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INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

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Preface

This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes procedures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. It provides general guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interrogation elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetime interrogation operations.

These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 and 60A (S/NOFORN); and to the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1.

The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements 1059 (National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents).

These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by FM 27-10, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

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CHAPTER 1

Interrogation and the Interrogator

Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. An interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two differs to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities, and because the circumstances of each contact and the physical environment vary.

PRINCIPLES OF INTERROGATION

Intelligence interrogations are of many types, such as the interview, debriefing, and elicitation. However, the principles of objective, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security apply to all types.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximun amount of usable information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a definite purpose—to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he obtains the information. The objective may be specific, establishing the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general, seeking order of battle (OB) information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should not concentrate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, during an interrogation, he learns of an unknown, highly destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his specific objective, he develops this lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weapon. It is then obvious that the objective of an interrogation can be changed as necessary or desired.

INITIATIVE

Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to a successful interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interrogation. He has certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation, such as the psychological shock the source receives when becoming a prisoner of war, which enable him to grasp the initiative and assist him in maintaining it. An interrogator may lose control during the interrogation by allowing the source to take control of the interrogation. If this occurs, he must postpone the interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a different interrogator should conduct the interrogation. In addition, the interrogator must identify and exploit leads developed during the interrogation.

ACCURACY

The interrogator makes every effort to obtain accurate information from the source. He assesses the source correctly by repeating questions at varying intervals. The interrogator, however, is not the final analyst and should not reject or degrade information because it conflicts with previously obtained information. The interrogator's primary mission is the collection of information, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all

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information as the truth; he views all information obtained with a degree of doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm information received and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is of great importance to report accurate information to the using elements. The interrogator checks his notes against the finished report to ensure that the report contains and identifies the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the source.

PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.

The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.

Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques.

SECURITY

The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a great deal of classified information. He is aware constantly that his job is to obtain information, not impart it to the source. He safeguards military information at all times as well as the source of information. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, there are those attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect any attempt made by the source to elicit information.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The interrogator is concerned primarily with two sources of information in his intelligence collection effort: human sources and material sources (mainly captured enemy documents (CEDs)). The senior interrogator, depending on the supported commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR), decides which of these sources will be more effective in the intelligence collection effort.

HUMAN SOURCES

The interrogator encounters many sources who vary greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation, military specialty, and political and religious beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health, their intelligence levels may range from well below average to well above average, and their security consciousness may range from the lowest to the highest. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Because of these variations, the interrogator makes a careful study of every source to evaluate his mental, emotional, and physical state and uses it as a basis for interrogation. He deals mainly with three categories of sources: cooperative and friendly, neutral and nonpartisan, and hostile and antagonistic.

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Cooperative and Friendly

A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount of information from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those private affairs which are beyond the scope of the interrogation. At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and losing control of the interrogation.

Neutral and Nonpartisan

A neutral and nonpartisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in low-intensity conflict (LIC) where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the information required.

Hostile and Antagonistic

A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real challenge to the interrogator. An interrogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when dealing with him. As a rule, at lower echelons, it is considered unprofitable to expend excessive time and effort in interrogating hostile and antagonistic sources. When time is available and the source appears to be an excellent target for exploitation, he should be isolated and repeatedly interrogated to obtain his cooperation. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where more time is available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CEDs include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession of a foreign nation and comes into US possession. This includes US documents which the foreign nation may have possessed. There are numerous ways to acquire a document, some of the most common ways are: found in the possession of human sources, on enemy dead, or on the battlefield. There are two types of documents: (1) official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters, diaries, newspapers, and books.

PERSONAL QUALITIES

An interrogator should possess an interest in human nature and have a personality which will enable him to gain the cooperation of a source. Ideally, these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator; however, in most cases, an interrogator can correct some deficiencies in these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote time to study and practice. Some desirable personal qualities in an interrogator are motivation, alertness, patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor.

MOTIVATION

An interrogator may be motivated by several factors, for example, an interest in human relations, a desire to react to the challenge of personal interplay, an enthusiasm for the collection of information, or just a profound interest in foreign languages and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is the most significant factor used by an interrogator to achieve success. Without motivation, other qualities lose their significance. The stronger the motivation, the more successful the interrogator.

ALERTNESS

The interrogator must be constantly aware of the shifting attitudes which normally characterize a source's reaction to

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interrogation. He notes the source's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. He determines why the source is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the source's mood and actions that the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is withholding information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for diminishing resistance, for contradictions, or other tendencies, to include susceptibility.

PATIENCE AND TACT

The interrogator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby, enhancing the success of the interrogation. Additionally, the validity of the source's statements and the motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of tact and patience. Displaying impatience encourages the difficult source to think that if he remains unresponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will stop his questioning. The display of impatience may cause the source to lose respect for the interrogator, thereby, reducing his effectiveness. An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and later continue further interrogation without arousing apprehension or resentment.

CREDIBILITY

The interrogator must maintain credibility with the source and friendly forces. Failure to produce material rewards when promised may adversely affect future interrogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are often the basis for tactical decisions and operations.

OBJECTIVITY

The interrogator must maintain an objective and a dispassionate attitude, regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience, or which he may simulate during the interrogation. Without this required objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effectively.

SELF-CONTROL

The interrogator must have an exceptional degree of self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative during the interrogation. Self-control is especially important when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emotions or attitudes.

ADAPTABILITY

An interrogator must adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during interrogations. He must also adapt himself to the operational environment. In many cases, he has to conduct interrogations under a variety of unfavorable physical conditions.

PERSEVERANCE

A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an interrogator who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, noncooperation, or other difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a successful conclusion nor seek leads to other valuable information.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR

The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the interrogation and the attitude of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a neat, organized, and professional appearance will favorably influence the source. A firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of

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speech and attitude may create a proper environment for a successful interrogation. If the interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and more receptive to questioning. However, depending on the approach techniques, the interrogator can decide to portray a different (for example, casual, sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the willing cooperation of the source.

SPECIALIZED SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE

The interrogator must be knowledgeable and qualified to efficiently and effectively exploit human and material sources which are of potential intelligence interest. He is trained in the techniques and proficiency necessary to exploit human and material sources. His initial training is in foreign language, and his entry-level training is in the exploitation of documents and human sources. The interrogator must possess, or acquire through training and experience, special skills and knowledge.

WRITING AND SPEAKING SKILLS

The most essential part of the interrogator's intelligence collection effort is reporting the information obtained. Hence, he must prepare and present both written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. He must possess a good voice and speak English and a foreign language idiomatically and without objectionable accent or impediment.

Knowledge of a foreign language is necessary since interrogators work primarily with non-English speaking people. Language ability should include a knowledge of military terms, foreign idioms, abbreviations, colloquial and slang usages, and local dialects. Although a trained interrogator who lacks a foreign language skill can interrogate successfully through an interpreter, the results obtained by the linguistically proficient interrogator will be more timely and comprehensive. Language labs, tapes, or instructors should be made available wherever possible to provide refresher and enhancement training for interrogator linguists.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE US ARMY'S MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS

Interrogation operations contribute to the accomplishment of the supported commander's mission. The interrogator must have a working knowledge of the US Army's missions, organizations, weapons and equipment, and methods of operation. This knowledge enables him to judge the relative significance of the information he extracts from the source.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE TARGET COUNTRY

Every interrogator should be knowledgeable about his unit's target country, such as armed forces uniforms and insignia, OB information, and country familiarity.

Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia

Through his knowledge of uniforms, insignia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of unit, and military experience of a military or paramilitary source. During the planning and preparation and the approach phases, later discussed in this manual, the identification of uniforms and insignia is very helpful to the interrogator.

Order of Battle Information

OB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. OB elements are separate categories by which detailed information is maintained. They are composition, disposition, strength, training, combat effectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronic technical data, and miscellaneous data. During the questioning phase, OB elements assist the interrogator in verifying the accuracy of the information obtained and can be used as an effective tool to gain new

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information. Aids which may be used to identify units are names of units, names of commanders, home station identifications, code designations and numbers, uniforms, insignia, guidons, documents, military postal system data, and equipment and vehicle markings.

Country Familiarity

The interrogator should be familiar with the social, political, and economic institutions; geography; history; and culture of the target country. Since many sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the interrogator may induce reluctant prisoners to talk by discussing the geography, economics, or politics of the target country. He may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and attitudes in the target country. He should keep abreast of major events as they occur in the target country. By knowing the current events affecting the target country, the interrogator will better understand the general situation in the target country, as well as the causes and repercussions.

KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON SOLDIER SKILLS

Interrogators must be proficient in all common soldier skills. However, map reading and enemy material and equipment are keys to the performance of interrogator duties.

Map Reading

Interrogators must read maps well enough to map track using source information obtained about locations of enemy activities. Through the use of his map tracking skills, the interrogator can obtain information on the locations of enemy activities from sources who can read a map. Furthermore, his map reading skills are essential to translate information into map terminology from sources who cannot read a map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26.

Enemy Material and Equipment

The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and employment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infantry support weapons, artillery, aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and NBC defense. FM 100-2-3 provides information on enemy material and equipment.

Specialized Training

The interrogator requires specialized training in international regulations, security, and neurolinguistics.

International Agreements

The interrogator should know international regulations on the treatment of prisoners of war and the general principles of the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Security

Interrogators must know how to identify, mark, handle, and control sensitive material according to AR 380-5. He should have received special training on Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA).

Neurolinguistics

Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communications model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The interrogator should read and react to nonverbal communications. An interrogator can best adapt himself to the source's personality and control his own reactions when he has an understanding of basic psychological factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions.

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CHAPTER 2

Role of the Interrogator

An interrogation element does not operate on its own. It conducts operations in response to an assigned collection mission and reports the information it collects back into the system to help support combat commanders in fighting the air-land battle. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process is the framework in which intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations take place Interrogation assets operate within that framework to support the commander.

COMMANDER'S MISSION UNDER AIR-LAND BATTLE

All combat commanders have the same basic responsibility. They must destroy the enemy's capability to conduct further operations within their assigned areas of operation. To accomplish this mission, commanders must locate, identify, engage, and defeat enemy units. A commander can only engage the enemy after that enemy has entered the commander's area of operations. The depth of this area is determined by the maximum range of the weapon systems controlled by the commander. High technology battlefields of the future will be characterized by high mobility, devastating firepower, and tactics which take maximum advantage of both. On such battlefields, a commander whose sole interest is his area of operations is a commander who has lost the initiative. Losing the initiative on a battlefield means losing the battle. Air-land battle doctrine projects a way for commanders to preserve the initiative. It requires commanders to expand their outlook on the battlefield to another area, the area of interest. This area contains those enemy elements which may be close enough to effect the outcome of combat operations in the immediate future. If commanders can locate, identify, and accurately predict the intentions of enemy units while they are in the area of interest, it may be possible to inhibit or destroy their ability to conduct future combat operations. In combat operations against the enemy, air-land battle doctrine concentrates on deep, close, and rear operations. Air-land battle doctrine requires all commanders to have a mental and emotional commitment to the offensive. They must set primary and secondary objectives in terms of enemy formations, not terrain features. They must attack units and areas critical to coherent enemy operations, not just the enemy's lead formations. Commanders must possess the spirit of offensive determination. They must direct powerful initial blows against the enemy, placing him at an immediate disadvantage. These initial blows must be rapidly followed by additional strikes to keep the enemy off balance. To successfully implement the air-land battle doctrine, commanders must—

- ☐ Hold the initiative.
- ☐ Operate across the entire width and depth of the battlefield.
- ☐ React rapidly to changes in the enemy's intentions.
- ☐ Synchronize the operations of their subordinates.

The air-land battle doctrine places an extremely heavy burden on all commanders. However, these burdens must be borne, if commanders expect to win against heavy odds on the battlefield of the future.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Like all other intelligence assets, interrogators serve the commander. Interrogation operations are of no value unless they contribute to the accomplishment of the supported commander's mission. To understand the interrogator's role in mission accomplishment, the overall contribution made by military intelligence must be understood. Military intelligence is responsible for providing commanders with an accurate and timely estimate of the enemy's

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capabilities and probable courses of action. This estimate must consider the terrain features in the area of operations, the number and type of enemy units in this area, and the prevailing weather conditions. Intelligence assets collect and analyze information to develop this estimate, then, give the estimate to commanders in sufficient time for use in their decision making.

Commanders request the information they need. These information requests are translated into collection requirements. The collection requirements are consolidated into collection missions and assigned to specific collection assets. Collection assets conduct operations to obtain information that satisfies their assigned collection missions. As collection assets gather information, they report it. The reported information is consolidated and analyzed to determine its reliability and validity. Valid information is collated and used to produce intelligence, which is then provided to the commanders, and simultaneously to collection assets to provide immediate feedback to assist in collection operations. This process is continuous, since commanders must react to a constantly changing battlefield. The following illustration shows the overall process followed by intelligence personnel in producing this estimate.



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Analysis is the heart or center of the intelligence process. The collection effort is driven by an analysis of the commander's mission and the information needs this analysis identifies. The information collected is analyzed to determine how well it fills the commander's needs. IPB is the initial step in performing this analysis. IPB integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain as they relate to a specific battlefield environment. This integration allows enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action to be determined and evaluated. On the battlefield, IPB is dynamic. It produces graphic estimates that portray the enemy probable courses of action in the immediate situation. Commanders and their staff elements use IPB products to help them determine how to achieve decisive results with limited resources.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

IEW operations are conducted to satisfy the aggregate intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and EW requirements of the commander. IEW operations include both situation and target development activities. They are collectively oriented on the collection, processing, analysis, and reporting of all information regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain. IEW operations generate combat information, direct targeting data, all-source intelligence, and correlated targeting information. CI supports OPSEC, deception, rear operations, and EW. CI support to OPSEC and deception protects friendly command, control, and communications (C^3) programs. These are integral to IEW operations performed in support of the commander's combat objectives.

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

Situation development requires the collection of information that accurately describes the enemy, weather, and terrain within the supported commander's area of interest. The following questions exemplify the types of information required.

- How will the terrain features and current weather affect the enemy's men and equipment? How will these effects change his operational timetables?
- What tactics will the enemy employ to achieve his objectives? What equipment will he employ? How will he organize his forces?
- Where will the enemy fight? What are his current unit locations? What are the strengths and weaknesses of those dispositions?
- What are the enemy's intentions? Where will he move next? What will he do when he gets there? Will he attack, defend, or withdraw? Where, When, How?
- Who, exactly, is the enemy? What are the capabilities, limitations, and operational patterns of specific enemy units and their commanders?
- Where is the enemy vulnerable? What are his technical, operational, and human weaknesses?

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Target development requires the collection of combat information, targeting data, and correlated targeting information. Its objective is to accurately predict where and when the enemy will establish dispositions that will yield the most decisive results when struck by a minimum of firepower. The following questions exemplify the types of information required.

- Where, exactly, are the high value targets? Where are the locations of enemy weapons systems, units, and activities that may impact on combat operations?
- What, exactly, is at these locations? How much equipment? How many personnel? To what units do they belong?
- How long will these locations be targets? When did the units, equipment, and personnel arrive? Where will they locate?

Specific Information Requirements

Tactical intelligence operations begin with the commander. He conveys his

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information needs to the intelligence staff who converts them into PIR and IR for the commander's approval or modification. The intelligence officer translates PIR and IR into specific collection missions for subordinate, attached, and supporting units and requests information from the next higher echelon. He receives and evaluates information from all sources, develops and nominates high-payoff targets (HPTs), and reports intelligence results to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

Battalion Specific Information Requirements

Battalion commanders need specific information and accurate intelligence from the brigade and higher headquarters to plan their operations. They need timely combat information and targeting data from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units to refine their plan and to win their offensive and defensive battles. Their specific information requirements (SIR) for attacking and defending are consolidated, due to the speed with which they must react on the extremely dynamic and volatile air-land battlefield. They must know—

- Location, direction, and speed of platoon and company-sized elements within the enemy's first-echelon battalions.
- Location, direction, and speed of enemy second-echelon battalions which indicate the first-echelon regiment's main effort.
- Disposition and strength of enemy defensive positions and fortifications.
- Location of antitank positions, crew-served weapons, individual vehicle positions, and dismounted infantry.
- Locations of barriers, obstacles, minefields, and bypass routes.
- Effects of terrain and prevailing weather conditions throughout the course of combat operations.
- Capability of enemy to employ air assets.
- Availability and probability of use of enemy radio electronic combat (REC) assets to disrupt friendly C^3.
- Possibility of special weapons.
- Probability of enemy use of NBC weapons.

Brigade Specific Information Requirements

Brigade commanders need and use specific information to plan, direct, coordinate, and support the operations of the division against enemy first-echelon regiments, their battalions, companies, and combat support units—the sustainers. They also need accurate intelligence about enemy second-echelon regiments within first-echelon divisions and any follow-on forces which can close on their area of operation before the current engagement can be decisively concluded.

Brigades strive to attack enemy first-echelon forces while they are on the move and before they can deploy into combat formations. The brigade commander needs specific information about—

- Composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of advancing enemy forces.
- Location, direction, and speed of enemy first-echelon battalions and their subordinate companies.
- Locations and activities of enemy second and follow-on echelons capable of reinforcing their first-echelon forces in the operations area.
- Location of enemy indirect fire weapon systems and units.
- Locations of gaps, assailable flanks, and other tactical weaknesses in the enemy's OB and operations security (OPSEC) posture.
- Air threat.
- Enemy use of NBC.
- Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
- Anticipated timetable or event schedule associated with the enemy's most likely courses of action.

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Should the enemy succeed in establishing his defensive positions, then, brigade commanders' SIR increase. They must then know the specific types, locations, and organization of enemy first- and second-echelon defensive positions and fortifications. These include—

- Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, and antitank strong points.
- Locations of antiaircraft and missile artillery units.
- Locations of surface-to-air missile units.
- Location of REC units.
- Location of reserve maneuver forces.
- Enemy ability to conduct deep attack into friendly rear area.

Brigade commanders given defensive missions, or forced to defend given sectors, require specific information about assaulting enemy companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions—generally, their strength, composition, and direction of attack. The same information is required about enemy follow-on units that can affect brigade combat operations. Of specific concern are the locations, size, activities, direction, and speed of enemy air-assault, heliborne, and tactical air units capable of dealing lethal and decisive blows to brigade units and which could potentially be used to thwart any counterattack.

Specific information about enemy first- and second-echelon regimental C^3 facilities is of paramount concern to the brigade commander, whether on the offense or defense. He must know the specific locations of enemy—

- Division forward and main command posts (CPs).
- Regimental and battalion CPs.
- Fire direction control centers.
- Command observation posts.
- Radio and radar reconnaissance sites.
- REC sites.
- Target acquisition sites.

The suppression, neutralization, and destruction of enemy C^3 systems and facilities are critical to the success of close operations. Brigade commanders, in concert with supporting division and corps IEW, and maneuver and fire support units use all available means to identify, locate, disrupt, and destroy these extremely HPTs. Their objective is to neutralize the enemy commanders' capability to command troops and control weapon and combat support systems. Thus, to degrade or deny the ability of the enemy commander to conduct his attack as planned, this is done by systematically attacking key nodes and information links in the enemy commanders' command and control (C^2) system, which supports their decision-making process. This form of C^2 warfare is founded upon the basic tenets of command, control, and communications countermeasures (C^3CM) strategy and is defined as—

The integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction, supported by INTELLIGENCE, to deny information, influence, degrade, or destroy enemy C^3 capabilities and to protect friendly C^3.

The protection of friendly C^3—protect C^3—is the number one priority under C^3CM strategy. Intelligence supports the protection of friendly C^3 primarily through CI support to OPSEC and deception.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The mission of CI is to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and international terrorism conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of the US Army. CI personnel identify the hostile intelligence collection threat. They, together with operations personnel, develop friendly force profiles, identify vulnerabilities, and make recommendations to reduce those vulnerabilities. CI operations support OPSEC, deception, and rear operations.

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS SECURITY

CI support to OPSEC is the principal role of CI at echelons division and below. It includes—

- ☐ The identification and analysis of enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities, personnel, units, and activities.
- ☐ The identification and analysis of enemy REC units, locations, and activities.
- ☐ Assisting in the development of friendly force profiles.
- ☐ Determining friendly vulnerabilities to enemy RSTA and REC activities.
- ☐ Recommending and evaluating appropriate OPSEC and deception measures.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE *SUPPORT TO DECEPTION*

Military deception operations are planned, controlled, directed, and conducted by commanders at echelons above division. They are designed to mislead enemy senior military and political leaders regarding our true military objectives, our combat capabilities and limitations, and the composition and disposition of our combat forces. Battlefield deception is deliberate action to achieve surprise on the air-land battlefield. Its purpose is to mislead enemy ground force commanders as to our true combat objectives; tactical OB; major axis of advance; and the disposition of our reserve and combat support units, defensive positions, fortifications, and C^3 facilities.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO REAR OPERATIONS

CI support to rear operations includes identifying and analyzing the enemy threat to brigade trains and both division support command (DISCOM) and corps support command (COSCOM) operations. CI personnel recommend steps to neutralize enemy agents, saboteurs, terrorists, sympathizers, and special purpose forces. Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all subordinate personnel must be trained and prepared to identify and report enemy units or activities which may pose a threat to brigade trains, DISCOM, and COSCOM operations. The potential impact on close operations from the rear cannot be overlooked.

Black, gray, and white lists identify personnel of CI interest. CI teams conduct operations that provide data used to compile these lists. Black lists contain the names of persons who are hostile to US interests and whose capture or nullification of their effectiveness are of prime importance. Gray lists contain names of persons whose inclinations or attitudes toward US interests are certain. White lists contain names of persons who are favorably inclined toward US interests and need to be protected from enemy targeting.

INTERROGATION SUPPORT TO CI

Interrogation and CI personnel must interact to defeat the enemy's collection effort and the threat posed to our rear areas. The interrogator must work in close coordination with CI personnel to keep abreast of CI targets in the event he encounters a source that possesses information of CI interest. The following questions exemplify the types of information required by CI:

- ☐ What specific intelligence collection operations are being conducted by the enemy?
- ☐ What aspects of the enemy's plans have been successfully concealed from our collection efforts?
- ☐ What aspects of friendly plans have been discovered by the enemy, and how were they discovered?
- ☐ Does the enemy plan to conduct sabotage operations?
- ☐ Does the enemy plan to conduct subversive operations?
- ☐ How effective are our OPSEC measures?

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- How effective are our attempts at military deception?

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW is an essential element of combat power. It can provide commanders both a passive and an active means to protect their C^3 systems and a passive and an active means to attack the enemy commanders' C^3 systems as well. Protecting C^3 is the number one priority for EW in accordance with C^3CM strategy. Action taken to deny, influence, and degrade or destroy enemy C^3 capabilities and counter-C^3 is equally important. EW, like other elements of combat power on the air-land battlefield, is waged by employing a combination of both offensive and defensive operations, tactics, and procedures. Air-land battle doctrine and the spirit of the offense are the overriding considerations in planning and conducting EW operations (see FM 34-1).

The following questions exemplify types of information that the interrogator provides to EW operations:

- Will the enemy employ jammers?
- Will the enemy augment heavy electronic equipment?
- What specific means of C^3 are being used by the enemy?
- What problem has the enemy experienced when using each of these means?
- What has been the effect of our attempts to influence, degrade, or destroy these means of C^3?

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF INTERROGATORS

Interrogators are trained as linguists to question sources and to exploit CEDs. They collect and report information that pertains to the IEW tasks. Reportable information is determined by comparing the information obtained to the PIR and IR contained in the interrogation element's collection mission. Interrogators collect information on political, economic, and a wide range of military topics. In doing this, they organize their collection effort according to the OB elements used by the intelligence analyst. However, at the tactical level, commanders and intelligence staff will generate requests for specific intelligence and combat information PIR and IR that will allow them to better conduct the war. Therefore, the collection effort should be limited to obtaining information that responds to the PIR and IR:

- Missions. Information that describes the present, future, or past missions of specific enemy units. Each unit for which mission information was obtained is identified.
- Compositions. Information that identifies specific enemy units. This identification should include the type of unit (artillery, transportation, armor, and so forth) and a description of the unit's organizational chain of command.
- Strength. Information that describes the size of enemy units in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. A unit identification must accompany each description.
- Dispositions. Information that establishes locations occupied by the enemy units or activities. The information will identify the military significance of the disposition, other enemy units there, and any security measures.
- Tactics. Information that describes the tactics in use, or planned for use, by specific enemy units. The doctrine governing the employment of these tactics will be included in the description.
- Training. Information that identifies and describes the types of individual and collective training being conducted by the enemy. The description will include all information on the thoroughness, degree, and quality of the training.
- Combat effectiveness. Information that describes the ability and fighting

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quality of specific enemy units. The description will provide unit identification and information about personnel and equipment losses and replacements, reinforcements, morale, and combat experiences of its members.

- Logistics. Information that describes the means by which the enemy moves and sustains his forces. This includes any information on the types and amounts of supply required, procured, stored, and distributed by enemy units in support of current and future operations.
- Electronic technical data. Information that describes the operational parameters of specific enemy electronic equipment. This includes both communications and noncommunications systems.
- Miscellaneous data. Information that supports the development of any of the other OB elements. Examples are personalities, passwords, unit histories, radio call signs, radio frequencies, unit or vehicle identification numbers, and PSYOP.

The degree of success achieved by interrogation operations is limited by the environment in which the operations are performed. Interrogators depend on the IEW process to give direction to their collection efforts. They rely on the conduct of combat operations to provide them with collection targets: sources and CED.

Interrogation operations are also limited by the very nature of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. The source or CED must actually have the desired information before the interrogators can collect it. With respect to sources, there is always the possibility that knowledgeable individuals may refuse to cooperate. The Geneva and Hague Conventions and the UCMJ set definite limits on the measures which can be used to gain the willing cooperation of prisoners of war.

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CHAPTER 3

Interrogation Process

The interrogation process involves the screening and selection of sources for interrogation and the use of interrogation techniques and procedures. Both screening and interrogation involve complex interpersonal skills, and many aspects of their performance are extremely subjective. Each screening and interrogation is unique because of the interaction of the interrogator with the source. There are five interrogation phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting.

SCREENING SOURCES

Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation. It must be conducted at every echelon to determine the cooperativeness and the knowledgeability of sources and to determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner.

CONDUCT PRESCREENING

Observe the Source

Screeners should personally observe the source. During this observation, the screener should first examine the EPW captive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive tag will provide the screener information regarding the source's circumstances of capture (when, where, how, by whom, and so forth). This information can assist the interrogator in the conduct of the screening and most importantly can show immediately if the source has the potential of possessing information which could answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. The screeners should pay particular attention to rank insignia, condition of uniforms and equipment, and behavior demonstrated by the source. Screeners should look for things like attempts to talk to the guards, intentionally joining placement in the wrong segregation group, or any signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source whose appearance or behavior indicates that he is willing to talk should be noted by the screeners. During the observation, the screener should look for signs (such as the source's branch insignia or other identifiable features) to indicate that the source could have knowledge of information related to the supported commander's PIR and IR.

Question Guards

Screeners should question guards about the source. Since the guards are in constant contact with the source, they can provide the information on the source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how the source has responded to orders, what requests have been made by the source, what behavior has been demonstrated by the source, and so forth. In addition, the guards can help screeners with specific items of interest to identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.

Examine Documents

Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any documents pertaining to the source. Documents captured with the source (identification card, letters, map sections, and so forth) can provide information that identifies the source, his organization, his mission, and other personal background (family, knowledge, experience, and so forth). Available documents pertaining to the source (screening reports, interrogation reports, and administrative documents, such as detainee personnel record (see Appendix B)) prepared by the military police, can help the screener by providing information on the source's physical and emotional status, knowledge, experience, and other background information. This information can be used to verify information from documents captured with the source and further assess his willingness to cooperate. When examining documents, screeners should look for items that will indicate whether the source is cooperative or willing to cooperate based on any

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specific personal interest. In addition, the screener should examine the documents to determine if the source has information which answers the supported commander's PIR and IR.

If the source has information pertaining to new foreign material, contact the technical intelligence element, and if the source has information of target exploitation interest, contact the target exploitation element.

COORDINATION WITH CI ELEMENT

Before initiating the interrogation and screening process, the interrogator establishes close liaison with the supporting CI agents. The CI element provides PIR of CI interest. During the interrogation and screening process, interrogators identify sources of CI interest. After these sources have been interrogated for any information of immediate tactical value, (as needed) they are turned over to CI personnel as quickly as possible. For example, CI is interested in sources that the following conditions apply:

- ☐ Have no identification documents.
- ☐ Have excessive identification documents.
- ☐ Have modified identification documents.
- ☐ Possess unusually large amounts of cash or valuables.
- ☐ Possess knowledge of critical interest (for example, nuclear power plant operations, chemical plant operations, weapons test and development, and so forth).
- ☐ Are illegal border crossers.
- ☐ Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
- ☐ Are on the black, gray, or white list.
- ☐ Request to see CI or US Army intelligence.
- ☐ Have family in the denied area.

Screeners should always consider cooperative, knowledgeable sources first. These sources are identified through the screeners' review of documents, questioning of the guards, and their own personal observations. Based on their notes, the screeners establish the order in which these sources will be screened. The guards are then told to bring these sources, in a specified sequence, to the screening site one at a time.

Screeners ask each source about the circumstances of his capture, his personal background, his military job, and his unit of assignment. The goal is to get the source to talk. Once the source is talking, the screeners try to identify any strong emotions and the reasons for them. This will indicate how susceptible the source may be to interrogation and may identify the approach techniques which have the greatest chance of success. Screeners also inject questions designed to identify those topical areas in which the source possesses pertinent information.

RECORD INFORMATION

A screener must record information as it is obtained from the source on a screening report form. An example of this form is shown in Appendix F. All of the information shown is rarely obtained from any one source. The blocks are there to save the screeners as much additional writing as possible. If size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment (SALUTE) reportable information is obtained during the screening, it must be exploited fully and reported as soon as possible.

ASSIGN CATEGORY

The screening of a source ends when the screener is sure that he can make an accurate assessment of the source's potential cooperation and pertinent knowledge. At this time, the source is returned to the control of the guards, and the screener records his assessment on the screening report form. The assessment is recorded by means of a screening code. The screening code is a number-letter designation which reflects the level of cooperation to be expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. The number "1" represents a source who responds to direct questions. The number "2" represents a source

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who responds hesitantly to questioning. The number "3" represents a source who does not respond to questioning. The letter "A" represents a source who is very likely to possess information pertinent to the supported commander's PIR. The letter "B" represents a source who might have information pertinent to the supported commander's IR. The letter "C" represents a source who does not appear to have pertinent information.

Those sources who have been assigned to the same category may be interrogated in any order deemed appropriate by the senior interrogator. Category 1A sources should normally be the first to be interrogated. Category 1B sources are next, followed by those assigned to categories 2A, 1C, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are normally interrogated last. This order of priorities ensures the highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent information within the time available for interrogations. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach. The following illustration depicts the order in which sources will be interrogated.

NOTE: The term "screening category" should not be confused with EPW or source-assigned category that is assigned according to their intelligence value (see Appendix A).

INTERROGATION PRIORITIES BY SCREENING CATEGORY



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INTERROGATING PROCEDURES

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Once the senior interrogator has assigned specific sources to his subordinates, the interrogators develop a plan for their interrogations. These plans reflect the current situation and the supported commanders' PIR and IR. If they do not, the subsequent interrogations will not help the element to satisfy its assigned collection mission, and information needed by the supported unit will be missed. Each interrogator, where feasible, begins his preparation by examining the situation map (SITMAP), the OB data base, and pertinent information contained in the interrogation element's files.

Interrelation of Planning and Preparation and Approach

The planning and preparation phase and the approach phase are interrelated. In the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator gathers information on the source's circumstances of capture, comments from others who have been with the source, information on the source's observed behavior, and information on some of the source's personal traits and peculiarities from the screening sheet. This information helps the interrogator develop a picture of the source and enables him to select approaches most likely to work. There are four primary factors that must be taken into consideration in selecting tentative approaches:

- The source's mental and physical state. Is the source injured, angry, crying, arrogant, cocky, or frightened? If so, how can this state be best exploited in the interrogation effort.
- The source's background. What is the source's age and level of military or civilian experience.
- The objective of the interrogation. How much time is available for the interrogation? Is the commander interested only in specific areas (PIR and IR)? Is this source knowledgeable enough to require a full OB interrogation?
- The interrogator himself. What abilities does he have that can be brought into play? What weaknesses does he have that may interfere with the interrogation of the source? Can his personality adapt to the personality of the source?

Questioning Guards

Interrogators should question guards as part of their preparations. The guards are in constant contact with the sources and may be able to provide the following types of information:

- Physical condition.
- Demonstrated attitude and behavior.
- Contact made with other guards or sources.
- How the source has been handled since his capture.
- Hearsay information from others who have handled the source.
- Confirmation of capture data, especially the circumstances under which the source was captured.

Each interrogator will unobtrusively observe the source to personally confirm his identity and to check his personal appearance and behavior.

Analyze Information

After the interrogator has collected all information available about his assigned source, he analyzes it. He looks for indicators of any psychological or physical weakness that might make the source susceptible to one or more approach techniques. The interrogator formulates a strategy to conduct his analysis. He also uses the information he collected to identify the type and level of knowledge possessed by the source that is pertinent to the element's collection mission.

Modify Sequences of Questioning

The interrogator uses his estimate of the type and extent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the basic topical

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sequence of questioning. He selects only those topics in which he believes the source has pertinent knowledge. In this way, the interrogator refines his element's overall objective into a set of specific topics for his interrogation. The major topics that can be covered in an interrogation are shown below in their normal sequence. The interrogator is, however, free to modify this sequence as he deems necessary.

- ☐ Mission.
- ☐ Organization.
- ☐ Personnel strength.
- ☐ Weapons and equipment strength.
- ☐ Dispositions.
- ☐ Tactics.
- ☐ Training.
- ☐ Combat effectiveness.
- ☐ Logistics.
- ☐ Electronic technical data.
- ☐ Miscellaneous.

Finalize Interrogation Plan

As a result of the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator develops a plan for conducting his assigned interrogation. He must review this plan with the senior interrogator when possible. Whether written or oral, the interrogation plan must contain at least the following items of information:

- ☐ Identity of the source.
- ☐ Interrogation serial number.
- ☐ Topics, in sequence, that will be covered.
- ☐ Reasons why the interrogator selected only specific topics from the basic questioning sequence.
- ☐ Approach strategy selected.
- ☐ Means selected for recording the information obtained.

The senior interrogator reviews each plan and makes any changes that he feels necessary based on the commander's PIR and IR. After the plan is approved, the holding compound is notified to have a guard bring the source to the interrogation site. The interrogator collects all available interrogation aids needed (maps, charts, writing tools, reference materials, and so forth) and proceeds to the interrogation site.

APPROACH

The approach phase actually begins when the interrogator first comes in contact with the source and continues until the prisoner begins answering questions pertinent to the objective of the interrogation effort. Interrogators do not "run" an approach by following a set pattern or routine. Each interrogation is different, but all approaches in interrogations have the following purposes in common:

- ☐ Establish and maintain control over the source and the interrogation.
- ☐ Establish and maintain rapport between the interrogator and the source.
- ☐ Manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation.

The successful application of approach techniques eventually induces the source to willingly provide accurate intelligence information to the interrogator. The term "willingly" refers to the source answering the interrogator's questions, not necessarily his cooperation. The source may or may not be aware that he is actually providing the interrogator with information about enemy forces. Some approaches may be complete when the source begins to answer questions. Others may have to be constantly maintained or reinforced throughout the interrogation. The techniques used in an approach can best be defined as a series of events, not just verbal conversation between the interrogator and the source. The exploitation of the source's emotion can be either harsh or gentle in application (hand and body movements, actual physical contact such as a hand on the shoulder for reassurance, or even silence are all useful techniques that the interrogator may have to bring into play).

Basic Concepts of Approaches

The manipulative techniques within each approach are different, but there are some

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factors common to all approaches which affect the success or failure of the approach itself. The interrogator should establish and maintain control, establish and develop rapport, assess the source, make smooth transitions, appear sincere, be convincing, and recognize the breaking point.

Establish and Maintain Control. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The interrogator must always be in control, he must act quickly and firmly. However, everything that he says and does must be within the limits of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as the standards of conduct outlined in the UCMJ.

Establish and Develop Rapport. Rapport between the interrogator and the source is really nothing more than a two-way flow of communication. It can involve showing kindness and humanity in an otherwise harsh situation, or it can mean badgering the source. Rapport is established when the source reacts to the interrogator's statement. Rapport must be maintained throughout the interrogation, not only just in the approach phase. If the interrogator has established good rapport initially and then abandons the effort, the source would rightfully assume that the interrogator cares less and less about him as the information is being obtained. If this occurs, rapport is lost and the source may cease answering questions. Rapport may be developed by—

- Asking about the circumstances of capture. By asking about the source's circumstances of capture, the interrogator can gain insight into the prisoner's actual state of mind and more importantly, he can ascertain his possible breaking points.
- Asking background questions. After asking about the source's circumstances of capture, the interrogator can further gain rapport by asking questions about his background. Apparent interest can be built by asking about his family, civilian life, friends, likes, dislikes, and so forth. The main point in asking about the source's background is to develop rapport, but nonpertinent questions may open new avenues for the approach and help determine whether or not the tentative approaches chosen in the planning and preparation phase will be effective. If nonpertinent questions show that the tentative approaches chosen will not be effective, a flexible interrogator can easily shift the direction of his approach without the source being aware of the change.

Depending on the situation, circumstances, and any requests the source may have made, the following can also be used to develop rapport:

- Offering realistic incentives: such as immediate (coffee, cigarettes, and so forth), short-term (a meal, shower, send a letter home, and so forth), and long-term (repatriation, political asylum, and so forth).
- Feigning experience similar to those of the source.
- Showing concern for the prisoner through the use of voice vitality and body language.
- Helping the source to rationalize his guilt.
- Showing kindness and understanding toward the source's predicament.
- Exonerating the source from guilt.
- Flattering the source.

Assess the Source. After having established control of the source and having established rapport, the interrogator continually assesses the prisoner to see if the approaches, and later the questioning techniques, chosen in the planning and preparation phase will indeed work. Remember that the approaches chosen in planning and preparation are only tentative and are based on the sometimes scanty information available from documents, the guards, and personal observation. This may lead the interrogator to select approaches which may be totally incorrect for obtaining this source's willing cooperation. A careful assessment of the source is absolutely necessary to avoid wasting valuable time in

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the approach phase. Make assessment by asking background and nonpertinent questions which will indicate whether or not the approaches chosen will be effective. The questions can be mixed or they can be separate. If, for example, the interrogator had chosen a love of comrades approach, he should ask the source questions like "How did you get along with your fellow squad members?" If the source answers that they were all very close and worked well as a team, then the interrogator can go right into his love of comrades approach and be reasonably sure of its success. However, if the source answers, "They all hated my guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," then the interrogator should abandon that approach and ask some quick nonpertinent questions to give himself some time to work out a new approach.

Make Smooth Transitions. The interrogator must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially if he needs to move from one approach technique to another. "Poking and hoping" in the approach may alert the prisoner of ploys and will make the job more difficult. Tie-ins to another approach can be made logically and smoothly by using transitional phrases. Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusion of simple sentences which connect the previously used approach with the basis for the next one. Transitions can also be smoothly covered by leaving the unsuccessful approach and going back to nonpertinent questions. By using nonpertinent conversation, the interrogator can more easily move the conversation in the desired direction, and as previously stated, sometimes obtain leads and hints as to source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be more successful.

Be Sincere and Convincing. All professional interrogators must be convincing and appear sincere in working their approaches. If an interrogator is using argument and reason to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and appear sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and arguments, or other invented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe depends on his level of knowledge, experience, and training. A good assessment of the source is the basis for the approach and is vital to the success of the interrogation effort.

Recognize the Breaking Point. Every source has a breaking point, but an interrogator never knows what it is until it has been reached. There are, however, some good indicators that the source is near his breaking point or has already reached it. For example, if during the approach, the source leans forward with his facial expression indicating an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point. The interrogator must be alert and observant to recognize these signs in the approach phase. Once the interrogator determines that the source is breaking, he should interject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, the interrogator can move into the questioning phase. If the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the interrogator must realize that the source was not as close to the breaking point as was thought. In this case, the interrogator must continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach or questioning technique and continue to work until he again feels that the source is near breaking. The interrogator can tell if the source has broken only by interjecting pertinent questions. This process must be followed until the prisoner begins to answer pertinent questions. It is entirely possible that the prisoner may cooperate for a while and then balk at answering further questions. If this occurs, the interrogator can either reinforce the approaches that initially gained the source's cooperation or move into a different approach before returning to the questioning phase of the interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the amount of time that is spent with a particular source is dependent on several factors, that is, the battlefield situation, the expediency with which the supported commander's PIR and IR requirements need to be answered, and so forth.

Approach Techniques

Interrogation approach techniques are usually performed by one interrogator

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working alone. However, sometimes interrogators work together. He must also remember that the tactical situation is very fluid and that the commander needs information in the shortest period of time. This means that the tactical interrogator has little time to waste, especially during the approach phase. Obviously, the more complicated an approach technique is, the more preparation time is required for it and its successful use. For this reason, the approach techniques discussed are those that take the least amount of time to produce the most usable information possible.

The number of approaches used is limited only by the interrogator's imagination and skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are not violated. The Geneva Conventions do not permit an interrogator to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or as a member of the Red Cross (Red Crescent or Red Lion). To every approach technique, there are literally hundreds of possible variations, each of which can be developed for a specific situation or source. The variations are limited only by the interrogator's personality, experience, ingenuity, and imagination.

With the exception of the direct approach, no other approach is effective by itself. Interrogators use different approach techniques or combine them into a cohesive, logical technique. Smooth transitions, logic, sincerity, and conviction can almost always make a strategy work. The lack of will undoubtedly dooms it to failure. Some examples of combinations are—

- Direct/futility/incentive.
- Direct/futility/love of comrades.
- Direct/fear up (mild)/incentive.

The actual number of combinations is limited only by the interrogator's imagination and skill. Great care must be exercised by the interrogator in choosing the approach strategy in the planning and preparation phase of interrogation and in listening carefully to what the source is saying (verbally or nonverbally) for leads that the strategy chosen will not work. When this occurs, the interrogator must adapt himself to approaches that he now believes will work in gaining the source's cooperation.

QUESTIONING

Although there is no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the questioning phase begins, generally the questioning phase commences when the source begins to answer questions pertinent to the specific objectives of the interrogation. Questions should be comprehensive enough to ensure that the topic of interest is thoroughly explored. Answers should establish the who, what, when, where, how, and when possible why. Questions should be presented in a logical sequence to be certain that significant topics are not neglected. A series of questions following a chronological sequence of events is frequently employed, but this is by no means the only logical method of asking questions. Adherence to a sequence should not deter the interrogator from exploiting informational leads as they are obtained. The interrogator must consider the probable response of the source to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to antagonize the source. Experience has shown that in most tactical interrogations, the source is cooperative. In such instances, the interrogator should proceed with direct questions.

Questioning Techniques

Use good questioning techniques throughout the questioning phase. An interrogator must know when to use the different types of questions. With good questioning techniques, the interrogator can extract the most information in the shortest amount of time. There are many types of questioning techniques.

In tactical interrogations, the direct questioning technique is used due to critical time factors. The direct questioning technique—

- Uses only properly formed, direct questions.
- Properly uses follow-up questions for complete information.

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- ☐ Properly uses repeated, controlled, prepared, and nonpertinent questions to control interrogation and assess source.
- ☐ Avoids confusing, ambiguous, and time-consuming questions.
- ☐ Uses a proper, logical sequence of topics or questions.

Characteristics of direct questions are—

- ☐ Basic interrogatives (who, what, when, where, and how, plus qualifier).
- ☐ Brief, concise, simply-worded, and address the looked-for information.
- ☐ Asks for a narrative response (cannot be answered by just yes or no).
- ☐ Produces the maximum amount of usable information and gives a greater number of leads to new avenues of questioning.

Follow-up questions are used to exploit a topic of interest. Questions usually flow one-from-another based on the answer to previous questions. Interrogators ask a basic question and then based on the answer from the source, use follow-up questions to completely exploit all available information about the topic. Follow-up questions are also used to fully exploit a lead given by the source in his response.

Nonpertinent questions are used to conceal the interrogation's objectives or to strengthen rapport with the source. They may also be used to break the source's concentration, particularly, if the interrogator suspects that the source is lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing liar if his concentration is frequently interrupted.

Repeated questions ask the source for the same information obtained in response to earlier questions. They may be exact repetitions of the previous question, or the previous question may be rephrased or otherwise disguised. Repeated questions may be used to check the consistency of the source's previous responses. They may also be used to ensure the accuracy of important details such as place names, dates, and component parts of technical equipment. The use of repeated questions may develop a topic that the source had refused to talk about earlier. They may also be used as a means of returning to a topical area for further questioning.

Control questions are developed from information which the interrogator believes to be true. Control questions are based on information which has been recently confirmed and which is not likely to have changed. They are used to check the truthfulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other questions throughout the interrogation.

Prepared questions are developed in advance of an interrogation to gain precise wording or the most desirable questioning sequence. They are used primarily for interrogations which are technical in nature, require legal precision, or cover a number of specific topics. Interrogators must not allow the use of prepared questions to restrict the scope and flexibility of their interrogations.

Leading questions may prompt the source to answer with the response he believes the interrogator wishes to hear. As a result, the response may be inaccurate or incomplete. Leading questions are generally avoided during interrogations, but they can be used by experienced interrogators to verify information. This is especially true during map tracking.

Avoid vague questions as they do not have enough information for the source to understand exactly what is being asked by the interrogator. They may be incomplete, "blanket" or otherwise nonspecific, and create doubt in the source's mind. Vague questions tend to confuse the source, waste time, are easily evaded, and result in answers that may confuse or mislead the interrogator.

The interrogator must use the different types of questions effectively. Active listening and maximum eye-to-eye contact with the source will provide excellent indicators for when to use follow-up, repeated, control, and nonpertinent questions. The interrogator uses direct and follow-up questions to fully exploit subjects pertinent to his interrogation objectives. He periodically includes control, repeated, and nonpertinent questions to check the sincerity and consistency of the source's responses and to strengthen

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rapport. A response which is inconsistent with earlier responses or the interrogator's available data is not necessarily a lie. When such a response is obtained, the interrogator reveals the inconsistency to the source and asks for an explanation. The source's truthfulness should, then, be evaluated based on the plausibility of his explanation.

There are two types of questions that an interrogator should not use. These are compound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information. They are, in effect, two or more questions combined as one. They require the source to supply a separate answer to each portion of the question. Compound questions should not be used during interrogations because they allow the source to evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer. They may confuse the source or cause the interrogator to misunderstand the response. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with words like "no," "none," or "not." They should be avoided because they may confuse the source and produce misleading or false information. They usually require additional questions to clarify the source's responses.

SALUTE Reportable Information

SALUTE reportable information is any information that is critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. SALUTE reportable information is reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE report format, written or oral (see Appendix E for an example). Information may be SALUTE reportable even when an interrogator cannot determine its immediate intelligence value. SALUTE reportable information is always time sensitive and answers the supported, higher, or adjacent unit's PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable information is identified by its potential value. If the information indicates a change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is SALUTE reportable. If an interrogator cannot decide whether or not a piece of information is SALUTE reportable, he should act as though it is. This means that he should exploit it fully and record all pertinent information. The interrogator should then consult the senior interrogator for a final determination of the information's value.

Hot and Cold Leads

Leads are signs which tell an interrogator that the source has additional pertinent information that can be obtained through further questioning. Leads are provided by a source's response to the interrogator's questions. There are two types of leads that concern interrogators—hot and cold. A hot lead, when exploited, may obtain information that is SALUTE reportable. A cold lead, when exploited, may obtain information that is not SALUTE reportable but is still of intelligence value. The use of follow-up questions to fully exploit hot and cold leads may require an interrogator to cover topics that he did not list in his interrogation plan. An interrogator must exploit hot leads as soon as he identifies them. Once the interrogator is sure that he has obtained and recorded all the details known to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. The interrogator then resumes his questioning of the source at the same point where the hot lead was obtained. An interrogator should note cold leads as they are obtained and exploit them fully during his questioning on the topics to which the cold leads apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may indicate that the source possesses pertinent information in areas not previously selected for questioning. If the interrogator does not fully exploit all of the cold leads he obtains, he must include information on all the leads he did not exploit in his interrogation report.

Hearsay Information

Hearsay information must include the most precise information possible of its source. This will include the name, duty position, full unit designation of the person who provided the information, and the date time group of when the source obtained the information.

Questioning Sequence

An interrogator begins his questioning phase with the first topic in the sequence he

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tentatively established as part of his interrogation plan. He obtains all of the source's pertinent knowledge in this topical area before moving on to the next topic in his sequence. He maintains his established sequence of questioning to ensure that no topics are missed. The only exception is to exploit a hot lead immediately. Even then, *however, he must resume his questioning* at the same point in the same area at which the hot lead was first identified.

Map Tracking

The interrogator obtains information concerning the location of enemy activities through the use of map tracking. Map tracking is performed in the order in which they are described. By following the sequence below, an interrogator ensures that all required details are obtained for each disposition known to the source:

- ☐ Establish an initial common point of reference (ICPR). The first location the interrogator should try to establish as the ICPR is the source's point of capture (POC), because it is the most recent in his memory.
- ☐ Establish a destination common point of reference (DCPR). The DCPR can be the reference point furthest back in time, distance, or higher echelon. This could be forward or to the rear of the ICPR. In any case, you must establish a route using the procedures, in the sequence shown, in the following illustration.

ESTABLISHING THE ROUTE

- Obtain the direction in which the source would travel when leaving the ICPR.
- Obtain a description of the surface on which the source would be traveling.
- Obtain the distance the source would travel in this direction.
- Obtain a description of the prominent terrain features the source would remember while traveling in this direction.
- Repeat the questions and plot the responses until the entire route between the ICPR and the DCPR has been plotted.
- The interrogator can follow the same sequence when establishing the route actually traveled by the source by beginning with the DCPR. Each sequence establishes a CPR.

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- ☐ Exploit the DCPR. Upon determining the DCPR, the interrogator must obtain the exact location and decription of each enemy disposition the source knew about at the DCPR. Methods of obtaining this information are shown in the following illustration. Until he obtains all dispositions known by the source in the vicinity of the DCPR, the interrogator must repeat these questions and plot or record the information as it is provided by the source.
- ☐ Segment and exploit the route segments. The interrogator begins exploiting the source's route with the segment closest to either the ICPR or the DCPR. The preferred segment is the segment closest to the DCPR, but either can be used. The interrogator will exploit each segment of the route by asking the question "From (description of common point of reference (CPR)) to (description of next CPR) back along your route of travel, what of military significance do you know or have seen or heard?" The interrogator will continue from segment to segment, fully exploiting each, until he has exploited the entire route traveled.
- ☐ Exploit dispositions not on route. If the interrogator obtains a disposition which is not located on the established route, he must establish the route the source would have taken to that disposition. The interrogator then treats this new route the same way he does any other route segment, exploiting it fully before moving on to the next segment of the original route.

The sequence, above, organizes map tracking so that information obtained from the source can be plotted and recorded accurately. Correct performance of this task results in the map used by the interrogator. The description of each disposition must be recorded preferably near the site of the disposition on the map.

EXPLOITATION OF DISPOSITIONS

- Identify and describe items of military significance belonging to his forces which are located at each disposition.
- Provide the full unit designation of the enemy units to which these items belong.
- Describe the security measures deployed at each identified disposition.
- Identify the source of his information.
- Provide the date and time when he obtained his information.
- Provide the name, rank, duty position and full unit designation of each person who provided hearsay information to the source.

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Recording Information

There are several reasons for recording information obtained during interrogations. The most important of these is to ensure that all information can be reported completely and accurately. Recorded information may also be used to—

- Refresh the interrogator's memory on a topic covered earlier, such as when returning to a topic after exploiting a hot lead.
- Check responses to repeated questions.
- Point out inconsistencies to the source.
- Gain the cooperation of other sources.
- Compare with information received from other sources.

There are several methods of recording information that can be used during interrogations. Two are listed below and their advantages and disadvantages are described. These methods may be used separately or in combination with each other:

Taking Notes. The interrogator's own notes are the primary method of recording information. When the interrogator takes his own notes, he has a ready reference to verify responses to repeated questions or to refresh his memory. They also provide him with the means to record cold leads for later exploitation.

Using his own notes expedites the interrogator's accurate transferral of information into a report format. When taking his own notes, however, he cannot observe the source continually. This may cause him to miss leads or fail to detect losses in rapport or control that are detectable only through clues provided by the source's behavior.

It is possible to lose control and the source's willing cooperation by devoting too much of his concentration to note taking. The interrogator must avoid distracting the source while taking notes. Notes should be taken in such a way that the maximum amount of eye-to-eye contact with the source is maintained.

The interrogator will not have enough time to record every word that the source says. He must be able to condense or summarize information into a few words. He must use his past experiences to decide which items of information should be recorded. He should organize his materials to avoid having to flip back and forth between references.

The only information that should be recorded during the approach phase is that required by part 1 of the interrogation report (format is shown in Appendix G). All other information should not be recorded until after the source's cooperation has been obtained.

All notes must be complete, accurate, and legible. Notes should be organized by topical areas. A separate piece of paper should be used to record cold leads. The interrogator should make maximum use of authorized military abbreviations and brevity codes. Notes should be in recognizable format and complete enough for any other interrogator to use. Situations may arise that require one interrogator to finish another interrogator's interrogation.

Using a Sound Recorder. The use of a sound recorder allows the interrogator to continually observe the source. When compared with note taking, this method allows more information to be obtained in less time. However, more time is required for report writing because the entire tape must be replayed to transfer information to the report. Place names, numbers, and other pertinent, detailed information may be unclear on the recording. Sound recorders cannot provide a ready reference that can be used to compare answers to a repeated question, and the equipment may malfunction.

TERMINATION

Although the termination phase is only the fourth phase of the five phases, it is the last phase in which the interrogator will actually deal with the source. The interrogator must leave the source ready to continue answering questions in the future if necessary. The termination of the interrogation must be conducted properly. If the interrogator mishandles the termination phase and he later finds that the source has lied or he needs to question the source further, he must start again from scratch.

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Need to Terminate

A number of circumstances can cause an interrogation to be terminated. An interrogator must be able to identify such circumstances as soon as they occur. Some circumstances that require an interrogation to be terminated are—

- ☐ The source remains uncooperative throughout the approach phase.
- ☐ Either the source or the interrogator becomes physically or mentally unable to continue.
- ☐ All pertinent information has been obtained from the source.
- ☐ The source possesses too much pertinent information for all of it to be exploited during the interrogation session.
- ☐ Information possessed by the source is of such value that his immediate evacuation to the next echelon is required.
- ☐ The interrogator's presence is required elsewhere.
- ☐ The interrogator loses control of the interrogation and cannot recover it.

Termination Procedures

Whatever the reason for terminating the interrogation, the interrogator must remember that there is a possibility that someone may want to question the source at a later date. For that reason, he should terminate the interrogation without any loss of rapport whenever possible. The interrogator reinforces his successful approach techniques to facilitate future interrogations. He tells the source that he may be talked to again. When appropriate, he tells the source that the information he provided will be checked for truthfulness and accuracy. He offers the opportunity for the source to change or add to any information he has given.

During termination, the interrogator must make proper disposition of any documents captured with the source. A source's military identity document must be returned to him. If a source does not hold an identity card issued by his government, the source will be issued a completed DA Form 2662-R (see Appendix C) by the military police. The identity card will be in the possession of the source at all times. Some captured documents will contain information that must be exploited at higher echelons. Any such documents may be impounded by the interrogator and evacuated through intelligence channels. The interrogator must issue a receipt to the source for any personal documents he decides to impound. He must comply with the accounting procedures established for captured documents by the military police, according to AR 190-8. The accounting procedures required for impounding documents captured with a source are time-consuming but necessary. The interrogator can save time by preparing receipts and document tags during the planning and preparation phase. He completes the termination phase by instructing the escort guard to return the source to the holding compound and to keep him away from any sources who have not yet been interrogated.

REPORTING

Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value that is obtained. Initial reports are submitted electronically whenever possible to ensure that the information reaches the intelligence analysts in the least amount of time. Written reports are prepared to document electronic reports. They are used as the initial means of reporting only when electronic reporting is impossible. Any information of intelligence value that will diminish with the passage of time must be SALUTE reported. Electronic SALUTE reports are formatted and submitted according to the procedures established during the senior interrogator's initial coordination. Written SALUTE reports are prepared according to the format in Appendix E. Information that is not SALUTE reportable is electronically reported with a lower priority. The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information which will help satisfy a commander's intelligence requirements. Since these requirements will differ in scope at each level, when conducting PIR or IR interrogations, nonapplicable paragraphs may be deleted. Part 1 must always be

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included and distribution made according to STANAG 2033 (see Appendix A).

INTERROGATION WITH AN INTERPRETER

Interrogating through an interpreter is more time consuming because the interpreter must repeat everything said by both the interrogator and the source, and the interpreter must be briefed by the interrogator before the interrogation can begin. An interrogation with an interpreter will go through all five phases of the interrogation process. After the interrogation is over, the interrogator will evaluate the interpreter.

Methods of Interpretation

During the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator selects a method of interpretation. There are two methods: the simultaneous and the alternate. The interrogator obtains information about his interpreter from the senior interrogator. He analyzes this information and talks to the interpreter before deciding which method to use. With the simultaneous method, the interpreter listens and translates at the same time as the person for whom he is interpreting, usually just a phrase or a few words behind. With the alternate method, the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph. He then translates it during natural pauses in the interrogation. *The simultaneous method should only* be selected if all of the following criteria are met:

- ☐ The sentence structure of the target language is parallel to English.
- ☐ The interpreter can understand and speak both English and the target language with ease.
- ☐ The interpreter has any required special vocabulary skills for the topics to be covered.
- ☐ The interpreter can easily imitate the interrogator's tone of voice and attitude for the approaches selected.
- ☐ Neither the interrogator nor the interpreter tends to get confused when using the simultaneous method of interpretation.

If any of the criteria listed above cannot be met, the interrogator must use the alternate method. The alternate method should also be used whenever a high degree of precision is required.

Interpreter Briefing

Once the interrogator has chosen a method of interpretation, he must brief his interpreter. This briefing must cover the—

- ☐ *Current tactical situation.*
- ☐ Background information obtained on the source.
- ☐ Specific interrogation objectives.
- ☐ Method of interpretation to be used.
- ☐ Conduct of the interrogation in that statements made by the interpreter and the source should be interpreted in *the first person, using the same content,* tone of voice, inflection, and intent. The interpreter must not inject any of his own personality, ideas, or questions into the interrogation.
- ☐ Selected approach techniques and how they are to be applied.
- ☐ Conduct of interrogation in that the interpreter should inform the interrogator if there are any inconsistencies in the language used by the source. The interrogator will use this information in his assessment of the source. One example is a source who claims to be an officer but who uses excessive slang and profanity.
- ☐ Physical arrangements of the interrogation site. The best layout is to have the interrogator and the source facing each other with the interpreter behind the source. This enhances the interrogator's control by allowing him to simultaneously observe the source and the interpreter.
- ☐ Need for the interpreter to assist with report preparation.

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Throughout the briefing, the interrogator must answer all questions that the interpreter may have as fully and clearly as possible. This helps ensure that the interpreter completely understands his role in the interrogation.

Conduct the Interrogation

During the interrogation, the interrogator corrects the interpreter if he violates any of the standards on which he was briefed. For example, if the interpreter injects his own ideas into the interrogation, he must be corrected. Corrections should be made in a low-key manner. At no time should the interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the source. The interrogator should never argue with the interpreter in the presence of the source. If a major correction must be made, and only when it is necessary, the interrogator and interpreter should leave the interrogation site temporarily.

When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogator and the source is especially important. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way that it would be if no interpreter was used.

During the termination phase, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the interrogator and the source is again very important. The approaches used are reinforced here, and the necessary sincerity and conviction must be conveyed to the source.

The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to fill in gaps and unclear areas in the interrogator's notes. He may also assist in transliterating, translating, and explaining foreign terms.

Following the submission of all reports, the interrogator evaluates the performance of his interpreter. The evaluation must cover the same points of information that the interrogator received from the senior interrogator. The interrogator submits the results of his evaluation to the senior interrogator. The senior interrogator uses this evaluation to update the information he has about the interpreter. This evaluation may also be used in developing training programs for interpreters.

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CHAPTER 4

Processing Captured Enemy Documents

The information contained in CEDs can prove to be of intelligence value to commanders at all levels. CEDs are important because they can provide information directly from the enemy. Only on rare occasions will a single document or group of documents provide vitally important information. Usually, each document provides a small bit of a larger body of information. Each CED, much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to their tactical intelligence value, technical data and political indicators can be extracted from CEDs that are important to strategic and national-level agencies. CEDs can also be helpful in exploiting sources.

STANAG 2084 defines a document as any piece of recorded information, regardless of form, obtained from the enemy and that subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force. CEDs can be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. Types of CEDs are typed, handwritten, printed, painted, engraved or drawn materials; sound or voice recordings; imagery such as videotapes, movies, or photographs; computer storage media including, but not limited to floppy disks; and reproductions of any of the items listed above.

CEDs are mainly acquired two ways. Some are taken from sources. Most documents, however, are captured on the battlefield from former enemy locations and from enemy dead.

Generally, CEDs are of two types: official and personal. Official documents are of government or military origin. Examples of official documents are, but are not limited to, overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field manuals, identification cards, reports, sketches, photographs, log books, maintenance records, shipping and packing slips, war and field diaries, and written communications between commands. Personal documents are of a private or nongovernment origin. Examples of personal documents are letters, personal diaries, newspapers, photographs, books, magazines, union dues payment books, and political party dues payment books.

Interrogators are, from time-to-time, required to handle and translate a wide variety of nonmission-related documents. Some include identity and other documents associated with working and residing in a foreign country.

DOCUMENT HANDLING

The accountability phase begins at the time the document is captured. Documents must be clearly tagged. The capturing unit attaches a captured document tag to each document. The capture data is always written on a captured document tag (see the following illustration of a captured document tag). When a captured tag is not available, the same information recorded on any piece of paper is acceptable. Nothing is to be written directly on the CED. The captured document tag should be assigned a sequential number at the first formal exploitation point, showing the nationality of the capturing force by national letters prescribed in STANAG 1059. Furthermore, the capturing unit will report the following information:

- Time the document was captured, recorded as a date-time group (DTG).
- Place the document was captured, including the six- or eight-digit coordinate and a description of the location of capture.
- Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if applicable.
- Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.
- Identity of the capturing unit.

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CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TAG

1. DATE/TIME CAPTURED: _____
2. PLACE CAPTURED: _____
3. CAPTURING UNIT: _____
4. IDENTITY OF SOURCE (IF APPLICABLE): _____

_____

5. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: _____

_____

_____

ACCOUNTABILITY

At each echelon, starting with the capturing unit, steps are taken to ensure that CED accountability is maintained during document evacuation. To establish accountability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs. Thorough accountability procedures at each echelon ensure that CEDs are not lost. To record each processing step as it occurs helps correct mistakes in CED processing. Accountability is accomplished by anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs. All CEDs should have captured document tags, and all captured document tags should be completely filled out. An incoming batch of documents includes a transmittal document (see the illustration on page 4-10). When a batch is received without a transmittal, the interrogation element contacts the forwarding unit and obtains a list of document serial numbers. The interrogation element records all trace actions in its journal. Accountability includes inventorying the CEDs as they arrive, initiating any necessary trace actions, and maintaining the captured document log. Whenever intelligence derived from a CED is included in a unit or information intelligence reports, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are quoted to avoid false confirmation. All CEDs are shipped with any associated documents.

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Inventory

An inventory of incoming CEDs is conducted initially by comparing the CED to the captured document tag and to accompanying transmittal documents. This comparison identifies any—

- ☐ Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
- ☐ Document tags not attached to CEDs.
- ☐ CEDs not attached to document tags.
- ☐ CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.

Trace Actions

When necessary, the receiving unit initiates a CED trace action. Trace actions are initiated on all missing CEDs, captured document tags, and on all information missing from the captured document tag. Trace actions are initiated by first contacting the element from which the documents were received. This corrective action can be completed swiftly if that unit's captured document log was filled out completely. If necessary the trace action continues to other elements that have handled the document. If a captured document tag is unavailable from elements that have previously handled the CED, the document examiner fills out a captured document tag for the document using whatever information is available. Attempts to obtain missing CEDs are critical because of the information those CEDs might contain.

Log

The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about a CED (see the following illustration of a captured document log). After trace actions are initiated, the CEDs are entered in the captured document log. The captured document log, in general, must contain the entries listed below:

- ☐ File number (a sequential number to identify the order of entry).
- ☐ DTG the CED was received at this element.
- ☐ Document serial number of the captured document tag.
- ☐ Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the CED.
- ☐ Full designation of the unit that forwarded the CED.
- ☐ Name and rank of individual that received the CED.
- ☐ DTG and place of capture (as listed on the captured document tag).
- ☐ Identity of the capturing units (as listed on the captured document tag).
- ☐ Document category (after screening).
- ☐ Description of the CED (at a minimum the description includes the original language; number of pages; type of document such as map, letter, photograph, and so forth; and the enemy's identification number for the CED, if available).
- ☐ Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
- ☐ Remarks (other information that can assist the unit in identifying the CED to include processing codes. These are set up by local SOP to denote all actions taken with the document while at the element, including SALUTE reports, translations, reproductions, or return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken).

Accountability for the CED should be established at each echelon once the actions described above have been accomplished.

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

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DOCUMENTS REQUIRING SPECIAL HANDLING

Technical Documents

A technical document (TECHDOC) is a document that pertains to equipment of any type. A captured TECHDOC should be evacuated with the equipment with which it was captured. If this is not possible, a cover sheet should be attached, with the word "TECHDOC" written in large letters across the top. The capture data is listed the same as other CEDs, and the TECHDOC cover sheet should contain a detailed description of the equipment captured with the document. If possible, photographs of the equipment should be taken, including a measurement guide, and evacuated with the TECHDOC.

Communications and Cryptographic Documents

CEDs containing communications or cryptographic information are handled as secret material and are evacuated through secure channels to the technical control and analysis element (TCAE).

DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION

As incoming CEDs are accounted for, the exploitation phase for intelligence information begins. Exploitation includes—

- ☐ CED screening to determine potential intelligence value.
- ☐ Extracting pertinent information from the CED.
- ☐ Reporting the extracted information.

CEDs are processed and exploited as soon as possible within the constraints of the unit's mission. The main mission of some units is the exploitation of human sources rather than the translation of CEDs; therefore, manpower constraints may limit the time that can be devoted to translation. However, the translation of CEDs is necessary at any echelon where interrogators and translators are assigned. It is important, therefore, that interrogation elements possess qualified personnel to provide the translation support required. Intelligence units ensure that there is no delay in the exploitation of CEDs. Qualified personnel or document copying facilities should be available to handle CEDs, and personnel should be available to exploit the volume or type of documents concerned. If not, the documents are forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon. Copying availability is determined by the echelon in question, as well as mission and mobility considerations.

CED SCREENING

Document exploitation begins when personnel are available for document exploitation operations. CEDs are screened for information of immediate intelligence interest; and as each document is screened, it is assigned one of the four following category designations. The category assigned determines the document's priority for exploitation and evacuation.

Document Categories

Category A. Category A documents contain SALUTE-reportable information, are time sensitive, contain significant intelligence information, and may be critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. Significant intelligence topics include the enemy's OB, new weapons or equipment on the battlefield, and may contain information that indicates a significant change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions. When a document is identified as category A, the document examiner immediately ceases screening operations and submits a SALUTE report of the critical information from the document. The examiner then resumes screening operations.

Category B. Category B documents contain information pertaining to enemy cryptographic or communications systems. Once a document is identified as category B, it is considered to be classified secret. This is done to limit the number of people having knowledge of either the capture or its contents. A category B document may contain SALUTE-reportable information, thereby requiring immediate exploitation.

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In every case, category B documents will be transferred through secure channels to the TCAE as soon as possible.

Category C. Category C documents contain no SALUTE-reportable or time-sensitive information but do contain information that is of general intelligence value that does not indicate significant changes in the enemy's capabilities or intentions. A category C document may be of interest or of value to other agencies. When identified as category C, it requires exploitation, regardless of the content.

Category D. Category D documents appear to contain only information that is of no intelligence value. Documents are not identified as category D until after a thorough examination by document translation specialists at the highest command interested. This is accomplished at EAC. Category D documents are to be disposed of as directed by the appropriate authority.

Special Document Handling

Technical Documents. TECHDOCs, containing information associated with specific items of enemy equipment, are given special handling to expedite their exploitation and evacuation. TECHDOCs are handled as category A CEDs until screened by technical intelligence personnel. Generally, TECHDOCs accompany the captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed. TECHDOCs include maintenance handbooks, operational manuals, and drawings.

Air Force-Related Documents. Documents of any category that are captured from crashed enemy aircraft, particularly if they are related to enemy antiaircraft defense or enemy air control and reporting systems, are transmitted to the nearest Air Force headquarters without delay.

Maps and Charts of Enemy Forces. Captured maps and charts, containing any operational graphics, are evacuated immediately to the supporting all-source analysis center. Captured maps and charts without graphics may be transmitted to the topographical intelligence section attached to corps.

Navy-Related Documents. Documents taken from ships (code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, and so forth) are forwarded without delay to the nearest Navy headquarters.

Recording Document Category

The category assigned to each CED is recorded as part of the captured document log entry for that CED. The entry includes a brief description of the CED. This description—

- Identifies the CED by type (sound recording, written material, painting, engraving, imagery, and so forth).
- Identifies the language used in the CED.
- Specifies the physical construction of the CED (typed, printed, handwritten, tape cassette, photographs, film, and so forth).
- Gives some indication of the size (number of pages, rolls of film, cassette, and so forth).

Screening at Higher Echelons

CEDs can be recategorized during screening conducted at higher echelons. The information may have become outdated, or the echelon currently exploiting the document may have different intelligence requirements.

TRANSLATING

Once a CED has been screened, the document must be exploited. The translator must be able to translate the document. For anyone else to gain benefit from the document translation, it must be clearly and accurately written (typed or handwritten). Also, as part of interrogation duties, the interrogator may have previously translated a document by sight to help gain a source's cooperation.

Types of Translations

Full Translation. A full translation is one in which the entire document is translated. It is very manpower- and time-intensive,

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especially for lengthy or technical documents. It is unlikely that many full translations will be performed at corps or below. Even when dealing with category A documents, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document to gain the information it contains.

Extract Translation. An extract translation is one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may decide that a few paragraphs in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit translation and a full translation of the manual is not necessary. Therefore, he would request an extract translation of the portion of the text in which he has an interest.

Summary Translation. A translator begins a summary translation by reading the entire document. The translator then summarizes the main points of information instead of rendering a full translation or an extract translation. This type of translation requires that a translator have more analytical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the document against the time available in combat operations. A summary translation may also be used by translators working in languages in which they have not been formally trained. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document. However, he can probably render a usable summary of the information it contains.

Translation Reports

Except for SALUTE reports, all information resulting from document exploitation activities will be reported in a translation report (see the following illustration for a sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports have been submitted, the translator will prepare any required translation reports. CEDs that contain information of intelligence value that was not SALUTE reported are the subject of translation reports. Translation reports are prepared on all category C CEDs and include portions of category A, TECHDOCs, and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported.

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SAMPLE TRANSLATION REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 231500ZAug85
TO: G2, V Corps

FROM: Team 1, IPW Section,
241st MI Bn, 23d Div (Armd),
V Corps

REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356

PART I: CONTROL DATA

1. DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVO-03093
2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten, mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school teachers and elderly people working in factories
3. DOCUMENT'S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian
4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug85
5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug85
6. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320
7. CAPTURING UNIT: A/1-505/3/82 ABN DIV
8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP.
9. TRANSLATOR: SSG Schnurbart
10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full

PART II: TEXT OF TRANSLATION

My dear Serezhen'ka:

It has been a long time since I received a letter from you. How are and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me alot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, despite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. I would be more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can.

Your KATHY.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Priorities. The priority for the preparation of translation reports is—

- Category A.
- TECHDOCs.
- Category B.
- Category C.

Format. A translation report should contain the following information:

- Destination. The element to which the report will be forwarded.
- Originator. The element which prepared the report.
- Date of preparation.
- Report number as designated by local SOP.
- Document number taken from the captured document tag.
- Document description including number of pages, type of document, and enemy identification number.
- Original language of the CED.
- DTG document was received at the element preparing the report.
- DTG document was captured.
- Place document was captured.
- Circumstances under which the document was captured.
- Identity of capturing unit.
- Rank and full name of the translator.
- Remarks for clarification or explanation, including the identification of the portions of the document translated in an extract translation.
- Classification and downgrading instructions, according to AR 380-5.

Dissemination and Records

Recording in Captured Document Log. The translator records each exploitation step taken in the captured document log. Transmission of SALUTE and translation reports is entered in the element's journal.

Reports Dissemination and Records. At least two copies are prepared for each SALUTE and translation report. One copy is placed in the interrogation element's files. The other accompanies the CED when it is evacuated. When the CED cannot be fully exploited, a copy of the CED should be made and retained. The original CED is forwarded through evacuation channels. Even when copies of an unexploited CED cannot be made, the original CED is still forwarded through evacuation channels without delay.

EVACUATION PROCEDURES

For friendly forces to benefit from a document to the greatest extent possible, send CEDs to the element most qualified to exploit them as quickly as possible. Information gained from a CED is frequently time sensitive. If a document is not sent to the element most capable of exploiting it, time will be lost. Any time lost in exploiting the document may reduce or even negate the value of the information. The CED evacuation procedures in use at any element must ensure that documents are shipped to their proper destinations in a timely manner.

NORMAL EVACUATION

CEDs are normally evacuated from echelon to echelon through the intelligence organizational chain. The capturing unit evacuates the CEDs to the first intelligence section, usually the battalion S2. The battalion evacuates them to brigade, brigade to division, division to corps, and then, to EAC. Depending on the type of documents they may, then, be evacuated to the National Center for Document Exploitation. Take care to protect the document from weather, soil, and wear. Interrogators and translators can exploit CEDs at every echelon and will make an attempt to exploit CEDs within their expertise and technical support constraints.

DIRECT EVACUATION

Some CEDs are evacuated to different elements based upon the information contained and the type of document concerned.

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Direct evacuation to an element outside the chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon. The previous guidelines, discussed in evacuation procedures, are followed when dealing with documents requiring special handling.

EVACUATION PRIORITIES

When transportation assets are limited, CEDs are evacuated according to priority. The priority is the category assigned to the CED. All category A CEDs will be evacuated first, TECHDOCs will be considered category A CEDs until examined by the captured material exploitation center (CMEC), followed in order by categories B, C, and D.

Category B documents are evacuated to the TCAE, which maintains a signals intelligence (SIGINT) and EW data base. Category B documents, pertaining to communications equipment, are duplicated if possible, and the duplicate documents are sent to the CMEC.

CEDs that are not evacuated are held until the next transportation arrives. These remaining CEDs are combined with any other CEDs of the same category that have arrived and have been processed in the meantime. When determining evacuation priorities, interrogators consider all CEDs that are ready for evacuation. Lower priority CEDs, no matter how old, are never evacuated ahead of those with higher priority. A package of documents contains documents of only one category. All unscreened CEDs are handled as category C documents, but they are not packaged with screened category C documents. CEDs in a single package must have the same destination.

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS

When CEDs are evacuated from any echelon, a document transmittal is used (see the following illustration for a sample CED transmittal). A separate document transmittal is prepared for each group of CEDs to be evacuated. When second copies of category B CEDs are being sent to a technical intelligence element, a separate document transmittal is required. The transmittal identification number is recorded in the captured document log as part of the entry for each CED. The exact format for a document transmittal is a matter of local SOP, but it should contain the information listed below:

- ☐ The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated.
- ☐ The identity of the unit forwarding the CEDs.
- ☐ Whether or not the CEDs in the package have been screened and the screening category. (If not screened, NA is circled.)
- ☐ The identification number of the document transmittal.
- ☐ A list of the document serial numbers of the CEDs in the package.

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SAMPLE CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

TO: _____ DATE/TIME: _____

FROM: _____ TRANSMITTAL NO: _____

SCREENED: YES NO CATEGORY: A B C / D N/A

DOCUMENT SERIAL NUMBERS:

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COVER SHEETS AND ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

All CEDs being evacuated must be accompanied with the appropriate—

- ☐ TECHDOC cover sheet.
- ☐ SECRET cover sheet on category B documents.
- ☐ Translation reports and hard-copy SALUTE reports accompanying translated documents.
- ☐ Captured document tags.

ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

The preparations for further CED evacuation begin with verifying the document serial numbers by comparing the entry in the captured document log with the entry on the captured document tag attached to each CED. Once all CEDs are present, copies of all reports derived from the CEDs are assembled. A copy of all SALUTE and translation reports is placed with the CEDs that were the sources of those reports. Whenever possible, all category B CEDs and their captured document tags should be copied.

GROUP DOCUMENTS

CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening code. Personnel must be careful when sorting the CEDs to ensure that no CED is separated from its associated documents. These large groupings can then be broken down into smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that were—

- ☐ Captured by the same unit.
- ☐ Captured in the same place.
- ☐ Captured on the same day at the same time.
- ☐ Received at the interrogation element at the same time.

DOCUMENTS CAPTURED WITH A SOURCE

The documents captured with a source play a very important role in the interrogation process and can contain reportable information the same as with a CED obtained on the battlefield. During source screening operations, for instance, documents can indicate that a specific source may have information pertaining to the commander's intelligence requirements. The interrogator uses various pieces of information in forming his interrogation plan. Documents captured with the source may provide the key to the approach necessary to gain the source's cooperation.

Guidelines for the disposition of the source's documents and valuables are set by international agreement and discussed in more detail in AR 190-8 and FM 19-40. Additionally, one way the source's trust and continued cooperation can be gained is through fair and equitable handling of his personal possessions. In some instances, such treatment can make it more likely that the source will cooperate during interrogation questioning. Furthermore, fair treatment by the interrogator and the holding area personnel can ease tensions in the confinement facility.

DISPOSAL OF DOCUMENTS

The disposition of documents captured with a source is normally a function of the military police and other holding area personnel. Because of their language capabilities, the interrogators at the compound will probably be required to provide assistance and guidance. The military police sign for all documents taken from sources; and to ensure proper handling and most expeditious disposition of these documents, the interrogation element should sign for any documents captured with a source. When the interrogation element assumes control of documents, they process them according to established procedures.

When documents are captured with a source, the immediate reaction is to take

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them away from him so that he cannot destroy them. In general, this is good, but there is one major exception. Under no circumstances is a source's identification card to be taken from him.

When documents are taken from a source, it is necessary to ensure the source from whom they were taken can be identified. The easiest way to accomplish this is with the source's captive tag (see standardized captive tag in Appendix D). The bottom portion of the tag is designed to be used for marking equipment or documents. Three possible actions may be taken with documents captured with a source. The documents may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the source.

Confiscation

Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention of returning them. Official documents, except identification documents, are confiscated and appropriately evacuated. The intelligence value of the document should be weighed against the document's support in the interrogation of the source. Category A documents require exploitation and should be copied. One copy should be translated and exploited separately, and the other copy should be evacuated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision should be made on whether to evacuate the document with the source or evacuate it separately. Category B CEDs should be evacuated to the TCAE for appropriate exploitation. Category C official documents can best be used in the interrogation of the source. Therefore, these CEDs and category D official documents should be evacuated with the source.

Impounded

Impounded CEDs are taken away with the intention of returning them at a later time. When a document is impounded, the source must be given a receipt. The receipt must contain a list of the items impounded and the legible name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. All personal effects, including monies and other valuables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of personal effects that have been impounded will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appendix B). Also, DA Form 1132 will be completed and signed by the officer in charge or authorized representative. A copy will be provided the source. Further procedures for the handling of personal effects are provided in AR 190-8.

Returned

Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and information of interest, and immediately given back to the source. Personal documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of such papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned to the source.

RECOGNITION AND EVACUATION OF DOCUMENTS

In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible that documents captured with sources will not be handled expediously. Final disposition of these documents may not be made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps holding area. Some documents captured with a source will aid in the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, should be copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately. This makes it particularly important for the capturing unit to correctly identify the documents captured with the source. This is more easily done when the interrogation

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element rather than the military police element signs for the documents captured with sources.

EVACUATION OF SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS

For more efficient exploitation of CEDs and sources, documents captured with a source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significance may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a reproduction should be made and kept with the source. If reproduction is not possible, the captured document tags should be annotated as to where the document was sent. Significant documents such as category A documents and TECHDOCs, Category B documents, maps, charts, and Air Force- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCUMENTS

The evacuation of documents captured with a source follows the same accountability procedures as with documents found on the battlefield. The capturing unit prepares a captive tag listing details pertaining to the source and the place and circumstances of capture. The bottom portion is used to list documents captured with the source.

Documents captured with a source are subject to the same screening and exploitation procedures as those found on the battlefield. These documents are categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A documents have SALUTE reportable information extracted and are copied, if possible. A copy can then be used to aid in the exploitation of the source, and the other copy is sent forward for prompt exploitation and translation. Category B documents should be treated as secret and evacuated to the TCAE. Category C documents are exploited. A category C document may also require copying and evacuation. Official documents should be evacuated through document evacuation channels. If they would aid in the interrogation of a source, personal documents may require similar copying.

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