

CHAPTER 5

Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations

The direction and supervision of interrogation operations are critical to the successful performance of the interrogation element's mission. Direction and supervision are the responsibility of the senior interrogator. These responsibilities fall into three categories: Advising, coordinating, and directing actual interrogation operations. FM 34-80 provides guidance for brigade and battalion IEW operations, and FM 34-25 provides guidance for corps IEW operations. The supervisory duties discussed in this chapter are—

- Advice and assistance.
- Prepare and move to deployment site.
- Establish a site for interrogation operations.
- Supervise the interrogation process.
- Supervise the CED exploitation cycle.
- Supervise administrative tasks.

ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE

The senior interrogator coordinates and provides input to both the parent MI unit's S2 and S3 and the supported echelon's intelligence staff. This includes reviewing source evacuation plans and estimates, as well as advising on the capabilities and limitations of the interrogation element. He must be able to discuss and provide advice on the interrogation element's deployment in order to most effectively support the intelligence collection effort. To accomplish this, the senior interrogator must be familiar with the intelligence annex to the supported echelon's operations order (OPORD). In addition, the senior interrogator must constantly coordinate with the division or corps G2, the interrogation teams, and the intelligence staffs of supported echelons. This is done preferably through liaison visits to these elements. This coordination is critical to ensure that information and information updates are passed to the interrogation teams and, in turn, are passed to OB personnel in an orderly, accurate, and timely manner. This ensures access to

important information which may become available between liaison visits.

PREPARE AND MOVE TO THE DEPLOYMENT SITE

The intelligence annex of the supported unit's OPORD indicates the exact location of the holding area. Once this is known, the senior interrogator ensures the interrogation team moves to that location. Interrogation elements deploy with little more than their personal weapons and equipment. Assigned vehicles and radios may not be sufficient to move the entire element; especially, when the element is deploying to more than one site. The senior interrogator makes arrangements for transportation and determines when it will be provided. Interrogation elements are not equipped for small unit movements. Unaccompanied deployment is a dangerous procedure and should be avoided. When this cannot be done, the following steps must be considered to minimize danger during movement:

- Confirm the element's exact destination.
- Obtain a safe route from the supported command, if this is not possible, then, select the route offering the best protective terrain.
- Identify checkpoint locations along the route. If checkpoints are not available, radio contact on a periodic basis should be established with the parent MI unit.
- Obtain current call signs, frequencies, and passwords for unit areas that will be crossed during the movement.
- Coordinate with all affected units. The safest method for deploying the interrogation element is to have them accompany one or more of the supported echelon's subordinate units as they deploy. This method should be used whenever possible. When it is

used, the senior interrogator must determine exactly when the element must arrive at the assembly area, the element's position within the march order, and what call signs, frequencies, and passwords will be used during the movement.

ESTABLISH A SITE FOR INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

Once the interrogation element has arrived at the designated holding area, the senior interrogator establishes a site for interrogation operations. The senior interrogator coordinates with the military police to ensure that the site is set up to enable operations between the interrogation operations and the holding area. He also contacts the commander responsible for the operational area. This commander authorizes a specific location close to the holding area and within its secure perimeter as the site for interrogation operations. The interrogation element's mission does not include performing its own perimeter security. The senior interrogator also contacts the officer in charge of the holding area and coordinates the following:

- Screening site. A specific site for screening sources must be selected and agreed upon. The site must enable the screener to observe the sources while they are inprocessed and segregated. The site, however, must be shielded from the direct view of, and far enough away from the sources so they cannot see, hear, or overhear screening conversations.
- Medical support. Procedures must be established to verify that any sick or wounded personnel have been treated and released by authorized medical personnel for interrogation.
- Guards. Arrangements must be made for guards to escort each source selected for interrogation. The guard should accompany the source throughout the interrogation process.
- Movement. Routes and procedures for movement must be arranged for trans-

portation of the source from the holding area to the interrogation operations area.

- Evacuation. Evacuation procedures should have been previously established. These procedures should be discussed so that all concerned are familiar with time constraints and procedures of exactly when and who should be evacuated.
- Communications. Arrangements for receiving and transmitting message traffic must be made with the C-E officer. These arrangements must provide for primary and alternate electrical and courier channels.
- Site preparation. An interrogation element must contain as a minimum, an operations and administrative area as well as specific areas to conduct interrogations. If the element will be exploiting CEDs, an area must also be designated for this activity.

The area, for the conduct of individual interrogations, is established in such a way as to ensure that interrogations taking place in one area cannot be heard by personnel in another area. At a minimum, the interrogations area, whether a tent or a building, must have enough space to accommodate the interrogator, source, guard, and an interpreter, if needed. Each area should have a table and at least three chairs. A light is required for night operations. Field expedient replacements for this equipment are used as necessary.

SUPERVISE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS

The senior interrogator ensures that the interrogation process is started immediately upon receipt of the source. This process is continuous and can become confused if the senior interrogator does not closely supervise the timely and orderly conduct of each step in the process. The three steps in the process are screening, interrogation, and reporting.

SCREENING

Screening determines who will be interrogated on a priority basis and in many cases how many times a source will be interrogated. For this reason, the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collection effort depends on qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a minimum. He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.

INTERROGATION

The senior interrogator ensures that sources are assigned for interrogation according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures that the highest probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the time available is chosen.

The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened sources. He does this by comparing information gained during the screening process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular source.

At times, a situation will occur in which none of the available interrogators speaks the target language well enough to conduct an interrogation. When this occurs the senior interrogator coordinates with S1/G1 for procurement of native interpreters. The senior interrogator maintains a list of available interpreters. He compares this list with the qualifications of his subordinate interrogators and the information listed on the screening report. Based on this comparison, the senior interrogator can then assign the best qualified interpreter and interrogator. Interrogators must monitor interpreters periodically to ensure their performance is according to the standards established by the senior interrogator.

REPORTING

The senior interrogator ensures that all reports are prepared and submitted in an accurate and timely manner. SALUTE reports must be generated immediately upon identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other reports which are generated by an interrogation must be correctly and accurately prepared and submitted upon completion of the interrogation.

The senior interrogator ensures that all reports generated in the interrogation process are transmitted within established time frames. Transmission procedures and time frames should have already been discussed and verified with the site communications officer upon arrival to the holding area.

SUPERVISE THE CED PROCESSING CYCLE

The senior interrogator ensures that the three steps of CED processing: accountability, exploitation, and evacuation are correctly and rapidly conducted (see Chapter 4).

SUPERVISE ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

The senior interrogator ensures that three major functions are accurate and kept updated. These are maintaining the SITMAP, updating the collection mission, and maintaining the Army files.

SITUATION MAP

He ensures that the SITMAP is kept updated by posting all known enemy units and activities within the supported unit's area of operations, according to the intelligence summary (INTSUM), intelligence report (INTREP), periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP), and other intelligence reports. In addition, he ensures any dispositions obtained through interrogations are posted to the SITMAP as accurately as the information will allow.

**COLLECTION MISSION
UPDATE**

Through previously discussed liaison via its and established communications, he ensures that all subordinate interrogators are kept abreast of any changes to the collection mission.

**MODERN ARMY BOOKKEEPING
SYSTEM**

He ensures that files have been established for any documents, reference mate-

rials, and blank forms that the interrogation element has in its possession. The same files must be generated for any documents, reference materials, and blank forms that may be acquired or generated during day-to-day interrogation operations. He ensures that these files are established, maintained, and disposed of according to AR 25-400-2.

CHAPTER 6

Operational Environment

Interrogation operations are conducted within the context of the supported unit's day-to-day combat operations. This chapter will describe the interaction of interrogation elements with the echelons they support.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Interrogation assets are not organic to echelons below division except armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) and separate brigades. At every echelon, division and higher, interrogators are assigned to the MI unit supporting that echelon. MI unit commanders are responsible for these assets and should become personally involved in two key decisions affecting interrogators:

- Which collection target, sources, or CEDs will be given command priority.
- Where interrogators will be deployed within the area of operations.

COLLECTION PRIORITY

As previously noted, interrogators are trained to exploit sources and CEDs. This allows the all-source collection manager three exploitation options for the interrogation assets. They may exploit sources alone, CED alone, or attempt to exploit both simultaneously. In the past it was assumed that interrogators could accomplish the dual collection mission no matter what type of combat operations were being supported. This may no longer be true. Unit manning, coupled with the amount of CEDs and sources, may prevent exploitation of both sources and CEDs simultaneously.

Combat since World War II indicates that the volume of CEDs alone will overwhelm an interrogation element the size of that being projected for a heavy division. A flow of CEDs similar to that encountered in Grenada will supply enough targets to keep a light division's interrogators busy around-the-clock just screening and categorizing the CEDs. Any attempt to conduct deeper exploitation would result in a tremendous evacuation delay and the end of

timely reporting. Experience indicates that a division involved in a high intensity conflict may have to process between 525 and 5,300 sources per week. While these figures are estimates, they demonstrate the inability of a division's own interrogators to simultaneously exploit both sources and CEDs. Divisions may receive additional interrogation assets from corps, depending on their mission. Prior planning must be conducted to establish the availability of these assets, and their deployment within the division.

The density of interrogation assets and command emphasis on the collection effort determines mission requirements. The feasibility of a dual collection mission may also be the result of initial IPB by the commander's intelligence staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual collection effort, interrogation of sources has traditionally received the priority for two important reasons:

- The greater intelligence potential of a source.
- The rate at which people forget detailed information.


An individual's value system is easier to bypass immediately after undergoing a significant traumatic experience. Capture, and the circumstances surrounding it, is significantly traumatic for most sources. Many former Vietnam prisoners of war indicated that a period of extreme disorientation occurred immediately after capture. Capture thrust them into a totally foreign environment over which they had no control. The standards of behavior and conduct which they had previously accepted and lived by were of no use to them during this period. Most of them survived this initial period by clinging to very basic values (love of family and loyalty to friends or comrades). Human beings are very adaptable, however, and this initial vulnerability passes rather quickly. An individual's established values begin to assert themselves again within a day or two. When this happens, much of an individual's susceptibility to interrogation is gone.

Memory stores information in two areas: The five senses constantly transmit information to the brain's *short-term memory*. This data is stored there temporarily and then shifted to the brain's *long-term memory*. The time at which this transfer takes place varies widely, but research shows that a great amount of detail is lost during that transfer. Studies conducted on classroom learning indicate that even though students know information stressed in class is important, by the next day most of the information is forgotten. The percentage of information lost beyond recall varies from study to study, but a 70-percent figure is a conservative estimate. Much of the information of value to the interrogator is information that the source is not even aware he has. Although no research data is available in this area, it is reasonable to assume that this type of information will be lost even faster than classroom learning.

CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive and are screened for possible exploitation as quickly as possible. Interrogators were given the CED exploitation mission because of their linguistic ability. This makes printed and typed material readily exploitable, but many handwritten documents are illegible. Information contained in undeveloped imagery and recordings is inaccessible to most interrogation elements. The intelligence value of painted, drawn, or engraved material cannot be exploited by many elements unless it is accomplished by explanatory information in writing. An example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, registration points, or identifying terrain features. In spite of these limitations, an estimated 90 percent of all the information contained in CEDs can be exploited. The following illustration shows a comparison along a time line of the amounts of information available to the interrogator from the two collection targets. The comparison assumes that the CEDs and the sources initially had the same amount of information, and that it was of equal intelligence value. Bear in mind that the figures used are conservative estimates, and that the time between the two target types might be

even greater between 24 and 72 hours. The percentage of information available from sources drops sharply during the first 24 hours after capture. This represents the rapid loss of what sources would consider to be insignificant details. A slower drop in the percentage begins at 48 hours to represent the resurgence of established value systems. This resurgence makes it harder for interrogators to obtain what information the source still remembers.

The supported echelon's intelligence officer determines the guidelines for priority of exploitation. The commander's intelligence needs and the G2's or S2's estimate of the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to which these guidelines can be applied. Exploitation priorities are reviewed and changed when needed.



6-2

DEPLOYMENT SITES

Interrogation assets are not mobile enough to be quickly shifted in response to new developments. The initial deployment of these assets are guided by the exploitation priority established by the commander. Operations are conducted at an echelon that will allow interrogators the best opportunity to satisfy their assigned collection mission. When making the deployment decision, the following should also be considered:

- Number of interrogators available.
- Type and intensity of anticipated combat operations.
- Support available at subordinate units.

The number of interrogators available limit the number of deployment sites that can be used. MI commanders at corps consider how many interrogators will be available for interrogation operations after augmentation has been provided to subordinate divisions. The number of interrogators also plays a key role in deciding the level of intense or sustained collection operations they can conduct.

Intense collection employs all available interrogators with little or no provision for them to rest. The major disadvantage of intense collection is that these interrogators become exhausted quickly. Interrogations amount to prolonged conversations under extreme stress. Once the available interrogators are exhausted, collection stops until they recover or additional assets arrive. A severe decrease in interrogation effectiveness can be expected to begin between 12 and 18 hours after the onset of intense collection. Eighteen hours should be considered the maximum period possible for intense collection. This kind of all-out effort can be justified when critical information must be obtained or confirmed quickly to forestall a major disaster. Similar problems can be expected during intense CED exploitation. Sustained operations can be maintained for indefinite periods of time. They also allow the commander some rested interrogators to use on a contingency basis in a different location. The disadvantage of sustained collection is that operations are

slower, exploiting fewer sources over a given period of time.

The last important factor that should be considered in making deployment decisions is the area in which operations are to be conducted. This area must be capable of providing the support required by the interrogation element. This support includes—

- Priority access to reliable means of secure communications.
- Adequate shelter and security.
- A flow of CEDs and sources to exploit.

TASKING RELATIONSHIPS

The MI unit commander retains overall responsibility for the interrogators assigned to his unit. The manner in which these interrogators are tasked depends on how the MI unit is task organized for combat. If interrogators are deployed in general support (GS) of the division, the MI battalion commander tasks them through his S3 and the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). If interrogators are deployed in direct support (DS) of a division's subordinate units, they are tasked by the commander of that unit through his S2. If attached to an IEW company, team tasking is directed through the team commander. The officers responsible for tasking interrogation elements ensure that the following steps are accomplished:

- Collection missions that reflect the capabilities and limitations of interrogators are assigned.
- Interrogation reports are integrated with information provided by other collectors during the IPB process.
- Copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, daily intelligence summary (DISUM), and supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP) are disseminated to the interrogation element as they are published.
- Close contact is maintained with the interrogation element.

COLLECTION MISSIONS

Once the IPB process has produced initial results, all identified intelligence gaps are addressed by detailed collection requirements. Any PIR and IR requesting information that interrogators can collect are identified. The PIR and IR are then consolidated into a collection mission and assigned to the interrogation element. The assigned collection mission is tailored according to the capabilities and limitations of interrogators (see Chapter 2). Tailoring collection missions ensures that all intelligence gaps are covered and avoids unnecessary duplication.

Collection missions are tailored and assigned by the collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section subordinate to the G2 at corps and division. The same functions are performed at brigade and battalion by the battlefield information control center (BICC). These elements ensure that the assigned collection mission is passed by secure means, through established channels, to the interrogation element. In addition to PIR and IR, the assigned collection mission includes—

- Specific events about which information is required.
- Time frames during which the events must have occurred to be of value.
- The date on which the information will no longer be of value.
- Channels to be used to report the information collected.
- Higher, lower, and adjacent units authorized to receive copies of reported information.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD INTEGRATION

The CM&D section or the BICC must ensure that information reported by the interrogation element is integrated with information collected by other intelligence disciplines during the IPB process. One major value of interrogation operations is that information obtained can cue other collection systems. Mission statements

obtained from sources often identify general locations that imagery intelligence (IMINT) or SIGINT collectors can further exploit to produce targeting data.

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

Intelligence is used by interrogators as a source of prepared and control questions (see Chapter 3). The CM&D section or BICC ensures that current copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, SUPINTREP, DISUM, and any other intelligence reports are provided to the interrogation element. Intelligence is also used to revise and refine the objectives of interrogation operations, to update the element's OB data base, and to keep the element's threat SITMAP current.

CONTACT

The CM&D section (through the MI battalion TOC) or the BICC maintains close contact with the interrogation element. This contact allows a two-way flow of communication. The CM&D section or BICC needs the contact to accomplish the collection mission, IPB interrogation, and intelligence dissemination. They also use the contact to revise the interrogation element's collection mission as required. The interrogation element requires the contact to ensure that it receives current guidance, direction, and assistance in solving collection problems.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Successful interrogation operations require support from a number of elements within their echelon of assignment, including all of the major staff organizations. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning that creates the overall environment for interrogators. The intelligence staff's (G2 or S2) direct contribution to interrogation operations has already been discussed. Its general responsibilities are outlined below, along with those of other staff and support elements.

PERSONNEL (G1 AND S1)

The G1 and S1 are responsible for: supervising the medical support furnished to

sources, maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified linguists within their command, and coordinating with the G5 for procurement and payment of other interpreters and translators needed to perform both intelligence and nonintelligence duties. The G1 and S1 ensure that the echelon's operations plan contains complete provisions for source handling and evacuation. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff officers, as well as STANAG 2044 (see Appendix A for an extract). Its provisions must cover the following principles:

- Humane treatment of all sources.
- Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.
- Opportunities to interrogate sources.
- Integration of procedures for the evacuation, control, and administration of sources with other combat support and combat service support (CSS) operations (through the provost marshal).
- Training for all troops on the provisions of international agreements and regulations relating to sources.

INTELLIGENCE (G2 AND S2)

The G2 and S2 are responsible for supervising appropriate censorship activities relating to sources. They are also responsible for—

- Projecting source capture flows.
- Determining the number of interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence duties.
- Controlling the procedures used to process and grant clearances to the interpreters and translators who need them.

OPERATIONS (G3 AND S3)

The G3 and S3 are responsible for operations, plans, organization, and training. Where military police assets are not available, or not sufficient, they are responsible for obtaining, organizing, and supervising

the employment of additional personnel as guards. It is also responsible for—

- Training of military police and guard personnel.
- Providing G2 and S2 with details of planned operations.
- Planning and supervising all PSYOP activities in support of tactical operations.
- Evaluating, in coordination with the G2 and the G5, enemy PYSOP efforts and the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP on target groups.

SUPPLY (G4 AND S4)

The G4 and S4 are responsible for the storage and maintenance of supplies and equipment needed by subordinate units to conduct source handling operations. They are responsible for delivering supplies and equipment to subordinate units as they are needed. They also supervise—

- Acquisition of real estate and the construction of source holding area facilities in the communications zone (COMMZ).
- Collection and distribution of captured enemy supplies. This is coordinated with the intelligence and operations staffs.
- Procurement and distribution of rations to source holding areas. Captured enemy rations will be used to the greatest extent possible.
- Determination of requirements for use of source labor for the logistical support needed in source handling operations.
- Provide logistical support to interpreter personnel.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (G5 AND S5)

The G5 and S5 are responsible for civil affairs (CA). They are also responsible for—

- Advising, assisting, and making recommendations that relate to civil-military operations (CMO) and CA aspects of current or proposed operations.
- Preparing estimates and conducting studies and analyses for CMO activities.
- Preparing the portions of operations, administrative, and logistics plans and orders concerning CMO activities.
- Determining the requirements for resources to accomplish the CMO activities of the command, including CA units and personnel.
- Maintaining a list of native linguists for interpreter support.
- Coordinating with local US Government representatives and host-nation armed forces for the procurement of native linguists for interpreter support.
- Recommending command policy concerning obligations between civil and military authorities and policy concerning the population of the area of operations and its works and activities arising from treaties, agreements, international law, and US policy.
- Providing civil support for tactical and CSS operations and for preventing civilian interference with these operations.
- Coordinating military support of populace and resource control programs.
- Providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of sources and enemy defectors.
- Coordinating the MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2 or S2.

ADDITIONAL SUPPORT

Besides the major staff elements, an interrogation element requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations. These elements include—

- Communications. Secure, reliable communications must be available at or near the interrogation element's deployment site. Priority access to these communications must be arranged to support contact with collection management.
- Staff judge advocate. This element can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation and application of international regulations and agreements concerning handling of sources. It is also a channel for reporting known or suspected war crimes.
- Health service support. This element must clear all sick and wounded sources before they can be interrogated. Seriously sick and wounded sources are evacuated through medical channels. If adequate facilities are not available in EPW hospitals, EPWs are admitted to military or civilian medical facilities where the required treatment can be obtained. Medical inspections are made and the weight of each EPW is recorded at least once a month. Provisions are made for the isolation of communicable cases, for disinfection, and for inoculations. Retained medical personnel and EPWs with medical training are used to the fullest extent in caring for their own sick and wounded. FM 8-2 and FM 8-10 provide guidance for health service support.
- NBC protection. All EPWs will be provided NBC protection. EPWs should be allowed to use their own NBC protection equipment or if not feasible, the detaining forces will exchange the EPWs' equipment for proper NBC gear. If EPWs do not have their own NBC protection equipment, the detaining forces must provide them with proper NBC gear.

- Chaplain support. The unit ministry team, chaplain, and chaplain assistant provide for religious support. Coordination is made with the S5 and G5 for religious support for refugees, displaced persons, and indigenous civilians. The unit ministry team provides for services for EPWs or assists by supporting detained clergy of enemy forces, supporting other detained clergy and providing for burial rites (combatants are granted, where possible, the right to be buried according to the rites of their religion). Religious preference of EPWs will be obtained from their detainee personnel record form (see Appendix B).
- Inspector general. This element is a channel for reporting known or suspected war crimes.
- Area studies of the target countries that emphasize the inhabitants and the economic, social, religious, and political systems which shape the behavior of those inhabitants.
- Principles of human behavior that emphasize the social and cultural characteristics of behavior considered acceptable in the target countries. As often as possible, training in these areas should be integrated with individual and collective training. This gives the unit the best return for the training time expended and gives the individual interrogator the most realistic training possible.

Innovative training methods are devised and implemented in garrison as part of the scheduled training cycle. This training is based on the results of periodic evaluations of individual and collective performance. Army Training and Evaluating Programs are being developed which set the standards for collective performance by interrogation elements of various sizes.

INTERROGATOR TRAINING

Commanders and supervisors must take a deep interest in the quality and quantity of training given to the interrogators assigned to their units. Commanders cannot wait for the start of hostilities to begin a comprehensive training program. Interrogators require a high degree of proficiency in several complex skills that are difficult to master. These skills fade rapidly if not practiced. The value and versatility of a commander's interrogation assets can be continually enhanced by a training program within his unit. An individual interrogator's contributions to the unit's overall collection effort are directly dependent on the degree of exposure he has had to—

- Language training that emphasizes continuous improvement in military and technical vocabulary, dialects spoken in the target countries, and slang or idiomatic expressions.

CHAPTER 7

Strategic Debriefing

Strategic debriefing is the art of interviewing an individual in a strategic environment, that is, voluntary sources of information to obtain usable information in response to command and national-level intelligence needs. Strategic intelligence provides support to national-level planners and operational commanders across the entire spectrum of conflict and is especially useful for long-range planning purposes. Strategic intelligence is collected in peacetime as well as wartime and often fills intelligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or from sensitive areas.

The objective of the strategic debriefing process is to obtain information of the highest degree of credibility to satisfy outstanding intelligence requirements. This avoids surprises of strategic nature and consequences. Strategic debriefing operations will be discussed further in FM 34-5 (S). The types of sources encountered in strategic debriefing are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources. While there are other types, these represent the vast majority. Doctrine for strategic debriefing is provided in DIAM 58-13.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Due to the diverse nature of the various operations using debriefers, both outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and within the continental United States (CONUS), specific duties and responsibilities peculiar to a particular operation will be detailed in unit SOPs. However, there are certain duties and responsibilities to debriefers regardless of assignment.

NOTIFICATION

Proper response to notification of the availability of a source will depend upon unit operations. The debriefer may have to respond spontaneously as in the case of walk-in sources. He may have the luxury of advance notice as in the case of an invitational interview.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Planning and preparation for the strategic debriefer are similar to that process already described in Chapter 3 with the following considerations peculiar to the strategic environment:

- Prior intelligence reports pertaining to a particular source may not be readily available and the source's area of knowledgeability, personality traits, and potential intelligence value should be determined by the debriefer.
- Pertinent intelligence requirements should be reviewed in an attempt to assess the source's potential to answer them.
- Necessary maps, technical reference manuals, city plans, photographs, handbooks, and so forth should be assembled and organized in the anticipated sequence of the interview.
- An appropriate debriefing site may need to be selected with considerations given to legal agreements with host countries or particular directives within unit SOPs.

CONTACT AND INTERVIEW

APPROACH AND INITIAL CONTACT

In the approach and initial contact, basically the same process is used as described before except that the sources for strategic debriefing are in a different legal status than EPWs.

QUESTIONING

The debriefer uses good questioning techniques and rapport and effective follow-up leads to ensure the answering of specific requirements.

RECORDING AND REPORTING

Comprehensive and logical note taking is translated into comprehensible, logical, and

objective reporting within the parameters of the intelligence report procedures outlined in DIAM 58-13.

TERMINATION

An interview is terminated in a manner which enables any debriefer to recontact a source at a later date and resume the debriefing process. The debriefer ensures that the source receives all promised incentives. It is often necessary to provide transportation and lodging for sources. Such considerations demand that the debriefer be familiar with the procedures for use of Intelligence Contingency Fund monies.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

There is an obvious need for OPSEC before, during, and after any debriefing. Source confidentiality and the handling of classified materials demand constant and special attention.

LANGUAGE ABILITY

Maintaining a language proficiency is a basic requirement, and improvement of dialects, slang, and technical terminology is a must.

LIAISON

A debriefer may have the added responsibility of maintaining local liaison with host-government agencies while OCONUS. Unit SOPs usually dictate the necessary and proper procedures.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ENHANCEMENT

The debriefer keeps up with new scientific and technical development of target countries. Intelligence agencies publish numerous reports and summaries which are readily available to the strategic debriefer.

COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Information gathered as strategic intelligence may be categorized into eight components.

An easy way to remember these components is through the use of the acronym **BEST MAPS**:

- B—biographic intelligence.
- E—economic intelligence.
- S—sociological intelligence.
- T—transportation and telecommunications intelligence.
- M—military geographical intelligence.
- A—armed forces intelligence.
- P—political intelligence.
- S—scientific and technical intelligence.

Each of these components can further be divided into a number of subcomponents. These components and subcomponents are not all-encompassing nor mutually exclusive. This approach is merely a means to enhance familiarization with the types of information included in strategic intelligence.

BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and backgrounds. This component can be divided into a number of subcomponents:

- Educational and occupational history—including civilian and military backgrounds of individuals.
- Individual accomplishment—notable accomplishments of an individual in professional or private life.
- Idiosyncrasies and habits—including mannerisms and unusual life styles.
- Position, influence, and potential—present and future positions of power or influence.
- Attitudes and hobbies—significant interests that may affect an individual's accessibility.

Such biographic information is reported by preparing a message intelligence report in accordance with the format in DIAM 58-13.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Economic intelligence studies the economic strengths and weaknesses of a country. Its subcomponents are—

- Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies.
- Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
- Manufacturing—information on manufacturing processes, facilities, logistics, and so forth.
- Source of economic capability—any means a country has to sustain its economy.

SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

Sociological intelligence deals with people, customs, behaviors, and institutions. The subcomponents are—

- Population—rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
- Social characteristics—customs, mores, and values.
- Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.
- Health, education, and welfare.
- Public information—information services within the country.

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies the role of transportation and telecommunications systems during military emergencies and during peacetime. The subcomponents of this topic are too varied and numerous to cover.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors (physical and cultur-

al) which may impact on military operations. Physical geography is concerned with natural or man-made geophysical features. Cultural geography provides demographic information.

ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE

Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground, sea, and air forces of a country—often referred to as OB. It is concerned with—

- Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics, politics, and so forth.
- Tactics—military deployments and operations doctrine.
- OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.
- Equipment—analysis of all military materiel.
- Logistics—procurement, storage, and distribution.
- Training—as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
- Organization—detailed analysis of command structures.
- Manpower—available resources and their conditioning.

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect military operations. Its subcomponents are—

- Government structure—organization of departments and ministries.
- National policies—government actions and decisions.
- Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
- Propaganda—information and disinformation programs.
- Policy and intelligence services—organization and functions.
- Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Scientific and technical intelligence studies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of new processes, equipment, weapons systems, and so forth. The subcomponents are—

- Weapons and weapon systems.
- Missile and space program.
- Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
- NBC developments.
- Basic applied science.
- Research and development systems.

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Equally important to the components of strategic intelligence is an awareness of the strategic intelligence cycle and the debriefer's role within that cycle. The first step is the identification of intelligence gaps. Analysts translate these gaps into intelligence requirements—the second step. In the third step, the strategic debriefer fulfills those requirements. The fourth step involves preparation of an intelligence report. The fifth and last step is the preparation of an intelligence report evaluation by the originator of the requirement. These evaluations measure the quality of the information as well as the quality of the report writing.

CHAPTER 8

Joint Interrogation Facilities

A conceptual void exists concerning the formation and use of a joint interrogation facility (JIF). This chapter provides general guidance to an EAC interrogation and exploitation (I&E) battalion commander on how to form a JIF (information on the organization of an EAC I&E battalion can be found in FC 34-124). STANAG 2033 provides the authority for the use of a JIF.

Many contingencies exist worldwide under which the use of US forces could become necessary. These procedures are in general terms and allow the I&E battalion commander the latitude necessary to form a JIF under those contingencies.

FORMATION

The JIF is not a TOE organization, but it is formed to meet specific requirements. It is task organized using I&E battalion assets. The personnel provided by other services and agencies will depend upon theater requirements.

Combined interrogation centers (CICs) are interrogation facilities which are manned by more than one nation and are not addressed. CICs, in the European theater, are established according to STANAG 2033. The operation of a CIC is determined by international agreement.

REQUIREMENT

In the constantly changing environment of today's world, our military forces could be called upon to enter into armed conflict in any level of intensity, anywhere on the globe. Unified and specified commands are totally prepared and react as necessary to multilevel threats of combat involvement. An intelligence collection facility is required to provide support to these joint commands.

MISSION

The JIF provides support to joint commands for collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence information. The JIF

provides this support through the interrogation of category A sources and exploitation of CEDs based on theater and national-level intelligence requirements.

ORGANIZATION

The intelligence collection facility is comprised of interrogators, CI personnel, and analysts from the US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and from various other US national agencies as required. They are established under one commander to operate as a JIF in the exploitation of documents and personnel. The JIF is a field activity of the joint command organized to meet theater requirements during crises or contingency deployments.

The organization of a JIF is tailored to meet the specific requirements of crises, contingency deployments, or military assistance operations to host nations. The Army component commander is designated as the executive agent for the establishment, organization, and functioning of the JIF. The EAC MI brigade commander, associated with the theater in question, will exercise command and control of the JIF.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The JIF, in meeting the specific requirements of crises, contingency deployment, or military assistance operations to host nations, is responsible for the following functions:

- Develop guidance and operational procedures for the conduct and management of all JIF functions.
- Coordinate with participating agencies and units to develop personnel selection criteria and assignment procedures necessary for partial or complete activation of the JIF.
- Organize, direct, manage, and control resources assigned to or included within the JIF.

- Supervise and direct full or partial activation of the JIF for the conduct of screenings and interrogation of sources, translation and exploitation of CEDs, and debriefing of captured or detained US personnel released or escaped from enemy control.
- Coordinate through the Army component with the theater J2 to ensure compatibility of other service components' plans and actions pertinent to the establishment and operation of the JIF.
- Coordinate through the Army component with the theater J2 the selection of suitable JIF operational sites.
- Coordinate with the provost marshal for all site operations.
- Coordinate and satisfy the intelligence collection requirements of theater and service components from available sources.
- Perform liaison to theater, service components, and other agencies and organizations as deemed appropriate.
- As directed, provide personnel as replacement, backup, or augmentation for service component interrogation organizations destroyed or depleted.
- Develop contingency plans for the evacuation of the JIF and the destruction of classified material. Selected sources, documents, and equipment will be evacuated with US forces.

USE

During crisis, contingency deployments, or military assistance to host nations, components will forward collection requirements to the theater command J2. The J2 serves as the requirements control authority and is responsible for the registration, validation, and establishment of priorities for JIF collection requirements. The J2 exercises staff cognizance over JIF operations.

OPERATION

The JIF deploys mobile interrogation teams (MIT) to identify, screen, and inter-

rogate category A sources to satisfy theater collection requirements and support service component interrogation operations. MIT interrogation reports are forwarded to the JIF, theater J2, and service components. In response to these interrogation reports, the theater J2 prioritizes and forwards additional collection requirements for specific sources to the JIF. The JIF directs the MIT to conduct further interrogations or coordinate evacuation of the source to the JIF for further interrogation.

Vital information derived by MIT through interrogation of sources or exploitation of CEDs is reported via secure communications to JIF and theater J2.

Based on collection requirements and MIT screening reports and interrogations, the JIF identifies EPWs for priority evacuation to the theater camp for JIF exploitation. The JIF prepares and disseminates source knowledgeability briefs (KB) to theater and national-level agencies. The JIF continually reviews the requirement to exploit these selected sources.

MIT assist lower echelon interrogators and intelligence specialists in the examination and categorization of CEDs for evacuation to the JIF.

Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value. Initial reports are submitted electronically whenever possible to ensure that the information reaches the analysts in the least amount of time. Written reports are prepared according to the format contained in Appendix G. Copies of SALUTE and interrogation reports pertaining to specific category A sources accompany them when they are evacuated to the JIF. In situations where time-critical data is involved, secure voice SALUTE reports to the theater J2 may be used to supplement procedures.

Initial MIT reporting includes the interrogator's assessment of the category A source intelligence value. This assessment addresses the category A source's intelligence, experience, cooperation, and reliability. Any areas of special knowledge possessed by the category A source is also identified.

COORDINATION

Effective coordination between the JIF and numerous component, theater, and national and host-government assets is necessary to ensure the success of JIF operations.

Theater J2 and service components' intelligence staffs require interface and coordination with the JIF to ensure collection requirements are satisfied accurately and in a timely manner. The success of JIF operations depends in part upon the screening, interrogation, and debriefing operations of division and corps interrogation and CI elements. The JIF establishes and maintains working relationships with service component HUMINT collection managers and interrogation and document exploitation units at all echelons. Service component members attached to the JIF facilitate this interface.

Interface and coordination with component security and military police elements are required to ensure the timely evacuation and proper safeguarding and exploitation of sources.

The JIF is located in the immediate vicinity of the theater EPW camp. The location of the EPW camp is the responsibility of the military police EPW camp commander. Army component G2s and provost marshal staffs coordinate all EPW planning about location.

Security arrangements for the EPW camp and planning for the segregation and safeguarding of JIF sources are the responsibility of the EPW camp commander. Sources are identified, classified, and segregated according to their status, sex, nationality, languages, and intelligence category. JIF sources are segregated and safeguarded from other sources. Security of the JIF and control over the sources within the JIF are under the direction of the JIF commander.

Component security and military police units are responsible for the evacuation, safeguarding, and control of sources. JIF MIT at lower echelons coordinate with these units for access to a source and the source's subsequent evacuation to the JIF.

JIF coordination and interface with theater and service component CI elements are necessary at all times. CI teams located at the JIF and with the MIT facilitate this interface and coordination. The JIF and MIT assist CI elements in the identification and exploitation of all sources of CI interest.

JIF coordination and interface with PSYOP and CA units are facilitated by direct access to members of these units conducting operations in support of military police EPW camps. PSYOP analysis concerning motivational and cultural factors of sources is of direct benefit to JIF operations.

JIF coordination and interface with legal, medical, and chaplain activities and authorities supporting EPW camps are required to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment and care of sources.

National agency access and participation in debriefings and interrogations conducted by the JIF are coordinated in advance through the theater J2. National agencies may establish liaison officers at the JIF.

Access to or knowledge of JIF operations and activities by host governments is coordinated through the theater J2.

COMMUNICATIONS

To effect required interface and coordination, the JIF requires secure communications with the theater J2, service components, and the MIT. Secure record and voice communications circuits and telephone switchboard trunks are used. Interface and compatibility with service component interrogation and CI team communications are required.

CHAPTER 9

Low-Intensity Conflict

This chapter provides concepts and doctrine concerning interrogation assets in LIC operations. Before discussing the use of interrogation assets in a LIC, we must understand the terminology and the US Army operational concept for LIC.

TERMINOLOGY

LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, military, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.

The definitions of mid- and high-intensity conflict limit their use to war between nations. These terms, defined here, will not be further discussed.

- Mid-intensity conflict—war between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (excluding nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons); command, control, and communications; and service support for limited objectives under definitive policy limitations as to the extent of destructive power that can be employed or the extent of geographic area that might be involved.
- High-intensity conflict—war between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons); command, control and communications; and service support.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regular forces.

The factors which lead to LIC are complex and, in many cases, cannot be resolved by short-term actions. Success in this environment is dependent upon the effective application of all elements of national power and clearly defined goals and objectives. Political objectives establish the limits and constraints for military operations, as well as other social, political, and economic programs. The difference between military operations in LIC and the war, as found in mid- or high-intensity levels, lies in the measure of military success. In the latter, military success is measured in terms of winning campaigns and battles. In LIC, however, success will consist of achieving US national objectives without the protracted commitment of US forces in a combat role. It must be noted that, should military intervention be necessary, a premature commitment of US soldiers to combat in a low-intensity situation may result in the loss of strategic initiative. Political, economic, social, and psychological initiatives are necessary to achieve lasting success in the LIC arena.

The US Army's mission in LIC can be divided into four general categories: peacekeeping operations, foreign internal defense (FID), peacetime contingency operations, and terrorism counteraction.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Increasing world tension, continuing conflicts, scarce resources, and general distrust have created environments in which a military force may be employed to achieve, restore, or maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present situations that are often ambiguous and may require forces to deal with extreme tension and violence in the form of terrorism, sabotage, and minor military conflicts from known and unknown belligerents.

Given the worldwide nature of US national interests, it is vital to US security to maintain not only the capability to employ force, but also the ability to assist in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. US Army participation in peacekeeping operations may be multinational in nature or may be conducted unilaterally.

Multinational peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. They may be undertaken in response to a request for assistance made to either a multinational organization or to the US directly. Historically, the United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of multinational peacekeeping operations, though regional organizations have acted in a similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.

Although unilateral peacekeeping operations are possible, they are inherently sensitive and require tacit international approval. Unilateral peacekeeping operations conducted by the US require clear humanitarian justifications.

The two common missions in peacekeeping operations are cease fire supervision and law and order maintenance.

Cease Fire Supervision

Peacekeeping forces can be deployed to observe and report on compliance with diplomatically arranged cease fires. The force will require the capability for rapid deployment to perform its peacekeeping function and must be initially self-sufficient, have self-defense capability, and possess effective internal and external

communications. The terms of the cease fire agreement may call for the peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawals and disengagements of the belligerents, supervise the exchange of prisoners of war, or monitor demobilization.

Law and Order Maintenance

Peacekeeping operations also include restoration or maintenance of law and order. Traditional civilian law enforcement functions are generally not performed by US military personnel. However, situations may arise which require limited support to duly authorized law enforcement authorities of a receiving state.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

FID encompasses those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of one government in any program taken by another government to preclude or defeat insurgency. Insurgencies cannot be overcome by military measures alone but by military support to national programs.

US Army forces operate in concert with other services, both US and host nation and with other US Government agencies. Operations are conducted in support of plans developed by the host nation and the US Government.

US forces involved in FID must have an appreciation of the culture into which they are employed and should be selected, educated, and prepared to ensure that US involvement and goals are understood and complied with. Language capabilities are important and must be developed to the maximum extent possible. Units should be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and arrive in the host country established as an effective, cohesive group, prepared to begin operations immediately.

US Army forces can assume various relationships with the host nation's military forces in FID operations. They can serve as advisors or instructors at all levels. Special forces units are specifically trained for this mission. Combat support of CSS units may augment the host nation's efforts and serve

to prepare the battlefield for US combat forces, if required. US forces must assume an unobtrusive support role to maintain credibility of the host government.

The manner in which US combat forces are employed will vary with the situation. Because of their familiarity with local communities and population, it is generally better to use indigenous military assets in more populated areas and to employ US combat assets in remote areas.

When US Army combat troops are required for FID operations, planning for their withdrawal begins at the time of deployment. The withdrawal of Army units depends on the capability of the host nation forces to regain and maintain control.

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

In certain environments, peacetime contingency operations become necessary when diplomatic initiatives have been, or are expected to be, ineffective in achieving extremely time-sensitive, high-value objectives. Failure to influence a belligerent nation or activity through diplomatic means may necessitate the use of military forces to protect US national interests, rescue US citizens, or defend US assets.

Intelligence is a particularly critical part of all peacetime contingency operations. The rapid and tightly controlled introduction of US combat forces is a part of contingency operations which requires precision planning. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence determines the success or failure of these operations. Time for planning and execution is typically short, and intelligence assets must be able to anticipate requirements and provide comprehensive products on extremely short notice. City plans with complete detail of utilities, personality profiles of local officials, and details of specific ports, airports, roads, and bridges are examples of information which must be made readily available. Intelligence gathering missions into sensitive areas are also conducted as required.

TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

Terrorism, employed worldwide, may be sponsored by political or other terrorist groups within a nation, sponsored by an external source, or employed as a tactic of insurgents. It is clearly a dimension of warfare which pays high dividends with minimum risk. Population areas, public transport conveyances, industrial facilities, and individuals are high-probability targets for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups increasingly threaten US interests throughout the world.

Terrorism counteraction consists of those actions taken to counter the terrorist threat. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken against terrorists. Specially trained US Army forces are the main element used in counterterrorism operations.

Intelligence is essential to implementing effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures. Its purpose in terrorism counteraction is to identify and quantify the threat and provide timely threat intelligence. This includes the evaluation of terrorist capabilities, tactics, targets, and the dissemination of this information.

Terrorism counteraction varies according to the type of terrorist organization involved. Autonomous terrorist groups, for example, are vulnerable to intelligence and police-type operations. In a different arena, the actions of state-supported and state-directed groups would certainly be sensitive to measures taken against the supporting states.

INTERROGATION SUPPORT TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The principles and techniques of interrogation discussed elsewhere in this manual apply with equal validity to interrogations

conducted in LIC operations. Specific applications of the general principles and techniques must be varied to meet local peculiarities. However, because of these peculiarities of LIC operations, this chapter provides additional guidelines for the conduct of interrogations in support of such operations. Intelligence interrogations play a significant role in ascertaining the development of an insurgency in the latent or initial stage; the intentions, attitudes, capabilities, and limitations of the insurgents; their underground organizations; and their support systems. In addition to the traditional military concepts of intelligence concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather, LIC operations have added a new dimension—the population. The major aim of both the threatened government and the insurgents is to influence the population favorably and win its support.

LIMITATIONS TO UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

US military or civilian participation in intelligence interrogations during LIC operations is generally limited to that permitted by the host government concerned. This limitation places certain restrictions on US military and civilian personnel engaged in such operations. The degree of participation will, therefore, be determined by combined US and host-country policies. Normally, the interrogator is asked to advise, assist, and train host-country personnel who are members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other security agencies (FM 100-20). The interrogator may also provide intelligence interrogation support to committed US or allied forces during LIC operations. This will require effective, close coordination of the combined effort with host-country agencies. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by conducting a combined interrogation effort with interrogators of the host country. Further advantages of such a measure are the language capability and the intimate knowledge of the area—personalities, customs, ethnic differences and geography—possessed by the host country's interrogation personnel.

INTERROGATOR SKILLS AND ABILITIES

LIC operations intelligence requirements demand detailed familiarity with the military, political, and front organizations of the insurgent enemy and the environment in which he operates.

The interrogator's familiarity with the areas of operations must include an understanding and appreciation of the insurgency, its objectives, history, successes, and failures. This understanding and appreciation is required not only on a general countrywide basis, but also on an expanded basis within the interrogator's particular area of operation. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator fully grasps the importance that the insurgent organization places on the accomplishment of political objectives as opposed to military successes.

One measure of the interrogator's effectiveness is his ability to apply the appropriate interrogation techniques to the personality of the source. Interrogations associated with LIC operations dictate the need for skill in the full range of interrogation techniques so that the interrogator can conduct the many types of interrogations demanded.

ADVISOR AND INTERROGATOR RELATIONSHIPS

In some instances, US Army interrogators are assigned to a host country to assist in developing interrogation capabilities of host-country forces. FM 100-20 contains detailed information on advisor duties, techniques, and procedures. However, the operations and relationship of the advisor to host-country interrogators require special mention and are discussed below.

Advisor Qualifications

The advisor must be a qualified, experienced interrogator with an extensive intelligence background. He requires area orientation and must have language ability, and a personality favorable for working with indigenous peoples. The following are normal functions of an interrogation advisor:

- Establish a working relationship with his counterparts through development of mutual respect and confidence.
- Provide advice for effective collection through interrogation.
- Assist in establishing combined interrogation centers.
- Provide on-the-job training for indigenous interrogators.
- Assist in the establishment of necessary file systems to support interrogation operations.
- Conduct appropriate liaison with all units participating in the combined interrogation center.
- Keep the senior Army intelligence advisor informed on operations and activities within his area.
- Provide the financial support, as authorized, for interrogation operations to his counterpart.
- Conduct appropriate coordination with other US intelligence advisors.

Counterpart Relationship

The advisor's accomplishments depend upon the relationship established with his counterpart. This relationship is influenced by the personalities of each. Ideally, this relationship should develop as the counterpart's knowledge of the area combines with the professional knowledge of the advisor. Before he provides advice to his counterpart, the advisor should observe the operation of the unit and become familiar with the area and the local situation. For convenience, his office should be adjacent to that of his counterpart. However, the advisor should not interfere with the routine administrative duties that must be accomplished by his counterpart.

Above all, the advisor must remember that his is an advisory role and not that of a supervisor or commander. He advises the counterpart rather than individuals within the unit. This is important, for advising individuals could result in advice which

would be contrary to the orders of the counterpart. In reality, advice is totally accepted only when the counterpart is convinced that the advice is sound and appropriate of the situation.

In cases where the advisor may observe brutal methods in handling and interrogating captives and other detainees, he must not participate in these acts and, further, should remove himself and any other US personnel for whom he is responsible from the scene. Local theater policies and directives normally assign other specified actions for the advisor in a situation of this sort. Such policies and directives may include advising the counterpart of the undesirability of such action and the reporting of the incident through US channels. The advisor must comply with any such theater (or other command) policies and directives.

Advisor Operations

The advisor must emphasize that development of a combined interrogation effort is of the utmost importance to successful operations. This combined capability is achieved by uniting the interrogation resources of all intelligence forces (except tactical) within a specific geographic area of responsibility (that is, national, province, district). Most likely, the advisor will find that in many host countries, interrogation responsibilities will be assigned as follows:

- Civilian police—suspects and insurgent political cadre.
- Military interrogators—captured military insurgents and those military insurgents who have rallied to the legally constituted government.
- Indigenous military counterintelligence—insurgent infiltrators and deserters from host-country forces.

The advisor must stress the integration of all interrogator resources to achieve economy of force and unity of effort. Often this task will be complicated by personalities of

the host country, military, and civilian officials. But if harmonious working relationships are established with the key personalities involved, the advisor can succeed in integrating all available resources.

The interrogator (advisor) should establish liaison with US advisors working with host-country tactical forces operating within his area. From these advisors he can be constantly informed of insurgents captured by these tactical forces. The interrogator (advisor) and tactical unit advisor, working together with their respective counterparts, can ensure effective interrogation of these captured insurgents. Further, the advisors can assist in achieving the required coordination between host-country tactical units and area forces to improve handling and exploiting interrogation sources.

THE SOURCE

The status of insurgents in LIC operations differs from that of recognized belligerents; the field of interrogation will encompass a wider variety of sources involved in operations.

LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENTS

EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and are governed by the guidelines and limitations provided by the Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subversive underground elements who are seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency do not hold legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host-government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions beyond the basic protections in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to the internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of US forces, however, will be governed by existing agreements with the host country and by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

POPULATION

LIC operations place the population in the position of a prime target. Therefore, the population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The population with which the interrogator will have to deal may be composed of friendly, hostile, or completely indifferent elements. In dealing with these population elements, as well as with the insurgents, the desires of the host country must be considered. There is a need to gain the support of the population to deprive the insurgents of their primary sources of support. Such a need places a burden upon the interrogator to learn more about the people—their customs and taboos (by ethnic groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear of foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philosophy or outlook on life, and other facets of their political, economic, and social institutions. Since CI elements are tasked with the mission of countersubversion, the primary responsibility of identifying insurgent operations within the population is placed upon CI personnel. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator maintain close and continuous coordination with CI personnel to ensure complete exploitation of the population.

INSURGENT VULNERABILITY TO INTERROGATION

The individual insurgent may lack many of the conventional psychological supports which are helpful in resisting interrogation. Often he is in conflict with his own people, perhaps of the same ethnic group, religion, environment, or even, in some cases, his family. Further, the insurgent has no legal status as an EPW and, therefore, realizes he may be considered a common criminal. The insurgent often expects to receive harsh and brutal treatment after capture. If he does not receive this harsh treatment, the psychological effect may make him amenable to the interrogator. In addition, the shock effect normally induced by capture will further increase his susceptibility to interrogation. Therefore, the individual insurgent may rationalize cooperation with the interrogator as the best course of action for his survival.

Although the insurgent often lacks conventional psychological support, as previously discussed, the interrogator should realize that other support may have been furnished him through intensive political and psychological indoctrination and training to resist interrogation. Indoctrination sessions using such techniques as self and group criticism can give insurgents a strong group identification and fanatical belief in the insurgent cause.

The entire range of insurgent activity is vulnerable to mass interrogation of the populace. Since the insurgent's operations are often contingent on the support of the populace, members of the populace inevitably learn the identities and activities of the insurgent. With large numbers of people knowing him, the insurgent is vulnerable to mass screening and interrogation programs. Success of such programs may be enhanced by the insurgent's previously committed acts of terror, tax collection, and forced recruitment, which will have alienated some members of the population.

HANDLING OF INSURGENT CAPTIVES AND SUSPECTS

Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. It is not usually a conflict of international character, and it is not a recognized belligerency. Therefore, insurgent captives are not guaranteed full protection under the articles of the Geneva Conventions relative to the handling of EPWs. However, Article 3 of the Conventions requires that insurgent captives be humanely treated and forbids violence to life and person—in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. It further forbids commitment of outrages upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, passing of sentences, and execution without prior judgment by a regularly constituted court.

Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance with Article 3, if for no other reason than to render them more susceptible to interrogation. The insurgent is trained to expect brutal treatment upon capture. If, contrary to

what he has been led to believe, this mistreatment is not forthcoming, he is apt to become psychologically softened for interrogation. Furthermore, brutality by either capturing troops or friendly interrogators will reduce defections and serve as grist for the insurgent's propaganda mill.

Special care must be taken in handling insurgent suspects, for their degree of sympathy with the insurgency usually is not readily apparent. Improper handling of such persons may foster sympathies for the insurgency or induce them to remain passive at a time when the host country requires active support from its citizens.

INSURGENT METHODS OF RESISTANCE

Recognizing vulnerability to interrogation, the insurgent counters by taking any of the following actions:

- Keeps his forces ignorant of future operations, unit designations, and true names of leaders.
- Assigns multiple designations to units, frequently changes them, and uses aliases for names of leaders.
- Hires informants to watch and report on the people and commits reprisals against those who provide information to the government.
- Instructs his forces to remain silent upon capture for a given period of time. This lapse in time tends to decrease the value of the information which is ultimately revealed to hostile interrogators.
- Provides plausible cover stories to hide true information.
- Indoctrinates his forces with ideological training.
- Publicizes cases where captives have been killed or mistreated by capturing forces.
- Screens his recruits carefully.
- Uses cellular structure to restrict knowledge of personnel and operations.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF SOURCES

The characteristics and knowledge of interrogation sources vary widely, based upon the position, status, and mission of the insurgent within his organization. The interrogator's appraisal of these factors, coupled with his own knowledge of the source and the organization to which he belongs, will assist in quickly evaluating the informational potential of each source. Interrogation sources vary and include the combatant, terrorist, propagandist, courier, political cadre, and intelligence agent. They may be young or old, male or female, educated or illiterate. General characteristics and knowledgeability of the more common types are discussed below.

Main and Local Forces

The main force combatant is the best indoctrinated, trained, led, disciplined, and equipped of all insurgent forces. He will know more, but may be inclined to reveal less than a local force insurgent or a member of the village militia. When properly interrogated, however, he can be expected to be a fruitful source of information on his unit and its personnel; current and past military operations; supply and base areas; status of training and morale; some information of higher, lower, and adjacent units; routes of infiltration and exfiltration; tactics and general information on his area of operations. In short, he may be likened to the more conventional prisoner of war and will be knowledgeable on topics akin to that type of individual. He will differ, however, in that his knowledge of units other than his own will be far less than that of the conventional prisoner of war. Generally speaking, the local force insurgent soldier (the second component of the insurgent regular armed forces) will be almost as valuable as a main force soldier for interrogation purposes. His knowledge will depend primarily upon the methods of operation used by the insurgent movement in the employment of its regular armed forces.

Militia

Compared to the main and local force insurgent, the local village militia member is often poorly trained, disciplined, and equipped. While he is not likely to be a profitable source of information on regular force units, his native familiarity with the area in which he operates makes him a most valuable source on local terrain, insurgent infrastructure, food and weapons caches, lines of communications and logistics, intelligence operations, and OB information on his own militia unit. When cooperative, he, likewise, can be used to identify local insurgent sympathizers within his area.

Political Cadre

This individual is a profitable interrogation source for obtaining information on the composition and operation of the insurgent's political structure. At the lowest level (hamlet and village) he normally wears "two hats," one as the political leader, the other as the commander of the militia. At higher levels the individual is more political in orientation and can provide information on cell members, front organizations, sympathizers, and nets. He is also knowledgeable on the military units within his area, their lines and methods of communications, and future plans and operations of both the political and military organizations.

Sympathizer

This individual may be a sympathizer in fact or one of circumstance—that is, through blackmail, terror, or relatives being held hostage. In either event, if skillfully interrogated, the sympathizer can become the most fruitful source of information on one of the greatest and most perplexing questions of insurgency—"How do you tell the difference between friend and foe?" The sympathizer coerced into assisting the insurgent is, of course, the most useful type of individual, but care must be taken to protect him after he has revealed useful information.

Defectors

These individuals are perhaps the best source of information available during LIC.

They are usually cooperative and easily susceptible to direct approach interrogation techniques. The most important feature of interrogating defectors is the capability to exploit physically the individual who voluntarily agrees to accompany friendly personnel into tactical operations areas. The primary methods of exploiting defectors are to use them as tactical guides and advisors, as informants, as aides in interrogation and document analysis, and as advisors on enemy agent net modus operandi. It should be noted, however, that some of these techniques involve personal danger for the defector, and for that reason, he should be provided appropriate protective equipment. Coercion cannot be used to induce his cooperation. However, when defectors are employed to accomplish objectives, as discussed in FM 34-60, they will be controlled only by qualified CI personnel.

INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

SCREENING TECHNIQUES

The screening of insurgent captives and suspects is the key to productive interrogation by CI personnel. Screening is a twofold operation conducted to identify insurgents or their sympathizers in the population and, of these, to find the most knowledgeable individuals for interrogation. Techniques for accomplishing these functions are varied and depend mainly upon the imagination and ingenuity of screener personnel. For this reason, only the most resourceful interrogators should be selected as screeners. Examples of successful screening aids and techniques are discussed below.

Local Leader

The local leader, whether a government official, religious personage, teacher or village elder, is a useful screening assistant. This individual knows the people, their habits and activities. He knows the legitimate resident from the stranger and can often point out insurgents and their sympathizers in his area. However, since the local leader is vulnerable to insurgent terror or reprisals, his overt use in screening may be sometimes limited. When employed in an

overt capacity, he will always require protection later. The mere fact that a man is a constituted local leader should never be viewed as prima facie evidence of loyalty to the host-country government. A leader may be secretly or tacitly supporting the insurgency or may, for personal political reasons, discredit political rivals with false accusations.

Insurgent Captive

The insurgent captive can be used as a "finger man" in a police-type line-up, an excellent means of mass screening. As the entire population of a community files past, the captive points out those individuals loyal to the insurgency. A police "mug file" is a useful variant of this technique. Here the captive reviews photographs taken from family registries.

Agent or Friendly Civilian

The line-up or the "mug file," described above, is most productive when friendly agents and civilians are used as screening assistants. However, care should be taken to hide the identity of these individuals by placing them behind a barrier or covering their faces. An excellent source for employment of this technique is the individual who has close relatives within the government or its military forces.

Area Cordon

A good method to screen a community is to cordon off the area and restrict the inhabitants to their homes. All movement thereafter must be strictly controlled and regulated. With this accomplishment, each member of the community is questioned regarding the identities of party members and sympathizers for the same length of time and with the same questions. If the desired information is not obtained after completion of all questioning, the process should begin again and continue until people start to talk. Once information is

obtained, the members of the local insurgent infrastructure are apprehended simultaneously and removed from the community for intensive, detailed interrogation.

Informant Technique

This technique involves placement of a friendly individual among a group of suspects or captives. The individual acts out the role of an insurgent sympathizer to gain the confidence of the group and to learn the identity of the true insurgents and their leaders.

INTERROGATION OF ILLITERATES

The interrogation of illiterate sources requires special questioning techniques. The interrogator is after facts, and eliciting such simple data from illiterates as "size" or

"how many" is often difficult. The interrogator must agree on common terminology with his source so that he can communicate and obtain the information he desires. He can use a system of holding up fingers on his hands, marking on a piece of paper, or using matchsticks, pieces of wood, or other materials to determine numerical facts. In determining types of weapons, the interrogator can show actual weapons, photographs, or drawings of weapons from which the source can make a comparison with what he actually saw. Description of colors can be made from pieces of materials or color charts. Direction of movement may be found out by location of the sun, stars, or landmarks familiar to the source. Time can be determined by the position of the sun, locating a traveled route and then computing how rapidly the source walked, or finding out how often he stopped and how many meals he ate. The methods discussed are examples of common terminology or reference points which an interrogator employs. Additionally, knowledge of the specific habits of the populace and of the area allows the interrogator to select a definite term of reference.

APPENDIX A
STANAG Extracts

Extracts from STANAGs 1059, 2033, 2044, and 2084 pertaining to intelligence interrogations and document exploitation are being provided in this Appendix for your information. The extracts have been

copied as they appear in the STANAGs and are not reformatted. Copies of STANAGs can be obtained from Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19120.

**EXTRACT FROM STANAG
1059**

NATIONAL DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR USE BY NATO FORCES

2. The following national distinguishing letters shall be used whenever it is necessary to use abbreviations in staff work and communications, including publications, documents, communications, orders or other media, to identify a NATO nation or any part of NATO Forces. The distinguishing letters are to be used to denote the countries concerned in all documents or papers, irrespective of whether they are in the English or French language. Whenever the NATO nations are listed in any paper or document, they are to be listed in the order shown in both English and French versions.

Belgium	BE
Canada	CA (see Note 1)
Denmark	DA
France	FR
Federal Republic of Germany	GE
Greece	GR
Iceland	IC
Italy	IT
Luxembourg	LU
Netherlands	NL
Norway	NO
Portugal	PO
Spain	SP
Turkey	TU
United Kingdom	UK (see Note 2)
United States	US

Notes: 1. The national distinguishing letters for Canada are not to be used to identify Canadian Army formations which have the word "Canadian/Canadienne" in their official designation.

A-1

2. The letters "UK" denote the United Kingdom, or a force or part of a force provided solely from the United Kingdom. The letters "BR" may, however, be used in special cases to denote a force comprising units or elements of more than one country of the British Commonwealth.
3. When used to identify a National Force or component of a National Force the distinguishing letters are to be bracketed immediately following the Force, formation or unit number.

Examples: 12(US) Army Group
 5(FR) Armoured Division
 6(NL) Infantry Brigade
 5(IT) Infantry Regiment

National distinguishing letters for components of Army Forces smaller than a division are to be used only when it is necessary to avoid confusion.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

21. Interrogation Serial Number. In order to avoid errors in cross-checking the information obtained from interrogating PW, the origin of information repeated in intelligence reports will be indicated in brackets. To this end, every PW interrogated is to be given an interrogation serial number as a source of information (not to be confused with the internment serial number discussed in STANAG 2044 which is given to PW for administrative reasons). This number is to be allocated by the first interrogation unit to interrogate him officially. It is to be noted on the Tactical Interrogation Report. Only one interrogation serial number is to be allocated to each prisoner; it will not be changed or re-allocated subsequently. The system of allocating the interrogation serial number is given in Annex B.

ANNEX B TO STANAG 2033
(Edition No. 4)

A-2

SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING AN INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBER

TO A PRISONER OF WAR

1. Every PW selected for interrogation shall receive an interrogation serial number as a source of information, (not to be confused with an internment serial number discussed in STANAG 2044, which is given to all PW for administrative reasons). This interrogation serial number will be allocated to the PW by the first team of interrogators officially interrogating him and responsible for his selection. This number will be constituted as follows:

a. Two letters, in accordance with STANAG 1059, indicating the nationality of the unit which captured the prisoner (e.g. BE, CA, GE, etc.).

b. Two letters indicating the service or enemy forces to which the prisoner belongs:

Army.....AR	Marines.....MR
Navy.....NV	Airborne.....AB
Naval Air Arm...NA	Police.....PL
Air Force.....AF	Irregular.....IR

c. Four or five figures as required, to designate the team which carried out the first official interrogation.

d. A number to identify the prisoner himself. Every prisoner selected for interrogation will receive a personal number, allocated in numerical order and given by the first team to interrogate him officially. This number, preceded by a dash will be added to the code number constituted as described above.

2. Table showing how numbers are allocated to teams of interrogators:

a. NATO Forces:

SACEUR	:	1.000 - 4.999	-SACLANT	:	5.000 - 6.999
CINCNORTH	:	1.000 - 1.999	-CINCHAN	:	7.000 - 7.999
CINCENT	:	2.000 - 2.999			
CINCSOUTH	:	3.000 - 3.999			

a. National Forces:

BELGIUM	:	10.000 - 10.999	-ITALY	:	16.000 - 16.999
CANADA	:	11.000 - 11.999	-LUXENBOURG	:	17.000 - 17.999
DENMARK	:	12.000 - 12.999	-NETHERLANDS	:	18.000 - 18.999
FRANCE	:	13.000 - 13.999	-NORWAY	:	19.000 - 19.999
			-PORTUGAL	:	20.000 - 20.999
			-SPAIN	:	24.000 - 24.999

Federal Republic

of Germany:	14.000 - 14.999	-TURKEY	:	21.000 - 21.999	
GREECE	:	15.000 - 15.999	-UNITED KINGDOM	:	22.000 - 22.999
			-UNITED STATES	:	23.000 - 23.999

3. Example of an interrogation serial number:

"BE-AR-2207-137"

BE : Belgian capturing unit.

AR : Prisoner is a member of enemy army forces.

2207 : The team of interrogators which allocated the number is part of a force attached to CINCENT.

137 : He is the 137th prisoner interrogated and numbered as such by this team.

9. Categories of PW According to Intelligence Value. According to their value of intelligence, PW may be divided for convenience into the following broad categories which are not listed in any agreed order or priority.

a. Categories A. High level PW whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators and at the highest level. This category will normally include all:

(1) General officers or equivalent, who have knowledge of sufficient value to NATO to warrant detailed interrogation.

(2) Chiefs of Staff of formations down to and including divisions or the equivalent.

(3) Heads of staff sections down to army group/army level or the equivalent.

(4) Scientific personnel.

(5) Technical personnel with up-to-date knowledge of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons or any other type of equipment.

(6) Psychological personnel.

(7) Political officers.

(8) Other officials, war correspondents, supply contractors, etc., who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistics capabilities or political and economic factors.

(9) Personnel with a knowledge of enemy communications and especially cyphers or cryptographic equipment.

(10) Officers serving intelligence appointments or organizations.

(11) Personnel who are intimately associated with or have a working knowledge of items of major intelligence importance.

(12) Flying personnel whose mission, subordination, training and knowledge of enemy locations and movements is thought likely to be of considerable intelligence interest.

(13) Officers, warrant officers and senior Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) of special purpose forces.

A-5

- b. Category B. PW who have enough information on any subject of intelligence interest to warrant a second interrogation.
- c. Category C. PW who have only information of immediate tactical value and do not therefore warrant a second interrogation.
- d. Category D. PW who are of no interest to intelligence.

**EXTRACT FROM STANAG
2044**

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH PRISONERS OF WAR

7. PW Processing-Stage 1-The Capture. As far as practicable, the responsibilities of the capturing unit are:
- a. To disarm the PW without delay and to remove all their military documents and equipment, except for clothing and protective equipment (Article 18 of the Convention). Tagging should then be carried out as described in Annex C.
 - b. To segregate, for the purpose of interrogation, PW according to rank, grade and service, sex, nationality, deserters, civilians and political indoctrination personnel. Such segregation is not to violate the requirements of Article 16 of the Convention.
 - c. To treat PW with correctness but to permit no talking or fraternization that may prejudice future interrogation.
 - d. To arrange for naval and air force PW to be interrogated by naval or air force interrogators as appropriate. To place adequate guards around crashed enemy aircraft.
 - e. To segregate, as soon as possible, from PW and other captured enemy personnel, enemy nationals who identify themselves as defectors. These personnel will be screened to ascertain whether they possess information of ground, naval or air interest. Upon determination of primacy of interest, the defector will be interrogated by that service. Subsequently, to send a report

A-6

along staff channels, as may be prescribed by the commander concerned, giving details of the alleged defector and asking for disposal instructions.

f. To segregate from other personnel, captured personnel claiming to be special agents of an allied service and send a report on such personnel to the appropriate staff.

g. To inform PW of their rights under Section V of the Convention.
(Relations of Prisoner of War with the Exterior.)

h. To escort PW to the nearest collection point or PW Holding Area as quickly as possible.

8. PW Processing-Stage 2-Evacuation and Holding. If the situation has prevented the capturing unit from fulfilling the responsibilities listed in para. 7 above, the unit administering the collection points should do so without delay. If PW bypass the collection points these responsibilities will be fulfilled by the unit administering the Corps of Army PW Holding Area. Then if possible the following should be carried out:

Completion of Detainee Personnel Record. The Detainee Personnel Record (Appendix B) is to be used as the basic Prisoner of War Personnel Record. The form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in one of the NATO languages. It remains a national responsibility to provide translation keys in the language of the prisoner concerned.

9. PW Processing-Stage 3-PW Camp. If any of the responsibilities or duties listed in paras 7 and 8 above or arising from the Convention have not been fulfilled they must be so fulfilled by the PW Camp authorities. In addition prisoners will be allotted internment Serial Numbers which are to be consecutive and composed of prefix code letters identifying the capturing nation in accordance with STANAG 1059.

10. Handling of Personal Property. The procedures set forth in Annex B are to govern the handling of personal property, including money.

A-7

11. Financial Accountability. Financial accounts, pay and work records, and receipts for property and money are to be in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

ANNEX B TO STANAG 2044
(edition no. 4)

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HANDLING OF PROPERTY AND MONEY
OF PRISONERS OF WAR

1. No attempt has been made to standardize a list of those effects of personal use, sums of money and articles of value to be impounded, confiscated or to remain in the possession of the prisoners. Policies in these matters are to be individually determined by the nations. Likewise, nations are independently to determine policies with regard to the conversion of foreign currencies into their own currency. When laying down these policies, nations are to ensure that the appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention of 1949 are complied with.
2. In addition to issuing receipts to the prisoners for articles and sums of money which are impounded for reasons of security, such impounded articles and money are to be listed in the appropriate space on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record. Sums of money are not to be taken away from PW except on order of an officer. That record must be maintained up to date by the addition of items taken from the prisoners subsequent to the initial entry and by the deletion of items returned to the prisoners.
3. In the event of an international transfer of prisoners, their impounded articles and money which has been converted into the currency of the detaining nation are to accompany them and must be clearly accounted for on the Prisoner of War Personnel Records which also accompany the prisoners. The appropriate representative of the receiving nation is to verify and sign for the articles and money received. Money taken from the prisoners in the currency of the

A-8

detaining nation and that which has been converted into the currency of the detaining nation at the request of the prisoners is not to be the subject of transfer. Such money is accounted for in the certificate required to be issued to the prisoners at the time of the transfer by the transferring nation, showing the amounts standing to the credit of their accounts, and need not to be the subject of concern to the nation receiving the prisoners. It should be clearly indicated on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record that such money, although initially listed on the form as impounded money, is not included in the articles and money delivered to the receiving nation.

4. Impounded articles and money, except money initially in the currency of the Detaining Power or subsequently converted to same and credited to the prisoner's account, which for any reason do not accompany the prisoner at the time of an international transfer, must be sent to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau of the nation receiving the prisoner.

ANNEX C TO STANAG 2044
(edition no. 4)

STANDARDIZE CAPTIVE AND EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENT TAG

GENERAL

1. A standardization tag is considered necessary for temporary use in identifying captured personnel and equipment or documents captured with personnel, before formal documentation can be completed. This tag should contain on one side the minimum necessary information in a standard format. The reverse side may be used for national handling instructions. The tag is not to be used for labelling captured equipment or documents not associated with captured personnel. The procedure for dealing with such equipment is covered by STANAG 2084.
2. The tag which is in 3 parts will be used as follows (Note 1):
 - a. Top part (marked "A")

A-9

To serve as identification of captured personnel before completion of the Prisoner of War Record; and to serve as a substitute identifying card when required.

b. Middle part (marked "B")

For administrative purposes according to national requirements.

c. Bottom part (marked "C")

To mark document and/or equipment.

3. The form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in one of the NATO official languages.

4. A specimen tag and description is at Appendix 1 to this annex.

PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS

5. Each captive is to be tagged by the capturing unit as soon as possible.

6. If a captive possesses equipment or documents, the capturing unit is to complete the bottom part of the tag (C) and affix it to the equipment or documents as soon as possible.

7. The tag number is to be preceded by the printed national code (see STANAG 1059) -e.g. BE, CA, FR, etc...

NOTE 1: Those nations which do not wish to use 3 part tags many have only a 2 part tag consisting of the top and bottom parts (marked A and C).

**EXTRACT FROM STANAG
2084**

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

3. Document. For the purpose of this agreement, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all:

- a. Written material, whether handwritten, printed or typed.
- b. Painted, drawn or engraved material.
- c. Sound or voice recordings.

A-10

d. Imagery.

e. Punched cards, punched paper tape, printed output and associated material.

f. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process.

PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS (CED).

General.

17. CED are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for intelligence purposes with minimum of delay.

18. CED associated with CEE (i.e. ATD marked TECHDOC) will be handled as described in part I. All other types of CED will be handled as described in this part. Such documents are to be divided into categories as follows:

a. Category A. Documents containing information concerning subjects of [sic] priority intelligence interest [sic].

b. Category B. Cryptographic documents, encrypted items and all other documents relating to enemy communications systems.

c. Category C. Documents considered of less intelligence value.

d. Category D. Documents containing no information of intelligence value.

19. In principle CED belong to the nation of the capturing unit, but in order to ensure that information of tactical intelligence interest is efficiently utilized, such documents should be handled through command channels in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final, thorough investigation will be the responsibility of the capturing nation.

20. CED associated with a PW, or copies thereof, should follow the PW during the PW interrogation process. Otherwise, the exploitation of CED should be carried out in accordance with the principles laid down for CEE in Part I, paras. 6 - 10.

A-11

EXPLOITATION PROCESS

21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be combined.

- a. Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tactical value by capturing unit.
- b. Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 18), reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence staffs.
- c. Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dissemination by CDU or other special elements.

MARKING OF CED

22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows:

National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated sequentially by the capturing unit.

Date-time of capture.

Place of capture (UTM co-ordinates).

Summary of circumstances under which the CED was obtained.

Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or known.

25. Reproduction and dissemination of CED and translation as necessary will be carried out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted to appropriate NATO and national staffs.

APPENDIX B

Sample Detainee Personnel Record

DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD				
For use of this form, see AR 190-8. The processing agency is GOCSPR.				
PART I - TO BE COMPLETED AT TIME OF PROCESSING				
CARD I		1. INTERNMENT SERIAL NO. (1-22)	2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) (14-34)	
3. RANK (24-27)	4. ENEMY SVC NO. (28-29)	5. TYPE (47)	6. DATE OF CAPTURE (48-53)	7. DATE OF BIRTH (64-69)
8. NATIONALITY (80-81)	9. EDUCATION (82)	10. RELIGION (83-84)	11. MARSTA (85)	12. PW CAMP UIC (86-91)
CARD II		13. PW PROCESS DATE (92-97)	14. SEX (1-4)	
(Key number to ID pick up (MIL LABS))		15. LANGUAGE I (16-18)	16. LANGUAGE II (19-21)	
17. PHYSICAL CONDITION (23)	18. PW CAMP LOCATION (20-23)		19. ENEMY UNIT (22-24)	
20. ARM OF SVC (35)	21. MOSC (36-39)	22. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION (40-45)		23. UIC CAPTURE UNIT (46-51)
24. CORPS AREA OF CAPTURE (52)	25. PLACE OF CAPTURE	26. POWER SERVED	27. PLACE OF BIRTH	
28. ADDRESS TO WHICH MAIL FOR PW MAY BE SENT		29. FATHER/STEPFATHER		
		30. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME		
31. PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS OF PW		32. NAME, ADDRESS, AND RELATIONSHIP OF PERSON TO BE INFORMED OF CAPTURE		
33. OTHER PARTICULARS FROM ID CARD		34. DISTINGUISHING MARKS		
35. IMPOUNDED PERSONAL EFFECTS AND MONEY ((AW AR 2, 36))				
THE ABOVE LIST OF IMPOUNDED ITEMS IS CORRECT				
36. REMARKS		(Signature of Detainee)		
		37. PHOTO		
		PHOTO (Front View)	PHOTO (Right Profile)	
38. PREPARED BY (Individual and unit)		39. SIGNATURE		
40. DATE PREPARED	41. PLACE			
DA FORM 4237-R, Aug 86				
EDITION OF MAY 82 IS OBSOLETE				

B-0

PART II - TO BE MAINTAINED BY UNIT HAVING CUSTODY

42. LAST NAME b. FIRST NAMES

43. INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER

44. MEDICAL RECORD

a. IMMUNIZATION (Vaccinations and Inoculations with Dates)

b. MAJOR ILLNESSES AND PHYSICAL DEFECTS (With Dates)

c. BLOOD GROUP

45. INTERNMENT EMPLOYMENT QUALIFICATIONS

46. SERIOUS OFFENSES, PUNISHMENTS, AND ESCAPES (With Dates)

47. TRANSFERS

FROM (Location)	TO (Location)	DATE

48. REMARKS

49. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER

a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount in words)

b. AMT IN FIGURES

c. LOCATION

d. DATE

50. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF SECOND INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER

a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount in words)

b. AMT IN FIGURES

c. LOCATION

d. DATE

51. REPATRIATION

a. REASON

b. MODE

c. DATE

52. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF REPATRIATION

a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount in words)

b. AMT IN FIGURES

c. LOCATION

d. DATE

REVERSE OF DA FORM 4227-R, AUG 55

B-1

APPENDIX C

Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card

EPW IDENTITY CARD <i>For use of this form, see AR 190-8; the proponent agency is DCSPER.</i>		DATE ISSUED
<i>(Photograph)</i>	LAST NAME	GRADE
	FIRST NAME	
	SERVICE NUMBER	POWER SERVED
PLACE OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH	
SIGNATURE OF BEARER		

DA FORM 2662-R, May 82

EDITION OF 1 JUL 83 IS OBSOLETE.

(Front)

OTHER MARKS OF IDENTIFICATION	LEFT INDEX FINGERPRINTS RIGHT INDEX	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES
		HEIGHT	COLOR OF HAIR
		BLOOD TYPE	RELIGION
		NOTICE	
This card is issued to prisoners of war in the custody of the United States Army. This card must be carried at all times by the EPW to whom it is issued.			

Reverse of DA Form 2662-R, May 82

(Reverse)

C-0

APPENDIX D

Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag

<p style="text-align: center;">ATTACH TO PW A</p> <p>DATE OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>NAME () _____</p> <p>SERIAL NUMBER () _____</p> <p>RANK () _____</p> <p>DATE OF BIRTH () _____</p> <p>UNIT () _____</p> <p>LOCATION OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>CAPTURING UNIT () _____</p> <p>SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS () _____</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <p>Search Thoroughly ()</p> <p>Tag Correctly ()</p> <p>Report Immediately ()</p> <p>Evacuate Rapidly ()</p> <p>Segregate by Category ()</p> <p>Safeguard from Danger/Escape ()</p> <p style="text-align: center;">P W</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">FORWARD TO UNIT B</p>	
<p>DATE OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>NAME () _____</p> <p>SERIAL NUMBER () _____</p> <p>RANK () _____</p> <p>DATE OF BIRTH () _____</p> <p>UNIT () _____</p> <p>LOCATION OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>CAPTURING UNIT () _____</p> <p>SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS () _____</p>	
<p style="text-align: right;">ATTACH TO ITEM C</p>	
<p>DATE OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>NAME () _____</p> <p>SERIAL NUMBER () _____</p> <p>RANK () _____</p> <p>DATE OF BIRTH () _____</p> <p>UNIT () _____</p> <p>LOCATION OF CAPTURE () _____</p> <p>DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONS/DOCUMENTS () _____</p>	
<p>DOCUMENT AND WEAPONS CARD</p> <p>FRONT STANAG 2844</p>	

D-1

APPENDIX E

Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report

SALUTE REPORT FORMAT

TO:	DTG:
FROM:	REPORT NO:
1. SIZE/WHO:	
2. ACTIVITY/WHAT:	
3. LOCATION/WHERE:	
4. UNIT/WHO:	
5. TIME/WHEN:	
6. EQUIPMENT/HOW:	
7. REMARKS	
a. SOURCE:	
b. MAP DATA:	

E-0

**SAMPLE JINTACCS SALUTE
REPORT**

(UNCLASSIFIED)

SALUTE REPOOT

TO: G2, V Corps

DATE: 230950Z Aug 85

FM: Team 1, IPW Section
241st MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMED)

REPORT NUMBER 08-0175

1. (U) **SIZE/WHO:** Company-size tank unit.
2. (U) **ACTIVITY/WHAT:** Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (number unknown).
3. (U) **LOCATION/WHERE:** West bank of FULDA River, southwest of BEBRA (NB 5547). Exact location unknown to source.
4. (U) **UNIT/WHO:** Amph Tank Co/Recon Bn/56th MRD.
5. (U) **TIME/WHEN:** Mission to be completed no later than 232300Z Aug 85.
6. (U) **EQUIPMENT/HOW:** Using assigned weapons and equipment.
7. (U) **REMARKS:**
 - a. (U) **SOURCE:** EPW assigned interrogation serial number US-AR-2235-1.
 - b. (U) **MAP DATA:** GERMANY, 1:50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

E-1

APPENDIX F
Sample Screening Report Format and Report

REPORT FORMAT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: _____ Date/Time: _____

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit/Report No.)

B. CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number: _____

2. Capturing Unit: _____

3. Date/Time of Capture: _____

4. Place of Capture: _____

5. Documents Captured (Disposition): _____

6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition: _____

7. Circumstances of Capture: _____

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number: _____

2. Date / Place of Birth: _____

3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: _____

4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: _____

5. Duty Position: _____

F-0

6. Military Education / Experience: _____

7. Civilian Education / Experience: _____

8. Languages Spoken (Proficiency): _____

D. OBSERVATIONS

1. Physical Condition of Captive: _____

2. Uniform / Insignia (type and condition): _____

3. Assessment of Attitude / Behavior: _____

4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: _____

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Screener's / Interpreter's Name(s): _____

2. Place of Screening: _____

3. Screening Code: _____

4. Remarks: _____

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Senior Interrogator's Name: _____

2. Interrogate (Y/N): _____

3. Remarks: _____

SAMPLE SCREENING REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1st Brigade IPW Team, 123rd CEWI
APO New York 09166

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: 001 Date/Time: 150345ZAUG 89

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit/Report No.)

B. CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number: PLA
2. Capturing Unit: C Trp/1st Sqdrn/8 ACR
3. Date/Time of Capture: 150330ZAUG 89
4. Place of Capture: NB645162
5. Documents Captured (Disposition): 1xID Card (retained by EPW),
1xS01 (evac w/EPW)
6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition: None
7. Circumstances of Capture: pulled out of stream near SETZELBACH
(NB6416)

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number: Kiril Dimitrievich
GRECHKO / JrsGT / 4911623
2. Date / Place of Birth: 11 NOV 67 / KIEV, UkSSR, USSR
3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: Male / Single / None
4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: WNA / CNB-677
5. Duty Position: WNA
6. Military Education / Experience: WNA

F-2

7. Civilian Education / Experience: 10 yrs compulsory

8. Languages Spoken (Proficiency): Ukrainian (N), Russian (FL)

D. OBSERVATIONS

1. Physical Condition of Captive: Tired and wet.

2. Uniform / Insignia (type and condition): _____

3. Assessment of Attitude / Behavior: A little shaken but cooperative

4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: Probably will answer PIR #5

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Screener's / Interpreter's Name(s): SGT PEREZ

2. Place of Screening: _____

3. Screening Code: 2B

4. Remarks: Source may respond to futility approach

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Senior Interrogator's Name: SSG RIVERA

2. Interrogate (Y/N): Yes

3. Remarks Assigned SSG Gonzalez

APPENDIX G

Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION
REPORT FORMAT**

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: _____ INTERROGATOR: _____

CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED: _____

INTG SERIAL NO: _____ MAPS USED _____

DTG OF INTG: _____ LANGUAGE USED: _____

INTG REPORT NO: _____ INTERPRETER: _____

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:
2. Date and place of birth:
3. Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:
4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency:
5. Unit formation or organization:
6. Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture:

B. CAREER:

1. Premilitary:
2. Military:

C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-0

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

1. Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability:
 2. Specialist knowledge:
 3. Discussion of approach technique:
- D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1. List of documents:
 2. Details of money and valuables:
- E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1. Personal equipment:
 2. Weapons:

NOTE: The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information which will contribute to the satisfaction of a commander's intelligence requirements. Since these requirements will differ in scope at each level of command, when conducting PIR and IR interrogations nonapplicable paragraphs may be deleted. Part I must always be included according to STANAG 2033

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. DOI is _____ unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

B. TEXT:

1. MISSIONS:
 - a. EPW: (and full unit designation)
 - (1) Time of capture:
 - (2) Future:
 - (3) Past:
 - b. Unit: (full unit designation)
 - (1) Present:
 - (2) Future:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-1

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(3) Past:

c. Unit: (full unit designation):

(1) Present:

(2) Future:

(3) Past:

2. COMPOSITION (Level of knowledgeability) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):

a. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (C², directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

b. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (C², directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeability):

a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attached/detached personnel:

(2) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attached/detached personnel:

(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elements, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).

b. Weapons and equipment (level of knowledgeability):

(1) Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(2) Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-2

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(3) Other weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution).

(4) Armored vehicles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution
of armored vehicles:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution
of armored vehicle

(5) Other Vehicles: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(6) Communications Equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledge-
ability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(7) NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Individual:

((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Vehicular:

((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(8) Specialized equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

4. DISPOSITIONS:
 - a. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of information. (H/S):
 - b. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated activities, 6-digit grid coordinate - physical description, security measures, DOI. (H/S):
5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability):
 - a. Offensive:
 - b. Defensive:
 - c. Special operations:
6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability):
 - a. Individual:
 - b. Unit:
 - c. Special:
7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeability):
 - a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (2) Equipment:
 - b. Replacements and Reinforcements (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (2) Equipment:
 - c. Combat experience (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - d. Morale (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
8. LOGISTICS (level of knowledgeability):
 - a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Weapons:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-4

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

- (2) Ammunition:
- b. Vehicles and POL (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Vehicles:
 - (2) POL:
- c. Food and water: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Food:
 - (2) Water:
- d. Communications equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
- e. Medical (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Individual equipment:
 - (2) Vehicular equipment:
 - (3) Personnel:
 - (4) Facilities:
 - (5) Evacuation procedures:
- f. NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
 - (1) Individual:
 - (2) Vehicular:
- g. Specialized equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
- 9. ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA (level of knowledgeability):
- 10. MISCELLANEOUS (level of knowledgeability):
 - a. Personalities (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MN/I	RANK	POS	FUD
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(tie-in to tie-in)

(tie-in to tie-in)

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

b. Code names/numbers (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Code name:

(2) Code number:

c. Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Radio frequency:

(2) Call sign:

d. Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e. Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

f. PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

G-6

**SAMPLE TACTICAL
INTERROGATION
REPORT**

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

<input type="checkbox"/> NAME OF PRISONER: SCHULTZ	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERROGATOR: SFC JONES
<input type="checkbox"/> CATEGORY: A (B) C D	<input type="checkbox"/> UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH INTERROGATOR ATTACHED: Team 1, Interrogation Section, 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD)
<input type="checkbox"/> INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR 2235-1	<input type="checkbox"/> MAPS USED: Germany, 1:50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242
<input type="checkbox"/> DTG OF INTG: 230930ZAug 85	<input type="checkbox"/> LANGUAGE USED: Russian
<input type="checkbox"/> INTG REPORT NO: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERPRETER: None

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:
JrSgt Georg SCHULTZ, 1634921, Squad Leader.
2. Date and place of birth: 12 Jun 62, KIEV, UkSSR, USSR.
3. Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: German Religion: none.
4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N), German (FL).
5. Unit formation or organization: 1 MR Sqd (MRS), 2 MR Plt (MRP), 3 MR Co (MRC) 3 MR Bn (MRB), 44 MR Regt (MRR), 32 MR Div (MRD), (1MRS/2/3/3/44/32MRD).
6. Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture: 221800ZAug 85, NB655498, 1st Plt/A/2/1/23 Div (ARMD), captured during a counterattack across the main road northwest of BAUHAUS (NB662495).

B CAREER:

- 1 Premilitary: 10 years civilian education, civilian occupation: coal miner.
2. Military: 5 years military service, attended NCO school in July 1982.

(DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
INSTRUCTIONS)

G-7

C. () ASSESSMENT O. INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

1. () Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative, answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were noted by use of repeat and control questions.

2. () Special knowledge: None

3. () Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the direct approach.

D. () DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. () List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to source).

2. () Details of money and valuables: None

E. () EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.

1. () Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to source).

2. () Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through supply channels)

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. () DOI is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

B. () TEXT:

1. () MISSIONS:

a. () EPW:

(1) () Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2) () Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3) () Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on Hill 456.

b. () Unit: (2MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD).

(1) () Present: Defend Hill 456 w/antitank Plt/3/44/32 MRD in support.

(2) () Future: Continue to defend Hill 456 until ordered to rejoin 3 MRC/3/44/32MRD.

(3) () Past: Assault and secure Hill 456; set up perimeter defense.

c. () Unit: (Amph Tank Co, Recon Bn, 32 MRD).

(1) () Present: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (no. unk) on the west side of the Fulda River, SW of BEBRA (NB5547) NLT 232300ZAug 85. (H/S U/I Sqd Ldr, Amph Tank Co. DOI: 220900ZAug 85.)

(2) () Future: Unk.

(3) () Past: Unk.

2. () COMPOSITION: (32 MRD and U/I MRL unit).

a. () 32 MRD had 44 MRR and 1 x Recon Bn.

b. () 4 MRR/32 MRD had 3 x MRD, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

c. () 3 MRR/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRC, dsg 1, 2, 3 and 1 x AT Plt.

d. () 3 MRC/3/44/32 MRD had a Co HQ and 3 x MRP, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

e. () Ea MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRS, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

f. () Recon Bn/32 MRD had 1 x Amph Tank Co.

g. () U/I MRL unit.

3. () STRENGTH: (3 MRC/3/44/32 MRD).

a. () Personnel: (3 MRC)

(1) () 3 MRC had 103 x pers. (6 x OFF, 102 x EM) (H/S Plt Sgt, 2 MRP/3 MRC, DOI: 201800ZAug 85).

(2) () Co HQ/3 MRC had 9 x pers. (3 x Off--CO, PO, TO 6 x EM--1SG, BMP driver, BMP gunner, 1 x PKM gunner, and 2 x riflemen).

(3) () 2 MRP/3 MRC had 33 x pers. (1 x Off--Plt Ldr, 32 x EM--Plt Sgt and 31 x Plt mbrs).

(4) () 1 MRS/2/3/ MRC had 10 x pers. (Sqd Ldr, sniper, RPG-7 gunner, 2 x PKM gunners, BMP driver, BMP gunner, and 3 x riflemen).

G-9

- b. () Weapons and equipment: (3MRC).
- (1) () Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MRC).
 - (a) () 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.
 - (b) () 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver, sniper, and PKM gunners.
 - (c) () 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.
 - (2) () Crew-served weapons: (1MRS/2/3 MRC).
 - (a) () 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.
 - (b) () 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.
 - (3) () Other weapons: (1MRS/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.
 - (4) () Armored vehicles: (2MRP/3 MRC) 3 x BMP, ea armed with 1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea MRS/2MRP.
 - (5) () Other vehicles: 2MRP/3MRC) No.e.
 - (6) () Communications equipment: (2MRP/3MRC) 3 x R-123 transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/2MRP.
 - (7) () NBC equipment: (3MRC).
 - (a) () Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1 x set U/I protective clothing, and 1 individual decon kit.
 - (b) () Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration system.
 - (8) () Specialized equipment: Unk.

4. () DISPOSITIONS:

- a. () CP, 3 MRC/3/44/32MRD location vicinity NB660495, in the last house on light surface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (NB6649). Security measures and collocated units: UNK. (H/S Plt Sgt, 2MRP/3/3/44/32 MRD DOI: 220800ZAug 85.)
- b. () U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx 500 meters N along a light surface road to NB654494. Guns were pointing west. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 220930ZAug85.
- c. () U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from NB659495 to NB654496, traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 221600ZAug, 85.

G-10

5. () TACTICS: (2MRP/3/3/4432MRD) Defensive tactics used by the 2MRP at Hill 456 were based on the use of boiling oil and catapulting large stones over the perimeter.

6. () TRAINING: (3MRC/3/44/32MRD) Political training by the PO, 3MRC had since 1 Aug 85 involved increased emphasis on perfidy of the NATO Alliance and especially the FRG in planning an invasion of the GDR.

7. () COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (3MRC/3/44/32MRD).

a. () Losses: (2MRS/2/3MRC).

(1) () Personnel: 1 x KIA on 21 Aug 85, when the 2 MRS BMP was destroyed by an U/I US missile.

(2) () Equipment: The 2 MRS BMP was completely destroyed by the same U/I US missile on 21 Aug 85.

b. () Replacements/Reinforcements: (2MRS/2/3MRC).

(1) () Personnel: 1 x EM arrived as replacements for 2 MRS/2/3 MRC at 221430Z Aug 85. The replacements arrived already formed in a MRS and appeared to be well-trained troops.

(2) () Equipment: A new BMP arrived at 221430Z Aug 85.

c. () Combat experience: None prior to current offensive.

d. () Morale: (3MRC) Morale in the 3 MRC was excellent, due to successes in the early stages of the offensive.

e. () Additional information: None.

8. () LOGISTICS: (3MRC/3/44/32MRD).

a. () Weapons and ammunition: (2MRP/3MRC).

(1) () Weapons: All weapons are in good condition. Spare parts for all weapons were stored in the BMP. No shortages of weapons.

(2) () Ammunition: All ammunition in the 2 MRP was in good condition and in adequate supply.

b. () Vehicles and POL: (3MRC).

(1) () Vehicles: All BMPs were in good condition. Each BMP carries its own spare parts and tool kit.

(2) () POL: POL resupply to the 3 MRC is delivered by truck of an U/I unit each evening at about 2000 hours. No shortages of POL.

G-11

c. () Food and water (3MRC).

(1) () Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 212000Z Aug 85.

(2) () Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d. () Communications equipment. (2MRP/3MRC) All transceivers were in good working order.

e. () Other: (3MRC).

(1) () Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2) () NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspected in early Aug 85.

9. () ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: None.

10. () MISCELLANEOUS: (3MRC/3/44/32MRD).

a. () Personalities: (3MRC).

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MN/I	RANK	POSN	FUD
HOFBAUER	FNU	MNU	Cpt	CO	3MRC
KAEMPERT	FNU	MNU	SrSgt	1SG	3MRC
BECK	Cosmos	MNU	JrLt	PltLdr	2MRP/3MRC
GUCHENKO	Franz	MNU	SrS_t	PltLdr	2MRP/3MRC

b. () Code name/code number: Unk.

c. () Radio frequencies/call signs: (MRC).

(1) () Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2) () Call signs: (2MRP/3MRC) Call signs for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: 1MRS/2MRP, AFCS 25; 2MRS/2MRP, AFCS 22, 3MRS/2MRP, AFCS 19. Call signs are changed at 2400 hours daily by unit SOI.

d. () Passwords: Challenge for 22 Aug 85 is DZIEN; countersign is DOBRY. Both are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOP.

e. () Obstacles: Unk.

f. () PSYOP: Unk.

G-13

APPENDIX H

Approaches

DIRECT APPROACH

The direct approach is the questioning of a source without having to use any type of approach. The direct approach is often called no approach at all, but it is the most effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell us that in World War II, it was 85 percent to 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 percent to 95 percent effective. The direct approach works best on lower enlisted personnel as they have little or no resistance training and have had minimal security training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct approach is always to be tried first. The direct approach usually achieves the maximum cooperation in the minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to quickly and completely exploit the source for the information he possesses. The advantages of this technique are its simplicity and the fact that it takes little time. For this reason, it is frequently used at the tactical echelons where time is limited.

INCENTIVE APPROACH

The incentive approach is a method of rewarding the source for his cooperation, but it must reinforce positive behavior. This is done by satisfying the source's needs. Granting incentives to an uncooperative source leads him to believe that rewards can be gained whether he cooperates or not. Interrogators may not withhold a source's rights under the Geneva Conventions, but they can withhold a source's privileges. The granting of incentives must not infringe on the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already entitled to. This can be effective only if the source is unaware of his rights or privileges.

Incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An interrogator must not promise anything that cannot be delivered. Interrogators do not make promises, but usually infer them while still sidestepping guarantees. If an interrogator made a promise that he could not keep and he or another inter-

rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and would most probably not cooperate. Instead of promising unequivocally that a source will receive a certain thing, such as political asylum, an interrogator will offer to do what he can to help achieve the source's desired goal; as long as the source cooperates.

The incentive approach can be broken down into the incentive short term (received immediately) and incentive long term (received within a period of time). The determination rests on when the source expects to receive the incentive offered.

EMOTIONAL APPROACH

The emotional approach overrides the source's rationale for resisting by using and manipulating his emotions against him. The main emotions of any source at the time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be exploited or turned into hate for someone else. For example, the person who caused the source to be in the position in which he now finds himself. The source's fear can be built upon, or increased so as to override his rational side. If the situation demands it and the source's fear is so great that he cannot communicate with the interrogator, the interrogator may find that he has to decrease the source's fear in order to effectively collect information from him. There are two variations of the emotional approaches: Emotional love, emotional hate.

EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH

For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the interrogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of

H-0

success. This approach usually involves some incentive; such as communication with the source's family, a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives, and so forth. A good interrogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reaching the breaking point. Sincerity and conviction are extremely important in a successful attempt at an emotional love approach as the interrogator must show genuine concern for the source and for the object to which the interrogator is directing the source's emotion. If the interrogator ascertains that the source has great love for his unit and fellow soldiers, he can effectively exploit the situations by explaining to the source that his providing information may shorten the war or battle in progress, thus saving many of his comrades' lives. But, his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This places a burden on the source and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation with the interrogator.

EMOTIONAL HATE APPROACH

The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The interrogator must correctly pick up on exactly what it is that the source may hate so that the emotion can be exploited to override the source's rational side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's regime, his immediate superiors, officers in general, or his fellow soldiers. This approach is usually most effective on a member of racial or religious minorities who has suffered discrimination in both service and civilian life. If a source feels that he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the interrogator can point out that if the source cooperates and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source an opportunity for revenge. By using a conspiratorial tone of voice, the interrogator can enhance the value of this technique. Phrases, such as "You owe them no loyalty for the way they have treated you," when used appropriately, can expedite the success of this technique.

One word of caution, do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of the source's background or life until your

assessment indicates that the source feels a negative emotion toward it. The emotional hate approach can be much more effectively used by drawing out the source's negative emotions with questions that elicit a thought-provoking response. For example, "Why do you think they allowed you to be captured?" or "Why do you think they left you to die?" Do not berate the source's forces or homeland unless you are certain of his negative emotions. Many sources may have great love for their country, but still may hate the regime in control. The emotional hate approach is most effective with the immature or timid source who may have no opportunity up to this point for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feelings.

INCREASED FEAR UP APPROACH

The increased fear up approach is most effective on the younger and more inexperienced source or on a source who appears nervous or frightened. It is also effective on a source who appears to be the silent, confident type. Sources with something to hide, such as the commission of a war crime, or having surrendered while still having ammunition in his weapon, or breaking his military oath are particularly easy to break with this technique. There are two distinct variations of this approach: the fear up (harsh) and the fear up (mild).

FEAR UP (HARSH)

In the fear up (harsh) approach, the interrogator behaves in a heavy, overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear. Great care must be taken when doing this so that any actions taken would not violate the Geneva Conventions. This technique is to convince the source that he does indeed have something to fear and that he has no option but to cooperate. A good interrogator will implant in the source's mind that the interrogator himself is not the object to be feared, but is a possible way out of the trap.

H-1

The fear can be directed toward reprisals by international tribunals, the government of the host country, or the source's own forces. Shouting can be very effective in this variation of the fear up approach.

FEAR UP (MILD)

The fear up (mild) approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of interrogator as there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, table banging violence. It is a more correct form of blackmail when the circumstances indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of coincidence; the soldier was caught on the wrong side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could be a terrorist), or a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his military oath and is now a traitor to his country, and his own forces will take care of the disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) approach must be a credible distortion of the truth. A distortion that the source will believe. It usually involves some incentive; the interrogator can intimate that he might be willing to alter the circumstances of the source's capture, as long as the source cooperates and answers the questions.

In most cases, shouting is not necessary. The actual fear is increased by helping the source to realize the unpleasant consequences that the facts may cause and then presenting an alternative, which of course can be effected by answering some simple questions. The fear up approach is dead-end, and a wise interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.

DECREASED FEAR DOWN APPROACH

The decreased fear down approach is used primarily on a source who is already in a state of fear due to the horrible circumstances of his capture, or on a source who is in fear for his life. This technique is really

nothing more than calming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or that for him the war is mercifully over and he need not go into combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rapport and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming the source, it is a good idea to stay initially with nonpertinent conversation and to carefully avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works quickly in developing rapport and communication as the source will readily respond to kindness.

When using this approach, it is important that the interrogator meets the source at the source's perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the interrogator's perspective level. If a prisoner is so frightened that he has withdrawn into a shell or regressed back to a less threatening state of mind, the interrogator must break through to him. This may be effected by the interrogator putting himself on the same physical level as the source and may require some physical contact. As the source relaxes somewhat and begins to respond to the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator can then begin asking pertinent questions.

This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source that he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent questions. If this occurs, reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will rapidly bring the desired result to the interrogator.

PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH

The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing pertinent information by using flattery or abuse. It is effective with a source who has displayed weaknesses or feelings of inferiority which can be effectively exploited by the interrogator. There are two techniques in this approach: the pride and ego up approach and the pride and ego down approach.

H-2

A problem with the pride and ego approach techniques is that since both variations rely on trickery, the source will eventually realize that he has been tricked and may refuse to cooperate further. If this occurs, the interrogator can easily move into a fear up approach and convince the source that the questions he has already answered have committed him, and it would be useless to resist further. The interrogator can mention that it will be reported to the source's forces that he has cooperated fully with the enemy, and he or his family may suffer possible retribution when this becomes known, and the source has much to fear if he is returned to his forces. This may even offer the interrogator the option to go into a love-of-family approach in that the source must protect his family by preventing his forces from learning of his duplicity or collaboration. Telling the source that you will not report the fact that the prisoner talked or that he was a severe discipline problem is an incentive that may enhance the effectiveness of the approach.

PRIDE AND EGO UP APPROACH

The pride and ego up approach is most effective on sources with little or no intelligence or on those who have been looked down upon for a long time. It is very effective on low ranking enlisted personnel and junior grade officers as it allows the source to finally show someone that he does indeed have some "brains." The source is constantly flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit. The interrogator must take care to use a flattering somewhat-in-awe tone of voice and to speak highly of the source throughout the duration of this approach. This quickly engenders positive feelings on the source's part as he has probably been looking for this type of recognition all his life. The interrogator may blow things out of proportion using items from the source's background and making them seem noteworthy or important. As everyone is eager to hear themselves praised, the source will eventually "rise to the occasion" and in an attempt to solicit more laudatory comments from the interrogator, reveal pertinent information.

Effective targets for a successful pride and ego up approach are usually the socially accepted reasons for flattery: appearance, good military bearing, and so forth. The interrogator should closely watch the source's demeanor for indications that the approach is getting through to him. Such indications include, but are not limited to, a raising of the head, a look of pride in the eyes, a swelling of the chest, or a stiffening of the back.

PRIDE AND EGO DOWN APPROACH

The pride and ego down approach is based on the interrogator attacking the source's sense of personal worth. Any source who shows any real or imagined inferiority or weakness about himself, his loyalty to his organization, or his capture in embarrassing circumstances can be easily broken with this approach technique. The objective is for the interrogator to pounce on the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the interrogator that he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride, the source will usually involuntarily provide pertinent information in attempting to vindicate himself. The source who is susceptible to this approach is also prone to make excuses and give reasons why he did or did not do a certain thing, often shifting the blame to others. Possible targets for the pride and ego down approach are the source's loyalty, technical competence, leadership abilities, soldierly qualities, or appearance. If the interrogator uses a sarcastic, caustic tone of voice with appropriate expressions of distaste or disgust, the source will readily believe him.

One word of caution, the pride and ego down approach is also a dead end in that, if it is unsuccessful, it is very difficult for the interrogator to recover and move to another approach and reestablish a different type of rapport without losing all credibility.

H-3

FUTILITY TECHNIQUE APPROACH

The futility approach is used to make the source believe that it is useless to resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. There are really many different variations of the futility approach. There is the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks sooner or later," futility of the battlefield situation, and futility in the sense that if the source does not mind talking about history, why should he mind talking about his missions, they are also history.

If the source's unit had run out of supplies (ammunition, food, fuel, and so forth), it would be relatively easy to convince him that all of his forces are having the same logistical problems. A soldier who has been ambushed may have doubts as to how he was attacked so suddenly and the interrogator should be able to easily talk him into believing that the NATO forces knew where he was all the time.

The interrogator might describe the source's frightening recollections of seeing death on the battlefield as an everyday occurrence for his forces all up and down the lines. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented by the interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice.

Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the interrogator. When employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.

Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of proportion. If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be easily led to believe that all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is hinging

on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation effort if he is told that all the other source's have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may need to be convinced that the situation on the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to paint a black picture for the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques.

"WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH

The "we know all" approach convinces the source that we already know everything. It is a very successful approach for sources who are naive, in a state of shock, or in a state of fear. The interrogator must organize all available data on the source including background information, knowledge about the source's immediate tactical situation, and all available OB information on the source's unit. Upon initial contact with the source, the interrogator asks questions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his specially prepared list. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies the detailed answer. Through the careful use of the limited number of known details, the interrogator must convince the source that all information is already known; therefore, his answers are of no consequence. It is by repeating this procedure that the interrogator convinces the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known. When the source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins interjecting questions for which he does not have the answers. After gaining the source's cooperation, the interrogator still tests the extent of that cooperation by periodically using questions for which he has the answers. This is very necessary; if the interrogator does not challenge the source when he is lying, the source will then know that everything is not known, and that he has been tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.

There are some inherent problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The interrogator is required to prepare everything in detail which is very time consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory as working from notes may show the limits of the information actually known.

"ESTABLISH YOUR IDENTITY" APPROACH

The "establish your identity" approach was very effective in Viet Nam with the Viet Cong, and it can be used at tactical echelons. The interrogator must be aware, however, that if used in conjunction with the file and dossier approach, it may exceed the tactical interrogator's preparation resources. In this technique, the interrogator insists that the source has been identified as an infamous criminal wanted by higher authorities on very serious charges, and he has finally been caught posing as someone else. In order to clear himself of these allegations, the source will usually have to supply detailed information on his unit to establish or substantiate his true identity. The interrogator should initially refuse to believe the source and insist that he is the criminal wanted by the ambiguous "higher authorities." This will force the source to give even more detailed information about his unit in order to convince the interrogator that he is indeed who he says he is. This approach works well when combined with the futility or "we know all" approach.

REPETITION APPROACH

Repetition is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this technique the interrogator listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats both the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the interrogator and to gain relief from the monotony of his

method of questioning. The repetition technique must be used carefully, as it will generally not work when employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. In fact, it may provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and delay the interrogation. In employing this technique, the use of more than one interrogator or a tape recorder has proven to be effective.

FILE AND DOSSIER APPROACH

The file and dossier approach is when the interrogator prepares a dossier containing all available information obtained from records and documents concerning the source or his organization. Careful arrangement of the material within the file may give the illusion that it contains more data than what is actually there. The file may be padded with extra paper, if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as education, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are particularly effective. The interrogator confronts the source with the dossiers at the beginning of the interrogation and explains to him that intelligence has provided a complete record of every significant happening in the source's life; therefore, it would be useless to resist interrogation. The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the source. If the technique is successful, the source will be impressed with the voluminous file, conclude that everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation during the interrogation. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naivete of the source, the volume of data on the subject, and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the source.

"MUTT AND JEFF" ("FRIEND AND FOE") APPROACH

The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") approach involves a psychological ploy which takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt which a source has as a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique necessitates the employment of two experienced interrogators who are convincing actors. Basically, the two interrogators will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. For example, the first interrogator is very formal and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He might be strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. The goal of the technique is to make the source feel cut off from his friends.

At the time the source acts hopeless and alone, the second interrogator appears (having received his cue by a hidden signal or by listening and observing out of view of the source), scolds the first interrogator for his harsh behavior, and orders him from the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of human sensitivity. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the source have, in common, a high degree of intelligence and an awareness of human sensitivity above and beyond that of the first interrogator.

The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude toward the second interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in an effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the second interrogator can hint that since he is of high rank, having many other duties, he cannot afford to waste time on an uncooperative source. He may broadly infer that the first interrogator might return to continue his questioning. When used against the proper source, this trick will normally gain the source's complete cooperation.

H-6 .

RAPID FIRE APPROACH

The rapid fire approach involves a psychological ploy based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks, and it is confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an unrelated question. This technique may be used by an individual interrogator or simultaneously by two or more interrogators in questioning the same source. In employing this technique the interrogator asks a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next question is asked. This tends to confuse the source, and he is apt to contradict himself, as he has little time to prepare his answers. The interrogator then confronts the source with the inconsistencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator. In attempting to explain his answers, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further interrogation.

The interrogator must have all his questions prepared before approaching the source, because long pauses between questions allow the source to complete his answers and render this approach ineffective. Besides extensive preparation, this technique requires an experienced, competent interrogator, who has comprehensive knowledge of his case, and fluency in the language of the source. This technique is most effective immediately after capture, because of the confused state of the source.

SILENCE APPROACH

The silence approach may be successful when employed against either the nervous or the confident-type source. When employing this technique, the interrogator says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source, but force him to break eye contact first. The source will become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and

look away. He may ask questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out questions such as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the interrogator is ready to break the silence, he may do so with some nonchalant question such as, "You planned this operation a long time, didn't you? Was it your idea?" The interrogator must be patient when employing this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding, but it usually will when given a reasonable chance.

H-7

APPENDIX I

Interrogation Guides

**EXAMPLE 1,
QUESTION GUIDE FOR
SUPPORT OF TACTICAL
INTERROGATION**

RIFLEMEN

Some of the specific topics on which a captured enemy rifleman may be questioned are—

- Identification of source's squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division.
- Organization, strength, weapons, and disposition of squad, platoon, and company.
- Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
- Location and strength of men and weapons at strongholds, outposts, and observation posts in the source's immediate area.
- Mission of the source immediately before capture as well as mission of source's squad, platoon, company, and higher echelons.
- Location and description of defensive installations, such as missile sites, antitank ditches and emplacements, minefields, roadblocks, and barbed wire entanglements in source's area before capture. Description of weapons with which these locations are covered.
- Names and personality information of small unit commanders known to the source.
- Possible identifications of support mortar, artillery, and armored units.
- Status of food, ammunition, and other supplies.

- Morale of troops.
- Casualties.
- Defensive and protective items of NBC equipment, status of NBC training and defensive NBC instructions, and offensive capability of NBC operations.
- Status of immunizations; new shots, booster shots more frequently than normal.
- Stress on care and maintenance of NBC protective equipment.
- Issuance of new or different NBC protective equipment.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

MESSENGERS

Messengers are frequently chosen on the basis of above average intelligence and the ability to observe well and remember oral messages and instructions. Messengers, who have an opportunity to travel about within the immediate combat zone, generally, will have a good picture of the current situation and are excellent prospects for tactical interrogation. The following topics should be included when questioning a messenger source:

- Nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable period of time, as well as the names of persons who originated these messages, and the names of persons to whom messages were directed. Description of duty positions of such personalities.

- Information as to the extent to which messengers are used in the applicable enemy unit, routes of messengers, and location of relay posts.
- Location of message centers and communication lines.
- Condition of roads, bridges, and alternate routes.
- Location of CPs and the names of commanders and staff officers.
- Location of artillery, mortars, and armor seen during messenger's movement through the combat area.
- Location of minefields and other defensive installations.
- Location of supply and ammunition dumps.
- Description of terrain features behind the enemy's front lines.
- NBC weapons, installations, and units.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Use of radio equipment in applicable enemy units.

SQUAD AND PLATOON LEADERS AND COMPANY COMMANDERS

Squad and platoon leaders, as well as company commanders, generally will possess information on a broader level than that discussed up to this point. In addition to the information possessed by the riflemen, they may be able to furnish information on the following subjects:

- Plans and mission of their respective units.
- Organization of their units as well as their regiment and battalion.
- Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.

- Disposition of companies, regiments, and reserves of each.
- Identifications and general organization of supporting units such as artillery, armor, and engineer units.
- Location, strength, and mission of heavy weapons units.
- Offensive and defensive tactics of small units.
- Quality and morale of subordinate troops.
- Doctrine for employment of NBC weapons.
- Doctrine for defense against NBC weapons.
- Status of NBC defense SOP and current NBC training.
- Communications procedures and communications equipment.
- Issuance of NBC detection equipment and detector paints or paper.
- Morale of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Instructions on handling and evacuation of US and allied prisoners.
- Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

RADIO AND TELEPHONE OPERATORS

Radio and telephone operators, like messengers, are frequently familiar with the plans and instructions of their commanders. In general, they can be expected to know the current military situation even more thoroughly because of the greater volume of information which they normally transmit. Topics to be covered when questioning communications personnel are—

- Nature and exact contents of messages sent and received during a given tactical situation.

- Code names or numbers of specific enemy units, such as those appearing in enemy telephone directories, and in other SOI such as unit identification panel codes.
- Major enemy units to your front and their code names.
- Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs, call words, and operating frequencies.
- Names and code names of commanders and their staff officers.
- Types, numbers, and basic characteristics of radios and telephone equipment used at company, regiment, and division level.
- Identification and location of units occupying front line positions.
- Location of artillery and mortar positions.
- Information on enemy codes and ciphers.
- Code names given to operations or to specially designated supply points such as supply points for special weapons.
- Names and signals designating various types of alerts.
- Attitudes of commanders and staff officers toward each other, civilians, units under their command, and the general military situation.
- Routes of communications and their condition.
- Tactical doctrines of commanders.
- Command and staff organization.
- Supply routes and road conditions.
- Location of supply points and types of military and civilian supplies.
- Sufficiency or lack of both civilian and military supplies.
- Types, numbers, and condition of military and civilian supply-carrying vehicles.
- Location of artillery and mortar positions.
- Troop movements and troop assembly areas.
- Location of truck parks and motor pools.
- Organization of antitank and air defense artillery units, weapons, and strength.
- Location of antitank and air defense artillery positions.
- Names of commanders of antitank and air defense artillery units.
- Mission of antitank and air defense artillery.
- Types and status of ammunition.
- Voluntary or forced evacuation or movement of civilians.
- Morale and health of civilians.

DRIVERS

Questions directed by the tactical interrogator to captured drivers should concern the aspects of the enemy situation which the prisoner would know because of his driving assignments. In dealing with EPW drivers of command and staff vehicles, supply vehicles, and vehicles drawing weapons, the following topics should be examined:

- Identification and location of command posts of higher, lower, and supporting units.
- Names and personal character traits of commanders and staff officers.
- Plans, instructions, orders, and conversations of commanders and staff officers.

PATROL LEADERS AND PATROL MEMBERS

The degree of patrol activity on the part of the enemy is often a good indication of enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrol leaders and members of enemy patrols upon their capture include—

- Specific mission of the patrol.

- Exact routes used and time of departure and return of patrol.
- Location of enemy forward edge of the battle area, general outpost, combat outpost, and outposts.
- Location of platoon, company, regiment, or division headquarters.
- Routes of approach and enemy positions.
- Enemy strongholds and fields of fire.
- Machine gun and mortar positions of the enemy.
- Observation posts and listening posts.
- Condition of bridges and location of fords.
- Description of key terrain features.
- Location and description of defensive positions such as antitank weapons, roadblocks, mines, barbed wire entanglements, gaps in wire and safe lines, trip flares, booby traps, tank traps, and ambushes.
- Other reconnaissance objectives, agencies, and patrols.
- Organization and equipment of tactical reconnaissance agencies in regiments and divisions.
- Passwords and counter signs of patrols and line units.
- Patrol communication system and range or radios.
- Names of commanders, staff officers, and particularly of intelligence officers of enemy unit.
- Coordination of patrol activities with other units such as rifle companies, mortar units, and artillery units.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

MEMBERS OF MACHINE GUN AND MORTAR UNITS

Members of machine gun and mortar units can be expected to know, on the basis of their experience or observation, the following:

- Location of their own, as well as other, machine gun and mortar positions and projected alternate positions.
- Organization, strength, casualties, and weapons of the source's unit.
- Targets for machine guns and mortars.
- Names of small unit leaders.
- Status of weapons crew training.
- Disposition of small rifle units, squads, and platoons.
- Supply of ammunition to include type of ammunition in the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical and biological ammunition.
- Location of forward ammunition points.
- Characteristics of weapons used.
- Food and other supplies.
- Morale.
- Effect of our own firepower upon their positions.
- Availability of nuclear capability.
- Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The liaison officer is the commander's agent for accomplishing coordination among the headquarters of lower, adjacent, and higher units. The liaison officer also may be called upon to effect coordination between infantry units and supporting or supported armor and artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units. Topics to be covered when questioning a captured liaison officer are as follows:

- Contents of field orders, such as composition of attacking forces; location and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans for attack, defense, or withdrawals; and plans for communication and coordination among units.
- Location of lower, adjacent, higher, and supporting unit CPs as well as location of supply and communications installations.
- Locations of observation posts and outposts.
- Assembly areas for troops and supplies.
- Disposition of regiments, battalions, and companies of a division.
- Identification and disposition of reserves.
- Status of supplies of all types.
- Civilian social and economic conditions.
- Evacuation or movement of civilians.

ARMORED TROOPS

Topics to be covered when questioning captured armored troops are as follows:

- Unit identifications.
- Designation and strength of supporting or supported infantry units.
- Types and characteristics of tanks employed.
- Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of these tanks.
- Means of communications between tanks and between tanks and infantry.
- Missions and objectives.
- Routes of approach.
- Armored units in reserve.
- Location of tank parks and assembly areas.
- Location of impassable terrain features.

- Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank coordination.
- Location of tank repair depots and *POL dumps* (to include resupply and refueling techniques).
- Effect of weather on tank operations.
- Armored reconnaissance missions.
- Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
- Morale and *esprit de corps* of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Status of ammunition and POL resupply.
- Location of ammunition supply points.
- Ammunition supply to include type in the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical ammunition.
- Measures for defense against NBC and radiological attack to include type of NBC defensive equipment installed in the tank.
- Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

ARTILLERYMEN

Topics to be covered when questioning captured artillerymen are as follows.

Forward Observers

Topics for interrogation of forward observers include—

- Location, organization, and number of guns of the battery or battalion whose fire the source was observing and directing.
- Location of front lines, outposts, and observation posts.
- Location of alternate observation posts.

- Location and probable time of occupation of present or alternate gun positions.
- Deployment of artillery.
- Characteristics of guns, including caliber and range.
- Targets for the various types of fire during different phases of combat.
- Nature of the infantry-artillery communications net.
- Type and location of artillery fire requested by infantry units.
- Identification of corps or other supporting artillery units.
- Plan of attack, defense, or withdrawal of enemy units.
- Methods of coordinating artillery fire with infantry maneuver.
- Mission and objectives of source's unit as well as of supported units.
- Routes of approach and their condition. Characteristics of terrain features.
- Methods of observing and directing artillery fire, including information such as types of aircraft employed.
- Methods of counterbattery fire and methods of protecting enemy positions from counterbattery fire.
- Use and location of dummy artillery positions.
- Types of artillery ammunition used for various targets, new types of ammunition, and conservation of fires and reasons for conservation.
- Location of artillery and infantry unit command posts.
- Trafficability of routes appropriate for movement of heavy artillery.
- Names of commanders, staff officers, and their attitudes toward each other and toward infantry commanders.
- Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
- Effect of our artillery upon the enemy units.
- Location and numbering of defensive concentrations.
- Location of ammunition supply points.
- Radio channels used for fire control nets.
- Identification and location of supporting battalions.
- Availability of nuclear fire support.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

Artillery Firing Battery Personnel

Interrogation of a source from a firing battery should cover the following topics:

- Measures of defense against friendly artillery fire.
- Counterbattery protection for artillery installations.
- Effect of friendly counterbattery fire.
- Location of battery ammunition points.
- Disposition of local security weapons.
- Direction and elevation of fire.
- Instructions concerning the use of ammunition.
- Names of battery and other commanders.
- Detailed description of artillery weapons used.
- Status of weapons crew training.
- Information on food supplies and morale of military and civilians.
- Measures for defense against NBC attack.

- Types and amount of ammunition, to include chemical and nuclear ammunition, in the basic load or on hand.
- Location of chemical and biological ammunitions.
- Location of targets marked for chemical and biological fires.

Air Defense Artillerymen

Interrogation of a source from an air defense unit should cover the following:

- Location and number of air defense weapons.
- Detailed description and characteristics of air defense guns and missiles used.
- Shape, size, and location of ground radars.
- Organization of air defense units.
- Types of areas defended.
- Nuclear capability.
- Methods of attack against friendly aircraft, by type of aircraft.
- Avenues of approach and altitudes most and least advantageous to enemy air defense.
- Methods of identifying unknown aircraft.

MEDICAL CORPSMEN

Although medical personnel are entitled to special protective measures under the provisions of international agreements, they can be, and are, interrogated without infringement of any existing laws or rules of warfare. Topics to be covered when interrogating enemy medical personnel are as follows:

- Number of casualties over a given phase of combat operations.
- Weapons accounting for most casualties.
- Key personnel who have been casualties.

- Conditions of health and sanitation in enemy units.
- Ratio of dead to wounded.
- Commander's tactics in relation to the number of casualties.
- Adequacy and efficiency of casualty evacuation.
- Weapons most feared by the enemy.
- Location and staffing of aid stations and hospitals.
- Organization of division, regiment, and battalion medical units.
- Status and types of medical supplies.
- Use and characteristics of newly developed medicine or drugs.
- Data on your wounded, sick, or dead in the hands of the enemy.
- Skill of enemy medical personnel.
- Information on mass sickness or epidemics in the enemy forces.
- Types of treatment and medication for NBC casualties.
- Supply and availability of materials used in the treatment of NBC casualties.
- Special training or treatment of NBC casualties.
- New or recent immunizations.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Location and present condition of civilian hospitals, factories producing medical supplies, and warehouses and stores containing medical supplies.

ENGINEER TROOPS

Topics for questioning of captured engineer troops are as follows:

- Mission of supported unit.

- Exact location and pattern of existing minefields, location of bridges, buildings, airfields, and other installations prepared for demolition, and types of mines or explosives used.
- Doctrine pertaining to the use of mines and booby traps to include types of mines, characteristics of firing devices, and minefield patterns.
- Location of roadblocks and tank traps and how constructed.
- Condition of roads, bridges, and streams or rivers for trafficability of personnel, vehicles, and armor. Weight-carrying capacity of bridges and location and description of fords.
- Location of engineer materials and equipment such as road material, bridge timber, lumber, steel, explosives, quarries, rock crushers, sawmills, and machine shops.
- Location of dummy vehicles and tank and gun positions.
- Location of camouflaged positions and installations.
- Water supply and locations of water points.
- Organization, strength, and weapons of engineer units.
- Presence of other than organic engineer units at the front and mission of such units.
- Number of organic trucks, tractors, and other engineer vehicles.
- Location of new or repaired bridges.
- Use of demolitions.
- Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
- Relocation or movement of civilians.
- Civilian supply.
- Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
- Location and present condition of civilian power plants, water works, and sewage disposal plants.
- Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS

Topics for questioning captured reconnaissance troops are as follows:

- The reconnaissance plan, march order, time schedule, and specific missions of all elements, means of coordination and communication between elements, and the unit headquarters and higher headquarters.
- Nature of orders received from higher headquarters.
- Identification, organization, composition, strength, means of transportation, and weapons of the unit.
- Routes of approach used by the unit.
- Identification, composition, organization, strength, and disposition of the main body of troops and reinforcements. Routes to be used.
- General quality of troops of the reconnaissance unit and of the main body.
- Radio communication equipment and frequencies used.
- Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment.

LOCAL CIVILIANS

Civilians who have recently left enemy-held areas normally have important information and often give this information readily. This information is usually of particular importance to the CA and PSYOP personnel of the unit. The following topics should be included when questioning local civilians:

- Location of enemy front lines and major defensive positions.
- Location of artillery positions.
- Location and nature of minefields in enemy rear area.

- Description of key terrain.
- Condition of roads, bridges, and major buildings.
- Enemy policy and attitude toward local civilians.
- Human and material resources of the area.
- Morale and esprit de corps of local civilians.
- Data on important civilian personalities remaining in enemy areas.
- Health and medical status of local populace.
- Effect of friendly operations on civilian populace.
- Instructions to prepare for defensive measures against NBC attack.
- Recent immunizations.

POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA PERSONNEL

Personnel recently acquired through combat operations and who are identified as being involved with political and PSYOP should be questioned. As a minimum, the following topics should be included:

- Policy, plans, and objectives.
- Organization and training.
- Current and past activities, to include themes of any propaganda programs.
- Enemy analysis of our weaknesses and strengths.
- Target audiences for propaganda, including priorities.
- Effects of friendly PSYOP.
- Analysis of enemy weaknesses and strengths.
- Enemy counterpropaganda activities.

GUERRILLA PERSONNEL

Topics for interrogation of captured guerrilla personnel are as follows:

- Area of activities.
- Nature of activities.
- Strength.
- Equipment.
- Motivation.
- Leadership.
- Reliability.
- Contacts
- External direction or support.

EXAMPLE 2, QUESTION GUIDE FOR NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

Some specific questions for information on NBC operations are as follows:

- What items of NBC protective equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Is there any differentiation in issue of items for particular areas? If so, what items for what areas?
- Are there any new or recent immunizations indicated by sources during interrogations?
- What immunizations have enemy troop units received, as indicated in captured immunization records?
- Are enemy troops equipped with protective masks? Is the individual required to carry the mask on his person? Are there any sectors where the mask is not required equipment for the individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask?
- Is protective clothing issued to enemy troops? If so, what type of clothing or articles? If special clothing is used, is it for any particular geographic area?
- Have enemy troop units constructed NBC protective shelters? If so, what type?
- Are enemy fortifications, individual and collective, provided with overhead cover?

- Are enemy troops issued any protective footwear or other means to provide protection against penetration by liquid agents?
 - Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles provided with specially installed protective equipment to protect the crew in case of chemical attack?
 - Are enemy troops issued any type of individual protective items, including antidotes or protective ointment, for first aid?
 - Are there any areas for which additional or unusual NBC safety precautions have been established?
 - What is the size and composition of enemy NBC specialist troop units? Where are they located? Why?
 - Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions concerning consumption of food and water or handling of livestock in areas that may be overrun by enemy forces?
 - What training, if any, have enemy troops received in the use of incapacitating-type agents and their dissemination?
 - What items of chemical detection equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Are the items operated constantly, irregularly, or not at all? Is there any differentiation made regarding their use in certain areas?
 - What type of radiation-measuring instruments are issued to enemy troop units and what is their range or limit? How are they distributed?
 - How many hours of training with radiation measuring instruments have enemy monitoring and survey personnel received?
 - How many hours of NBC training have enemy troops received? How many hours training are devoted individually to chemical, biological, and radiological operations? Have enemy troops received any special or accelerated training as opposed to what is considered routine?
 - Do enemy units have decontamination materials on hand? If so, what type and in what quantity?
 - Have sources observed decontamination stations or installations established in enemy areas? If so, what is their location and composition?
 - Are enemy troop units issued biological sampling kits or devices? If so, what is their type and composition?
 - Have sources observed any cylinders or containers which might contain bulk chemical agents?
 - Have sources observed any tactical aircraft equipped with accessory tanks which indicate a spray capability?
 - Are sources aware of location of dumps of chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and bulk chemical agents?
 - Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket units have chemical ammunition on hand?
 - At what radiological exposure or dose are troops required to relocate?
 - Are there any problem areas or shortcomings in NBC material?
- The following PIR and IR are applicable for internal defense operations in appropriate theaters of operations?
- What types of tunnels and caves and modification are used in defense against riot control agents and explosive gases?
 - What defensive material and instructions are issued for defense against riot control agents?
 - What defensive measures are taken against defoliation and anticrop agents?

APPENDIX J

1949 Geneva Conventions

1. The United States is a party to the following Geneva Conventions of 1949:

■ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS.

■ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS Sea.

■ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GPW.

■ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GC.

2. These treaties will be strictly observed and enforced by United States forces without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its specific relations with any other specified country. Military commanders will be instructed which, if any, of these treaties, or component parts thereof, are not legally binding in a given situation. On 10 August 1965, the US Secretary of State notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Geneva Conventions as a whole would apply to the Vietnam conflict. Future armed conflict involving the United States will most likely be subjected to the same laws on a unilateral basis.

3. Those articles of the above-referenced treaties directly applicable to this manual are quoted below. (See FM 27-10 for full explanation of these treaties.)

(GWS, GWS Sea, GPW, GC, Art. 2) SITUATIONS TO WHICH LAW OF WAR ARE APPLICABLE

J-0

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the State of War is not recognized by one of them.

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.

(GWS, GPW, GWS Sea, GC, Art. 3) INSURGENCY

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

■ Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

- violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- taking of hostages;
- outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
- the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

J-1

■ The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

(GPW, Art. 4) PRISONERS OF WAR DEFINED

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

■ Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

■ Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

- that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- that of carrying arms openly;
- that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

■ Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

J-2

■ Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

■ Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

■ Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

■ Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

■ The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exceptions of Article 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

J-3

(GPW, Art. 13) HUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

■ Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. An unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

■ Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

■ Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

(GPW, Art. 17) QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS

■ Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

■ If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

■ Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

■ No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

■ Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

■ The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.

(GC, Art. 31) PROHIBITION OF COERCION

■ No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.

J-5

GLOSSARY

abn	airborne
ACR	armored cavalry regiment
AF	Air Force
AG	Adjutant General
AKM	designation of a type of Soviet rifle
amph	amphibious
amt	amount
AOE	Army of Excellence
approx	approximately
armd	armored
at	antitank
ATGL	antitank grenade launcher
Aug	August
BEST MAPS	B - biographic intelligence E - economic intelligence S - sociological intelligence T - transportation and telecommunications intelligence M - military geographic intelligence A - armed forces intelligence P - political intelligence S - scientific and technical intelligence
BICC	battlefield information control center
BMP	designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier
bn	battalion
C ²	command and control
C ³	command, control, and communications
C ³ CM	command, control, communications countermeasures
CA	civil affairs
C-E	Communication-Electronics
CEB	captured enemy document
CEE	captured enemy equipment
CEWI	combat electronic warfare and intelligence
CINCAFMED	Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Mediterranean
CI	counterintelligence
CIC	combined interrogation center
CINCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
CINCHAN	Allied Commander in Chief Channel
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CM&D	collection management and dissemination
CMEC	captured material exploitation center
CMO	civil-military operations
co	company
COMMZ	communications zone
CONUS	continental United States
COSCOM	corps support command
CP	command post
CPR	common point of reference
CSS	combat service support

Glossary-0

DCPR	destination common point of reference
decon	decontamination
det	detachment
DIAM	Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DISCOM	division support command
DISUM	daily intelligence summary
div	division
DOI	date of information
DS	direct support
dsg	designated
DTG	date-time group
E	east
ea	each
EAC	echelons above corps
EM	enlisted man
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
evac	evacuation
EW	electronic warfare
FID	foreign internal defense
fl	fluent
FM	field manual
FNU	first name unknown
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FUD	full unit designation
G1	Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, Personnel
G2	Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
G3	Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations
G4	Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics
G5	Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GS	general support
H/S	hearsay
HPT	high-payoff target
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
ID	identification
ICPR	initial common point of reference
i.e.	that is
I&E	interrogation and exploitation
IEW	intelligence and electronic warfare
IMINT	imagery intelligence
intel	intelligence
intg	interrogation
INTREP	intelligence report
INTSUM	intelligence summary

Glossary-1

IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPW	prisoner of war interrogation
IR	information requirements
J2	Intelligence Directorate
JIF	joint interrogation facilities
JrLt	junior lieutenant
JrSgt	junior sergeant
KB	knowledgeability briefs
KIA	killed in action
ldr	leader
LIC	low-intensity conflict
MARSTA	martial status
mbr	member
MHz	megahertz
MI	military intelligence
MIT	mobile interrogation teams
MN/I	middle name/initial
MOSC	military occupational specialty code
MR	motorized rifle
MRB	motorized rifle battalion
MRC	motorized rifle company
MRD	motorized rifle division
MRP	motorized rifle platoon
MRR	motorized rifle regiment
MRS	motorized rifle squad
N	north/no
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical
no	number
OB	order of battle
OCONUS	outside continental United States
off	officer
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
PERINTREP	periodic intelligence report
pers	personnel
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PKM	designation of a type of Soviet weapon
PKT	designation of a type of Soviet weapon
plt	platoon
PO	political officer

Glossary-2

POC	point of capture
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
pos	position
PSYOP	psychological operations
REC	radio electronic combat
recon	reconnaissance
regt	regiment
RPG-7	designation of a type of Soviet antitank grenade launcher
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
S	south
S1	Adjutant (US Army)
S2	Intelligence Officer (US Army)
S3	Operations and Training Officer (US Army)
S4	Supply Officer (US Army)
S5	Civil Affairs Officer (US Army)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAEDA	Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SFC	sergeant first class
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIR	specific information requirements
SITMAP	situation map
SOI	signal operating instructions
SOP	standing operating procedure
sqd	squad
sqdrn	squadron
SrSgt	senior sergeant
STANAG	standardization agreement
SUPINTREP	supplemental intelligence report
svc	service
SVD	designation of a type of Soviet rifle
SW	southwest
TCAE	technical control and analysis element
TECHDOC	technical document
TOC	tactical operations center
TOE	table of organization and equipment
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UIC	unit identification code
UkSSR	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
U/I	unidentified
unk	unknown
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

Glossary-3

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (grid)

W west
WNA would not answer

Y yes

Glossary-4

REFERENCES

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.

Army Regulations (ARs)

25-400-2 The Modern Army Recordkeeping System
190-8 Army Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons
380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program

Field Manuals (FMs)

19-40 Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons
21-26 Map Reading
27-10 The Law of Land Warfare
34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
34-60 Counterintelligence
34-60A (S/NOFORN) Counterintelligence Operations (U)
100-2-3 The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment
100-5 Operations
100-20 Low Intensity Conflict

Department of Army Pamphlets (DA Pams)

27-161-1 International Law Vol 1

Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAMs)

58-13 (S) Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U)

Miscellaneous Publications

The Hague and Geneva Conventions
Uniform Code of Military Justice

Department of Army Forms (DA Forms)

1132 Prisoners Personal Property List-Personal Deposit Funds

Reference 1

COMMAND

Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Determine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.

Field Circulars (FCs)

8-2 Medical Intelligence in the Airland Battle, 31 Mar 86. Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Houston, Texas 78234-1600
34-124 MI Bn/Co Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), Oct 85. United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000

PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS

Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint distribution. They may not be obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1.

Field Manuals (FMs)

34-5 (S) Human Intelligence Operations (U)
34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Field Manuals (FMs)

8-10 Health Service Support in Theater of Operations
33-1 Psychological Operations
34-80 Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

Reference-2

INDEX

- air-land battle**, 2-0, 2-5, 2-6
 - area of interest, 2-0
 - area of operations, 2-0
 - initiative, 2-0
 - doctrine, 2-0
- analysis**, 2-2
- approach**, 3-0, 3-3, 7-0
 - approaches, 3-4, 3-7, H-0
 - decreased fear down, H-2
 - direct, H-0
 - emotional, H-0
 - emotional hate, H-0
 - emotional love, H-0
 - "establish your identity", H-5
 - fear up (mild), H-2
 - fear up (harsh), H-1
 - file and dossier, H-5
 - futility technique, H-4
 - incentive, H-0
 - increased fear up, H-1
 - "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe"), H-6
 - pride and ego, H-2
 - pride and ego down, H-3
 - pride and ego up, H-3
 - rapid fire, H-6
 - repetition, H-5
 - silence, H-6
 - "we know all", H-4
 - assess the source, 3-5
 - breaking point, 3-6
 - commander's information requirements, 3-6
 - commander's priority intelligence requirements, 3-6
 - contact, 7-0
 - establish and develop rapport, 3-5
 - establish and maintain control, 3-4, 3-5
 - establish and maintain rapport, 3-4
 - Geneva and Hague Conventions, 3-5
 - initial contact, 7-0
 - interview, 7-0
 - manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses, 3-4
 - phase, 3-4
 - planning and preparation, 3-3
 - selecting, 3-3
 - sincere and convincing, 3-6
 - smooth transitions, 3-6
 - techniques, 3-4, 3-6
 - UCMJ, 3-5
- battlefield information control center**, 6-4
 - contact, 6-4
 - DISUM, 6-4
 - intelligence dissemination, 6-4
 - INTREP, 6-4
 - INTSUM, 6-4
 - PERINTREP, 6-4
 - SUPINTREP, 6-4
- captured enemy documents**, 1-1, 1-2, 4-0, 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, A-11
 - accountability, 4-1, 4-13
 - Air Force-related documents, 4-5
 - captured material exploitation center, 4-9
 - captured with a source, 4-11
 - categories, 4-4
 - category A, 4-4
 - category B, 4-4
 - category C, 4-5
 - category D, 4-5
 - communications and cryptographic documents, 4-4
 - confiscation, 4-12
 - date-time group, 4-0
 - detainee personnel record
 - disposal, 4-11
 - electronic warfare, 4-9
 - evacuation, 4-1, 4-12
 - exploitation, 4-4, 8-0
 - handling, 4-0
 - impounded, 4-12
 - inventory, 4-2
 - log, 4-2, 4-3
 - maps and charts of enemy forces, 4-5
 - Navy-related documents, 4-5
 - recognition, 4-12
 - recording documents category, 4-5
 - returned, 4-12
 - SALUTE report, 4-4, 4-8
 - screening, 4-4
 - SIGINT, 4-9
 - STANAG 1059, 4-0
 - STANAG 2084, 4-0
 - tag, 4-1
 - technical control and analysis element, 4-4, 4-9
 - technical documents, 4-4, 4-5, 4-9
 - trace actions, 4-2
 - translation reports, 4-6, 4-8
 - translating, 4-5
 - transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10

Index-1

categories

document, 3-2, 4-4, A-11
source, 3-1, 3-2, 8-0, A-4, A-5, A-6

combined interrogation center, 8-0

STANAG 2033, 8-0

collection management and dissemination, 6-4

contact, 6-4
DISUM, 6-4
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
PERINTREP, 6-4
SUPINTREP, 6-4

command, control, and communications, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6

countermeasures, 2-4
programs

counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4

agents, 3-1
agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
air-land battle, 2-5
black list, 2-5
command, control, and communications programs, 2-2, 3-4
deception, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5
element, 3-1
enemy agents, 2-5
gray list, 2-5
informant technique, 9-10
insurgent captive, 9-9
interrogation operations, 9-9
local leader, 9-9
operations security, 2-2, 2-4
priority intelligence requirements of counterintelligence interest, 3-1
radio electronic combat, 2-5
rear operations, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, 2-5
saboteurs, 2-5
screening techniques, 9-9
sympathizers, 2-5
special purpose forces, 2-5
terrorists, 2-5
white list, 2-5

echelons above corps, 1-2, 4-5

electronic warfare, 2-2, 2-6

capabilities and limitations, 2-6
combat effectiveness, 2-6

command, control, and communications, 2-6

compositions, 2-6
counterintelligence, 2-2
dispositions, 2-6
electronic technical data, 2-7
IR, 2-6
logistics, 2-7
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
missions, 2-6
OB elements, 2-7
PIR, 2-6
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
training, 2-6

high-intensity conflict, P, 9-1

human intelligence, 2-7

cooperative and friendly, 1-2
hostile and antagonistic, 1-2
human sources, 1-1
neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2

information

all-source intelligence, 2-2
analyze information, 2-3
area of operations, 2-1
collection assets, 2-1
collection missions, 2-1
collection requirements, 2-1
combat, 2-2, 2-3
components of strategic debriefing, 7-1
armed forces intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
biographic intelligence, 7-1
economic intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
military geographical intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
political intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
scientific and technical intelligence, 7-1, 7-3
sociological intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
transportation and telecommunications intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
direct targeting data, 2-2
electronic technical data, 2-7
imagery intelligence, 6-4
interrogation operations, 2-0
military intelligence, 2-0, 2-4
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
OB elements, 2-7
OB data base, 3-3
signals intelligence, 6-4

Index-2

- situation map, 3-3
- strategic debriefing, 7-0
 - duties and responsibilities, 7-0
 - notification, 7-0
 - planning and preparation, 7-0
- targeting data, 2-3
- terrain features, 2-1
- weather conditions, 2-1
- information requirements**, 2-3, 2-6, 3-0, 3-1, 3-4, 3-6, 3-8
- intelligence and electronic warfare**, 2-0, 2-2, 2-4, 2-7, 3-3
 - all-source intelligence, 2-2
 - CED, 2-7
 - collection, 2-2
 - combat information, 2-2
 - command, control, and communications programs, 2-2
 - counterintelligence, 2-2
 - deception, 2-2
 - direct targeting data, 2-2
 - electronic warfare, 2-2
 - operations security, 2-2
 - processing, 2-2
 - rear operations, 2-2
 - reporting, 2-2
 - sources, 2-7
 - situation development, 2-2
 - target development, 2-2
- intelligence annex**, 5-0
 - deployment site, 5-0
- intelligence preparation of the battlefield**, 2-0, 2-2
 - battlefield information control center, 6-4
 - collection management and dissemination, 6-4
 - collection missions, 6-4
 - intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2
 - military intelligence, 2-0
 - weather and terrain, 2-2, 2-3
- interpreter**, 3-14, 3-15
 - interrogation, 3-14
 - methods, 3-14
 - preparation, 3-14
 - reports, 3-15
- interrogation**, 1-0, 3-0, 3-3, 6-0, 8-0
 - accuracy, 1-0
 - advisor operations, 9-5
 - agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
 - and the interrogator, 1-0
 - approach, 3-0
 - area cordon, 9-9
 - battlefield information control center, 6-4
 - CEDs, 4-0
 - collection management and dissemination, 6-4
 - collection mission, 6-4
 - collection priority, 6-0
 - command relations, 6-0
 - contacts, 6-4, 7-0
 - counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4
 - defectors, 9-8
 - deployment site, 6-3
 - detainee personnel record, 3-0
 - EPW captive tag, 3-0
 - examine documents, 3-0
 - foreign internal defense, 9-1
 - illiterates, 9-10
 - information requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6-4
 - informant technique, 9-10
 - initiative, 1-0
 - prisoner of war, 1-0
 - insurgent captive, 9-9
 - insurgent vulnerability to interrogation, 9-6
 - intelligence, 1-0
 - intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-0, 2-2
 - intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 2-0
 - joint interrogation facilities, 8-0
 - legal status of insurgents, 9-6
 - local leader, 9-9
 - low-intensity conflict, 9-1, 9-3
 - main and local forces, 9-8
 - military police, 3-0
 - militia, 9-8
 - mission, 8-0
 - national agency, 8-2
 - objective, 1-0
 - order of battle, 1-0, 2-3
 - interrogation, 1-0
 - interrogator, 1-0
 - OB elements, 2-7
 - observe the source, 3-0
 - operational environment
 - operations, 2-0, 9-1, 9-9
 - peacekeeping operations
 - peacetime contingency operations, 9-1
 - plan, 3-4
 - planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-4
 - political cadre, 9-8
 - population, 9-6
 - prescreening, 3-0
 - priority intelligence requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6-4

Index-3

- principles of, 1-0
- process, 3-0
- question guards, 3-0
- questioning, 3-7
- reports, 3-15
- screeners, 3-0, 3-1
- screening, 3-0, 9-9
- security, 1-1
- site, 3-14, 6-3
- situation map, 3-3
- source, 3-0
- support relationships, 6-4
 - additional, 6-6
 - chaplain, 6-7
 - communications, 6-6
 - health service, 6-6
 - inspector general, 6-7
 - NBC protection, 6-6
 - staff judge advocate, 6-6
 - civil-military operations (G5 and S5), 6-6
 - intelligence (G2 and S2), 6-5
 - operations (G3 and S3), 6-5
 - personnel (G1 and S1), 6-4
 - supply (G4 and S4), 6-5
- sympathizer, 9-8
- termination, 3-12
- terrorism counteraction, 9-1
- with an interpreter, 3-14

interrogator, 1-0, 3-14

- accessible information overtime, 6-2
- adaptability, 1-3
- advisor operations, 9-5
- advisor qualifications, 9-4
- advisor relationships, 9-4
- alertness, 1-2
- and the interrogation, 1-0
- approach techniques, 1-4
- capabilities and limitations, 2-6
- combat effectiveness, 2-6
- common characteristics of sources, 9-8
- compositions, 2-6
- counterintelligence, 2-4
- counterpart relationship, 9-5
- credibility, 1-3
- dispositions, 2-6
- enemy material and equipment, 1-5
- entry-level training, 1-4
- electronic technical data, 2-6
- foreign language, 1-4
- hot and cold leads, 3-9
- information requirements, 2-6
- intelligence assets, 2-0
- intelligence and electronic warfare
 - operations, 2-2
- international agreements, 1-5, 1-6
- knowledgeability of sources, 9-8
- law of land warfare, 1-5
- logistics, 2-7
- long-term memory, 6-1
- map reading, 1-5
- map tracking, 1-5, 3-10
- miscellaneous data, 2-7
- missions, 2-6
- motivation, 1-2
- neurolinguistics, 1-5
- objectivity, 1-3
- order of battle, 1-4
- OB data base, 3-3
- patience and tact, 1-3
- perseverance, 1-3
- personal appearance and demeanor, 1-3
- personal qualities, 1-2
- population, 9-6
- priority intelligence requirements, 2-6
- role, 2-0
- security, 1-5
- self-control, 1-3
- short-term memory, 6-1
- situation map, 5-3
- SALUTE, 3-9
- specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4
- strength, 2-6
- tactics, 2-6
- target country, 1-4
- tasking relationships, 6-3
- The Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1-5
- training, 2-6
- writing and speaking skills, 1-4

joint interrogation facility (JIF), 8-0, 8-2

- CA units, 8-2
- category A sources, 8-0
- communications, 8-2
- coordination, 8-2
- debriefing, 8-2
 - division and corps interrogation and CI elements, 8-2
- EPW camp, 8-2
- exploitation of documents, 8-0
- formation, 8-0
- Geneva Conventions, 8-2
- HUMINT collection, 8-2
- interrogation, 8-2
 - division and corps interrogation and CI elements, 8-2
- interrogation reports, 8-1
- knowledgeability briefs, 8-1

Index-4

- mission, 8-0
- mobile interrogation teams, 8-1
- national agency, 8-2
- operation, 8-1
- organization, 8-0
- PSYOP, 8-2
- requirement, 8-0
- responsibilities, 8-0
- SALUTE, 8-1
- screening, 8-2
 - division and corps interrogation and CI elements, 8-2
- use, 8-1
- low-intensity conflict, P, 1-6, 9-1**
 - advisor and interrogator relationships, 9-4
 - advisor operations, 9-5
 - advisor qualifications, 9-4
 - area cordon, 9-9
 - cease fire supervision, 9-2
 - common characteristics of sources, 9-8
 - counterpart relationship, 9-5
 - defectors, 9-8
 - foreign internal defense, 9-1, 9-2
 - Geneva Conventions, 9-7
 - handling of insurgent captives and suspects, 9-7
 - humane treatment, 9-7
 - illiterates, 9-10
 - informant technique, 9-10
 - insurgent captive, 9-9
 - insurgent methods of resistance, 9-7
 - insurgent vulnerability to interrogation, 9-6
 - interrogation operations, 9-9
 - interrogator skills and abilities, 9-4
 - interrogation support to, 9-3
 - knowledgeability of sources, 9-8
 - law and order maintenance, 9-2
 - limitations to US assistance, 9-4
 - local leader, 9-9
 - main and local forces, 9-8
 - militia, 9-8
 - peacekeeping operations, 9-1, 9-2
 - peacetime contingency operations, 9-1, 9-3
 - political cadre, 9-8
 - population, 9-6
 - screening techniques, 9-9
 - source, 9-6
 - sympathizer, 9-8
 - terminology, 9-1
 - terrorism counteraction, 9-1, 9-3
- mid-intensity conflict, 9-1**
- modern Army recordkeeping system, 5-3**
- operations security, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 7-1**
 - reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, 2-5
- order of battle, 1-0, 1-4, 2-3, 2-7**
 - data base, 3-2
 - elements, 2-7
- planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4**
 - documents captured with a source, 4-11
 - EPW captive tag, 3-0
 - evaluation of documents, 4-12
 - examine documents, 3-0
 - guards, 5-1
 - interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
 - interrogation, 3-14
 - observe the source, 3-0
 - preparation, 3-14
 - questioning guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
 - SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
- priority intelligence requirements, 2-3, 2-6, 3-0, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-8, 3-13**
 - commander's, 3-6
 - of counterintelligence interest
 - supported commander's, 3-1
- procedures**
 - accountability, 4-1, 4-13
 - administrative tasks, 5-2
 - area cordon, 9-9
 - assign category, 3-1
 - captured document log, 4-2, 4-3
 - captured document tag, 4-1
 - captured enemy documents, 4-1, 4-9, A-11
 - captured material exploitation center, 4-9
 - categories of PW, A-4
 - chaplain, 3-7
 - collection mission update, 5-3
 - collection priority, 6-0
 - commander's information requirements, 3-0, 3-1
 - commander's priority intelligence requirements, 3-0, 3-1
 - communications, 5-1
 - communications and cryptographic documents, 4-4
 - confiscation of documents, 4-12
 - counterintelligence operations, P
 - date-time group, 4-0
 - detainee personnel record, 3-0
 - disposal of documents, 4-11

documents captured with a source, 4-11
document evacuation, 4-1, 4-8, 4-9, 4-12
document inventory 4-2
electronic warfare, P, 4-9
evaluation of documents, 4-12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
high-intensity conflict, P
humane treatment, 9-7
impounded documents, 4-12
intelligence and electronic warfare
operations, 5-0
intelligence annex, 5-0
intelligence cycle, 7-3
interpreter, 3-15
interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
interrogating, 3-8, 3-15
interrogation guides, I-0, I-8
armored troops, I-4
artillerymen, I-4
drivers, I-2
engineer troops, I-6
guerrilla personnel, I-8
liaison officers, I-3
local civilians, I-7
medical corpsmen, I-6
members of machine-gun and motor
units, I-7
messengers, I-0
patrol leaders and patrol members, I-2
political and propaganda personnel, I-8
prisoner of war captive tag, D-1
prisoner of war identity card, C-0
reconnaissance troops, I-7
radio and telephone operators, I-1
riflemen, I-0
squad and platoon leaders and
company commanders, I-1
interrogation site, 3-14, 5-1
liaison, 7-1
low-intensity conflict, P
medic, 3-7
medical support, 5-1
methods of interpretation, 3-14
military police, 3-0
modern Army recordkeeping system, 5-3
movement, 5-1
neurolinguistics, 1-5
nuclear, biological, and chemical, P
planning and preparation, 3-3
prepare and move to deployment site,
3-14, 5-0, 5-1
priority, 4-8, 4-9
prisoners of war, 2-7
question guards, 3-0
question guide for NBC operations, I-8
humane treatment, J-4
insurgency, J-1
1949 Geneva Conventions, J-0
prisoners of war, J-2
prohibition of coercion, J-5
questioning of prisoners, J-4
recognition of documents, 4-12
recordkeeping, 3-12
Red Cross, 3-7
returned documents, 4-12
S2, 5-0
S3, 5-0
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
sample detainee personnel record, B-0
screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1
screening report format, F-1, F-2
senior interrogator, 5-2
signals intelligence, 4-9
source evacuation, 5-1
STANAG extracts, A-1
STANAG 1059, 4-0, A-2
STANAG 2033, 8-0, A-2
STANAG 2044, A-6
STANAG 2084, 4-0, A-10
tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7
technical control and analysis element,
4-4, 4-9
technical documents, 4-4, 4-9
termination, 3-13
trace actions, 4-2
translation report, 4-8
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10
processing, 2-2
approach, 3-0
cycle, 5-2
EPW captive tag, 3-0
intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-7
intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2
interrogation, 3-0, 5-2
observe the source, 3-0
planning and preparation, 3-0
prescreening, 3-0
questioning, 3-0
reporting, 3-0
screeners, 3-0
screening, 3-0, 5-2
documents, 4-4
source, 9-9
termination, 3-0
prohibition against use of force, 1-1
international law, 1-1, 1-5
law of land warfare, 1-5

Index-6

legal status of insurgents, 9-6
 question guide for NBC operations, I-8
 humane treatment, J-4
 insurgency, J-1
 prisoners of war, J-2
 prohibition of coercion, J-5
 questioning of prisoners, J-4
 The Hague and Geneva Conventions, P,
 1-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-7, 8-2, 9-6, 9-7, J-1
 Uniform Code of Military Justice, P, 2-7,
 3-5

questioning, 3-0, 3-7, 7-0
 collection mission, 6-4
 collection priority, 6-0
 guards, 3-3
 hearsay information, 3-9
 hot and cold leads, 3-9
 information requirements, 3-9
 interrogation, 5-1
 interrogation guides, I-0, I-8
 armored troops, I-4
 artillerymen, I-4
 drivers, I-2
 engineer troops, I-6
 guerrilla personnel, I-8
 liaison officers, I-3
 local civilians, I-7
 medical corpsmen, I-6
 members of machine-gun and motor
 units, I-7
 messengers, I-0
 patrol leaders and patrol members, I-2
 political and propaganda personnel, I-8
 prisoner of war captive tag, D-1
 prisoner of war identity card, C-0
 reconnaissance troops, I-7
 radio and telephone operators, I-1
 riflemen, I-0
 squad and platoon leaders and
 company commanders, I-1
 map reading, 1-5
 map tracking, 1-5, 3-10
 destination common point of reference,
 3-10
 exploit dispositions, 3-11
 initial common point of reference, 3-10
 point of capture, 3-10
 segment and exploit the route
 segments, 3-11
 missions, 2-6
 modify sequences of, 3-3
 OB elements, 2-7
 PIR, 2-6, 3-9
 question guide for NBC operations, I-8
 questioning of prisoners, J-4
 questioning techniques, 3-7
 compound and negative, 3-9
 control, 3-8
 direct, 3-7
 follow-up, 3-8
 leading, 3-8
 nonpertinent, 3-8
 prepared, 3-8
 repeated, 3-8
 vague, 3-8
 recognition of documents, 4-12
 recording information, 3-12
 SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8
 sequence, 3-9
 strength, 2-6
 tactics, 2-6
 training, 2-6

reporting, 2-2, 3-0, 3-13, 7-0
 DISUM, 6-4
 documents captured with a source, 4-11
 information requirements, 3-9, 3-13
 intelligence annex, 5-0
 intelligence dissemination, 6-4
 INTREP, 6-4
 INTSUM, 6-4
 interrogation reports, 8-1
 PERINTREP, 6-4
 preparation of, 3-15
 priority intelligence requirements, 3-9,
 3-13
 questioning, 3-0
 record information, 3-1
 recording documents category, 4-5
 S2, 5-0
 S3, 5-0
 SALUTE report, 8-1, E-0, E-1
 sample translation report, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10
 screeners, 3-1
 screening code, 3-1
 screening report, 3-1, F-0, F-2
 situation map, 5-3
 SALUTE, 3-1, 4-6
 SUPINTREP, 6-4
 tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7
 translation, 4-6
 transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10
 writing and speaking skills, 1-4

screening, 3-0, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 8-2, 9-9
 assign category, 3-1
 categories of PW, A-4
 CEDs, 4-0
 CEDs captured with a source, 4-11

Index-7

code, 3-1
 EPW captive tag, 3-0
 evaluation of documents, 4-12
 examine documents, 3-0
 guards, 5-1
 observe the source, 3-0
 prescreening, 3-0
 priority intelligence requirements of
 counterintelligence interest, 3-1
 question guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
 recognition of documents, 4-12
 report, 3-1, F-0, F-1, F-2
 SALUTE report, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
 screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1
 sources, 2-7
 techniques, 9-9
senior interrogator, 3-3, 3-4
 administrative tasks, 5-2
 advice and assistance, 5-0
 CED processing cycle, 5-2
 collection mission update, 5-3
 communications, 5-1
 establish site, 5-1
 interrogation, 5-1
 screening, 5-1
 evacuation, 5-1
 guards, 5-1
 intelligence annex, 5-0
 interrogation operations, 5-0
 interrogation process, 5-1
 medical support, 5-1
 movement, 5-1
 planning and preparation, 3-3
 prepare and move to deployment site, 5-0,
 5-1
 recordkeeping, 5-3
 reporting, 5-2
 S2, 5-0
 S3, 5-0
 screening, 5-2
 situation map, 5-3
situation development, 2-2
 terrain, 2-2
 weather, 2-2
sources, P, 1-1, 1-4, 2-7, 3-0, 9-6, 9-8
 accessible information overtime, 6-2
 agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
 captive tag, 3-0
 captured enemy documents, 1-1, 4-11, 4-12,
 4-13
 category A, 8-0
 cooperative and friendly, 1-2
 corps or echelons above corps, 1-2
 defectors, 9-8
 hostile and antagonistic, 1-2
 human intelligence, 2-7
 human sources, 1-1
 illiterates, 9-10
 imagery intelligence, 6-4
 informant technique, 9-10
 insurgent captive, 9-9
 interrogation operations, 9-9
 knowledgeability briefs, 8-1
 local leader, 9-9
 long-term memory, 6-1
 main and local forces, 9-8
 militia, 9-8
 neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2
 political cadre, 9-8
 prisoner of war, 1-0, C-0, D-1
 sample detainee personnel record, B-0
 screening, 9-9
 short-term memory, 6-1
 signals intelligence, 6-4
 sources of information, 1-1
 sympathizer, 9-8
target development, 2-2
 combat information, 2-3
 combat operations, 2-4
 command and control, 2-4
 command, control, and communications,
 2-3, 2-4
 command, control, and communications
 countermeasures, 2-4
 counterintelligence, 2-4
 high-payoff targets, 2-3, 2-4
 high value targets, 2-2
 information requirements, 2-2
 intelligence officer, 2-3
 operations security, 2-3, 2-4
 order of battle, 2-3
 priority intelligence requirements, 2-2, 2-3
 radio electronic combat, 2-3
 specific information requirements, 2-2,
 2-3, 2-4
 battalion, 2-3
 brigade, 2-3
 targeting data, 2-3
 weather and terrain, 2-3
termination, 3-0, 3-12, 3-13, 3-15, 7-1
 phase, 3-12
 questioning, 3-0
 returned documents, 4-12
 source evacuation, 5-1

Index-8

training, 1-4, 2-6

enemy material and equipment, 1-5
entry-level training, 1-4
foreign language, 1-4
international agreements, 1-5
interrogator, 6-7
language, 6-7, 7-1
map reading, 1-5

map tracking, 1-5

neurolinguistics, 1-5
order of battle, 1-4
scientific and technical enhancement, 7-1
security, 1-5
specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4
target country, 1-4

translating, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7

Index-9

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