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Synopsis: The purpose of this communication is fourfold: 1) To provide a summary of work-todate by an FBI deployment team that is processing approximately 1,300 detainees held by Northern Alliance forces in Sheberghan, Afghanistan for fingerprints, photographs, DNA and biographical information; 2) To document the individuals interviewed to date that the team considers most dangerous among the detainees and should be considered for transfer to U.S. custody in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and 3) To document the FBI deployment team's contention that no individual within the detainee population can at this time be considered "safe" to be released and the deployment team will make no such recommendation. 4) To document the FBI team's concern about credible reports that significant numbers of detainees may be released in an Afghan government amnesty around the Eid celebration marking the end of Ramadan (o/a December 4). The FBI team and U.S. Department of State (DOS) political officer in Mazar-E-Sharif believe Afghan government officials should be approached to prevent such an amnesty with respect to Sheberghan detainees, or at a minimum to ensure that the most dangerous among the detainees are not released.

Details: Referenced previous communications laid out an FBI team's deployment to Sheberghan Prison, Afghanistan, to interview and process the 1,300 detainees. The idea of the deployment is to obtain identifying data on all detainees - fingerprints, photographs, DNA and biographical information - for search and posting in FBI databases to include its 43-million electronic print database, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and in National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is accessible to all U.S. law enforcement, including border security.

The 1,300 detainees will be assigned FBI numbers and maintained in the databases in the same manner as arrest and criminal information, such as felony convictions, so that the detainees can always be identified as enemies of the U.S. and a potential threat. The Sheberghan deployment is one of a number lead by agents with the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) division, which is the steward of IAFIS and NCIC. The previous deployments to Afghanistan and Pakistan have garnered a fingerprint-based database of 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters and enemies of the U.S.

The database is fingerprint-based because fingerprints are unique identifiers which do not age and cannot be altered or counterfeited. Traditional name and date-of-birth databases have little utility tracking Middle Eastern or Asian individuals, whose names are common, phonetically spelled from different alphabets, and who frequently don't know a date-of-birth. The terrorism investigations conducted since September 11 have also clearly shown that terrorists such as Al Qaeda members are mobile, well-funded, criminally sophisticated and adept at obtaining false identity documents, so fingerprints may be the only way to effectively track and identify them. The 1,300 detainees from Sheberghan are being added to this database, which resides within the IAFIS.

The deployment team is equipped to run as many as three booking stations, and have hired Urdu and Pushtu translators to facilitate interviews, which at minimum generate mandatory biographical information necessary for entering the subject into NCIC. This information includes name, DOB or age, place of birth, height, weight, eye color, hair color, scars and marks

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and tattoos. Each detainee is also asked a series of questions that are Middle Eastern or Asian identifiers, such as father's name, village of origin and tribal affiliation. About 700 of the detainees are Afghan with Pushtun tribal affiliation, and by custom have only one name. The remaining 600 detainees are primarily Pakistani, with a few Sudanese, Bangladesh and other nationalities.

Each detainee is also asked the following questions: 1) Do you have any knowledge of any threat against the United States or government of Afghanistan? 2) Do you have any knowledge of any terrorist act - past, present or future - against the United States or government of Afghanistan? 3) Do you have any information regarding Al Qaeda? 4) Do you have any information regarding Usama Bin Ladin? 5) Have you traveled to any country outside of Afghanistan?

A series of questions regarding length of time fighting for the Taliban, weapons assignment, battles fought, tactics used, commanders and command structure, and place of capture by the Northern Alliance forces are also asked. Detainees are then asked directly the following questions: 1) Are they enemies of the United States? 2) Would they attack and kill the FB1 interviewers if they could? 3) Would they continue Jihad against the U.S. upon release? And 4) Would they be willing to conduct a martyrdom mission? About ten percent of detainees answer affirmatively to this series of questions.

To date, about 800 detainees have been processed by the FBI team, which deployed from the U.S. in early November, when General Abdul Rasheed Dostum, the Special Representative for the North of the Afghan Government who controls Sheberghan prison, indicated he would give access to the detainees. The team consists of a CJIS Supervisory Special Agent and three Bvidence Response Team (ERT) Special Agents from the Newark Division of the FBI. A CJIS technician accompanied the team as far as Kabul, and in FBI space in the U.S. Embassy annex installed a computer platform with the latest in fingerprint technology, which converts the fingerprints on a standard FBI fingerprint card to digital information and launches the prints by satellite for search and posting against IAFIS and NCIC.

The team is supported by a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) team, A Company, First Battalion, 20th SFGA, ODA 2014, based in Mazar-E-Sharif, which provides the liaison contacts with General Dostam that allowed the deployment to occur, provides the contacts for hiring local translators fluent in English, Pushtu and Urdu, and provides security at Sheberghan prison and convoy travel from the General's compound and an OGA safe house in Mazar-E-Sharif. A U.S. Army Military Police (MP) team, 972rd Military Police Company, Melrose, Mass, from K-2 base in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbeckistan, has been integrated into the booking process and provides additional security and assistance with collection of identifying information.

The team gathers prints, photos, DNA and biographical information by the following process: Because of extremely primitive conditions at the prison, which lacks power, running water, heat and concrete floors, prints are gathered on a briefcase-sized station with printer's ink and paper FBI cards, two cards per detainee for quality purposes. Each detainee's picture is taken five times with a digital camera on fine quality - full front, right 45 degree, right profile, left 45 degree and left profile. The sequence is based on recommendations from vendors developing

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emerging facial recognition technologies. The five photos are backed up with two 35 mm photos taken in the traditional law enforcement mugshot sequence: full front and right profile. Two DNA bucal swabs are taken from each detainee, air-dryed and placed in evidence envelopes. A short-form interview form based on questions detailed above is completed by agents and translators. The print cards, swabs and interview forms are maintained in a large manilla envelope, and each item as well as digital and 35 mm photos are tagged with a tracking number based on characters: SHER-0000.

The packets, film, CDs containing digital photos, 35 mm film and floppy discs containing all interview write ups and accompanying electronic communications are packaged and The prints, photos and other information are scanned by the CJIS technician into the remote fingerprint platform, which submits the prints and information by satellite link to CJIS for search and posting against IAFIS and NCIC. The DNA swabs and the hard copies of the prints are sent by post to the FBI Laboratory. The remote submissions of fingerprints and other information involves the following:

1) The detainees' prints are searched against the IAFIS fingerprint file of the FBI's 22 most wanted terrorists.

2) The detainces' prints are searched against IAFIS files to include the fugitive and criminal history files.

3) The detainees' prints are searched against the latent print file containing unidentified crime scene prints from terrorist acts including Tanbomb, Kenbomb, the USS Cole bombing and the World Trade Center attacks.

4) The detainees are assigned FBI numbers, which are permanent tracking numbers, and their prints are permanently posted in IAFIS for future searches and comparisons.

5) The detainces' photos and biographical information are posted permanently in the NCIC Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) for retrieval by any U.S. law enforcement agency making an inquiry.

The remote submission ensures that at the least agents will know before the deployment is completed that no wanted individual is among the 1,300 Sheberghan detainces, will know whether any of the detainces had been arrested in the U.S., and will know that the fingerprints and the photos are of sufficient quality to reside in IAFIS for future searches and comparisons. It is noted that the utility of this database could be critical to border security in coming years, as the U.S. may go to a fingerprint-based visa system.

To agents conducting the interviews in Sheberghan, it became quickly apparent that the detainees had been coached in counter-interrogation. Several detainees, in fact, stated that leaders within the prison had held classes in what to tell the Americans, techniques that fit precisely into what is known of Al Qaeda counter-interrogation techniques taught in Bin Laden camps. The detainees' pre-rehearsed stories, as agreed upon in the classes, admits the obvious, some involvement in the

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Taliban and the detainces' surrender Konduz or Irganak. But detainces decline to give or claim they don't remember any specifics of their battles, tactics, command structure or communication structure. Most minimize their involvement, again as they were coached, advising they were conscripted, were only with the Taliban days or a few weeks, and were non-combatants: cooks, drivers and farmets. Many denied even knowing what Al Qaeda or UBL was.

Detainees advised other detainees were debriefing as to the American's questions upon return to their cells, and on their answers. A few detainees further advised that it was widely known inside the prison that a detainee who began cooperating with General Dostum's criminal intelligence officers was murdered on orders of a leader among the detainees. Agents have identified the leader and two of the conspirators, who tortured the victim with electric shocks for about a halfhour before then strangling him. The three openly admit the murder, though they dispute the motive of the victim's cooperation and describe it as a personal grudge. Agents have obtained the local officer's files, which contain a dozen statements of witnesses and participants to the killing, and are having the statements translated to identify other conspirators. Interestingly, the statement of one that has been translated indicates the leader's motivation was the victim had information that would have sent him to Cuba. A letter recovered from the leader makes a remark about fearing transfer to Cuba if more were known of him.

The victim in the killing is described as follows:

The leader and the two conspirators admitting the murder are described as follows:

Agents have begun fast-tracking the booking process as much as possible, and aim to ensure that all identifying information of the remaining 400, to include fingerprints, photographs, DNA and biographical information is gathered by Eides, the Muslim holiday marking the end of the fast of Ramadan. Agents have also begun the tedious process of comparing varying detainee lists, to include the prison's poorly documented, hand-written lists, to ensure every detainee has been processed. Missing some detainees is a real possibility, in that guards have on several occasions brought detainees who already had been processed.

The decision was made to fast-track the booking process because of persistent rumors passed to agents by local officer hat the Afghan government may release all the detainees as a "good will gesture" coinciding with Eides. Agents on the FBI deployment team have been asked whether they could provide lists of detainees who would be "safe" to be released. As stated in the summary of this communication, agents strongly contend that none of the detainees are "safe" to be released and will under no circumstances describe any detainee as anything other than a continuing threat to the U.S., to soldiers and U.S. citizens in the combat theater and to the Government of Afghanistan.

The deployment team agents and two Temporary Duty (TDY) agents based in Kabul have made contact with U.S. military in Bagram about transferring detainees deemed most dangerous into U.S. custody for re-interviewing and possible transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Chief among this group is the prison leader who issued the Fatwah resulting in the torture and murder of another detainee, and the conspirators who admit involvement. The agents have further sent

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electronic communications, referenced above, requesting FBIHQ guidance as to criteria and procedure for effecting transfer into U.S. custody.

General Dostum has indicated to the FBI on-scene supervisor that the U.S. could take custody of. any detainee it wants. The SF group that is supporting the deployment has contacted the U.S. Air Force to accomplish an airfield survey of Sheberghan airfield for possible use by C-130s or other Air Force planes for prisoner transport. It is noted the MP team integrated into the booking process is Raven-trained to provide security for such transports.

The deployment team has maintained a running list of individuals who they believe need to be extensively re-interviewed. The list generally falls into three categories: 1) Individuals who openly advise that they are committed Jihadis who want to kill Americans and will do so upon their release. 2) Individuals who agents suspect are prison leaders or possible Al Qaeda members. 3) Individuals who, though they describe themselves as conscripted farmers, have been previously identified in FBI communications as Al Qaeda members. (The TDY agents in Kabul are effecting these identifications.) Agents strongly contend these individuals, in addition to their intelligence value, are simply too dangerous to consider releasing.

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Agents further have maintained close contact with the criminal intelligence officers, who have worked within the prison for a year. The officers advise that there are about 100 individuals at the prison who they believe are Al Qaeda members or committed Jihadis, in particular among the <u>600 Pakistanis detained there</u>. Agents have obtained this list, translated it and have passed it to The list is attached and made part of this communication, and this <u>EC and the attached agent list also will be passed in its entirety to</u> and by the Kabul agents to military authorities in Bagram.

What follows is identifying data and brief summaries of the deployment team's list of detainces who require re-interview. It is noted in compiling this list that 400 of the Pakistanis have yet to be processed, and that the Pakistanis have to date had higher percentages of individuals committed to continuing, religiously motivated war. The list, which is followed by the intelligence officers list of 100, is as follows:

On 11/10/2002, SA interviewed the following individuals at Sherbergan Prison, Sherberghan, Afghanistan.

claimed to not be involved with the Taliban or the military conflict. He also claimed no knowledge of US involvement in Afghanistan. He stated that he was indifferent to the US and

	did not have any enemies.	Ъб Ъ7С Ъ7D
		Ъб Ъ7С Ъ7D
	knowledge of the existence of Al Qaeda or Usama Bin Laden.	Ъб Ъ7с Ъ7D
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On 11/11/2002, SAinterviewed the following individuals who were incarcerated at the Sherberghan Prison.	Ъ6 Ъ7С
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٩ • . (NU.149 ۲.12 b6 b7C b7D ı : He expressed a desire to continue the jihad when he was released. Ъ6 b7C b7D b6 b7C b7D will continue to fight jihad if released. bб b7C b7D He stated that he would continue jihad if released and that he considered all infidels his enemies. Ъб b7C b7D He believed that the Americans attacked Afghanistan and were his enemies. He said that he would continue jihad if released, b6 b7C b7D FBI003022CBT AODUORED165801 p.12 -

				his enemies are
	He said that he would			
the Americans t	hat bombed him his e	would continue the	ne jihad when relea	sed. He considered
	8/2002, SA at Sherberghan Prison		red the following s	ubjects who were
On 11/20	0/2002, SA	interview	red the following i	
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	He was very uncooperative and aggressive. He did state that	b6 b7C b7D
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ŗ, Ъб b7C . b7D b6 b7C He maintained that he could not remember the name of his commander. Ъб He b7C believed that Islam should control all the world and infidels were his enemies. He stated that he has not yet killed an American, but would like to do so when he has the opportunity. He also said that he would be willing to perform a martyr mission if he was asked to do so. Ъб b7C b7D He also stated that Americans were his enemies because they are infidels. b6 b7C b6 Ъ7С b7D FBI003026CBT ADDUORED116589#1 p.16

). SECRET. 1 Ъб b7C He said that he would like to have the opportunity to kill Americans. He fully supported USAMA BIN LADEN and would participate in a martyr mission if UBL asked him. He stated that he would travel to America and become a martyr there if he were ordered by UBL to do so. b6 b7C He considered all Americans his enemies. If a religious leader ordered him to perform a marty mission to kill Americans, then he would do it. b6 He said that he b7C would like to be able to kill American infidels. He denied that he would travel to American to do so, however. He denied that he spoke any English, but he responded to all directions that were given in English. b6 b7C b7D b6 b7C He said that all Americans were his enemies. b6 b7C He considered all Americans his enemies and would continue jihad. Ъб b7C b7D SER FBI003027CBT AODU-0750165851 p.17

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	On 11/11/02, SA interviewed the following individual at SHERBERGAN PRISON, Sherbergan, Afghanistan regarding his incarceration after being captured by the Northern Alliance:	ь6 Ъ7С
	provided the following:	b6 b7C b7D
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stated that he had never heard of USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL), b6 nor had he heard of AL-QAEDA. Later in the interview, stated that he had heard that b7C UBL was a great man and that he had done great things for the people of Afghanistan. Further, b7D (ph) considered himself a part of AL-QAEDA because MULLAH OMAR supported the TALIBAN and UBL (ph) also stated that he felt that he was part of the MUJAHADEEN (ph). stated that he would continue to accept orders from Mullah OMAR and UBL even if the order meant that he had to kill innocent women an children. (ph) stated that he considered that anyone who did not follow the Holy Koran to be an infidel and that it was necessary to kill them, Mullah OMAR is the leader of the Islamic world and as such (ph) felt that it was his duty to obey hid orders without question. Ъб (ph) stated that he joined jihad against the U.S. after the bombing attacks in b7C Afghanistan. MULLAH OMAR stated that it was time for Afghanistan to fight avd b7D (ph) strongly agreed (ph) still considers himself a soldier and stated that if he were released that he would finish his Islamic studies and continue his lihad. (ph) stated that he would kill SA if he could and that he would kill General ABDUL RASHEEM DOSTUM, Commander of the Northern Alliance Troops, if he were ordered to do so by Mullah OMAR or UBL. (ph) stated that he would follow any orders issued by either of these men to include being a suicide bomber (ph) has never been asked to be a suicide bomber nor does he know anyone who has been a suicide bomber. FBI003029CBT A D D U O RED 1 85971 p. 19

give any further information.			refused to
He would provide no was someone of great importance	information. It was the	opinion of the interpret	er that
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Below are the list of prisoners interviews:	interviewed by SA	that require	additional
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	He did not believe Bin Laden was dead or fled the country.	7ط 7ط
	This subject has significant information on the Taliban and possibly Al-Queda, he should be considered for transport and additional interrogation.	4
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. [The subject advised that he did not know about Al-Queda and had first heard of them from the BBC radio broadcast. He advised the broadcast was in english. When confronted with this contradiction concerning listening to an english radio broadcast and denying to understand	
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	Claimed he had never heard of Al-Oueda or Usama Bin Laden.
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	This subject should be considered for transport and further interrogation.
	Misc: This subject advised that he believed in the Taliban government
	and .
	and and wished that they had won this war. He believed in Martyrdom and hoped to be a martyr some
	and and wished that they had won this war. He believed in Martyrdom and hoped to be a martyr some day. The subject advised he will always follow the jihad. The subject advised that he would not answer any question honestly because he was incarcerated. The subject advised that he would not
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			· .		
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	The subject	denied ever h	earing about 1	nartvrdom.	
		, uomod ovor n		· · ·	
This subject should be re-int	erviewed.			`	
Misc: S knowledge of UBL or AL-Que	ubject claims to j eda.	have been a fa	rmer and hav	e no working	
This subject should be re-int	terviewed.	, ·			
Misc: T subject was captured and has	The subject was c been in custody	aptured by the for seventeen 1	Taliban and nonths.	forced to fight. Th	e
This subject should be re-in				l forther	
interogation.,	terviewen ann e	ANTINEED IOL 1	r anohor t and		

ADDUORED11659921 p.24

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	b6 b7C
	b7C b7D
This subject needs to be re-interviewed.	
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	b6 b7
	b7
This subject should be re-interviewed.	
	b6 . b7
	b7
This subject discussed in detail the Taliban use of young boys for sexual gratification of the adu men. The subject advised that the Talib would take boys, usually between 9 years old and fiftee	m,
for sex. An adult male could take a boy, but would be responsible to clothe and feed the boy or boys he took. This subject advised that his preference was for boys ages ten or eleven.	J b
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This subject should be re-interviewed.	
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The subject believed i	n
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martyrdom and hoped to be a martyr some day. The subject advised that he would like to kill Americans.

Subject should be re-interviewed.

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Consider for re-interview.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

b6 b7c b7D This subject believed in martyrdom and jihad. b6 b7c b7D

ADDUORED165991 p.26-

FBI003036CBT

ALC: NO

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b6 b7C b7D

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	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
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	The subject denied knowing English, but did respond to commands in English. The	•
	subject also appeared to be reading what was written in English.	
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		)
	The subject advised that he knew         about Al-Queda and UBL, but         had no details.	d d
•		b
		d d
		a d
	This subject should be re-interviewed and considered for transport and interrogation.	
		9ď 7ď
	The subject provide negative answers for	b7
	any additional information on Al-Queda or UBL.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
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This subject should be considered for re-interview.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

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b6 b7C b7D

FBI003038CBT

## AODUGRED11659981 p.28

. 2 SÈ Ъ6 .b7C b7D The subject denied any knowledge of english, but responded to english commands. The subject was clearly deceptive and gave contradictory information to the translator concerning his travel. This subject should be re-interviewed. Ъб b7C Ъ7D This subject made several contradictory statements and was very deceptive. This subject should be re-interviewed. b6 b7C b7D This subject should be considered for re-interview. • Ъб b7C b7D SEGRET FBI003039CBT ADDUORED11659971 p.29

	· ·
	b6 .b7C b7D
	b6 b7c
	b70 b70
This subject denied knowing any english, yet did respond to english commands and some uestions.	b6 . b7C
laimed that he wrote this, but then denied knowing what he wrote. The subject was very eceptive.	b7D
laimed that he wrote this, but then denied knowing what he wrote. The subject was very eccptive. This subject should be re-interviewed.	
eceptive.	
eceptive.	b6 b7c
eceptive.	b6 b7c b7D
Chis subject should be re-interviewed.	b6 b7c
eceptive.	b6 b7C b7D b6 b7( b7)
Chis subject should be re-interviewed.	b6 b7C b7D

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		ь6 b7
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	The subject denied having any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBL.	
	The subject demed having any knowledge of Al-Queda of OhL.	
		b6 b7
		b7
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
		be
		b6 b7 b7
		b7
		b7
		b7 b7 b6 b7
·	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area	b7 b7
		b7 b7 b6 . b7 b7]
Ţ	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area	b7 b7 b6 b7
·	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area for one hour.	b7 b7 b6 b71 b71 b6 b71
·	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area for one hour.	b7 b7 b6 b71 b71 b6 b71
Ţ	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area for one hour.	b7 b7 b6 b71 b71 b6 b71
	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area for one hour. The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBL. This subject was very deceptive and uncooperative with the interpreter.	b6 b7 b7 b7 b7 b7 b7
	The subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area for one hour. The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBL. This subject was very deceptive and uncooperative with the interpreter.	b7 b7 b6 b71 b6 b71 b6 b7 b7

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		b7C b7D
		Ъ6
		b7C b7D
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		b6 b7C b7D
L	This subject advised that he would always fight the jihad against America. The subject advised that he hoped to kill all the Americans at Sheberghan if given the chance. The subject advised that he would also like to kill all the translators that worked with the Americans.	_
	This subject should be transported and interviewed in depth.	-
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		b7C b7D
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		Ъ6 Ъ7с Ъ7D
	The subject began to refuse to answer questions the more he was interviewed.	Ъ6 Ъ7С Ъ7D
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	1
		Ъ6 • .b7с • Ъ7D
. , ,		Ъ6 Ъ7С Ъ7D
	The subject advised he	Ъб Ъ7С Ъ7D
	believed in Jihad and would like to kill as many Americans as possible. The subject advised that he was familiar with Al-Queda, but did not train with them. The subject refused to provide any additional information. This subject should be re-interviewed.	
		b6 b7c b7D
	ADDUOREDI166991 p.33	т,

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		b6 b7C b7D
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L	The subject refused to answer any question about UBL or Al-Queda. This subject should be re-interviewed.	
	· ·	
		b6 b7C b7D
		,
	The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBL. The subject advised that he wanted to kill Americans.	b6 b7
	It was the opinion of the interpreter that this subject was an extreme fundamentalist and had additional information to provide.	b7:
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
		b6
		b7 b7
	He went on the jihad to kill Americans. The subject denied	· ·
	TROPET	,

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	knowing english, but responded to english commands	b6 b7C
	The subject denied any knowledge og Al-Queda or UBL. The subject was very deceptive and refused to answer most questions.	b7D
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
		7
		b6 b70
	The subject refused to answer any additional	_
	questions.	
	questions. This subject should be re-interviewed	. •
	This subject should be re-interviewed	
	This subject should be re-interviewed	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The Subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBl or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any english.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The Subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBl or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any english.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The Subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBl or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any english.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBI or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any english. This subject should be re-interviewed.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The Subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBl or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any english.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed The subject denied any knowledge about his Mullah, UBI or Al-Queda. This subject was very deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not know any eiglish. This subject should be re-interviewed. The subject responded to all english commands, but denied knowing any english. The subject denied to have any information about who he traveled to Afghanistan with, who sponsored his	

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	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
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Γ		Γ.
		b6
L	The subject refused to answer any questions about Al-Queda or UBL. The subject advised that he came to fight the Jihad and kill Americans. The subject advised that he would like to continue to fight and kill americans. The subject advised that America will always be his enemy.	- b7c
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
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		b7 b7
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	The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda	b
	or UBL.	b
•	This subject should be re-interviewed.	
		:
	The subject came to Afghanistan for jihad to kill	b b
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L.	SEDRET (•	
:	americans		・b6 b7C b7D
	This subject should be re-interviewed.	J 	
			b6 b7C b7D
,			ьс ъб ъ7с ъ7р
	Al-Queda, UBL or the Taliban. This subject should be re-interviewed.	_	
			b6 b7C b7D
			b6 b7С b7D
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			 b6

DEC. 9.2002 12:38PM

NO.150 P.25

Ъ6 Ъ7С

> b6 b7C

b6 b7C

b6 b7C b7D

b6 b7C b7D

subject was very reluctant to answering any questions.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

The subject denied any affiliation with any groups. The subject denied knowing his commanders name. The subject advised eh came to Afghanistan alone. The subject refused to answer questions concerning his unit and where he was captured. The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBL. The subject refused to answer any questions about his group, his leaders or his travel to Afghanistan. The subject said he was committed to jihad and martyrdom.

This subject should be re-interviewed.

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	The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.	
	This subject should be re-interviewed prior to being released.	
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		b
	This subject denied knowing the name of his commander. He denied knowing th enames of	b
	anyone he traveled with. He denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.	
•.	This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release.	
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	Queda. The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-	
	This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release, RUSH PRINTS.	

ADDUORED11869971 p.39

C. 9.2002 12:40PM NO.150 P.	.27
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	b b
The subject refused	
answer most questions. He would not answer questions concerning UBL, Al-Queda or why h came to Afghanistan. The subject	
This subject should be re-interviewed, RUSH PRINTS.	-
	Ъ6 .b7
	b7
The subject advised that he came to A februistan to fight in jihad.	b6 b7
The subject denied any knowledge	1 7 7
UBL or Al-Queda. The subject refused to answer most questions.	
This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release.	
	d. d.
The subject denied any affiliation with any fundamentalist group. The subject came to Afghanistan for the jihad.	
	bo
	b7
This subject denied any informatic about UBL, Al-Queda, any commanders or anyone he may have traveled with.)n, .
This subject should be re-interviewed and evaluated for transport.	•*

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The subject denied knowing who his commander was. He d			b6
The subject denied e foreigners. The subject was very uncooperative and refused	ever seeing any Al-Qued	ia or	.b7C
Subject should be re-interviewed.			
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