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01G-INTV-000656

CaseMan Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [REDACTED] Interview 1" - 35 of 7882 (0.4%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones  
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Date & Time	Fact/Text	Source(s)
Sun 02/28/1999	[REDACTED] BOD date is 2/28/1999, and before that he was an Army engineer officer for 10 years.	[REDACTED] Interview I at 01:00-01:55
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[REDACTED] served in Iraq between 1/7/2004 and 3/20/2004 at Baghdad International Airport, and a came and was a liaison with the (b)(1) Baghdad International Airport, a (b)(1) (b)(1) He also went through Camp Victory, and Slayer, from time to time. He knew the (b)(1) He conducted detainee interviews at the (b)(1) He estimates that he spoke with roughly five to ten detainees there. He agrees that Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel spoke to a fairly small fraction of the detainee population there. He estimates that at a given time there were usually 20 to 35 detainees at this facility.	[REDACTED] Interview I at 02:00-06:35
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[REDACTED] says that his OSC and D/OSC were Edward H. Lueckenhoff and [REDACTED] He worked with SSA [REDACTED] who worked at the Bagdad Operations Center at Baghdad International Airport [REDACTED] DNK whether or not [REDACTED] ever went to the (b)(1) [REDACTED] essentially worked as a deputy to [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Interview I at 06:35-07:20
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[REDACTED] says that in addition to a US civilian military contract translator, he teamed up as much as possible for detainee interviews with another Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. He did not have a consistent partner though. As to the joint planning with other US military, even military personnel wore civilian clothing, so it was somewhat ambiguous, and it was hard for him to tell whether he was working with a military person or a civilian, but it was not a problem. The person was serving as a translator, and the planning related to having the translator understand what	[REDACTED] Interview I at 07:20-11:11

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	intended to do and subjects he intended to cover, to see if the translator had worked in interviews on these subjects before. However, he usually used Federal Bureau of Investigation translators; it was the rare occasion when he used military translators. He recalls working with 1(b)(1), (b)(3):10 U.S.C 130(b). This may be (b)(1), (b)(3):10		
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	says that as to training, Edward H. Lueckenhoff provided guidance as to Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel not participating in interview techniques they would not use in the normal course of their work those that went beyond their training. says that Edward H. Lueckenhoff did not go into or describe specific kinds of such conduct that he might encounter.	Interview 1 at 11:11-11:50	b6 Per FBI b7C
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	says that he was part of an advance party for his deployment, and arrived in Iraq about a week before the main body of Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel for that deployment. So there may have been other training the rest of the group got that he did not. But he did not get any training before deployment as to Federal Bureau of Investigation or non-FBI standards of conduct or as to what he should do if he saw something wrong.	Interview 1 at 11:50-13:00	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	DNR whether Edward H. Lueckenhoff specifically discussed what Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel should do if they encountered some conduct beyond Federal Bureau of Investigation protocol, in terms of reporting or stopping the conduct. However, understood that if there was a problem, he could come back and discuss it with the chain of command.	Interview 1 at 13:00-13:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	says that re his recommendation in response to 25 that further agent training should be broad and focused on principles, the downside to itemizing banned techniques is that there are so many variations of improper treatment that one cannot itemize all the permutations that military interrogators could devise, and the agent is not given specific guidance on what to do in that instance.	Interview 1 at 13:55-15:35	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	says that as to sleep deprivation in question 29, he observed a detainee at the (b)(1) February or March 2004 who was forced to stand in his cell for an extended period of time, but he DNR how long, in order to keep the detainee awake. He saw the guard open the cell door, catch the detainee sleeping, tell him in English to get up and back on his feet, saw the detainee comply, and saw the	Interview 1 at 18:50-21:01	b6 Per FBI b7C

	guard close the door. [redacted] did not observe any slapping, any strobe lights or loud music used for this purpose. [redacted] asked the guard what was that about and the guard said he had been instructed to keep the detainee awake. *	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that as to forcing a detainee to perform demanding physical exercise (Question 38), SAs [redacted] and [redacted] told him they had observed this with several detainees at the (b)(7) [redacted] said that "interrogators would occasionally have a detainee pace back and forth along a wall for hours in order to induce fatigue. I don't know if he ever saw this or not. SA [redacted] advised that he once observed a military interrogator have a detainee do deep knee bends/squats for a short period of time in order to induce cooperation/fatigue." [redacted] says that he also recalls hearing about other physical training or calisthenics with detainees, such as pushups, situps, and the like. There was no indication of beatings or assault or anything like that. *	[redacted] Interview J at 18:50-23:00
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that all of his observations of detainee treatment described in his Questionnaire responses occurred at the (b)(7)	[redacted] Interview J at 18:50-21:01
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that as to Question 38, he did hear about some detainees refusing to comply with instructions to perform the calisthenics, in the sense of a detainee getting tired and stopping walking, for example. He DNK what happened then, but would imagine that the interrogators yelled at him and told him to keep going. *	[redacted] Interview J at 22:45-23:25
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that as to Question 42, hooding or blindfolding other than during transportation, in 2/2004 or 3/2004, he occasionally observed a total of several detainees being removed from their cells to be taken to interviews, and that they already had hoods over their heads. He did not see or hear about detainees being interrogating while the hoods were on, however. He was aware that at times, a detainee was left in his cell with the hood on, but he could manage to take it off. He observed a guard look into a cell through the "peep hole" and tell a detainee to put his hood back on. [redacted] did observe detainees being held for long periods with hoods over their heads in their cells, but does not know for how long. He understood that the purpose of this was to soften up the detainees and coerce information from them.	[redacted] Interview J at 23:25-25:50

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	The particular instance he was describing was that the same detainee he observed with the guard being forced to stay awake and stand up that was also being told to keep his hood on. *	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that in the interrogation rooms, the detainees at times had handcuffs on, but it was not all the time. In the cells, when one would open the door and there were several detainees inside, some would have them on and some did not. He never saw a detainee being held in a position with foot shackles. When they were put into cells, usually the guards would take the shackles and the handcuffs off. He observed that sometimes they ran short of cuffs and shackles so they took them off some detainees to put on others. The foot shackles he observed had about 18 inch chains between the two of them. He did not observe any attachment of shackles or handcuffs to floor bolts in the cells, but did see some shackles embedded in the floors or walls to hold a detainee in position in some of the interrogation rooms. *	[redacted] interview I at 25:50-27:55
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says as to cold or hot room temperatures (Question 43), that he "once observed a detainee through the open door of an interrogation room that appeared to be shaking/cold. The wall unit A/C was on in the room and I knew the room could get cool from previous interviews I had done there." He could hear the wall unit operating and saw him shivering. He DNK how long the detainee was in that situation, but did not believe it would have been longer than a shift since it was not a holding cell. He did not discuss this observation or detainee with any military personnel. *	[redacted] interview I at 27:55-29:00
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that as to bright flashing lights or darkness (Question 45), he "occasionally observed a detainee being removed from a cell with no light on inside. One such instance was when the detainee was forced to stand but the light was kept off." He DNK how long the light had been off, but he was aware that guidance would have been given to the guards. He believed this was preparatory to the interrogations *	[redacted] interview I at 29:00-30:05
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that no detainee that he interviewed at the (b)(1) lever complained to him about the way they had been treated by any US personnel. The complaints he got - from one detainee in particular - was that he did not understand why he was being detained. [redacted] believed he had a legitimate complaint	[redacted] interview I at 30:05-31:35

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	in that regard and [redacted] discussed it with the officer in charge, telling him that [redacted] was concerned about whether there was sufficient cause to hold this detainee, but the detainee remained in custody. The officer in charge said that the detainee was going to be transferred to Abu Ghraib Prison, where there would be a final determination as to his release or further detention. He DNK what happened with this detainee. [redacted] says that he never went to Abu Ghraib Prison for any purpose.	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] said in his questionnaire response to 46 that a fairly high-ranking Ansar al-Islam (AI) detainee and veteran of Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s was an admitted jihadist and operative "was isolated for two purposes: to reduce his influence on other detainees and to isolate him in order to maximize cooperation. I occasionally observed other detainees that were alone - I don't know for how long." The isolation was for two or three weeks to his knowledge but it could have been longer, and this was a very tough individual and from what [redacted] could see he was not very much distressed by this. He was in the same building with the other detainees in a separate cell, next door to others, separated by plywood walls, so he could hear others and probably talk to neighbors. [redacted] estimates that the cells were about 6.5 ft square. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 3:35-35:00
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] said in his questionnaire response to 58 that the (b)(1) (b)(1)	[redacted] Interview 1 at 35:00-38:50

Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that he did not hear that [redacted] personnel used harsh or aggressive interrogation tactics at the (b)(1). However, [redacted] considered himself a visitor of (b)(1) "huff," and that (b)(1) personnel considered everyone other than themselves as visitors in their "space" so that they expected all visitors to follow their rules and do things their way. [redacted] would have been surprised if [redacted] personnel were allowed to do anything beyond (b)(1) rules in their camp. [redacted] feels this was a very well-run facility, and that the commanders were always present while he was there for the 3-4 weeks he was the Federal Bureau of Investigation liaison to that facility. *	[redacted] Interview I at 38:50-40:35
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that he thinks there had been some press reports by that point about what had happened at Abu Ghraib Prison, and that those at (b)(1) were not going to permit a similar breakdown in professionalism and discipline there. While other Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had not come back from Abu Ghraib Prison and said they saw any abuses, they came back and said it was in horrible condition to live or work there. [redacted] DNK whether or not the discipline he observed at the (b)(1) was the result of what had come out about Abu Ghraib Prison or was inherent in that organization and facility, but suspects it was a combination of both. *	[redacted] Interview I at 40:35-42:45
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] said that Edward H. Lueckenhoff and other agents in Iraq were clear that Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel were not to be involved in any detainee abuses of the kind that were being discussed re Abu Ghraib Prison, and if such were happening there, Federal Bureau of Investigation people were walking away from it. In the scuffle about what had occurred at Abu Ghraib Prison among Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel, there was no talk about the existence of photos or videos depicting those abuses.	[redacted] Interview I at 42:45-46:10
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] said in his questionnaire response 62 that he observed the occasional use of a female military interrogator "in order to demonstrate how much power was held over the given subject. I never heard/saw of this becoming a sexually coercive/provocative issue, rather a demonstration that a woman could be in power over them - something not well accepted by the detainees." He did not conduct any joint interviews with the female military interrogator, so he DNK if she did anything	[redacted] Interview I at 46:10-50:40

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	<p>other than ask detainees questions the way a male would. He would have been very surprised if the female interrogators were in any way sexually suggestive with the detainees. He did not observe it and heard of no planning for it either. His knowledge of this was derived from the shift change meetings discussions. He thinks it was understood by all that Arab males did not like taking orders from or answering questions by females. It was only implicit that they wanted to see if a female would rattle a detainee. It was not accidental. *</p>	
<p>Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004</p>	<p>_____ says that as to question 70, his report in late February 2004 to SSA _____ related to _____ question about what he should do if he observed a detainee being made to walk back and forth next to a wall, specifically and non-FBI techniques generally. _____ advised that I was not to participate in any practices beyond Federal Bureau of Investigation scope/procedure, likewise I was to give similar guidance to other Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in that situation. He asked me to keep him informed if I saw anything abusive/illegal, which I never did see. _____ had seen the rub mark at shoulder height in the interrogation room where detainees had walked the wall, but he had not seen it being done yet. _____ raised this issue during his first week in the (b)(1) _____ and wanted to know whether he could bring such matters to Schwein who assured him that he could do so. He DNR any specific lines drawn or more specific guidance beyond a reminder of what Edward H. Lueckenhoff had said, to use his good judgment as an agent, to be thoughtful and careful, and if it is really bothersome to him to report it. This was the understanding _____ had when he came away from the conversation, and not a quote of what _____ said. *</p>	<p>Interview _____ at 30:50-53:30</p>
<p>Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004</p>	<p>_____ said in response to question 76: "The detention facility I had exposure to was a well-run military operation. The chain of command was present at all hours of day and night. There was a medical doctor, psychiatrist, and attorney on-site as well. They held twice daily staff meetings to discuss recent rounds of interviews/interrogations and the next round. The officer-in-charge and NCOIC were often inside the jail facility, ensuring control of the prisoners, guards, and interrogators alike. I observed this organization retrieve actionable intelligence from detainees that was then used by the tactical unit they supported to conduct more</p>	<p>Questionnaire _____ Interview 1 at 1:14:25-1:16:35</p>

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	successful missions." [redacted] notes that there was an Army CID officer stationed at the (b)(1) [redacted] who was observant about detainee treatment issues. This officer was actually concerned about turf and whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation was getting into his law enforcement duties, and [redacted] tried to assure him that was not the case. [redacted] helped the CID officer with info and advice from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's explosives experts there at Baghdad International Airport. *	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] recalls there was an SOP for the (b)(1) [redacted] as to how it would be run. It did not relate to how interviews or interrogations were to be conducted or what kinds of techniques were or were not allowed. He DNR anything in the SOP as to not giving food or water to detainees for the first 24 hours. He would not be surprised about food, but would be surprised about water. He DNR anything about withholding food or water, and no detainees complained about this. The main complaint was when guards were not quick in getting detainees to the portable toilet when the detainees knocked to signal that they had to use it. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:07:19-1:07:35
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] did speak at some point to the military commander at the (b)(1) [redacted] about the differences between Federal Bureau of Investigation and military rules for questioning detainees, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did nothing that would violate the military's rules, that as Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, they had to do things their way, and that they had been given guidance not to participate in some things that the military personnel did, and there was no objection to that. The military personnel usually questioned detainees in the first 24-72 hours, and it was after that that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents came in and did more thorough interviews. There were situations when the military went back in to question detainees after the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had interviewed them, but not by design, rather it was due to situations such as newly obtained information. He was not aware of any discussion whereby a sequence of military and Federal Bureau of Investigation interviews was arranged. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:04:35-1:05:55
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] was not aware of any case in which a detainee was put into a sleeping bag and tied up to induce feelings of claustrophobia. He was also not aware of any use of duct tape as blindfolds. Inside the (b)(1) [redacted] they used empty sandbags only with the tie strings left loose. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:07:20-1:09:10

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Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that in the (b)(1) there was one observation room with closed circuit television monitors for most if not all of the interrogation rooms. He never heard of any effort by military personnel to prevent the Federal Bureau of Investigation's observation of what was going on in an interrogation room. He never saw anything on any of the monitors that concerned him re detainee treatment. *	[redacted] Interview I at 1:09:10-1:10:40	b6 Per FBI b7C
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that at the (b)(1) they also collected biometric information from the detainees, and that he observed this occurring, and participated for all the detainees who came in while he was deployed there. He did not observe any injuries that seemed to him to have occurred other than in battle or in the capture of the detainee, due to abuse of a prisoner. *	[redacted] Interview I at 1:16:35-1:17:55	
Wed 01/07/2004 - Sat 03/20/2004	[redacted] says that while he was deployed to the (b)(1) he was there more than any other Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. He took over for [redacted] here. He believes that SA [redacted] in Miami took over for him when he left. *	[redacted] Interview I at 1:18:00-1:19:05	
12/??/2004	[redacted] says that the After Action Review described in his response to question 75 was hosted by Frankie Battle from Counter Terrorism Division - FBI sometime in late 2004. [redacted] was also at this conference as the Washington Field Office reps. [redacted] may also have been there, and there were agents from NY there as well. There were also reps from the recent rotation in the fall of 2004 who had just returned from Iraq. Not everything was fresh in [redacted] mind as to what had happened during his deployment, but he recalled enough to have some input. He DNK whether anything was put in writing to memorialize the results of the conference. There was a private contractor who served as a moderator for the conference. He believes that the discussions relating to detainee treatment and interview / interrogation issues focused mainly on what kinds of guidance should we be giving to our agents prior to deployment.	[redacted] Interview I at 53:50-58:30	b6 Per FBI b7C
12/??/2004	[redacted] says that by the time of the one-day After Action conference in late 2004, the (b)(1) Baghdad International Airport had been shut down and moved to a different facility, and that some Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel were located there, rather than everyone coming home at night to the Bagdad Operations Center. There was discussion of guidance for that situation, and while	[redacted] Interview I at 58:00-1:00:00	b6 Per FBI b7C

	there was "not too much consternation" about preparation or guidance for that situation, but that the sense of the meeting was "absolutely" that training and guidance "could be improved." He DNR any specifics being offered or discussed.	
12/7/2004	<p>[redacted] recalls that at the After Action, Frankie Battle said early in the day that he had received guidance from those even higher in the chain of command that he was going to be very receptive to this kind of feedback and he said he would pay close attention to whatever product came out of this meeting. It was clear to [redacted] that someone had made clear that this feedback was going to be taken seriously. However, he DNR what actions were taken as a result of the conference. He DNR that any specific kinds of detainee treatment were discussed at the conference, and says that this topic was one of about eight that were addressed during the course of the day. This was the only occasion on which any Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel discussed detainee treatment issues with him. He did talk before the conference to [redacted] about this subject and the need to avoid violating Federal Bureau of Investigation standards but still get access to these facilities. [redacted] did not share any particular concerns re detainee treatment with [redacted]. No one from the military has spoken to [redacted] about this either.</p> <p>Tue 11/22/2005 [redacted] says that he is not aware of any photos or videos depicting what could be seen as detainee mistreatment or abuse beyond what he has seen in the media. *</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 58:00-1:01:19, 1:10:40-1:14:25</p> <p>[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:07:00-1:07:20</p>

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