

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2. DATE /YYYYMMDD/ 2004/05/19	3. TIME 1429	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS CW2	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A/CO 519TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, FORT BRAGG, NC 28310			

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on or about 25 July 2003, after staging thru Kuwait (12 March 2003) and serving for a period of time in Iraq at Bushmaster and Dogwood (6 - 30 April 2003). On May 1st I moved to BIAP to establish the V Corps Interrogation Facility. We conducted a Transfer of Authority with B/325 MI in June 2003 as we were expected to soon redeploy to the Fort Bragg. However, we had were informed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] around 20 July that we would be moving to Abu Ghraib to establish a special interrogation facility there. While on a recon of AG with COL Pappas [REDACTED] and others, I and several other interrogators gave recommendations on setting up the facility and processes for screening and interrogating the detainees. We were first told that the objective would be to establish a specialized facility to identifying and interrogating Saddam Fedayeen personnel detained as a result of Operation Victory Bounty. (A unidentified maneuver unit was conducting operations based on a list of some 1800 - 2000 names of Saddam Fedayeen. When CJTF-7 found out about the list, Operation Victory Bounty was formed). The actual raid rounded up some 180 folks from the list out of which only 62 proved to be of any value. The impression I had was that this operation was based on old and unverified single-source information. Many of the detainees who were on the list really did not have any affiliation with the Fedayeen Saddam (i.e., mayors and other officials who were notified they were now members of the Fedayeen Saddam then later - 2 months later - notified they were no longer members). At some point the decision was made to expand our mission to a larger scope due to short falls at Camp Cropper. I suspect that BDE [REDACTED] may have known about the consolidation of facilities at AG and might have wanted for A/519 to get its foot in the door at AG and begin to lay a solid foundation for the consolidated facility. Although operational plans for new operations called for detainees to be sent to Camp Cropper, they redirected to AG instead. AG began to receive detainees of value from all raids in the area and gradually mission creep set in and we were no longer specializing in attempting to identify Fedayeen Saddam personnel. In the beginning of the establishment of the facility at AG, C2X and 205th constantly pressured us for more and quicker reporting from detainee interrogations, at times contacting interrogation personnel directly. Only after the intervention of the 519th BN Commander did they begin to back off and start using the established reporting chain without skipping echelons. On or about 12 September we found out that the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) was to be formed at AG, mostly as a result of the visit by MG Miller and his team, although the decision might have been made prior to the MG Miller visit. MG Miller and his team recommended to COL Pappas on forming "Tiger Teams" with a dedicated analyst, but in hindsight that might have been more suited to a strategic environment than to our tactical situation. One of the main problems we faced was a lack of thoroughness by capturing units, MITs and Division cages - there seemed to be no tactical screening, the processing was not done right, and capture tags were either not done or done incorrectly. By 12 September the decision had been made to consolidate some facilities and move detainees into AG. Around 14 or 15 Sep detainees from Camp Cropper began moving to AG. A couple days later, interrogators from the 325th moved to AG. (We were joined by interrogators from 66th, 500th, and 470th in October). While the 205th was beginning to stand up the JIDC around mid September, COL Pappas informed me that [REDACTED] would be the JIDC Operations OIC and that [REDACTED] would be the Deputy JIDC CDR. In several meetings with COL Pappas [REDACTED] the 519th personnel raised several issues that needed to be dealt with (detainee population, composition of JIDC, reporting, detention criteria, JIDC's criteria for accepting detainees from other units, release process, use of Mobile Interrogation Teams, OGA, etc.) Detainee population: In the beginning (end of July to mid September) the 72d MP Company commented that the detainees held at AG were well mannered. Normally, 519th personnel ended interrogations by reinforcing the camp rules. Yet after the consolidation of facilities the detainees who had moved from Camp Cropper and other facilities who were not so well mannered or orderly began to influence our original detainees. Also, since detainees were slow to be released, we were quickly becoming severely overcrowded. The engineers originally built the facility to hold 300 detainees and we had a population of around 900. Detainees that had been screened and were deemed of value were placed on "MI Hold" status. The definition of MI Hold was originally our designation to let the MP's know we were interested in the detainee and to not move them to another camp. Somehow the MI Hold status became a designation which needed senior officer approval for removal, much like the designation of Security Detainee needed senior officer approval for release. [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED] PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

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## STATEMENT (Continued)

At one point, we were told that all Victory Bounty detainees would need LTG Sanchez's approval for release. By mid-August we had some 300 plus detainees from various raids and [REDACTED] and I tried to convince those above us that we were maxed out, but there was no change. Prior to the arrival of additional interrogators from 325th MI, the 519th conducted interrogation operations during the day. After 325th interrogators arrived (on/about 15 September) up to about 20 Sep we worked in two shifts: A/519th on days and 325th on nights. The detainees moved from Cropper were a part of a huge backlog of detainees that were earlier designated as MI Holds by 325th MI had had not yet been interrogated. This schedule lasted until the mortar attack on 20 September 2003 which killed two of our personnel. Composition of JIDC: Likely influenced by MG Miller's visit, a decision was made to form Tiger Teams (consisting of an interrogator, an analyst, a reports officer and an interpreter) plus support personnel. Using our past interrogation experience, A/519th leadership tried to explain to COL Pappas and [REDACTED] on how best to structure the organization and how the interrogation operations had worked for us. [REDACTED] was not on site most of the time; he received input by phone and email and then made decisions. When I asked for a list of all inbound personnel (by rank and MOS) so I can begin organizing the "Tiger Teams" I was told by [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] would decide on the composition of the teams, not me. Around 23 to 25 September we had a meeting with [REDACTED] concerning changes in operations, likely due to the recent visit by LTG Sanchez. He instituted changes like "no interrogation would be accomplished until all background information had been checked out" and "interrogations had to be approved by [REDACTED]". The former quickly proved to be unrealistic. Before [REDACTED] and I could respond, the latter was intensely questioned by the interrogators and section leader as to why the approval was now above my (Interrogation Operations) level. The approval process was later delegated back down to the appropriate level sometime in October. Reporting: We were informed during MG Miller's visit that only a few of the 350+ Intelligence Information Reports we had sent were actually forwarded outside of theater. This gave the impression that the interrogation facilities were not doing their job in extracting and reporting information. MG Miller and others on his team had commented that there was nothing wrong with interrogation operations and reporting, the problem was somewhere up the intelligence distribution chain (likely C2). Since there was this misperception of the lack of reporting, both BDE and C2 began to ask for the actual notes from the interrogation. Interrogator notes are close hold working papers intended to document in detail to aid other interrogators who may conduct an interrogation of the detainee at a later date. They are not intended to be reports to be forwarded up the intelligence chain, much less to organizations outside the intelligence chain. Yet, they (C2 and LTG Sanchez) had been receiving these types of reports from other units (TF 121 and possibly IAD) and wanted the same from us. We vehemently objected to releasing these reports saying this would lead to others without knowledge of interrogation operations questioning our interrogators, their methods, and the information they obtained. We were able to delay releasing these reports until 10 October when I was ordered by COL Pappas, through [REDACTED] that "this is a copy of the report. This is exactly how I want it to look." By mid-October we started the process of "cleaning up" (sanitizing them for release in a way that would shield the interrogation teams as much as we could) the interrogator notes and submitting them as Summary Interrogation Reports. Since there seemed to be an insatiable demand for data by C2 (wanting the interrogation notes soon after an interrogation) we were instructed to change our reporting priorities - interrogation notes, then intelligence reports. On the surface we complied, however, I told my section leaders that if we come across any information that is time sensitive, we will report that information first. At one point we were directed to write out each question and response in the Interrogation Notes. Obviously, this was met with much objection and did not last long. Since the JIDC quickly expanded and no one initially took the time to define duty positions and duty descriptions, there was constant confusion about who does what and how. Throughout this whole process I had the impression that the leadership from the BDE level on up did not know and understand the process and procedures of interrogation operations, which led to a confusing and unorganized, amateurish, and undisciplined organization. Mobile Interrogation Teams (MIT): We had concern over how MITs were utilized by maneuver units. By doctrine, they are to quickly identify, screen, and interrogate detainees who could provide valuable information to the supported maneuver commander. However, in personal conversations with some of the MITs, it became apparent that they were used to aid in filling out the capture information for the detainees. They did little to no screenings or interrogations. When questioned about the purpose of the operations they were supporting and the questions they were able to ask, they stated they did not know the purpose and only questioned detainees concerning CJTF-7 PIRs. It seemed that the maneuver units gave very broad instructions to round up any male from 16 - 60 years of age that had a cell phone, without any other verification that they were "bad guys". During a meeting with COL Pappas, [REDACTED] suggested that the JIDC provide MITs for specified operations as we would ultimately receive the detainees and this would aid us since we would already be familiar with the operation and the supported Commander's PIRs. Detention criteria/JIDC acceptance criteria: In my opinion less than 10% of the detainees had any real intelligence value. We told MG Miller, MG Fas, LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas (anyone that would listen) that there needed to be established criteria for the maneuver units and the Division cages on whom to look for and how to process and forward detainees of value to the JIDC. I felt some of the maneuver units' interrogators were interrogators in name only. The 4th ID folks were really bad, the 1 AD folks were OK and the 101st folks were so-so. On more than one occasion I have seen as many as three screening reports on one detainee where the three screeners commented "deceptive, needs to be interrogated by higher" (some were also labeled as having no intel value but were forwarded to the JIDC). 4th ID in particular, it appeared they would simply pass them off without conducting any questions, since after they would forward their detainees we would receive a list of questions to ask them. I responded "why don't your interrogators do their jobs?" OGA: [REDACTED] had what we refer to as ghost detainees that were "buried" or hidden in our facility. OGA had started in early September to come over to talk to some of our detainees with one of our interrogators present [REDACTED]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

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As the JIDC was forming and we began to use 1A of the "hare site", they gradually started bringing their own detainees to our facility. This was done despite the objections from me, [REDACTED]. We explained, based on prior experience that OGA "does not play well with others", they did not live the same rules as we did and was notorious for receiving but not sharing information. Also, they did not seem to have full accountability for their detainees. [REDACTED] both promised that [REDACTED] but that did not happen. We were overruled and [REDACTED] handled most of the dealings [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] himself primarily worked [REDACTED] and insisted on working only with [REDACTED] and did not go through the established process. [REDACTED] spent some of his time either at the MI LSA, or the 1A hard site (I suspect more time at the hard site than he should have). [REDACTED] seemed to have an affinity for OGA and special ops. [REDACTED] initially questioned and "broke" a detainee [REDACTED] who then followed up with more questioning. [REDACTED] role [REDACTED] was very limited. He was not present during the interrogation, but stated he heard slaps but was not sure if the slaps were done to the detainee or to the table in the room. I was not informed of any [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Shortly after returning from leave on 11 December 2003, I heard that [REDACTED] ghosts died during an interrogation. Although I did not delve into details, I heard that it was suspected he died as a result of wounds inflicted during capture. Also, I heard that [REDACTED] was involved, but I do not know the extent of his involvement. Interrogations were to be scheduled through the JIDC Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and conducted by interrogation teams. However, I am aware of two occasions where unscheduled interrogations by unqualified personnel were conducted. The first was conducted by [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] (the primary interrogator for the detainee), [REDACTED] was directed by BG FAST (through C2) to go in and interrogate using the fear up approach immediately. [REDACTED] woke [REDACTED] and an interpreter to assist in the interrogation. Against the advice of [REDACTED] insisted on the interrogation, knowing the detainee had just ended a 72-hour adjusted sleep schedule and was now resting and recuperating. The detainee collapsed during questioning. Afterwards, I was informed of the incident and found that both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] write a statement concerning the incident. The second incident also involved [REDACTED]. A female detainee (not of interest to MI) claimed to have information concerning Saddam Hussein. [REDACTED] took his assistant, [REDACTED] (97E - not assigned as an interrogator), to facilitate questioning and report writing. Later, [REDACTED] became involved when he heard that the female detainee's family frequently visited the gates of AG to determine how she was doing. He began to "task" her father to provide information saying things like "come back with some information and you can visit with your daughter". Although we disagreed with the whole situation, we insisted that if he was to continue with his unauthorized "interrogation" he would have to complete all required reports. COL PAPPAS was aware of these interrogations. As both our mission and detainee population quickly expanded, we did not have enough military interrogators to handle the workload. CACI contract interrogators started to arrive in mid-October. For the most part they seemed very professional and experienced, with the exception of [REDACTED]. He was very limited in his skill set and seemed to use the "fear up" quickly during interrogation. I talked with his section leader about this observation and suggested he talk with [REDACTED] about it. [REDACTED] and possibly [REDACTED] would interview the incoming CACI personnel to determine their background and experience. Although I was never informed that we could reject any unqualified CACI personnel, I did know based on working with contractors in the past that we had an influence in accepting/rejecting the contractors. I trusted that the [REDACTED]

Initials of person making statement  
[REDACTED]

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Army's hiring process had some built in quality control IAW the Statement of Work, which was resident with the on site manager. I had heard that CACI personnel were not to supervise military personnel or serve as team leaders, but in fact at least one of them [REDACTED] did so temporarily for about 2 or 3 weeks, at least until some of the 66th and 500th military personnel came on board. I do not know who approved the decision to make him a temporary supervisor, nor do I know if a waiver was requested or approved. I did not personally interview all of the CACI personnel as they arrived since I was too busy with other duties such as maintaining the database, managing interrogation operations, responding to email inquiries, and occasionally editing reports, etc. However, I did sit down and talk with a few as I had time available. All personnel (CACI, Titan and military) went through our "new guy" briefing and orientation, which entailed information on IROE, interrogation and reporting processes, and a tour of the facility. They were given a statement to sign acknowledging that they had received a briefing, read and understood the IROE. The signed copies of these statements were kept in a black 2 1/2 - 3 inch binder in the ICE Operation section. **Interrogation Rule of Engagement:** From the time we arrived in Kuwait on 12 March 03 to the day we arrived in AG on 25 July 03, I never saw a document with the approved IROE from either V Corps or CJTF-7. During that time we relied on our past experiences with past interrogation facilities. When we move to AG to establish our fourth interrogation facility, we knew this facility was going to have high visibility and that other facilities were having problems. As a result, we began to outline our own IROE drawing upon our experiences with other facilities, issues identified at Camp Cropper, and procedures used by TF 121. In addition to the IROE, we drafted requests to use civilian clothes and modified grooming standards. We submitted these requests to CJTF-7 (through BN, BDE, and C2) and requested the approvals to be filed in writing. Only through [REDACTED] persistence did the IROE finally reach C2/JAG and LTG Sanchez. I never saw any signed copy of the IROE, but saw a message which said they had been approved. I can only assume the Civilian Clothes and Modified Grooming requests were denied since I never heard anything more about them. The IROE were constantly modified and each change was to be signed by a General Officer. All personnel had to acknowledge that they were aware of the changes. Again, signed copies of these statements were kept in a black 2 1/2 - 3 inch binder in the ICE Operation section. All new personnel were trained in proper procedures; people knew the boundaries. The IROE were posted in several places and we were always talking about them. For certain approaches such as sleep deprivation (adjusted sleep schedule), we had to write up a schedule and submit a request with the interrogation plan. It would be reviewed by the JAG and sent to COL PAPPAS for approval, but LTG Sanchez would be informed. I do not know for sure but I felt that COL PAPPAS was informing the General. Other methods had to be approved by LTG Sanchez; I never saw any written approvals but was informed that it was done electronically. Each of these requests was forwarded up the chain for approval. For approved sleep deprivation the schedule was given to the MPs to implement, but I do not know how they handled it or who, if any one, in the MPs approved how they were to implement it [REDACTED]

Initials of person making statement  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
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15. STATEMENT (Continued)

Optimally, I would like to have constant interrogations conducted while a detainee was under the adjusted sleep schedule. However, it took too many resources (interrogators/linguists) away from other interrogations or one interrogation team would be as much sleep deprived as the detainee it would have been fruitless. The use of sleep deprivation was monitored; we did not want to harm the detainees. Beginning in mid-December we had Air Force doctors monitor the detainees. One instance for the use of a guard dog (in late December) entailed having the dog under control of the handler but present during the interrogation. [REDACTED] was the interrogator. No direct reference was made to the dog, but it was felt that just the presence of the dog would be unsettling to the detainee, as we knew the detainees were typically afraid of dogs. I do not know who actually approved the procedure, but I had verbal notification from [REDACTED] who got it from COL Pappas, that it was approved. The written approval should be on file with the JAG. The MPs often used the dogs for random inspections. I did not see any maltreatment of detainees with the dogs.

Abuses: Some time in late September or early October, there was an incident involving the use of alcohol and an unauthorized interrogation of a female detainee. This was quickly dealt with. It involved an interrogator, two 97Bs and a Titan interpreter. The three soldiers were reduced in rank and given extra duty. I do not know exactly what happened to the Titan contractor, but I do know he no longer worked for us as an interpreter for interrogations. Although I was not involved with the incident, I am sure that [REDACTED] informed Titan that the interpreter was no longer welcomed and should be fired. Shortly afterwards, although we did not have any female detainees of MI interest, the procedures for dealing with female detainees were added - only females could interrogate female detainees. After I returned from leave 11 December I was informed of the incident with [REDACTED] in which she made a detainee strip and return to his holding area naked. [REDACTED] recommended an Article 15 for humiliating the detainee but was overruled by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was taken off interrogator rotation and given extra duty. I did not witness any physical abuse of detainees. I saw some "normal" pictures of AG which included detainees, but nothing of an untoward nature. I told my personnel that pictures were not to be taken. I was not aware of any exchanges of pictures among personnel. I am not aware of any videos made. My personnel never reported to me that they had observed any abuse, humiliation or use of guard dogs during interrogation. If I had been told or knew of any incidents I would have reported them. For example, in late December, [REDACTED] expressed concern that the one of the MPs may be "taking things too far", possibly abusing detainees. The MP was earlier shot in the chest by a detainee who obtained a gun smuggled in by one of the Iraqi guards. It was thought this incident was affecting his judgment when handling detainees. We brought these concerns up to [REDACTED] and possibly [REDACTED] who then talked with the MPs. I am not aware of the outcome as I was preparing to leave Iraq on Emergency Leave. Comment on the picture of the detainee on the ground surrounded by MI and MPs: I identified [REDACTED] 96B, [REDACTED] 97E, [REDACTED] 96B; and [REDACTED] Titan Contractor. I was unable to identify the other individual in the picture who is said to be MI. Looking at the picture and noticing who is present and their state of dress, I am certain it is not an interrogation as reported by the press. 1. Night shift MPs are present 2. [REDACTED] is in shorts and flipflops (this also tells me that it occurred early in October when 325th lived near the facility and not in the NE compound. 3. [REDACTED] was never assigned as an interrogator, although he is a 97E. 4. Interrogations never occurred in the open areas at the prison. Always in the booths, the stairwell, or the detainees' cells. 5. I believe [REDACTED] was an interpreter for THT at this time.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19TH day of MAY, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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