

CaseMap Facts Report

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
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Date & Time:	Fact Text:	Source(s)
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings was contacted by Dale Watson immediately after 9/11/01 and asked to work TDY in DC. At the time he was in Richmond working as a field supervisor. Arthur M. Cummings said in February or March of 2002, Dale Watson asked him to go to Cuba to "fix a problem in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." According to Arthur M. Cummings, "drug supervisors" from the Miami Field Office were trying to run terrorist cases.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 2
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings met with Michael E. Dunleavy and Ron Bukema and explained the Counter Terrorism Division - FBI's mission. Arthur M. Cummings said they were "floored" to hear what the Federal Bureau of Investigation could offer. They thought that Federal Bureau of Investigation was there to "put people in handcuffs." Federal Bureau of Investigation showed up and Michael E. Dunleavy said he had no idea why they were there. Miami said it did not have any agents available to conduct counter-terrorism interviews, but someone got agents assigned. When he went to visit, Arthur M. Cummings said there were 15-20 agents just sitting and reading files. Arthur M. Cummings explained to Michael E. Dunleavy that the Federal Bureau of Investigation could offer a service. The Federal Bureau of Investigation knows how to conduct adversarial interviews and how to get people to talk when it is not in their best interest. The military was clear that what they wanted to elicit was "tactical" intelligence. Arthur M. Cummings agreed to unravel the network of Jihadists in general and not just Afghanistan. Arthur M. Cummings convinced Michael E. Dunleavy to build extra detainee interrogation rooms for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Arthur M. Cummings said there were no documents recording his	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 2

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To Be Determined	<p>meetings.*</p> <p>Immediately after meeting with the military in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Arthur M. Cummings just "got on the phone" and called Pasquale D'Amuro. He assigned [redacted] an analyst, to keep things running. She put together a protocol and showed the military (<i>What protocol?</i>) Arthur M. Cummings said that initially there was no disagreement with the military about technique, coercive vs noncoercive. Most interviews were done separately. If a detainee was very important for both then the Federal Bureau of Investigation would have a military person in the room. Arthur M. Cummings left U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in April 2002, after 32 day TDY.. Once at HQ he was taken off the project and put on a different project with Pasquale D'Amuro.*</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 3
To Be Determined	<p>According to Arthur M. Cummings, the question of what kind of support Federal Bureau of Investigation should have in Afghanistan was critical. He thought that it was important for Federal Bureau of Investigation to be involved with the Department of Defense. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was qualified to work a site like a crime-scene, but for High Value Detainee. In June 2004 he went to Afghanistan because one of his agents almost got killed at a Sensitive Site Exploitations [redacted] had gotten into a fire-fight.) *</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1
To Be Determined	<p>According to Arthur M. Cummings, Federal Bureau of Investigation involvement with Department of Defense at Sensitive Site Exploitations was critical.*</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
To Be Determined	<p>Arthur M. Cummings said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot be the IG for counter-terrorism investigators. He has heard about different strategies that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would not do, and assumes that the other agency is doing it based on their own policy. Arthur M. Cummings said the Director made a decision early in the process that he did not want Federal Bureau of Investigation agents involved in an coercive strategies. He said that Pasquale D'Amuro or Larry A. Mefford told him that the Director said these strategies were "off the table." Arthur M. Cummings said it may have been Mary Galligan who pushed these strategies. She wanted to "get in front of" KSM and [redacted]</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
To Be	<p>Arthur M. Cummings described the [redacted]</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview

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Determined	Federal Bureau of Investigation agents would go TDY to the [redacted] to do interviews with detainees after the HVD had been interrogated. Once the Federal Bureau of Investigation got involved, Arthur M. Cummings said they assumed the agency had used whatever authority they were allowed to use. Arthur M. Cummings said there was an MOU with the [redacted] but that we would have to talk to the [redacted] to obtain the MOU.	1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
To Be Determined	When asked about [redacted] Arthur M. Cummings described him as "ranting" and being almost "irrational." It struck him that [redacted] was in a panic, or at least that is what he heard. He thought that if he was so unclear about his role, then he should not be in that situation. "	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that when an agent is TDY [redacted] [redacted] The Federal Bureau of Investigation Director does not want the agents to be tainted by anything they do or see. Arthur M. Cummings said that although he knows that the [redacted] has authority to use "advanced techniques" he has never been briefed as to what those techniques are and does not know what they are. Arthur M. Cummings said that although people were initially annoyed with the Director's decision, now it seems "brilliant." He said the [redacted] [redacted] or [redacted] should be able to tell the Office of the Inspector General when the Director made the decision. Arthur M. Cummings said the Director did not issue anything in writing to everyone. He said he "did not know" why the Director didn't put this in writing.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said he did not know of a general MOU between the military and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When an individual agent is detailed, there is an agreement about paying for housing. Arthur M. Cummings said he recalled conversations with [redacted] about U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques. He thinks those may have been in connection with detainee # 63. Arthur M. Cummings remembered that Department of Defense was not able to get # 63 to talk, but that he talked once the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with him. Department of Defense said that they had "softened him up." "	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05

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To Be Determined	According to Arthur M. Cummings, the counter-terrorism issues at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were being handled by agents who knew about narcotics. It was being managed by drug supervisors who did not understand counter-terrorism issues. Michael E. Dunleavy thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation was there to put handcuffs on people. They had no idea why the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Federal Bureau of Investigation was not getting access to any of detainees. Counter-terrorism needed a national approach, but it was getting a local one. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 8:10; 10:27; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 2.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings got military to understand that they needed to know everything about the detainees as possible, about family, about everything. They were not interested in the tactical information. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 13:00
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that initially, Michael E. Dunleavy said, "I have no idea why you're here." Arthur M. Cummings said the Federal Bureau of Investigation quote to Michael E. Dunleavy was, "I'm just a narc, tell me if you need anything" Arthur M. Cummings did not know who got the agents assigned to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at first, but there were 15 - 20 agents there when he arrived. They were just reading files. *	Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 3; Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 15:30
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings identified [redacted] an analyst, as his "right hand person." They put together a triage, Pakistani first... She was assigned to Miami, she stayed, she kept everything running. She got promoted at headquarters and now works in Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. At the time he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the only thing he heard was going on was interviews. No controversy over technique, coercive or non-coercive. Arthur M. Cummings described most of the military people doing interviews as reservists who had no prior training. "The Dunkin Donuts management." Mostly, interviews done separately. At the end of the day, they'd schedule them for the next day. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 17:22, 20:00; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 3
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings described two "points of contention" between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. One was whether the detainees would be shackled during interviews, shackled to a belt. There were debates over interview techniques, "what a bunch of clowns." *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 26; 29:00 Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 4.
To Be	[redacted]	Arthur Cummings Interview

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Determined	[REDACTED]	I at 26:50; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 4
To Be Determined	July 2002, Arthur M. Cummings working for the Director to have a new analytical capability. They had 30 analysts from the [REDACTED] They had someone from [REDACTED] help to build a "hybrid." In September 2002, he was given the position as head of the new Section. Building the counter-terrorism from 100s to thousands, from one to nine section chiefs. At this point, Larry A. Mefford was DAD and Pasquale D'Amuro was EAD. Arthur M. Cummings argued it was becoming a "hodgepodge." He wrote a proposal for Frankie Battle's section, Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI.	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 32:00 - 35.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings noted that Federal Bureau of Investigation was involved in Sensitive Site Exploitations. March 2004 to November 2004 he was section chief of ITOS 1. Arthur M. Cummings wanted to make it clear to the military that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not an extension of the military. An EC put together by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 44; 46.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings recalled hearing that a detainee was going to be thrown out of a helicopter. He thought this was awful. The Federal Bureau of Investigation handbook says we don't do that. [REDACTED] told Arthur M. Cummings that there were high level discussions going on about U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion tactics.	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 54; 56
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be "out of line" and be in trouble if it tried to stop certain actions taking place. We would not be out of line if we brought it up with our supervisors. The counter-terrorism community has to work as a single group. The Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot be the IG for the counter-terrorism community. We will not get anywhere. Arthur M. Cummings: if something is methodical and part of a process, as much as people don't like it, then it is okay. If it turns into anger, then he knows a line has been crossed.	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 1:01
To Be Determined	According to Arthur M. Cummings, the Director has made clear that even if the agents want access to high value detainees, we cannot have access to them. This	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 1:05 - 1:07; Arthur

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	debate went on for over a year since 9/11. We were told [REDACTED] The Director said no. You cannot even be there. This came up with Larry A. Mofford and Pasquale D'Amuro regularly. The material coming out the HVD was "garbage" so they kept asking to be able to get to the HVD. [REDACTED] had Pentbom. She was the one who was really hard on getting in front of [REDACTED] and KSM. Arthur M. Cummings said he told [REDACTED] he could not get in front of the Director.	Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 9.
To Be Determined	[REDACTED]	Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 9; Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:09
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings identified an MOU between the [REDACTED] and Federal Bureau of Investigation. He said he could not provide the MOU without getting clearance. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:14.
To Be Determined	Discussing change of counter-intelligence units, Arthur M. Cummings recommended to Larry A. Mofford that it be divided by operational units, operational support units and analytical response sections. According to Arthur M. Cummings, headquarters agreed with his suggestions and wrote a section for operational response section led by Frankie Battle. Arthur M. Cummings "picked up" Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI in January 2003. Then Military Liaison and Detainee Unit developed, part of ITOS under Andrew G. Areta. [REDACTED] began to report to Arthur M. Cummings in January 2002 - first week in March 2002. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 35 - 40; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 5
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that as head of International Terrorism Operations Section he was interested in what were they getting from these interviews. He was very invested in Federal Bureau of Investigation CT strategy. He wanted to make a big cultural shift and relegate law enforcement to below CT. He argued that Federal Bureau of Investigation participation with SSE with military were essential. Arthur M. Cummings said to take the words "crime scene" out of the vocabulary, but to do	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 40; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 6 - 7.

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	essentially the same tasks. Go to where an High Value Detainee was supposedly located and collect all the important information. March 2003 - November 2004 he was section chief of International Terrorism Operations Section I. Frankie Bartle had all logistic support to military with U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Afghanistan. Arthur M. Cummings was responsible for operations. What investigations should be done, make sure they were done correctly, etc. *	
To Be Determined	[redacted] got into a firefight during an Sensitive Site Exploitations that Arthur M. Cummings approved. Larry A. Mefford was concerned that an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent would get killed in Afghanistan. In response, Arthur M. Cummings went to Afghanistan to review all the operations including the Sensitive Site Exploitations and make sure the military understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not there to be an extension of the military. Is the military taking agents and sending them on missions that were not Federal Bureau of Investigation missions? Arthur M. Cummings said that [redacted] and [redacted] put together an EC afterwards. (11/23/04 EC - bates 18012) *	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 46 - 49; Bates 18012
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said there were agents doing interviews with detainees, but he did not look into that. He said that his understanding was that if detainees had any value, those detainees were already being interviewed. [redacted] He distinguished this scenario from interviews conducted at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 49:20; 50:55
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings comments about [redacted] Arthur M. Cummings said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation kept asking, "Do you think you're ingratiating yourself." The answer was that the military did not want to do that. Arthur M. Cummings repeated the Federal Bureau of Investigation "mantra" that you "always start soft and then go hard. Once you've gone hard, you can never go back."	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 52
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said he never saw anything that he thought was outside what he /the Federal Bureau of Investigation should see. The first time he heard about this	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 53

To Be Determined	was an EC [REDACTED] Arthur M. Cummings said that basic Federal Bureau of Investigation policy is that they do not do anything coercive. "we don't do that." If he saw Department of Defense or [REDACTED] doing something different, he would disagree with the technique, but he would assume it "was consistent with their policy."	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 54
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that [REDACTED] told him that there big negotiations were going on about whether they could use U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques. These were high level discussions, Pentagon and Donald Rumsfeld. Policy decisions being made. Arthur M. Cummings said that "if I saw them and thought they were egregious, I would have the sense to report this, but I was never exposed to this."	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 55 - 56; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 8.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said he had been through U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion training so he knew what [REDACTED] was referring to when they had these discussions. Arthur M. Cummings thought there was a list as to what the military could do. [REDACTED] said he thought it was interesting to him, but it was outside his realm of responsibility.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 56 - 57
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings explained that if he witnesses something and it is methodical and part of a process then it is okay. If it turns to anger, and someone has lost their composure then he knows that a line has been crossed. Arthur M. Cummings said that he would not be in the room in any event.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:03 - 1:04
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said that there was an argument for a year after 9/11 that there were detainees that the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in the field wanted access to. Arthur M. Cummings [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Director said, "I don't care what you guys say, I do not want you to be there." Some agents said, "Can't we just be there, even if we're not doing anything?" Arthur M. Cummings said that Larry A. Mefford and Pasquale D'Amuro reported to him that the Director said it was "off the table, period." The Director did not want to discuss it at all.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:05 - 1:08
To Be	[REDACTED] was very determined [REDACTED]	Arthur Cummings Interview

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Determined	She had the Pentbomb case and wanted to get information [redacted] that Arthur M. Cummings said he finally started parroting and telling it was not on the table.	I at 1:08-1:09; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 9
To Be Determined	[redacted]	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 1:09 - 1:11:53; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 9-10
To Be Determined	[redacted]	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 1:12 - 1:14
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings thought dealing with detainees after they had been dealt with by the military was the same thing as dealing with detainees who had been dealt with by [redacted]	Arthur Cummings Interview I at 1:15

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To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] To his knowledge, when he was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he did not know about Department of Defense using enhanced techniques. He heard about yelling, but nothing else. He knows that [redacted] has a different story because there was a debate about Department of Defense using U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques. Arthur M. Cummings said he does not know if Department of Defense did authorize U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques. "</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:16 - 1:18; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 10.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings said at this point, preservation of evidence comes second to gathering intelligence.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 10
To Be Determined	<p>Arthur M. Cummings said he did not know what [redacted] had been briefed into. [redacted] sent an e-mail to [redacted] that he was uncomfortable with things that "might" happen. He got a call from [redacted] Arthur M. Cummings said that if [redacted] could not make that judgment after eight or nine years, then he should come home. As an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, he should know what he can do and what he could not do. Arthur M. Cummings sent an e-mail to Valerie E. Caproni and Marion E. "Spike" Bowman asking for guidance. "</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:24 - 1:26
To Be Determined	<p>Arthur M. Cummings said that when he asked [redacted] where were the "enhanced techniques" occurring, [redacted] said "well, they could happen" * *</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:30
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] reported to Arthur M. Cummings in his official capacity. Arthur M. Cummings worked with [redacted] and his "shop" as to what is working, what is not working. [redacted]</p>	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:34 - 1:37; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 11.

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To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings explained that the Director's point of keeping agents from the "enhanced techniques" is to keep them from being tainted. The Director did not want agents to have difficulties when on the stand in the future when asked about what they did or what they saw. Arthur M. Cummings said he did not know what may have been reported to, for example, Valerie E. Caproni, as to what agents may have seen soon after 9/11. Arthur M. Cummings emphasized that he has never been briefed as to what the advanced techniques are. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:38 - 1:40; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 11.
To Be Determined	According to Arthur M. Cummings, in retrospect, the Director was very wise to keep the Federal Bureau of Investigation out of "enhanced techniques. Arthur M. Cummings said he did not think it was "plausible deniability."	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:40-42
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings gave the following example: [REDACTED] Arthur M. Cummings said, why am I second guessing them? The question is where is the line? Arthur M. Cummings said he holds agents to a very high standard. He thinks agents should be able to tell the difference. He thinks the agents should not be seeing these things, if it happens it happens by accident. We're not supposed to be exposed to it, if we are, then you should report it. If it is reported, should go to T.J. Harrington and then to Department of Defense.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:46 - 1:54
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] would be aware of the Director's decision that they would not be involved. There was no written document after the decision was made. Arthur M. Cummings said he did not know why a written decision was not issued. Arthur M. Cummings said this decision did not require action so that may have been one reason why it was not written up.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 1:55 - 1:57; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 12.
To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings did not recall there was an MOU with the military. They use MOU's when people are detained.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings

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To Be Determined	Arthur M. Cummings recalled a conversation with [REDACTED] about # 63 that after they discovered he was likely the 20th hijacker, then his value went up. Department of Defense used enhanced techniques on him, but it wasn't until the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with him did they get information. Department of Defense responded that they had "softened him up." Arthur M. Cummings noted this was outside his area of responsibility and was just a conversation he had with [REDACTED]	Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 12. Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 12.
To Be Determined	Pre-911, Arthur M. Cummings said they would be called in to collect evidence. Post 911, they collect intelligence and do not worry about evidence. We have told the military and [REDACTED] When there was the bombing of the Jordanian embassy, Arthur M. Cummings said he pushed to get involved because the Federal Bureau of Investigation is involved in the CT community. The Director agreed. According to Arthur M. Cummings, that was almost a "watershed event." No American individuals.	Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 2:20; 2:20; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 14
To Be Determined	[REDACTED]	Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 15; Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 2:30

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??/??/2002	<p>Arthur M. Cummings said that initially, Michael E. Dunleavy had no idea why Federal Bureau of Investigation was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. <u>The events from the Miami field office</u> told him they usually did narcotics cases. [redacted] was Arthur M. Cummings "right hand person." She was an analyst, initially assigned to Miami, but then promoted and assigned to Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. She put together a protocol and showed it to the military. Initially, there was no disagreement about interview techniques, e.g. coercive vs. non-coercive. Arthur M. Cummings described most of the military personnel doing interviews as reservists who were "Dunkin Donuts management." Most of the interviews were conducted separately, but the ones that were very important to both would have an Federal Bureau of Investigation and military person in the room. Arthur M. Cummings emphasized that there were no documents initially and that he would just get on the telephone and call Pasquale D'Amuro. "</p>	<p>Arthur Cummings Interview 1, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05</p>
??/??/2002	<p>Arthur M. Cummings said he briefed the Director in 2002 as to how valuable U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was. They couldn't say they weren't getting any access, because they were getting some access. The problem was with detainees like #63. The Director asked for situations when the military did something and it did not work and the Federal Bureau of Investigation did something and it did work. Arthur M. Cummings said he could not do that until [redacted] Arthur M. Cummings said he was disgusted because the military had him for nine months; within five hours they got him to talk. Arthur M. Cummings thinks it may have required Marion E.</p>	<p>Arthur Cummings Interview 1 at 2:06 - 2:08; Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05 at 13.</p>

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	"Spikes" Bowman to reach out to the Defense Intelligence Agency General Counsel to get the Federal Bureau of Investigation access. *	
02/17/2002	After 9/11/01, Dale Watson asked Arthur M. Cummings to come to HQ for a 90 day TDY. (He had been assigned to Richmond.) During the second TDY assignment, in February or March of 2002, Dale Watson asked Arthur M. Cummings if he would go to Cuba to "fix our problem in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." Arthur M. Cummings thought it was management problems. The problem was that it was being run by "drug" guys and not people with CT training. Arthur M. Cummings said he met with Michael E. Dunleavy and Ron Bukema and explained that "we (the Federal Bureau of Investigation) offer a service. We know how to do adversarial interviews. We know how to get people to talk when it is not in their best interest." Arthur M. Cummings described Michael E. Dunleavy and Ron Bukema as "floored" because they thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation was there just to put people in handcuffs. Arthur M. Cummings said that the problems at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were getting a local approach and not a national approach. Arthur M. Cummings said he convinced them that they needed to get information from the detainees that was not just tactical information. The military wanted tactical information. Arthur M. Cummings raised the question, "after being held in custody for so long, was really is tactical?" In general, these detainees were all Jihadists, not Afghans. Arthur M. Cummings said he got Michael E. Dunleavy to agree to give the Federal Bureau of Investigation access to the detainees and to build extra detainee interrogation rooms. According to Arthur M. Cummings, there are no documents reflecting his discussions or agreements. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1. Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05
03/17/2003 - 11/17/2004	Arthur M. Cummings helped Pasquale D'Amuro reorganize, on 7/1/02 they put together the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (National Joint Terrorism Task Force). The task force did threat warning and assessment. He was given the section chief position in September 2002. In January 2003, they put together Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. [redacted] was the first Unit Chief. Between March 2003 and November 2004 Arthur M. Cummings was the Section Chief for International Terrorism Operations Section I. *	Arthur Cummings Interview 1
Tue	When asked about the e-mail dated 11/9/04 to Marion E. "Spikes" Bowman and	Arthur Cummings Interview

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11/09/2004	[redacted] re: \$5 million Reward for Justice program for capture of [redacted] [redacted] in Yemen, Arthur M. Cummings explained that the State Department would not pay the reward to a nation. Arthur M. Cummings said that other countries release 130 terrorists every year. (There was further e-mail traffic with Valerie E. Caproni, [redacted] Gary M. Bald, [redacted] et al. .)	I, Arthur Cummings Interview Notes 8/2/05	b6 Per FBI b7C
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