 1015 located in file 199E-HQ-1404383 Serial 204.

Personnel:

(U) The OSC working with CTD's Operational Response Section must ensure the following functions are fully staffed in Iraq:

(U) Although DoD has reiterated its commitment to provide medical support, it remains extremely beneficial to the overall health of all FBI personnel to maintain the presence of a medically trained agent.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Arabic Language Support personnel will provide translation services for the interviews of the HVD's, and provide any other translation requirements as necessary. It is of critical importance to maintain FBI language capability in the ITO, for both investigative matters and integration into the ISG analytical element and the CMPC.

(U) Communications will be maintained by CRU. These individuals are rotated into theater on a separate basis from the overall agent deployments providing necessary overlap. All of the communication equipment is provided and maintained by CRU.

(U) HRT will provide personnel security and coordinate all movements outside the safe zone of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).

(U) The Fly Team will provide investigative expertise for each rotation.

(U) The OSC will be required to consult with the CTD Operational Response Section in regards to any additional personnel requirements.

Training:

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(U) All FBI personnel prior to their deployment to Iraq must successfully complete the following:

(U) Conus Replacement Center (CRC) training from the U.S. military which includes, specialized military training in which agents receive military identification, equipment, medical screening and WMD training. The FBI conducts predeployment training for personnel prior to entering the ITO. This training includes two days concentrating on the following:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ Briefings from the Middle East Operations Unit/ITOS II/CTD on Iraq and appropriate investigative issues;
- (U) ~~(S)~~ HRT training regarding weapons familiarization, movement drills and emergency action scenarios;
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Medical training regarding preventative measures and medical concerns specific to the ITO; and
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Training regarding the scanning of documents utilizing FBI equipment and SOP's for the ITO.

Summary:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ This document outlines the priorities for the FBI within the ITO, and further articulates that no investigative efforts outside the scope of these priorities will occur without the approval of the AD/CTD. All FBI personnel must obtain prior approval from the OSC or Deputy OSC to travel outside of BIAP. Agents are to operate under the FBI's standard deadly force policy while in the ITO. FBI agent personnel can provide limited support to DoD and other government agencies during approved operations.

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