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OIG-INTV-000738

CaseMan Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [REDACTED] Interview 1" - 44 of 7882 (0.6%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] says that his first trip to Afghanistan occurred when [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Interview 1 at 29:35-35:35
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] says that he was not part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contingent. [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED]	Interview 1 at 33:03-35:49
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] says that he went to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba a couple of times - first with [REDACTED] shortly after the trip.	[REDACTED]
	[REDACTED] sat in on or observed a couple of the interviews [REDACTED]	Interview 1 at 36:40-42:00

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	<p>did. [] says that [] was a very effective agent, very talented interviewer, and it was the Federal Bureau of Investigation's loss when he retired. For the first 1.5 years or so at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, everyone in US law enforcement wanted to go there and contribute in some way, so that there were a lot of local law enforcement personnel there as part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force as task force officers, not under the control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.</p>	
To Be Determined	<p>[] says that as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's relationship with the [] and problems gaining access to detainees held by the [] He says that the [] sees the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the guys who prosecute civil rights abuses and prosecute them, and therefore view the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the enemy. [] also believes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation leaks like a sieve, "and we do." As to the [] access problem, "we were on the phone daily" with Pasquale D'Amuro at HQ, saying that they had been told this had been worked out at the highest levels, and asking for help. [] understanding is that when [] and another agent (name not recalled) were allowed to tag along. According to what [] told [] they were allowed to pass questions to the interrogators, but were not allowed to be in the room with him. Later, when [] and [] talked about how this went, Butsch told him [] Those were [] words, and [] was surprised to hear this.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 2:08:13-2:15:55</p>
To Be Determined	<p>[] says that he has never met with or talked to Valerie E. Caproni where she asked him questions similar to those we have asked him about today or about Afghanistan. He heard rumors about an internal inquiry that she lead with help from Inspections Division - FBI personnel. However, at least twice DAD T.J. Harrington has asked him if he had seen or was aware of anything relating to detainee treatment. [] DNK if T.J. Harrington was doing so on someone else's behalf. [] emphasizes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has always</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 2:15:55-2:17:25</p>
To Be		

Determined	tried to pick people for their experience and maturity, and believes that for the most part it has done a reasonably good job, but with the few bad apples that are found in any large organization. Most of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's personnel know right from wrong, and that is truly engrained in us. He believes that no Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel would condone or participate in "true abuse."	Interview 1 at 2:20:00-2:21:10
Sun 04/15/1984	[redacted] says that his correct EOD date is 4/15/1984, and the date entered on his question is his birth date. Since joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he was in the Atlanta Division for 2.5 years, transferred to the New York Office where he worked for 14 years. On 9/11/2001, he was the SWAT Team coordinator/ crisis manager for the NY office, and was in Yemen assisting with the investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. When he returned, he applied for and took a position on the Moussawi (ph) trial team here in the DC area, and a few months later was asked to join the reorganized Fly Team as a supervisor. He then took the assistant chief position he holds now in Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI. He was also involved with the teams of Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel who investigated the embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998. *	Interview 1 at 01:30:02:00, 02:40-05:54
09/7/2001	[redacted] explains as to the Counter Terrorism Division - FBI organizational chart (bates 16807), within the Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI portion, he reports to Frankie Battle who in turn reports to DAD T.J. Harrington. It is one of the few HQ operational units. Before 9/11, HQ had none; all operational units were in the field offices. After 9/11, Director Mueller saw the need to have operational units within HQ that he could send out to the field as investigators, and serve as HQ's eyes and ears, instead of waiting for the field to relay critical information up the chain through the layers. [redacted] experience in the USS Cole bombing had been with the traditional method of sending his information back through the NY office management structure, and then down to Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ. Robert S. Mueller, III was responsible for briefing the National Security Council at the White House every day - and was not getting information fast enough. The Fly Team was created in response - to fill that need.	Interview 1 at 06:30:09:50,
11/??/2001	[redacted] says that as to other portions of Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI, the other components of it were not necessarily logically placed in	Interview 1 at 10:00-

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	CTORS, but no one knew where else to put them, including Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. MLDU was built on the fly, like building an airplane in the air, and was the result of the need for boots on the ground in Afghanistan to help the military process and interview detainees. As he understands it, the military asked for assistance, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation responded. Thereafter, Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel were sent to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to interview detainees there as well. He thinks that even the military has come to recognize that the Federal Bureau of Investigation are effective interviewers using their traditional criminal interview method. The MLDU was created later to keep track of the people sent.	11:40
12/27/2003	[redacted] says that the military did not tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Iraq that they were going out on the raid to capture Saddam Hussein, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation found out about it the next morning. The Federal Bureau of Investigation [redacted] ended up interviewing him because the [redacted] and military were concerned that there would be trials at which they would be exposed. [redacted] ended up interviewing Saddam Hussein for six months. *	Interview 1 at 57:30-59:20
??/??/2004	[redacted] says that the second time he went to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was for one week in 2004 on an Federal Bureau of Investigation operations assessment trip with Frankie Battle. In neither of [redacted] trips to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba did he observe any conduct towards detainees that concerned him. He did occasionally hear someone in an interrogation yelling at the top of their lungs.	Interview 1 at 36:40-42:00
Sat 01/24/2004	[redacted] says that Gary M. Bald would be the person to tell us what happened on this subject between Edward H. Lueckenhoff's 1/24/2004 e-mail Gary M. Bald, Frankie Battle, M. Chris Briese, and T.J. Harrington, et al., and [redacted] 5/11/2004 e-mail. He says that Edward H. Lueckenhoff "was a bit of a unique problem for us in that he had a tendency to pick the phone up and call Bald directly. He felt he had this special relationship with Gary Bald or upper management and did not need to go through the chain of command at HQ." This was a "problem on numerous occasions." [redacted] believes that Lueckenhoff had many many telephone conversations with Bald. He thinks that the reason Lueckenhoff "circumvented" the chain	Interview 1 at 1:59:21-2:01:39

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05/??/2004	of command was that he had a "big ego," and since OSCs tend to be picked by an AD or higher, they may feel they do not need to talk to lower ranking personnel. *	
05/??/2004	raises the matter of [redacted] in Afghanistan, says that he was at the center of that and can speak to it. [redacted] was the only agent who raised detainee treatment concerns to [redacted] but he never said he saw anything; only that he was worried it was going to happen. *	Interview 1 at 44:00-44:33, 1:01:00-1:01:35
05/??/2004	says that he was right in the middle of the situation with [redacted]. As to the 5/13/04 e-mail to Gary M. Bald and others including [redacted] (Charles 10488-492), he says that the three Fly Team agents were [redacted] and does not believe they shared [redacted] concerns. [redacted] showed the e-mail to [redacted] and they discussed it, and [redacted] was immediately concerned about [redacted] mental state. He then went to discuss this with T.J. Harrington. Halfway through reading it, T.J. Harrington said he thought [redacted] needs to come home," and [redacted] agreed. He also then saw Arthur M. Cummings in the hall and asked him to read the e-mail. Arthur M. Cummings had the same reaction. *	Interview 1 at 1:04:00-1:09:45
05/??/2004	says that during the weekend after the 5/13/2004 e-mail from [redacted] came in [redacted] grand-daughter was born and [redacted] was in the hospital most of it. [redacted] called him on his cell using the satellite phone from Afghanistan, and they could not talk freely over the open line, but [redacted] was able to communicate that the things there that he said could be better related to their team leader, and [redacted] was able to say that HQ was going to fix the situation. Within a few days [redacted] was on a plane home. *	Interview 1 at 1:09:45-1:10:25
05/??/2004	says someone there in Afghanistan asked [redacted] if he had seen any abuse, and he said no, but that he was concerned that it could become another Abu Ghraib Prison, which was then all over the news media worldwide. [redacted] was asked if he really thought other military officers were going to jeopardize their careers by asking him to participate in something like this. [redacted] says that [redacted] seems like a nice guy, but very high-strung, gets worked up very quickly, and did not have the seasoned, confident and commanding presence that was needed to be able to say to military officers, if the situation warranted, "sorry, Colonel, but we don't do that."	Interview 1 at 1:10:25-1:14:00, 1:22:30-1:23:11

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	<p>_____ did not talk to _____ when he came back. He has talked to _____ and _____ and they told him at the time that they saw no abuse and he thinks they share his opinions on _____. _____ thinks _____ was "a poor choice for the position." He feels that his concerns were an over-reaction to the situation. *</p>		b6 Per FBI b7C
05/??/2004	<p>_____ says that he did not know if _____ had ever been in a war zone before, that seeing detainees being put into kennels may have been startling for him. He says that it is possible that he misunderstood his assignment, or that it was not adequately explained to him - which would be "our fault" for not being clear. _____ may have mistakenly thought he was being sent "to do the military's bidding." *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:13:20-1:14:10</p>	
05/??/2004	<p>_____ says that he DNR _____ discussing being concerned about the military's use of stress positions as a standard procedure. However, at some unknown point in time, _____ has learned that such positions are allowed in military interrogations. The CTD marching orders for Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel have been that if they are present when techniques beyond Federal Bureau of Investigation rules are employed, they are to remove themselves and report the situation to their On Scene Commander. The OSCs were instructed to be familiar with the military techniques, and if a report came to him indicating that the conduct exceeded approved military techniques, then the OSC was to raise the issue with his counterpart in the military and report it back to Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ. He says that it was incumbent on the OSCs to educate their personnel on approved military techniques. This was the policy starting around May 2004. *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:14:10-1:17:25</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
05/??/2004	<p>_____ recalls sitting down with Valerie E. Caproni and Marion E. "Spike" Bowman, and then saying that the Federal Bureau of Investigation needed to give the agents written guidance. He told them what he thought the policy should be, and they agreed. He says that there needs to be some flexibility and realism - half in jest he notes the difficulty in the mountains of Afghanistan in telling (b)(7) personnel their conduct would be reported. _____ was at this meeting as was _____. Later that day they composed the EC that did not get signed. _____ was back from Afghanistan by then, and was invited to the meeting but did not show up. They were surprised that he did not show up. *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:17:25-1:21:16</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C

05/??/2004	<p>[redacted] recalls the e-mail from Arthur M. Cummings telling a number of Federal Bureau of Investigation managers to meet with [redacted] and have him clearly articulate his concerns and be able to tell Federal Bureau of Investigation agents exactly what kind of environment they can operate in. This was around the same time as the meeting with Valerie E. Caproni and Marion E. "Spike" Bowman. [redacted] thinks it is probably true that he did not participate in the meeting with [redacted] because he was with Arthur M. Cummings overseas at the time, and he DNR being at such a meeting. When he was overseas, he did brief Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel on the interview policy he has described to us. *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:18:40-1:22:45</p>
Tue 05/11/2004	<p>Raymond W. Holcomb says that as to the 5/11/2004 e-mail from [redacted] on bates 4688-4690, which attached e-mails from January 2004, he DNR of anything that happened on this subject between Edward H. Lueckenhoff's 1/24/2004 e-mail and [redacted] 5/11/2004 e-mail to [redacted] et al - all supervisors on the Fly Team. He DNR what happened on this after Edward H. Lueckenhoff forwarded it to Gary M. Bald, Frankie Barile, M. Chris Briese, and T.J. Harrington, et al. When he saw the 5/11 e-mail, he recalled vaguely having seen or hearing about the 1/22/2004 e-mail. He used to sit next door to [redacted] He says that [redacted] is a "very capable agent" and "did a very good job" as detainee interview coordinator at Abu Ghraib Prison. *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:54:30-1:59:21</p>
Wed 05/19/2004	<p>[redacted] says that as to the 5/19/2004 EC from Office of the General Counsel - FBI concerning the treatment of prisoners and detainees, bates 6332-6334, he thinks he wrote a lot of it. He also says as to the 5/26/2004 document on the same subject, it was drafted by [redacted] and [redacted] right after the meeting with Valerie E. Caproni and Marion E. "Spike" Bowman in the middle of May, and that they wrote it without knowing about the 5/19/2004 document. He thinks the 5/19 document was not issued and uploaded until much later. He then agrees he may be wrong about that because the 5/26/2004 document references the 5/19 OGC document, saying that the 5/26 was written to clarify the 5/19. He reiterates he did not know about the latter, does not recall the synopsis line referring to the 5/19 and speculates that it may have been added after he left. Soon after the 5/26 was written, he left for Afghanistan, and kept sending e-mails back asking whether or not the 5/26 EC had finally been approved and signed off on</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:23:20-1:34:40</p>

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	by OGC. In any event, the rules in the 5/26 was what he was telling Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel at the various locations he went to in Afghanistan while he was over there - whether it was official policy or not. He does not believe the 5/26 was ever signed. He thinks [redacted] can explain what the sequence was here, but guesses that the 5/19 may have drawn from the 5/26. He explains the difference between case numbers and serial numbers.	
06/??/2004 - 07/??/2004	[redacted] deployed two or three times to Afghanistan, but has never been deployed to Iraq. His deployment in June and July 2004 to Afghanistan did not involve any joint interviews or joint planning of interviews with the military or others. He was there as a manager and On Scene Commander to assess the Federal Bureau of Investigation's operations there, and form opinions as to how it should use its resources there. Arthur M. Cummings was also part of that assessment team, but went home after a week, while [redacted] stayed for another month or so. He did not interview any detainees but was inside the detention facility at Bagram. From the catwalk in that detention facility, he could observe the detainees in their cells, but he did not observe interviews being conducted. He saw no conduct by US personnel at Bagram that could be considered mistreatment. *	Interview I at 26:40-29:35, 35:35-36:45
06/??/2004 - 07/??/2004	[redacted] says that while he was in Afghanistan, he toured a number of the forward bases - Khost, Salerno, Jalalabad - and traveled to Kandahar. He did not see any interrogations or interviews while he was in these locations. He does not recognize the [redacted] His trips to the forward bases and Kandahar were meet with and check and see that his personnel were OK, and find out what they were doing. [redacted] who may be retired now. The Federal Bureau of Investigation agents detailed to the [redacted] had language abilities, or had worked on Al-Qaeda matters for a long time [redacted] He does not believe that any of the Federal Bureau of	Interview I at 59:20-1:01:30, 2:02:20-02:05:00

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	Investigation agents detailed to the [redacted] would depart from established Federal Bureau of Investigation rules re interviewing detainees. He cites [redacted] as the kind of person who would stand up to Tenet if necessary, and not back down. *		
Tue 11/23/2004	[redacted] says that the assessment he did concerning Afghanistan was not approved and uploaded into the Federal Bureau of Investigation system for many months after the date it bears. As to the discussion on page 5, 2d paragraph, concerning Federal Bureau of Investigation use of rapport-based interview strategies and joint interviews with military and [redacted] personnel, [redacted] estimates that as to Afghanistan, joint interviews with military personnel have been far more common. [redacted] He agrees that the use of the word "jointly" suggested more military participation in interviews than may have actually been the case. *	Interview 1 at 1:34:40-1:38:50, 1:40:30-1:42:26	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] is Assistant Section Chief with Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI, and held this position in an acting capacity for nine months before being confirmed. Altogether he has held this position for about two years. *	Interview 1 at 0:00:01-30, 02:00:02-45	
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that Military Liaison and Detainee Unit now has liaison personnel with all of the major military combatant commands -- NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, SOCOM. *	Interview 1 at 11:40:	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that the Fly Team now has close to 30 investigators, many of whom have been overseas numerous times, and many of whom were formerly in the military and move more easily into that environment and structure overseas, and are often paired up with an agent from a field office. *	Interview 1 at 12:50:15:08	
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that as to another portion of Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI, the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, is the umbrella organization that oversees and coordinates all of the terrorism task forces nationwide, including one in every field division. *	Interview 1 at 15:08:16:00	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that OPS 1 and OPS 2 are different from Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI in that they oversee the ongoing field investigations within the US. OPS 1 is composed of small teams, each of which oversees several field	Interview 1 at 16:00:24:03	

	divisions -- with a resulting geographical organization. He thinks that OPS 2 breaks things down differently - organizing its oversight teams according to terrorist organization. ORS differs from OPS in that ORS supports OPS 1 and OPS 2, by providing a lot of the analytical tools to the field, and process, analyze and organize all of the intelligence coming in, and share the results with the field, and with OPS 1 and OPS 2, who also pass it out to the field. He agrees it is fair to say that ORS are the collectors and processors of the information coming in, and that the field offices, through OPS 1 and OPS 2, as well as National Joint Terrorism Task Force, are the consumers of the ORS information products, such as collected information on, for example, missing crop dusters or tractor trailers, that might be used in terrorist attacks. The hope is that such information products can be used to prevent and disrupt terrorist activities, and in that way ORS is a support organization. ORS information products are predominantly derived from domestic information collection. Access to such information overseas is difficult at best. In terms of overseas detainees, the only parts of ORS that would relevant information for us would be Military Liaison and Detainee Unit and the Fly Team, and he, Frankie Battle and T.J. Harrington oversee those.	
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that he has been deployed many times overseas as a member of the Fly Team. It was originally structured to respond to domestic situations, where field division offices did not have enough seasoned investigators to handle them. As time went on they became focused more on overseas operations, and now about half their work is overseas. *	Interview 1 at 24:30-26:43
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] says that he never really felt that he needed better information or understanding as to what a military or [redacted] interrogator was allowed to do in questioning detainees. He felt that it was enough for him to know what the Federal Bureau of Investigation's rules and limits were. He is extremely confident when he says, after 22 years in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that they are well-trained, have a lot of interview strategy classes, and they come out of Quantico believing and understanding that they are guardians of the Constitution. "By and large," they use a "reasonable man standard" and "have an instinct about what is right and what is wrong." He says that he is totally confident and proud to be able to say that he is not aware "of any instances where an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent exceeded his authority or	Interview 1 at 42:00-48:35

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	participated in an operation where it was clearly abusive."	
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ agrees that one problem that can occur when Federal Bureau of Investigation work in the military's environment is that an agent can be drawn into conduct in which he or she would not otherwise engage. The other problem is knowing what to report and what need not be reported. He points out the frequent use of the word "abuse" with little or no definition. He says that he is not sure that a definition is really necessary, but might be nice to have, and notes that a senior Federal Bureau of Investigation management person recently said that she had learned of a new allegation of abuse at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that related to an instance where an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent sang to the detainees. He says that he just about fell out of his chair, was trying to keep a straight face, and asked her if the agent had a really bad voice. He says that she was really quite upset that an agent was singing to detainees.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 42:00-49:35</p>
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ says that in the situation where the military beats a detainee in the morning and the Federal Bureau of Investigation interviews him in the afternoon using their standard report-based approach, he does not believe one can ever come up with a precise line at which the Federal Bureau of Investigation is participating in the abuse. "Amazingly enough," things have "worked pretty well" as is. He feels that if the good cop-bad cop situation were deliberately set up, then an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent would not participate, and that would be "wrong." However, if a detainee whom you believe has important information comes into your custody after having been mistreated by another organization, an agent would probably try to determine who was responsible for the mistreatment, and then go forward with a traditional interview. For example, he interviewed a detainee in Zanzibar who had been held in a black hole in the ground in Tanzania, who was so glad to see him he thought the guy was going to jump in his lap and kiss him. Since the guy wanted to talk to _____ he was going to listen.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 49:30-54:07</p>
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ says that as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's relationship with the _____ there has been "initial" cooperative and joint interviewing of detainees by the two agencies. "Very little." He says that the _____ story is "famous" within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is illustrative: the first two agents to get access to him were Federal Bureau of Investigation when he was critically wounded and believed to be on his death</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 53:55-57:50</p>

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	<p>bed [redacted] has heard that the agents actually tended to his wounds, fed him and gave him water at his bed side, developed an amazing relationship with him and got some great intelligence from him days later when once he was recovering. Tenet thought that the [redacted] agents were doing the interviews, and when information gathered from [redacted] made its way back to the White House and National Security Council, Tenet was "proud as a peacock." [redacted] has heard that when he learned that it was Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who had gathered this information, Tenet "hit the roof." Immediately after that, the Federal Bureau of Investigation people were pulled out, and Federal Bureau of Investigation access ended. [redacted] says that there "has been very little friendly, cooperative, joint interview or interrogation work by the two agencies." He says they have their reasons, saying that the military is uncomfortable with the Federal Bureau of Investigation too, because they initially saw the Federal Bureau of Investigation as people who were going to open cases on the military personnel for abuses, and "were very leery" of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. You could see it in their eyes, a room full of military [personnel] would quiet when FBI agents entered the room, and in some cases FBI agents were asked by military personnel to leave a room. In his opinion, the relationship with the [redacted] has changed very little over the last several years. *</p>	
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>[redacted] says that over time "the military has come a long way," and has slowly come to realize from the results that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's technique does work, that it takes patience, and that real life interrogations are unlike the image conveyed by Hollywood. As a result the military has more and more adopted Federal Bureau of Investigation techniques in their interrogations, and become more and more comfortable with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Initially, the military thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation were softies.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 36:00-57:30</p>
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>[redacted] says there is for agents deploying to Iraq on Federal Bureau of Investigation training program similar to the one that has been set up in Salt Lake City for agents deploying to Afghanistan. It is conducted at Quantico. It used to be five days long and may have been expanded to seven. He thinks, but is not sure that someone from Office of the General Counsel - FBI participates in the Quantico program. He guesses that the Afghanistan and Iraq training programs started about 1.5 years ago. He thinks that the first</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:01:30-1:04:00</p>

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	two or three rotations in did not get the training. The contents of the training have evolved.	
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ says that due to the small numbers of Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in Afghanistan, the number of interviews in which they have been involved is small compared to the number of interviews they have "had no involvement in whatsoever." Often, an interview is done at the request of a field office back in the US as a lead to be pursued overseas. Often, when scheduling the interview with the military and arranging access, they would say they wanted to come along just to hear it. It was not possible for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to interview all the detainees that came through US military facilities. It has also been the case that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had to rely on military translators because they did not have their own in Afghanistan. *</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:38:25-1:42:35</p>
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ says that he thinks there are MOUs between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military of the _____ but DNK of any bearing on the treatment and questioning of detainees. He thinks that it is unlikely there is any such thing with the _____ but would be surprised if there is still no MOU covering this issue with the military. He would talk to _____ if he had to find such a thing as to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and to any of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's OSCs in Iraq or Afghanistan.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:42:35-1:46:45</p>
Tue 09/27/2005	<p>_____ says that all of the OSCs are debriefed when they return from Afghanistan and Iraq, depending on their schedules and with consideration for their desires to see their families after being away for long periods. If they do not catch them on their way through DC, they have brought them back to HQ as soon as possible for after-action debriefings. This is what _____ has been involved in. There is no hard and fast debriefing schedule. Also, Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, because it is a small operation, they are on the phone every day with the OSC in Afghanistan, "there is a constant dialog," and when he comes home they already know what his complaints and suggestions are, and there are no surprises. In Iraq, it is a little harder to do that. The debriefing responsibilities are therefore shared by _____ Frankie Battle, Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, International Terrorism Operations Section 1 and International Terrorism Operations Section 2. As to the responsibilities for daily communications with Iraq, _____ explains that International Terrorism</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 1:47:10-1:53:44</p>

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	<p>Operations Section 2 is responsible for Iraq operations, and oversees Iraq more closely than International Terrorism Operations Section 1 oversees Afghanistan because ITOS1 has Al-Qaeda cases and is therefore very busy. ITOS2 is nowhere near as busy as ITOS1. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit assumed a lot of the responsibilities as to Afghanistan because Arthur M. Cummings (then Section Chief of ITOS1) trusted and had confidence in [redacted] and was happy to have them take that responsibility. International Terrorism Operations Section 2 uses MLDU much less, handling more of the logistics themselves, in [redacted] opinion, for internal Federal Bureau of Investigation turf and political reasons. When it came to daily hands-on stuff, ITOS2 section chiefs, M. Chris Briese, [redacted] and now [redacted] would talk every day to the OSCs in Iraq. In other words, there was just as much HQ dialog with OSCs in Afghanistan as in Iraq, just different participants in the dialog. *</p>	
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] knows of no photos or videos, other than what has appeared in the media, depicting what could be considered abuse or mistreatment of detainees. *	Interview 1 at 2:05:00-2:05:40
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] knows of no case in which an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent asked someone in the military to do something with a detainee that the agent would not himself be allowed to do. He says that if that situation came up, he would "absolutely" consider that a problem.	Interview 1 at 2:05:40-2:07:09
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] knows [redacted]	Interview 1 at 2:06:10-2:06:50
Tue 09/27/2005	[redacted] knows of no instances where an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent said that military personnel had asked them to do something with detainees with which they were uncomfortable. He also knows of no instance when military personnel attempted to prevent Federal Bureau of Investigation agents from observing what was going on in an interview being conducted by military personnel, by, e.g., blocking the view from an adjacent observation room.	Interview 1 at 2:07:00-2:08:15

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