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Tillery, Monica J

From: Lamotte, Russ K. (SBU)
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 11:25 AM
To: Dorosin, Joshua L (SBU); Thessin, James H. (SBU); Buchwald, Todd F (SBU); Mathias, D Stephen (SBU)
Subject: RE: TRANSCRIPT: SASC hearing yesterday on Iraq/Afghanistan

Josh -- You left out the most important part. See below, in green.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dorosin, Joshua L (SBU)
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 11:17 AM
To: Thessin, James H (SBU); Buchwald, Todd F (SBU); Lamotte, Russ K. (SBU)
Subject: FW: TRANSCRIPT: SASC hearing yesterday on Iraq/Afghanistan

Please note in particular the following from the end of the hearing:

SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Chairman, just on that point, on whether the TAL binds a sovereign government, are you saying that the agreement that was arrived at without a sovereign Iraqi government being involved is binding on a sovereign -- limited or otherwise -- Iraqi government?

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, we certainly believe that it's binding on the government that will take over on the 1st of July.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Could you give us the legal opinion on that? I think it is very important. These questions about -- because it affects our status of forces, among other things, also the Iraqi group, the survey group, but a lot of other things. Could you give us the legal opinions on this issue that a number of us have raised as to whether or not a sovereign government in Iraq is bound by the TAL, is bound by -- and whether the U.N. resolution relative to the force that is there protects our force after July 1st to take whatever military action we determine is appropriate, despite what the wishes could be of a sovereign government? I think we need to get the legal opinions that support this.

MR. GROSSMAN: Of course, Senator. We'll have somebody from our L/PM office get in touch with you tomorrow to clear all this up.

-----Original Message-----

From: Suh, Susan(P)
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 11:05 AM
To: Dorosin, Joshua L (SBU); Lamotte, Russ K. (SBU); Buchwald, Todd F (SBU)
Cc: Thessin, James H (SBU)
Subject: TRANSCRIPT: SASC hearing yesterday on Iraq/Afghanistan

... for your reading pleasure (it's long, 70-ish pages). Will also send you HASC today and SFRC tomorrow when I get those transcripts. Thanks for all of your help! Cheers, Sue

HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

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HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E SCHMELZER
 DATE/CASE ID: 16 DEC 2004 200303827

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AFGHANISTAN

CHAired BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOWITZ; JOINT CHIEFS CHAIRMAN GENERAL RICHARD MYERS; UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MARC GROSSMAN

106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

9:33 A.M. EDT, TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2004

SEN. WARNER: The committee meets today in another of its series of hearings on the worldwide threat situation, with emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq.

We welcome our witnesses, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Secretary Marc Grossman, undersecretary of State for political affairs. Each of our witnesses is very well qualified to discuss the full range of the topics before the committee today. All have been deeply involved in the planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Myers just returned Sunday from a trip to the region to visit our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Colleagues and friends, the past few weeks have been particularly challenging for our nation. We are ever mindful of the risks our troops face every day, those of the coalition forces, and the sacrifices made by the families and the communities that support them as those who have been removed from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat, and as terrorists lash out at the loss of another area in which to train and spawn terrorism throughout the world. We mourn every loss of life and salute those who serve, their families, for their bravery, their commitment and their sacrifice.

The timeliness and importance of this hearing cannot be overstated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I myself just returned several weeks ago from a trip to both of those countries. The brilliant military victories achieved by our armed forces together with the coalition partners have presented an opportunity to fully defeat violence and terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, nations whose previous rulers had perpetrated violence and terror not only on their own populations and their neighbors, but spreading it throughout the world.

The cycle of violence that has gripped this part of the world must end if we are to win the global war on terrorism and make America and our friends and allies a safer place. Deviation from our current course will only embolden those who are intent on bringing about instability and anarchy not only in the region but elsewhere in the world.

We've achieved extraordinary success in a relatively short period of time in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed are gone. The future is hopeful for the Iraqi people. We must continue to send a strong message of resolve to the people of Iraq, to our troops, to our coalition partners and to the rest of the world that the United States will stay its course and get the job done.

As President Bush stated last week and I quote, "Now is the time and Iraq is the place in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not waver," end quote.

President Bush has set a course that calls for the return of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30th. It is critical that we end our status as an occupying power and give Iraqis an increased stake in what happens in their future and the nation.

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This date was endorsed by the U.N. special representative, Brahimi. Brahimi and the U.N. are playing an important role in the transition to sovereignty and will continue to play a critical role in helping Iraq on its path to democracy. This committee will learn today from this distinguished panel further details on that operation.

The president's appointment yesterday of a trusted international statesman and current U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, as the first ambassador to a free and democratic is another important step in this process. I've had the opportunity through the years to know Mr. Negroponte quite well and have the highest personal regard for him.

Continued U.S. commitment to the June 30th transition date is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to the region, and -- for it will be the day that Iraq takes its place in the community of free nations and the day the Iraqis assume a greater degree of responsibility for their future. The coalition forces, however, will remain on standby status and involve themselves in the security of that nation.

A free, democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces of terrorism and instability in Iraq.

Clearly, the recent surge in violence in Iraq is related to the imminent transfer of sovereignty. Those who fear democracy are trying to delay its arrival. Those who incite terror realize their days are numbered. Opponents of a free, democratic Iraq are desperate and will become even more desperate, unfortunately, in the days to come. We will be prepared for more violence as June 30th approaches. We must not waver in the face of terror and intimidation. Our troops, members of our coalition and the people of Iraq need the continued strongest support of the Congress of the United States.

Many countries shared in the military effort to liberate Iraq. Other nations not involved directly in the military have joined in the rebuilding of Iraq. A to

of 38 nations are now involved in this overall endeavor. I welcome the increased participation of the United Nations in the political transition process. I applaud President Bush for his consistent efforts, efforts that began in September 2002 at the United Nations, to build and expand the coalition of nations who have the courage and the conviction to fight tyranny and terror in order to make the region and the world a better place, a safer place.

As we are focused as a nation on developments in Iraq, we must not lose sight of ongoing developments in Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition forces continue to eliminate remnants of all al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbored them. NATO forces are taking increasing responsibility to provide security and reconstruction assistance across many parts of the country. The recent donors conference in Berlin secured commitments from the international community to provide the assistance Afghanistan will need to recover from decades of war and oppression. A constitution's been approved. An election's been scheduled. These are important steps on Afghanistan's path to full democracy.

The future is finally hopeful for the people of Afghanistan, but challenges remain. Speaking for myself personally, as a consequence of my visit there, I remain very interested in our witnesses' view on how we can help Afghanistan conquer a very serious drug trade, which is growing, not diminishing -- growing at an alarming rate.

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The hearing today is an opportunity to review current policies and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can provide insights into a number of questions, among them the issue of this 700,000 (dollars). I will put in today's record the details of the briefings that this committee received -- and it was on a bipartisan basis -- with regard to the use of those funds.

Our committee records show that on the 13th of February, 2003, the JCS-J4 briefed the committee staff.

Later, on February 23rd, 2003, then DOD Comptroller Dove Zakheim briefed the staff. Lastly, representatives from the OSD comptroller provided a classified briefing on April 4, 2003. The questions regarded the use of funds, that is O&M funds, to do what is predominately milcon-type functions. We have in the committee records, for the inspection of our members, a classified document dated April 4, 2003 which details those expenditures.

Nevertheless, Secretary Wolfowitz, I hope you can elaborate on that issue.

Further, the questions before the committee today: Are current troop levels in Iraq, as recently requested by General Abizaid, sufficient? Do our troops have sufficient equipment and correct equipment to carry out and complete the mission? How will an Iraqi interim government be formed? And how are Iraqis reacting to the recent U.N. proposal? What role will the U.N. and other international organizations play in the reconstruction of Iraq after the transition of sovereignty? Will the U.S. seek a U.N. Security Council resolution to cover the next phase of activities, political and military, in Iraq? And what are the details that we have at hand with regard to the all-important Status of Forces Agreement, which spells out, hopefully -- or will, perhaps coupled with a U.N. resolution, which I believe will be forthcoming, exactly how the relationship between the new transfer of power to an Iraqi government and the utilization of our troops and those of coalition forces for further security.

I now recognize our distinguished ranking member.

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning; Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Grossman, General Myers. These three witnesses, representing as they do, defense policy, diplomacy and military planning, provide us an opportunity to explore a number of important issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I join you, Mr. Chairman, and every member of this committee in expressing our gratitude to our troops, who demonstrate such constancy and courage.

This would be an important hearing no matter when it was held, but events of the last few months have made it even more crucial. Today's hearing takes place in a month that has tragically seen more U.S. military deaths from combat in Iraq than any other month since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is a month that has also seen an outbreak of insurgent violence in Fallujah and elsewhere in central Iraq consisting primarily of Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and militia resistance in several cities in southern Iraq consisting mostly of Shi'a.

Despite the obvious setbacks that we have experienced, I believe that we can succeed in bringing peace and stability to Iraq. It will help to achieve that goal if we're willing to learn from our mistakes. The first step is to recognize that mistakes were made, and that may be the most difficult step of all.

Our uniformed military always conducts after-actions, lessons learned reviews so that the mistakes that have been made are not repeated in the future. That practice needs to be followed by the civilian leadership of the executive branch, including both the Defense and State Departments.

For example, instead of merely tossing off the continuing violence as "a tough period of days," there should be an assessment as to whether we adequately planned for the possibility of post-Saddam chaos.

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Most expert commentators agree with former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq to deal with the situation once the Saddam Hussein regime had fallen. The looting that took place and the damage to government buildings and public infrastructure that resulted might have been avoided or been of less severity if General Shinseki's advice had been heeded instead of his being disparaged by the civilian leadership.

Most experts agree that it was a mistake to totally disband the Iraqi army, beyond, of course, removal of dedicated Ba'athists and Saddam loyalists.

Most experts agree that the de-Ba'athification program went beyond what was needed to assure that the Ba'athist leadership was not maintained. As Mr. Brahimi stated last Wednesday, quote, "It is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staff, engineers and other professionals who are sorely needed have been dismissed within the de-Ba'athification process, and far too many of these cases have yet to be reviewed," close quote.

The fact that the widely disliked and distrusted Mr. Chalabi was put in charge of the de-Ba'athification program was a mistake that still needs to be corrected. The restriction of the U.S. military to a minor role in planning for the stability phase, or phase four, of Operation of (sic) Iraqi Freedom, as General Franks described it to Chairman Warner and me several weeks ago, was, in my judgment, clearly a mistake.

And despite all the talk about the Iraqi security forces being the largest force in Iraq and the ones who would soon be the line of defense against the former regime elements and jihadists, the fact is that there's been a failure to adequately train more than 4 percent of the Iraqi police until now. Surely there are lessons to be learned from that.

Perhaps the greatest mistake was the failure to appreciate the importance of securing international support through the United Nations before initiating hostilities against Iraq.

The United States was unable to convince the other members of the Security Council that Iraq posed an imminent danger, and we cut U.N. weapons inspections off before they were concluded. The difficulty following the war and obtaining broad international support, including troops and police from Muslim countries, is the result.

The price we are paying is an extremely high one. Even before our troop rotation we were providing more than 80 percent of the troops in Iraq, a figure that will rise with the impending withdrawal of the Spanish and Honduran troops. And although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of contributions of other nations, we are providing far in excess of 80 percent of the financial assistance for Iraqi reconstruction.

After keeping the United Nations at arm's length throughout the occupation of Iraq, the president finally recognized the central role of the U.N. in finding a way to an interim government which will be accepted by the people of Iraq. When asked last week about the Iraqi entity to whom sovereignty will be restored on June 30th, the president said, quote, "that's going to be decided by Mr. Brahimi," close quote; quite a reversal of the prior posture of the administration towards the U.N. and long overdue.

Formal U.N. involvement in the transition to a new interim Iraqi government as our full partner would help provide essential legitimacy in many parts of the world. U.N. endorsement of a process of selecting an interim government and authorizing a multinational force after the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty might also open the door to troops and police officers from other nations, including Muslim nations, and to NATO involvement in Iraq. Some nations will, however, require a more formal role for the U.N. in the continuing political development of Iraq as a condition for their participation or continued participation there. Conversely, a failure to give the U.N. a major and formal role after restoration of sovereignty would make it difficult for a number of nations to keep their forces in Iraq, not to mention attracting new troops and police.

I visited U.N. headquarters in New York last Friday and met with U.S. Ambassador Negroponte and with

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the British, French, German and Pakistani ambassadors as well. I attended a Security Council meeting in which Ambassador Negroponte reported to the council on the efforts and the progress of the U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq.

I met with Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and in the course of our meeting he expressed his disagreement with statements in the press that the United Nations would choose the people who would make up the new interim government. He said that the United Nations would hopefully help produce a process by which the Iraqi people would choose their leaders, which is very different from the U.N. choosing them, and far, far different from the United States and the coalition occupying powers choosing them.

In response to my question to him about a Plan B if Mr. Brahimi is unable to help produce a satisfactory consensus by June 30 -- in other words, if there is no credible, broadly supported government to whom sovereignty by that date can be restored -- Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that there isn't enough time to come up with a Plan B, so the only alternative would then be to extend the existence of the Iraqi Governing Council.

I know the administration intends to stick to the June 30th date. But the task of putting together the pieces of a sovereign government which the various factions of the Iraqi people support, by an artificial, and in a relatively short time, is a massive one. If the U.N. doesn't have the pieces together by June 30, the worst thing we could do is to attempt to restore sovereignty to leaders that appear to be our choices instead of the Iraqis'. Even greater chaos and possibly civil war could result. .

So while the administration doesn't want to talk about the possibility that the U.N. doesn't succeed by June 30th, I hope the administration has a plan for what they would do in that event, because the possibility is a real one. We cannot repeat the lack of planning which marked the post-Saddam period.

For our military, one of the thorniest issues is whether a new sovereign Iraqi government will be able to change the status of our forces, or will a prior or new U.N. resolution assure continuity? A gap in the ability to do what is required militarily is unacceptable.

Other key issues for our leadership include how many U.S. troops will be required to ensure stability in Iraq in both the short and long term; how will the forces of nations like Spain and Honduras, that plan to withdraw their troops from Iraq, be replaced?

As for Afghanistan, which has received significantly less attention since the start of the Iraq conflict, 2004 started with good news as the constitutional loya jirga was completed and NATO decided to expand its role there. However, the last few weeks have seen a number of challenges to the government of President Karzai from regional warlords and their militias. Additionally, NATO nations have not fulfilled requests for more troops, and the narcotics problem in Afghanistan seems to be out of control. What specific plans are there to address these real concerns?

And finally, I would note that questions have been raised as to whether Congress was adequately informed and involved concerning the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for construction activities in preparation for war with Iraq. And as our chairman noted, our witnesses need to address that matter.

I look forward to the testimony of those witnesses addressing these and many other vital questions of concern to our committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

We'll now proceed to hear testimony. Your statements, prepared, which have been submitted to the committee, will be a part of the record. You may address those parts that you think pertinent for your

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opening statements. And at the present time, the committee intends to have a brief closed session, following this open session, in 222 Russell.

Secretary Wolfowitz, will you kindly proceed?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, I have quite a long prepared statement which I will submit for the record. In the interest of time, I will just summarize and read some portions of it.

I'd like to begin, though, by citing what a Marine company commander wrote to his father, as this Marine prepared to lead his troops into Fallujah recently. And I quote, "This battle is going to have far-reaching effects on not only the war here, but in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. There will be no shock and awe. This battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war. A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them.

"The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history," this company commander wrote, "as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world, or we will die trying. The Marines are fired up. I'm nervous for them though, because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I've been nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young Marines were involved they have always exceeded my expectations.

"God bless these great Americans," he wrote, "who are ensuring we continue to fight an away schedule."

Let me add God bless these wonderful Marines and soldiers and all the members of our armed forces. Our prayers are with him and with all of our people -- military and civilian alike -- currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America, and the world, more secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East. Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our nation -- serving so that others may be free, and so that our children and our grandchildren can be more secure. And we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.

We also owe a profound debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 35 coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of NGOs and with the Coalition Provisional Authority. They have recently become a particular focus of terrorist attacks. One heroine, Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women, was brutally murdered a few weeks ago for the work she was doing. Though it is small consolation to her family and friends, she wrote to a friend that if she died, she would die doing what she believed in.

And finally, I'd like to thank the members of this committee, and the Congress as a whole, for their continued strong support for our members of our armed forces.

Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that day, some 25 million of one of the most talented populations in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last hundred years. According to a theme that one hears often these days, the world is full of bad guys, Saddam Hussein was just another bad guy.

Any time that I hear Saddam Hussein referred to in that way, I know that the person making the statement really doesn't understand who Saddam Hussein was and is. During my career, I've had the experience of working up close and personal with some truly bad guys: Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, President Suharto of Indonesia. To paraphrase someone else on a very different occasion, I knew Ferdinand Marcos; Saddam Hussein was no Ferdinand Marcos.

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Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. He ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was a torturer or an informer.

I've traveled to Iraq several times since liberation. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both there and here in the United States. And one of my strongest impressions is that the fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq. A smothering blanket of fear woven by 35 years of repression, where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death -- or fates worse than death, like the death of one's children or the rape of one's relatives -- that fear won't be cast off in just a few weeks or even just a year or two.

Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In 1979 when he formally assumed power as president, he had a sweeping purge of top Ba'athist Party leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam, with tears running down his cheeks, and puffing on a cigar, talked about the "confession" of disloyalty they had received from a top party member, and then continued one by one to name other guilty colleagues. One by one, guards dragged these people out of the meeting. And then Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty test: they were required to participate in the firing squads that executed those he'd identified:

And he didn't stop there. He had videos made of the whole event and distributed throughout the Middle East so people would know what kind of a man he was. Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood that his threats were to be taken seriously, in doing that, Saddam Hussein applied the techniques that any FBI agent will tell you are the techniques of a gangland boss, but he did it on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government.

One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter -- the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war -- described a prison in Baghdad whose stench, he said, was unreal, an amalgam -- I quote -- "of urine, feces, vomit and sweat, where prisoners were howling and dying of thirst." In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers -- their crime being children of the regime's political opponents.

I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has accurately called the "density of evil" that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that doesn't end. Such evil and fear are so alien to our own American experience that I think it's necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges facing us because, Mr. Chairman, this is not just history. Didn't tell these stores in order to educate people about the past. It is the present. When we use this rather anodyne term "former regime elements" to describe the people that we capture and the people that are organizing much of the fighting in Fallujah, my view the more correct term would be the torturers and killers of the old regime.

One example, and I will like to submit the full classified statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, but this is an analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency of one branch of the former Iraqi intelligence service called the M-14, the so-called special operations and antiterrorism branch -- "antiterrorism," it's Orwellian. This branch specialized in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings and assassinations. It was a terrorist branch. These people are in the field today.

As that report says, former Iraqi intelligence service operatives from M-14 have been involved in planning and conducting numerous improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and radio-controlled improvised explosive devices for anti-coalition attacks throughout Iraq. It goes on to say that cells of former M-14 personnel are organizing/conducting a terrorist IED campaign against coalition forces throughout Iraq. The explosives section of M-14 prepared for the invasion by constructing hundreds of suicide vests and belts for use by Saddam Fedayeen against coalition forces. The Iraqi intelligence service established a campaign that was purposely decentralized so that attacks could be carried out in the event that cell leaders were captured or killed. And it goes on to mention that, given their high level of skill, M-14

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tactics including explosives are likely to be sophisticated.

I'd like to submit the full -- I don't have page numbers -- it's about a seven-page document, and the detail is stunning in my view.

SEN. WARNER: Without objection, Mr. Secretary, that will be done.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: And given that kind of presence, it's not surprising to me that we get accounts like this one that came recently from the Marines on the battlefield. I guess I should always say that first reports in war are frequently wrong, and even second reports can be wrong, and I don't know whether this is a first, second or third, but it strikes me it is probably true.

The Marines reported a firefight in a small village northeast of Fallujah called Kharma (ph). They basically stumbled across what seemed to be a large enemy position. The enemy swarmed in attack on the Marines. The result of a very intense firefight was over 100 enemy killed in action. The significant thing, which I am looking to confirm, the report says upon termination of hostility, the local townspeople approached the Marines, thanking them for their action because the enemy had taken over their town and had been effectively holding them hostage.

I can confirm more reliably, Mr. Chairman, that a similar situation prevailed in the town of Samarra, further east in the area of operation of the 4th Infantry Division, which is now run by the 1st Infantry Division, a situation not as bad as Fallujah, but in some ways perhaps emblematic of the Fallujah problem. General Odierno and the 4th ID, about two months ago, undertook a cordon and search operation where they closed off the town and systematically went after the anti-democratic forces that had been organizing and terrorizing that town. I've heard different estimates, ranging from 200 to 700 enemy captured and detained. But what is in no disagreement is that once those people were gone, Samarra was a different place. And indeed, it's been a different place during the violence of the last few weeks.

Jim Steele (sp), who is a retired Army colonel with incredibly bravery and also incredible expertise about police forces in third world countries, he's been in Iraq for the last year. He gave a report about a recent visit to Samarra. He said, "It's a different place from what it was during my last visit in December. The number of active police stations has more than doubled. The attitude toward the coalition forces was much improved as well. Samarra is an excellent example of local and regional cooperation."

And in fact, during the recent fighting, the police in Samarra performed well. This is from a report from Major General John Batiste, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, which now took over from General Odierno. He said, "We stood up a Security Working Group in Samarra in advance of the April 9th-12th Arba'in celebrations to keep the peace, and if necessary, respond with firmness. There was some violence on 12 April in Samarra, but Iraqi security forces were part of the solution and the violence was contained. I am using the Samarra model throughout the region."

I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because as bad as the situation is in Fallujah, and I don't in any way mean to minimize it, I think the enemy that we are facing is an enemy that rests on killing and death and terror, not an enemy that has genuine popular appeal. We have to work on our side on improving the belief of the Iraqi people in their future and the belief in what we can do for their future. But we also have to work to overcome the fear that these people implant.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of systematic abuse. A year after its liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring unimaginable horrors, Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better in the 12 months since its liberation.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam's personal fiat. Ba'athists suppressed dissent

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through murder, torture and arbitrary imprisonment.

Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons. Today Iraqis have an interim constitution that contains assurances of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement -- provisions that are highlighted in that chart on my right.

Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy the means to end life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq's hospitals and clinics that did remain open served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times -- that is 30 times -- over pre-war levels, and children are receiving crucial vaccinations for the first time in years.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption and the systematic misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of the regime. Today the Iraqi economy is starting on a path of recovery, even though the full effect of the \$18.4 billion that the Congress provided is only just starting to be felt. This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern to us, but we are making progress in the face of years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.

For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq's oil revenues helped to build Saddam's palaces and line his pockets and those of his cronies. Today that revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps to build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its pre-war levels, and a total of \$7.5 billion has been generated for the Development Fund for Iraq. That, I would add, is on top of the roughly \$8 billion from past revenues out of the oil-for-food program. So that Iraq has contributed \$17 billion, approximately, of its own resources -- 16.9, to be precise -- to the reconstruction effort already.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in a state of unimaginable disrepair. Saddam corrupted the oil-for-food program and diverted the wealth of the country for his own power and comfort. Today power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed throughout the country.

For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Ba'ath party fascism. Today that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system; 64,000 secondary teachers and 5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods; the endless references to Saddam in the textbooks have been removed; and coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools.

After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's marsh Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were on the verge of extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people, the marsh Arabs, whose history goes back thousands of years. Today the marshlands are gradually being restored, and that ancient culture is being revived.

For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Iraq's state-run media. Today Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources, including 170 newspapers.

For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation's future. Today more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a nongovernmental organization.

I read in The Guardian of London recently, and I'd like to submit the full article for the record, that recently in the overwhelmingly Shi'a province of Diyala in southern Iraq, 17 towns held local elections using ration cards in the absence of registration rolls. Their first genuine elections ever, and in almost every case either secular independents or non-religious parties outpolled the Islamists. Perhaps most important, in the year since Iraq has been liberated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men,

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women and children, capriciously murdered by a brutal regime. And the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down for good.

Despite all the uncertainty and violence caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite all the difficulties that are correctly described in Iraq today, 56 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. And a full 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I'm not here to paint a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored glasses. There are enormous problems. Some of them are, indeed, the result of what General Petraeus, who recently commanded the 101st in Iraq and will be going back, by the way, to perform a crucial role in building Iraqi security forces, General Petraeus called it the man-on-the-moon phenomenon. That is to say, you Americans can put a man on the moon; how come my electricity doesn't work, how come the sewers aren't fixed, how come everything isn't perfect after liberation? And I believe that it is critical not only for the concrete benefits that come from employing people and fixing their basic services, I believe it's also critical in terms of maintaining faith and confidence in the United States that we have to speed up this reconstruction effort. We're trying to understand -- Senator Levin referred to lessons learned. One of the lessons we are trying to learn is the roadblocks that have made it slower than I believe is acceptable to get projects moving. Some of those roadblocks are unavoidable. They are the inevitable result of an insecure situation. Some of them are self-imposed red tape or, in some cases, I think, legislation. And I hope we can work together with the Congress to eliminate both where there are unnecessary obstacles.

We have a strategy. It has three basic elements. The first one involves building capable Iraqi security forces. The picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned, important lessons learned from the last few weeks. But I believe on balance it is one of the most critical elements. In fact, I will also submit for the record -- I won't read it in length -- but Jim Steele (sp), whom I quoted earlier, also reported visiting police stations in two critical sections of Baghdad in Adhamiya and Sadr City late at night during the recent disturbances and was frankly surprised but pleasantly surprised to find the chief of police there on duty and working.

One of the problems is, through our slowness in getting equipment into the field, many of these Iraqi police were outgunned by the militias that they faced. That is a problem we can fix. In fact, if I were an Iraqi policeman, I guess I'd be asking why didn't you fix it sooner. We are moving to fix it as rapidly as we can.

The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative self-government with the aim of creating a government the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power.

Can someone put up the chart, please, that shows that process?

I would emphasize it is a process. Things won't change overnight on July 1st. While many think that July 1 will be a magical date on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraqi government, it is actually, like the process in Afghanistan that was started in Bonn in December of 2001, just one step in a process. Already, free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for government functions for quite some time. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running.

And -- I think this is important -- the July 1st transition is just one of three important steps in the future. It will be followed by the elections to establish the transitional government in January of 2005, and let me emphasize elected; not appointed by the Americans, not negotiated by Ambassador Brahimi, but fully elected early next year. That government in turn will be replaced by a permanent elected government under a constitution at the end of 2005.

And the third element of the strategy, Mr. Chairman, involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and

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the restoration of essential services to provide better lives for Iraqis and put people back to work. Again, this is an area where we have got to speed things up. I think things are speeding up, and there's no question that the infusion of money that the Congress provided last year is starting to be felt and will be felt on a larger scale over the course of this calendar year.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the same time the Iraqis are undergoing a significant transition, we will be transitioning from the Coalition Provisional Authority, under Ambassador Bremer's leadership, to a new American embassy led by one of our most distinguished career diplomats, John Negroponte, our current ambassador to the United Nations, as was just announced yesterday. We have been working closely with our colleagues in the State Department, example of extraordinarily good cooperation.

I have with me retired General Mick Kicklighter, who has been working on these issues for the Defense Department, and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, doing them for the State Department. We sometimes aren't quite sure whether they're the Bobbsey Twins because we always see them together, but they are here and they are a resource for the committee.

SEN. WARNER: Wonder if they would -- would they stand up and be recognized.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: If they would stand up I think it would be helpful. They deserve at least some recognition for the extraordinary work they've been doing.

Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I give details about the timeline in the transition -- the administrative law on these three phases. I think it's important to understand that there are three phases, and that July 1st is not an all-or-nothing kind of date.

I can't sit here today and predict the exact form of government that will result from this process any more than I could have predicted in December 2001 what would result in Afghanistan from the Bonn process. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent constitution and who will emerge as the leaders of a new Iraq. Particularly after 35 years of what they've been through, it's a complicated task.

But Americans of all people should understand that a democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes; it opens up ideas for debate. One need only look back to our own constitutional convention to be reminded that any attempt to establish rule for the people and by the people will involve uncertainty and controversy.

Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years in countries that had no prior historical experience of democracy. They are all different; none of them are perfect. Neither are we. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be a light years improvement over what that country has been like for the last 35 years.

And let me say one more thing here. I think it's wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, and Christians and Turkomans, some of the most intelligent people in the world, are incapable of achieving what Lithuania, or Korea or the Philippines or Indonesia or Croatia or other newly emerging democracies have accomplished over the last couple of decades. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves impressively well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sadism. And I guess I'd say, well, if someone is sitting there saying, "What on earth is he talking about, when we read these scenes in Fallujah, or we read about Mr. Sadr," let me just give you one example.

We didn't read about the massive Arba'in pilgrimage. I don't know the estimates; I think roughly a million Shi'a pilgrims on the road for that celebration, very emotional celebration of the martyrdom of Ali. We anticipated -- we were afraid of massive violence during that event. There was no news because there was no

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violence. The Shi'a of Iraq, on the whole, have conducted themselves with incredible restraint in the face of repeated provocations both from the Zarqawi terrorists, from the former regime killers, and from this small-time gangster, Mr. Sadr.

I do want to recognize that we have disappointments with the performance of security forces. We are learning lessons from that. I cite three in particular at length in my testimony. The first is the need for stronger leaders.

The second is that Iraqi security forces need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to feel, and to have their friends and relatives feel, that they're fighting for Iraq, not for the Americans. That is one of the reasons why General Abizaid and our commanders were those who were pushing so hard to accelerate the transition to a sovereign government. That is the reason why they found, and I felt with them, that this label of "occupying power" was not a good one to hang on to for another year and a half, if there was any way to avoid it.

And third, and this is our responsibility, Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment, and they need it faster.

Mr. Chairman, I have some comments about Afghanistan. I'll be happy to discuss that in questions.

I would like to stress that I think the American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq and in Afghanistan; that the efforts of our service men and women are transforming the lives of 50 million people, overwhelmingly Muslims, and transforming two regions that have for too long accommodated despotism and terrorism, to the detriment of its people.

Both our friends and our enemies, and our friends particularly, in Iraq and Afghanistan need to know that this country has the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives. And I suppose it's worth highlighting for the international audiences that the debate in this country seems to be about whether we have enough troops or whether we should have more troops, not about whether we should abandon the people of Iraq or the people of Afghanistan. That is an incredibly important message. It is one of the most valuable messages we can deliver, because it builds confidence in the people, it encourages people to cooperate with our troops, and it will allow us to defeat this ugly enemy sooner rather than later.

Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I think I'm going to abbreviate here. I do want to say that there are quite a few myths out there, and I cite some of them in this testimony. It is a myth to say that the June 30th date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, and even more of a myth to say it's driven by the math of U.S. electoral politics. There are very good important reasons in Iraq for doing it, and I would note that, in fact, it was our friends in the United Nations, particularly France, that were most critical when we established the Governing Council that Iraq needed a sovereign government, not an American occupation.

SEN. WARNER: Mr. Secretary, I think we can probably perceive the benefit of your additional points in the exchange we'll have --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let's do that. If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one impressive quote from General Jack Keane at his retirement, because I think this is a message to the world.

The general said that, "The foreign terrorists, the Ba'ath Party sympathizers, the extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations have no idea what they're up against. They think they know us," General Keane said, "because they've heard of Lebanon in '83 or Somalia in '94 or the USS Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their knowledge is superficial, and their understanding is shallow. To understand America and Americans," General Keane said, "they need to understand the Marne in 1918 or Tarawa in '43, Omaha beach in '44 or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy, John Pershing and George Marshall, Chesty Puller and George Patton, Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now performing every day." And the general concluded, "Our enemies

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are cunning, but they are ignorant. And they're ignorance will be their undoing. They do not our will, our courage, or our character."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless those wonderful men and women who serve our country so well. And I thank this committee for the -- and the Congress for the support you give them.

SEN. WARNER: Well, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee and, indeed, throughout the Senate share those beliefs about the men and women of the armed forces and have the highest regard for General Keane. I hope he's doing well.

General Myers?

GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Levin, members of the committee, once again I thank you for your unwavering support of our armed forces and, more specifically, our men and women in uniform as they fight this all-important war on terrorism.

As Chairman Warner said, I just returned from visiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly, the spike in violence that we've all seen in central Iraq over the last week is a challenge, no doubt about it. And we mourn every coalition soldier that we lose. But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in our resolve to help create a free, prosperous, a democratic Iraq. A violent minority, a small marginal minority cannot be allowed to defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people.

This is no popular uprising. This violence is a desperate attempt by frustrated, isolated groups such as the insurgents in Fallujah as described by Secretary Wolfowitz, and Sadr's thugs to derail the progress that we're making. According to recent polls, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the majority of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed. And they're positive about what the future holds, thanks in large part to the efforts of our servicemen and -women. I know you all are as proud as I am of how well they're performing. They are so tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very well. They also understand what a huge difference that they're making.

And the contrast between our troops and the anti-coalition forces they're fighting couldn't be greater. In Fallujah we've seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques as operating bases, deliberately put children in the line of fire as human shields, and attack innocent civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars into marketplaces. Our servicemen and -women, on the other extreme, are going to extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane operation they can. That means at times we accept greater risk in order to avoid civilian casualties.

Make no mistake, we are hitting the enemy very hard, and we are devastating them. But our troops are also very compassionate. Their strength of character in the end, I believe, will be a major factor in determining Iraq's future. I see the same thing in Afghanistan as well with 12 provincial reconstruction teams now working on security and civil affairs for the Afghani people.

Let me close by sharing a letter a member of my staff received from a private first class. This young man enlisted after one year of college. In fact, he was in college on an ROTC scholarship. But because after 9/11 he saw an opportunity to make a difference. He's now serving in one of the more dangerous areas in central Iraq. He describes how he went on a mission to look at the structural integrity of some of the bridges. In the course of the patrol they talked to many of the Iraqis, especially the children. And he had their medical corpsman take care of some of the children with medical problems. By the time they drove off, everyone in the town was smiling and waving at them. I'll quote, and here's what he said:

"What I'm trying to say to you guys is this" -- and "you guys" are his parents -- "we're making a difference here. An area smack-dab in the infamous Sunni triangle known for its ruthlessness is gradually, patrol by

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patrol, becoming safe and free."

Patrol by patrol. That means we still have a long way to go in this war beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, and elections in Afghanistan. But let's not forget that our troops are making a huge difference every day, and they know it. We're truly blessed with amazing men and women to do this important work, and I include in there their families, and for the reserve component, the Guard and the Reserve, the employers who support them so well. And again, I thank this committee for its strong support.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, General.

Secretary Grossman.

MR. GROSSMAN: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you all for the opportunity to testify before you today. And, Senator Warner, I thank you for putting my full statement in the record, and I'm pleased to summarize what I have to say, I hope in a short way.

Before I begin, let me add my voice to the committee's and to my fellows here on this table to pay tribute to all of those, military and civilian, who are today serving our country around the world, and specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

And I also want to thank the committee for their support of the State Department, because without your support and without the Congress's support, we would not have been in a position a year ago, two years ago, to do what we have had to do in Afghanistan and Iraq. And I'll talk a little bit more about that. But I thank you in the very beginning for the strong support of the Congress for the secretary's goals in making the department an effective institution.

I also would like to say, as you did, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Levin, that we're delighted with the president's nomination yesterday of Ambassador Negroponte as our first ambassador to the new Iraq, and we look forward to his confirmation hearings and his confirmation by the Senate. And we thank you for your words of support to Ambassador Negroponte.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, in your letter of invitation to me, you asked me a series of questions about how the transition was going to go between CPA and a new embassy. And I wanted today to take a few minutes to talk about where we stand in that transition and try as specifically as I can to answer your questions.

First let me say that in my view, we have the guidance we need about how to do this; we have the direction we need about what we're supposed to do; and as I hope to convince you, we also have a plan about how to move forward between now and the 30th of June/1st of July, so that a U.S. embassy and a United States ambassador representing the United States of America are there to represent us in Iraq.

Our guidance, obviously, Mr. Chairman, as you have quoted, comes from the president. "Our central commitment," he said last Tuesday, "is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on the 30th of June. It's important that we meet that deadline."

Our specific direction, as you can imagine, comes from Secretary Powell. And he has set as the goal of the State Department to make sure that we are ready to take on this responsibility on the 1st of July. And I might also say how proud we are of Lieutenant General Kicklighter and also Frank Ricciardone, who are spearheading this effort for us, and now Ambassador Negroponte will come and join us and add effort and add focus to the effort that we are making.

I can tell you that the secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily.

We send to the secretary each evening a report on what's gone on during the day to move issues forward.

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We're also sending him a weekly consolidated summary.

And to execute our plan, we have obviously been working closely with all of our interagency colleagues, not just DOD and JCS. We've consulted the Congress, with our allies, with our coalition partners. So people know what it is that we're doing and how it is that we are moving forward.

As an early step, and one of the I think very best ideas of Ambassador Ricciardone and General Kicklighter, the transition planning team sent out very expert people to Iraq to try to tell us what were the main sectors that needed to be dealt with in this transition. And they came up with 15, 16 sectors that we're now moving forward on every day, and these sectors are broken down into individual tasks or milestones. Every one of them need to be accomplished. And although we list on our major charts, 15 or 16 of these milestones, in fact the sectors relate to more than 500 milestones that we have. And just to show you that, we've got a series of charts that we're using to make sure that those with the responsibility to do these jobs are doing them.

And, Senator Warner and Mr. Levin, I would invite members of the committee or members of the committee staff to come and have a look at these. They're all on the web and at the State Department on our classified systems, and people are welcome to come and look at them at any time and see how it is that we are doing. There is a responsibility. There is a completion date. There is a desire to get these things done, and we intend to do them. It's obviously a living document. New issues come up each day. New responsibilities have to be assigned. But we are doing our very best to keep to this plan.

I'd like to take today, of these 15 or 16 items, four of them just to talk about briefly.

First, let me talk about people. State Department officers, as both Ambassador Wolfowitz and General Myers know, have been in Iraq from the very beginning with General Garner in ORHA and now under Jerry Bremer in CPA, and we have 170 people in Iraq today. And like Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, we are also immensely proud of our people's work that are being done in Iraq. And I can tell you that they have come from dozens of Washington agencies, dozens of missions overseas, foreign service, civil service, from brand-new officers to sitting ambassadors.

The question we are asking ourselves now is how big will this embassy be on the 1st of July, and one of the questions you asked me in your letter of invitation. We at the State Department have so far announced positions for 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff. In addition, Secretary Powell has written to all of his Cabinet colleagues, asking them to identify the contributions that they wish to make to this embassy. And to date, he's received 10 replies for requests for a presence in our mission in Baghdad for a total of 254 Americans and 280 locally hired personnel looking forward to the fiscal year 2005. Long term, because these 10 aren't the only people who will look for representation at the mission, we look for a total of between 350 and 400 permanently assigned Americans from probably 12 to 15 Cabinet agencies that will serve under the chief of mission in Iraq. And I'd also note that a number of people who work at CPA today we hope will also move under the embassy and allow us to continue with the great expertise that they have developed.

I can also report to you that, of this announced 142 positions for our new embassy at the State Department, we've had over 200 bidders on these jobs. We have not had any problem at all enticing people to be assigned to Iraq. And of the 142 positions that we've announced, we've assigned 97 people, another 32 are pending, and we will have all of these people assigned well in time to meet our obligations. And we also, Senators, are starting to begin the process to hire locally hired people, Iraqis, which is a big challenge as you might imagine. But we've hired our initial Iraqi employees and they are undergoing training here in Washington so they can help us then hire more.

Mr. Chairman, one of the questions that is around and was in your letter of invitation was what is going to be the responsibility of the American ambassador there, given the obviously large military role that will

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remain in Iraq after the 1st of July.

And I can tell you that the American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the president, as all our ambassadors carry letters from the president, that spells clearly his authority. It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal representative of the president, reporting through the secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States government executive branch employees in Iraq except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization.

Of course, as Paul and I have talked about a lot, our ambassador and our military commanders will need to work very closely together. We do this around the world. We will be able to do this successfully in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, the second of these areas is security. Obviously, our top priority is security. It was our top priority before the last couple of weeks. It remains our top priority. And we've already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound, based largely on security features. We've got 32 officers from the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service already in Iraq to define the mission's security requirements and begin to meet them, as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors.

And as you know, Deputy Secretary Armitage and our assistant secretary for Diplomatic Security were in Iraq over the past few days to continue this consultation.

Iraq is, not just for our military colleagues but for us as well and for all of our civilian colleagues, a dangerous place to work. Our people know that. That is worth saying out loud. And protecting our people in a wartime environment's difficult, it's expensive, but we will continue to meet our responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, also, in terms of a building, I have laid out in my statement our plan for creating interim facilities for the 1st of July and then our plan for building an embassy after that. I just want you to know it's there, and I'm glad to talk about it. We're glad to consult about it at any time.

And then finally is the question of finances. How much is it going to cost? And do we have the money? And let me just share with you our current thinking on the financial resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad and, if I could, just emphasize as much as can that the costs I report to you today are a snapshot. They're where we are on the 20th of April, because we've got some responsibilities to meet. And we believe that they will be costly, but we can meet them.

In order to open an embassy on the 1st of July, we've got to, as I said, meet basic security needs, technology needs, housing needs for our people. And so far the Congress has provided us money with which to do some of this job. We've got in FY '04 \$97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect to have available in the fourth quarter a portion of the operating expense budget appropriated to the CPA -- that's about \$198 million -- and, pursuant to the FY '04 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund which could be transferred, which is about \$184 million.

We're also now working to determine the joint mission costs, which I would say to you are going to be in the range of \$500 (million) to \$600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004, and how we'll allocate those costs among the various embassies.

And in addition, we're trying to figure out and look for the amount of money that we need to move forward to operate our mission in 2005, which could be on the order of a billion dollars. We're working closely with CPA, with the Defense Department, OMB to refine these estimates. We look forward to providing you as accurate information as we can. And we'll consult with you and your colleagues before anything is made final.

Mr. Chairman, I've talked in my statement a little bit about Iraq's transition to sovereignty. But I think

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Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz with his charts and comments has made many of the comments that I would have wanted to do, and also about the Iraqi interim government.

Might I just jump, if I could, to talk for a moment about what -- the United Nations Security Council resolutions, since both you and the ranking member had raised this issue. And obviously, we are looking to go for another Security Council resolution. Both President Bush and Secretary Powell have discussed this. We're now in a conversation inside of the administration about what kind of resolution might be appropriate, how to go forward with it, when to go forward with it, and the possible elements of that resolution. As you both said in your statements, the new resolution should extend a hand to this new Iraqi government. It could also deal and regularize reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq, deal with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could encourage other nations, as you both said, to get involved on both security and reconstruction efforts, and a new resolution could structure a role for the United Nations in this new political framework, particularly in supporting progress towards elections.

Mr. Chairman, you both -- and the ranking member talked about Afghanistan. Let me just be brief, if I could, about those two issues, since I think they are extremely important, and we do need to keep paying attention to them. We have tried to pursue a policy in Afghanistan that has to do with increased security, reconstruction and economic growth and the growth of constitutional, democratic and effective government. These things are all related. And as we move forward on one and have success on one, we believe that they will have positive -- a positive outcome on the others. As you both said, the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting, and we need to pay particular attention to them.

You asked me in your letter about elections. President Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the lower house of parliament would take place in September. And we are doing all we can to support the United Nations effort to help the Afghans have a successful election. This announcement is consistent with the Afghan -- with Afghanistan's new constitution, which said that these parliamentary and presidential elections ought to be held together. As you said, there was the Bonn agreement, there was the loya jirga of 2002, the constitutional loya jirga of 2004, and we believe that we can make progress here toward these elections.

The United Nations reports that about 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote as of last week with registrations so far focused on urban centers, and the number will rise significantly as people reach out to other Afghans. I would say just parenthetically that 29 percent of registered voters are women, and that percentage is steadily rising. And over the past two weeks women have represented 39 percent of those registered.

Finally, a word about narcotics because, as you say, this is a great -- this is a very important challenge to what we're doing in Afghanistan. Narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most serious threat to our common mission in Afghanistan. And just as you and the ranking member said, all indicators point toward a significant increase in poppy cultivation this year, and we should make no bones about that. This is a real challenge that we are going to have to deal with. We're working with President Karzai. I know that you saw a couple of weeks ago at the Berlin conference he called for a jihad against drug trafficking. And we are doing all we can to fight this problem with him.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the carve-up of responsibilities in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom has the lead on counter-narcotics initiatives. And between the United Kingdom and the United States, we now have a very comprehensive strategy to try to deal with some of this problem.

The United Kingdom's efforts started this month. Ours will start at the beginning of next month. We've put about 40 extra million dollars into a government-led eradication program. We're training teams to do eradication. And President Karzai has set himself the goal of eradicating 25 percent of the crop this year, and we want to help him succeed in meeting that goal.

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Just let me end by saying that, although we've talked a lot about Iraq and Afghanistan has come at the end of your statement, the end of my statement, this is something we're paying tremendous attention to, and I'd be glad to talk about this and anything else in the question period.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We'll now proceed to a round of six minutes for each member.

My question is going to come down to one sentence, after I make a preliminary observation. What's the status of the American GI on the morning of July 1st? I'm going to assume that there's an Iraqi interim government in place following the procedures that you've alluded to today. I'd like to know what's the probability of the status of forces agreement likewise being in place, and what are the guidelines that will be followed in writing that up?

By way of background, I make the following observations: We're using interchangeably now the terms that on July 1, there will be a transfer of power to the Iraq interim government. Others, including the president, have said there will be a transfer of sovereignty. Well, the word sovereignty is pretty well carefully defined. It can mean everything. So I'd like to know who's going to give that GI the orders, and what is he expected to do?

Now, we have the TAL, Transitional Administrative Law, which says, as follows: Iraqi armed forces will be, quote, "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under a unified command, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511." So I go to that. And that's very generalized. And by the way, that was dated 16 October, 2003, and an awful lot of developments have occurred since that time. But it generally says, "authorizes a multinational force under a unified command to take all necessary means to contribute to the maintenance, security and stability in Iraq," and so forth and so forth.

I think this has got to be updated and clarified. And to the extent that you can advise this committee this morning, and I put the question to all witnesses, who's going to give the orders to the security forces on July 30th (sic)? And should there be a difference of views between, say, the U.S. military commanders as to what should be done to meet whatever contingency may arise on July 30th (sic) and thereafter, who's going to reconcile those differences between the professional military and a brand new government who will have been in office for but a day?

Mr. Secretary, can you lead off?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will, and I'm sure that General Myers and Ambassador Grossman can supplement here. The question you ask, obviously, is a crucial one, and we've spent a lot of time studying it. I would emphasize, it's not a unique situation. We went through transition to a sovereign government in Afghanistan, as I noted earlier, in December of 2001. We've been operating with our forces in Bosnia with a sovereign government since the Dayton Accords of 1995.

And indeed, if you look around the world, there are many, many countries where you have sovereign governments and American forces under American military commanders, not least Korea.

Each one of these cases is different. In the case of Iraq, the principal authority is in fact the authority that you cited, provided by --

SEN. WARNER: I beg your pardon. What is --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Case of Iraq, the principal authority is the authority in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which creates a multinational force to provide for security of Iraq until a permanent constitutional government is established, which would be the end of next year, and that that force is under the command of an American commander.

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As you also noted, the Transitional Administrative Law has the Iraqi Governing Council placing Iraqi forces under that command, as part of that command. In fact, Iraq is one of the most important if not the most important members of that coalition force. That provides enormous authority and discretion to our commanders. Should there be another U.N. Security Council resolution -- I think Ambassador Grossman can comment on the likelihood; I think it's very likely -- we would I assume either continue that authority or specify it in any further detail if it were necessary or useful.

Further, we have Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 I believe it is that goes into more detail about the rights and privileges and immunities that pertain to foreign forces providing for security in Iraq.

And finally, after an elected government -- transitional elected government takes power, takes office next January and --

SEN. WARNER: You know, we can -- excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We can get to January. I'm still worried that, say, there's a major insurrection that occurs early on in July and our military commanders have to decide to the extent that force must be applied. And we've seen recently in the Fallujah operations where there's been some honest difference of opinion between members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the current governing body, and our military commanders as to the timing, the quantum and otherwise the use of force. Fortunately, as you say, Fallujah may be taking on a brighter status here if these negotiations continue to be fruitful.

But given military operations, you can't sit down and deliberate over an extensive period of time what to do. You've got to react and react very swiftly. And if you're going to give them sovereignty, and at the same time our military commander, as I believe you're saying, has the authority to make those decisions as to how to apply force, I see a basic conflict of interest here.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: But, Mr. Chairman, the issue, as I think your comment correctly implies, is political, not legal. We had that issue today with a different legal framework. The use of force in someone else's country is always got potential political ramifications and political controversy. We've had this on numerous occasions with President Karzai's government in Afghanistan. And the answer there is you have got to be prepared to discuss, to negotiate, and also at the end of the day to use the authority that is granted to us. That is -- I would say describes the way we're proceeding in Fallujah. It's the way we will have to proceed until such time as the Iraq is fully in control of whatever forces are there.

(To General Myers.) General Myers, do you want --

SEN. WARNER: But the safety and welfare of the American GI may be at risk in a matter of hours if there's indecision and a lack of I think specific authority as to who can make what decisions.

General, can you address this?

GEN. MYERS: Sure, I can -- I don't think I'm going to say anything different than what the secretary said, but there is nobody that believes, Iraqi or coalition, that on 1 July the security situation is going to dramatically change. It's going to be what it is --

SEN. WARNER: Correct.

GEN. MYERS: -- and it's going to go over.

SEN. WARNER: Let's hope it improves, that -- that's a goal.

GEN. MYERS: Certainly. Certainly. But from 30 June to 1 July, we don't -- there's not -- there's not going to be a change to the security situation, nor in the responsibility of the coalition forces as outlined in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which is the basis for our action even today and will be the basis for

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action in the future if we don't get a new U.N. Security Council resolution. And I'll let Secretary Grossman speak to that.

The way we have structured our military forces for the post-1 July period is to have a partnership with Iraqi forces that goes from the tactical level all the way up to the political level in Iraq, to the Ministry of Interior, to the Ministry of Defense. The command and control, the command post that we'll have set up will be in partnership with our -- with Iraqi security forces. And that's the way it's set up. I don't see a problem with our authorities right now; given the transitional administrative law, given the provisional -- Coalition Provisional Authority mandates and the U.N. Security Council resolution we just talked about. Our forces will have the authority and the wherewithal to do what they need to do to provide security, as they must, for Iraq.

SEN. WARNER: So irrespective of the word "total sovereignty" or power going over, that -- General Abizaid or his deputies can make the decision to use or not use force in their own judgment. They may consult the government, but it is their decision as to how, when and where to apply force.

GEN. MYERS: That's correct. And as I said, I mentioned the word "partnership" as this -- as we proceed down this path, we want this to be more of a partnership. But in the end --

SEN. WARNER: But partners disagree, and you can't have a lot of disagreement.

GEN. MYERS: But -- right. And -- but I said in the end, or I was going to say in the end, Mr. Chairman, we're going to have to do what we have to do.

SEN. WARNER: All right.

And Secretary Grossman, do you agree?

GEN. MYERS: And we think we have the authority to do that as well.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Just as we do in Afghanistan, for example, or in Bosnia.

MR. GROSSMAN: I have nothing to add except to say, as both have invited me to, I certainly believe we will be seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution, and one of the elements of it will be to see if we can not just maintain our authorities under 1511, but see if we can get others to join us in carrying them out.

SEN. WARNER: So we transfer sovereignty, but the military decisions continue to reside indefinitely in the control of the American commander. Is that correct?

GEN. MYERS: That's correct.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Levin.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, what options are you looking at should we need an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq?

GEN. MYERS: We have a -- we have done a scrub of forces that could be available, essentially immediately, to -- in the next few weeks to the next couple of months, in case we need more forces. And we have a fairly extensive list of those forces and the support that goes with them. And in the closed session I'd be happy to talk in a little bit more detail. But we have -- we have done that look. That's been presented to Secretary Rumsfeld. And in -- and we're going to continue to refine that list as we look at those forces.

Obviously, we have set ourselves some administrative guidelines to try to protect time home back from

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overseas, and so forth. And we're looking at that. But that's -- we do have forces that have been identified.

SEN. LEVIN: Has the 3rd Infantry Division been alerted about the possibility of an earlier redeployment to Iraq than had been earlier planned?

GEN. MYERS: Sir, I'll check -- Senator Levin, I'll check. I don't have that list in front of me. But like I said, we'll do it in the closed session. I don't think so. I don't think the 3rd ID has been alerted.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, prior to the war, there was a Joint Staff assessment as to the number of U.S. forces that would be needed, or expected to be needed one year after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What was that assessment?

GEN. MYERS: The only assessment that I know of is there was an assessment done by Central Command, I think before combat operations began, which had in September of '03 said here's what we think the troop strength is going to be. And this is from the field commander at the time. And as I recall, that number was somewhere around 60,000.

I don't know -- I'll tell you personally, I did not believe that number was correct, and I don't know that many of the Joint Chiefs believed that number was correct. But that was a number on a chart that I recall. I don't know how long that was the number that anybody was standing up to. That's the only number I can ever remember seeing, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: And when you say you didn't believe it was correct, you meant that it was too low, it was too high?

GEN. MYERS: I thought it was too low, sure.

SEN. LEVIN: As things now stand -- this goes to -- this is a question to you, Secretary Wolfowitz, and to Secretary Grossman. The U.N. is attempting to work out a process, through Mr. Brahimi, where the Iraqis will reach a consensus on the form of the entity to whom sovereignty is to be restored on June 30th. It's important that that deadline be met; I think everybody acknowledges that, since it's now been set and it's very clearly the expectation. But the challenge is immense in order to put the pieces together and to get a broad consensus in Iraq among its people for such a sovereign government. We're talking about a sovereign government, a government to which sovereignty is going to be restored; it's going to make critical decisions about who will draft a constitution for the people of Iraq, and other critical decisions.

Now, I asked Kofi Annan last week if the pieces can't be put together by June 30th, then what? Is there a Plan B? He said there's no time for a Plan B. The only alternative would be for the Governing Council to continue until an interim government can be put together which has broad support of the people of Iraq.

Now, we hope that Mr. Brahimi will succeed in putting together that consensus. But if he doesn't, does the administration have a plan for what to do?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Levin, I think it's important to understand what this interim government is intended to do and what it is not --

SEN. LEVIN: I wonder if could just interrupt you because my time is running out. If you could just --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is not in fact picking the people to write the constitution.

SEN. LEVIN: I don't care -- I'm not asking what is in the plan --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Its main role is to establish a framework for elections so that the government, the transitional government that comes in in January is an elected government.

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SEN. LEVIN: I understand. But that plan for a government will draft a constitution, the government that it drafts the plan for.

But my question is --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, it won't. It will provide elections for a group that then --

SEN. LEVIN: I agree. I agree with that.

My question to you is this. If the pieces cannot be put together by June 30th, does the administration have a plan for what it would then do? That's my only question. Either you have a plan or you don't. I know you don't want it to happen. Nobody does.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We think --

SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Brahimi doesn't want it to happen. Kofi Annan doesn't want it to happen. Everybody wants that interim government to be established by the people of Iraq, presumably, that will have this broad support of people. But if the pieces can't be put together, my simple question is, does the administration have a plan?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: There's certainly ways to proceed if it can't be done by July 1st. But the reason for keeping so much pressure on July 1st is, as I said earlier, it will improve the security situation in the country enormously if people stop thinking of themselves as occupied; if they have some consonance, as we have been able to build out of the Bonn process in Afghanistan that Mr. Brahimi also led, a sense that there is a road to full and complete elected constitutional government.

But this is a six-month interim appointed group, based on a consensus that hopefully Ambassador Brahimi will be able -- be able to distill out of his many discussions in the country.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. It's important not just because it will devise a plan for elections for people who will draft a constitution, but for the reasons that the chairman and I have mentioned before, is that if a sovereign country may be able to change the status of forces -- those are our forces, and we've got to make sure that they have the military authority to act. And if we put in place a sovereign government, that means that they presumably would have sovereignty to decide what troops can do in their own country. That raises significant issues, and I don't want to go beyond what you've already --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Actually, Senator, that sovereignty is limited by the U.N. Security Council resolution that arranges for the security issues, as I said to Senator Warner.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. One other question. In response to my request from November of last year, Undersecretary Feith promised in February that he would provide me with numerous documents produced by the Office of Special Plans and the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I have still not received the documents that he promised, and I would ask that you intervene and get me those documents, with him.

But relative to the Feith office, last August or -- excuse me -- in August and September of 2002, Undersecretary Feith presented a briefing to the secretary of Defense. And then, after that, it was presented by Secretary -- Undersecretary Feith to the National Security Council staff and the staff of the vice president. And this is relative to a relationship, the extent of it, between Iraq and al Qaeda. It was a briefing which was very critical of the CIA, disagreeing with the CIA's assessment that there was not a strong relationship or a clear relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq.

And my question to you is this. Were you aware of the fact that that briefing was being given to the staff of the NSC and the Office of the Vice President, and that the CIA was not aware of the fact that the briefing was being given to the vice president and to -- Vice President's Office and to the staff of the National

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Security Council?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I can no longer recall whether I was aware or not. There's nothing unusual, Senator Levin, about different staffs in the government discussing material. And the material under discussion was in fact material generated by the CIA. The issue was how to assess various intelligence reports produced by the CIA. And essentially the same briefing was presented, I believe, previously to a collection of CIA analysts, to call their attention to --

SEN. LEVIN: It was a very different briefing, and a very critical one, but --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: There was one slide that was different, Senator; that's all.

SEN. LEVIN: And that one slide was highly critical of the CIA?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It -- that one slide listed some assumptions that were -- that Mr. Feith's staff thought were at issue.

One of those assumptions, it seems to me, in fact has been proven out to be wrong. That was the assumption that because bin Laden was a secularist -- excuse me, an Islamist and Saddam a secularist, they were incapable of cooperating. We have since seen evidence -- in fact, there was evidence, it turns out, in the sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden issued in February of 1998 that said that bin Laden and Saddam had concluded an agreement not to attack one another and to cooperate with each other. So I think it was perfectly appropriate to ask the question whether one should analyze these reports on the basis of an assumption which in fact has turned out to be a false assumption.

SEN. LEVIN: But you were not aware, in any event, of the fact that -- you do not remember whether you were aware that the briefing to the vice president's office and the NSC staff was being made without the knowledge of the CIA?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it overstates it. First of all, there's nothing unusual about staffs talking to each other, and the only thing that --

SEN. LEVIN: I'm just asking, you don't remember whether you were aware of it. That's my question.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I don't remember, but it's also not the dramatic event that I think you're describing it as.

SEN. WARNER: We've got to --

SEN. LEVIN: Well, there were additional slides. There were additional slides to the one that you make reference to --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: One additional slide, and I think I've described it.

SEN. LEVIN: (Inaudible.)

SEN. WARNER: We thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Allard.

SEN. WAYNE ALLARD (R-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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I'd like to thank the panel for giving us an update this morning.

There have been some who have suggested that what's happening in Iraq has a lot of parallels with what was happening in Vietnam, Secretary Wolfowitz, and for the life of me I feel -- I don't see hardly any correlation at all. And I'm curious to know how you respond to those who try and characterize our efforts in Iraq as that similar to what happened in Vietnam.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm with Senator McCain. I think there's no comparison at all, except I guess it is important to say that our soldiers fought with enormous courage in Vietnam as well, and the Vietnamese people would be better off today if they had won.

But I think, as I've said in my statement, I think one enormous difference, and I hope the killers out there, the enemies of democracy in Iraq have gotten this message, is that the debate in this country is not about whether to abandon Iraq. The debate is about whether to keep 135,000 troops there or to add more troops. That is really where the issue lies.

The other huge difference is that, without being an apologist for Ho Chi Minh or his Vietcong, they at least made credible pretensions to doing something for the Vietnamese people. The people that we are fighting in Iraq today are a combination of killers who abused and tortured that country for 35 years and newcomers -- some from outside, some from inside -- like Mr. Zarqawi, who makes abundantly clear in this infamous letter that we captured that his goal is simply destruction and death. And indeed, he thinks that the goal in life is to worship death and to be willing to sacrifice yourself for martyrdom. He sees democracy as the enemy, makes no pretense in fact of doing anything other than bringing chaos and instability.

And I think it's important not only in analyzing the problem we're up against, but I would be much more concerned if I thought we were dealing with a genuine popular uprising. And I don't want to -- again, I want to be sure not to put on rose-colored glasses. There is a lot of broad dissatisfaction, especially in the Sunni Arab community, partly with the pace of progress, and the terrorists have done their best to slow down the pace of progress; partly because after all of this historical experience I think Iraqis believe that it's winner take all, and if the Shi'a take all now the Sunnis will be abused. It's partly misunderstanding, frankly more misunderstanding than actual fact about the de-Ba'athification policy.

We need to work harder, and we are looking precisely at how to work harder, to win back the Sunni moderates.

And I think they are -- again, I think, the overwhelming majority of that community. But the basic enemy, the enemies of democracy in Iraq are just killers.

SEN. ALLARD: General Myers, if you listen to the papers, or when you read the papers and listen to TV and everything, I think the impression that tends to come across, that we do have a lot of battles and a lot of conflicts going on in Iraq. And I was over in Iraq 30 days ago, about a month. And, you know, I saw a lot of good things happening around Mosul and a lot of the other towns that I was visiting: a lot of reconstruction, a lot of positive things. And I -- what is happening now with the conflict? Just put a general picture there, you know? I've always perceived that north and south was pretty much settled and our real problem was the Sunni triangle. And so I'd like to have you comment about what we're seeing now on TV today and reading in the papers.

GEN. MYERS: Well, in the last couple of weeks what we've seen are really two different events inside Iraq. One was Sadr and his militia, which is fairly small, sent out or rose up in several towns in the south. All those towns, with the exception of An Najaf, where his headquarters is, are back under Iraqi and coalition control. Coalition forces, Iraqi police are on duty in al Kut, Nasiriyah and the other cities where there were uprisings. These were small and easily contained because Sadr is increasingly being marginalized. He is not a popular figure with most Iraqis. He is preaching violence against the coalition. He

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has come out against the transitional administrative law, which the Iraqi Governing Council has approved. And my view is he will continue to be marginalized. But he is in An Najaf, and the Iraqis are negotiating and dealing with him right now as long as -- as well as some negotiators from the Coalition Provisional Authority and Ambassador Bremer.

The other fight was the fight that Secretary Wolfowitz described, which are these extremists, which, by the way, if you compare and contrast with Vietnam, they are not fighting for an ideology. They're fighting to disrupt progress. They have no ideology other than to go back to the terror of the former regime -- I mean, if that's an ideology. So the why they're fighting I think is an important question when you try to compare it to other events. This occurs in the same area, as you pointed out, that -- where we've had a lot of our instability. Fallujah has been the heart of that. And we've been in Fallujah from time to time, and then we come out.

If you remember, we went in because of the atrocities on the Blackwater security personnel, the four personnel that were killed and later burned and then hung on a bridge. We went in because we had to, and to find the perpetrators. And what we found was a huge rats nest that is still festering today, needs to be dealt with. Right now we're dealing with it through negotiations and through a cease-fire. I will say that the cease-fire is only on the side of the Marines that are in Fallujah, it's not on the part of the folks in Fallujah that are -- the extremists and so forth. They are still firing. They're using -- just, it was -- I think it was yesterday or the day before, a Red Crescent, our equivalent of the Red Cross, ambulance trying to get into Fallujah, was stopped, and weapons were found inside. They were trying to resupply themselves with weapons and ammunition. I mentioned the mosque and the schools and using women and children. They have done that. That was all out of Fallujah.

So that area is still very, very hot, and that extends into Baghdad, by the way. Sadr City is still a problem area, although most -- it's relatively calm today compared to when Sadr was -- those uprisings were going on about a week ago.

In the north, interestingly enough, with events in Fallujah, there were lots of demonstrators in Mosul. The demonstrators were dealt with by the Sunni -- basically the Sunni government in Mosul and the Iraqi police in Mosul and the Civil Defense Corps. So it's a very different picture in the north right now. Relatively stable. Economically doing quite well. It's the central area that has remained the problem. And I could go into it, but I don't want to take any more time. Part of it's going to have to be dealt with by military force, in my judgment. Obviously, a big part of it has to be dealt with in making sure we have a strategy that enfranchises the Sunni population, and that's being worked very hard. I spent a lot of time on that particular subject in Iraq just recently.

SEN. ALLARD: Well thank you for your response.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude by just this one brief statement. This last Saturday I happened to participate in a welcome home for Bravo Company of the 244th Engineering Battalion in Fort Collins, Colorado. And this was the local unit. And, you know, the report that came back from our troops verifies pretty much what you were saying about the morale of our troops in Iraq. They were very proud of what they were doing. They were building a lot of infrastructure, and they felt like they were really doing something to improve the country because they were improving the infrastructure -- you know, that's sewer and water and roads, and doing a lot of -- education, providing an education there.

And one of the comments I think was made at that is you know, there's a lot of pride and a lot of good morale; people feel good about what they're doing. They're professional soldiers. But they emphasized time and time again is the American people need to stand behind us. And so I'm there, and I think that that's a message that we need to know, is that we're very proud of what they're doing and we're standing behind them.

Thank you.

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GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Senator Allard.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kennedy.

SEN. TED KENNEDY (D-MA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Myers and gentlemen, we all do stand behind our servicemen. But we have some responsibilities to find out about the policy and where it's going, that is requiring the presence of those service men and women.

Mr. Secretary, I must say I found your presentation here this morning somewhat disingenuous. I was here when the administration made the case for going to war, and the case for going to war was the threat that the United States was facing from nuclear weapons that were going to be provided to al Qaeda by Iraq. And here we have your statements all about the human rights violations. Everyone knows that Saddam Hussein is a brute, despicable, deplorable murderer. And I'll include in the record the State Department's filing about the human rights violations around the world, about what the Chinese are doing to the Tibetans; what the North Koreans are doing in terms of torture, forced abortions, infanticide; what the Burmese are doing, and the rest of the world. And I want to make that as a part of the record.

There wasn't a word in this presentation about the weapons of mass destruction in this presentation here this morning. Now, Mr. Secretary, you were one of the principal architects of war with Iraq, and it's been on your agenda since the end of the Gulf War, 1991.

It's now clear the Iraq was high on the agenda of the administration from day one, even though the outgoing Clinton administration made it clear in the briefings during the transition that al Qaeda was the most serious threat to our security. Dick Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, wrote that when he raised al Qaeda in the first meeting of the deputies in April, 2001, you, Mr. Secretary, said, "I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden. At every stage, even after 9/11, it seems that you treated al Qaeda as less than a main threat, as a diversion from the real priority, which was Iraq. And in his book, Bob Woodward says the administration diverted resources from the war in Afghanistan to plan for the war in Iraq.

Now we have in the newspapers this morning, The Washington Post: "Al Qaeda intends to strike, officials say. U.S. intelligence community believes al Qaeda is intent on launching terrorist attacks in this country sometime between now and the November election."

Aren't we paying a high price and isn't the world paying a high price because of the administration's obsession with Iraq?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Kennedy, actually I welcome the opportunity to correct the record on some of these things, although I would have preferred you hadn't used that word "disingenuous." I am trying my best to be candid with this committee and with the American people. But the notion that an invasion of Iraq has been on my agenda since 1991 is simply wrong, sir.

Until September 11th, I thought the problem with Saddam Hussein was something that should be dealt with by Iraqis, although I was consistently critical of the lack of American support for those Iraqis who were prepared to liberate their own country. And we will never know, because history, unfortunately, only tells you what happened on one course of action, but we will never know whether some of our problems today might have been avoided if at earlier times we had enabled the Iraqis to do the job for themselves.

Secondly, Mr. Clarke's book is just full of gross inaccuracies. He has Secretary Rumsfeld attending a critical September 4th meeting that the secretary wasn't even at. He has the secretary in the Pentagon on a secure

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videoteleconference, a rather dramatic, memorable moment, when the secretary didn't turn up until an hour later. He puts quotes in my mouth that are about 165 degrees opposite of anything I could possibly have said.

And he is simply wrong when he says that I dismissed the threat of al Qaeda or the threat of terrorism. To the contrary, Senator, one of the concerns I had, I've had for many years, was the question of who did the World Trade Center in 1993, the most serious act of foreign terrorism on American soil prior to September 11th, which, it turns out, was done by the nephew of the man who was the mastermind of September 11th. There's a straight line from 1993 to the tragedy of September 11th.

And I was concerned that this was obviously not just a rogue bunch of misfits operating out of a mosque in Brooklyn, that there was international expertise behind it. And when I served on the Rumsfeld commission in 1998, we asked for a briefing from the counterterrorism center -- I did -- on who was behind it, because it seemed to me, correctly, that if we're concerned about missile attack on the United States, we also need to think about terrorist attack on the United States.

SEN. KENNEDY: Why did we have the diversion -- because my time is going. Why did we have the diversion, then, of funds, if we're going after al Qaeda?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Because they are part of a single --

SEN. KENNEDY: And why aren't we going after --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- conflict. And when Mr. Clarke erred --

SEN. KENNEDY: And we have Osama bin Laden on --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: --- and said there's not a shred of evidence about al Qaeda and Iraq -- excuse me -- he was in charge of counterterrorism --

SEN. KENNEDY: No, but I'm talking now about --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- when that secret indictment was issued. And he was in charge of counterterrorism, Senator Kennedy, when Saddam Hussein, for 10 years, harbored Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was the only bomber from the 1993 World Trade Center event who was still at large. His lack of curiosity about why the Iraqis were holding a man who was responsible for what in the 1990s was the most serious act of foreign terrorism on the United States is a mystery to me to this day.

SEN. KENNEDY: All right. We'll take all the criticisms you have of Mr. Clarke.

Can you tell me why the administration diverted funds, though, when we were beginning to target Osama bin Laden, had him, evidently, effectively trapped in Tora Bora, then the administration diverted \$700 million out of that to go to begin the process or advance the process in terms of Iraq?

And if so, I mean, how much responsibility do you bear in that?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Again, I appreciate the opportunity to set the record straight. We did not divert funds. We were working --

SEN. KENNEDY: My time is up, but I'm addressing the Woodward issue --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I'll be happy to put it in the record.

SEN. KENNEDY: Okay.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We were very careful in making sure that we applied money to the broader war on

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terrorism that the Congress had authorized, and we specifically withheld funding for those projects that were specifically Iraq-related until after the joint resolution passed the Congress. We were very conscious of the Congress's authority in this area, and we tried, as scrupulously as I know how, to live up to our obligations.

SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will submit for the record these points that I would have made.

SEN. WARNER: Correct. Did you have adequate time to reply to the important question raised by myself, Senator Levin and Senator Kennedy about that 700 million (dollars)? That's --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: If I could have a few more minutes, I would --

SEN. WARNER: I think I'll give you a minute or two, because it's very much on the minds of all of us.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: In the course of -- that \$750 million number comes from a set of tasks that CENTCOM put together in the summer of 2002 as things that they would want to have in the event of an Iraq contingency. The DOD comptroller looked at this list with a view to those things that were consistent with existing authorities in the supplemental appropriations of the global war on terror, and to distinguish between those and things which would be Iraq-specific, as I said.

After -- based on that exercise, in August and September of 2002, 178 million (dollars) was made available to support CENTCOM's global efforts, including funding for communications equipment, fuel supplies, humanitarian rations and improvements to CENTCOM's forward headquarters. All the investments were designed to strengthen our capabilities in the region or support ongoing operational requirements. No funding was made available for those things that had Iraq as the exclusive purpose.

On October 11th, as you're well aware, Congress passed the Iraq resolution, and consistent with congressional statutory requirements regarding military construction activities, we did notify the Congress about \$63 million in MILCON. And after October 25th, some \$800 million was made available over the following months to support Iraq preparatory tasks, consistent with that joint resolution.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.

Senator Collins.

SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Secretary Wolfowitz, all of us share your admiration and your gratitude to the men and women who are serving in Iraq. They are the best that our country has to offer. And that is why I am increasingly concerned about the strain that we are putting on our Reservists and our Guard members, their families and their employers.

Now Secretary Rumsfeld testified recently before our committee that only 7 percent of the Guard and Reserve have been involuntarily mobilized more than once in the past 13 years. I have to tell you that has not been our experience in Maine at all. I have talked to numerous Guard members and Reservists who have been deployed three times in the last decade.

To illustrate my concern, I'd want to tell you about the specific experience of a specific Reserve unit, and that's the 94th MP Company. This unit has been deployed two and a half of the past four years. They spent nine months in Bosnia. They've now been in Iraq for more than a year. They originally were scheduled to come home last fall. Then the Pentagon changed the policy to one year boots on the ground, so their tour was extended. That year expired on Easter weekend and they were literally on the bus to their plane to take them back to the United States when they got the news that once again they would be extended. I have to tell

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you that this has been devastating to the families and demoralizing to many of the soldiers who serve in this unit.

General Abizaid testified before us last year that one of the most important things for any soldier to know is when they're coming home when they're employed in a combat zone. He went on to say, quote, "We owe those soldiers the answer as to when that might be." Well, the answer has changed time and again, and I'm very concerned about what the impact is on these troops, their families and their employers.

I have three questions for you.

First, doesn't the fact that we are repeatedly deploying the same Reservists and the same members of the Guard over and over again suggest that we don't have the right mix of skills in the Army?

Second, are you concerned that changing the rules and extending deployments repeatedly, plus having a very high rate of deployment, is going to hurt our ability to retain skilled soldiers such as those in this unit?

And third, is the Pentagon considering any extra compensation for the members of units that have been involuntarily extended beyond the year that they originally thought they were going to have? Actually, it's even longer than that because of the change in policy last fall.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'll ask General Myers to comment also, especially on that last question.

But the issue you raise is a very important issue. We've been, even before this came up with your unit, your military police unit from Maine, we knew we had a big problem because of the decision that was really made I think 20 or 30 years ago that we would have a -- basically a Cold War military that couldn't go to war unless we were in a condition where the reserves were mobilized on a massive scale. And from that flowed a decision to take certain military occupations -- and military police, which is -- the unit you're talking about was one of them -- and put them almost exclusively in the reserves. And as a result, I think the unit from Maine was deployed to Bosnia's military police.

We need military police in every one of these, whether you call it peacekeeping, which is not Iraq, or stability operations, or low-intensity war, which is what Iraq is. And if you're part of that 7 percent that is mobilized more often, it doesn't matter to you that it's only -- quote, "only" 7 percent. I think the secretary was clear about that.

General Schoomaker has put together a plan that will move 100,000 positions, shift them from the active force to the Reserve -- or from the Reserve to the active force so that we can begin to cover these needs in a more balanced way with the active force, so that we're not constantly going back to the same well on Reservists for certain occupations that don't exist.

Military police is one, civil affairs is another. That's going to take some time. But it's a -- it is a major part of the fix.

The second major part of the fix is to increase the effective size of the army. Now, I said "effective size" because what General Schoomaker's plan is, is focused with about a 30,000 temporary increase in active Army manpower to work through a plan, as I think you've been briefed, but it's worth repeating, that we'll add at least 10 active brigades to the 33 in the Army now. And if we get to that point of 10 and think we should go further, there's a plan to go to 48, which would be a 50 percent increase in the number of active combat brigades in the Army with this roughly 30,000 personnel increase. And that 30,000 increase will be mostly temporary, particularly if we top off at 43.

There's no question it would be nice right now to have a larger army. The problem is, if we decided now or a year ago to have a larger army, you can't just -- these people don't just walk in and -- it's not like hiring for a check-writing organization. You have to grow the units. And once you've grown them, if it turns out that

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you've built up something you don't need, then you go through the pain of the 1990s of demobilizing people who you recruited in. So it's something the Army and the civilian leadership undertake with some care. I think we have a good plan here that gives us a chance to get more combat power into the Army. And if we ultimately decide a permanent increase is necessary, we can do that. But none of that, I'm afraid, helps your wonderful people from Maine. And on the question of -- let me ask General Myers to speak to that, and I certainly want to look into whether there are things that we can do on the compensatory front.

General Myers?

GEN. MYERS: Senator Collins, your first question, does a repeated deployment mean we have the wrong mix, and as Secretary Wolfowitz said, absolutely. We are not structured for the security environment we're in.

To put a little texture on the hundred thousand that the Army's going to be restructuring, they're going to take down field artillery battalions, air defense battalions, turn them into -- and others, but those are two of the primary ones -- and turn those into military police units, transportation units, petroleum distribution, water distribution. You know, it's the kind of units that we -- are in very high demand, and also put more of those in the active force. And that work has already started. It will continue for the next four or five years as we re-balance. It's a very important part of it.

Retention. Clearly, this unit has worked very hard. MPs are in high demand. I can remember right after 9/11 the MPs that showed up at Fort Myer, where I live, to provide addition security for the post. And there were some active duty for a while, and then pretty soon some Guard and Reserve, and sometimes forces that weren't trained to be MPs that were re-trained to come up there and help.

So, clearly we've got to do a better of this whole mix. The retention issue is huge. I would only say that as we look at recruiting and retention, this mission is so important that I think these people, besides being disappointed -- I mean, their families being tremendously disappointed and their employers being disappointed, that what they're doing is so important that I hope that that, along with other incentives, will convince them to stay with us. This is an important time to serve. I think they realize that. They're terrific men and women, as most of these MP companies are.

And the third point was extra compensation, and absolutely we are. Within our authorities we have authority for providing extra compensation for those that are going to be extended past the one-year, we call it "boots on the ground" in Iraq, there will be additional compensation.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, senator.

Senator Lieberman?

SEN. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, gentlemen, for your service and for your testimony.

I agree with what's been said both by members of the committee and Secretary Wolfowitz that -- and all of you, that it's important to look back so that we move forward with success. But I'm sure that all of us also agree that the emphasis has to be on looking forward and moving forward with as much success as we can achieve in Iraq, and more broadly in the war on terrorism.

The second thing about looking back is that if you spend too much time looking back at the various paths that you took to get to where we are now, we may lose sight of the fact that we're all heading in the same direction; that as we focus on the now and the future in Iraq, I see a very heartening consensus emerging, certainly among the American people, and particularly in the American political leadership community. And

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I think we ought not to hold ourselves back from seeing that because it is a source of strength.

I haven't heard anybody in a responsible position -- certainly no one on this committee -- call for a withdrawal or a retreat from Iraq. And whether that is because we feel, as I do, that the war was a necessary and noble undertaking in pursuit of our values, our security, or whether we feel -- whether some feel that because we're there now, departing hastily would cause chaos in Iraq and the region, endanger American security, embolden the terrorists; everyone in a position of authority in American government, regardless of party, wants to win in Iraq. And it's very important for observers not to be confused either by the very healthy questioning that goes on at a hearing like this, or by the crosscurrents of an American political campaign. We are together in this. It's important that the American men and women in uniform understand that we're not only behind them -- of course we are; they are our sons and daughters, our neighbors, our brothers and sisters -- but that we are behind them in a quest for victory.

It's very important also that the rest of the world, including particularly our enemies in Iraq understand that. And I was very pleased that Senator Kerry, in a statement last week made quite clear that no one in the world should be under the impression that the outcome of the American election this November will alter the basic thrust of American policy in Iraq. And that policy has drawn closer; people have moved. As you said, Secretary Wolfowitz, the debate now is not over to withdraw troops, it's how many troops to add to secure the situation.

There's been debate over -- as we look about -- to the extent to which we should have and could have involved the United Nations or NATO. The fact is we are involving the United Nations now and trying to involve NATO more. So that consensus is important through all of the comment and controversy to recognize because it is a source of our strength, and it's very much in line with the quote that you read from General Keane.

I want to ask a few questions. First, I want to say, General Myers, that I was heartened to hear that the administration, the Pentagon, is looking at alternatives for sending more troops into Iraq in the short term. Because as we approach June 30th and the period afterward leading up to elections, obviously our enemies, the fanatics, the terrorist insurgents, the Saddam remnants will seek to disrupt the movement of progress and freedom.

And it's very important for them to understand that. I'm encouraged by that.

I understand, and I also took heart from the presidents' statement at his press conference last week, that there are discussions going on with NATO about the possible increased NATO involvement in peace-keeping -- I should say not increased but NATO involvement in peace-keeping -- hasn't been before -- either on the borders or in the section of Iraq now overseen by the Polish forces. Secretary Wolfowitz, can you give us any update on that, on those discussions with NATO?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Be happy to. And I want to thank you, Senator Lieberman. You've shown extraordinary leadership on this issue over more than 10 years. And what you just said about the message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of democracy in Iraq -- that they should not confuse debate in this country as a lack of will -- is a very important statement. I was in Najaf last July, and I was struck at both the level of confusion about our politics, which I think I could straighten out, and the level of paranoia about whether we would abandon them, as they, I think with some justification, felt we had done in 1991. And on the latter point, the question came in the form of, "Are you Americans just holding Saddam Hussein as a trump card over our heads?" It sounds like paranoia, but if you've been through what they've been through, it's not so paranoid.

I was delighted a couple weeks later when we could tell them, well, we've got the two sons, and we're after the father. And it was a huge event in December to have captured Saddam Hussein. It'll be an even bigger event, frankly, Senator, when a new Iraqi government has the legal authority to try him and bring him to

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justice.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: I agree.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: As early as December of 2002, I was in -- spoke to the NAC in Brussels and proposed a range of possibilities for the alliance role in Iraq, including the use of NATO collective assets, the provision of support services for those allies who would participate, and most of all, a NATO role in post-war humanitarian and stability operations. The alliance did decide to play a role. It has provided planning and other support services for the Polish division, which is in the critical central-south area, to include force generation, planning and communication support. We have 17 of the 26 allies with us, and seven partners.

We are asking NATO to look at ways it could expand its contribution, including to assume leadership of that multinational division currently led by Poland, to possibly provide an additional multinational unit led by NATO, and to provide additional logistics support for coalition operations. Of course, any decision in that regard would be a political decision that would have to be taken by allies. I do think in this regard, a successful transition to a sovereign government in July, hopefully another U.N. Security Council resolution might ease some of the concerns, at least of some of our allies, about joining in that kind of consensus decision.

NATO, as you well know, is an organization that operates on consensus, and there are limits to what it can do when only -- only! -- (laughs) -- 17 of 18 or 19 members are supporting something. But I think it's already made a big contribution. We'd like to see more.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you. Yeah, General Myers.

GEN. MYERS: If I could -- yeah, Senator Lieberman, can I just add onto that? I -- in terms of Afghanistan, I think NATO has over 6,000 forces in there, and they are responsible, as you know, sir, for the security in Kabul. They're doing a very good job of that. They want to expand their responsibilities -- they have the ambition to expand their responsibilities in Afghanistan by establishing some NATO-led provincial reconstruction teams.

It remains to be -- and there are a couple right now. There's one led by the Germans, we're in discussions with the Italians on another one, New Zealand has one, the Brits have one, and we're looking at others.

It remains to be seen whether they'll have the resources to do that, but that's their ambition and that's what we're in discussions with them. And it's a long way from Europe, but they understand the importance of that. And I'm optimistic, as Secretary Wolfowitz is, that beyond the role of providing the force generation capability for this Polish division in the center-south region of Iraq, that perhaps they can play a larger role in the future.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: That's very encouraging. I think you will remember that -- there's been discussion about comparisons to Vietnam -- remember that there's a military doctrine that emerged from Vietnam that bears the name of the current secretary of State, the Powell doctrine. And generally applied, it is to make sure that we don't ever go into combat again without all necessary forces.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you. My time is up. I do want to say that I hope the committee will focus on the end of Secretary Wolfowitz's statement, where he calls for three enhanced authorities, which I would guess that we'll all agree on: one for \$500 million to train and equip military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and friendly nearby nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism; second, commanders' emergency response program to enable military leaders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction; and third, an increased drawdown under the Afghan Freedom Support Act to provide additional help for the Afghan National Army. I hope, in the spirit that I began my statement, together we might on this committee take the lead in responding to those requests as rapidly as the urgent circumstances

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on the ground require.

SEN. WARNER: Senator, we will do that. I think I share with you the importance of those.

Senator Sessions.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you very much for that last intervention.

SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you also, Senator Lieberman, for those excellent comments.

And I'd like to join with Senator Collins in her concern about Guard units that have been extended. We have an MP unit from Alabama that's been extended, and I know how painful that is for family members who are on the verge of expecting them home. But we trust, and we'll be in contact with you as they go forward, that this was required.

You know, one of the great strengths of America is that we are self-critical. We've heard today a litany of mistakes. We've been hearing about how many errors we made prior to 9/11. But I'd like to make a point or two that I think must be made, and that is we need to recognize how much progress has been made to date on the war on terrorism, which President Bush told us from the beginning would be long and difficult years, in effect, and stated that. But there have been a number of accomplishments.

Pakistan, when confronted and challenged it was playing footsie with the Taliban and al Qaeda, chose to be with us and the civilized nations in making a big difference in the world right now. That's a great nation that chose to abandon terrorism. The Taliban chose wrongly. They rejected our call, and they've been removed from power. And the al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan have been eliminated, and their leaders, the ones that still exist, are hiding in caves somewhere in the mountains. Saddam Hussein failed the opportunity he had to avoid military action, and he's been removed from power, found hiding in a cave, a hole in the ground, like the rat that he is. Libya has come in now and renounced terrorism after that event.

And Muammar Qadhafi actually appears to be seriously wanting to join the civilized nations of the world.

Abdul Khan, the Pakistan scientist who was involved in proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, to Iran, to Libya, has confessed and told what he was doing. And while we were signing treaties prohibiting that, he was doing it. That activity on his part was ended as a result of military action, encouraging leadership by the president.

And most unexpected, and most blessed to date is we've not had another attack on this country. I would not have thought that were possible that we would have gone almost three years without another attack. And I know that we can expect our elections to be in danger, that some will try to disrupt that and maybe achieve a Spanish result. But I don't think the American people will lose their poise if that were to happen. Pray God it does not.

These are not mistakes, these are accomplishments. No war comes out like you expect it, completely. And there's no doubt that we are facing today a troubling surge of violence in Iraq. The Iraqi people have got a history -- have not had a history of law and order or representative government. The severe oppression under which they have suffered has clearly scarred them, keeping emotions raw, paranoia widespread, and fear high. Their history has been that the winner, the leader is the one who uses violence and power to achieve power. Thus, the government formation -- as that government formation moves forward, there remains a window of opportunity for these terrorists, these violent guys who want to take control of this country by power, to seize power. There's a window of opportunity for them. They are using every tool at their disposal; fomenting hatred, distorting religion, and utilizing violence to create instability.

Our challenge has proven difficult indeed. I had hoped things would be doing better now. The war went better than I ever thought it would go. And this has been more difficult in recent weeks than I expected for

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sure. But we've made progress in a number of areas in Iraq, as you've stated. Our goal -- a free, stable and prosperous Iraq -- is noble and important for us, and the world, and the war against terrorism.

The president, this Senate, by over a three-fourths majority, and the American people, have set the goal. No one wants to achieve it more than you do, the members of this panel. No one knows the situation better than you. You are tireless and dedicated to this goal. My advice to you is to stay the course, stay fixed on the goal, and continue to be flexible. Every war throughout history is different from the ones preceding it. Adjust as you go. Learn from the situation. Keep your eye on the goal of a free and prosperous Iraq.

There's going to be a lot of difficulties as we go forward. There will continue to be unexpected difficulties. But if we keep our poise and our head about us, I believe we can make it.

The critics and second-guessers are vocal. Those who say thanks for the accomplishments, and who pray daily for our troops, are not so visible, but they are many. This will test the American people and the Congress. Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, however, that it's our destiny at this time in history to lead. Our soldiers must know we support them completely. So despite the naysayers, we will meet the challenge, I believe, that's before us. The whole world for decades to come will benefit from our constancy and courage. And I salute you for it, and I particularly salute the men and women in uniform who are putting their lives on the line to make this a safer world and a better Iraq.

General Myers, I understand General Petraeus will be going to Iraq. If you would tell us when you expect him to arrive, and what ideas you may have for strengthening the local police and security forces that I believe is critical to our long-term success, and what if anything this Congress can do to help you achieve that goal.

GEN. MYERS: Senator Sessions, thank you for your tribute to our men and women in uniform. And, as Secretary Grossman pointed out, there are lots of other men and women from lots of different countries, some wearing uniforms, some not, that show a great deal of courage in that country day in and day out.

As far as General Petraeus, I think he's in country now. He was certainly going to arrive this week, and I think he has arrived. He will be -- he comes off a very successful tour as the division commander of the 101st Division. They were in northern Iraq. He showed a great deal of innovative thought in how he worked with the local governates in that area, helping improve their economies and so forth, and did a terrific job I think by everybody's estimation. He's going back to work.

Security cooperation. As you know, the Defense Department has the responsibility for all security forces, which includes the Iraqi police, the new Iraqi army, border, the Civil Defense Corps and Facilities Protection Services. As Secretary Wolfowitz said, we have not equipped them as fast as we needed to do, and that is one of the issues that we have to work. And I think we've solved all our -- all the hurdles that we either had here in Washington or in Baghdad. Those hurdles have been solved. We've got contracts. Equipment is arriving. I've seen the -- in fact, there's a very great -- very good British officer that showed me the plan for equipping the police, great detail in terms of equipment and where in the country and so forth. I mean, they've got it mapped out and we have the resources to do that. We've just got to follow through.

We've got to continue the training of all these forces. In particular the police have undergone some training, but there's a large number of police that haven't been trained. We need to do that. And then once they're trained and they go to their individual police stations, what needs to happen is they get the proper mentoring because in some cases the leadership may not be all that good in these police stations. So you get one of these recruits that's been trained and you've got to keep their enthusiasm up and keep them on the right track. We have civilian police from around the world that the State Department is organizing that is to do that task.

And then I think General Abizaid is exactly right, as he has said I think many times and that we're now saying and Secretary Wolfowitz said earlier, they have to feel like they're responding to Iraqi authority. And we have to connect those dots between the local police station and the province on up to the Ministry of

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Interior in Baghdad and to the political leadership that will stand up 1 July. And that part has yet to happen, but there are efforts under way to make all that happen.

I think what the Congress has done to ensure we have the funding for the equipping and training of these forces right now is adequate, and it'll just -- it'll take some time. It's certainly going to take beyond 1 July. We think by the end of this year that we will have clearly the majority of these forces properly equipped and trained and in the field, and connected to their command authority, if you will.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, General Petraeus did a great job with 101st in Mosul, and I think a lot of us have confidence in him. And you know, we want to support you in that effort.

GEN. MYERS: Thank you. He'll do very well.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, senator.

Senator Reed.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you urged us all to show will and resolve. And you emphasized that by those very compelling letters from those young privates and captains who are showing will and resolve. But around here in Washington the usual measure of will and resolve is the budget. And when General Schoomaker and General Jumper and General Hagee were here, they said without a supplemental appropriations by October 1st they could be running out of money in critical accounts for this operation. Commentators like Anthony Cordesman have suggested there's a \$50 billion hole that has to be filled by a supplemental. When will the Department of Defense show its will and resolve by sending a supplemental up to the Congress?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Reed, if we think one is necessary, when we think it's necessary. We had a session with the same chiefs that you quoted, I think about a week ago, to precisely address where we stand with this process. What happens is, as you go through the year, certain accounts start to run short because you're spending more money on them than you planned, and clearly the unanticipated higher level deployment leads to some accounts being overspent. And you hear about that quickly. Other accounts spend slower than was planned, and they start to have surpluses there. And I can assure you people don't come running down the hall with their hair on fire to tell you, I have a surplus in my account. We have a process called the Midyear Execution Review, which is conducted by the DOD comptroller. It is underway now. As a result of that meeting with the secretary we've speeded up the schedule by a week so that if there is a problem, we can identify it sooner rather than later and come for help if we need it.

One kind of help we really do need, and that is general transfer authority. In fact, at the end of my testimony, those three points that Senator Lieberman pointed out, I also said that most of all, in this kind of wartime situation where you're dealing with unpredictable events, it is important to have more rather than less flexibility. And I think we asked for \$4 billion, which is 1 percent of our budget last year. And it was cut by roughly half. The more flexibility, the sooner we can re-balance accounts. Of course, we can reprogram; that takes time. But the sooner people know that money is going to be available from an account that has a surplus into an account that has a deficit, the better we can manage the resources we have.

The bottom line, though, senator, and I think you and I agree on this, is the troops need to have what they need. And we need to make sure they do.

SEN. REED: Well, I think the bottom line, Mr. Secretary, is you need a supplemental up here. And this is not a shortage of several billion dollars, this is a growing shortage. And as you point out, when the chiefs testified, the anticipated force level would be 105,000, not 135,000, as it is today.

General Myers, is it your professional judgment --

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MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, you --

SEN. REED: General Myers, is it your professional judgment that there are adequate resources without a supplemental to continue operations without seriously harming other important Defense Department programs?

GEN. MYERS: We're -- Senator Reed, we're evaluating that right now. I've got to withhold judgment for just a little bit more time. Obviously, the extension of the 1st Armored Division, the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment and their combat -- support, combat service support is going to increase our costs. The operations tempo is also higher, so we know that on -- that we have additional costs that we have to find funding sources for. We also know there'll be execution issues with some of our acquisition systems and so forth. So, I think we need to wait until the OSD comptroller can look at these issues before we can have a firm decision. We thought before, with what the services were identifying as shortfalls, that we could bridge the gap between -- for the last month of this fiscal year and cover our expenses.

I think we just have to ensure ourselves that's still true, given the higher expenses we have right now.

SEN. REED: General Myers, another issue has become relevant in the last few days, certainly since the terrible attack on the contractors in the Fallujah area. That is a huge number, 20,000 estimated, of armed security contractors. This presents a problem today, but it certainly will present even a greater problem after July 1st. I mean, what rules of engagement will they operate under in this new sovereign Iraqi entity? Can an Iraqi minister of Interior hire 200 former special forces for his own private army? What's their status? This is, to me, a startling departure from previous doctrine of using these contractors in security positions. What's your view, and what are you going to do about it?

GEN. MYERS: What we're doing about it is providing Central Command, and General Abizaid, General Sanchez, with the policy guidance that will allow them to handle this issue. And you raised the questions. We do have a lot of contractor support not only in the security area, but also in a lot of our logistics capability -- truck drivers --

SEN. REED: Relatively non-controversial.

GEN. MYERS: Right. But still, it raises issues as to their status, their arming, and so forth. You're right, the security forces are probably the -- and we're providing that guidance to Central Command so they know how to handle the situation.

By the way, I would just say parenthetically that when I was there, one of the issues I looked at was the coordination between coalition military forces and security forces. And I'm assured there's a pretty robust mechanism for security forces inside Iraq to make sure that they have the latest intelligence or information and that they share information back and forth. And I was a little bit worried about that after the Blackwater issue in Fallujah and some of the things I'd heard about that. I think General Sanchez and his folks do a pretty good job of that.

SEN. REED: Just a final point. My time's expired.

General Eikenberry conducted a report -- or a review of security forces several months ago. We've been endeavoring to obtain a copy of that report; if it's classified, certainly under those classified terms. It seems to me unfortunate that it takes us weeks and weeks and weeks to get reports which you've acknowledged, both the secretary and uniform leadership, exist, that you have, that you've reviewed, and that we can't get access in a timely way. I just think it's unfortunate -- more than unfortunate, I don't think it's appropriate. Can you assure us that we will get access to this report within days?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will check on that, Senator. And I can assure you I will do my best to see if it is

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appropriate.

SEN. REED: Well, why can't you assure me, Mr. Secretary? This is a report that was prepared by an officer of the United States Army to inform the Department of Defense. But also, this is the Armed Services Committee; we should have access to those reports in a timely fashion. If they're classified, we can go up to 407, we could read them under the circumstances and the classifications. It seems to me this is unacceptable that you, as deputy secretary of Defense say I'll try, but I can't promise you you'll get a report.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, we try to give you everything that we can. We also have got to make sure that we manage the whole process of reports like this, and reviews like this, so that people give us candid opinions. Quite frankly --

SEN. REED: Well, don't we deserve a candid opinion, Mr. Secretary?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- I put a lot of effort into getting the Eikenberry mission out there against some people who didn't really want to have people looking and examining how we were doing. Lessons learned are a wonderful thing; we need to do lessons learned. We also need to manage, and we need to manage between the executive and the Congress in an appropriate way so that people don't begin to fear every time someone comes out to do an Eikenberry report or to do an assessment or do a lessons learned, it's time to shut up and not give them any information because the next thing you know --

SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, that's totally unfounded.

We are constitutionally required to supervise the activities of the Department of Defense. We have just as much of a right to get this information as you do, and you seem to be saying we don't. You seem to be saying that we cannot get access to reports prepared in the course of the business of the Department of Defense. Is that what you're saying?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I will do my best. -- I don't -- I have not looked at this issue. I would like to get you the report. If I can get it for you, I --

SEN. REED: Well, what you seem to be saying, Mr. Secretary: if you don't want the contents of that report disclosed to us, you won't get it for us. If those contents are embarrassing to the administration, you won't get it for us. If those contents suggest that the problems we saw two weeks ago were understood or anticipated or should have been --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, that's not the issue. Don't -- please don't do that --

SEN. REED: Well, what is the issue, Mr. Secretary?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: The issue is how to protect the decisional processes that I think are in the country's interest, the candor that is required in predecisional documents, and the equally important responsibility to keep Congress informed.

SEN. REED: Secretary --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe that you can see this report, but I don't know --

SEN. WARNER: Senator, I must say there are seven colleagues waiting. It is an important issue. Senator Levin and I will address the issue.

And may I also thank you for bringing up the question on the contractors. And General Myers, that's a matter that's before the committee for review right now, because they're providing an absolutely essential service not only to our security side but the logistics side. And we've got to do what we can, particularly those that have affiliation with the coalition partners --

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SEN. REED: Mr. Chairman --

SEN. WARNER: Yes?

SEN. REED: I appreciate the fact -- I apologize to my colleagues -- this is an astounding statement by the deputy secretary of Defense, saying that if he wants us to get the information, he'll give it to us, but if he doesn't, he won't. And it's not for any legal --

SEN. WARNER: I -- (off mike) -- I interpret it that way --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: This not a personal thing, Senator Reed. You know -- I think you know that there are issues about what documents are predecisional and what things need to be shared. Let's be clear. The Eikenberry report is something I did personally push for, because I thought it was important to have a thorough examination of this issue. And it was -- it met some resistance because people are afraid sometimes to have things examined. I said -- and I repeat -- I will do my best, if I am permitted -- it's not me personally -- to make that report available to the Congress.

SEN. WARNER: We are now reviewing, Senator Levin and I, in the context of some requests by Senator McCain, the committee and others, as to how we're going to work out a smoother and a more understandable exchange of information --

SEN. REED: Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for one moment?

SEN. WARNER: Yes.

SEN. REED: My understanding is that reports that are prepared by the Department of Defense are classified and that subject to those classifications, people have access to it. I assume we have a sufficient clearance level on this committee to have access to the report I'm talking about and probably everything that's prepared at the Department of Defense. If I'm in error --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Reed, I'm going to do everything I can to get you the report. I just did not want to promise something I'm not sure I can deliver. I will do my best.

SEN. REED: Well, so --

SEN. WARNER: Senator Reed, we just simply have to move on, in fairness to my colleagues and your colleagues on both sides here.

Senator Cornyn.

SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. And I for one agree, I believe, with the comments of Senator Lieberman and Senator Sessions and those who have associated themselves with the importance of this committee conducting proper oversight and particularly in dealing with matters that are our present concern and planning for the future. I think we are at our best when we do that. I think we are at our worst when we look back and try to dissect lessons learned while we are still at war, in the battlefield. And that, unfortunately, particularly in a supercharged political environment leading up to a November election, I think, is not as constructive as we could or should be in dealing with the present and plans for the future.

But unfortunately, in this environment, when questions are raised and statements are made and not responded to, or when the context of the answer is not made clear, unfortunately, that has to be addressed.

And so it is in that context that I want to ask two questions.

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Over the weekend we heard some unfortunate claims, one related to the 70 -- excuse me, the \$87 billion supplemental that I want to ask you about, and one goes to the very nature of the conflict that we are currently engaged in in the war on terror.

The first question I have involves the \$87 billion supplemental that Congress passed to fund the war on terror. It was said this weekend that even the generals in Iraq said that monies in that bill had no impact on their ability to continue the fight. And it was also said that that vote would never -- that vote would never have prevented -- that is, a negative vote against that supplemental -- would never have prevented any of the body armor, ammunition, or anything from getting to our troops.

Now I had heard that statement earlier and it caused me to ask in another hearing, a SASC hearing, at which the vice chief of staff of the Army, General Casey, appeared, and I asked him about that \$87 billion appropriation, and if it had not passed what the consequences would have been to our troops. He was unequivocal. He said this supplemental appropriation has enabled us to significantly increase the protection for our soldiers throughout the theater of Afghanistan and Iraq. I asked him, if Congress had not stepped up and funded the \$87 billion supplemental, that it would have meant or resulted in increased casualties as a result of the failure to provide those up-armored Humvees and body armor? And General Casey agreed that it would have meant more casualties or the Army would have had to gut the Army budget to find the money to do this; that is, pay for the body armor or up-armored Humvees by other means.

My question for you, Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers: Did the \$87 billion supplemental have an impact on the ability of our men and women to fight and win the war on terror in which we are currently engaged?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Cornyn, I can't imagine how we could continue conducting operations without that supplemental. It not only provided for basic operations, but it also provided substantial amounts for things like body armor and up-armored Humvees and various force protection measures. There were two different pieces of the supplemental, of course. There was roughly 67 billion (dollars) that goes directly to our troops, which is absolutely indispensable.

Then there's the 18 billion (dollars) of -- 18.6 billion (dollars) to reconstruction funds, which are spending slower but they are already having an impact. And that -- I think it's very important, as we said in testifying on the reconstruction funds, that money can help to create Iraqi security forces that can take the place of Americans. That money can help to create a positive political environment inside Iraq that will make our forces safer. So really the whole 87 billion (dollars) I think, and it covers Afghanistan as well, was essential to this war on terror.

SEN. CORNYN: General Myers.

GEN. MYERS: I really -- I don't know how I can add anything more to that. That supplemental's absolutely essential to our ability to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Secretary Wolfowitz -- I think we approved 750 million (dollars) for force protection initiatives alone, and we can do more if required in that regard. But the general, just paying for our operational tempo. If we didn't do that, General Casey would be right: you'd gut the Army budget, and not only the Army budget but the Air Force and the Marine Corps and the Navy budgets as well. So it's absolutely essential to our operations.

SEN. CORNYN: This last week I was at the Red River Army Depot, where they are providing additional armor or metal containers essentially to upgrade Humvees for additional armor and protection for troops currently in the battlefield. And it's that kind of additional protection which I believe has led to the greater security and greater likelihood of success of our troops in the field.

My only other question, really, relates to the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged, in which, at last count I saw, we had 135,000 troops currently in Iraq fighting this conflict. It was said this weekend again, a

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reiteration of an earlier claim, that the war on terrorism is not primarily a military operation but that it is an intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and public diplomacy effort.

Now, I disagree with that completely, and I believe that indeed treating the war on terror previously, after we had been attacked, after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, for example, as a criminal investigation and a law enforcement matter, as we've seen before the 9/11 commission, has led to insecurity and endangered American lives because of the lack of information sharing, among other things.

But I would just ask your response, Secretary Wolfowitz. Do you agree that what we are engaged in in Afghanistan and Iraq is not primarily a military operation but is rather an intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and diplomatic mission?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Cornyn, I think that I resisted these comparisons initially, when people said this is like the Cold War and it's going to be as long as the Cold War and as difficult as the Cold War, in the aftermath of September 11th. Increasingly I think it has all of those characteristics and then some, and it requires all the elements of national power, as the president has said over and over again, including military, including intelligence, including law enforcement, including diplomacy, including economic assistance, all those things working hand in hand reinforcing one another.

I mean, the fact is that one of the biggest successes in the intelligence/law enforcement arena in this war on terrorism was capturing the mastermind of September 11th, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, in Pakistan. I would note, by the way, for those people who say we were diverted by Iraq, it was done the month before Operation Iraqi Freedom that we captured this villain. But we would never have gotten him in Pakistan if he were still hiding in Afghanistan, if they still had that sanctuary. It is important to take the sanctuaries away from these people. At least in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, it could not have been done except by military means.

But then we see the case of Libya, where the military, without doing anything, plays a critical role in supporting diplomacy, which achieved an enormous amount, in part thanks to some great work by the intelligence people that uncovered what Qadhafi was doing.

So all these things have to work together. That's point number one.

Point number two, I really do think if there's a single lesson from September 11th, to me it is that we can't wait until after the fact to find the perpetrators of events, of terrorist acts, and either bring them to court and bring them to trial or, if they're foreign countries, punish them with some kind of cruise missile retaliation. We have got to do preventive action. And preventive action in the last resort may sometimes be military, but when I say preventive action, I mean on a very broad scale.

I think one of the most important kinds of preventive action we could be undertaking as a country -- and we're starting to, I'd like to see us do more -- is to help countries like Pakistan that are trying to redo their education system so that instead of breeding terrorists in these madrassas that preach nothing useful and a lot of hatred, young, poor Pakistani children can go to a school where they learn how to succeed in the modern world.

So all of those instruments are necessary. It is a very broad effort. It's a big mistake to suggest that it can be narrowed.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

SEN. CORNYN: Thank you. My time's expired.

SEN. WARNER: Thank our witness.

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Senator Ben Nelson.

SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Wolfowitz, I'm a little confused about the development of the security forces within Iraq. It was my understanding that what we were going to do is build up the Iraqi security forces, therefore we could take down our presence militarily because of the increasing capacity of the Iraqis to support themselves for their security needs. I thought I just heard you say that the -- by staffing the Iraqi security forces we would make it safer, and we would be able to do that, and then I thought I heard you earlier say that we're having trouble because of the -- they needed stronger leaders and they were -- need to fight for Iraq, and they need more and better equipment. I'm a little confused about that, but I suspect you and I can resolve that confusion.

What I'd like to do is, I've been advocating -- is to give you an idea and see how this fits with where the plans for the Iraq political transition would fit in. I've been advocating for some time that, at the point of hand-over on June 30, that the new sovereign government at that point would ask the United Nations to help with this transition, of this governmental transition from the interim to transitional and then to constitutional government by helping them develop and carry out free elections, and that the new sovereign government would then ask the NATO countries to come in, and NATO as a group to come in and provide security, not the United States asking for another U.N. resolution. We've not had a great deal of success in getting other countries to come in. And I don't believe we're going to get the United Nations to come in until there is security. It seems to me that we can decide the chicken or the egg here, and we say that both have to be accomplished at the same time, the United Nations come in, and NATO come in, which I would hope would reduce our presence, which I am going to ask General Myers to give us some idea of what additional NATO forces we might receive.

I thought I heard that the government -- that the administration's approach from Secretary Grossman is to -- for us to ask for United Nations help. That -- I've met with ambassadors from Germany and France and run this by them, and they didn't make any commitment, of course. But they didn't say no to considering whether the new Iraqi government would ask, which would be different than an occupying force or an occupying presence such as the United States represents right now, which has created some of the consternation between us and other countries.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Some good questions. If I could go back just briefly and see if I can clarify what may have sounded like confusion, I don't think it is.

I think the difference lies in when Iraqi security forces can actually assume the role we'd like to see them assume. And I would also like to stress, the most important thing is not so that we can reduce our numbers, although that's clearly something we'd like to do, but even more important, so that we can have Iraqi forces out in front and on the streets. And just to give you one important obvious example, if you have to go into a mosque because it's being used as a military base, and we've had that happen, having Iraqis go in and do that kind of work is much, much better than --

SEN. BEN NELSON: Are they doing that?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: They are in some cases, and in some cases, we don't have them. And as you might expect, the results are generally better when they can do it.

Now, we never thought that by this April, they'd be ready to operate independently. And the report Senator Reed was asking about was in fact stimulated by my concern that things were not moving as fast as they should have. I think we found, through General Eichenberry's (sp) efforts, some ways to speed things up. And it's important. But particularly when, in some case, they were literally outgunned by the enemy, then it's not surprising that they had problems. There are other problems. Leadership problems; training problems. I think it's the right course. We shouldn't -- we should push it. We should push it faster. We shouldn't assume

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success until we have success.

On the question you asked about other countries, and particularly NATO and NATO countries contributing, and Ambassador Grossman or General Myers might want to add to this, but think first of all, one reason why we would very much like to see this transition take place on July 1st -- and I can't stress how many times enough, this -- from a political point of view, this is the last -- the last thing you want is to be undergoing a transition like this in the middle of an American political season. But from a military point of view and an Iraqi security point of view, the sooner you have an Iraqi government that can ask allies to come in, the better off we'll be. The sooner we have an Iraqi government that can try Saddam Hussein, the better off we'll be.

So that will be a step forward, number one. Number two, I do think there are quite a few countries who aren't going to come in until it's safer to come in. And they may say it's the lack of this or the lack of that or this U.N. resolution or that. The fact is, this is not peacekeeping, it's combat. And until it becomes peacekeeping, a lot of countries are probably going to still stay on the sidelines.

And finally, some countries have real capabilities, and other don't. The country that has the potential to have real capability is Iraq itself. In pure numbers, they are now the largest member of the coalition. In number of people killed in action, it's over 250 Iraqi police and civil defense corps and army who have been killed fighting for a new Iraq.

SEN. BEN NELSON: In the line of --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: In the line of duty, since June 1st.

SEN. BEN NELSON: In the line of duty?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It's second only to the United States. And it's not a number I want to see grow on either side, but they will probably -- who knows; I shouldn't predict. But they are up there fighting. The better we equip them, the better we train them, the more they will be fighting. It is their country; they should fight for it.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEN. BEN NELSON: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: I wonder, Secretary Grossman, would you like to contribute to this important question? □

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir. Just in a very --

SEN. BEN NELSON: If I might as, I was because I thought I heard you say that we would secure a United Nations resolution as opposed to the Iraqi government doing it. That's what caused me some confusion about the timing. □ **MR. GROSSMAN:** Yes, Senator Nelson, if I could, I think it's -- as we have, all of us here today, paid tribute to those people who are contributing in Iraq, I think it's worth noting that although the United Nations left in large numbers after the murder of Brahimi (sic), I give great credit to the people who, on behalf of the United Nations, in UNICEF, in World Food Program, local Iraqis have continued to work. And I think it's worth saying that, in terms of our immunization program and our food programs, without UNICEF, without World Food Program, we wouldn't be able to accomplish that task.

Second, I think that it's important to know that the Iraqi Governing Council, along, obviously, with the CPA, invited Ambassador Brahimi to come back. It's the Iraqi Governing Council that's invited the very admirable Ms. Perelli, who works on elections for the United Nations, to come back.

And so I agree with you completely, that I would hope that on the 1st of July, a new interim authority, a new interim Iraqi government would be very much welcoming further United Nations help and support, and we

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will be there with them.

In terms of seeking a Security Council resolution, I would imagine from all that I have heard from Iraqis, they would seek -- they would welcome a Security Council resolution. But I do think that that is some of the responsibility that we take on as permanent members of the Security Council.

So I think if we drive forward for it, it's a good thing for us, I'm sure Iraqis will support it.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEN. BEN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: I would just observe one of your responses, Secretary Wolfowitz: the sooner the Iraqi governments gets in, the sooner they can invite other nations to join. But let's make it clear from what you said, once they join and contribute forces, it's the commander in chief, the president of the United States that has control over the use of those forces, am I not correct?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely. Can repeat it multiple times. It's very important.

SEN. WARNER: Everybody talks about giving sovereignty, and you look at the definition, it's everything. But it's sovereignty, but the security remains clearly within the control, as we've stated, with the president on down.

Senator Dole.

SEN. ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC): Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been charges that the war in Iraq took our focus off of al Qaeda and the war on terror as a whole. Just like you, Mr. Secretary, I found the memo written by captured al Qaeda operative Zarqawi to be very interesting and compelling. In noting concern that the Mujahideen may lose its foothold in Iraq, he wrote, "There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking and the grip around the throat of the Mujahideen has begun to tighten. With the spread of the army and the police, our future is becoming frightening."

Can you elaborate on this memo and its significance, please?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It is pretty amazing. When I first read it, I wanted to make sure that we were absolutely certain this wasn't some forgery that someone had presented to us, hoping to get paid for it or otherwise manipulate us. I've been assured multiple times that no, the circumstances of our obtaining it were that we captured it off of a senior terrorist who was carrying it, I think in the form of a computer disk, from Iraq back to Afghanistan. And it was in response to, apparently, a query from Mr. Zarqawi's al Qaeda friends in Afghanistan as to whether they should send people to Iraq.

I think it's important to emphasize, since it's strange name, and even though Secretary Powell spent some time talking about Mr. Zarqawi at the U.N. in February of last year, I'm surprised how often people are completely unaware of who he is. He's not some local figure. He ran a terrorist camp in Afghanistan, a training camp, for a number of years when bin Laden was in charge there. We use the word "al Qaeda-associated" I think primarily because we're not sure about whether he's formally pledged allegiance to bin Laden, whether he to some extent runs his own operation. But it's a substantial operation. It is credited with being involved in planning terrorist plots that were broken up in London, in Paris, and one that was pulled off successfully in Casablanca. He is a world terrorist. He has murdered, probably, we believe, our diplomat in Jordan, Ambassador Foley. He is wanted under a warrant in Jordan for attempting to assassinate a senior Jordanian official. In fact, when the Jordanians went to the Iraqi government in 2002 to ask to have him extradited, he miraculously just disappeared.

This man -- we've been surprised, frankly, at the extent of his network in Iraq, or the size of it. It's not a few

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tens; it seems to be at least some scores of people.

But what is most striking in that letter that you cite is the length in which he describes his sense of desperation. He even uses the word "suffocation" at one point. In part, because -- and I think I quoted in my testimony, I will paraphrase it -- the Americans, he says, the most cowardly of all peoples, aren't going to leave no matter how many wounds they suffer. It's interesting, though, he calls us cowardly; he understands that we're not; he's understood that we're not leaving. And therefore, he lays out his strategy has to be -- and he seems to have a sense of desperation that he needs to do this before there's a sovereign Iraqi government, although he doesn't use precisely that phrase -- the strategy has to be to promote chaos and division in Iraq by attacking four targets he identifies: the Iraqi security forces, the Kurds, the Americans and, most importantly, the Shi'a.

And that seems to conform with both the attacks we saw in Irbil, two suicide bombers on Eid al-Adha who blew up some 150 people in a horrific incident, and then even more significantly, the attacks on the Shi'a population in southern Iraq.

I think that exposure of that letter, plus our offensive operations that have captured by now more than 30 of his people, may have set him back. The exposure of the letter, I think, helped to make sure that the Shi'a understood that if there were more bombings, he was the man responsible.

And I guess I'd just like to conclude with this point, the only comment I'd make on Senator Sessions' eloquent intervention earlier. One of our great assets, I think, is the sheer evil of our enemy. They attacked us on September 11th believing that we would be divided and we would retreat. They failed. They attacked Indonesia and Bali, believing this would cause the Indonesians to waver and weaken, the Australians to pull out because of mostly Australians killed. They failed. They attacked synagogues in Istanbul and the British Cultural Center in Istanbul, thinking that this would divide Turkish Muslims from Turkish Jews, and Turks from British. And they failed. With the unfortunate exception of Madrid, they have failed time and time again. In Saudi Arabia May 12th, they attacked the American compound, residential compound in Saudi Arabia. It has led to the largest, most successful crackdown on al Qaeda that we have -- up until May 12th we were not successful in getting the Saudis to undertake. And most importantly, they've attacked innocent Iraqis, innocent international aid workers, innocent Kurds, Shi'a and Sunni alike, in Iraq. And I think they're failing, but we have to keep at it to make sure they do.

SEN. DOLE: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like you to respond to another quote, please, this time George Shultz in an excellent opinion piece in *The Wall Street Journal* just recently. And I quote: "The most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge, and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for the tactic of violence in Iraq. The message is that the United States and others in the world who recognized the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the takeover of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations, including the development of awesome weapons for threats, for use, for sale, behind the shield of protection that statehood provides." End of quote.

Would you comment on the significance of this statement as it relates to what you have seen in Iraq and what you are seeing?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think -- I remember reading that whole article. It's --

SEN. DOLE: Excellent.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd encourage -- Mr. Chairman, if I could add it to the record of this hearing, it's, as most things that George Shultz does, it's a terrific piece.

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In my less eloquent way, let me just say I think what he points out correctly is that you can't go after terrorist networks and ignore what states do to support terrorism. And I mentioned earlier in my testimony this division of the Iraqi intelligence service called M-14, that was the so-called anti-terrorism section. It wasn't anti-terrorism. These are the people who developed over many years the kind of explosives expertise that was then handed off to terrorists. These are the people who conducted their own assassinations, who today in Iraq are allied with terrorists. To simply say, well, Saddam Hussein harbored Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas but they weren't al Qaeda, it seems to me, ignores the basic point that given what we saw on 9/11 and given what we know terrorists might do with even more terrible weapons, we simply can't afford -- we have to have a zero tolerance policy.

We can no longer afford to have states in the business of using terrorism as an instrument of national policy. Hopefully, we can get the world to change without having to undertake one military operation after another. But I think there's no question, as Secretary Schultz says in that article, that what happened to the Taliban and what happened to Saddam Hussein is a very salutary lesson for other states that may be tempted to continue on that course.

SEN. DOLE: Thank you very much. My time has expired.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, senator.

Senator Dayton.

SEN. MARK DAYTON (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, books like this are amazing to me, how high level people will reveal their supposedly top secret information, or disclose proceedings at the highest level meetings. And I guess I would -- my colleague Senator Reed has left, but if we wanted to get some of these documents he was requesting from the deputy secretary of Defense, I think we should ask Mr. Woodward to get us copies, because he seems to get everything quite readily.

But one of the other insights I got from reading through this is that, you know, I and I think the people who elected me and sent me to Washington delude ourselves that we have some incentive, some legitimate and constitutional role, and then to find out how contemptuously we're regarded in the executive branch, starting with the president himself, who was quoted as saying here in a meeting where Senator Levin was then the chairman of the Armed Service Committee, referenced some deep concerns that the U.S. military had this prior to the resolution, and the president said "It would be nice if they" -- meaning the military -- "expressed their reservations to the president rather than just someone in the Senate." But it goes beyond that, because -- my reading of this book, it goes clearly into duplicities and the deceptions that were -- and misrepresentations were made to members of Congress and those who want to look at the -- those who are preventing others of us from looking at the misuse of intelligence information before the congressional resolutions were adopted should -- and thereafter should look at what was said, according to the quotes in this book, to members of Congress by the highest administration officials that are even more emphatic in their representations of intelligence information that turned out to either be erroneous or mis- -- intentionally misrepresented, I find it just horrifying. So when we get into these matters of -- you know, the lack of legitimacy for anyone to question anything that's been decided, anything that's been done or hasn't been done, anything that has been represented, is found out, been found to be totally untrue, and find once again, as we have in other times in history, that anybody who raises those questions is guilty of either failing to support our armed forces, whose heroism is beyond belief and description, which we all recognize, and those of us who have been there, who have seen them, talked to their families, those who are over there now who are anxiously waiting to find out whether their loved ones are coming back alive or not, those who are not coming back at all, those families and all, to have it be suggested that any of us here lack that support because we're raising questions about what decisions were made and what pretexts were given for entering into this war and what has transpired since and what has happened in the last weeks -- and the statement at

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the conclusion, Mr. Deputy Secretary, of your remarks that if they -- meaning the enthusiasm -- well, I'll read the whole paragraph here -- "The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat alongside the coalition is also colored by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq.

If they sense that that we will not see them through to a new constitution, an election and strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal with those who would shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid."

Mr. Secretary, our -- I can only speak for myself; I'm not going to presume to speak for others. But my commitment to their freedom is rock-solid. My commitment to our troops is rock-solid. And that's exactly why here we should have had the opportunity -- and we've had very limited opportunity -- to find out the realities of the military situation. Rather, we've been, you know, given a series of just glossy overstatements of what transpired over the last year and how bad Saddam Hussein is, which we know. And the fact that there aren't any weapons of mass destruction and that our armed forces are now, as the ranking member said, suffering greater casualties than any other time -- what we hear is that, well, he's a really bad man. Well, he's a really, really bad man.

That's not the point here. The point is, we want -- have a right to know and we should be told what is going on over there, in factual terms, in military terms. And that's -- I've sat through now most of the last three hours and watched other parts of it on television to find out that virtually nothing's been said.

So I find this extremely disappointing, but I find it a continuation of this attitude that Congress is just to be duped and basically led along to this; and the less that's presented to us, that we can actually know what's going on, the better; and as long as we can be led to believe whatever suits the purposes of those who are carrying this out, then fine; just ignore us or lie to us or use us in whatever way you possibly can get away with. And I find it just abhorrent.

I would like to ask General Myers one question regarding the transition that's described there, the political transition. What is the military equivalent of that?

We've got our troops over there. We've seen the first evidence of the Iraqi security forces, how they've responded and failed to respond. And I gather it's a mixed situation over there in the last couple weeks. What is the Iraq military transition for our armed forces getting out with a victory -- the victory that we all want secured, the freedom we all want secured?

GEN. MYERS: Senator Dayton, what we're going to be doing simultaneous to that -- and if you go back, I think the chart goes to -- well, we can see -- we can look at April there -- we will stand up shortly this new Multinational Force Iraq, is what it's going to be called. So we're going to have an overall coalition commander -- it'll be U.S., it'll be General Sanchez -- that will be overall responsible for security in Iraq.

And below him he'll have a couple of significant offices. One will be the tactical commander. That's Lieutenant General Tom Metz. He and Sanchez are working side by side right now. And General Metz will take the tactical situation. And then we talked about General Petraeus coming over to work the offices of, I think, security transition we call it now -- I think that's right -- which will work the equipping and training of the Iraqi security forces, police on through border patrol -- important functions.

And throughout that organization will be woven Iraqis who will be part of the police and the new Iraqi army and all those other Iraqi security force entities will be woven in that. It's envisioned that this commander of the multinational force Iraq will be very close to our chief of mission over there, as they will be a team that will work those issues that they're going to have to work together because there's going to have to be a lot of collaboration, as there is in Afghanistan with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barno. They have offices that are essentially feet apart, 20 or 30 feet apart, and --

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SEN. DAYTON: General, excuse me, but my time is limited here, sir.

We're given here the political transition through the year 2006. And as this is the Armed Services Committee, I'd like to know what is the military transition through years 2004 --

GEN. MYERS: Well, that --

SEN. DAYTON: -- 2005, 2006, as it affects American forces? Because, as Senator Collins and others have said, we've got a lot of people back in my state of Minnesota wanting to know when their men and women are coming home.

GEN. MYERS: Right, and I was going to get to that.

SEN. DAYTON: Right.

GEN. MYERS: I was talking about command and control structure, which is very, very important to our military transition. And if we don't do that right, we're not going to get our forces --

SEN. DAYTON: Right. I accept that. I apologize.

GEN. MYERS: But we -- no, I was too long, I guess.

But our forces will continue. We are looking at the next rotation of forces and the rotation after that, and as we've done between the first rotation and the one we're currently in, trying to stretch this out so it doesn't all occur in one lump of time. And we're looking at those forces that will support it out into the future, certainly as far as that chart goes.

Obviously, we do not have perfect clarity on the forces that are going to be needed in 2005 and 2006. So we're planning for that. We're basing that on estimates that we get from General Abizaid. That will be, as we get closer and closer, further and further refined. But we're planning for a presence there to help with security throughout that period.

SEN. DAYTON: Mr. whoever it is, my time is expired. But I would ask that either in the closed session or subsequently we get, you know, some statistical representation of what that transition's going to look like, please.

GEN. MYERS: Yeah, and we'd have to do it in closed session with you.

SEN. DAYTON: All right. Thank you.

SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Dayton.

Senator Ensign.

SEN. JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all three of you for sitting through quite a long session, and I -- but these are very, very important times and important questions to have answered.

I believe very strongly that the only way that we lose in Iraq, Afghanistan, really this whole global war on terrorism, but especially right now in Iraq is if we lose the support of the American people; if it's a political loss, if the American people somehow aren't behind the president, behind the Congress in support of what's going on over there. The reason I say that at the beginning is because the politics of what is happening here in the United States affects the support of the American people. And there are comments that have been made, as a matter of fact in -- and I want to get your sense of the political comments that are made here, how

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it affects the military operation and the morale of the terrorists and the insurgents over in Iraq.

It was -- recently I think Senator Kennedy even said that Iraq is "George Bush's Vietnam" is a direct quote.

Two days later, al-Sadr declared that, quote, "Iraq will be another Vietnam for America and its occupiers." Iran's Revolution Guard Corps press office warned, quote, "A fate more horrifying than Vietnam awaits America in the morass of Iraq," unquote.

With those kinds of statements following the statements made in the United States -- I believe in free speech strongly as anybody, but I also believe that there is responsibility with free speech, when we are in critical times especially -- how does that affect what is going on with our military and the whole military strategy in Iraq?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Ensign, I guess the way I would answer -- and I'm actually glad I have an opportunity comment on a couple things Senator Dayton said -- we simply can't allow the enemy to deny us the right to hold free debate. Our men and women out there on the front lines are fighting so that we can have a free country and a country where we debate freely. And I think everybody in that debate has to think about what their proper role is. But what I have said, I said it clearly in my testimony, I applaud what Senator Lieberman said -- I think it is very important that we do what we can to send a message to the enemy that, don't confuse American debate for American weakness. And I think that is critical.

Senator Dayton, the reason I talked about the nature of the Saddam Hussein regime is because that is still the enemy. We're still fighting them. They're still threatening Iraqis in a way that is part of our challenge. It's not getting into old debates.

As far as I know, everyone was working off the same intelligence. I think it was Senator Rockefeller actually who characterized the threat as imminent, which is not a characterization I would've used. I don't think anyone is, to use your word, lying or deliberately misrepresenting. I think we are trying our best. Sometimes we do it publicly, and sometimes we do it in classified sessions. I think on virtually a weekly basis, we have had classified briefings to this committee or to the full Senate on the nature of the operations in Iraq. And there is no question that part of the battle there is an information-warfare battle. When those people took those four American bodies and burned them and strung them up, they had Somalia in their minds, I'm sure. They probably told each other, this is Mogadishu all over again.

But I think we're winning, as that letter from Zarqawi makes clear. We aren't leaving. He knows we aren't leaving. It's suffocation for him. And some of what we're seeing -- I don't mean to diminish it. I -- we're all very concerned about the level of sophistication of the Fallujah-based attacks. And let me -- Senator Dayton, if you think we haven't been talking about the character of the military operation, let me just say, I think we have been. We're trying to say Sadr is a very different kind of problem, both militarily and politically. He's a marginal figure with not very capable forces. In the Sunni heartland, we're dealing with a different problem where politically we're not comfortable with our position vis-a-vis the Sunnis, and where militarily, we are now facing an enemy that at least stands and fights in squad- and occasionally company-sized units. But I think that the end result of this action is going to be to set them back further. And I think --

SEN. ENSIGN: Mr. Secretary, just -- if I just may interrupt very quickly, because I don't have a lot of time, and I want to get to another question. And I appreciate the free debate that we have in this society, and I think it's very important that we have that free debate. I just think that it needs to be emphasized that there is responsibility with that debate. And part of that, as you said, is that when we are debating, to emphasize once again that that does not mean that we are going to back down from what is going on.

We don't want to have what happened in Spain, where terrorist attacks decide what happens internally within the United States; that that is -- we are free and independent, we debate, but when we go overseas, we are united in our purpose to defeat terrorism.

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Now, on a -- a question on the oil --

SEN. WARNER: Senator, we have to make it pretty brief --

SEN. ENSIGN: Okay, this is going to be a very brief question, and maybe I can get it in writing. Two quick questions, and I'll take the responses back in writing. One is on the oil-for-food program that we had and the corruption involved with the oil-for-food program. And it has to do with the countries that were involved at the United Nations security level with the oil-for-food program and the corruption that was involved, could we have at any time, in your opinion, gotten their support, ever? I mean, there is this talk of more internationalizing the efforts in Iraq. Could we have -- was there any way to get their support?

And the second question has to do with the drug problem that we have going on in Afghanistan. I asked this -- it was in a classified session, but it wasn't a classified question. I asked this last year on the drug problem in the support of terrorism. And last year there wasn't a lot of import put into this, and I thought at the time that it was one of the biggest problems that we had in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world in supplying the money to the terrorists. And at that time -- as a matter of fact, it was not -- there was not a lot of import put on the question. So I would like the response, whether it's in a classified response, I'm not sure, but the bottom line is how much money is being -- from the drugs and also, you know, the complete strategy on how we're dealing and how aggressively that we're dealing with that.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Can we reply for the record? But if I could make a quick comment on the first one --

SEN. WARNER: It's a very important question, and I associate myself with that question.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: -- and Mr. Grossman on the second one.

On the first one, just very quickly, I think the notion that I can't predict what France might have done if we had waited six months or 12 months or 18 months. But the notion that we wouldn't lose anybody by waiting is wrong -- or at least not knowable. I think if we'd had this May 12 bombing in Riyadh not after the liberation of Iraq and after we were able to tell the Saudis we were finally going to take our Air Force out of Saudi Arabia, after 12 years of bombing Iraq out of Saudi Arabia, we might have had a very different result. We had some people who were with us in critical ways in that war who could have been shaken by any number of events. So the notion that if we had simply waited, we would have had more people, I think fails on both counts.

Ambassador Grossman might say something on the counternarcotics.

MR. GROSSMAN: If I might, just very quickly. First of all, I'd be glad to try to answer the question in specifics on the numbers because I think it's very important.

But I think you make an extremely important point, Senator, which is that drugs fuel terrorism. And I have testified in this committee on a number of times about what we're doing in Colombia. And two years ago, we started to call people what they are, which is narco-terrorists. And there is not a separation there. And around the world, as you say, particularly in Colombia, but I think again in Afghanistan, we will find there is this connection. And I'd be glad to answer the question, but it's something we take very seriously. And they're narco-terrorists and we ought to call them that.

SEN. ENSIGN: Just real quickly, Mr. Chairman. The reason I brought that up as a question is because -- and my question last year is why aren't we going all out with the military against, for instance, in Afghanistan? We're more limited in what we can do in Colombia.

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But we are not limited on what we can do in Afghanistan on these poppy fields. And obviously, we are limited in what we do with Pakistan. But once again, Afghanistan is someplace where we have our military there to affect a great deal of the drug trade. And I just didn't see a huge effort going toward that.

SEN. WARNER: I think that question needs to be answered. Now, I'm going to have to ask you to do it for the record --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We'll do it for the record.

SEN. WARNER: -- because we've got colleagues --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We are increasing our effort as --

SEN. WARNER: Well, I can't overemphasize the importance of that question, because I asked it when I was in Afghanistan just weeks ago.

Senator Akaka.

SEN. DANIEL D. AKAKA (D-HI): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, if you would add to this question, I'd like to ask some questions about our forces, our force requirements and force deployment tempos. One of the things that DOD has been looking at for the last few years is whether we can reduce the burden on our forces by decreasing our participation in some long-standing operations. Obviously, your actions in Iraq has really eliminated the need for Operations Southern and Northern Watch. And we have drawn down our participation in the Balkans. My question is, are there other long-standing operations that we're looking to cut back on? And if so, which are they?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Akaka, we're looking carefully at our entire global footprint, as we call it, to make sure that, particularly given the stresses on our forces and what it costs to deploy them, that we don't just mechanically proceed with a force posture that we inherited at the end of the cold war. I remember when I was in the Pentagon the last time, leaving in 1993, that we had a hundred thousand troops in Europe and a hundred thousand in the Asia-Pacific region, and it seemed like that was a reasonable position to start from post-cold war, but that I thought over the next 10 years we would probably reduce some, especially in Europe. And to the contrary, we found our troop levels in Europe going up. Some of that doesn't make sense. I think it can be adjusted. The world has changed enormously. At the same time, we have no intention of abandoning our fundamental commitments. I give you one more example, and I -- Korea is a case where -- one of the most important security commitments we have to the security of South Korea. At the same time, we've looked very closely, we are convinced that we can do what we need to do in many ways, redeploying our forces, investing in them so they're more capable, and ultimately making some adjustments in the numbers. So the commitment remains, but how you fulfill the commitment changes depending on the threat and the circumstances and what your forces can do.

GEN. MYERS: Senator Akaka, I would only add to that that besides the Balkans and the areas that Secretary Wolfowitz mentioned, one of the reasons we're such an effective armed force is that we exercise very rigorously. And that's one of the areas that we have actually cut back on during these times because of the tempo on our forces.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, could I make -- being that you're from the state of Hawaii, I think it's a(n) opportunity to stress my own view is that one area of the world where we -- there's a lot that can go wrong if the United States disengages is this huge vast area of the Asia-Pacific region, where you have some of the most rapidly-growing, biggest, potentially most powerful countries in the world. And I think as we adjust our footprint, I just really want to make it clear, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, we are very mindful of the fact that American engagement in that region is a key element of stability and we don't intend to

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abandon it.

SEN. AKAKA: General Myers, General Pace last week said that he has evaluated force requirements for continued operations in Iraq for years out into the future and that we can maintain planned force levels -- and I quote him -- "for as long as we need to," unquote. I am reassured by his comments, of course, but have a few follow-up questions about our ongoing commitments.

One of the questions is, how long do you expect that we will continue to need a force of 135,000 in Iraq? I know that your position is that we can sustain this force level indefinitely, but I'm wondering about what this does to the deployment tempo of our forces, both active and Reserve. Can you tell us how often a given active or Reserve member, say an infantryman, for example, would expect to be deployed versus how long they would be at home under various scenarios; and likewise as the infantryman, could be a helicopter pilot or a logistician?

Another question is, what do you expect Reserve component participation to be in Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and 4 if we continue at the current level of force levels?

And my last question is, what expectations do you have about force requirements in Afghanistan?

GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Senator Akaka. We talked about, with Senator Dayton's question, about how long we predicted that we might -- that we've planned for. As you said, we can't determine exactly what the requirements are going to be. They'll be driven by events on the ground. Lots of factors to go into that. We listen to General Abizaid and General Sanchez currently on their predictions.

For planning purposes, like most reasonable people, I think, we tend to be very, very conservative in our estimates. We are not -- we don't put a very optimistic face on it. We say, okay, if we're needed, you know, what's the maximum number of forces that might be required? Then we try to source to that. And that's the process we're in right now.

To your question about how often, for active duty we hope that those forces that are deployed will have at least a year back home before we would have to use them again. That's for active duty. For Reserves, as you know, we call them up for a maximum of two years. Most Reserve forces, some will serve two years, as we talked about with Senator Collins, or even over in a fairly short period of time. But for the most part, the majority of our forces -- Reserve forces will serve up to two years. They won't all serve two years. Some will be released earlier. It depends on how long it takes to mobilize them and demobilize them, and that's almost unit specific and mission specific to that unit. Again we'd hope they'd be mobilized for two years, and our rule of thumb is -- and it's just a rule of thumb -- is that we wouldn't mobilize them except once out of every six years, would be our approximate.

The force requirements in Afghanistan. Again, the situation in Afghanistan, I think, is actually pretty good.

We've got a major NATO commitment in there. NATO wants to expand its role in Afghanistan. Good coalition partners.

We have about 13,000 U.S. forces right now. We're -- have bumped them up just recently because of the upcoming elections and the fact that this is the time of year when we generally see an increase in incidents by the Taliban or former al Qaeda, and we've got to be ready to thwart that.

We're -- actually changed our tactics in Afghanistan. We are very active in those areas in south and southeast Afghanistan. Every day of the week, basically, we have soldiers out there, humping their packs and walking the ground, to make sure that that threat is subdued and does not emerge.

Now everything I've said is -- are rules of thumb. There is nothing in concrete about any of those, because the overriding issue is -- just for the same reason that we extended forces in Afghanistan or in Iraq here

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recently, was that the mission will dictate what we have to do. This is -- we have to keep coming back to this, I think, in my mind. This is a very serious threat. It's a threat to our way of life and the things that we stand for. And it's this generation of members of the armed forces -- they're going to play a major role, not the only role, certainly, but a major role in combatting that threat.

And I'll give you a couple examples. I was flying on a 130 to Mosul the -- last Thursday night, and the navigator was a Reserve lieutenant colonel. He'd been promoted to colonel but refused to put on the rank, because if he did, they'd send him home. He says, "Nope, I want to serve."

When I got to Mosul, I'm in the hospital in Mosul. Unfortunately, there had been a mortar attack. Three individuals were injured. I went in the hospital. I met a doctor. He's going to celebrate his 40th year in the armed forces here this month. He was a brigadier general, and they needed his skills in Iraq, but they said, "You can't go as a brigadier general."

He said, "Okay, I'll take that rank off. What do you want to make me?"

They said, "We'll make you a colonel." He's over there, serving.

We'll have our rules. We'll try to provide predictability. We're as aware and as concerned as anybody about taking care of this force properly. They are working hard, but the threat -- the threat requires it.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you for your responses.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEN. AKAKA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: General, that's very interesting.

Senator Bayh.

SEN. EVAN BAYH (D-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you. Your stamina has been exhibited here today at great length, and we appreciate that.

Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying I agree with something that our colleague Senator Lieberman said when he indicated that we are all committed to success. The stakes on the upside are significant. The risks on the downside are significant. There is no substitute for success. I agree to what he had to say there.

And Secretary Wolfowitz, I agreed with two things that you said in your opening statement: first, your commendation of our military men and women for their heroism and their idealism. I found the letter of that young Marine you read to be quite moving.

Secondly, with regard to the -- well, let me move on. I agreed with what you said with regard to that.

Oh, I know what it was, the second thing: with regard to the historic magnitude of the malevolence and the evil of the former regime in Iraq. I don't think that there can be any serious debate about that. It is a good thing that Saddam is gone.

Saying that, there are some growing concerns about the efficacy of the political transition and whether some of the problems that we may be experiencing there are imperiling all the good that we hope to do for both the Iraqi people and the cause of freedom in the world and ultimately for our own security.

So with that in mind, after three and a half hours of listening, I have two questions. First, how do we define -- how do you define sovereignty, the sovereignty that we will be conveying to this new interim entity, particularly when it does not come, as it cannot come, under current circumstances, with responsibility for

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security?

And most importantly, how does this truncated sovereignty that we are transferring create -- and here's the point I want to emphasize -- legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people? Because ultimately it is not sovereignty that we hope to transfer; it is legitimacy that we hope to create, because it is only legitimacy that will ultimately enlist the Iraqi people in the cause of establishing their own freedom and their own independence.

So I am somewhat concerned that we have -- we are elevating expectations that may be somewhat disappointed, that could lead to disillusionment and ultimately to opposition.

And if I could just conclude by saying, with regard to my first question, in some ways we may be trying to have it both ways. We're saying we're transferring sovereignty. That's significant. That's big. But at the same time we're saying well, now, we got to understand the real mission of this interim entity is really quite limited. It's to set the stage for elections, which are in fact interim elections held at the end of this year, and the real elections won't be held for a year after that. So how does this sovereignty that we're transferring lead to legitimacy, which at the end of the day is critically important to our success?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Bayh, if I could compliment you not only for your stamina but for a terrific question, and it doesn't have a simple answer.

I think there's a basic tension here, which is you need to set people's sights not at the ceiling, but above the floor. And I would go back to some comments I made, too, that you know, there are a lot of countries in Eastern Europe now that are properly described as democracies, but they still have a long way to go even to get as far as we've gotten, and we're not perfect. So when we use those words about Iraq, we use them with some recognition of how challenging it will be. But at the same time, I think we need to go in a step-by-step way that doesn't just stop at a, well, anything that's not the old regime is good enough for us. I don't think that can be the standard.

Now, I'll add one more problem to the questions that you put on the table about this interim authority, and I've mentioned it earlier. And that is, in addition to the questions you asked, we have a real challenge I think particularly with the Sunni Arabs in getting them convinced that they have a real role in the future of Iraq. They have to understand that role is not the old role. If they think that they ran Iraq -- and I'm not sure they really do; I think they know Saddam Hussein ran Iraq -- (chuckles) -- but if they think it's still winner take all and they'd like to be the winners and take all, that's not the story. But it can't be winner take all, either; that the Shi'a, just because they're a majority, are going to run the government in Baghdad and everyone else is going to have to do what they say the way they did in the old days.

And I think a significant part of the answer to that comes out of our own constitution, our political process; that is to say, more local control, more decentralization. It's a country that's been centralized, unfortunately, for a lot longer than just Saddam Hussein. The more people believe that they can run their own affairs, I think the more they'll accept the overall situation.

This government that will come in on July 1st, part of its effect is going to be based on its being purely temporary. It's not going to be broadly legitimate and Iraqis are going to stand up and cheer and say, you know, this is my government. Hopefully we'll get a little bit of bounce from that, but most importantly they -- and they will run ministries. They will run the police force, in coordination with CENTCOM cause this is not a normal police situation. But most importantly, they'll be setting up elections.

As you remember, we were in this uncomfortable position for the United States of having to argue last fall against elections because it wasn't timely. Well, it is going to be timely. I mentioned in my testimony we've seen some local elections in southern Iraq that apparently worked.

SEN. BAYH: Would you forgive me for --

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MR. WOLFOWITZ: Sure.

SEN. BAYH: I don't mean to interrupt, but I do have one other question and I'm about to run out of time.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Go ahead.

SEN. BAYH: So basically, the legitimacy ultimately that we seek will more than likely -- we have a greater chance of achieving that in either the interim elections or the ultimate elections than this sort of interim --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Correct. It's a step-by-step, and it will grow over time.

SEN. BAYH: Well, I am concerned that we may have elevated expectations either within our own country or perhaps there, and disappointment is not a helpful thing.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: And if you can help us calibrate expectation, that's a good thing.

SEN. BAYH: Okay. And my second question is somewhat related, and it has to do with the degree of popular support for our role in what we're trying to do. I'm interested in your concern about the potential for Iraqi nationalism to at some point trump their gratitude for the liberation and their hopes for the future, because as long as we are only fighting the remnants of a despised despot, we will ultimately win. As long as we are fighting outsiders who are there and no friends of the Iraqi people, we will ultimately win. But if at some point, this morphs into -- as I understand it did to the British in 1920 in some respect -- a broader sense of Iraqi nationalism and we're on the wrong side of that, then the task becomes much, much more difficult.

And so I am particularly -- we've heard the polls cited, and those are obviously important. So I am interest in your concern about that. What if anything we can do to keep that from happening, and some disconnect between the polls and what we read in the popular press in our own country. And I would just cite as one example the Washington Post story of Sunday where it says the crisis has "stirred support for the insurgents across both Sunni and Shi'ite communities, has also inflamed tensions between Arabs and Kurds." Quote: "The Fallujah problem and the Sadr problem are having a wider impact than we expected," a senior U.S. official involved in Iraq policy said. "The effect has been profound." The insurgency appears to be generating" -- not a quote now, just from the story -- "the insurgency appears to be generating new alliances and tensions among the major sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq."

Just two final things. "The crises have helped boost the standing of more radical Shi'ite and Sunni political leaders." And finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, "The extent of popular support for the resistance is unclear. But in nationwide surveys taken before the sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing percentage of Iraqis said that they saw the U.S. forces as occupiers, not liberators."

So I'm concerned that at some point, this may tragically morph into the bad guys being aligned with Iraqi nationalism, and what can we do to keep that from happening? And is your sense that that is in fact a real danger we're confronting here, as at least this anecdotal information or at least some of the reports in our press suggest that it may be?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Even though I think some of that anecdotal information is overstated, and it's amazing how quickly people 8,000 miles away will conclude after two days about some trend in Iraq, nevertheless, that basic concern is very real. It's been something that's concerned me, concerned General Abizaid, concerned everybody who's dealing with this issue from day one -- what General Abizaid calls consent, which we had on a large national scale on April 9th of last year, starts to slowly slip away. How long you hang onto it no one knows. But because you know you don't hang onto it forever, it means it's very important to accelerate the governance process. That is why I believe it was the absolutely right thing to bring about this transfer of sovereignty. If anything, I would have preferred to see it even earlier.

And secondly, it's why it is so important to do things like restoring electricity. It's not only jobs for people,

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but it's the sense that the American really meant what they said, because the enemy propaganda out there, just so you know, is: "The Americans are going to leave. We're coming back. They just came here to steal your oil and be going." And if the electricity doesn't work, it sort of plays into that conspiracy theory.

There are two specific phenomena in the recent troubles that are troubling and are referred to in those anecdotes.

And it -- one is, with respect to the Sunni community, where we have troubles to begin with, the impression created that we are creating wholesale civilian casualties is terribly damaging, and the lies transmitted on Al-Jazeera -- and I use that word deliberately. It's not a matter of how you balance the news or which things you choose to cover. They absolutely make up stories about American use of cluster bombs, American torture, absolutely fabricated out of whole cloth. Those lies, combined with the unfortunate truth that there are civilian casualties in a fight like this, is one of our challenges. And one of the reasons for working with the Governing Council and trying to find a solution in Fallujah that at least minimizes the violence, even if we can't avoid it completely, is critical to that community.

With the Shi'a, I think it's a different story. And I don't -- whatever that allusion was that their radicals are getting more traction, what I actually see is that we're seeing more and more evidence that most Shi'a think this fellow Sadr, although his father was a hero and a martyr, and that's part of his standing, that he is a gangster, and on the other hand, they do not want us marching into the holy city of Najaf with foreign troops to take him out. So the restraint that we're showing I think in dealing with him I think is paying dividends. It's an information warfare battle, as we -- as the military says. It's two different fronts, very different fronts. And I wouldn't want to say that we want it. But I think if we're careful we can come out of this ahead.

SEN. BAYH: Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, my final, just brief comment to senators would be this is a very difficult situation. If the consent necessary to our being successful is a diminishing asset and the legitimacy ultimately necessary for keeping that consent from diminishing but, in fact, increasing doesn't occur until next January or, in fact, a year from next January, we need to avoid a tipping point at some place in there to make sure that we are ultimately successful and the Iraqis are, too. I --

SEN. WARNER: Well, senator, I'd like to also say I associate myself and I -- earlier in this hearing my first question was on this question of sovereignty. The dictionary -- this is a dictionary definition: "Supreme and independent power or authority in a state." And I think we -- take note in this hearing of the concern of myself, the senator, and perhaps others. I think we should start using the term "limited sovereignty" at this time rather than kind of saying we're transferring sovereignty. I really feel strongly we could be raising expectations and problems in the future if we don't be careful right now.

Senator Clinton.

SEN. HILLARY CLINTON (D-NY): Well, I agree with the chairman and Senator Bayh. I think that this is a serious issue because it's not only the possibility that the definition will take on a life of its own, causing all kinds of unintended consequences, but that, in fact, the earlier questions that the chairman raised about the rules of engagement for our military and the authority that they have following this period of sovereignty, however one defines it, I think are going to be very sticky. And then you throw into the mix all these private contractors running around heavily armed, I think it becomes even more of a challenge. So I believe, Mr. Secretary, you've gotten at least from some of us a concern about what this means, how it's going to be operationalized. And I just have -- one suggestion would be to look for some tangible way to demonstrate the benefits that flow from this interim period to individual Iraqis. You said in passing that one of the concerns we have to address is the efforts to undermine our legitimacy and our role in Iraq by not only making up stories about actions that never occurred under our military control, but also this whole idea we're there to steal the oil.

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You know, I -- when I was in Iraq, I spoke with Ambassador Bremer, and I've raised this in other settings -- I really urge the administration to look at ways that we could demonstrate clearly that the results from increased production of oil in Iraq are going to benefit individual Iraqis. You know, I'm not an expert on this, but back in the days when we opened the North Slope in Alaska for oil exploration, the state of Alaska, in conjunction with, I think, the federal government, created a trust fund for the Alaskans. Literally checks were sent out to Alaskans, saying this is your land, it's being exploited, this oil is going all over the world, but you are given a stake in this future.

And when I raised this with Ambassador Bremer, I said, you know, trust is in short supply, as we know. Consent and trust are essential ingredients for success in this undertaking. We need to do something, and we need to be in the process of doing it before sovereignty, however it's defined, takes over and all kinds of deals are cut, because I'm deeply concerned about those on the Governing Council and those who might be on any expanded transitional entity, who seem to be making out quite well, and that will further undermine legitimacy.

So I raise it again. I hope that something, if not that, can be looked at as a means of demonstrating both our commitment to the Iraqi people in a tangible financial way and also removing some of the sting of this idea that we're there to steal the oil.

General Myers, as you may recall, during several hearings before this committee I raised the subject of medical tracking and surveillance of our troops. Both on February 13th and on February 25th, I asked what efforts were being taken regarding medical tracking and surveillance and follow-up care. I also requested and received a briefing from the Department of Defense on the proposed medical tracking plan for troops being deployed to Iraq.

I came at this issue in large measure because of my concerns about the problems that many of our veterans had after the first Gulf War, when they returned home and had a syndrome of undiagnosed illnesses, which at first were, you know, frankly, dismissed, chalked up to all kinds of personal stress-related issues, and then only gradually taken seriously, and then finally we were able to secure veterans' benefits for a lot of those troops.

Now, I raise this today because of the troubling treatment of members of 442nd Army National Guard MP Unit out of Orangeburg, New York. My staff and I have met with members of this unit, and they have a very disturbing story to tell. Specifically, 12 of them were medevaced out of Iraq for various injuries -- fractured feet, you know, problems with humvees rolling over, all kinds of, you know, action-related injuries, but they were also suffering similar symptoms to those that we heard out of the first Gulf War -- dizziness, headaches, sleeplessness, cramps, blood in their urine, blood in their stool. Yet when they went to the Army to ask for testing, they were given the runaround.

And they became concerned about possible exposure to radiation because of information they were given by Dutch personnel who were stationed near them during their time in Iraq.

Based on some tests that the Dutch medical personnel did of the place they were assigned to be, including using, you know, radioactive detectors and other devices to test the environmental exposures, the Dutch said they were leaving, they would not stay there, and they moved their troops to another location.

Several of the members of the 442nd who were medics were in ongoing discussions with the Dutch, who were telling them: you should move, too; you know, there's all kinds of problems here. There were, you know, bombed-out Bradley Fighting Vehicles and other equipment that had been dragged and dumped there after the military actions and other kinds of issues that, at least in the minds of the Dutch as it's been reported to us, caused them to act.

So when these men returned home and kept trying to get somebody to talk to them and were not given much

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of an answer, they went to a New York newspaper. They went to the New York Daily News with their concerns. And that newspaper paid for testing, and their blood was tested being sent to Germany, which had some advanced equipment. The results came back saying that several of them had elevated levels of radiation exposure, and they attributed it to exposure to depleted uranium. Whether or not that is the causation I'm not here to suggest.

But my bottom line is that I think our troops deserve better. I've already requested another briefing on medical tracking, especially with respect to radiation exposure, which we hope to schedule soon. But I think this raises a red flag for me because I had hoped that we wouldn't make the mistakes we made before.

I now have -- on further investigation have learned that we have hundreds of troops sitting at Fort Dix who have ongoing medical complaints and ailments, and they're basically being given two choices: sit there -- some have been sitting there for months, Mr. Chairman -- sit there and wait to be given an appointment at Walter Reed or appointment at someplace else, or go ahead and sign this document and leave the military and don't worry about it. Some leave, but others are saying, wait a minute, I want to find out what's wrong with me; I'm not going to leave, I want treatment.

So, General, again, I would ask that you take whatever action is necessary, and, Mr. Secretary, as well on the civilian side, to ensure that, first, these members of 442nd get whatever testing is appropriate and necessary, that we take a hard look at the radiation exposure numbers back, that we used the more advanced testing techniques that are available in Germany and Japan but which our military are not currently using -- the test that we are using for exposure to uranium or radiation is not as specific as the tests that are being done in Europe and Japan -- and that we try to make sure that the plans for medical surveillance, tracking and treatment that I was told about are actually implemented.

And specifically, I would appreciate a report about what is happening at Fort Dix. And I don't -- you know, I don't know, but I am concerned by the story. We heard a lot of anecdotes today about how great everybody is feeling about their mission and I'm glad to hear those anecdotes, but I'm increasingly hearing a lot of anecdotes about how poorly people are being treated when they return home.

So, General, I would like a very specific report as soon as possible on the 442nd, on conditions at Fort Dix, what the Army and the rest of the services intend to do about radiation exposure, other kinds of environmental problems that may be contributing to some of these symptoms.

GEN. MYERS: Thank you, Senator Clinton. And you're absolutely right; we've got to do a first-class job of taking care of our troops. And we'll look into the Fort Dix situation. I haven't -- don't believe I've seen those reports, but we'll look into that. That's very important.

In terms of the 442nd, my understanding is, we have tested some of their members, through urine samples, which is the way, I guess, you detect things like depleted uranium and so forth. We have not found anything. I'll look at the differences between European testing, Japanese testing and our testing.

But you're right. We need to monitor and make sure we don't overlook things that could cause them problems later on. And that's a very important part of our responsibility. So I'll get you those two reports.

SEN. CLINTON: Well, I would look forward to that and a continuing effort to keep me informed about what we're doing on this medical testing and surveillance. I don't want to go through what we went through after the first Gulf War.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I appreciated Secretary Wolfowitz's response to Senator Cornyn about the many tactics that we should employ with respect to the war on terrorism, and I especially appreciated what you said about education. I spoke this morning to the Council on Foreign Relations and urged that we place universal education on a much higher priority than we have heretofore. And I will be introducing legislation to try to better position our own country to do just what needs to be done with respect to

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education.

I share your concern about the madrassas. I spoke with President Musharraf when I was in Islamabad. And I feel strongly that we need a system that can leverage public support and private support.

And I also obviously am concerned about investing in girls' education, because it is still the smartest, best investment with respect to promoting democracy and stability. And girls still face enormous obstacles.

So I would welcome the support of the administration in my Education for All legislation. I would welcome the support of members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. Even if we could not be immediately successful this year, it would send the kind of statement that frankly, I think, we are in -- (chuckles) -- in some need of sending to the rest of the world: that we are, you know, not only pursuing military action, not only recognizing the need for intelligence and law enforcement, but that education and health are critical components in our leadership in the war against terrorism and on behalf of freedom.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Clinton, I agree with you. I think women are one of the most important forces for progress and moderation in the Muslim world, for fairly obvious reasons. And actually, in Iraq, they're a substantial majority because of the unfortunate killing that took place over the last couple of decades. They're critical allies.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Clinton, I'd like very much to work with you on that issue of education. I share that.

SEN. CLINTON: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: And I'll bring to your attention some interesting research I've done on the subject.

We're going to discontinue now this hearing -- excuse me. Secretary Grossman, would you like to --

MR. GROSSMAN: If I might --

SEN. WARNER: Please do, sir.

MR. GROSSMAN: Senator, I apologize. I don't want to hold up the show here.

SEN. WARNER: No, no apology at all.

MR. GROSSMAN: But I hope that you might also take for the record some information I'd like to provide to Senator Clinton on what's going on, on women and girls, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

And I wasn't quick enough, after Senator Sessions spoke and General Myers responded, to just thank General Myers for noting the role of the State Department in the creation of the Iraqi police force. And I just wanted to let Senator Sessions know that we are committed to this, that we are committed to support that mission, that -- are training people in Jordan, training we're doing in Iraq. The money that the Congress has given us -- that's something that we want to absolutely support; and that's part of our mission as well, and I wanted you to know that.

SEN. WARNER: Fine.

MR. GROSSMAN: Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you.

I say to my witnesses: Do you feel there's any issue that we've covered today -- and we've covered a great many issues in what I think is an excellent hearing -- that you felt that you needed another minute to address

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any particular point?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think one thing I'd like to do for Senator Levin is get back to him as quickly as I can first on his request for information that you said you'd been looking for for months and what I was trying to reconstruct from memory about those briefings, because I want to confirm that my memory --

SEN. WARNER: Fine. Well, I think you made that clear.

Senator Levin wanted to take a minute or two on the record here to --

SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, on that issue, I appreciate your looking into the delay in obtaining documents that were promised long ago from Mr. Feith. And I will put into the record now the letter which he wrote to me which is now two months old promising those documents and promising them on a rolling basis, as they were collected so that he didn't have to collect them all before he sent them, but as they were collected, he committed to send to me through the chairman, as a matter of fact, and to all the members of the committee through the chairman, these documents that have not been forthcoming. So I'd like that to be made part of the record, and I appreciate your follow-up on that.

Secondly, just one comment. You made reference, in terms of the briefings that were provided to the Office of the Vice President and the staff of the National Security Council, and the difference between that briefing and the one that your received or the one that the CIA received. There were significant differences. It's not just one chart. And I think that you should want to clear up the record on that matter. There were many charts that were added for the National Security Council staff and for the White House. There were perhaps 40 differences between the -- in the briefings. It wasn't just one chart, in other words, the one that was highly critical of the CIA, but many charts, including a key chart on any alleged relationship with Mohammed Attah and the Iraq police at a meeting that was referred to as possibly taking place in Prague, but which the CIA is highly dubious about. But that -- there was a chart on that issue, according to published sources -- so I have to rely on published sources, but I've also seen the charts -- on that issue.

And so your statement about trying to minimize the difference is inaccurate, and I would appreciate your comparing those presentations, those briefings and just confirming for the record that there were significant differences or numerous differences between those two briefings, not just the one chart.

Finally -- and so that would be for the record, if you have a chance to look at the briefings. And finally, you said that it's common for there to be conversations between staffs, discussions between staffs as though this kind of a 20-to-30-slide briefing on intelligence matters by the Department of Defense is something which was common. And I would ask you for the record if you know of any similar intelligence briefing by a group inside the Department of Defense with the Office of the Vice President or the staff of the National Security Council on intelligence matters. This was a very structured perhaps 30-slide briefing handled by the Feith office without the knowledge of the CIA. And to kind of just casually say, well, these discussions take place commonly is to cast this as an occurrence which is not unusual. And if this was a usual occurrence, I'd like to know if there's any other example you can provide us for the record of a formal, structured intelligence presentation to the Office of the Vice President, National Security staff by the Defense Department, outside of the CIA channels.

This was a presentation about CIA intelligence to those two very high level offices. And if you could present that evidence, if you have any, for the record, that would be appreciated.

Finally, if you'd tell us for the record whether you were aware of the classified letter from Undersecretary Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee, dated October 27th 2003, providing answers to questions for the record, that was then reportedly leaked to the Weekly Standard? And that was a very major leak, and a very major document, allegedly, because of what the vice president said to the press on January 9th 2004, when he said that that top secret code or document allegedly reported by the Rocky Mountain News was, quote, "Your best source of information," to use the vice president's words, "on the relationship between Iraq and al

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Qaeda."

For the record, if you would tell us whether you were aware then of that classified letter from Mr. Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee. That'll take care of my questions for the record, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you. My quick roundup, I want to direct my thoughts to Secretary Grossman. I appreciate your joining us today.

This chart that's been displayed here: Could you tell us the extent to which the United Nations was involved in formulating that? Whether the Secretary General has -- understandably Dr. Brahimi has indicated this is basically his format -- has the Secretary General, so to speak, associated himself with the accuracy of this, and the extent to which the Security Council has reviewed this chart and, so to speak, gives their blessing to it?

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, Senator, the chart, of course, comes from the transitional administrative law, which was designed by -- (inaudible) -- and so, no, that was not something that the United Nations was involved in.

SEN. WARNER: No, but it was adopted, I think by the --

MR. GROSSMAN: By the Governing Council.

SEN. WARNER: -- Iraqi Council, which --

MR. GROSSMAN: That's right. That's their job, and we were there -- we obviously participated in that, but that's their document, and a good document.

That, the transitional administrative law then laid out this process. And then what you had after the transitional administrative law was the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA write to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and say we need help. We need help here in putting together the interim government, and we also need some help and some advice on whether it's possible to have elections, as the TAL originally talked about.

As you know, Brahimi has been there -- Ambassador Brahimi's been there a couple of times -- (inaudible) --

SEN. WARNER: Speak into your mike directly.

MR. GROSSMAN: I'm sorry.

SEN. WARNER: We're losing some of your voice.

MR. GROSSMAN: Ambassador Brahimi's been there a couple of times now.

SEN. WARNER: Right.

MR. GROSSMAN: And he'll go back in the beginning of May. As I said, Miss Perelli has been there to help on the election side. So, I think it would be fair to say -- they have to speak for themselves -- that everybody has essentially adopted this timeline. We'll have to wait and see when Ambassador Brahimi reports to Kofi Annan. He will come out and say, "Yes, you know, I accept this. My guys -- (inaudible) --

SEN. WARNER: So, that's important.

MR. GROSSMAN: Absolutely.

SEN. WARNER: That bridge has not been crossed yet.

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MR. GROSSMAN: No, sir.

SEN. WARNER: And the Secretary General is reviewing this?

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir.

SEN. WARNER: Right.

MR. GROSSMAN: Ambassador Brahimi -- just a technicality -- is went to Italy after he was in Iraq, and he will be on his way to New York to make a report to the Secretary General.

SEN. WARNER: Correct.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Actually, Brahimi did help to negotiate details specifically on the point that the interim government doesn't have to be elected. As you recall, that was the big point of dispute between the governing council and Sistani.

SEN. WARNER: Right. That I understood. Now the Security Council, the extent to which they have given any views with regard to this.

MR. GROSSMAN: They have not given views --

SEN. WARNER: Have not.

MR. GROSSMAN: -- in regard to this yet. No.

SEN. WARNER: So, the use of this chart today is I think much clearer now in my view. And i want to make that distinction for the record.

Lastly, Secretary Grossman, this issue which a number of us have raised about the use of the word "sovereignty", and I think -- if I'm not mistaken -- I followed the president's press conference the other day very carefully. I believe he used the word "sovereignty" without any qualifications.

Do you have some concern that expectations could be raised unduly if we don't start using phraseology which indicates very clearly that -- limited sovereignty at this time or some -- something, because I do not find that what we're doing is consistent with the dictionary definition nor with the common acceptance of the term "sovereignty" in international law.

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, you asked us to take seriously what this committee has said today, and we certainly will. But I think what Paul said earlier in response to a question is right, which is to say that there is limited sovereignty in Iraq, certainly, on the 1st of July. It's limited by the transitional -- (inaudible) -- law and it's also --

SEN. WARNER: All right, but you have to use the word "limited."

SEN. LEVIN: Limited by what?

MR. GROSSMAN: By the Transitional Administrative Law and also by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511. And it seems to me -- now, my opinion about this is, is Iraqis, near as I can tell, have a vision for where they'd like to take their society, and they realize they can't get to that vision without security, and they can't get to security without the support of the coalition. So that's --

SEN. WARNER: I concur in that totally. I just think that in the use of the term on what's happening on the 30th, we'd be wise to employ some equivocation -- or maybe not equivocation, but some limitation on what the sovereignty is.

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MR. GROSSMAN: I take your point.

SEN. WARNER: Fine. Thank you.

SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Chairman, just on that point, on whether the TAL binds a sovereign government, are you saying that the agreement that was arrived at without a sovereign Iraqi government being involved is binding on a sovereign -- limited or otherwise -- Iraqi government?

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, we certainly believe that it's binding on the government that will take over on the 1st of July.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Could you give us the legal opinion on that? I think it is very important. These questions about -- because it affects our status of forces, among other things, also the Iraqi group, the survey group, but a lot of other things. Could you give us the legal opinions on this issue that a number of us have raised as to whether or not a sovereign government in Iraq is bound by the TAL, is bound by -- and whether the U.N. resolution relative to the force that is there protects our force after July 1st to take whatever military action we determine is appropriate, despite what the wishes could be of a sovereign government? I think we need to get the legal opinions that support this.

SEN. WARNER: Those are the points that we've made.

SEN. LEVIN: And for myself, I hope it's true, by the way, okay? So I'm not questioning the --

SEN. WARNER: Wisdom of the --

SEN. LEVIN: -- the sufficiency or the wisdom, but we've got to be comfortable that our forces in fact have that kind of power and are not going to be restricted by a sovereign government. Otherwise, there's going to be a limbo, there's going to be a period of great uncertainty which our troops should not be confronted with.

SEN. WARNER: And I'd simply add, should there be some disagreement as to the conduct of, say, an individual soldier or military person, what recourse could be taken against them, and how we're going to protect them in the performance of their duties.

And while, General, you say quite appropriately the Iraqi army then becomes a partner, I would hope that they would not be issuing any orders. I'm not sure what partnership means when it comes to the military. I want to make certain that U.S. commanders and, to the extent the British commanders are associated in that chain of command, and coalition commanders, that is the chain. And when we introduce the Iraqi army as a partner, I think we need clarification exactly what that would mean on the command chain.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, we'll get you that information. I think it's very important to have clarity, and I appreciate the opportunity.

I think it's also important to be clear this is not something brand new. I mean, we have a similar situation in Afghanistan. The government, the sovereign government of Bosnia has been constrained by Dayton ever since it was established.

And in the -- I don't want to make too much comparison -- these are different situations -- but with our NATO allies and with Korea, there are obviously provisions in wartime that transfer the military command to U.S. commanders.

SEN. WARNER: Fine. And I just want to make certain that those protections are in here because you can use those as examples, and in the 25 years I've been here I've worked through almost all of those situations. But here we got one hundred-plus thousand Americans involved, and it is exceedingly important -- and a level of insurrection which is most regrettable at this point in time, and no certainty that that's going to cease

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and desist on the 30th of June.

SEN. LEVIN: Would you include in that, please, what did the president mean, then, when he said the other night that we would be negotiating the status of forces agreement with the new sovereign government on July 1? What did he mean by that? If we already have a status of forces agreement under U.N. resolution and under the TAL, then what does that mean when he said that? If you could include that, it would be helpful.

SEN. WARNER: My own view is I hope a lot of this is rewritten carefully, not to rely on the U.N. resolution of October 3rd, 2003; that we really have a new resolution that will bring greater clarity to this entire situation of status of forces and what degree of sovereignty Iraq will have on the 30th of June.

Thank you very much. We'll now go upstairs to 222. (Sounds gavel.)

END.

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