

OIG-INTV-000051

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [REDACTED] Interview 1" - 32 of 7911 (0.4%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/23/2009 3:36:41 PM

Date/Time	Event	Source ID
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] says that whether or not the military interrogator has approval for certain techniques, such as stress positions, does not have any effect on what actions he as an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent can take, and he believes that any information obtained using such techniques is absolutely worthless. He would want to verify using Federal Bureau of Investigation techniques any information obtained using the military's techniques. He notes that he would want to know whether a detainee had been subjected to such military techniques, because it would affect his decision as to when or whether to interview that detainee.	Interview 1 at 1:23:25-1:26:45
Mon 08/22/1988	[REDACTED] is now assigned to the Critical Incident Response Group in Quantico. Before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation he served as an Army infantry officer for about six years. His BOD date is 8/22/1988. His first office was the Washington Field Office, left in 1992 to go to Alabama, then went to Hostage Rescue Team until 1998, then took a supervisory position in the Laboratory Division, Hazardous Materials Response Unit until July 2001, when he was transferred back to HRT. After 9/11, he was detailed to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI in 11/2001, and was the Federal Bureau of Investigation's representative to CENTCOM, Special Operations Command. He was overseas from 11/2001 until 4/02, and during most of that time he was in Qatar, Afghanistan, Kenya, Yemen, Kuwait, Dubai, Ethiopia, and Uzbekistan. He served as part of the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force, on which a (b)(1) [REDACTED] case officer, a State Dept. security representative also served. Later in 4/2002, he went back to HRT as a supervisor. In 1/2003 he was detailed to International Terrorism Operations Section 2 in CTD to start writing what became OPORD 1015, and later traveled quite a bit overseas in order to implement it. In May 2003, he went back to Quantico, in January 2004, joined the	Interview 1 at 00:10:06:35

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	My Team, and just left CTD in 10/2005 to go back to Critical Incident Response Group at Quantico on the Personnel Recovery Coordination Group. *		
11/7/2001	[redacted] says that before he left to go overseas in 11/2001, he knew there was a pretty good chance that he would be interviewing detainees together with US military or [redacted] personnel. But the primary reason he went over was to facilitate operations overseas between Federal Bureau of Investigation country teams and Department of Defense personnel. *	Interview 1 at 19:55-23:45	
11/7/2001	[redacted] says that in his conversation with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman concerning possible observations of improper detainee treatment by the military, he also confirmed that in addition he would report it to Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ. If the issue had come up, [redacted] would have reported it to his supervisor [redacted] who was head of the Osama Bin Laden Unit, and to Marion E. "Spike" Bowman, since he did a lot supporting Department of Defense requests to Department of Justice for support personnel - Sensitive Support.	Interview 1 at 28:50-30:35	b2 Per FBI b6 b7C
11/7/2001	[redacted] says that he was not aware of any disputes or conflicts between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military as to proper or effective interrogation techniques in Afghanistan, but it was his understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's rapport-based and substantial advance preparation based interview techniques were foreign to a lot of the military and [redacted] interrogators early on who asked questions only from a set script, according to what he heard from others. He heard that early on the military complained that the Federal Bureau of Investigation took too long, but later the military realized and acknowledged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was really good at getting information from the detainees that their interrogators had not. *	Interview 1 at 32:10-35:30	b2 Per FBI b6 b7C
11/7/2001 - 04/7/2002	[redacted] says that in the period of 11/2001 to 4/2002 when he was overseas, he had access to and saw some classified documents relating to military rules as to what they were allowed to do if they requested and were given permission from the appropriate command level to do things like stress positions and ambient temperature adjustments, but he was not briefed by anyone on this issue. These was a Department of Defense document from Donald Rumsfeld which told him just how far a military interrogator could go. He DNR the dates of the document, but believes he first saw it in 2002 and believes that it was two to three pages long. He later says that it is possible he first saw it during preparations to go	Interview 1 at 23:45-28:40, 35:30-43:13	b6 Per FBI b7C

	<p>into Iraq [] also spoke to Marion E. "Spike" Bowman before going over about his reporting obligations as an agent if he encountered detainee treatment by the military in which he was not allowed to engage. He confirmed with Bowman that if he encountered such things he would excuse himself from the room, go advise the military commander that the detainee may be part of a criminal case and he could not be part of or privy to this. Also, while he was in Qatar, there were certain cases in Afghanistan in which he was told by agents there that as a general rule early on the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not allow military interrogators to join them in detainee interviews, if it related to an Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation, unless there was a very good reason for them to participate in the Federal Bureau of Investigation interviews. At that time it was also very hard to get Federal Bureau of Investigation agents into interview of detainees by the military or get access to the information gathered by the military from the detainees. He also referred to a Department of Justice document relating to questioning detainees. He thinks that most Counter Terrorism Division - FBI personnel dealing with interrogation operations overseas were familiar with the Donald Rumsfeld document. <i>Follow-up [] thinks he can access and provide us a copy of the classified Donald Rumsfeld document he used from his computer archive file, and he will check.</i></p>		<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p> <p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
01/??/2002	<p>[] says that during his work overseas from 11/2001 until 4/02, in Qatar, Afghanistan, Kenya, Yemen, and other countries, related to detainee treatment and interview issues in that he did interact with the first people going in to Afghanistan - [] and his personnel. He went to Afghanistan to coordinate in about January 2002 what they were doing, would read the reports from detainee interviews, and would review what they were getting from Department of Defense or the [] He did not do any detainee interviews in Afghanistan during this period. He went to both Kandahar and Bagram.</p>	<p>[] Interview 1 at 06:35-10:30</p>	<p>b2 Per FBI b6 b7C</p>
01/??/2002	<p>[] says that as part of his duties and responsibilities in Afghanistan in 1/2002, he traveled first to Kandahar with the [] case officer and the Navy officer to see how operations were going there, then went to Bagram. Around that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has suspended its participation in Sensitive Site Exploitations with Department of Defense at Robert S. Mueller, III's request due to safety issues. Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in Sensitive Site Exploitations resumed</p>	<p>[] Interview 1 at 11:32-15:35</p>	<p>b2 Per FBI b6 b7C</p>

	at a later date. In Bagram, he was there only about two days, and observed and acted as a liaison the intelligence fusion cell headed by General Gary Harrill. There were between two and four Federal Bureau of Investigation agents working in that fusion cell at any given time. Harrill had recently had a video-conference call with Robert S. Mueller, III in which Harrill indicated that he needed the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents there. [redacted] did no detainee interviews there and did not observe interviews done by others. He did not tour or observe conditions in the Bagram detention facilities.		b6 Per FBI b7C
01/??/2002	[redacted] notes that they had [redacted] [redacted] This was very frustrating. This was one of the reasons [redacted] went to Bagram. [redacted] felt that the [redacted] was starting to shut the Federal Bureau of Investigation out of the detainee interrogation process.	Interview 1 at 15:35-16:20, 1:33:10-1:34:25	b2 Per FBI b6 b7C
01/??/2002	[redacted] says that during his trip to Afghanistan in 1/2002, none of the agents there expressed to him any concerns about the way detainees were being treated by the military or anyone else. None of the agents in Afghanistan indicated to him while he was in Qatar any concerns relating to interrogations or treatment of detainees by the military. *	Interview 1 at 16:20-16:45, 28:40-29:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
01/??/2002	[redacted] says that in the early period in Afghanistan, he believes that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents could have done joint interviews with military of [redacted] personnel if they chose to, but that they chose not to. He believes this was largely because of the great differences in the interview approaches, and the limited time available to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents with the detainees. He is not aware of insistence by the military of [redacted] Agency on participating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in interviews. He thinks it may have happened but was worked out on the ground and did not percolate up the chain to HQ.	Interview 1 at 43:00-45:30	b2 Per FBI b6 b7C
??/??/2003	[redacted] was aware of Federal Bureau of Investigation assessment teams going over to Iraq after the OPORD 1015 to assess the situation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation mission there. He thinks that [redacted] did one, and that [redacted] did another [redacted] was probably involved in one as well, and probably [redacted] did as well. *	Interview 1 at 56:31-1:00:35	b6 Per FBI b7C
01/??/2003 -	[redacted] Discusses the two drafts of OPORD 1015 [18435-48 -(1/22/2003) and 31643-		

02/??/2003	655 (2/5/2003)) relating to operations in Iraq which identify him as the drafter. He says he has seen a final version of this signed by Director Robert S. Mueller, III. At the time [] was working for Charles E. Frahm who was International Terrorism Operations Section 2 section chief, and Frahm tasked him to prepare this, and he is now the CT SAC in NY. *	Interview 1 at 45:30-48:58	
01/??/2003 - 02/??/2003	[] says as to page 3, paragraph h., of the OPOD 1015, relating to a planned Joint Interrogation Facility-North in southeastern Turkey, this was not actually done because the Turks ultimately did not cooperate, so the US military did not host Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel there. It would have been a Defense Intelligence Agency facility. [] does not know whether the military hosted Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel in another JIF. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's initial focus and operations were with document exploitation elements of Defense Intelligence Agency in Kuwait as described in paragraph g on the same page. *	Interview 1 at 49:00-52:40	b6 Per FBI b7C
01/??/2003 - 02/??/2003	[] says as to these the OPOD 1015 drafts that the intent was to have a handful of HRT guys (led by []) co-located with the first US personnel to gain access to Iraqi intelligence HQ, and that the HRT would breach the safes to obtain and initially analyze their contents for information concerning potential Iraqi operations in and attacks against the US. *	Interview 1 at 52:40-54:15	b6 Per FBI b7C
01/??/2003 - 02/??/2003	[] says as to these the OPOD 1015 drafts that he DNK whether there was any consideration given to including guidance as to the differences between the military's rules for questioning detainees and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's rules. *	Interview 1 at 54:15-56:31	
05/??/2004	[] says as to the e-mails (4688-4690) starting with the 1/22/2004 [] to Edward H. Lueckenhoff and [] forwarded to [] and others in May 2004, he was aware of this at the time. He DNK whether the military ever approached the Federal Bureau of Investigation as [] said they might. He did not and does not know of anyone else in the Federal Bureau of Investigation who saw the videotapes that are described. In May 2004, he was not asked to do any follow up on this and DNK of anyone else who was, and he had no contact with T.J. Harrington or Valerie E. Caproni about it. He DNK of any follow up action on this matter within the Federal Bureau of Investigation between January and May 2004. The 5/11/2004 e-mail from [] was sent to her supervisors on the Fly Team. *	Interview 1 at 1:02:00-1:09:50	b6 Per FBI b7C

05/??/2004	[redacted] says that he spoke to [redacted] about her 5/11/2004 e-mail after she returned from Iraq and sent it, but DNR the details of that conversation, other than it was a casual one and not because he was asked to follow up. *	Interview 1 at 1:31:15-1:33:10
Wed 05/19/2004	[redacted] says that he remembers seeing the 5/19/2004 EC from Office of the General Counsel - FBI (6332-6334). He did not participate in drafting it, and knows of no one in Counter Terrorism Division - FBI who did. If someone in CTD had been involved, he would not be surprised if they had spoken to [redacted] and would also guess they would talk to the extra-territorial folks out of NY and [redacted]. He thinks he had seen written guidance on this subject before, but could not say when. He does not think there is anything new in it. He was aware of some requests for additional guidance as to what constitutes "abuse" (but not "participation"), and thinking that that was "kind of asinine because if you had any doubt whatsoever, stop, get up and leave," and also report it. To him it is "very cut and dried as to what we can and can't do." He never heard any discussions about agents seeing questionable or abusive conduct by the military, but did hear the "what ifs."	Interview 1 at 1:09:52-1:17:00, 1:20:15-1:20:40
Wed 05/19/2004	[redacted] says that he DNR any later revisions of the 5/19/2004 EC.	Interview 1 at 1:20:40-1:21:05
Fri 05/21/2004	[redacted] says that as to the 5/21/2004 e-mail from Frankie Battle (4481-4482) to [redacted] re a request from [redacted] seeking assistance in preparing for Gary M. Bald's testimony before Congress, [redacted] had no responsibilities and was not actually involved in this. *	Interview 1 at 1:57:55-2:00:45
09/??/2004	[redacted] says that in September 2004 he did some detainee interviews in Afghanistan in connection with the bombing of the Dyncorp building killing three Americans, as part of a group of Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel investigating that case. [redacted] and worked at Bagram [redacted]. While there [redacted] served as OSC because the current OSC had to leave early and they wanted a GS-15 there. [redacted] was there about one month. He did not get to Kandahar. He did communicate by phone with Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel deployed to Khost and FOB Salerno. During this trip he had no contact with detainees held by the US	Interview 1 at 07:00-11:20, 19:00-19:40

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09/7/2004	military. *	[redacted] says that [redacted] followed him as OSC in Afghanistan. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 10:25-11:00
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted] Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] says that he has not served in either Iraq or U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo	[redacted] Interview 1 at 11:20-11:32
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] is not aware of any photos or videos depicting what could be considered mistreatment of detainees by any US personnel, except for what has been in the media. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:21:05-1:22:39
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] has not observed or heard from someone who did any of the kinds of detainee treatment described in the questionnaire. He was aware that when detainees were first brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1/2002 they were shaved and given haircuts for hygiene purposes and to get a good facial identification, but not to embarrass them. He did not witness identification processing of detainees. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:22:39-1:23:25, 1:27:10-1:31:10
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] that he has never learned that any military or [redacted] personnel had attempted to conceal what was going on in a detainee interrogation.	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:33:10-1:34:15
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] says that he did not see any impersonation of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, and possibly heard about it but recalls nothing specific, except for [redacted] in Afghanistan. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:34:15-1:36:20
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] says he DNR ever hearing about any Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel removing themselves from an interview or ending their participation in an interrogation because of the conduct of military or [redacted] personnel. *	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:36:20-1:36:50
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted]	[redacted] was not debriefed individually about his overseas experiences, but did participate after he returned from Afghanistan in regular roughly quarterly, after action, "hot wash" meetings at HQ with groups of agents about what agents had seen they they were doing well, poorly or indifferently, and recommendations - both as to Afghanistan and Iraq. The last one he attended related to Iraq, was chaired by Gary M. Bald (possibly) and T.J. Harrington, and was attended by former OSCs such as Edwin L. Worthington and Thomas	[redacted] Interview 1 at 1:36:50-1:44:15

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	V. Fuentes, and by Frankie Battle, and occurred while Edward H. Lueckenboff was OSC in Iraq. [redacted] attended because he was involved in deployment arrangements for people to go over to Iraq. He is not sure if the event was sponsored by Counter Terrorism Division - FBI or Critical Incident Response Group. He recalls that much of the discussion related to what their mission was, what were appropriate uses of Federal Bureau of Investigation resources, and whether they should be doing the kinds of things they were doing, such as responding to and investigating bombings, rather than what was appropriate in detainee interviews. He is confident that the meeting was memorialized and that he has seen the document. To find it, he would check with Frankie Battle or Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit - FBI. *	
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted] says that before today he has not been interviewed by anyone about the kinds of issues we have asked him about, except for the e-mails and a questionnaire from OGC trying to get a handle on who had seen what overseas. *	Interview 1 at 1:44:15-1:45:10
Mon 11/14/2005	[redacted] says he thinks that because of their experience with detainee interviews, we would want to talk as well to [redacted] (now Legat in Yemen), [redacted] at Critical Incident Response Group, [redacted] Washington Field Office, [redacted] (now on Fly Team) (Arabic speaker), [redacted] (Arabic speaker), [redacted] (now Legat in Amman, Jordan), as well [redacted] due to her logistics work in Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit - FBI).	Interview 1 at 1:49:30-1:57:55

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