

ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

Chapter 3
Operational Intelligence
Topic D: Collection

Observation Synopsis:

In an unconventional environment such as found in Afghanistan, HUMAN Intelligence (HUMINT) was the most effective collection method and supported actions from the tactical to strategic level. Beyond the theater MI brigade's interrogation and counterintelligence assets, the CFLCC possessed few organic collection assets, relying primarily on national and theater capabilities to collect information in support of ground operations. The Interrogation and CI battalion typically drew 90% of its linguists from contractors, other services, and the reserve component, but for this operation, received only Reserve Component augmentation. In other cases, the Army identified and deployed linguists, only to discover that their language or proficiency level was incorrect or insufficient.

The CFLCC had access to non-Army collection systems, such as the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which became an essential tool in collecting information in a highly non-permissive environment. Access and tasking priority was not always sufficient to meet organization needs, particularly because ground force commanders found innovative uses for the employment of this scarce resource that conflicted with the owning service's view of targeting and collection.

The Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF). The Theater MI Brigade had the capability to establish only one JIF capable of gathering information from prisoners or detainees. While with augmentation this would have been adequate for sequential operations, larger or more simultaneous operations likely would have overwhelmed the unit's ability to accomplish the mission.

In the context of unconventional operations countering terrorists, Military Police and Military Intelligence doctrinal solutions for establishing tactical interrogation and holding facilities were proven to be inadequate in providing the war fighters and the commanders with the capability to exploit HUMINT sources and develop future contacts. Operations at Bagram demonstrated that an organization like the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) must play a central and leading role in interrogation operations because of the nature of the war on terrorism. The JIATF integrates the capabilities of CIA, DHS, FBI, and conventional military HUMINT forces into a fusion cell capability. The JIATF must have the authority to task military units and must have the resources and authority to conduct unique HUMINT operations. These types of operations require a non-doctrinal approach to interrogation operations and innovative or "outside the box" methods to interdiction operations. The typical "JIF" or tactical exploitation facility is not the appropriate solution. It requires an integrated operational focus supported by fused intelligence to conduct responsive detection and apprehension operations of terrorists. Furthermore, from an MP perspective it is also a uniquely different mission as it is not

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just a "Detainee" or EPW holding facility. Instead, it is a unique operational intelligence exploitation facility in which the MP resources must be subordinate to the JIATF in regards to evacuation / release decisions on detainees.

A related point is that the doctrinal approaches to "EPW" or "Detainee" operations initially utilized by CFLCC did not take full advantage of the various policies adopted by civilian leadership to deal with the unique nature of this unconventional operation. The laws and policies regarding the war against terrorism must be used to the maximum extent possible and support flexibility for commanders instead of acting as restrictive barriers. The laws permit greater latitude than what is exercised in conventional operations. Commanders must understand the need for custodial interrogations of people whom U.S. forces have no intention of detaining. In addition, there is a need for absolute non-disclosure of the identities of all persons in custody until they have been determined to be not of high value or high intelligence value. This approach is not risk free, but success requires innovative action. This innovative action must facilitate:

- a. Segregation of high value individuals.
- b. "Incentive Program" controlled by intelligence personnel dictates level of treatment above minimal standards.
- c. Release v. Repatriation of individuals (There are differences between the two.)
- d. Interrogators must have TS Clearances

Interrogators must have more strategic level training (i.e. – Training must emphasize unconventional interrogation operations and place less emphasis on tactical EPW interrogations). In addition to this increased training, all interrogators should have TS Clearances to be able to work seamlessly with the JIATF.

Flexibility should be provided to commanders on the ground on the ability to determine to hold or release persons that are not deemed to be a High Value or High Intelligence Value.

High Value individuals must be segregated from the general detainee populace. MP and interrogation assets must be able to cover and accommodate these situations.

Linguist Support. The Interrogation and CI Battalion, lacked sufficient linguists to accomplish the mission without augmentation from contractors and Reserve Component augmentees.

The Joint Interrogation Facility was designed to fill 90% of its requirements from joint, contractor, and reserve component manning. The Reserve Component provided limited, high quality manning, but no other services contributed to the manning of the JIF, except for the USMC while it was responsible for the installation at Kandahar. The result was a shortage of linguists, and initially, insufficient manning.

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The mission of screening and interrogating large numbers of important detainees demanded native-proficiency level linguists in order to perceive cultural nuances, understand a variety of dialects, and accurately understand acquired information. The most effective means of acquiring native linguists was through contracting. The Army could not provide, and did not have an effective system in place to identify and contract for, this support. On its own initiative, the Interrogation and CI Battalion was able to initiate the process to find and contract for a linguist in a critically short, but essential, language prior to deployment.

Another factor contributing to initial difficulties was that the Army identified linguists by language group, not specific language and dialect, and many linguists were only marginally proficient. As a result, the Interrogation and CI Battalion had to return 60% of the linguists provided to the United States because they did not possess the requested language, or were not sufficiently skilled in the language they possessed.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): UAVs became one of the most important collection assets in theater because they allowed commanders and intelligence staffs a real time, visual view of the battlefield. Overall, the Predator met CFLCC requirements for imagery collection in Afghanistan and could support Army operations in the future, although its capabilities could be improved with the addition of a laser designator for locational and targeting use.

The USAF operated and controlled all military UAVs in theater. The CFLCC was given tasking authority of these UAVs during high priority operations, but there were often conflicts of purpose and task. Because the system resided with the Air Force, their analysts were trained primarily to identify and track air-appropriate targets. While the Air Force was supportive to Army requirements when tasked by CENTCOM, they were not capable of exploitation the ground-oriented products required by the CFLCC. This need to exploit imagery in a more rapid, focused fashion tailored to Army needs was not acknowledged by the USAF during the operation. The Theater MI Brigade has created a UAV Exploitation Team (UET) that captured UAV images and exploited them to facilitate ground-oriented analysis, adding considerably to the amount of intelligence derived from each UAV mission.

The ability to see the battlefield on video and simultaneously at virtually any level of command also created the opportunity for leaders to participate in battles to an unprecedented degree. While this had benefits in terms of speed of the decision-making process and shared awareness of the battlefield, it may have resulted in multi-echelon participation in decisions normally made at lower levels. Most commanders and staff officers expressed frustration at being "micromanaged" from one or two levels above them.

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generally reduced when NGOs begin sustained operations. The C-JCMOTF's continued presence could have caused tensions with NGOs. NGOs cooperated with our HA efforts, but prefer to avoid an obvious association with the military. A Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) in title alone creates the perceived association NGOs seek to avoid. CMOCs in direct support (generally battalions) were referred to as Civil Humanitarian Liaison Centers (CHLC-pronounced Chic-lit), the term used by the British military. It also immediately identifies the level of the CA force, since CMOC is used at all levels of support.

The collection and classification of information and samples of Dexorybo Nucleic Acid (DNA) collected through the Personnel Identification Data (PID), and the subsequent Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT) process has enhanced the ability to provide FP through the immediate identification of suspected criminals, and it has also enhanced the nations ability to collect criminal intelligence information for future pursuit and processing of suspected criminals (terrorists). When the campaign on the "War Against Terrorism" in Afghanistan, the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) were already holding approximately 3200 detainees throughout the Coalition Joint Operational Area (CJOA) Afghanistan. US forces were directed to collect PID on all potential Taliban and al-Qaeda members in an effort to identify America's newest enemies. PID collection packets (consisting of names, fingerprints, DNA, and digital photos) became a key tool in our fight in the AOR. Once a detainee has completed the PID process, they are screened by the MIT to determine if they meet the criteria established by the CFLCC for retention under the custody of the US forces and subsequent movement to the Theater Short Term Holding Facility (STHF) in the AOR. Increased training needs to occur between the MP and the Military Intelligence (MI) community to ensure that all tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are comprehensively addressed. These types of missions are ideal for both the MP and the MI branches because of the mobility and flexibility of the MP Corps, and the MI requirement for collection and processing in information. Due to the uniqueness and newly implemented process that occurred, it is recommended that the both the MP and MI communities address the cooperative affect that these missions require.

The additional duty appointment of an MP Bn staff officer was assigned to address the issues and concerns identified by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in reference to the detainees being held throughout the AOR. The MP Battalion staff officer provided a cooperative relationship between the ICRC and the MP Bn conducting the detainee operation. The ICRC staff representative performs as a liaison/mediator between the Bn Commander, the unit conducting the interment process within the wire and the ICRC detainee representative. The additional tasking of an ICRC Coordinator is usually conducted at the brigade level. However, the MP Bn Commander identified the need to have a facilitator within his own staff in order to facilitate the relationships that he knew were required when working with the ICRC. The ICRC involves itself with the observation and interaction of detainees/EPW within a area of conflict. The ICRC consistently referred to the detainees as EPWs; however, the MP Bn continued to explain and enforce the use of the term detainee when coordinating/cooperating with the ICRC. Several issues arose regarding the ICRC at Kandahar and Bagram due to the amount of time the detainees were being held. The collection facility at both Kandahar and Bagram were originally designed to be temporary (24-48 & 24-72 hour) holding facilities. The average time a detainee is being held at Bagram in one month, Kandahar's

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average time is a little longer. This presents inherent danger to the overall base/base cluster defense plan due to the target of opportunity the detainee facility provides to the enemy. The unit ICRC (additional duty appointee) needs to receive training/information exchange of the requirements/responsibilities of the ICRC prior to arrival in theater to conduct detainee operations. Staff representatives tasked to perform as C2 multipliers when dealing with agencies outside of the traditional military spectrum, is an overall positive approach to addressing entities that will inherently be on the battlefield and within the AOR during most operations.

Several training requirements may be identified for future development of units/services who are responsible for the preponderance of FP activities in an active theater of operations. The initial hand-off between the Marine Corps and the MP Company (Co) (CS), and the MP Co (CS) and the MP (Guard) Company incurred several issues concerning consistent implementation of procedures in reference to conducting the handling of the detainees. In order to facilitate the training and hand-over, CFLCC sent a specialized detainee/Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) team to help ensure that as smooth a transition between units would occur. Eventually the issues were resolved, but have created persistent problems with the unit, the detainees and the ICRC.

Additional training requirements when working in a Joint operations include, but are not limited to the following: detainee security in-transit, coordination with Military Intelligence in the conduct of internee interrogation, and EPW processing, etc., and extraction of detainees by air and other available means. Future warfare will require MPs to extract detainees/EPWs early in the fight. During the unconventional warfare phase, and starting in early combat operational phases, to gain real time intelligence value which will shape the current operations (Personal Identification Data (PID)/Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT)/and Military Intelligence Support Team (MIST). The MIST consists of, but not limited to, Special Operation Forces (SOF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Counter Intelligence (CI). The purpose of the MIST is to repair inadvertent/perceived damage conducted by United States personnel and is information based, not the retrieval of suspects (i.e., low over flight of homes without roofs was considered an invasion of privacy, particularly concerning the female Afghan). Presently conducting inter-theater transfer of detainees. The collection of detainees initially begins in a forward collection sight. Then the detainees are moved to a Detainee Collection Point, formerly known as the Division Collection Point, for initial processing. The detainees are then moved to a Short Term Holding Facility (STHF), formerly known as the Corps Holding Area. Ultimately, the detainees will be transferred to an out of theater longer term holding facility. Echeloning of evacuation level does not necessarily, in the nonlinear battlefield, connote threat level. In this AO the division collection point was at lower threat condition (THREATCON) Level than in the STHF, although the division collection point was closer to the objective area. This is a change in the traditional battlefield approach to the collection and processing of detainees/enemy prisoner of war (EPW), and an excellent representation of a noncontiguous asymmetrical environment. MPs remain the force of choice in these environments, and thus ultimately an increase is feasible in order to support CINC's objectives, and ultimately National Command Authority (NCA) goals.

The ability to conduct United States (U.S.) Law and Order (L&O) missions, both on Camp Doha and in the theater of operations are restricted to U.S. military personnel only. The ARCENT Kuwait PM is only authorized to conduct L&O requirements within the confinement

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of Camp Doha. During events where U.S. personnel participate in misconduct off post, they are subject to the local law enforcement agencies this is where the OMC is utilized. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) provides a liaison to assist in any incidents that may occur both on and off the installation. U.S. security contract personnel are not authorized to perform personal security details (PSD) off post due to the restriction of weapons off post. However, U.S. soldiers are allowed to conduct military operations off post while armed. L&O missions vary depending on the location within the area of responsibility for the Central Command (CENTCOM). L&O missions conducted in the theater of operations allows for the investigation and prosecution of any case against a U.S. soldier by U.S. forces. A cooperative approach to establishing L&O authority is very dependent on the situation, and most importantly what the Host Nation wishes to allow. Establishing a cooperative approach to conducting L&O missions should be conducted by highly trained and experienced personnel within the Military Police/Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) field.

The training of leaders in the field, particularly those dealing with the interpretation and enforcement of FP in a battlefield environment, needs additional Level II threat and anti-terrorism training. Additional Force Protection training will enhance Military Police and other Force Protection personnel/entities capability to provide guidance and overarching planning concerning the needs for - standoff, entry control requirements, identifying high value targets (HVT), airport security, etc. This is especially important when integrated into a joint/combined/coalition operation. By providing Force Protection Level II threat and anti-terrorism training to both officer's and non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) will enhance their ability to respond to these types of requirements in the growing number of joint/combined/coalition operations. Recommend officer's and NCO's ability would greatly improve if these types of topics were included/improved in current officer and NCO career developmental courses. For officer's, this training would be best provided as a supplement to the Officer's Basic Course (OBC) with a refresher or advanced level of training at the Advance Course (OAC). For the NCO, this training would be best provided at the Basic Non-Commissioned Officer's Course (BNCOC) with a refresher or advanced level of training at the Advance Non-Commissioned Officer's Course (ANCOC). The recommendation for this training at these levels is because of their increased opportunity to become involved with these types of requirements/missions.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Providing HA concurrent with combat operations may result in continued military presence of NGOs in the AOR.
- Uniforms can be a force protection issue when conducting HA in a semi-permissive environment. It is important to have a good relationship with the NGOs and address their concerns, but to not compromise safety of soldiers or integrity of mission.
- Increased training needs to occur between the MP and the Military Intelligence (MI) community to ensure that all tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) are comprehensively addressed.

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- These types of missions (PID/MIT) are ideal for both the MP and the MI branches due to the mobility and flexibility of the MP Corps, and the MI requirement for collection and processing in information.
- Combined training, incorporating several different Army branches of service, needs to occur due to these increasing mission requirements concerning detainees/EPW, and engaging populations in the AOR.
- The preferred methods for the use of linguists are those habitually found within the MI community due to the security and sensitivity of the interview. However, due to the shortage of military linguists versed in the languages used throughout the AO, civilian contract linguists were required in order to complete this process. The lack of Army linguist presents an increasing problem as we employ our forces in remote and austere environments.
- A cooperative approach to establishing L&O authority is very dependent on the situation, and most importantly what the Host Nation wishes to allow.
- A cooperative approach to conducting L&O missions should be conducted by highly trained and experienced personnel within the Military Police/Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID) field.
- By providing Force Protection Level II threat and anti-terrorism training to both officer's and non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) will enhance their ability to respond to these types of requirements in the growing number of joint/combined/coalition operations.

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Chapter 9
Public Affairs

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Introduction:

This chapter focuses on the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Public Affairs (PA) mission to fulfill the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and to help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the Army's readiness to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Public Affairs are critical battlefield functions in the War on Terrorism in today's global environment.

Public Affairs assisted the commander in monitoring and understanding public opinion, explaining the situational context of events and communicating the Army's perspective clearly and accurately. Synchronized, well-planned and actively executed public affairs tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) significantly clear the fog of war and impacted the morale and effectiveness of the force. Public affairs reduced distractions, misinformation, uncertainty, confusion and other factors that cause stress and undermine efficient operations.

Coalition Forces Land Component Command Public Affairs Mission Statement:

"Conduct Public Affairs activities in support of coalition land forces operational objectives to destroy Al Qaida and resisting Taliban forces in order to prevent the re-emergence of transnational terrorist groups, and expand stability operations to support the Interim Authority/Government of Afghanistan in order to establish a safe and secure world environment."

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Topic A: Providing Public Affairs

Observation Synopsis: The Coalition Forces Land Component story was told, with varying degrees of success, to audiences, both internal (U.S. military, allied military and civilians) and external (U.S. citizens at home and the international civilian community). The objective of the Public Affairs (PA) information campaign was to tell the story of the forces fighting the war on Terrorism to targeted internal and external audiences. It is important that commanders understand the direct correlation between media coverage and the confidence of key audiences in the U.S. Military Services. There are some issues that are more challenging than others to discuss with the media. One of the greatest challenges to deal with is that of casualties, both friendly fire and civilian. While these casualties are never easy to address it is important that commanders, while expressing sincere regret for loss of life, facilitate timely and accurate media coverage.

Internal Communication: Forward deployed PA elements wrote stories and took photographs then send them back to CFLCC-command information for review/editing and marketing. The CFLCC Command Information (CI) NCO edited the stories and then forwards to CENTCOM PA, ARCENT Atlanta PA and various outlets (such as ARNEWS) for marketing. The CI effort for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was slow to start for several reasons, but has steadily improved. Some of the challenges at the beginning included:

- (1) Few public affairs assets forward (problems with getting transportation priority for PA assets),
- (2) Lack of communications (email) prevented filing of stories, and
- (3) Forward PA personnel had to set up operations in very austere situations, and
- (4) PA assets at times were completely devoted to media escort.

External: Since the transition to an active posture, the main effort for PA in Afghanistan has been media facilitation. The goal was to accommodate all media desiring access to troops and operations within the confines of operational security. Any national media representative (NMR) wishing to spend the night was able to do so. Conditions were extremely austere but the basic necessities were available. PA also facilitated unilateral media that showed up at the gate on a daily basis. The CFLCC PA staff escorted media in and out of Afghanistan on military aircraft originating from and terminating in Kuwait. Basically, the media flew into Kuwait commercially and were transported in and out of the theater by military aircraft.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Internal and external audiences want to know what is happening and why.
- Media will be there!
- The vast majority of both civilian and military media representatives were committed to providing responsible, accurate and balanced coverage.

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Observation Synopsis: The relationships between the public affairs officers and their commanders were outstanding. Commanders depended upon their PAOs to advise them and consequently the PAOs had direct access to the commanders and were deeply involved in the planning process.

Commanders in the AOR recognized that effective public affairs operations are critical to successful Army operations. PAOs contributed to wargaming and mission analysis. The Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and CFLCC-FWD PAOs were standing members of the Operational Planning Group (OPG), the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) and were involved in all aspects of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

The PAOs also:

- Assisted with the numerous Congressional delegation visits
- Prepared commanders and subject matter experts for press briefings
- Provided media analysis
- Conducted command information program
- Advised the commanders and staff about the impact of media coverage upon media operations
- Advised the commanders and staff how military operations would be perceived and covered by the media and interpreted by the public
- Supervised the Coalition Public Information Center
- Provided the media access and facilitated the completion /filing of their stories
- Coordinated and synchronized operations and information with higher and lower headquarters

CFLCC PAO has unlimited access to the CFLCC command group. Commanders at forward locations relied heavily on and were pleased with the efforts of their PAOs.

Key Lessons Learned:

- It was very effective for the PAO to play an integral role in the MDMP, key working groups, wargaming and mission analysis

Observation Synopsis: There was insufficient published Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and it was often reactionary rather than proactive. PAG should be prepared and approved as early as possible. Anticipating the need for specific PAG and developing drafts ahead of time can accomplish this. Leaders generally understand the need for timely approval of PAG but with the many competing priorities higher headquarters must place a priority upon quick approval and turn around of proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG).

The PAG issued for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) pertaining to operations in Afghanistan was incremental and reactive. Initial PAG was restrictive and passive due to host nation sensitivities and limitations, restrictions on covering special operations, operational

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security and hesitation on the part of the higher headquarters to empower subordinate units to speak. When the posture changed from passive to active it was difficult to catch up and then get out in front of the media. PAG submitted by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to higher headquarters was routinely bogged down in the approval process and on occasion was overcome by events. On several occasions, the CFLCC went directly to OSD at the last minute. Reactive PAG (such as that concerning detainee operations) was useful, but often came too late. PAG for Operation Anaconda was done at the tactical level and worked well.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Initial PAG should be prepared as early as possible
- PA posture should be "active" whenever operational security and force protection permit
- Higher headquarters needs to be responsive in approving (PPAG)
- Restrictive PAG increases chances of inaccurate and frustrated reporting, causes speculation and limits the ability to tell the story

Observation Synopsis: The correct public affairs (PA) units must be deployed to support theater media and command information operations. It is recommended that warfighting headquarters deploy with sufficient organic public affairs assets and equipment. Imperative also is the selection of the appropriate supporting PA unit to augment them. The Press Camp Headquarters (PCH) was not the correct public affairs unit for the required mission and organic public affairs assets with deployed units were inadequate. A mobile Public Affairs Detachment is the correct PA unit to support this type/scope mission.

Battlefield commanders have two sources of tactical and operation public affairs support. The first is the PA section organic to the warfighting headquarters. The second is a PA unit attached to augment the commands PA capability. In the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) area of Responsibility (AOR) the organic PA assets that accompanied the deployed units were inadequate to meet the demands. This was due in part to the restrictive "footprint" that limited the total number of personnel who could deploy.

Conducting PA planning, facilitating the media, researching and providing information, executing PA training, and other related support operations is manpower intensive and requires specific training and equipment. It is important to select and deploy the correct unit for the mission.

A Press Camp Headquarters was not the appropriate unit but they miraculously rose to the occasion. The PA unit designed, staffed and equipped for this mission is a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD). When the PCH was alerted for deployment there was an expectation, based upon plans at the time, that a large theater media center would be required. Unfortunately, the PCH was erroneously placed on the Time phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to report to Kuwait, CFLCC Headquarters, before the mission had fully developed and before they were needed. There is no explanation for how this error occurred but with eleven days notice the PCH rallied, prepared and deployed into the theater. Real world operations

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required that the PCH be split into smaller elements and deployed to multiple locations. A PCH is not designed or equipped to be split up and work in four different locations, as they were required to do. The PCH did a great job despite the lack of personnel and resources and a mission that was not theirs.

The CFLCC had also requested an MPAD to perform inner-theater Public and Command Information missions. This request was denied based on the deployment of the PCH. The MPAD skills, staffing and equipment would have provided untold capability. However, with support from deployed HQ CFLCC PA staff and creative employment of the PCH, required public affairs missions were accomplished. The Command Information mission would have been better if the appropriate PA units had deployed.

Public Affairs assets available in theater during the Operation Enduring Freedom missions in Afghanistan were:

- A Press Camp headquarters – dispersed throughout the theatre from Kandahar, Bagram, Kabul and at times Mazar-e-Sharif (MES)
- A Public Affairs Detachment (PAD) – was based out of K2, also worked in MES and Bagram; rotated back to the states
- Task Force Mtn PAO – based out of Bagram
- Task Force Rakkasan PAO – base at Kandahar, subordinate to Task Force Mtn PAO
- JSOTF PAO – based out of K2 and had Navy representation at Kandahar

Key Lessons Learned:

- The warfighting headquarters must bring sufficient organic public affairs assets to perform the basic PA missions
- Selection and deployment of the appropriate public affairs unit, with the suitable personnel and equipment is imperative
- The correct unit to deploy with the Task Force was a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)
- Deployed public affairs assets were successful in accomplishing their mission even though they were understaffed and inappropriately employed but at a significant cost to the deployed command, the higher headquarters and the individual deployed PA personnel
- The PAD redeployed too early because they did not anticipate further missions bringing large numbers of media back into the AOR

Observation Synopsis: The public Affairs Officer was a member of the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) and had excellent coordination with the IOWG

The IOWG provided a forum for managers of information to plan, coordinate, and execute IO events. The Coalition Forces Land Component command (CFLCC) public affairs officer attends weekly Information Operations Working Group meeting to help synchronize missions with the CFLCC objectives. The PA gathered, coordinated and disseminated information with and from other members of the working group. Lower echelon PAOs at the

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subordinate Task Force levels were also members of their unit IOWG and contributed significantly to the planning and execution of overall information operations. Working groups and other IO meetings provided a situational awareness through the information provided by maneuver and support units.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Public affairs officers were active members of the Information Operations Working Group and provided important information to coordinate the IO campaign
- Public affairs operations contribute many products in the execution of the IO campaign

Observation Synopsis: Most of the Public Affairs personnel were adequately trained. However, the writing and photographic skills of some of the journalists were weak and some of the officers were not familiar with doctrinal tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). PA Unit commanders did ensure necessary professional references were available. On-the-job mentoring and supplemental training is critical to mission success.

Experience and training levels of deployed PA personnel varied widely. This was particularly true in the Reserve Component where some RC PAOs work in public relations jobs in their civilian careers and others have little or no experience. In the active component, the situation has improved with the implementation of OPMS 21 and early CFD, but we still have officers going into critical PAO positions with little or no experience. Training continued while performing PA missions through mentoring and on-the-job training.

Key Lessons Learned:

- There will be varying degrees of competence and experience
- On-the-job training and mentoring is valuable

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Topic B: Media Operations/ Public Information

Observation Synopsis: Getting media into the theater was a challenge because of the limited space on aircraft, competition with higher priority passengers and equipment, and absence of available commercial conveyance. All traveling personnel are provided transportation on a space available basis. Media should be placed on the waiting list as soon as they arrive at the transient point between commercial and military air transportation. If there is an impending significant event or operation and media must be moved immediately to the site to accompany the forces, it is recommended that the appropriate command representative "block" space on the aircraft.

It was difficult to transport media into the AOR. In the early stages of military operations in Afghanistan it was particularly difficult. While it is was not quite as difficult in the latter phases of operations the challenge still remained. On many occasions there were significant events that warranted coverage but the media could not get there. If media cannot get into the area of operations in a timely manner the story cannot be told and we cannot meet our obligation to keep the American people informed.

Key Lessons Learned:

- The public affairs staff and commanders had to be actively involved to ensure travel into the AOR was approved and made available
- Use of military aircraft to get into the theater is a must in an austere environment when there is no commercial transportation available
- To ensure media access to cover US Forces we must facilitate timely transportation into and around the theater.

Observation Synopsis: Media access was a success story. Commanders facilitated unprecedented access. This access to soldiers and ongoing operations resulted in outstanding and detailed coverage by print and broadcast journalists. The goal in granting access should be "maximum access with minimum delay" while safeguarding operational security and force protection. Embed media in units whenever possible. This is the best way to facilitate access.

Media access was very slow and limited in the beginning of operations. This was the case for many reasons. When U.S. forces were located in Uzbekistan, host nation sensitivities prohibited any media coverage of operations and units there. Additionally, when conventional forces were working with Special Forces units there was no media access permitted.

Once located in Afghanistan, Command guidance was to allow maximum access without compromising operational security and force protection. In varying degree, commanders at all echelons allowed access for the media to talk to their soldiers. Some were more accommodating than others. Some were more prepared and experienced than others. But overall access was

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very good. One commander said that when he allowed his soldiers to talk, the truth was told and reporters "got it right." The media preferred to talk to soldiers, airmen and marines who were really participating in the operations rather than the public affairs spokesperson. This access also gave audiences the opportunity to see the situation through the eyes of those living it.

Media access to combat operations was particularly successful and the result was an accurate and realistic story of war and its consequences. Media that were embedded with units provided unprecedented coverage. Thousands of newspaper headlines, broadcast leads, magazine covers and lead articles vividly told the stories. Americans were interested and wanted to know what was happening. The accurate reports bolstered their confidence in the capability of their armed forces.

"Working with the media is one of the most important things I do."

Major General, Task Force Mountain Commander

There were two specific areas where media access or lack thereof became an issue. Those areas were media access to cover U.S. casualties and detainees.

CASUALTIES There was no access granted to photograph U.S. casualties. Commanders on the ground made decisions concerning media access to photograph wounded or killed service members. Their decisions were universally very conservative. On one occasion, the media at Camp Rhino were actually secured inside so that they could not take photos of injured or killed service members. As always, there was a delicate balance to be achieved between the concerns for the family, respect for the individual and the need to inform the American people of the brutal reality of combat. When commanders allowed casualties (wounded) to be photographed it was from a distance and angle that did not show the service members face until next of kin had been identified. The flag draped coffins were the symbolic photographs of the killed in action.

AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES The Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) pertaining to the detainees dictated extremely restrictive coverage. The supplemental PAG did not permit photos or any coverage of detainees when in transit. Because there was no proactive/preemptive release of information or photos there was a void that resulted in inaccurate interpretation and reporting. When the first detainees were to be moved the forward deployed public affairs team was prepared to release photos and information to ensure the media had an accurate understanding of why the detainees were handled, dressed, controlled and moved as they were. However, they were denied permission to do so. As a result, the first pictures of the detainees were grossly misinterpreted and the public was misinformed or misled. It is always easier to be out in front and preemptive rather than being required to clean up the battlefield after the fact.


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Key Lessons Learned:

- When media were provided access the accurate story was reported
- Host nation sensitivities may limit media access
- There is extremely limited media access to Special Operations forces and missions
- When media were not provided with information the result was speculation, misinformation and inaccuracy
- When commanders were negative and restrictive the strained relationship lead to less favorable reporting and frustration
- Some commanders still have a distrust of the media and are hesitant to allow access

OBSERVATION SYNOPSIS: Public Affairs Officers and Commanders minimize potential compromises in operational security and force protection through the development and enforcement of media ground rules. Appropriate ground rules were established in Afghanistan that governed the conduct of news gathering and the release and/or use of specified information.

Public Affairs Officers (PAO) and the commanders safeguarded sensitive information that could jeopardize the successful outcome of the mission or endanger the lives of soldiers while complying with the DOD Principles of Information by strictly enforcing the ground rules. The penalty for violating grounds rules was loss of access to U.S. troops and facilities. DoD and the Combined CFLCC both developed Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and each forward location created additional ground rules specific to their locations and operations.



Task Force Mountain Public Affairs Officer discussed ground rules with the media before a press briefing

The most significant ground rule was absolutely no Special Operating Forces (SOF) coverage without CENTCOM approval. Also, the detainee photograph and interview ground rules were significant. A few reporters attempted to circumvent both of these ground rules but only two were denied access for violations.

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Key Lessons Learned:

- Media ground rules prevented compromises in OPSEC and Force Protection
- Ground rules change as the mission dictates or as operations move through different phases

Observation Synopsis: News media coverage greatly influences the perceptions of soldiers, family members, the domestic and international publics and political leaders. There is a direct correlation between media coverage and the confidence of key audiences in US military services. The majority of the Operation Enduring Freedom media coverage has been extremely balanced and accurate.



TIME Magazine, 18 March 2002, devoted much of the issue to the War on Terrorism. The lead story was a detailed account of the Operation Anaconda that included descriptions, maps, timelines and photos that accurately told the story so everyone could understand it.

The overall professionalism and character of the media was excellent. This can be attributed to giving the media access and allowing them to stay with the troops so they gain an appreciation and understanding for what we are doing (context). Martha Radditz from National Public Radio put it best... "Grant me access and I'm a lap dog. Deny me access and I'm an attack dog." The media proved they could be trusted not to compromise operational security or force protection and to embargo sensitive information until after an operation. For example, many members of the media, particularly those who were embedded were aware of Operation Anaconda from its conception yet did not divulge any information inappropriately. Almost all media abided by the ground rules and only two were expelled and denied further access.

The primary method/venue used to successfully tell the story to both internal and external audiences was media facilitation (escorts, embeds, phone interviews, briefings, responses to query (RTQ), hometown news releases, command information and marketing of internal stories and the Internet. There were also successes marketing internal products through the American Embassy in Kuwait to target Arab/Muslim outlets.

Twenty to 100 media representatives covered theater operations on a daily basis. There were media representatives from most major U.S. national press (CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX, CNN, MSNBC, Newsweek, Time, U.S. News and World Report, WSJ, USA Today, New York Times, L.A. Times, Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, Associated Press, Newhouse News Service,

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National Public Radio), many regional and local organizations covering specific units, a wide variety of international media (Reuters, BBC, AFP, APTV, Al Jazeera, Pakistan News Agency, Russian News Agency, Voice of America, variety of German and Canadian press), and several miscellaneous media (Hustler, Gear Magazine, VH1, Discovery Channel, Esquire).



Karzai, interim leader of Afghanistan and
MG Hagenback, Commander, Task Force Mountain

While the majority of the coverage was accurate and balanced, the coverage of civilian casualties became an issue. It is inevitable that when war is fought in any country, no matter how careful targeting may be, that there will be civilian casualties. An overarching theme was that forces were doing all within their power to preclude civilian casualties and when they did occur the message was one of condolence. A perception exists that civilian casualties can be avoided by the correct use of precision and “smart” munitions. This made the understanding and acceptance of civilian casualties extremely difficult. There is a belief that we can fight a war and only kill the bad guys.

Key Lessons Learned:

- When media are provided access to commanders, subject matter experts and troops the cover will be balanced, accurate, informative and interesting
- Reporting on civilian casualties is necessary

Observation Synopsis: Media access and reporting on Special Operations Forces, even though limited, was unprecedented and told a very important but little understood story. For the first time, media were actually embedded on at least six missions. The glimpse into the necessarily private world of Special Mission Forces provided valuable insight to the American people and garnered new support for their important role.

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When reporting on Special Operations the media were not permitted to release operational details in order to protect certain capabilities, identities and units in order to maintain maximize operational flexibility. However, limited coverage of Special operating forces demonstrated the bravery, courage, professionalism and skill of these unique forces.

Media representatives were very positive about their unprecedented access to some Special Forces Operations. But they expressed their concern that the Department of Defense demonstrated favoritism by hand-picking the media representatives to go on the missions.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Special operations can be covered without jeopardizing operational security
- The American people gained an understanding of the importance of the special mission forces they never had before

Observation Synopsis: The embedding of individual members of the media during Operation Enduring Freedom Missions in Afghanistan was an extremely effective way to facilitate access and accurate reporting. Embedding media in units was an excellent means to ensure access and resulted in accurate, detailed and timely coverage of events. Media were embedded not only to accompany units on operations but also to gain a better understanding of the unit's mission, personnel and routine.

Embedded media work, eat and live with the unit. Therefore, those who may not have known much about the Army, except from an intellectual level, gained a firsthand operational understanding and were able to accurately explain/report what was happening on the ground.

Commanders expressed their satisfaction with embedded media and most said they "would never go on another mission without embedding media". The fact that media were embedded gave them direct access, on an ongoing basis, to the unit's leaders and soldiers. This was a success and never resulted in the divulging of classified or sensitive information that jeopardized operational security or force protection. As a matter of fact, the media were aware of Operation Anaconda from the onset of planning and they did not compromise the mission in anyway.

Due in large part to the fact that media were embedded and that six pooled to actually accompany the units on Operation Anaconda, the reporting was incredibly descriptive, detailed and accurate. The graphics, timelines, photos and narrative descriptions were extraordinary.

"I will never go on another mission without embedded media."

Colonel, Task Force Rakkasan Commander

Key Lessons Learned:

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- Embedded media gain a much better understanding of the unit and their missions when they are embedded with the unit.
- Access is much greater and easier for embedded media
- Embedded media, through their detailed understanding of a unit, report more accurately and descriptively
- Both the media and the units reap positive benefit from embedding
- Prior to actual deployments units should train and participate in exercises with embedded media as part of the scenario
- Commanders, from the onset, plan for embedded media

Observation Synopsis: Doctrine and policy dictate that media be pooled only as a last resort when limited by complex combat missions and available space on military aircraft and vehicles. This was the case in Afghanistan. Media were seldom pooled during military missions. Because media were embedded and allowed access to events as they unfolded there was little usefulness or need to pool media. However, on a few occasions it was necessary to pool media because of logistical or transportation restraints. Combat and cave exploitation missions are examples of those events which sometimes required pooling.

The telling photos, videos and stories prepared by the pooled media on the Anaconda missions were shared with other media.



Photo taken by Warren Zinn – US Army Pool, GETTY

When covering the actual execution of Operation Anaconda combat missions it was necessary to create a pool from the already embedded media. (Embedded media should be provided the first opportunity to be a part of the pool rather than bringing media into theater as part of a pool.)

The commander determined that six media could go on the mission. It is normal practice for the media to, amongst themselves, select the pool representatives. However, in this case the Task Force commander selected three of six members of the pool based upon their long and continuous coverage of the unit. The media representatives chose the other three. The office of

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the Assistance Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs intervened and required the theater pool to share products with all national and international media

Observation Synopsis: Press briefings are scheduled and conducted to facilitate accurate reporting, provide access and reinforce themes and messages. These crucial press briefings were conducted during all phases of the Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan. It is important that commanders and subject matter experts are trained and prepared to successfully participate in press briefings. Commanders, soldiers and public Affairs officers (PAO) were well prepared. Press Briefings were professional, informative and timely.

Commanders and subject matter experts willingly participated and media were generally satisfied with the content and flow of information. The public affairs staff provided training, developed messages, recommended an opening statement and provided anticipated questions and answers.



British Commander talking with the media during
a press briefing in Bagram, Afghanistan

Key Lessons Learned:

- Well prepared commanders presented a much better press briefing
- Recommended themes and messages help all to speak with one voice and sync with higher and lower headquarters
- Press briefings provide factual information and allow media representatives to ask questions and get clarification

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Observation Synopsis: It became necessary to rapidly shift and augment public affairs assets from one location to the next as the mission changed. PA assets must develop and maintain this flexible capability to accommodate access and accurate coverage.

Media interest was the most intense at the onset of an operation. As missions changed so did the media interest. When interest and locations changed there was a need to move public affairs assets to accommodate media operations. The forward deployed PA assets developed this capability despite extremely limited personnel, transportation and equipment. Through creative planning and use of available resources combined with the Task Force Commander's emphasis, it was possible to redistribute public affairs assets and the media. However, the shift did not always occur as quickly as the mission required. An example of a necessary shift of PA assets was when operation Anaconda was taking place and large numbers of media wanted to be located at bases where the forces were staging, departing and returning. The volume of media and the complex intensity of the operation required a shift in assets within the AOR and augmentation personnel from the higher headquarters PA staff, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Public Affairs.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Media interest and requirements will change as the mission changes
- Media interest and volume will ebb and wane as the intensity of the ongoing operations increases and decreases
- There must be a preexisting plan to shift assets as the mission dictates
- There must be an ability to get the PA assets and media to different locations in a timely manner

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Chapter 9

Public Affairs

Topic C: Command/ Internal Information

Observation Synopsis: There were many methods used to produce and disseminate the Army Story through the Command Information (CI) Program. The Public Affairs (PA) assets organic to the units produced command Information (CI) products, the Press Camp Headquarters, the Public Affairs Detachment and HQ Coalition Forces Land Component Command PA personnel. The CI products were slow to begin and limited in scope and volume because of the requirement to facilitate the large number of media in the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The military journalists in Afghanistan produced news stories with photos, and stand-alone photos, as well as serving as media escorts. They sent their stories and photos by e-mail to the copy editor to be further edited and marketed by PA soldiers in Kuwait. Articles were edited and packaged prior to being sent to CENTCOM-PAO to be cleared. Another copy was sent to ARCENT-PAO in Atlanta. Once the products are cleared, CENTCOM and ARCENT marketed the stories to many other places, including Army or DoD web sites, such as the Army home page, and the Operation Enduring Freedom and the Defend America web sites and ARNEWS/ArmyLink.

The news stories and photos were also sent to the appropriate post newspapers and Army magazines, such as Soldiers, Army Reserve, National Guard, armor, aviation, logistics, and other branch magazines as appropriate. The stories and photos were also sent to local newspapers near the home posts of units in the news, and to soldiers' hometown newspapers, when that information was available. The intent was to tell the Army story, in both words and photographs, in a positive light, in as many publications, in as many places, as possible.

News stories were written in Microsoft Word. The original raw, or TIFF, files of photos were copied onto CDs, without being cropped, color-corrected, or altered in any way. High-resolution copies of the same photos, but in JPEG format, were also written onto CDs. Stories and photos were treated as national, historical records and were placed into Army and DoD imagery collection agencies and will eventually be put into the National Archives.

Also, the Desert Voice is a weekly newsmagazine published by the PAD for soldiers in Kuwait.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Trained PA assets (military journalists) must be available to produce command information products
- PAOs must market and follow-up with HQDA to ensure use of availability of submitted products

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Observation Synopsis: The There was no Public Affairs Plan provided by CENTCOM. The only plans published were prepared by the CFLCC and the forward deployed PAOs. The plan for a synergistic PA Information Campaign must be worked and supported at all echelons of command. An overarching Public Affairs Campaign plan should be prepared in the planning phase and supplemental plans prepared for each phase of the operation.

The CFLCC in Kuwait and forward PAOs produced plans as they were needed. On occasion, plans were produced independently that were not approved by higher headquarters. The plan developed for the "Completion of Operation Anaconda" was excellent.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Development and execution of PA Information Campaign Plans are key to a synchronized effort
- PA Plans provide pertinent themes, messages and facts
- Plans help prevent speculation and misinformation
- Speaking with one voice is important for credibility

Observation Synopsis: Army web sites, newspapers and magazines, as well as radio and TV, were used to provide information to target audiences. Specifically for web sites, the Army home page, the Operation Enduring Freedom site, the Defend America site, and ArmyLink, as well as the CENTCOM and ARCENT web sites all displayed news stories and photos of deployed units and individuals. As for newspapers and magazines, major Army publications such as Soldiers Magazine, the Army Reserve magazine, the National Guard magazine, and branch magazines, such as armor, infantry, aviation, logistics, etc., were targeted as well as Army newspapers, such as post newspapers and Army Reserve Regional Support Command newspapers.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Command Information Products must be aggressively marketed
- Use all available tools to reach a large number of the targeted population
- There must be a process to ensure that command information is being "pushed" to all deployed personnel. The Desert Voice, a weekly magazine published by the 4th PAD at Camp Doha, provided command information for soldiers in Kuwait. A new publication, the Afghanistan Observation Post, published by CKTF Mountain, provided command information for soldiers in Afghanistan. The publications are set out in heavily-used common areas where soldiers are likely to find them. Also where available use of email is common as well as public folders on the email systems.
- Families of the deployed units are kept informed best through post newspapers, web sites and family readiness group activities at the respective posts.

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Observation Synopsis: Command Information is the responsibility of all PA personnel but due to their limited number and the taxing demand of large-scale media operations the PA assets in theater spent most of their time facilitating the media. It is important that a plan be developed and executed which ensures the production of command information products. Time must be managed so that all journalists may be required to write and/or produce command information products.

Available military journalists were used for two purposes: to escort media representatives throughout the theater and from Kuwait to Afghanistan; and to produce news stories and photographs, or, in the case of broadcasters, to record the news on videotape for broadcast. The journalists did not produce a newspaper or magazine. Instead, they sent news stories and photos to Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) who then forwarded the products to CENTCOM-PAO and ARCENT-PAO, and sometimes other places, for distribution and marketing. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) supported command information by providing satellite radio and television service to forward locations. It has been a challenge to get broadcast stories produced in Afghanistan back to AFRTS to air.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Even though they are not more important, media operations, by their nature and presence, demand and get more attention than command information when there are limited PA assets
- Poor communication assets inhibit the transmission of command information
- Public Affairs Officers must make sure journalists have time to work on command information products
- The chain of command continues to be the primary means of disseminating command information
- Field newspapers are valuable tools for command information but the assets were not available to dedicate to producing one

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Chapter 9

Public Affairs

Topic D: Public Affairs Logistics and Technology

Observation Synopsis: The Public Affairs (PA) mission cannot be accomplished without sufficient communication equipment. Prior to deployments, PA units must assess the environment of the Area of Operations (AOR) and acquire the necessary equipment. PA units must have the capability to rapidly transmit information. This can be accomplished by leveraging available technology. There was insufficient reliable communication equipment to transmit information in a timely manner. Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment documents should include satellite capable, stand alone computers that work as phone, fax, and will link to anywhere in the world, even the most remote location. The dependence upon phone lines for internet access results in unreliable and extremely slow communications. Satellite capability provides timely and dependable access.

Afghanistan is an austere environment with limited viable communication capability. It was several months before the Army had connectivity with some of the sites and most still only have sporadic telephone and computer connectivity. There was also very limited capability to send material electronically because most of the lines were Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) rather than Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPRT), therefore, non-classified material could not be sent through secure lines. There were also frequent requirements for the forward deployed PA staff to send information products to Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Central Command (CENTCOM), Department of the Army (DA), and Department of Defense (DoD). Without the availability of technologically advanced and reliable communications equipment it was impossible to comply in a timely manner. Using the available systems and phone lines it took 3-5 minutes to transfer and send a photograph through the internet. The media, using current technology could send the same photo in a fraction of that time via satellite equipment.


Key Lessons Learned:

- In an austere, immature theater there is always a lack of reliable communications capability and competition with the other battle staffs for the resources.
- There is a need to send photos, stories and videos to locations around the world.
- The lack of appropriate phones and computer connectivity impacts negatively on the mission to tell the Coalition/Joint/Army story in the fight against terrorism.
- There is a need for satellite capable, stand alone computers that work as phone, fax, and will link to anywhere in the world

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Soldier uses stand alone satellite computer system that gives him the capability to call, fax and use the internet anywhere in the world. Photos and documents can be transmitted rapidly from the most isolated locations.



Observation Synopsis: A standard package with the necessary equipment to conduct successful public affairs and media operations was unavailable. Commanders need and expect their organic and augmentation public affairs assets to hit the ground ready to operate.

There was an expectation that the PA staff would come prepared to perform their mission and, like other staff sections, come with the mission essential equipment. When the Task Force arrived in Afghanistan media were already there but there were insufficient PA personnel and equipment to adequately facilitate media coverage. The large number of media required a more robust PA staff and much of the basic equipment required to support them was unavailable.

Different PA units have different authorized equipment based upon their (Mobilization Table of Equipment (MTOE). An organic, standardized, pre-packaged and containerized "kit" of essential public affairs equipment should be sent with the earliest deploying PA assets so that there can be immediate media facilitation and Command Information. The public affairs media operations kit should include:

- satellite capable, stand alone computers that work as phone, fax, and will link to anywhere in the world, even the most remote locations
- copier
- generator
- two media tents

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- ten phone devices
- one production suite for editing and producing video products
- one digital video camera for taping press conferences and for media training
- five lap top computers
- two quality digital cameras for command information

Key Lessons Learned:

- The Mobilization Table of Equipment (MTOE) for the organic public affairs is inadequate. Critical pieces of equipment are not resourced
- The Public Affairs (PA) augmentee units seldom have the required equipment to set up and operate a Coalition Public Information Center (CPIC)
- In an austere, immature theater it is not possible to purchase the equipment needed on the local economy
- PA units must arrive with a complete package of equipment and be ready to operate immediately

Observation Synopsis: There were outstanding Coalition Public Information Centers (CPIC) in Bagram and Kandahar despite the austere environment and lack of equipment. A CPIC is the hub for all media activity and synchronizes information, access, information and support. Units must develop a plan to staff, equip and operate a CPIC.

A single Coalition Public Information Center (CPIC) or Media Operations Center was not established. CENTCOM had plans to set up two theater level information bureaus but they never materialized. It was to be staffed with a Press Camp Headquarters (PCH). The Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planned to establish one in Kuwait and then one in Qatar, but host-nation sensitivities in both these countries made this infeasible. One of the problems with establishing a theater level information bureau in Afghanistan was that there were no commercial airports for the journalists to fly into. Coalition Public Information Centers (CPIC) were established at Bagram and Kandahar. The CPIC at Kandahar was the primary location until Task Force Mountain arrived at Bagram to establish the CFLCC-FWD headquarters and conduct Operation Anaconda. Bagram then became the focal point. Kuwait became the central location from which media were brought into country. The CFLCC PAO coordinated and escorted journalists flying commercially into Kuwait City to the CPICs in Bagram or Kandahar via military air. The commander of the CPIC in Kandahar was the PCH Commander. He was supported by elements of his PCH. He was also the TF Rakkasan PAO. A major from the CFLCC and elements of the PCH manned the CPIC in Bagram. The director of the Bagram CPIC was subordinate to the Task Force Mountain PAO. CFLCC maintained the flexibility to surge personnel to various locations based on the situation.

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Key Lessons Learned:

- Missions and geographically dispersed units may require setting up multiple Media Operations Centers or Coalition Public Information Centers
- Public affairs assets must be able to shift as the mission dictates embedding media is the most efficient and effective way to ensure access and get the media to “the fight” or along on the mission
- The CPIC needs the capability to communicate to anywhere from anywhere in the world.

Observation Synopsis: There were not enough vehicles to transport media and support PA Operations. When the media cannot get to required locations they cannot cover the operation. PA vehicles should be classified as mission essential, acquired and dedicated for PA missions. If sufficient organic vehicular support is unavailable, leased vehicles are an option.

Ground Transportation assets in the theater were extremely limited. The PA units did not have organic vehicles to transport media and supplies. Because of the requirement to fly all resources into the theater PA vehicles were often “bumped” by equipment and vehicles deemed to be a higher priority.

There were also very limited numbers of leased vehicles available because they do not exist in Afghanistan in significant numbers. PA staff had to depend largely upon borrowed vehicles with undependable availability.

Key Lessons Learned:

- Vehicles are needed to ensure media get to locations to cover events and operations.
- High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWV) and Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV) were best suited for the rough terrain and poor roads.

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Chapter 9

Public Affairs

Annex A: Coalition Task Force Afghanistan Annex F

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Coalition Joint Task Force-Afghanistan
Bagram, Afghanistan
201930Z Feb 02

(U) ANNEX F (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO CTF-AFGHANISTAN OPOD OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM

(U) REFERENCES:

- a. Joint Pub 3.61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, 14 May 1997.
- b. SecDef Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) Casualty and Mortuary Affairs—Operation Enduring Freedom, 012100Z Nov 01.
- c. SecDef Consolidated Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for News Media Coverage of Operation Enduring Freedom, 072020Z Dec 01.
- d. CFLCC-PAO Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) Establishment of Detainee Holding Facilities 111112Z Dec 01.
- e. SecDef Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for Operations Friendship's Gate (Mazer-E Sharif) and Friendship's Door (Bagram), 201915Z Dec 01.
- f. SecDef Msg 302330Z Nov 01 Any servicemember email.
- g. Frago 2 to CFLCC OPOD 02-018 Establishment of CTF Afghanistan 130016Z Feb 02.

1. (U) Situation:

a. (U) General. World attention focuses on Afghanistan AO as US and coalition forces continue to combat Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan to ensure homeland security.

b. (U) Friendly Forces:

(1) (U) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, (OASD –PA).

(a) Provides PAG.

(b) Retains release authority for all U.S. specific matters related to this operation.

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- (c) Supports/conducts regular press briefings.
- (2) (U) HQ CENTCOM PA. McDill, AFB, Fla.
 - (a) Informs internal military audiences by providing coverage of joint operations.
 - (b) Validates PA manning requirements. Tasks services to fill valid requirement.
 - (c) Issues news releases on all casualties; post these releases on the CENTCOM website: <http://www.centcom.mil/default.asp>.
- (3) CFLCC PAO. Camp Doha, Kuwait.
 - (a) (U) Combined Forces Land Component PAO continues as our higher HQ PAO and all operational releases/events will be sent to CFLCC-PAO.
 - (b) (U) Until CTF-AF PAO certifies they are fully operational, CFLCC-PAO retains full C2 of PAO assets in the Afghanistan AO and all reports will continue to be sent there.
 - (c) (U) Provides policy guidance and changes to approved PA guidance to CTF-Afghanistan Commander.
 - (d) (U) Coordinates manpower augmentation for CTF-Afghanistan PAO.
- (4) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) PAO.
- (5) (U) Joint Coalition Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) PAO, Kabul, AFG.
- (6) (U) US State Department PAOs in US Embassies in Afghanistan AOI.
- c. (U) Attachments and Detachments:
 - (1) 314th Press Camp Headquarters.
- d. (U) Unfriendly Forces:
 - (1) (U) Governments and forces opposed to operations.
 - (2) (U) Media opposed to operations.
 - (a) TBD
 - (b) TBD

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e. (U) Assumptions:

(1) DELETED

(2) (U) The following events will generate national and international media interest during any U.S. action in the Afghanistan area of operations:

(a) (U) Confrontations with opposing forces, up to and including actual combat operations.

(b) (U) U.S. casualties.

(c) (U) Mistaken targetry/civilian casualties.

(d) (U) Follow-on movements and deployments.

(3) (U) US and international media will

(a) Be in the AOR before, during and after all operations.

(b) Want to embed with deploying forces.

(c) Play a significant role in shaping U.S. and international audience attitudes to conflict/crisis.

(d) May possess and use communications equipment capable of providing live Internet, TV and Radio broadcasts from remote locations under very austere conditions.

(4) (U) Local and regional news media vicinity home stations will accept and publish almost any stories from the Afghanistan AOR.

(5) (U) Deployed forces will need CI products to keep informed of happenings both in theater and on the home front.

(6) (U) Forces and family members remaining at home station will be hungry for any news from the Afghanistan AOR, especially news about their deployed forces.

2. (U) Mission: CTF-AF Public Affairs assumes responsibility for all coalition Public Affairs in the Afghanistan AO on or about 21Feb02 in order to assist in the destruction of Al Qaeda, keep coalition service members and fighters informed, continue public support for OEF, and support the Afghan Interim Authority.

3. (U) Execution.

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a. (U) Intent. We will finish phase III of this operation with a world public that continues to support ongoing combat ops and who understands our genuine HA/CA efforts, a media that generally supports our effort, and that believes we have been as open and truthful as possible, deployed troops who understand their part in this critical operation and who feel in touch with their homes, and our non-deployed forces and family members feel in touch with the deployed troops.

We will do this by a coordinated IO campaign that provides maximum exposure of the great efforts of our coalition soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians to coalition media and by producing stories and photos we exporting to coalition media who can't/aren't in this AO.

Remember that we are a combat multiplier only if we understand and support the strategic and political goals of our CINC.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. CTF-Afghanistan PAO conducts 24-hour ops at CTF-Afghanistan Headquarters, Bagram providing C2 and direction to PA forces in the AO. The 314th PCH operates the CPIC at Bagram and sub-CPICs at locations (Kandahar, Kabul, MES, and K2) that support the CINC's IO intent through media facilitation, and, until a PAD arrives in the AO, Command Information support to deployed troops.

c. (U) Execution:

(1) (U) PHASE I: DEPLOYMENT AND BUILDUP:

(a) (U) CTF-Afghanistan PAO establishes 24-hour ops at CTF-AF HQ in Bagram on or about 21Feb02.

(b) (U) Coordinate and provides guidance to subordinate units in Afghanistan AO.

(c) (U) CTF-AF prepares news release for CFLCC to issue announcing formation of CTF-AF to home station and national media.

(2) (U) PHASE II: INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT

(a) (U) Combined Press Information Center operational at Bagram and Sub-CPICs operational where we want the media to go and where we have PAO and CI coverage requirements (currently at Kandahar, Kabul, MES, and K2) NLT 28Feb02.

(3) (U) PHASE III: EXIT AND REDEPLOYMENT:

(a) (U) Plan to support redeployment or withdrawal, as appropriate.

(b) (U) Provide continuity with follow-on PA assets

(c) (U) CENTCOM, FORSCOM, and Reserve PA assets re-deploy on order.

d. (u) Public Affairs tasks.

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- (1) CTF-AF PAO will
 - (a) Coordinate with CFLCC PAO for release of operational information.
 - (b) Provide C2 of OPCON PA assets.
 - (c) Provide guidance and intent from Commander, CTF-AF, to all CTF-AF PA assets.
 - (d) Actively participate in CTF-AF Information Operations planning and execution.
 - (e) Conduct PA planning and analysis for the CTF commander.
 - (f) Accompany the CTF-AF cdr to all his media events.
- (2) (U) The 314th PCH.
 - (a) On order, OPCON to CTF-AF.
 - (b) Operates the Combined Press Information Center, at Bagram in the hangar across from the CTF-AF TOC, to inform internal and external audiences by facilitating media and producing CI products NLT 28Feb02 in order to assist in the destruction of Al Qaeda, keep coalition service members and fighters informed, continue public support for OEF, and support the Afghan Interim Authority.
 - (c) Be technologically capable to serve as the base force to support ARFOR or Joint PA media center operations.
 - (d) Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.
 - (e) Ensure life support and back-up communications are available for media representatives at Bagram, Kandahar, Kabul, and MES.
 - (f) Monitor international and national print news via Internet for analysis and review of external media messages.
 - (g) Upon availability of satellite television, Monitor international and national print news via internet for analysis and review of external media messages.
 - (h) Evaluate and conduct public affairs training programs for the CTF.
 - (i) Operate Sub-CPICs at Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-E-Sharif, and other locations as required to support the IO plan.

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(j) (U) Provide one NCO to 507th CSG at K2 NLT 28 Feb02 in order to provide PA advice to the 507th and JSOTF commanders, CI coverage to the thousands of troops there, and crisis communications capability in case of an incident.

(k) Ground transport personnel, equipment, and media to separate locations in and around the area of operations with organic vehicles.

(l) Respond to media queries.

(m) Continue to actively entice and embed media with CTF-AF forces in order to inform the American public about progress in the war.

(n) (U) Publish CI newspaper at CPIC weekly. Send all papers, on the day of publication, as a PDF file to sub-CPIC to add local information to, print and distribute at their locations. Also send to all other CTF-AF PA personnel, home stations of units mentioned in each issue, CFLCC PAO, US Army Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, and Armed Forces Information Service. As soon as possible, move to a weekly contracted, 8-page tabloid.

(o) Retain release authority for non-operational CTF-AF information.

(p) Send photos and stories to home station PAOs and local and regional newspapers to keep our non-deployed troops, families, and local community members informed.

(q) Prepare and electronically send to HNR HQ at <http://hn.afnews.af.mil/> at least five Hometown News Releases per day in order to keep American public involved with the war effort. See CTF-AF PAO for username, password, and release code.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Basic Command Messages. CTF-PAO will update these as the operation moves from active combat ops to CA/HA centered. So we are ALL on the SAME message, disseminate and use these messages only. Send recommended changes/additions to CTF-AF PAO.

(a) We will continue to find, capture and destroy terrorist cells and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

(b) We are not here to rebuild Afghanistan. We are helping to set the stage and lay the foundation for the Afghan people to affect change within their own country.

(c) Our war is against terrorists—not Islam or the Afghan people.

(d) *Respond to query only.* We have no permanent bases in the CENTCOM AOR. We do have a continuing presence.

(2) (U) Coordination of Release of Information.

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- (a) CFLCC-PAO must clear release of all operational information.
- (b) CPIC commander has release authority for non-operational events: i.e. stories and photos of MPs on guard duty or airmen playing volleyball. CC all releases to CTF-AF PAO and CFLCC-PAO.
- (3) (U) There will be no reporting or photographing SOF forces or equipment.
- (4) (U) There will be no reporting or photographing of detainee operations.
- f. (U) Historical records
 - (a) CPIC will archive, by burning on CD all photos retained—understanding that photographers will shoot many more digital photos than they save—with cutlines embedded into the PhotoShop document: caption, date created, City, country name, byline, and byline title (shooter's unit).
 - (b) CPIC will archive news stories that concern the CTF-Afghanistan AOR from the following media: NY Times, Washington Post, Associated Press, USA Today, and LA Times.
 - (c) All staff and units will keep historical records for after action reports. CTF-Afghanistan PAO will produce weekly CTF-AF history.
- g. (U) Ensure PA efforts equitably represent all Reservists, National Guard troops and Individual Mobilization Augmentees.
- h. (U) Arrangements for news media representatives:
 - (1) Media Registration. CTF-Afghanistan PAO uses established DoD procedures; procedure is to maintain accountability, not accredit. All accredited media must sign ground rules. Intent is to support all bona fide media.
 - (2) Media facilities. ICW unit S-1s, CPIC will provide life support, including chow and sleeping areas, to media representatives consistent with U.S. objectives and operational requirements.
 - (3) Embedded Media.
 - (a) We encourage embedded media, both with deploying units from CONUS and with units in the CTF-AF AO.
 - (b) CENTCOM PAO ICW CFLCC-PAO approves requests for embedded media.
 - (c) Embedded media must sign hold harmless agreement.

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(4) Requirements to facilitate media travel into the theater:

- (a) Obtain Theater Clearance from by the CENTCOM PAO.
- (b) Obtain Country Clearance from specific country teams (US Embassy).
- (c) Media must get their own visas through the host country embassy.

(d) (U) Afghanistan and Kyrgastan are the easiest as is Bahrain when clearances are submitted in a timely fashion. Kuwait, Yemen, and Turkey are possible with appropriate coordination and clearances. Saudi Arabia is very difficult. Due to host nation sensitivities, we cannot bring journalists without visas into, even in transit: Oman, Uzbekistan, Qatar, and UAE. Remember to begin planning as early as possible.

(e) Shots. Inform media traveling to this AO that service members and DA civilians coming to the Afghanistan AO get these immunizations:

(1) Influenza, Tetanus, Yellow Fever, Typhoid, MMR, OPV (Polio), MGC (Meningitis).

(2) Service members and DA Civilians also receive tests for HIV and TB, Cipro to carry in case of exposure to Anthrax and preventative medication for malaria. Also, a DNA sample is taken.

(5) In order to travel in any US vehicle or aircraft, media must have Travel Authorization signed by the CTF-AF Commander.

i. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)—if these happen, wake up the CTF-AF PAO.

- (1) Any CTF-AF casualty or class A accident.
- (2) Any CTF-AF caused civilian casualty.
- (3) Media OPSEC violations.
- (4) Any negative incident between coalition forces and Afghan Interim Administration.

(5) Classified employment of coalition forces observed by media (i.e. the Marine helicopters that departed on a mission in December that we said were "not going anywhere.")

4. (U) Service Support.

- a. CTF-Afghanistan C1 ensures daily delivery of the European *Stars and Stripes* to the

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deployed forces.

b. Any Service Member mail is not authorized to the CTF-AF AOR due to security concerns raised after the Anthrax incidents of Fall 2001. IAW reference f, any service member email is suggested.

c. CTF-AF C4 will provide CPIC 20 cots and a tent/building to bed down visiting media. Media is responsible for their own sleeping gear.

d. CPIC must provide number of media at each base to the base S4 so they can include in headcount for CL I.

e. Generally, media must provide their own Kevlar helmet and body armor, but for specific short-duration missions, CPIC will provide those. Until that gear can arrive at CPIC, CPIC will, with the assistance of CTF-AF PAO, short-term hand receipt that gear from non-deploying service members.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) Command.

(1) The CTF-AF PAO will be located at the CTF-AF HQ at Bagram.

(2) The CPIC will be located at Bagram.

(3) 314th PCH will provide an LNO to CFLCC-PAO at Camp Doha.

b. (U) Signal.

(1) (U) CTF-Afghanistan PAO requires SIPRNET and NIPRNET drops, DSN telephone drop, and AFN feed.

(2) (U) Media will use commercial communications whenever available. When not available, media may use non-classified military communications systems to transmit media reports, contingent with operational situation. Current PAG does not authorize military security review of media reports.

(3) (U) CTF-AF provides satellite television to the CTF-AF PAO and the CPIC.

(4) (U) Key phone numbers:

(a) CENTCOM PAO: 312-651-4190

(b) CFLCC PAO: 318-438-8040/2583

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(c) CTF-Afghanistan PAO: 318-640-1230

(5) (U) Ensure all PA personnel practice OPSEC, including closing classified laptops and covering classified paperwork when journalists are in our work areas.

c. (U) Reports.

(1) (U) CTF-AF PAO sends media analysis, focused on CTF-Afghanistan AOR, to all CTF-Afghanistan commanders and primary staff daily NLT 1100Z (1600 local Uzbekistan time) using Early Bird, JFCOM Media Summary, and surfing of NY Times, Washington Post, CNN, Reuters, Watertown Daily Times, and Syracuse Post-Standard Web pages.

(2) (U) All PA units in CTF-AF AO reports the following to the CTF-PAO daily NLT 1100Z.

- (a) Current Location
- (b) PA personnel by grade and unit
- (c) Status (Green/Amber/Red/Black)
 - (1) Personnel
 - (2) Computers
 - (3) Communications
 - (4) Photographic Equipment
 - (d) CI products in last 24 hours
 - (e) Media
 - (1) Registered
 - (2) Embedded
 - (3) Current queries
 - (4) Current activities
 - (5) PA events planned/projected
 - (6) Analysis of Media reporting and interests
 - (f) VIP Visitation
 - (g) General Remarks

(3) (U) CTF-Afghanistan PAO briefs CTF-Afghanistan Cdr at 1200Z on public affairs issues, i.e. media visits, queries.

(4) (U) CTF-AF PAO provides daily Public Affairs sitrep to CFLCC-PAO NLT 1300Z.

(5) (U) All PA sections report sensitive items inventory complete daily at 0800 (local) and 2000 (local) to the CTF-AF PA SGM.

6. (U) Safety.

a. All PA orders and instructions will include safety for all operations, especially night operations.

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b. Before issuing live ammunition to any PA personnel, and weekly on Saturdays, the highest-ranking PA NCO physically present at each location will review ROE and specific weapons clearing procedures.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

HAGENBECK
Major General

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Annex B: Master Ground Rules

CJTF-Mountain Ground Rules Agreement

1. All interviews will be on the record. Security at the interview source is the policy.
2. At U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a Public Affairs escort will be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements. When escorted, media must remain with military escorts until released and will follow instructions regarding their activities.
3. Media will not carry personal weapons.
4. Under no circumstances will media take photographs or video any detainees or detainee facilities in Afghanistan. No interviews with detainees will be granted.
5. Media will not photograph Special Operations Forces personnel or their equipment.
6. Media will stay in areas as directed by CJTF Public Affairs staff.
7. **The following categories of information are not releasable since their publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:**
 - a. For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, equipment or critical supplies (e.g. artillery, tanks, landing craft, radars, trucks, water, etc.).
 - b. Names of military installations or specific geographic locations of military units in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, unless specifically released by the Department of Defense.
 - c. Information regarding future operations, current operations or strikes including postponed or cancelled operations.
 - d. Information regarding security precautions at military installations or encampments.
 - e. Photography that shows level of security at military installations or encampments, especially aerial and satellite photography which reveals the name or specific location of military units or installations.
 - f. Information on intelligence collection activities including targets, methods and results.
 - g. Information on special operations units U.S. or Coalition, unless otherwise directed by CJTF-Mountain PAO staff.

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- h. Information on coalition forces, unless specifically cleared by the CJTF-Mountain PAO.
- i. Information on effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare.
- j. Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage and cover.
- k. Additional guidelines the CJTF-Mountain PAO determines necessary to protect tactical security.

l. Registration

a. I am not aware of any existing physical or health conditions which would adversely affect my covering strenuous combat activities." _____ (Initial)

b. "I (insert name) _____, am (insert job description) _____ an employee of _____ (insert news organization), have read the aforementioned media ground rules and agree, with my signature, to abide by them. I also understand that violation of these ground rules is cause for the revocation of my media accreditation with CJTF-Mountain."

Signature Date

Printed Name, affiliate, address & phone number

Witness Signature Date

Witness Printed Name, Rank & Organization

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Hold Harmless Agreement

Hold Harmless/Release From Liability Statement

1. I recognize that covering combat and other military operations carries with it certain inherent risks to life, limb and equipment.
2. I recognize that the U.S. military, in pursuing the successful accomplishment of its mission, cannot guarantee my personal safety or the safety of my equipment.
3. I hereby release the U.S. Government and the U.S. military of any liability from and hold them harmless for any injuries I may suffer, or any equipment that may be damaged as a result of my covering combat or any other military operations.
4. I understand that my agreement to this statement is a condition of being credentialed to cover U.S. military operations and receiving assistance for that coverage.

Signature

Date

Printed Name, affiliate, address & phone number

Witness Signature

Date

Witness Printed Name, Rank & Organization

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Annex C: CG's Anaconda News Briefing statement

First I'd like to thank you for coming.

I'd like to offer my condolences to the family and friends of our fallen comrades.

I'm going to open with a brief statement describing Operation Anaconda. Then I will take your questions.

And I'd like to remind everyone that exactly 177 days ago these very people we are fighting here killed more than 3000 innocent civilians from around the globe as they went about their lives. That is why we are here.

As President Bush said in his State of the Union Address, America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror.

This mission involved soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines from 8 different countries, as well as our Afghan allies. This was truly a team effort. And the uncommon valor displayed by these service members is truly awe-inspiring.

Several weeks ago we began to get information from various sources, including local residents afraid of these terrorists, that Al Qaeda extremists and non-Afghan Taliban were gathering near Sherkankhel.

Our information indicated over one hundred of these terrorists were gathering to plan and launch terrorists acts against the Afghan Interim Administration and against as coalition forces.

Our campaign had already seriously damaged the Al Qaeda network, but they are fanatics and they still work to destabilize this beautiful country.

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Due to the size of the enemy concentration and the difficulty of the terrain and weather there—the village itself is at 2500 meters and the mountains to the east rise to 3500 meters (over two miles high)—we began planning a large, complex, multinational operation—but we attempted to make the component parts as simple as possible.

We conducted a hammer and anvil type of operation.

Afghan forces led by General Zia and supported by US forces, moved from Gardez in the northeast to attack the area around Sherkankhel. This was the hammer.

The anvil consisted of Afghan forces under General Kamal Khan Zadran, General Zakim Khan as well as two U.S. Infantry battalions.

The Afghan forces sealed escape routes to the north and west of the town while two battalions from Colonel Wiecinski's Task Force Rakkasan, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry from the 10th Mountain Division and 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry from the 101st Airborne Division; air assaulted from Bagram into blocking positions to the south and northeast of the area, thus effectively sealing off the extremists' escape routes

We also had lots of help from a wide range of coalition special operations forces who conducted reconnaissance missions in this area

At D-Day we had more than 1000 Afghan forces and another 1000 coalition forces from 8 different countries in the fight.

We went in Saturday morning, D Day, as General Zia began his movement. We conducted a dawn air assault, with multiple landing zones. Within 2 hours we had secured and routed the enemy at every landing zone but one.

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At that southernmost LZ, the 1-87 Infantry battalion headquarters and a platoon from Charlie Company, 1-87 Infantry, immediately began to receive heavy mortar and machinegun fire, both from the ridge to the east and the village of Marzak to the west.

After a painstaking, positive identification process, we determined that there were no non-combatants in Marzak, so we targeted that village, relieving the intense pressure on the 1-87 forces there.

Also that morning, General Zia's force came under mortar fire, killing three Afghans and one of our Special Forces soldiers accompanying that force.

I decided to delay a second air assault into the area to continue to engage the enemy forces vicinity Marzak with our fire support platforms.

Saturday night, we pulled out the unit in the far south and inserted forces to the north—we reinforced success.

On Monday night (D+2) we inserted a Special Forces team in the south. Unfortunately, the helicopter inserting this team took fire on the landing zone, and was forced to pull out—somehow one man was left behind. The pilot managed a controlled landing several kilometers north of the insertion point, where they discovered he was missing.

We never leave a man behind, so we immediately launched a quick reaction force that also took fire on the same landing zone. The quick reaction force, in a truly heroic action, held off overwhelming odds, killing more than forty of the terrorists.

Unfortunately, six of our men were killed; six heroes who refused to leave a fellow warrior behind. After a long day on the battlefield, we extracted that entire force—including the body of the man we went to save—the terrorists had killed him.

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The battle continues: General Zia and his forces are back in the fight, and we continue to isolate the enemy. Yesterday we killed several hundred Al Qaeda attempting to reinforce their terrorist friends.

We continue to maneuver in the objective area and have cleared numerous caves and enemy compounds.

Today, we killed many more fanatics who are intent on killing us.

I don't know when this battle will end, but we will stay here until all the terrorist surrender or die.

— Now, when we moved into this operation we prepared restrictive rules of engagement to ensure we didn't harm non-combatants.

Also we worked very hard on our identification system to ensure we detained Al Qaeda and specific Taliban members and only Al Qaeda and specific Taliban members. Our enemy is neither the religion of Islam nor the people of this country.

The results speak for themselves: several hundred Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists who now will not be able to kill innocent men, women, and, children.

The last phase of this operation will be humanitarian assistance. We already have civil affairs teams providing assistance in the area.

We will expand our humanitarian assistance to other areas, once they have been cleared of terrorists.

I'd like to share one tale of heroism with you. When 1-87 infantry went in the south, they landed between an enemy position above them and an enemy village beside them. One soldier, wounded, was lying in freezing snow, but was able to place effective fire on

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an Al Qaeda mortar position Every time the terrorists came out of their cave with their mortar, he fired at them and forced them to take cover.

This wounded soldier kept this up all day and when he was finally evacuated his body core temperature was in the low 90s, but still he didn't want to leave. He saved his buddies lives—he is a real American hero.
Apaches.

In the war between freedom and fear, freedom will win because the citizens of the world are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure victory.

Now I will take your questions.

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Annex D: Public Affairs Annex for Operation Anaconda

Copy ____ of ____ copies

Combined Forces Land Component Command (Fwd)
Bagram, Afghanistan
201200Z Feb 02

(U) ANNEX F (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO CTF-AFGHANISTAN OPORD ANACONDA

(U) REFERENCES:

a. SecDef Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) Casualty and Mortuary Affairs—Operation Enduring Freedom, 012100Z Nov 01.

b. SecDef Consolidated Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) for News Media Coverage of Operation Enduring Freedom, 072020Z Dec 01.

c. CFLCC-PAO Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) Establishment of Detainee Holding Facilities 111112Z Dec 01.

7. (U) Situation:

a. (U) General. This is the largest combat operation of the war and will generate intense interest by international media. OPSEC is also a concern, as we must not allow media to report our movements to our enemies. Balancing OPSEC, our great soldiers and airmen deserve recognition for heroism and the American public has a right to know about their armed forces.

b. (U) Friendly Forces:

(1) TBD

(2) (U) Joint Coalition Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) PAO, Kabul, AFG.

(3) (U) US State Department PAOs in US Embassies in Afghanistan AOR.

(4) (U) PAO assets in Kandahar.

(a) (U) Seven 314th Press Camp Headquarters personnel

(b) (U) 101st PAO with TF Rakkasan

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(5) Two CFLCC PAO personnel in Bagram

c. (U) Attachments and Detachments:

(1) 314th Press Camp Headquarters OPCON after 21Feb02.

d. (U) Assumptions:

(1) (U) Combat Operations phase of Anaconda will last 6-8 days.

(2) The following events will generate national and international media interest during any U.S. action in the Afghanistan area of operations:

(a) (U) U.S. casualties.

(b) (U) Mistaken targetry/civilian casualties.

(3) (U) US and international media will

(a) Be in the AOR before, during and after all operations.

(b) Watch our forces airlift out of Bagram and the FARPs.

(c) Want to come here, as this is the HQ, the FOB, where they will have to embed from and where all the troops are.

(d) Want to stay on base considering the security conditions and lack of accommodations off base.

(e) Be willing to go out with our CA teams after Anaconda is over.

(f) Once they are here, want to stay even after Anaconda.

(4) Facts:

(a) Kabul is a two-hour drive from Bagram and the road is unsecure at night.

(b) Do not know how long Anaconda will last.

8. (U) Mission: CTF-AF Public Affairs facilitates media and participates in Information Operations in order to assist in the destruction of Al Qaeda, keep coalition service members and fighters informed, continue public support for OEF, and support the Afghan Interim Authority.

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9. (U) Execution.

(U) Intent. There will be no media releases that violate OPSEC; the story of our valiant service members gets out to the Coalition publics AFTER the operation; the publics and media will continue to have confidence in our war fighting capabilities as well as in our openness; the world will understand the coalition and Afghan contributions; any casualties/accidents will be released ASAP--in consideration of OPSEC.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. CTF-Afghanistan PAO prepares IO plan to explain increased air activity in our AO; facilitates media coverage of mission successes; embeds media with the CTF TOC, and with combat units if possible; prepares releases for successful and unsuccessful mission accomplishment; and sends story/photos back to home station PAOs and local news outlets.

b. (U) Execution:

(1) PHASE I: Setting the conditions:

(a) Prepare plan to respond to media enquires about increased air activity and TF Rakkasan deployment.

(b) Embed Newhouse News journalist and photographer with CTF-AF.

(2) PHASE II: Insertions

(a) Ask CENTCOM for approval to send a trusted journalist with TF Rakkasan.

(b) Send Combat Camera with one of the combat units

(3) PHASE III: Combat Operations:

(a) Prepare releases in case of aircraft accident, fratricide, or civilian casualties.

(4) Phase IV: Assessment and transition.

(a) Prepare and get pre-approval for releases for successful and unsuccessful mission accomplishment.

(b) Publicize our successes to meet the CINC's IO guidance to degrade morale and stress inevitability of defeat of remain Al Qaeda, and to emphasize that US/Coalition forces will remain until all Al Qaeda are captured or eliminated.

(c) Get CFLCC approval for post-operation interviews with participants, including a news conference with the Cdr CTF-AF at the CTF-Afghanistan TOC location.

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c. Schedule

- (1) D-Day: Embedded media go in.
- (2) D+ 2: Embeds come out and file
- (3) D+3: New set of embeds go in

D+4 (Thursday morning): CG news conference 0730L (1800 East Coast time) This allows us to make the evening news as well as the print news cycle.

(4) D+5: Begin making selected U.S. and coalition soldiers available for interviews, including phone interviews to hometown media as well as national media.

(5) D+10: Send home selected soldiers to appear on national shows such as Good Morning America. (Need CENTCOM help to expedite this.)

d. Public Affairs tasks.

- (1) (U) CTF-AF PAO will

- (a) Coordinate with CFLCC PAO for release of operational information.

- (b) Provide C2 of OPGON PA assets.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) (U) Command Messages.

- (a) We will continue to find, capture and destroy terrorist cells and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

- (b) This mission shows the resolve of the coalition and the Afghan Interim Government to rid themselves of these outside, Al Qaeda, anti-Islamic extremists.

- (c) Our war is against terrorists—not Islam or the Afghan people.

- (2) (U) We will make every attempt to get operators rather than PAO on camera/in stories.

- (3) Security concerns

- (a) We **will** protect SOF and OGA identity, even at the cost of stopping all coverage.

- (b) We **will** protect OPSEC, especially timing of air assaults, even at the cost of stopping all coverage.

- (4) Battle embed plan

- (a) In order to get the most bang for the buck with limited spaces (and spaces are limited to not overload the air lift and the commander on the ground) We will rotate media out to the battle in the following priorities: (We will fill the a priority first, then the b priority, then the c.) Media who has rotated out will have to wait until media in their category here at Bagram are

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- (1) Any CTF-AF casualty or class A accident.
- (2) Any CTF-AF caused civilian casualty.
- (3) Media OPSEC violations.
- (4) Any negative incident between coalition forces and Afghan Interim Administration.
- (5) Classified employment of coalition forces observed by media (i.e. the Marine helicopters that departed on a mission in December that we said were "not going anywhere.")
- g. Additional ground rules:
 - (1) No live shots of the flight line.
 - (2) Any allowed flight line shots will be embargoed 12 hours to ensure we do not compromise stories.
 - (3) No shots of non-afghans in civilian clothes.
 - (4) No shots of SOF or other governmental agencies personnel or their compounds
 - (5) No mention that SOF or OGAs are here
 - (6) No mention of other countries forces without that countries prior approval.
 - (7) No use of any electronic transmission device, including cell phones, within 3 hours of any large helicopter activity.
 - (8) Media will not be allowed in the TOC.
 - (9) All interviews will be arranged through/approved by PAO.

10. (U) Service Support.

- a. CJTF-Mountain C-4 will provide tents, cots, food, and water for embedded media.

11. (U) Command and Signal.

- a. The CTF-AF PAO will be located at the CTF-AF HQ at Bagram.
- b. The Combined Press Information Center will be located at Bagram.
- c. CJTF-Mountain ICW PAO must make one NIPERNET line available to the media on demand.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

HAGENBECK
Major General

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Chapter 9

Public Affairs

Annex E: Public Affairs Paragraph to Operation Anaconda Order

3.D.25 (U) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAO

3.D.25.A. PAO. THERE WILL BE NO MEDIA RELEASES THAT VIOLATE OPSEC; THE STORY OF OUR VALIANT SERVICE MEMBERS GETS OUT TO THE COALITION PUBLICS AFTER THE OPERATION; THE PUBLICS AND MEDIA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN OUR WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS IN OUR OPENNESS; THE WORLD WILL UNDERSTAND THE COALITION AND AFGHAN CONTRIBUTIONS; ANY CASUALTIES/ACCIDENTS WILL BE RELEASED ASAP--IN CONSIDERATION OF OPSEC.

3.D.25.A.1. CTF-AFGHANISTAN PAO PREPARES IO PLAN TO EXPLAIN INCREASED AIR ACTIVITY IN OUR AO; FACILITATES MEDIA COVERAGE OF MISSION SUCCESSES; EMBEDS MEDIA WITH THE CTF TOC, AND WITH COMBAT UNITS IF POSSIBLE; PREPARES RELEASES FOR SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT; AND SENDS STORY/PHOTOS BACK TO HOME STATION PAOS AND LOCAL NEWS OUTLETS.

PHASE I: SETTING THE CONDITIONS: PREPARE PLAN TO RESPOND TO MEDIA ENQUIRES ABOUT INCREASED AIR ACTIVITY AND TF RAKKASAN DEPLOYMENT. EMBED NEWHOUSE NEWS JOURNALIST AND PHOTOGRAPHER WITH CJTF-AF.

PHASE II: INSERTIONS ASK CENTCOM FOR APPROVAL TO SEND A TRUSTED JOURNALIST WITH TF RAKKASAN. SEND COMBAT CAMERA WITH ONE OF THE COMBAT UNITS

PHASE III: COMBAT OPERATIONS: PREPARE RELEASES IN CASE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, FRATRICIDE, OR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

PHASE IV: ASSESSMENT AND TRANSITION.

PREPARE AND GET PRE-APPROVAL FOR RELEASES FOR SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. PUBLICIZE OUR SUCCESSES TO MEET THE CINCS IO GUIDANCE TO DEGRADE MORALE AND STRESS INEVITABILITY OF DEFEAT OF REMAIN AL QAEDA, AND TO EMPHAZISE THAT US/COALITION FORCES WILL REMAINUNTIL ALL ALQAEDA ARE CAPTURED OR ELIMINATED. GET CFLCC APPROVAL FOR POST-OPERATION INTERVIEWS WITH PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING A NEWS CONFERENCE WITH THE CDR CTF-AF AT THE CTF-AFGHANISTAN TOC LOCATION.

3.D.25.A.2. COMMAND MESSAGES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FIND, CAPTURE AND DESTROY TERRORIST CELLS AND PREVENT AFGHANISTAN FROM BECOMING A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS. THIS MISSION SHOWS THE RESOLVE OF THE COALITION AND THE AFGHAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO RID THEMSELVES OF THESE OUTSIDE, AL QAEDA, ANTI-ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS. OUR WAR IS AGAINST TERRORISTS--NOT ISLAM OR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

3.D.25.A.3 ENCOUNTERS WITH MEDIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD. NON-EMBEDDED MEDIA SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE ANY OTHER CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IF YOU KEEP CIVILIANS FROM AN AREA, KEEP MEDIA FROM THE AREA. IF YOU DETAIN CIVILIANS, DETAIN MEDIA. HOWEVER, REALIZE THE POWER OF MEDIA TO SHAPE WORLD OPINION AND THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THIS WAR, THEREFORE, ASAP RECORD ALL CONVERSATIONS AND

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INTERACTIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND RELAY THIS INFORMATION TO THE PAO SO WE CAN MITIGATE ANY NEGATIVE STORIES. AS THE MEDIA WILL REPORT ON TF RAKKASAN'S AIR OPERATIONS, CTF-AF SHOULD MOVE SOME TROOPS AND AT LEAST ONE HELICOPTER TO BAGRAM SO WE CAN REPORT TRUTHFULLY, "TF RAKKASAN IS MOVING TROOPS TO BAGRAM TO BETTER SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN THE AFGHANISTAN AO."

3.D.25.A.4. COORDINATION OF RELEASE OF INFORMATION. CTF-AF PAO MUST CLEAR RELEASE OF ALL OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. THERE WILL BE NO REPORTING OR PHOTOGRAPHING SOF FORCES OR EQUIPMENT. THERE WILL BE NO REPORTING OR PHOTOGRAPHING OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS.

3.D.25.A.5. CRITICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. ANY CTF-AF CASUALTY OR CLASS A ACCIDENT. ANY CTF-AF CAUSED CIVILIAN CASUALTY. MEDIA OPSEC VIOLATIONS. ANY NEGATIVE INCIDENT BETWEEN COALITION FORCES AND AFGHAN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. CLASSIFIED EMPLOYMENT OF COALITION FORCES OBSERVED BY MEDIA (I.E. THE MARINE HELICOPTERS THAT DEPARTED ON A MISSION IN DECEMBER THAT WE SAID WERE "NOT GOING ANYWHERE.")

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Public Affairs

Annex F: Operation Anaconda Mission Ground Rules

1. Agreement between embedded media representatives and Task Force Rakkasan, giving access to combat operations for the period beginning 25 Feb 02 to 5 Mar 02 (approximate).
2. All coverage for this operation must be pooled to allow for maximum coverage by all media at Kandahar Airfield. This allows the pool members in various positions/locations to capture other aspects of the operation and also allows non-pool members at Kandahar Airfield access to the operation.
3. As a member of the Media Pool – Kandahar, I agree to the following restrictions in addition to the normal OEF ground rules:
4. I will only release the story after completion of any active mission to be determined by Task Force Commander, COL Wiercinski.
5. I will not capture imagery of deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF) or mention specific SOF units, techniques, or procedures. However, such statements as "a SOF unit conducted an air assault into the area" are allowed.
6. Pool members will not transmit or broadcast any copy/imagery from remote locations. Upon immediate return to Kandahar Airfield, pool members will distribute unedited copy/imagery to other media representatives at Kandahar Airfield. This period of distribution will begin immediately upon arrival and end when distribution is complete for on site media representatives.
7. If this operation includes the collection of detainees, I agree to the following:
 - 7A. Coverage, including photo/video coverage, will not identify detainees by name or by image. (i.e., close up images of individual face(s) that would allow individuals to be identified will not be permitted).
 - 7B. Coverage of detainees in transit is not permitted, including ground and air movement between the field site and detention facilities.
 - 7C. Coverage of detainee interrogations or interviews is not permitted. Media interviews with detainees are not permitted.
8. Pool members will not carry satellite equipment, nor use flash photography or lighting during daylight or night operations.

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10. To maintain operational security, pool members will not broadcast, transmit, or otherwise release any information until mission completion.

11. Pool members will not identify specific troop movements, destinations, and locations until mission completion.

Signature and Date:

Witness:

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Annex G: Public Affairs Paragraph to Post-Operation Anaconda Order

3.D.25 (U) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAO

3.D.25.A. ENDSTATE. THIS OPERATION IS AS SUCCESSFUL AS ANACONDA: NO MEDIA RELEASES VIOLATE OPSEC; THE AFGHAN PUBLIC IN THE KHOWST REGION LEARNS OF OUR EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF; THE PUBLICS AND MEDIA CONTINUE TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN OUR WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS IN OUR TRUTHFULLNESS; THE WORLD UNDERSTANDS THE COALITION AND AFGHAN CONTRIBUTIONS; ANY CASUALTIES/ACCIDENTS ARE RELEASED ASAP--IN CONSIDERATION OF OPSEC; WE MEET THE CINCS IO GUIDANCE TO DEGRADE MORALE AND STRESS INEVITABILITY OF DEFEAT OF REMAIN AL QAEDA, AND TO EMPHAZISE THAT US/COALITION FORCES WILL REMAIN UNTIL ALL AL QAEDA ARE CAPTURED OR ELIMINATED.

3.D.25.A.1. COMMAND MESSAGES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FIND, CAPTURE AND DESTROY TERRORIST CELLS AND PREVENT AFGHANISTAN FROM RETURNING TO A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS. THIS MISSION SHOWS THE CONTINUING RESOLVE OF THE COALITION AND THE AFGHAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO RID THEMSELVES OF THESE OUTSIDE, AL QAEDA, ANTI-ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS. OUR WAR IS AGAINST TERRORISTS--NOT ISLAM OR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

3.D.25.A.2. MEDIA EMBEDDS. ALL NON-SOF COMMANDERS WILL ATTEMPT TO EMBED AT LEAST 3 MEDIA--STILL, VIDEO, AND WRITER--IN EACH BATTALION-SIZED UNIT ON EVERY NON-CLASSIFIED MISSION. ON LONGER MISSIONS, THESE MEDIA WILL ROTATE EVERY 48-72 HOURS.

3.D.25.A.3 ENCOUNTERS WITH NON-EMBEDDED MEDIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE KHOWST REGION IS HEAVILY POPLUATED AND THERE IS A VERY HIGH PROBABILITY WE WILL ENCOUNTER MEDIA DURING OUR OPERATIONS. TREAT NON-EMBEDDED MEDIA AS YOU WOULD ANY OTHER CIVILIAN ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IF YOU KEEP CIVILIANS FROM AN AREA, KEEP MEDIA FROM THE AREA. IF YOU DETAIN CIVILIANS, DETAIN MEDIA. HOWEVER, REALIZE THE POWER OF MEDIA TO SHAPE WORLD OPINION AND THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THIS WAR. THEREFORE, RECORD ALL CONVERSATIONS AND INTERACTIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND RELAY THIS INFORMATION ASAP TO THE PAO SO WE CAN MITIGATE ANY NEGATIVE STORIES.

3.D.25.A.4. RELEASE OF INFORMATION. CJTF-MTN PAO APPROVES RELEASE OF ALL OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. THERE WILL BE NO REPORTING OR PHOTOGRAPHING SOF FORCES OR EQUIPMENT OR OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL EMBARGO 12 HOURS ALL PHOTOGRAPHS AND REPORTS OF FLIGHTLINE OPS. ALL NON-SOF PERSONELL ARE ENCOURAGED TO SPEAK TO ESCORTED MEDIA TO HELP TELL THE COALITION STORY.

3.D.25.A.5. CRITICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. ANY CJTF-MTN CASUALTY OR CLASS A ACCIDENT. ANY CJTF-MTN CAUSED CIVILIAN CASUALTY. ENCOUNTERS WITH MEDIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD. MEDIA OPSEC VIOLATIONS. ANY NEGATIVE INCIDENT BETWEEN COALITION FORCES AND AFGHAN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

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Chapter 9

Public Affairs

Annex H: Secretary Rumsfeld's Principles of Information

February 26, 2002 1:16 PM

SUBJECT: Principles for the Department of Defense

1. Do nothing that could raise questions about the credibility of DoD. DoD must tell the truth and must be believed to be telling the truth or our important work is undermined.
2. Do nothing that is or could be seen as partisan. The work of this Department is non-partisan. We have to continuously earn the support of all the people of the country and the Congress. To do so we must serve all elements of our society without favor.
3. Help to create an environment in DoD hospitable to risk-taking, innovation, and creativity. This institution must be able to house people of all types.
4. Work vigorously to root out any wrongdoing or corruption in DoD. Waste undermines support for the Department, and robs DoD activities of the resources they need.
5. Consistently demonstrate vigilance against waste. It is the taxpayers' money, earned by people who work hard all across this land. We owe it to them to treat their dollars respectfully, and we owe it to the importance of our responsibilities to see that every dollar is spent wisely.
6. Reflect the compassion we all feel when innocent lives are lost, whether US service people or innocents killed by collateral damage.
7. Demonstrate our appreciation for the cooperation we receive from other nations and for the valuable contributions coalition forces bring to our efforts – whether in peacetime by way of strengthening the deterrent, or in wartime by securing victory.
8. Because of the complexity of our tasks, DoD must work with other departments and agencies of the federal government in a professional manner, respectful of others' views but willing to raise issues to the next higher level up the chain of command, as necessary.
9. DoD personnel – civilian and military – must not compromise classified information. It is a violation of federal criminal law, and those who do so are criminals. They are also individuals who have lost their moorings and are willing to put lives of the men and women in uniform at risk. They must be rooted out, stopped and punished.

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10. The public needs and has a right to know about the unclassified activities of DoD. It is our obligation to provide that information professionally, fully and in good spirit.

11. Nothing is more important than the men and women who work in this Department they are its heart and soul and its future. Our country's success depends on them. We must all treat them with respect, show our concern for them and for their lives and their futures, and find opportunities to express our full appreciation for all they do for our country.

12. The Legislative Branch is in Article I of the Constitution; the Executive Branch is Article II. That is not an accident. We must respect the Constitutional role of Congress, learn from those who have knowledge that can be helpful and work constructively, with revolving coalitions, to achieve the important goals of the Department and the country.

13. Finally, the President of the United States is our Commander-in-Chief. Those of us in DoD – military and civilian – believe control, are respectful of it and must be vigilant to see that our actions reflect that important Constitutional obligation.

Donald Rumsfeld

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