


*FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)

Field Manual
No. 3-06

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 1 June 2003



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Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 90-10, 15 August 1979.

DODDOA-004417

FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)

URBAN OPERATIONS

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JUNE 2003

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Preface

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation will be distinct from any other—any other urban operation as well as similar types of operations in other environments. Each operation will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geo-political considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders are responsible to strike the proper balance between preparing for future challenges and maintaining the capability to respond to current threats.

PURPOSE

This manual provides the analytical tools for evaluating an urban operation to determine if the operation is necessary for overall mission success. It also provides the means to understanding and determining the impacts of the urban environment on military operations and provides information on managing, taking advantage of, and mitigating the effects of those impacts as appropriate. As such, this manual demonstrates how to apply the doctrinal principles in FM 3-0 to this unique environment.

SCOPE

Chapter 1 introduces theoretical and historical perspectives of urban operations that serve as the underlying basis for the rest of the manual. Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics of urban centers and populations as well as their impact on operations. It is unlikely that Army forces will ever operate in a benign urban environment; therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the varied nature of potential urban threats. An understanding of the complexities of the urban environment and the nature of the enemy is essential to sound decisionmaking. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the potential costs of urban operations as well as the effects on each battlefield operating system that the commander and his staff consider early in their planning. These chapters also outline an urban operational framework and specific urban considerations that create the foundations necessary for successfully applying operational doctrine to an urban environment.

The second half of the manual (Chapters 6 – 9) discusses how urban operations are conducted and resourced. Urban operations include major offensive and defensive operations in urban environments as well as stability operations and support operations ranging from peace operations and combatting terrorism to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. For the different types of operations—offense, defense, stability, and support—the purpose, characteristics, organization, and considerations are discussed.

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However, commanders consider that most urban operations will involve some aspect of all four types of operations (although one may dominate) and plan accordingly.

APPLICABILITY

This manual is intended for commanders and their staffs at the brigade through corps level. It addresses the range of operations (both violent and nonviolent) throughout the spectrum of conflict that Army units will execute in urban settings. However, users should also consult JP 3-06 for specific joint information. Additionally, users should be familiar with FM 3-06.11, TC 90-1, and urban operations chapters, appendices, or sections found in other infantry, armor, combined arms, and proponent field manuals for the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and appropriate proponent information necessary to conduct tactical urban operations at the brigade level and below.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

Chapter 2 defines "city" according to a the population size. However, in historical vignettes and accounts, the term "city" is applied in its common usage without specific regard to size to maintain conformity with most other historical reports.

In this manual, the term "threat" is applied broadly to include an enemy force (conventional or unconventional), an armed belligerent in a peace operation, antagonistic or unfriendly elements of the civilian population, or some other hazardous condition in the urban environment that negatively influences mission accomplishment. The term "hostile" is used as a subset of the threat and denotes a particular element of the urban population (individual, group, or organization) or one or more opposing armed factions in a peacekeeping operation. Both an enemy and a hostile have the *intent* to exploit Army vulnerabilities and negatively affect the urban operation. A hostile, however, is not engaging Army forces in protracted combat operations.

The term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is replaced by urban operations (UO). MOUT is an acronym from FM 90-10 *Military Operations on Urban Terrain* that is superseded by this manual.

Otherwise, the glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-06 that have joint or Army definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (*Army*) follows the term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

The manual attempts to incorporate historical vignettes into each chapter where the account supports the doctrinal line of reasoning. Two historical vignettes, however, were included as appendices (A and C) because of their longer lengths.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not

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refer exclusively to men.

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Chapter 1

Urban Outlook

¹The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders understand their operational environment, can assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware—then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operating environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.

FM 1

Given the prevalence of large cities throughout the world, Army forces, division size and larger, will likely be required to conduct operations in and around large urban areas. These operations will be in support of a joint force commander (JFC) conducting military operations pursuant to United States (US) national security policy. This manual is designed to facilitate the planning and conduct of the full range and spectrum of land operations in a complex urban environment. Each urban environment and urban operation is unique; prescribing specific doctrinal "solutions" for situations is impossible. Instead, this manual provides a framework to commanders and their staffs for understanding the urban environment, for analyzing and deciding whether urban operations (UO) are necessary or feasible, and for applying operational doctrine to this complex environment. It also provides historical vignettes to help develop a refined analytical perspective and some planning points and tactics and techniques to assist in preparing for and conducting UO. Together, this information provides a foundation for approaching major UO, which, combined with other joint and Army doctrine, will help commanders and their staffs learn to adapt and succeed in this challenging environment.

Contents
The Prospect of Urban Operations Urban Perspective Historical Significance of Urban Areas in Warfare Strategic Importance of Urban Areas US Army's Experience in Urban Operations

THE PROSPECT OF URBAN OPERATIONS

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1-1. The world is in a period of massive urbanization. A trend of migration from rural to urban areas is occurring throughout the globe. This trend is especially evident in developing nations. Combined with the exponential growth of the

global population in the last quarter century, this migration has created massive urban areas that hold the centers of population, government, and economics in their respective regions. In Western Europe, for example, over 50 percent of the land area is urbanized. Just over 30 years ago, only three urban areas in Asia contained at least eight million people. By 2015, estimates show that Asia will have 17 urban areas over ten million, and three of those will top 20 million residents. Almost half of today's population resides in urban areas. Trends also indicate that less developed nations have more centralized societies in a few urban areas. Developed nations spread their centralized societies in several urban areas. In many cases, rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructures, scarce resources, and a fragile economic base. Given the global population, Army forces will likely conduct operations in and around urban areas—*not as a matter of fate but as a deliberate choice linked to national objectives and strategy and at a time, place, and method of the commander's choosing.*

Army Urban Operations

Army forces conduct UO either as one component of a larger operation or as a single operation focused totally on a specific urban environment. Major Army UO are often part of a joint and multinational effort requiring interagency and civil-military coordination that may include the full spectrum of Army operations. Commanders of Army major operations must determine if UO are essential to mission accomplishment. If so, commanders must carefully integrate the operations into campaign planning to support the operational objectives of the JFC.

Army leaders conducting UO must—

- Assess the urban area to determine decisive points.
- Shape the operation to set the conditions for success.
- Precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area.
- Then transition the urban area to the control of another agency or back to legitimate civilian control.

URBAN PERSPECTIVE

1-2. As a subset of all Army operations, UO are operations focused on an urban environment. UO include the full range of Army operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support—that may be executed, either sequentially or simultaneously, during the conduct of a single urban operation. Depending on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), urban operations may—or may not—be conducted predominantly *within* the urban area (see Figure 1-1). Furthermore, UO may be the sole mission of the commander or one of several tasks nested in a larger operation. Regardless of the types of operations conducted or whether the urban area is the single focus of the operation or only one component of a larger operation, the complex urban environment significantly affects the overall conduct of the mission.

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


Figure 1-1. Full Spectrum Urban Operations

1-3. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders understand two important terms: urban area and urban environment. The first is a subset of the second. An *urban area* is a topographical complex where **man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature**. Focusing on urban areas means concentrating on the physical aspects of the area and their effects on tactics, techniques, and procedures. The *urban environment* includes the physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships between its key components—the terrain (natural and man-made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure—as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems. Critical elements of the infrastructure may lie far beyond the area’s physical confines. For example, the generating source providing power to the urban energy system is part of that system but may be located well outside of the urban area. Similarly, effects of the interaction between components of the infrastructure, located both inside and outside the urban area, extend well into smaller, neighboring urban areas and surrounding rural areas and often form their political, economic, and cultural focus. Understanding the total urban environment is essential to planning and conducting the full range of Army urban operations across the spectrum of conflict.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN AREAS IN WARFARE

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1-4. Urban areas always have been central to, or have significantly influenced, military operations. One of the first urban-centered battles was the siege of Troy at the beginning of Greek history. Moreover, much of the history of early Greece revolved around wars between its city-states or with Persia and centered on the conquest, siege, or blockade of cities. Five hundred years later, the Roman Empire replaced Greece as the dominant world power although urban areas remained central to Roman warfare. Even Rome’s history can be viewed as a microcosm of

urban warfare over the past two thousand years. Though military operations within the physical confines of many of these historic urban areas were not the norm, *the focus* of these operations was their conquest or control.

²Rome

A Microcosm of Urban Warfare

During two millennia, Rome has been the center of at least 12 battles. The Gauls lay siege to Rome first in 387 BC. That first siege lasted six months and ended after the barbarians burnt much of the city. The surviving patrician families paid a ransom for the withdrawal of Brennus' army. From 408 to 410 AD, the Goth leader, Alaric, successfully besieged Rome no less than three times. The Byzantine General Belisarius captured Rome twice from the Goths and withstood siege inside the city once between 536 and 549. Five hundred years later in 1084, Norman adventurer Robert Guiscard captured medieval Rome and sacked the city during a dispute between the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. Forces of the Holy Roman Empire again stormed and captured the city to punish the Pope in 1527. During the Italian Revolution in 1849, a French army supporting the Pope captured the city from the Italian revolutionary army under Garibaldi. In 1944, the last military action took place in and around Rome when the US Fifth Army captured the city from the retreating German army. Rome's turbulent history—fought over ethnic and religious differences, prestige, and military necessity—demonstrates the importance of urban areas in warfare and the various causes and combatants within this complex environment.

1-5. Although Rome last saw combat in 1944, urban areas have been no less prominent in warfare since that time. Beirut in Lebanon, Grozny in Chechnya, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been centers of conflict in the last 50 years. Urban areas, now more pervasive than ever before, will continue to be essential to successful operational and strategic warfighting. Today, armies cannot execute major military operations without the influence of surrounding urban environments (with the possible exception of the open desert).

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS

1-6. Several reasons have attracted (and continue to attract) armies to combat in urban areas:

- A military force chooses to position itself in an urban area to capitalize on the perceived advantages offered by the environment. In contrast, an opposing force, by analyzing the factors of the situation, determines that it must enter the urban area to attack and destroy its enemy (or devote essential combat power to their isolation).
- The urban area's infrastructure, capabilities, or other resources have significant operational or strategic value.

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- The urban area has significant symbolic importance.
- The urban area's geographical location dominates a region or avenue of approach.

1-7. Russia's 1994 experience in Chechnya illustrates an increasingly important motivation for conducting urban operations. The Chechen rebels, after failing to engage Russian forces outside the city, chose to turn Grozny into the battlefield. Leaders of the defeated Chechen conventional forces recognized that fighting in the urban area provided them their best chance for success. The complexities of urban combat and the perceived advantages of defending an urban area mitigated their numerical and technological inferiority. The urban area provided the Chechens protection from fires, resources, interior lines, and covered and concealed positions and movement. Given such advantages offered by the environment, smaller or less-sophisticated military forces have similarly chosen to fight in urban areas.

1-8. Such advantages of operating in an urban environment also prompt forces to conduct an urban operation to facilitate a larger campaign plan and decisive battle in another location. The urban operation can focus the enemy on the urban area and allow other forces to conduct operations elsewhere. From a defensive perspective, an urban defense may gain time and space to reorganize forces in new defensive positions, to divert enemy forces from other critical tasks, or to prepare to conduct offensive operations. To some extent, these reasons motivated Soviet forces defending Leningrad and Stalingrad from the Germans in World War II. The stubborn defense permitted the Soviets to reorganize for later offensive operations. From an offensive perspective, an attack on an urban area may be a shaping operation used to divert resources from the decisive operation that will follow.

1-9. Armies also fight in an urban area to obtain some critical feature or resource in the area, such as a port facility. The desire to control an important seaport and access to the Persian Gulf largely motivated the Iranian and Iraqi struggle for Basra in the 1980s. Earlier, in 1944, British forces fought German units in Arnhem for control of the Rhine River Bridge. Other infrastructure of the urban environment may have operational or strategic significance and can compel military forces to attack or defend the area. As urban areas account for an increasing share of a country's national income, often generating over 50 percent of gross national product, the strategic implications for their control or influence become even greater.

1-10. Urban areas are often located on terrain that dominates a region or an avenue of approach. In these cases, offensive armies capture these areas to proceed with security to another objective. Conversely, defensive forces commonly defend the area to deny the area of operations. To illustrate, Cassino, Italy stood astride the critical highway approach up the Liri valley to Rome. The allies had to attack and capture the monastery to facilitate the allied offensive north. Cassino's location made bypassing virtually impossible. Likewise, Israeli army urban operations in Beirut were (and have continued to be) a result of its strategic location near the Israeli security zone; various Arab insurgent and terrorist groups used Beirut as a

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base for attacks against Israel. Beirut evolved as the major base of the Palestine Liberation Organization, a major opponent of Israel. Beirut's location made it a security threat to Israel and thus compelled several major Israeli operations in the urban area (see Appendix A).

1-11. Another reason for engaging in urban operations is the symbolic—historical, cultural, political, and even economic—importance of many urban areas. Often, capital cities—such as Rome, Paris, Seoul, and Berlin—are identified as the strategic centers of gravity of their respective nations. Possessing or threatening these urban areas may impact directly on the outcome of a conflict. The objective of Germany's wars with France in 1870 and 1914 was ultimately Paris. Napoleon's 1812 campaign had as its objective Moscow, as did Hitler's 1941 offensive into Russia. The objective of the Soviet 1945 offensive was Berlin, and the North Vietnamese 1975 offensive had as its objective the South's capital of Saigon. Still, history also reminds us that commanders assess the sustainability and decisiveness of operations directed toward these "prestige" objectives. For example, in 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow but had to evacuate it within 30 days. He lacked supplies and shelter, failed to destroy the Russian Army, and failed to defeat the political will of the Czar and the people. Similarly, the North Korean occupation of Seoul during the Korean War was equally indecisive.

US ARMY'S EXPERIENCE IN URBAN OPERATIONS

1-12. The US Army has a varied history of conducting operations to attack or defend larger urban areas. The American Revolution saw the Army conduct several urban operations. These operations included the unsuccessful defense of New York, the successful attack on Trenton, and the decisive siege and attack on British forces at Yorktown. The Mexican War also had a successful assault on the fortified city of Monterey and the decisive siege of Mexico City. During the American Civil War, the armies, in the tradition of Napoleonic maneuver warfare, avoided urban areas and fought in the open. However, the opposing armies frequently made urban areas their objective because of their importance as railheads. Success in the siege of several key urban areas—Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Petersburg—contributed to the Northern victory.

1-13. Following the Civil War, the US Army faced no large-scale urban combat for several generations. The Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and even World War I did not require the Army to fight in large urban areas. Between the Civil War and World War II, the US Army fought in several urban areas worldwide supporting US commitments. These limited urban combat operations were small but essential parts of what were urban stability operations. From 1900 to 1901, the Army provided public security for a sector of Peking, China of around 50,000 inhabitants. The Army conducted UO and, in the course of the operation, the 9th US Infantry suffered 20-percent casualties while fighting in Tientsin. Punitive expeditions to places such as Siberia, Cuba, Philippines, Central America, and Mexico put the Army in various urban situations that required using military power, notably, the occupation and security of Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914. In the context of these smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), UO became a staple of US Army employment.

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1-14. World War II forced the Army to grapple with the issues of large-scale urban combat almost immediately. In his 1941 defense of the Philippines, General MacArthur examined how to defend Manila. Manila represented a large, modern, friendly urban area, which was the capital city of a close US ally. Defending the urban area posed numerous challenges. Ultimately General MacArthur determined that he could best conduct its defense outside the city by defeating the enemy forces in combat on the invasion beaches or shortly after they landed. When Japanese forces defeated MacArthur's Philippine Army in a series of engagements, MacArthur had to decide how best to protect the friendly populace of Manila. He had two choices: abandoning the city or waging a costly defense that would likely result in the city's destruction, thousands of noncombatant casualties, and no operational advantage. He had little choice but to declare Manila an open city and move his forces to Bataan to wage an operational defense in the vain hope that a counteroffensive could relieve his isolated force. On 2 January 1942, Japanese forces entered Manila unopposed.

1-15. Had General MacArthur decided to defend Manila, his forces would have found scant doctrine in the Army regarding how to fight in an urban area. Doctrine for urban operations did not appear until early 1944, when faced with the possibility of fighting through the larger urban areas of Western Europe. At his time the US Army published FM 31-50, *Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns*. This manual had the first formal discussion of how the Army viewed urban combat. It was based on the Army's limited experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the study of German and Soviet experiences on the Eastern front.

1-16. FM 31-50 emphasized a deliberate pace, individual and small unit initiative, the liberal use of direct and indirect firepower, and decentralized command and execution. It focused on the urban area (as opposed to the environment); however, it did include policies towards the noncombatants. The manual was also focused at the regimental combat team level. Complementing the doctrine of FM 31-50 was the 1944 operations manual, FM 100-5. This latter manual emphasized the importance of combined arms actions and the need for extensive reconnaissance of prepared and defended cities. The Army successfully implemented this doctrine in several major instances of urban combat, most notably the capture of the first German city, Aachen, and hundreds of small-scale urban assaults on cities, towns, and villages across France, the Benelux, and Germany. Army forces also successfully employed this urban combat doctrine during the liberation of Manila in 1945.

1-17. The legacy of this era of Army operations was an effective tactical solution to urban offensive combat: isolate the urban area, seize a foothold, and expand the foothold block by block until occupying the entire urban area and destroying the enemy. The doctrine's emphasis on firepower kept friendly casualties to a minimum. Unfortunately, when enemy forces stoutly defended the urban area, the emphasis on firepower resulted in its virtual destruction and high casualties among noncombatants.

1-18. The doctrinal approach honed in World War II remained the accepted Army approach to urban combat to the century's end. The last successful implementation

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occurred when liberating Seoul during the Korean War. The Vietnam conflict did not offer the Army opportunities or the requirement to practice urban combat or test and refine doctrine on a large scale. The largest urban battle, Hue, was a chaotic tactical battle that validated most of the historical lessons of urban combat without generating any new doctrinal insights for large-scale urban warfare.

1-19. From the mid-1950s through the 1990s, the Army conducted UO in the United States in support of civil authorities during civil unrest and anti-Vietnam protests. Some operations involved numerous active and reserve component forces engaged in restoring public order. The Detroit riots of 1967 and the Los Angeles riots of 1992 required the commitments of active and National Guard units. In 1968, the Army deployed over 35,000 troops to Washington D.C., Chicago, and Baltimore following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1-20. In the 1970s and 1980s, Army doctrine predominantly focused on urban areas and successfully fighting a conventional ground war against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The 1979 FM 90-10, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)*, described how to conduct urban operations against Soviet forces in Germany. Its concepts were never tested other than in simulation, and its approach to urban combat was not substantially different from that practiced by the Army since World War II. Despite previous doctrine's admonition to avoid cities, the Army has had to fight in them in diverse circumstances.

MODERN ARMY URBAN OPERATIONS

1-21. Modern urban operations span the full range of possible applications of military power. At the high end of the spectrum of conflict is major theater war (MTW) dominated by offensive and defensive operations that, when undertaken, will commonly include urban operations. At the lowest level are a multitude of urban peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. These activities foster and strengthen alliances and coalitions as well as deter aggression on the part of potential threats. At mid-level between MTW and PME are SSC urban operations. As a result of being mid-range, any type of operation may potentially dominate an SSC; however, the various urban stability operations form the majority. At higher echelons, these separations are often viewed as levels of intensity. For the tactical units conducting urban operations, these divisions appear indistinct, as the intensity is often high despite where the operation falls within the level of conflict.

MAJOR THEATER WAR

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1-22. While UO in a MTW can encompass the full range of Army operations, the offense and defense will be central and decisive to success. Although mindful of collateral damage and noncombatants, urban operations in a MTW (compared to urban operations in SSCs or as part of PME activities) will be the least constrained because vital national interests will be at stake. UO in a MTW, therefore, will require a significant investment of resources of all types. Specialized units such as psychological operations, civil affairs, and other special operations forces (SOF) will likely be in high demand. UO in a MTW will require an abundance of

infantry and may require significant casualty replacements and medical support. Logistics to support the distinctive urban environment includes large amounts of lethal and nonlethal specialty munitions, such as smoke, precision field artillery rounds, demolitions, and hand grenades.

1-23. Of potential urban scenarios confronting the future Army, urban offensive and defensive operations in an MTW are the most dangerous and challenging. They will take one of two principal forms: fluid or siege. In a fluid urban combat operation, both sides may contend for position and advantage in the urban battlespace. The attacker will seek to quickly seize decisive points before the enemy is able to establish a cohesive defense. This will likely require the attacker to bypass enemy defensive positions whose occupation or reduction are not critical to mission success. Conversely, the defender may use interior lines to shift forces in a fluid defense. In a siege, one side clearly has the initiative as the attacker, and the other side has the advantages of the defense. A siege situation can develop as a result of an initial fluid urban battle, or it may be a function of previous military operations that occurred outside the urban area. The Army doctrine's emphasis on initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility generally supports the fluid form of urban combat; however, commanders also understand that the factors of METT-TC may support a longer-term, siege approach.

SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

1-24. SSCs encompass a wide range of military operations that fall between MTW and PME and frequently involve urban operations. SSCs are conducted to facilitate diplomacy and support political initiatives, protect American lives and interests, and disrupt illegal activities. Joint task forces (JTFs) typically conduct SSCs although one service may provide the bulk of the force. During these urban contingencies, resources are often more limited and the restraints on applying combat power are greater as the need to maintain legitimacy will grow in importance. Typically, Army forces will need the assistance of multinational partners, other agencies, local noncombatants, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to successfully complete the mission.

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

1-25. UO, at the lowest level of conflict, may also take many forms. They serve to strengthen alliances and coalitions, discourage arms races, combat terrorism, and generally reduce the potential for instability and conflict. Combat in PME activities is not the norm. They are least likely to involve the use of force (when necessary, nonlethal is preferred). The presence of Army forces performing PME activities in foreign urban areas provides a visible sign of US commitment to peace and stability in that region. In many of these lower-intensity UO, Army forces often support other agencies. These other agencies actually plan and lead the operation. Army forces provide military capabilities (to include organization and leadership), manpower, equipment, and other resources not readily available. As with UO in SSCs, proactive and aggressive interaction and coordination with multinational partners, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the urban populace will be vital to success.

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PREPARING FOR FUTURE URBAN OPERATIONS

1-26. To operate successfully in a complex urban environment requires rigorous, realistic UO training. Training is conducted by the complete combined arms team and covers the full range of Army operations. It also replicates—

- The psychological impact of intense, close combat against a well-trained enemy.
- The effects of noncombatants in close proximity to Army forces.
- The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an urban area.

It recognizes the constraints of collateral damage and, therefore, emphasizes the development of flexible, effective, and understandable rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE help preclude soldiers from randomly using deadly force while allowing them sufficient latitude to accomplish the mission and defend themselves. Training in ROE also includes significant and periodic changes that test and develop flexibility in and adaptability to a fluid environment. Additionally, force preparedness mandates integrating simulations, exercises at urban training sites, and the actual use of urban terrain into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training. Concurrent training extends from the individual soldier to the joint level. Additionally, preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in regards to urban multinational and interagency operations.

1-27. Realistic UO training (as well as the conduct of real world operations) has the added benefit of identifying operational requirements and resultant changes necessary in our doctrine, organizations, materiel design, leadership, and soldier support (see Figure 1-2). While technology (materiel) and organizational changes are critical, soldiers remain the decisive means for success. The technology and organizational changes will be a critical enabler to achieve the agile, simultaneous, and precise lethality required in urban operations.




Figure 1-2. UO and the Army Imperatives

and precise lethality required in urban operations. In the future, technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to urban operations. Still, competent leaders and well-trained and disciplined soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to succeed in this complex, multidimensional, and noncontiguous urban environment.

Chapter 2

Urban Environment

³From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population.

FM 3-0

Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found elsewhere. Its distinct characteristics result from an intricate topography and high population density. The topography's complexity stems from the man-made features and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds, thousands, or millions of civilians may be near or intermingled with soldiers—friendly and enemy. This second factor, and the human dimension it represents, is potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders and their staffs to understand and evaluate. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) *process* remains unaffected by urban areas (see FM 34-130 and Appendix B); this chapter provides information essential to the conduct of the IPB for an urban environment.

Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is distinct and will react to and affect the presence and operations of Army forces differently. A tactical technique effective in one area may not be effective in another area due to physical differences, such as street patterns or the type of building construction. An Army policy popular with one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in another due to diverse cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, but they increase the complexity for Army forces operating in urban areas. These difficulties range from conventional military forces to disease and starvation (see Chapter 3) to a pervasive media—often acutely present in intricate combinations. Thus, commanders at all levels make extraordinary efforts to assess and understand their particular urban environment to plan, prepare for, and execute effective urban operations (UO).

Contents	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Complex Environment Urban Terrain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multidimensional Battlefield Broad Urban Patterns Lesser Street Patterns An Urban Model Urban Society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential Center of Gravity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Cycle of Effects Urban Infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interdependence Separate Parts of a Whole Structures and People Impact on Future Operations Resource Intensive Communications and Information

DODDOA-004437

General Population Size
 Group Size, Location, and Composition
 Leadership and Organization
 Interests and Actions
 Interaction, Influence, or Control

Transportation and Distribution
 Energy
 Economics and Commerce
 Administration and Human Services

A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate, available building materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not only among urban areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural and man-made features in urban areas present commanders with some of the most difficult terrain in which to conduct military operations.

2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are identical. The sprawl of Los Angeles, for example, bears little physical resemblance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most significantly affect each area's uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the terrain, its potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be determined with some degree of certainty. However, the human dimension is much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its effects on military operations. Like any environment, *the side that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban environment has the best chance of success.*

2-3. Whether a large metropolis or a small village, each urban environment has an identifiable system of components that constantly change and interact. This "system of systems" consists of the *terrain*, the *society*, and the *infrastructure* that links the two (see Figure 2-1). (These categories highlight the key aspects to understanding the urban environment and will be used throughout the manual; however, the civil-military operations (CMO) discussion in Chapter 9 provides an alternate method for categorizing and assessing the effects of civil considerations in *any* operational environment.)




Figure 2-1. Keys to Understanding the Urban Environment

2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories but rather overlapping and interdependent. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along with the other factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support available, time, and civil considerations—

DODDOA-004438

- Contributes to commanders' situational understanding.
- Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements.
- Allows them to develop courses of action that apply appropriate resources against decisive points.

2-5. In stability operations and support operations, this understanding allows commanders to engage and dominate the decisive points critical to maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment. Although each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, commanders often "step back" and visualize each system, the complex urban environment, and their area of operations (AO). This "systems thinking" aids commanders in uncovering key relationships and intersections that can help reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points.

2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest extent possible, commanders carefully integrate and employ special operations forces (SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units—and a myriad of other human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and regional, language, and cultural experts. The societal aspects and integrating infrastructure will challenge commanders' assessment and understanding. These aspects will also require greater dependence on nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for their information, knowledge, and expertise. This last consideration requires commanders to develop effective techniques and procedures for coordinating and interacting with these agencies.

URBAN TERRAIN

2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however, requires comprehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and man-made features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis considers both. Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns, forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine make it difficult to describe a "typical" urban area. However, these elements provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area. Furthermore, man-made features significantly affect military systems and soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban operations are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on battlefield operating systems (BOS) (see Chapters 5 and 9) and the range of operations (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8) are interwoven throughout the manual.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD

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2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on a map by the surrounding

countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban battlespace is many times that of a similarly sized portion of natural terrain. The sheer volume and density created by urban geometry can make UO resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.

2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can radically alter the physical character of the urban terrain in ways not experienced in other environments. They may cause (either intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires or the loss of electricity. A power outage can cause flooding (especially in subsurface areas) by shutting down pumping stations. Entire buildings may be destroyed, eliminating reference points and leaving large piles of rubble. Additionally, buildings and other urban structures, damaged but not destroyed, can still be effective obstacles and possible booby traps. Their weakened construction and unstable structure increase the risk of injury to soldiers and civilians moving within them. (Engineers often determine whether the buildings can support occupation by Army forces or civilians.) The likely presence of toxic industrial materials (TIM) can create additional obstacles.

2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth, breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: *airspace* and *surface*. In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include *supersurface* and *subsurface* areas (see Figure 2-2). Although spatially separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, line of communications (LOC), and engagement area.




Figure 2-2. The Multidimensional Urban Battlefield

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2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban physical environment. Commanders consider activities that occur outside buildings and subterranean areas (the *external space*) as well as the activities that occur unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the *internal space*). The internal space further challenges command, control, and intelligence collection activities and increases the combat power required to conduct UO. Commanders develop methods to help themselves, their staffs, and their subordinate commanders and staffs to represent and visualize the multiple dimensions. Such

dimensions can change rapidly simply due to continued urban growth or, as described earlier, the effects of nature and UO themselves.

Airspace

2-12. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of approach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and extraction of soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect aviation assets. However, buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other urban constructions create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking). These obstacles can limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increases aviation vulnerability to small arms and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), particularly when supporting ground forces.

Surface

2-13. Surface areas apply to exterior ground level areas, such as parking lots, airfields, highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. They often provide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However, buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat avenues of approach or essential LOCs and, therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such, amphibious and river-crossing operations may be an integral part of the overall urban operation.

2-14. Larger open areas—such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots—are often critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation centers, and prisoner of war holding facilities. These areas also can afford suitable aircraft landing and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide logistic support areas and aerial resupp

DODDOA-004441

Chapter 3

Urban Threat

7 . . . [T]he United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities. Moreover, these interventions may take place in distant regions where urban environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic conditions present major operational challenges.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001

As the strategic environment has become less stable, more uncertain, and more dangerous, Army forces are trained and ready to address urban threats. These threats range from regional conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas, and insurgents to terrorists, criminal groups, and angry crowds. Although uncertain about events, Army forces can be clear about trends. Increasingly, the Army will face threats that severely differ in doctrine, organization, and equipment, yet can fully interact with the three other components of the urban battlefield—terrain, society, and infrastructure. In stability operations and support operations, commanders broaden their concept of the threat to include natural disasters, hunger and starvation, and rampant disease. Further, commanders plan to contend with many passive urban threats, such as psychological illnesses and toxic industrial materials (TIM). These threats may be found in isolation, but most likely commanders will encounter them in various combinations. Moreover, each new threat will pose a different combination and likely have new capabilities that previous opponents lacked.

Contents	
Asymmetry	Use the Population to Advantage
Weapons of Mass Destruction	Win the Information War
Threat Operational Principles	Manipulate Key Facilities
Deny Access	Use All Dimensions
Neutralize Technology Overmatch	Employ Urban-Oriented Weapons
Control the Tempo	Engage Entire Enemy Force
Change the Nature of the Conflict	Focus Attacks on Support Areas,
Cause Politically Unacceptable Casualties	Isolated Groups, and Individuals
Allow No Sanctuary	Negative Effects of Urbanization
Conduct Dispersed and Decentralized	General Instability
Operations	Food and Water Shortage
Urban Threat Tactics	Disease and Pollution
	Competing Power Structures

ASYMMETRY

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3-1. An emphasis on asymmetric means to offset United States (US) military capability has emerged as a significant trend among potential threats and become an integral part of the threat principles and tactics discussed below. Asymmetry results when one opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values, organization, training, or equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not a new concept. It naturally evolves from a sound mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis by an intelligent, freethinking, and adaptive threat. These asymmetric approaches will include the most advanced, commercially-available technology innovatively applied and mixed with crude, simple, and unsophisticated weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

3-2. A chief asymmetric means of engaging the national power of the US is to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the US or its allies. These weapons can be used against military forces by military forces and include high-yield explosives as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Operations in urban areas may require concentrating forces and may create a lucrative target for a threat that possesses fewer numbers and less equipment.

3-3. A threat's WMD use will adversely affect the Army's abilities to conduct urban operations (UO) to various degrees. For example, the intervening structures and the effects of urban microclimates complicate the ability to detect and identify radiological, chemical, or biological attacks from a standoff distance. Also, the individual soldier's ability to recognize his leaders, understand oral and visual commands, and operate increasingly sophisticated equipment is difficult when wearing protective clothing and equipment—particularly if his training proficiency is low. Despite the increased challenges and complexity, Army forces have the training and equipment necessary to respond to such an attack compared to most armies around the world, but certainly when compared to the civilian sector.

3-4. Although initial casualties could be high, the public can accept military casualties before those of civilians. Therefore, threats may gain an initial tactical advantage but would achieve less asymmetric benefit by directly attacking Army forces. They may attempt to achieve an extraordinary asymmetric strategic advantage by employing WMD against US or allied civilian populations. In doing so, threats hope to use political sensitivity to high civilian casualties to reduce popular support for the US or its allies. The chance of these attacks occurring in an urban area increases because—

- The area facilitates weapons' effects and camouflages delivery means.
- The dense civilian population ensures a high casualty rate.
- The attack (or even the threat of attack) often will receive more publicity and public attention.
- The urban area's infrastructure is especially vulnerable to WMD

DODDOA-004443

particularly the systems of the economics and commerce infrastructure located in large urban areas, and may have far-reaching national and global effects.

THREAT OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

3-5. The threat may apply several key operational principles to oppose Army forces operating in an urban environment (see Figure 3-1). These principles focus more on how a threat might fight in an urban area rather than specifically whom the threat might be or in what region of the world the conflict might occur. They are more effective in an urban environment due to—

- The high costs in time, material, and manpower involved in UO.
- The limiting effects of urban areas on many technological advantages.
- The proximity of airfields and ports to urban areas.
- The potential moral dilemmas created by exposing numerous civilians to harm or injury.




Figure 3-1. Threat Operational Principles

These principles complement and overlap each other; however, at their core is the need to defeat an enemy of superior numbers, technology, or both.

DENY ACCESS

3-6. The Army may not be located where future conflicts are fought. Thus, the Army maintains the ability to rapidly project and sustain combat power over long distances and time spans. This capability demands that Army forces quickly gain and maintain control of seaports or aerial ports of embarkation or debarkation, particularly where the density of US basing and en route infrastructure is low. Commanders gain control of these ports by unopposed (assisted or unassisted) or forcible entry operations. In either case, these phased-entry operations may present potential vulnerabilities, particularly—

- Unsuitable composition of initial or early entry forces lacking necessary combat power for immediate decisive operations.
- Initial command and control difficulties and an immature situational understanding.

DODDOA-004444

- Lack of developed theater support.

3-7. Consequently, threats may attack during initial force projection operations to oppose, disrupt, or prevent the build-up of essential combat power into a theater of operations. These attacks may occur anywhere deploying Army forces are located, at overseas bases, at home stations, and even in military communities. Increasingly, deployment facilities such as airfields and ports exist as integral components of urban areas. Threats will invariably use the complex and concealing nature of these urban areas, coupled with the vulnerabilities, to create favorable conditions for their attacks.

DODDOA-004445

Chapter 4

Contemplating Urban Operations

¹⁶We based all our further calculations on the most unfavorable assumptions: the inevitability of heavy and prolonged fighting in the streets of Berlin, the possibility of German counter-attacks from outside the ring of encirclement from the west and south-west, restoration of the enemy's defence to the west of Berlin and the consequent need to continue the offensive.

General of the Army, S. M. Shtemenko
describing the operational level planning for taking Berlin
The Soviet General Staff at War

In any potential situation and in any area, Army commanders will likely need to assess the relevance and impact of one or more urban areas on their operations. They will also need to determine whether full spectrum urban operations (UO) will be essential to mission accomplishment. UO may be the commander's sole focus or only one of several tasks nested in an even larger operation. Although UO potentially can be conducted as a

A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area.

single battle, engagement, or strike, they will more often be conducted as a major operation requiring joint resources. Such actions result from the increasing sizes of urban areas. Army commanders of a major urban operation then ensure that UO clearly support the operational objectives of the joint force commander (JFC), requesting and appropriately integrating critical joint resources. Whether the urban operation is the major operation itself or one of many tasks in a larger operation, Army commanders assess and thoroughly shape the conditions so subordinate tactical commanders can dominate in the complex urban environment.

Contents

Necessity of Urban Operations	Joint
Force Strength	Full Spectrum
Type of Forces	Integration into Land Operations
Casualties	Concept of the Operation
Munitions and Equipment	Rules of Engagement
Collateral Damage	Resource Allocation
Time and Momentum	Urban ISR
Vulnerabilities	Information Operations
Escalation	Integration of Conventional and
Consider Alternatives and Risk,	Special Operations Forces
Reduction Measures	Coordination with Other Agencies
Characteristics of Major Urban Operations	

DODDOA-004446

NECESSITY OF URBAN OPERATIONS

4-1. Early in planning, commanders of a major operation address the necessity of conducting operations in urban areas located throughout their areas of operations (AOs). Chapter 1 discussed strategic and operational considerations that compel forces to operate in urban areas. These reasons include the location of the threat force; critical infrastructure or capabilities that are operationally or strategically valuable; the geographic location of an urban area; and the area's political, economic, or cultural significance. Several considerations exist, that may make UO unnecessary, unwarranted, or inefficient. When determining whether to operate in an urban environment, commanders consider the operational (and accidental) risks and balance them with mission benefits. The factors shown in Figure 4-1 highlight some measures to evaluate the risks associated with UO.




Figure 4-1. Risk Management and the Risks Associated With Urban Operations

When determining whether to operate in an urban environment, commanders consider the operational (and accidental) risks and balance them with mission benefits. The factors shown in Figure 4-1 highlight some measures to evaluate the risks associated with UO.

FORCE STRENGTH

4-2. When facing prospective UO, commanders consider if they have troops available to conduct the operation properly and with acceptable risk. Under normal circumstances, large urban areas require many forces merely to establish control. New York City police department has over thirty thousand officers simply to conduct peacetime law enforcement. Major UO, particularly those that are opposed, will often require a significant number of forces. If commanders lack sufficient force to conduct effective operations, they may postpone or consider not initiating those operations until they have the necessary strength. Commanders add to their analysis the requirements for troop strength elsewhere in the AO.

TYPE OF FORCES

DODDOA-004447

4-3. Along with force strength, commanders consider the type of forces available. This consideration includes an assessment of their level of training in urban operations. *All UO put a premium on well-trained, dismounted infantry units.* Therefore, Army forces conducting UO should be force tailored to include a large infantry component. In addition, special operations forces (SOF) are invaluable in UO. SOF include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces. They should always be considered as part of the task organization.

4-4. UO include combined arms to ensure tactical success in combat. Although

masses of heavy forces are not normally required, successful UO require all the combined arms capabilities of all Army forces. Even if an urban operation is unlikely to involve offensive and defensive operations, field artillery may be essential to force protection. In urban stability operations and support operations, successful mission accomplishment requires more robust CA organizations. They are also valuable in urban offensive and defensive operations. While commanders may have sufficient combat and combat support forces, they may lack enough combat service support forces to provide the logistic support to maintain the tempo. Commanders without balanced types of forces, to include their proficiency in operating in urban environments, should consider alternatives to UO or delaying UO until proper force types are trained and available in sufficient numbers.

CASUALTIES

4-5. Casualties in UO are more likely than in operations in other environments. In urban offense and defense, friendly and threat forces often engage at close range with little space to maneuver. The urban terrain provides numerous advantages to the urban defender; higher casualties occur among troops on the offensive, where frontal assaults may be the only tactical option. Conversely, defenders with limited ability to withdraw can also suffer high casualties when isolated and attacked. Casualties can be more difficult to prevent in urban stability operations and support operations because of the dense complex terrain, the close proximity of the urban population, and the possible difficulty in distinguishing friend from foe. The potential for high casualties and the subsequent need for casualty evacuation under difficult circumstances make the positioning and availability of adequate medical resources another important consideration.

4-6. Though casualties occur in all operations, commanders recognize the likelihood of more casualties during large-scale or high-intensity UO. During the battle for Hue in 1968, for example, many company-size units suffered more than 60 percent casualties in only a few days of offensive operations. Commanders conducting urban stability operations and support operations know the casualty risk and how it relates to national and strategic objectives. While a lower risk normally exists in stability operations and support operations than in offensive and defensive operations, just one casualty may adversely impact the success of the stability or support mission. A realistic understanding of the risk and the nature of casualties resulting from UO critically affect the decision-making process. If commanders assess the casualty risk as high, they ensure that their higher headquarters understands their assessment and that the objectives sought within the urban area are commensurate with the anticipated risk.

MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT

4-7. Offensive and defensive operations in an urban environment put a premium on certain types of munitions and equipment. Forces may want to use vast amounts of precision munitions in the urban environment. At the tactical level, they will likely use more munitions than during operations in other environments. These munitions include—

DODDOA-004448

- Grenades (fragmentation, concussion, stun, riot control, and smoke).
- Mortar ammunition (due to its rate of fire, responsiveness, and high-angle fire characteristic).
- Explosives.
- Small arms.

Soldiers need access to special equipment necessary to execute small-unit tactics effectively. In urban stability operations and support operations, this equipment may include antiriot gear, such as batons, protective clothing, and other nonlethal crowd control devices. In urban offensive and defensive operations, special equipment can include sniper rifles, scaling ladders, knee and elbow pads, and door busters. Soldiers can conduct UO with standard clothing and military equipment. However, failure to equip them with the right types and quantities of munitions and special equipment will make mission success more difficult and costly. When commanders consider whether to conduct UO, they evaluate the ability of combat service support to provide the resources (see Chapter 9).

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

4-8. UO require an expanded view of risk assessment. When considering risk to Army, joint, and multinational forces, commanders analyze the risk to the area's population and infrastructure. This comprehensive analysis includes the second- and third-order effects.

DODDOA-004449

Chapter 5

Foundations for Urban Operations

¹⁸Utilities such as electricity and water are as much weapons of war as rifles, artillery pieces or fighter aircraft. . . . In the case of Manila, where there was a noncombatant, civilian population of one million in place, it was the attacker's aim to capture the utilities which the defender planned to destroy.

The Battle for Manila

Commanders conducting major urban operations (UO) use their ability to visualize how doctrine and military capabilities are applied within the context of the urban environment. An operational framework is the basic foundation for this visualization. In turn, this visualization forms the basis of operational design and decisionmaking. To accurately visualize, describe, and direct the conduct of UO, commanders and their staffs understand the basic fundamentals applicable to most UO. They also understand how the urban environment affects the battlefield operating systems (BOS) and the tactical urban battle.

Contents	
Urban Operational Framework	Minimize Collateral Damage
Assess	Separate Noncombatants from Combatants
Shape	Restore Essential Services
Dominate	Preserve Critical Infrastructure
Transition	Understand the Human Dimension
Fundamentals of Urban Operations	Transition Control
Perform Focused Information Operations	General Effects on Operations
Conduct Close Combat	Battlefield Operating Systems
Avoid the Attrition Approach	Tactical Considerations
Control the Essential	

URBAN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

DODDOA-004450

5-1. Army leaders who have an urban area in their area of operations (AO) or are assigned missions in an urban area follow an urban operational framework. They identify the portion of the urban area essential to mission success, shape the area, precisely mass the effects of combat power to rapidly dominate the area, and then transition control of the area to another agency. This framework divides into four essentials: *assess*, *shape*, *dominate*, and *transition*. These four components provide a means for conceptualizing the application of Army combat power and capabilities in the urban environment. The Army framework modifies the joint urban operations framework (understand, shape, engage, consolidate, and transition) to further clarify the JUO concepts within the context of Army capstone

doctrine found in FM 3-0. The framework for joint urban operations (JUO) provides the joint force commander a framework for planning and conducting JUO. FM 3-0 provides Army commanders with the operations process that provides a framework for planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. Army capstone doctrine, supported with the Army UO framework, is fully compatible with the concepts and purpose of the JUO framework.

5-2. The urban operational framework assists commanders in visualizing urban operations. This framework is simply an aid to the commander. Commanders combine the framework with—

- The principles of war.
- The tenets of Army operations.
- The components of operational design.
- Considerations for stability operations and support operations.
- Characteristics of combat service support (CSS).
- Staff estimates.
- Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).
- Each commander's experience.

The framework contributes to the visualizing, describing, and directing aspects of leadership that make commanders the catalysts of the operational process (see Figure 5-1). In the same manner, the urban operational framework contributes to the overall operations process (see FM 3-0).




Figure 5-1. The Urban Operational Framework and Battle Command

ASSESS

5-3. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments (FM 3-0). Commanders use visualization as their assessment method, staff officers use staff estimates, and all use the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. Commanders and staffs begin the assessment process by observing and then collecting information about the situation. They observe and learn about the urban environment, and factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. They use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means; information systems (INFOSYS); and reports from other headquarters, services, organizations, and agencies. Then they orient themselves to the situation and achieve situational understanding based on a common operational picture (COP) and continuously updated CCIR. Largely, the ability to rapidly and accurately assess the situation contributes to the commanders' abilities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during UO.

Disproportionately Critical

5-4. The Army operations process requires continuous assessment; it precedes and guides every activity. In UO, however, assessment is disproportionately critical for several reasons. First, each urban environment is unique. Other environments can be studied and their characteristics quantified in a general manner with accuracy. This is fundamentally not true of different urban areas. The characteristics and experience in one urban area often have limited value and application to an urban area elsewhere. This characteristic sets UO apart from operations in other environments.

DODDOA-004452

Extremely Dynamic

5-5. The urban environment is also extremely dynamic. Either deliberate destruction or collateral damage can quickly alter physical aspects of the urban environment. The human aspect is even more dynamic and potentially volatile. A friendly civil population, for example, can become hostile almost instantaneously. These dynamics (combined with initial difficulty of understanding and describing this unique environment) make it difficult for commanders and staffs to initially develop and maintain a COP and establish situational understanding. Furthermore, public reaction to media coverage of the urban operation and political changes influence national objectives and overall strategy. Such changes can affect the basic nature of an operation, especially after it has commenced. Anticipating these potential effects and developing appropriate branches and sequels based on an accurate assessment often determines how quickly commanders can achieve the desired end state.

Risk Assessment

5-6. As in any environment, UO pose both tactical and accident risks. However, the level of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction can often be higher than that of many other environments. Such challenges increase the probability and severity of a potential loss due to the presence of the enemy, a hostile civilian group, or some other hazardous condition within the urban environment (see *Necessity of Urban Operations* in Chapter 4). Therefore, commanders—

- Identify and assess hazards that may be encountered in executing their missions.
- Develop and implement clear and practical control measures to eliminate unnecessary risk.
- Continuously supervise and assess to ensure measures are properly executed and remain appropriate as the situation changes.

Risk decisions are commanders' business. Staffs, subordinate leaders, and even individual soldiers also understand the risk management process and continuously look for hazards at their level or within their area of expertise. Any risks identified (with recommended risk reduction measures) are quickly elevated to the appropriate level within the chain of command (see FM 100-14).

Complex and Resource Intensive

DODDOA-004453

5-7. The urban environment is the most complex of all the environments in which the Army conducts operations. It is comprised of a diverse civil population and complex, ill-defined physical components. A sophisticated net of functional, social, cultural, economic, and political institutions unites it. Thus, the analysis to understand the environment is also complex and time and resource intensive. The nuances of the urban environment can take years to uncover. Hence, constant analysis of the environment requires greater command attention and resources.

Accurately assessing the environment is a prerequisite to shaping it, and both are critical to achieve domination.

SHAPE

5-8. Shaping operations, part of all Army operations, are essential to successful UO. They set the conditions for decisive operations at the tactical level in the urban area. Rapid action, minimum friendly casualties, and acceptable collateral damage distinguish this success when the AO is properly shaped. Failure to adequately shape the urban AO creates unacceptable risk. The commander of a major urban operation has several resources with which to begin shaping the AO. Important capabilities include—

- Fires.
- Information operations.
- Special operations capabilities.
- The maneuver of major subordinate units.

Isolation

DODDOA-004454

5-9. Isolation of an urban environment is often the most critical component of shaping operations. Commanders whose AO includes operationally significant urban areas often conduct many shaping operations to isolate, or prevent isolation of, those areas from other parts of the AO. Likewise, commanders operating in the urban area focus on isolating decisive points and objectives in the urban area or from being isolated. Isolation is usually the key shaping action that affects UO. It applies across the range of Army operations. Most successful UO have effectively isolated the urban area. Failure to do so often contributed to a difficult or failed UO. In fact, the relationship between successful isolation and successful UO is so great that the threat often opposes isolation actions more strongly than operations executed in the urban area. In some situations, the success of isolation efforts has been decisive. This occurs when the isolation or imminent isolation of the urban area compels a defending enemy to withdraw or to surrender before beginning or completing decisive operations. In UO that are opposed, Army forces attempt to isolate the threat three ways: physically, electronically, and psychologically (see Figure 5-2).




Figure 5-2. Urban Isolation

5-10. **Physical Isolation.** In offensive UO, physical isolation keeps the threat from receiving information, supplies, and reinforcement while preventing him from withdrawing or breaking out. Conversely, a defending Army force attempts to avoid its own physical isolation. Simultaneously, this force conducts operations to

isolate the threat outside, as they enter, or at selected locations in the urban area. Physical isolation can occur at all levels. In many situations, particularly major theater war (MTW), the commander of a major operation may attempt to isolate the entire urban area and all enemy forces defending or attacking it. At the tactical level, forces isolate and attack individual decisive points. In stability operations, physical isolation may be more subtly focused on isolating less obvious decisive points, such as a hostile civilian group's individual leaders. In many operations, isolation may be temporary and synchronized to facilitate a decisive operation elsewhere. To effectively isolate an urban area, air, space, and sea forces are necessary in addition to the capabilities of ground forces.

5-11. **Electronic Isolation.** Electronic isolation is achieved through offensive information operations (IO). Electronic warfare (particularly two of its components: electronic warfare support and electronic attack) and computer network attack are critical to electronic isolation (see FM 100-6 and Information Operations in Chapter 4). At the operational level, offensive IO aims to quickly and effectively control the information flow into and out of an urban area. This isolation separates the threat's commu

DODDOA-004455

Chapter 6

Urban Offensive Operations

²³ . . . *Capture Suez City "provided it does not become a Stalingrad situation."*

Order to the Adan Armored Division
prior to its 1973 attack on Suez City
On the Banks of the Suez

Offensive urban operations (UO) are one of the most challenging operations that military forces can undertake. Campaigns and wars have sometimes hinged on their success or failure. Costly in resources, even when successful, they are not lightly entered into. Once engaged, they are executed rapidly and decisively. For reasons already discussed, threat forces defending in UO may gain advantages from the environment while Army force capabilities may diminish. Despite the challenges, Army forces conduct successful urban offensive operations by combining the Army's existing offensive doctrine with a thorough understanding of the environment.

Contents	
Purpose of Urban Offensive Operations Characteristics of Urban Offensive Operations Surprise Concentration Tempo Audacity Urban Offensive Operations and Battlefield Organization Sustaining Operations Shaping Operations	Decisive Operations Forms and Types of Urban Offense Forms of Offensive Maneuver Types of Offensive Operations Urban Offensive Considerations Assess Shape Dominate Transition

PURPOSE OF URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-1. Like all offensive operations, urban offensive operations are designed to impose the will of commanders on the threat. The urban offense often aims to destroy, defeat, or neutralize a threat force. However, the purpose may be to achieve some effect relating to the population or infrastructure of the urban area. Army forces may conduct offensive operations to secure a port or a communications center, to eliminate a threat to a friendly government or the urban population, or to deny the threat use of urban infrastructure. No matter the purpose, commanders use a combined arms approach for successful urban offensive operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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6-2. All offensive operations contain the characteristics of surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity (see FM 3-0). These characteristics also apply to urban offensive operations.

SURPRISE

6-3. Army forces can achieve offensive surprise at two levels: operational and tactical. In urban offensive operations, operational surprise can be decisive. The goal is to attack the urban area before the threat expects it, from a direction he doesn't expect, or in a manner he doesn't expect. In major operations, this requires an attack against an area that appears *to the threat* to be safe from attack. Urban areas that meet this criterion are not easily accessible. Army forces launch such an attack in different ways: through a vertical assault using airborne or air assault forces, through an amphibious assault, or through a penetration followed by a rapid and deep advance. All three attacks aim to achieve surprise and to deny the threat time to prepare and establish a defense. Surprise in a major urban operation prevents a threat from falling back to occupy prepared positions in and around an urban area.

6-4. At lower tactical levels, forces achieve surprise by attacking asymmetrically. An asymmetric method attacks the threat so he cannot respond effectively. This may be achieved by using special operations forces (SOF) against a threat prepared for a conventional attack, by attacking decisively with heavy forces when the threat expects an effort by light forces or SOF, or by leveraging Army forces' extensive information operations (IO) capability. Offensive IO—primarily using IO elements of deception, electronic warfare, and operations security (OPSEC)—can help achieve surprise at all levels (see Chapter 4). Attacking at night surprises the threat and maximizes the Army forces' training, command and control (C2), and technological advantages. Attacking from unexpected or multiple directions achieves surprise by leveraging Army information systems (INFOSYS) and superior synchronization of combat power and capabilities.

CONCENTRATION

6-5. In UO, the attacking force creates a major advantage by concentrating the effects of combat power at the point and time of its choosing. The area and its compartmented effects naturally disperse and dissipate combat capability. The environment also hinders repositioning forces rapidly. Such effects can work equally against defending and attacking forces. However, in a well-prepared defense, the defender often has the advantage of interior lines. The defender can reinforce or reposition forces more quickly using covered and concealed routes (such as, sewers, tunnels, or prepared holes made in walls). Successful UO need synchronized air and ground maneuver with overwhelming effects from fires at decisive points on the urban battlefield. To achieve proper synchronization and precise effects, commanders consider the unique time and distance relationships set by the environment.

TEMPO

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6-6. Tempo is the rate of military action. Commanders understand that the tempo of urban operations differs from operations in more open terrain. The complexity and the potential risk of the urban environment may invoke a cautious and methodical response on the part of commanders and their staffs. While preparing and planning urban operations, commanders conducting major operations that include urban areas strive to maintain an active tempo in offensive operations. Often, the primary purpose of the threat's urban defense is to disrupt the rapid tempo of Army offensive operations. The synchronized application of combat power and anticipation of threat reactions achieve tempo. The rapid tempo of events places Army forces in positions of advantage and helps achieve surprise. Controlling operational tempo and not allowing the different tempo of urban operations to adversely affect other operations is a challenge for commanders of major operations.

²⁴The Operational Context of Urban Operations

Brittany Ports – August to September 1944

The plan for the invasion of Normandy, France, in June 1944 was meticulously developed. The plan not only addressed the invasion itself, but also contained detailed planning for the campaign to follow. A major concern of the detailed campaign planning was logistics. To address this critical concern, and specifically the problem of ports to supply the allied armies once ashore, the pre-invasion planning called for the major ports of the French province of Brittany—Brest, Lorient, and Saint Nazaire—to be objectives of General Patton's Third Army, once it was activated.

Early August 1944, almost two months after the successful Normandy invasion, the operational situation significantly differed from that envisioned by the D-Day planners. General Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group was still fighting in the Bocage of Normandy. In contrast, General Bradley's Twelfth Army Group had just achieved a major breakthrough at Saint Lo, secured the Cotentin Peninsula, and reached the city of Avranches. Here was a decision point. Bradley and Eisenhower had to decide whether to adhere to the original plan and turn west with Patton's forces to secure the peninsula or to take advantage of the breakout at Saint Lo and turn east to exploit the disruption of the German defenses.

Ultimately they reached a compromise. General Middleton's VIII Corps was tasked to secure the peninsula, and the bulk of Patton's Army, three Army corps, was turned northeast to exploit the operational collapse of the main German defenses. See Figure 6-1.

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


Figure 6-1. Initial Attack in Brittany

Middleton's corps sprinted into the peninsula with the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions leading the way. However, poor communications, disagreements between commands, and contradictory orders caused the corps to hesitate before pushing the two divisions to continue to exploit toward the ports. The result: the 6th Armored Division missed an opportunity to seize Brest against light resistance by one day. The 4th Armored Division, after capturing the smaller port of Vannes, was also frustrated on the approaches to Lorient. The American reaction to the inability to rapidly seize the ports demonstrated an understanding of changing circumstances. The 6th Armored Division turned the attack at Brest to the 8th Infantry Division and then relieved the 4th Armored Division at Lorient. The 4th Armored was moved to rejoin the rest of Third Army exploiting to the east and north. Ultimately Brest fell to VIII Corps on 19 September after a 43-day siege by three infantry divisions. The victory yielded 36,000 German prisoners of war (POWs). However, the German defense and demolitions of the port left the port without an impact on the logistic situation of the allies. Brest cost the US Army almost 10,000 casualties and the commitment of significant supplies. The experience convinced commanders to surround and bypass the other major Brittany ports. Lorient and Saint Nazaire remained under German control, deep in allied territory, until the war ended ten months later (see Figure 6-2).

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


Figure 6-2. Subsequent Disposition of Forces in Brittany

The operational lessons of the Brittany campaign are numerous. First, commanders are responsible to continually assess assumptions and decisions made during planning based on the changing circumstances of the battlefield. This includes the planning decision to conduct urban offensive operations. When the allies arrived at the Brittany Peninsula, the focus of the operational maneuver was no longer securing logistics facilities but exploiting the breakthrough at Saint Lo and the disintegrating the German defense. The bulk of Third Army then was turned to the north and east rather than west into the peninsula.

The Brest experience also demonstrates that the costs of urban offensive operations are continually assessed against the operational value of the objective. This lesson was applied to the cities of Lorient and Saint Nazaire. The cities were never seized from the Germans because their logistic value failed to warrant the required resources. German retention of the ports had no major adverse effect on the overall campaign.

Another lesson is that commanders cannot allow urban operations to disrupt the tempo of other offensive operations. One German goal of defending the ports was to disrupt the rapid tempo of the US exploitation. They failed to achieve this goal because General Bradley continued the exploitation with the bulk of Third Army and executed the original plan with only a single corps.

Finally, commanders cannot allow emotion to color their decision to conduct or continue UO. The failure of 6th Armored Division to seize Brest rapidly caused some commanders to believe that Brest had to be captured because the prestige of the Army was committed to the battle. Costs of the continuing combat

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operations to seize Brest were significant. These resources might have been better committed elsewhere in the theater.

6-7. Tactical tempo is also important in urban combat. Because of the complex terrain, defending forces can rapidly occupy and defend from a position of strength. Once Army forces initiate tactical offensive operations, they cannot allow the threat to set the tempo of the operation. Instead, attacking forces seek to maintain a high tempo of operations. However, the tactical tempo of urban operations differs from operations in other terrain. Not necessarily slow, it requires a careful balance of preparation, speed, and security. In terms of unit fatigue, resource consumption, and contact with the threat, the tempo of most urban offensive operations may be rated as very high. On the other hand, in distances traveled and time consumed to achieve objectives, the tempo of many urban offensive operations might be rated as slow. The urban battlefield's density concentrates activity and consumes resources in a relatively small area. The lack of terrain seized or secured is not to be construed to mean a low tempo in the battle. In reality, the natural tempo of urban operations is not faster or slower than other types of operations, merely different. A higher tempo of operations, however, can favor forces which are better led, trained, prepared, and resourced.

6-8. A high tactical tempo in urban offensive operations challenges logisticians to provide for the increased consumption of munitions and degrades soldiers' physical capabilities. Commanders anticipate these challenges and develop the means and abilities to overcome them. In the past, these challenges forced commanders to conduct urban offensives cyclically. They used night and other periods of limited visibility to resupply, rest, and refit forces. The environment influenced the tempo of their operations. This type of "battle rhythm" resulted in the forces spending each new day attacking a rested threat that was in a well-prepared position.

6-9. Army forces must maintain the tempo. Offensive operations continue even during darkness. Moreover, Army forces increase the tempo of operations at night to leverage the limited visibility capabilities, increased situational understanding, training, and INFOSYS that give an advantage to Army forces in all environments. To overcome the physical impact of the environment on soldiers, commanders retain a large reserve to rotate, continuing offensive operations at night. The force that fights in daylight becomes the reserve, rests, and conducts sustaining operations while another force fights at night. Army forces can then maintain the tempo of operations and leverage technological advantages in urban offensive combat.

6-10. Tempo in UO does not necessarily mean speed. Offensive operations balance speed, security, and adequate firepower. Commanders plan for the complex tactical environment and the requirements to secure flanks and airspace as the operation progresses. Mission orders allow subordinate units to make the most of tactical advantages and fleeting opportunities.

AUDACITY

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6-11. Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Superb execution and calculated risk exemplify it. In an urban attack, a thorough assessment of the physical terrain can mitigate risk. The terrain's complexity can be studied to reveal advantages to the attacker. Audacity can also be embodied in an operation by inventively integrating the direct action tasks of SOF throughout the operation. Combining SOF actions with conventional attacks can asymmetrically unhinge a defensive plan.

URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

6-12. Urban offensive operations, like all operations, are framed in the overall doctrinal framework of sustaining, shaping, and decisive operations. Each operation is essential to the success of an urban offensive, and usually two or more of these operations occur simultaneously. Sustaining operations in urban offensive operations ensure freedom of action. They occur throughout the area of operations (AO) and for the duration of the operation. Shaping operations in urban offensive operations create the conditions for decisive operations. In UO, much of the shaping effort focuses on isolation, which is critical in both major operations and tactical battles and engagements. Decisive operations are attacks that conclusively determine the outcome of UO. These attacks strike at a series of decisive points and directly lead to neutralizing the threat's center of gravity.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

6-13. Commanders conducting urban offensive operations ensure security of the sustaining operation and bases; in many situations, sustaining operations may be the greatest vulnerability of the attacking force. Those supporting an urban offensive are tailored to the urban environment and are well forward. Ideally, the supporting forces closely follow the combat forces and move within or just outside the urban area as soon as they secure an area. Operating in the urban area during offensive operations allows the sustaining operation to take advantage of the defensive attributes of the environment for security purposes.

6-14. Counterattacks against sustaining operations may take the form of special operations activities aimed at lines of communications (LOCs) leading to or within the urban area. Choke points—such as bridges, tunnels, and mountain passes—are vulnerable to these attacks and may require combat forces to protect them. Threat forces attack the LOC to blunt the Army's combat power advantage in the urban area.

6-15. Attacks against the LOC into the urban area may also attempt to isolate the attacking Army forces from its sustainment base. Isolated forces in an urban area are greatly disadvantaged. Commanders plan and aggressively execute strong measures to protect their LOC, even if it requires reduced combat power to execute their offensive operation.

6-16. Sustaining operations anticipate the volume and unique logistics requirements of urban operations. Specialized individual equipment—such as grappling hooks, ladders, and pads—is identified and provided to troops in

quantity before they are needed. Forces stockpile and distribute their attacking units' special munitions requirements including small arms, explosives, and grenades of all types, precision artillery munitions, and mortar ammunition. Forces also supply transport to move the resources rapidly forward, both to and through the urban environment. Sustaining operations cannot rely on "operational pauses" to execute their tasks. Commanders plan to continuously supply resources and capabilities to the most forward combatants as offensive operations advance.

6-17. Sustaining operations also anticipate the growth of sustainment requirements as Army forces secure and take responsibility for large portions of the urban area. The success of Army urban offensive operations will often uncover the civil population in former threat occupied areas. It may attract the civil population from sections of the urban area where the Army is not operating to areas occupied by Army forces. Rural populations may migrate to the urban area as the result of successful Army offensive operations.

6-18. Army forces may be required to take initial responsibility to provide for the urban population. This consideration is integrated into logistics planning and organization from the start of the planning process. To be successful and efficient in such a situation, logistics planning includes Army civil affairs (CA) specialists and local government representatives. It also integrates and consults with the international community and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that might augment or supplement Army logistics capabilities.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

6-19. Shaping operations that support the urban attack separate into those focused on isolating the threat and all others. Army forces isolate the threat to ensure successful urban offensive operations. Depending on the threat reaction to isolation efforts and the nature of the threat center of gravity, this task may become decisive. Other shaping operations include those common to all offensive operations and others unique to urban operations. Unique urban shaping operations may include securing a foothold in a well-fortified defensive sector, securing key infrastructure, or protecting noncombatants. Because of the nature of UO, shaping operations may

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Chapter 7

Urban Defensive Operations

³⁰Generally, a modern city magnifies the power of the defender and robs the attacker of his advantages in firepower and mobility. A city can ingest an invading army, paralyze it for weeks on end, and grind it down to a state of ineffectiveness.

"Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain:
The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, at Aachen, October 1944"

The skillful defense of an urban area can decisively affect a campaign. The urban area offers many advantages to defending forces. An adroit defender can use the advantages of the urban environment to negate combat power disparities, blunt the tempo of an attack, attrit threat forces, and sap the morale of attacking troops. The defender gains an opportunity to concentrate resources, reconstitute attrited units, and transition to the offense. A successful defense of an urban area can also deny the threat vital resources. Defense in the urban environment is an essential Army capability and can significantly affect the outcome of entire campaigns and the achievement of national objectives.

Contents	
Purpose of Urban Defensive Operations	Types of Urban Defense
Characteristics of Urban Defensive Operations	Area Defense
Preparation	Mobile Defense
Security	Retrograde
Disruption	Urban Defensive Considerations
Massing Effects	Assess
Flexibility	Shape
Urban Defensive Operations and	Dominate
Battlefield Organization	Transition

PURPOSE OF URBAN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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7-1. Army forces defend urban areas for various reasons: defeating a threat attack, buying time, economizing forces, protecting an ally's political institutions and economic infrastructure, protecting an urban population, shaping conditions for decisive offensive operations, and shaping conditions for executing stability operations or support operations. During force projection operations, urban areas may be used as initial lodgment areas that Army commanders may need to defend at the outset until they build sufficient combat power. Usually two or more of these purposes apply to the urban defense. Urban defensive operations provide commanders great opportunities to turn the environment's characteristics to the advantage of Army forces. Urban areas are ideal for defensive operations and

greatly enhance the combat power of defending units.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7-2. There are five general characteristics of the successful defense: preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility. All apply to the successful urban defense and to the higher commander supporting a subordinate defending in the urban area.

PREPARATION

7-3. The urban area suits the defense since the area's physical characteristics naturally enhance the combat power of defending units. These characteristics include protection, obstacles, and concealment. Urban terrain provides superb defensive positions with minimum preparation. With deliberate preparation, urban defensive positions can rapidly become strong points.

7-4. One primary characteristic of urban terrain that enhances the defense is protection. With little or no advance preparation, buildings, subsurface structures, and walls protect soldiers from direct and indirect fire, interdict indirect fire, limit observation, and limit engagement ranges. Nearly all buildings provide some ballistic protection from direct and indirect fire. Mason and stone buildings with basements and cellars can protect soldiers from most fires except the largest caliber or tonnage bomb. Minimal additional preparation turns them into formidable, defensive strong points.

7-5. Buildings in urban areas, because of their height and close proximity, also can protect soldiers by masking them from indirect fire. The height of a building may interdict the flight path of an artillery round, rocket, missile, or bomb at a point short of the intended target. Masking protects static defending forces and protects forces moving along routes bordered with tall buildings that form urban "canyons". These protected routes can be used for logistics, counterattacks, and maneuver.

7-6. Structurally significant buildings in an urban area can create major obstacles to maneuver. These obstacles immediately canalize maneuver into existing streets and routes without any preparation by the defense. These obstacles then become kill zones for well-positioned and sited defensive forces. Minimal obstacle construction as point obstacles blocking streets and routes can further restrict the maneuver options of the attacking force. Rubble from structures collapsing into streets after fires (intentional or unintentional) can also block routes.

7-7. Buildings also conceal the location, disposition, and intent of the defense. They limit visual observation to the external perimeter of the urban area. They degrade radar and electronic position identifiers and decrease the utility of overhead imagery. The physical aspect of the urban environment greatly enhances the defense by degrading the opposition's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Buildings can conceal static defensive positions and the maneuver of defensive forces in the urban area. Although the environment

constrains defensive mobility in much the same manner as offensive mobility, the defense has the time and opportunity to conduct careful reconnaissance and select and prepare routes. This gives the defender the ability to move reserves, maneuver counterattack forces, and plan logistics without observation. Careful preparation provides the defense a mobility advantage over attacking forces.

SECURITY

7-8. The urban area can be an advantage or a disadvantage to the security of defending forces. This largely depends on the nature of the human dimension of the environment. If the population is evacuated or allied with Army forces, then the environment may assist in the security of defending Army forces. However, if the population is present and hostile, then the environment may make security difficult.

7-9. The physical aspects of the urban environment, uninfluenced by the human dimension, may assist in the security of defending Army forces. The combat power of small security force

Chapter 8

Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations

³⁴The Rangers were bound by strict rules of engagement. They were to shoot only at someone who pointed a weapon at them, but already this was unrealistic. It was clear they were being shot at, and down the street they could see Somalis with guns. But those guns were intermingled with the unarmed, including women and children. The Somalis were strange that way. Most noncombatants who heard gunshots and explosions would flee. Whenever there was a disturbance in Mogadishu, people would throng to the spot. . . . Rangers peering down their sights silently begged the gawkers to get the hell out of the way.

Black Hawk Down

The fundamental shared aims between stability operations and support operations and any operation conducted in an urban environment are the increased significance and influence of the civil population and nonmilitary organizations. Often, no military victory is to be achieved. The center of gravity for these operations normally cannot be attacked through military means alone; the Army (and the military in general) is often but one tool supporting a larger, civil-focused effort. Without a tightly coordinated civil-military effort, success will be difficult or impossible to achieve. Commanders who can understand and cope with the complexities of stability operations and support operations gain insights that directly apply to executing any urban operation. Urban stability operations and support operations may complement urban offensive and defensive operations, or may dominate the overall operation. Army forces may need to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend themselves or destroy urban threats seeking to prevent the decisive stability or support mission. During hostilities, urban stability operations may keep armed conflict from spreading, encourage coalition and alliance partners, and secure the civilian population's support in unstable urban areas (and the surrounding rural areas under their influence). Following hostilities, urban stability operations may provide a secure environment for civil authorities to rebuild. Urban support operations can range from transporting, feeding, and sheltering the population made homeless as a result of combat operations or natural disasters to providing medical care during urban counterinsurgency operations.

Contents	
Purpose of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations	Types and Forms of Stability Operations and Support Operations
Characteristics of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations	Stability Operations
Urban Stability Operations, Support Operations, and Battlefield Organization	Support Operations
Decisive Operations	Considerations of Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations
Shaping Operations	Assess
Sustaining Operations	Shape
	Dominate
	Transition

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PURPOSE OF URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-1. Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, strengthen democratic processes, retain United States (US) influence or access abroad, assist US civil authorities, and support moral and legal imperatives. Stability operations promote and sustain regional and global stability. In contrast, support operations meet the urgent needs of designated groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks without military assistance. Nearly every urban operation will involve some type or form of stability operation or support operation combined and sequenced with offensive and defensive operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-2. Worldwide urbanization, migration trends from rural to urban areas, and more centralized populations in urban areas increase the chance that Army forces will conduct stability operations and support operations in or near urban areas. Simply put, many people live in urban areas, and their welfare will be the primary reason for conducting these operations. Urban areas that serve as economic and government centers (the ideal location for US and allied embassies) are often the focal point for many threat activities.

- Long or Short Duration
- Unilateral or Multinational
- Domestic or Foreign
- Joint and Interagency
- Increased Civil-Military and Legal Considerations
- Greater Potential for Ambiguity
- Increased Constraints Necessitating More Restrictive ROE
- Amplified Need for Cultural and Political Sensitivity

Figure 8-1. Characteristics of Stability Operations and Support Operations

Therefore, Army forces may need to conduct stability operations in these cities to counter those threats. Additionally, urban areas may contain the resources and infrastructure to support both types of operations, regardless of whether the overall focus is in urban or rural areas. Repairing or restoring the infrastructure may be a critical task in accomplishing a support mission. Supported governmental and nongovernmental agencies are not as logistically self-sufficient as the Army. As such, these agencies may need to center their operations in and around urban areas to use the area's infrastructure to support themselves and their objectives. These agencies may require military protection to accomplish their missions. Figure 8-1 lists some defining characteristics of these wide-ranging operations.

8-3. Stability operations and support operations are diverse, varied in duration, unilateral or multinational, and domestic or foreign. Like all urban operations (UO), they are usually joint. Unlike urban offensive and defensive operations, they are more often interagency operations and require more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). The multiplicity of actors involved usually increases the scope and scale of required coordination and communication. In urban stability operations or support operations, adverse conditions arising from natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions—such as human suffering, disease, violations of human rights, or privation—will significantly modify the urban

environment. Unresolved political issues and tenuous agreements, difficulties discriminating combatants from noncombatants or between parties of a dispute, and the absence of basic law and order all serve to complicate an already complex and uncertain environment. Civil-military and legal considerations take on added significance in all urban operations (see Civil-Military Operations and Legal Support in Chapter 9), but even more so in urban stability operations and support operations. Finally, recognizing and achieving the desired end state is often more difficult than in offensive and defensive operations.

8-4. Overall, commanders of major operations involving urban stability operations and support operations do not expect clear guidance. They learn, adapt, and live with ambiguity. They cannot expect to operate in a political vacuum (even commanders at the tactical level) and do not expect an easily identifiable enemy located across a clearly demarcated line. In fact in many peace operations, commanders and their soldiers resist the need to have an enemy—difficult at best when one side or another (or both) may be sniping at them. They also expect changing and additional missions and tasks, without being allowed to use every means at their disposal to carry out those missions. Many tasks required may be ones for which their units have never, or rarely, trained. Finally, commanders expect to show restraint with a keen sensitivity to political considerations and to alien cultures, either or both of which they might find confusing or even repugnant.

URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS, SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AND BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

8-5. Each type of urban stability operation or support operation is distinct. These operations differ even more when applied to a specific urban area. Due to the complexity of the environment, commanders carefully arrange their forces and operations according to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission. In most UO the terrain, the dense population (military and civilian), and the participating organizations will further complicate this arrangement.

DECISIVE OPERATIONS

8-6. In urban stability operations, decisive operations may take many years and include multiple actions before achieving the desired end state. This particularly applies to the strategic and operational levels. Oppositely, decisive operations involved in an urban support operation for mitigating or reducing disease, hunger, privation, and the effects of disasters normally achieve faster results. However, an operation that attacks the underlying cause and seeks to prevent or relieve such conditions is more a stability operation than a support operation and will usually take longer. In urban areas, establishing law and order to protect critical infrastructure and the inhabitants from lawlessness and violence is often critical and often the decisive operation.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

DODDOA-004469

8-7. Shaping operations establish and maintain the conditions for executing

decisive operations. In urban stability operations and support operations, shaping operations always include information operations (IO) that influence perceptions and maintain legitimacy. Often, various participants, and their potentially divergent missions and methods, are involved. Army commanders coordinate their planning and efforts (early and continuously) to ensure that their decisive, shaping, or sustaining operations are not working against other agencies' efforts and operations—agencies that may have the lead role in the operation. Thus, a critical shaping operation may be to establish the coordination to help develop a common purpose and direction among agencies. In some instances and with some organizations and agencies, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), genuine unity of effort may not be achievable; however, recognizing the differences in aims and goals will allow Army commanders to conduct operations with less friction. Commanders include NGOs and appropriate governmental agencies in mission readiness exercises or any other training for stability operations or support operations.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

8-8. Sustaining operations enable decisive and shaping operations and include combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. Sustainment bases, especially those located in urban areas, become an attractive target for hostile civilians; therefore, commanders actively and aggressively protect these bases as well as lines of communications (see [Chapter 9](#)).

TYPES AND FORMS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-9. Figure 8-2 defines stability operations and support operations and lists their subordinate types and forms. If necessary, commanders can refer to [FM 3-07](#) to develop a more detailed understanding of the specifics of these diverse operations.

DODDOA-004470

	Definition	Types or Forms
Stability	Operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace Operations • Foreign Internal Defense • Security Assistance • Support to Insurgencies • Humanitarian and Civic Assistance • Support to Counterdrug Operations • Combatting Terrorism • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations • Arms Control • Show of Force
Support	Operations that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic Support Operations • Foreign Humanitarian Assistance <p style="text-align: center;">Forms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief Operations • Support to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management • Support to Civil Law Enforcement • Community Assistance

Figure 8-2. Urban Stability Operations and Support Operations

STABILITY OPERATIONS

8-10. Urban areas will be decisive to accomplishing many types of stability operations because urban areas are the centers of population, culture, economy, and government. Much of the support provided by Army forces will aim to assist local, regional, or national governments. Their location (urban areas) will, by necessity, be a dominating factor in accomplishing the mission. As importantly, many stability operations—enforcing peace in Bosnia for example—will require interacting, influencing, controlling, or protecting all or parts of the civilian population. Assessing, understanding, and gaining the support of civilians in key economic, cultural, or political urban areas may influence surrounding regions (smaller urban areas and the rural countryside) and may be decisive to achieving stability objectives. Finally, the support and assistance that Army forces will provide is only temporary although often of long duration. Commanders execute operations with that thought always in mind. Eventually, the government and administration secure and support their population by themselves.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS

DODDOA-004471

8-11. Support operations consist of domestic support and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. They can occur in a foreign urban environment as a result of military operations affecting the infrastructure or from a natural disaster, such as an earthquake. Support operations can also occur domestically when a natural or man-made emergency overwhelms local resources. Such a situation could result from a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident, hurricane, flood, or civil disturbance in a domestic urban area.

8-12. CBRNE incidents are disastrous. In urban areas, the potential for catastrophic loss of life and property is enormous. The Army categorizes CBRNE incidents separately from other natural and man-made disasters because it has specific expertise with these weapons. CBRNE incidents usually result from a military or terrorist threat (adding a law enforcement dimension to the disaster).

8-13. Subways and other subsurface areas offer ideal areas for limited chemical or biological attacks. Nuclear attack (and high-yield explosives) can produce tragic results due to the effects of collapsing structures, flying debris, and fires. Dispersion patterns are affected by the urban terrain and are more difficult to predict and monitor. Large-scale incidents may produce hundreds of thousands of casualties, but even a limited attack may require evacuating and screening large numbers of civilians. Requirements for medical support, basic life support, and, if necessary, decontamination may quickly overwhelm the Army force's capabilities even with augmentation.

8-14. Panic and disorder may accompany the event. Fleeing civilians may clog elements of the transportation and distribution infrastructure. Physical destruction may also affect other components of the infrastructure of critical and immediate concern, such as energy and administration and human services (water, sanitation, medical, fire fighting, and law enforcement). Because all elements of the infrastructure may be affected, the overall recovery time may be lengthened and the effects broadened to include much of the surrounding area. The effects of a single urban CBRNE event potentially could be felt nationally or globally.

CONSIDERATIONS OF URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-15. The urban operational framework (assess, shape, dominate, and transition) provides a structure for developing considerations unique to urban stability operations and support operations. Many considerations presented in urban offensive and defensive operations apply to urban stability operations and support operations, particularly those that address how to assess the urban and overall operational environment. Because the situations in which stability operations and support operations normally occur share strong similarities with any urban environment, many of these considerations are closely linked to the urban fundamentals presented in Chapter 5. Taken together, commanders will often find them useful in conducting UO throughout the full range of operations and across the spectrum of conflict. Appendix C has a historical example of how to apply the urban operational framework to support operations and stability operations.

35

In wars of intervention the essentials are to secure a general who is both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interests.

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri,
Baron de Jomini

ASSESS

DODDOA-004472

8-16. In urban stability operations and support operations, commanders carefully assess the political dimension of the operational environment, as well as their role and the media's part in managing information. These operations are inherently tied to the exercise of diplomatic power. All operations in urban areas are often the focus of the media and thus gain considerable public and political attention. Therefore, military objectives in urban stability operations

DODDOA-004473

Chapter 9

Urban Combat Service Support

³⁹Even supply is different. While deliveries do not need to be made over great distances, soft vehicles are extremely vulnerable in an environment where it is hard to define a front line and where the enemy can repeatedly emerge in the rear. All soldiers will be fighters, and force and resource protection will be physically and psychologically draining. Urban environments can upset traditional balances between classes of supply. . . . [a] force may find itself required to feed an urban population, or to supply epidemic-control efforts. . . . [a]ll combat service support troops are more apt to find themselves shooting back during an urban battle than in any other combat environment.

Ralph Peters
 "Our Soldiers, Their Cities"

Combat service support (CSS) capabilities exist to enable the Army to initiate and sustain full spectrum operations. CSS is a major component of sustaining operations and provides the means for commanders to build and maintain combat power. Sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations. In offensive and defensive operations, they are not by themselves likely to be decisive or shaping; however, they contribute to those operations. In some stability operations and most support operations, when the critical objectives may be restoring the infrastructure and the welfare of civilians, CSS forces can often be the decisive element. Their success will allow Army forces to *dominate* this complex environment. However, like all urban operations (UO), CSS operations affect and are affected by the environment. The urban terrain, infrastructure, and existing resources, coupled with supportive civilians, may facilitate CSS operations. In contrast, a poorly designed or damaged infrastructure and a hostile population may severely hamper CSS operations. In the latter case, critical Army resources required elsewhere in the area of operations (AO) may be diverted to repair facilities and control and support the inhabitants of the urban areas.

Contents	
Urban CSS Characteristics	Maintenance
Responsiveness and Sustainability	Transportation
Economy and Attainability	Combat Health Support
Survivability	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support
Simplicity	Human Resources Support
Integration	Financial Management Operations
Flexibility	Religious Support
Logistics Preparation of the Theater	Legal Support
Support to IPB	Band Support
Urban Logistic Information	General Engineer Support
Potential Restrictions	The Use or Investment of Resources
Urban Societal Considerations	Fire Fighting Support

DODDOA-004474

Support Areas	Waste Management
Overall Assessment	Civil-Military Operations
CSS Functions	Civil Affairs
Supply	Assessment of Civil Considerations
Field Services	

URBAN CSS CHARACTERISTICS

9-1. CSS characteristics (see Figure 9-1) guide prudent logistic planning regardless of the environment. They provide commanders an excellent framework to analyze and develop urban logistic requirements, assess the impact of the environment on the provision of CSS, and gauge the effectiveness of urban CSS support.




Figure 9-1. CSS Characteristics

RESPONSIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

9-2. UO require responsiveness and sustainability to establish and maintain the tempo necessary for success. Responsiveness—providing the right support in the right place at the right time—is the essential CSS characteristic. It requires that CSS commanders and planners accurately forecast urban operational requirements. Continuous urban operations will drain personnel, equipment, and supplies (based on history, this can be more than five times that experienced in other environments). Therefore, sustainability—the ability to maintain continuous support throughout all phases of the operation—will be a significant concern. Anticipation is critical to both responsiveness and sustainability. It requires that CSS commanders and planners comprehend the potential effects that the components of the urban environment (terrain, infrastructure, and society) may have on operations and CSS, either benefiting or impeding UO. Effective urban operational and logistic planning cannot be accomplished separately. Operational and CSS planners, as well as CSS operators, are closely linked to aid in synchronizing and attaining responsiveness and sustainability.

ECONOMY AND ATTAINABILITY

DODDOA-004475

9-3. A thoughtful assessment and understanding of the urban environment can also help determine how specific urban areas can contribute to or frustrate the

achievement of economy and attainability. Economy is providing the most efficient support at the least cost to accomplish the mission. Attainability means generating the minimum essential supplies and services necessary to begin operations. If available, obtaining support in the AO costs less than purchasing the supplies outside the area and then transporting them there. Critical resources may be available in urban areas to support the operation. However, relying on sources outside the established military logistic system may create conflict with other CSS characteristics. A strike by longshoremen, for example, may shut down port operations (at least temporarily) lowering responsiveness and sustainability.

SURVIVABILITY

9-4. Survivability is being able to protect support functions from destruction or degradation. Commanders often choose to locate CSS functions in an urban area because the buildings may better protect and conceal equipment, supplies, and people. Urban industrial areas are frequently chosen as support areas because they offer this protection as well as sizeable warehouses, large parking areas, and materials handling equipment (MHE). Such areas facilitate the storage and movement of equipment and supplies. They also provide readily available water, electricity, and other potentially useful urban resources and infrastructure. However, these areas may also contain toxic industrial materials (TIM) (see the discussion of industrial areas in Chapter 2). These materials and chemicals in close proximity to support areas may unjustifiably increase the risk to survivability, especially any CSS facilities located in subsurface areas (liquids and heavier gases often sink and accumulate in low-lying areas). Furthermore, CSS activities located in any type of confined urban areas can offer lucrative targets for terrorists or even angry crowds and mobs. Although host-nation support may include assets to assist in defending CSS units and lines of communications (LOCs), CSS commanders carefully consider if adequate protection measures can ensure survivability.

DODDOA-004476

Appendix A

**⁴⁵Siege of Beirut:
An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban Operations**

⁴⁶The IDF had neither the strategy nor the experience nor the configuration of forces to fight and sustain a house-to-house campaign in Beirut.

Richard A. Gabriel

Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon


Contents	
Overall Strategic Situation	Avoid the Attrition Approach
Israeli Military Position	Control the Essential and Preserve
PLO Military Position	Critical Infrastructure
Role of Civilians	Minimize Collateral Damage
Information Operations	Understand the Human Dimension
Conduct of Urban Operations	Separate Noncombatants from Combatants
Lessons	Restore Essential Services
Perform Focused Information Operations	Transition Control
Conduct Close Combat	Summary

OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION

DODDOA-004477

A-1. In 1982, Israel launched OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE designed to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in southern Lebanon. On 1 June, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a massive assault across the border into southern Lebanon. The Israeli attack focused on the PLO, but the operations quickly involved major ground and air combat between Israel and Syrian forces.

A-2. In the first few weeks, Israeli forces quickly pushed back both the Syrians and the PLO. However, except for some PLO forces isolated in bypassed urban areas, such as Tyre and Sidon, most of the PLO fell back into Beirut (see Figure A-1). By 30 June, Israeli forces had reached the outskirts of



southern Beirut, occupied East Beirut, isolated the city from Syria and the rest of Lebanon, and blockaded the sea approaches to the city. Even so, with most of the PLO intact inside and with significant military and political capability, the Israelis had yet to achieve the objective of OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE. The Israeli command had to make a decision. It had three choices: permit the PLO to operate in Beirut; execute a potentially costly assault of the PLO in the city; or lay siege to the city and use the siege to successfully achieve the objective. The Israelis opted for the latter.

ISRAELI MILITARY POSITION

A-3. The Israelis had an excellent position around Beirut. They occupied high ground to the south and west, virtually dominating the entire city. Israeli naval forces controlled the seaward approaches to Beirut. The Israelis' position was also strong defensively, capable of defeating any attempt to break out of or into the city from northern Lebanon or Syria. The Israeli air force had total and complete air superiority. The Israelis controlled the water, fuel, and food sources of West Beirut. Although the PLO forces had stockpiles of food and supplies, the Israelis regulated the food, water, and generating power for the civil population.

A-4. Despite the superior positioning of Israeli forces, the IDF faced significant challenges to include the combat power of the PLO, Syria, and other threats in Beirut. Israeli doctrine and training did not emphasize urban operations. Additionally, Israel was constrained by its desire to limit collateral damage and friendly and noncombatant casualties. Organizationally, the Israeli army was not optimized to fight in urban terrain. Armor and self-propelled artillery formations dominated the Israeli forces, and most Israeli infantry was mechanized. The Israeli forces had only a few elite formations of traditional dismounted infantry.

PLO MILITARY POSITION

DODDOA-004478

A-5. Despite being surrounded and cut off from support, the PLO position in Beirut offered numerous advantages in addition to the characteristic advantages of urban defense. The PLO had long anticipated an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon; it had had months to prepare bunkers, obstacles, and the defensive plan of Beirut and other urban areas. Approximately 14,000 Arab combatants in West Beirut readied to withstand the Israeli siege. This was done with the advice of Soviet, Syrian, and east European advisors. The preparation included stockpiling essential supplies in quantities sufficient to withstand a six-month siege. Also, the PLO fighters integrated into the civil populations of the urban areas. Often their families lived with them. The civil population itself was friendly and provided both information and concealment for PLO forces. PLO fighters were experienced in urban combat and knew the urban terrain intimately. PLO forces had been involved in urban fighting against Syrian conventional forces and Christian militias in Beirut several years prior to the Israeli invasion. Finally, the organization of the PLO centered on small teams of fighters armed with machine-

guns and antitank weapons, and trained in insurgent, hit-and-run tactics-was ideally suited to take maximum advantage of the urban environment.

ROLE OF CIVILIANS

A-6. Various ethnic and religious groups make up the civil population of southern Lebanon. However, West Beirut's population was heavily Palestinian and Lebanese. The civil population of West Beirut was between 350,000 and 500,000. The Palestinian population supported the PLO. The Lebanese population may be described as friendly neutral to the Israelis. Although unhappy under Palestinian dominance, this population was unwilling to actively support Israel. The civilian population was a logistic constraint on the PLO, which would have become significant had the siege lasted longer. The civilians in West Beirut were an even larger constraint on the Israelis. The presence of civilians significantly limited the ability of the Israelis to employ firepower. However, the Palestine refugee camps located in West Beirut were both civilian centers and military bases. The Israeli constraints on artillery and other systems against these parts of the city were much less restrictive than in other parts of West Beirut where the population was mostly Lebanese and where fewer key military targets existed.

A-7. The PLO knew of the Israeli aversion to causing civil casualties and purposely located key military centers, troop concentrations, and logistics and weapons systems in and amongst the population-particularly the refugee Palestinian population in the southern part of West Beirut. Tactically, they used the civilians to hide their forces and infiltrate Israeli positions.

A-8. The friendly Palestinian population provided intelligence to the PLO while the friendly Lebanese population provided intelligence for the IDF. Throughout the siege, the IDF maintained a policy of free passage out of Beirut for all civilians. This policy was strictly enforced and permitted no weapons to leave the city. Some estimates are that as many as 100,000 refugees took advantage of this policy.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

A-9. The siege of Beirut involved using information operations (IO) to influence the media. PLO information operations were aimed at controlling the media and hence the international perception of the operation. This was done by carefully cultivating a select group of pro-PLO media years before hostilities even began. Once hostilities started, only these media sources were permitted to report from the besieged portions of the city, and they were only shown activities that portrayed the IDF negatively. The IDF did not vigorously counter the PLO plan. In fact, the IDF contributed to it by limiting media access to their activities. The PLO information operations had a successful impact. The international community was constantly pressuring the Israeli government to end hostilities. This put pressure on the IDF to conduct operations rapidly and to limit firepower and casualties.

CONDUCT OF THE URBAN OPERATIONS

DODDOA-004479

A-10. The siege of Beirut began 1 July (see Figure A-2). By 4 July, Israeli forces occupied East Beirut, the Green Line separating East and West Beirut, and dominating positions south of the airport. IDF naval forces also controlled the sea west and north of Beirut. On 3 and 4 July, IDF artillery and naval fire began a regular campaign of firing on military targets throughout West Beirut. On 4 July, the IDF cut power and water to the city.





Figure A-2. Initial Conduct of the Urban Operation

A-11. From 5 to 13 July, the Israeli fires continued to pound PLO targets in West Beirut. The PLO gave one significant response, firing on an Israeli position south of the city and causing several casualties. On 7 July, reacting to international pressure, the IDF returned power and water to West Beirut's civil population. On 11 July, the IDF launched its first attack, probing the southern portion of the airport with an armored task force (see Figure A-3). The PLO repulsed this attack and destroyed several IDF armored vehicles.



DODDOA-004480

Figure A-3. Israeli Probe of PLO Defenses

A-12. On 13 July, both sides entered into a cease-fire that lasted until 21 July. They began negotiations, mediated by international community, to end the siege. The PLO used this period to continue to fortify Beirut. The Israelis used the time to train their infantry and other arms in urban small unit tactics in Damour, a town the Israeli paratroopers had captured.

A-13. The cease-fire ended on 21 July as PLO forces launched three attacks on IDF rear areas. The Israelis responded with renewed and even more vigorous artillery, naval, and air bombardment of PLO positions in the city. The IDF attacks went on without respite until 30 July. On 28 July, the IDF renewed its ground attack in the south around the airport (see Figure A-4). This time IDF forces methodically advanced and captured a few hundred meters of ground establishing a toehold.




Figure A-4. Initial Israeli Attack

A-14. The Israeli bombardment stopped On 31 July. However, on 1 August the IDF launched its first major ground attack, successfully seizing Beirut airport in the south (see Figure A-5). Israeli armored forces began massing on 2 August along the green line, simultaneously continuing the attack from the south to the outskirts of the Palestinian positions at Ouzai. On 3 August, the Israeli forces continued to reinforce both their southern attack forces and forces along the green line to prepare for continuing offensive operations. On 4 August, the IDF attacked at four different places. This was the much-anticipated major Israeli offensive.




Figure A-5. Final Israeli Attack

A-15. The Israeli attack successfully disrupted the coherence of the PLO defense. The southern attack was the most successful: it pushed PLO forces back to their camps of Sabra and Shatila and threatened to overrun PLO headquarters. Along the green line the IDF attacked across three crossing points. All three attacks made modest gains against stiff resistance. For this day's offensive, the Israelis suffered 19 killed and 84 wounded, the highest single day total of the siege, bringing the total to 318 killed. Following the major attacks on 4 August, Israeli forces paused and, for four days, consolidated t

DODDOA-004482

Appendix B

Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

⁴⁷Maneuvers that are possible and dispositions that are essential are indelibly written on the ground. Badly off, indeed, is the leader who is unable to read this writing. His lot must inevitably be one of blunder, defeat, and disaster.

Infantry in Battle


The complexity of the urban environment and increased number of variables (and their infinite combinations) increases the difficulty of conducting the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for urban operations (UO). Although more intricate, *the IPB process remains essential to the successful conduct of UO*. Conducted effectively, it allows commanders to develop the situational understanding necessary to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in successfully accomplishing the mission.

Contents	
Urbanization of IPB	Environmental Threats
Unaffected Process	Civilians
Increased Complexity	IPB Tools and Products
Amplified Importance of Civil (Societal) Considerations	Urban Imagery
Significant Characteristics	Three-Dimensional Representations
Multiple Overlaps	Infrastructure Blueprints
Urban Terrain and Weather	Hydrographic Surveys
Urban Society	Psychological Profiles
Urban Infrastructure	Matrices, Diagrams, or Charts
Threat Considerations	Various Urban Overlays

URBANIZATION OF IPB

DODDOA-004483

B-1. IPB is a systematic process for analyzing the environment and the threat in a specific geographic area—the area of operations (AO) and its associated area of interest. (The area of interest might include areas that are not contiguous with the AO.) It provides direction for the intelligence system, drives the military decisionmaking process, and supports targeting and battle damage assessment (see Figure B-1). The procedure (as well as each of its four steps) is performed continuously



throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of an urban operation.

UNAFFECTED PROCESS

B-2. The IPB process is useful at all echelons and remains constant regardless of operation or environment. However, urban IPB stresses some aspects not normally emphasized for IPBs conducted for operations elsewhere. The complex mosaic is comprised of the societal, cultural, or civil dimension of the urban environment; the overlapping and interdependent nature of the urban infrastructure; and the multidimensional terrain. This mosaic challenges the conduct of urban IPB. There is potential for the full range of Army operations to be executed near-simultaneously as part of a single major operation occurring in one urban area with the multiple transitions. Such precision stresses the importance of a thorough, non-stop IPB cycle aggressively led by the commander and executed by the entire staff. Overall, the art of applying IPB to UO is in properly applying the steps to the specific environment and threat. In UO, this translates to understanding and analyzing the significant characteristics of the environment and the role that its populace has in threat evaluation. FM 34-130 details how to conduct IPB; FM 34-3 has the processes and procedures for producing all-source intelligence. This appendix supplements the information found there; it does not replace it.

INCREASED COMPLEXITY

B-3. Uncovering intricate relationships takes time, careful analysis, and constant refinement to determine actual effects on friendly and threat courses of action (COAs). These relationships exist among—

- Urban population groups.
- The technical aspects of the infrastructure.
- The historical, cultural, political, or economic significance of the urban area in relation to surrounding urban and rural areas or the nation as a whole.
- The physical effects of the natural and man-made terrain.

A primary goal of any IPB is to accurately predict the threat's likely COA (step four—which may include political, social, religious, informational, economic, and military actions). Commanders then can develop their own COAs that maximize and apply combat power at decisive points. Understanding the decisive points in the urban operation allows commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.

Blurred Situational Understanding May Lead to Mission Failure

DODDOA-004484

B-4. Commanders and their staffs may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of the urban environment and more adept at thinking and planning in other environments. Therefore, without detailed situational understanding, commanders

may assign missions that their subordinate forces may not be able to achieve. As importantly, commanders and their staffs may miss critical opportunities because they *appear* overwhelming or impossible (and concede the initiative to the threat). They also may fail to anticipate potential threat COAs afforded by the distinctive urban environment. Commanders may fail to recognize that the least likely threat COA may be the one adopted precisely because it is least likely and, therefore, may be intended to maximize surprise. Misunderstanding the urban environment's effect on potential friendly and threat COAs may rapidly lead to mission failure and the unnecessary loss of soldiers' lives and other resources.

Training, Experience, and Functional Area Expertise

B-5. Not all information about the urban environment is relevant to the situation and mission—hence the difficulty. Although it may appear daunting, institutional education, unit training, and experience at conducting an urban IPB will improve the ability to rapidly sort through all the potential information to separate the relevant from merely informative. (This applies to any new or difficult task.) The involvement and expertise of the entire staff will allow commanders to quickly identify the important elements of the environment affecting their operations. Fortunately, IPB is a methodology comprehensive enough to manage the seemingly overwhelming amounts of information coming from many sources.

B-6. As in any operational environment, tension exists between the desire to be methodical and the need to create the tempo necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative necessary for decisive UO. Quickly defining the significant characteristics of the urban environment requiring in-depth evaluation (not only what we need to know but what is possible to know) allows rapid identification of intelligence gaps (what we know versus what we don't know). Such identification leads to priority information requirements (PIR) and will drive the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan (how will we get the information we need). FM 3-55 and Chapter 4 discuss ISR. Commanders carefully consider how to develop *focused* PIR to enable collectors to more easily weed relevant information from the plethora of information. Commanders can make better decisions and implement them faster than a threat can react.

AMPLIFIED IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL (SOCIETAL) CONSIDERATIONS

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B-7. The Army focuses on warfighting. The experiences in urban operations gained at lower echelons often center on the tactics of urban offensive and defensive operations where the influences of terrain and enemy frequently dominate. At higher echelons, the terrain and enemy are still essential considerations, but the societal component of the urban environment is more closely considered. Moreover, the human or civil considerations gain importance in support operations and stability operations regardless of the echelon or level of command. In addition to the echelon and the type of operation, a similar relationship exists between the key elements of the urban environment and other situational factors. These factors can include where the operation lies within the spectrum of conflict or the level of war and the conventional or unconventional nature of the opposing threat. Figure B-2 graphically represents the varying significance of these elements to urban IPB. Population effects are significant only

in how they affect the threat, Army forces, and overall mission accomplishment.

B-8. Describing the battlefield's effects—step two of the IPB—scribes meaning to the characteristics analyzed. It helps commanders understand how the environment enhances or degrades friendly and threat forces and capabilities. It also helps commanders understand how the environment supports the population. It also explains how *changes* in the "normal" urban environment (intentional or unintentional and because of threat or friendly activities) may affect the population. Included in this assessment are matters of perception. At each step of the IPB process, commanders try to determine the urban society's perceptions of ongoing activities to ensure Army operations are viewed as intended. Throughout this process, commanders, staffs, and analysts cannot allow their biases—cultural, organizational, personal, or cognitive—to markedly influence or alter their assessment (see FM 34-3). This particularly applies when they analyze the societal aspect of the urban environment. With so many potential groups and varied interests in such a limited area, misperception is always a risk.




Figure B-2. Relevance of Key Urban Environment Elements

SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

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B-9. For IPB to remain effective in UO, its analysis must include the urban environment's attributes—man-made terrain, society, and infrastructure—and an evaluation of characteristics traditionally included in IPB: the underlying natural terrain (to include weather) and the threat. Because the urban environment is so complex, it is useful to break it into categories. Then commanders can understand the intricacies of the environment that may affect their operations and assimilate this information into clear mental images. Commanders can then synthesize these images of the environment with the current status of friendly and threat forces and develop a desired end state. Then they can determine the most decisive sequence

of activities that will move their forces from the current state to the end state. Identifying and understanding the environment's characteristics (from a friendly, threat, and noncombatant perspective) allows commanders to establish and maintain situational understanding. Then they can develop appropriate COAs and rules of engagement that will lead to decisive mission accomplishment.

B-10. Figures B-3, B-4, and B-5 are not intended to be all-encompassing lists of urban characteristics. They provide a starting point or outline useful for conducting an urban IPB that can be modified to meet the commander's requirements. Commanders and staffs can compare the categories presented with those in the civil affairs area study and assessment format found in FM 41-10 and the IPB considerations for stability operations and support operations found in FM 34-7.

MULTIPLE OVERLAPS

B-11. Since the urban environment is comprised of a "system of systems," considerations among the key elements of the environment will overlap during urban IPB analysis. For example, boundaries, regions, or areas relate to a physical location on the ground. Hence, they have urban *terrain* implications. These boundaries, regions, or areas often stem from some historical, religious, political, or social aspect that could also be considered a characteristic of the urban *society*. Overlaps can also occur in a specific category, such as *infrastructure*. For instance, dams are a consideration for their potential effects on transportation and distribution (mobility), administration and human services (water supply), and energy (hydroelectric).

B-12. This overlap recognition is a critical concern for commanders and their staffs. In "taking apart" the urban environment and analyzing the pieces, commanders and staffs cannot lose perspective of how each piece interacts with any other and as part of the whole. Otherwise, their vision will be shortsighted, and they will fail to recognize the second- and third-order effects of their proposed COAs; the actual end state differing dramatically from the one envisioned by the commander. The increased density of combatants and noncombatants, infrastructure, and complex terrain means that a given action will likely have unintended consequences. Those consequences will be more widely felt and their impact will spread in less time than in other environments. These unintended results may have important strategic and operational consequences. The multiple ways these dynamic urban elements and characteristics combine make it necessary to approach each urban environment as a unique IPB challenge.

URBAN TERRAIN AND WEATHER

Terrain

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B-13. Earlier admonitions that civil considerations are more closely considered in UO do not necessarily mean that consideration for urban terrain is de-emphasized. In every urban operation, terrain and its effects on both threat and friendly forces is assessed and understood. Then commanders can quickly choose and exploit the

terrain (and weather conditions) that best supports their missions. Terrain analysis thoroughly assesses urban structures as well as the ground on which they stand (see Figure B-3 and FM 5-33). An analysis of urban terrain first considers broader urban characteristics and effects and progress to a more detailed examination.

<p>Forms and Functions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cores • Industrial areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic industrial material production and storage facilities • Standard signs and markings for toxic chemicals • Outlying high-rise areas • Residential areas and shantytowns • Commercial ribbon areas • Forts and military bases <p>Broad Urban Patterns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satellite • Network • Linear • Segment • Dominant or central hub (if any) • Area covered (square miles) <p>Street Patterns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radial • Grid • Irregular (planned and unplanned) • Variations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rayed • Radial-Ring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contour-forming • Combined • Widths <p>Construction and Placement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mass or framed • Light or heavy clad • Material (dirt, wood, stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel, and glass) • Density and thickness (roofs, floors, and interior and exterior walls) • Load bearing walls and columns • Height (floors) • Doors, windows, fire escapes, and other openings • Interior floor plan (including crawl spaces, elevators, and stairs) • Placement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Random • Close-ordery block • Dispersed • Ownership <p>Military Aspects of Terrain: OAKOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observation and fields of fire <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smoke (fire), dust (explosions), and flying debris 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rubble • Engagement ranges (including minimum safe distances and backblast factors) and obliquity/angle (nicochets) • Elevation and depression considerations • Lasers and reflective concerns • Avenues of approach (mobility comdors) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airspace • Surface • Supersurface (intrasurface) • Subsurface • Key terrain <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landmarks • Buildings of significant cultural, social, political, or economic significance • Obstacles <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rubble and vehicles • Masking of fires • Burning buildings or other fire hazards • Rivers and lakes • Cover and concealment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building protection • Weapon penetration (single shot and multiple rounds) considerations • Rubble and vehicles
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Figure B-3. Significant Urban Characteristics

B-14. **Natural Terrain.** The natural terrain features beyond the urban area and beneath urban structures significantly influence unit operations. They dictate where buildings can be constructed, the slope and pattern of streets, and even the broad urban patterns that develop over longer periods of time, thereby influencing a unit's scheme of maneuver. The military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)—remain critical to the analysis of natural terrain in, under, and around urban areas. Fortunately, commanders and their staffs are accustomed to this type of analysis.

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⁴⁸ **Analysis of an Urban Area's Underlying Terrain
Mitrovica, Kosovo**

An urban area's underlying terrain provides many clues into its history, economy, society, and current situation. Mitrovica, Kosovo is an illustrative

example. The Ibar River creates a natural line of communications through the middle of the city as well as an obstacle that bisects the urban area. This bisection naturally divides the two resident ethnic groups: Albanians and Serbs. The separation became significant at both the strategic and tactical levels during 1999 deployments to Kosovo. Army forces had to ensure that the Orthodox Church located south of the Ibar was accessible to Serbs residing in the north. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeepers built a footbridge across the river that allowed reliable, safe passage. The natural feature separating the two groups assisted NATO troops in maintaining stability in the region.

B-15. Man-Made Terrain. Building composition, frontages, placement, forms and functions, size, floor plans, and window and door locations affect maneuver, force positioning, and weapons deployment considerations. Angles, displacement, surface reflection, and antenna locations influence command and control. Structures also influence ISR operations. The increased density and volume created by man-made structures increase how much information commanders and their staffs collect and assess as well as the number of forces required. Building materials and construction will also influence force structures to include weapons and equipment required. The ability to maneuver through the urban dimensions—airspace, supersurface (including intrasurface), surface, and subsurface—and shoot through walls, ceilings, and floors also creates increased psychological stress. The characteristics of man-made terrain can also be analyzed using OAKOC.

Weather

B-16. Weather and its effects are often considered when examining the military aspects of terrain. Military aspects of weather include temperature (heat and cold), light conditions, precipitation (cloud cover, rain, snow, fog, and smog), and wind. Their military effects during UO are similar to any operational environment (see FM 34-81 and FM 34-81-1). Extremes of heat and cold affect weapon systems and the soldiers that operate them. The extra luminescence provided by the ambient light of an urban area, unless controlled, may affect night vision capabilities and the ability of the Army to "own the night." Precipitation affects mobility and visibility. Smog inversion layers are common over cities. An inversion layer may trap smoke and chemicals in the air to the detriment of soldiers' health. (If the conditions are severe enough, it might require the use of protective masks.) Winds, which may increase as they are funneled through urban canyons, may—

- Increase other weather effects (wind chill, for example).
- Decrease visibility (blowing debris, sand, rain, and snow).
- Spread radiation, biological, and chemical hazards.
- Adversely affect low-altitude air mobility.

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However, commanders also analyze weather for its potential effect on civilians. Rain might create sewage overflow problems in refugee camps, increasing disease and even creating panic. (Rain and flooding may also make some subsurface areas impassable or extremely hazardous to military forces.) Other weather effects on UO can include—

- Heavy snowfall in an urban area that may paralyze area transportation and distribution infrastructure, hindering the urban administration's ability to provide vital human services (police, fire fighting, medical, and rescue). Heavy rains may have similar effects on poorly designed and constructed roads.
- Extreme hot and cold weather climates that increase the dependence (and military significance) of many elements of the infrastructure. For example, the energy infrastructure may be critical; without it, civilians may not be adequately cooled or heated.
- In urban areas located in tropical regions, it can rain at the same time each day during the wet season. Threat forces may attack during these periods knowing aircraft will have difficulty responding. Bad weather also reduces the effectiveness of surveillance, direct and indirect fire, and logistic support.
- Inclement weather may preclude demonstrations or rallies by threats. Good weather may mean a maximum turnout of civilians for events such as festivals, sporting events, and other social, cultural, or religious activities.
- Severe weather may affect psychological and civil-military operations. Heavy rains may disrupt leaflet drops, construction projects, and medical and veterinary assistance programs.

URBAN SOCIETY

B-17. This manual shows that societal considerations take on added importance. Critical to operational success is knowing which groups live in an urban area, what relationships exist among them, and how each population group will respond to friendly and threat activities. Often determining any of this is very difficult. Social and cultural understanding is also essential in helping commanders and their staffs to view the urban area as the residents view it. The demographics presented depict *what* conditions exist, while the other categories help to explain the root causes or *why* conditions exist (see Figure B-4). These other categories include health, history, leadership, ethnicity and culture, religion, and government and politics.

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<p>Population Demographics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General population size <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Village • Town • City • Metropolis • Megalopolis • Group size based on race, age, sex, political affiliation, economics, religion, tribe, clan, gang, criminal activities, or other significant grouping <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant US or allied populations • Distribution, densities, and physical boundaries and overlaps • Majority, minority, and dominant groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing or decreasing migration trends <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dislocated civilians • Nongovernmental organizations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local • National • International • Languages (distribution, dialects, relationship to social structure) • Educational levels and literacy rates • Crime rates • Birth and death rates • Labor statistics and considerations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled and unskilled • Imported and exported • Unemployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standard wages and per capita income • Workday and workweek norms <p style="text-align: center;">Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diseases • Nutritional deficiencies • Local standards of care • Pollution and environmental hazards (air, water, food, and soil) • Health workers (types, numbers, and degree of skill) <p style="text-align: center;">History</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General and for a specific group <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal or external • Recent conflicts
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Figure B-4. Significant Urban Societal Characteristics

<p>History (continued)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship with US, allies, and other participating multinational forces • Applicable international treaties • Status-of-forces agreements • Antagonists/protagonists • Heroes • Events, facts, and dates considered important or celebrated • Urban area's historical importance <p>Leadership and Prominent Personalities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affiliation (ethnic, religion, military, government, industry, criminal, or entertainment) • Education attained • Organization and distribution of power • Associations among different leaders and groups <p>Ethnicity and Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Values, moral codes, taboos, and insults (verbal and non-verbal) • Attitudes towards age, sex, and race (including same-sex interaction) • Role of the clan, tribe, or family • Biases between ethnic groups • Privacy and individuality • Recreation, entertainment, and humor • Fatalism or self-determination • Exchanges of gifts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displays of emotion • Lines of authority • Dating and marriage • Greetings, leave-takings, and gestures • Visiting practices • Alcohol and drug use • Important holidays, festivals, sporting, or entertainment events • Eating and dietary practices • Significance of animals and pets • Urban-rural similarities and differences • Driving habits • Clothing <p>Religion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sects, divisions, and overlaps • Religious biases and problems • Relationship and influence on government, politics, economics, and education • Impact on ethnic and cultural beliefs • Key events or celebrations (daily, weekly, monthly, or annually) • Funeral and burial practices <p>Government and Politics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Present and past forms • Organization and powers (executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative divisions) • Scheduled elections and historical turnouts • Degree of control over the population <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Border-crossing procedures • Relationship with US or multinational governments, national governments, and criminal elements • Political factions and boundaries • Political traditions • Grievances • Censorship • Nepotism and other clan, tribal, or social ties • Civil defense and disaster preparedness (organization, plans, training, equipment, and resources) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuation routes • Legal system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System of laws • Applicable treaties • Courts and tribunals • Procedures • Records (birth and deeds) • Property control • Monetary system (formal and informal) • Domestic and foreign trade <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taxation and tariffs • Customs requirements • Rationing and price controls • Economic performance and contribution to gross national product • Economic aid • Perception of relative deprivation • Trade unions • Competition with the black market and organized crime
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Figure B-4. Significant Urban Societal Characteristics (continued)

B-18. Aside from friendly and threat forces, the society is the only thinking component of the urban environment able to rapidly impact the urban operation. (Even people going about their daily routines can unwittingly hamper the mission.) Urban residents create conditions for restrictive rules of engagement, increase stress on soldiers and logistic capabilities, and confuse threat identification (see Threat Considerations in this appendix). Demographic, health, safety, ethnic, and cultural concerns will be essential considerations in most UO. Other situational factors—the mission, enemy, and time available—dictate the balance between the level of detail and analysis to support the overall urban operation with the level of detail that commanders and their staffs can achieve. However, an IPB that fails to devote enough time and resources to societal analysis can find large elements of the population turned against the Army force. Analyzing the urban society first may help to focus or limit further analysis of the terrain and infrastructure, saving time and ISR resources.

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URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

B-19. Functional and analytical overlap readily appears when examining urban infrastructures (see Figure B-5). They are composed of physical structures or facilities and people. Hence, much of the analysis conducted for terrain and society can apply when assessing the urban infrastructure. For example, commanders, staffs, and analysts could not effectively assess the urban economic and commercial infrastructure without simultaneously considering labor. All aspects of the society relate and can be used to further analyze the urban work force since they are a subelement of the urban society. Similarly, the OAKOC aspects used to evaluate terrain may also apply to the urban infrastructure, especially considerations of key terrain.

<p style="text-align: center;">Transportation and Distribution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shipyards and other port and harbor facilities • Inland waterways, canals, and locks • Offshore pipeline berths • Cargo storage and handling • Types and number of ships, boats, and ferries • Dams • Streets and roads <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bridges and fords • Over- and underpasses • Raised embankments, tunnels, culverts, and other subterranean features (widths and clearances) • Parking areas (surface, subsurface, and supersurface) • Weight restrictions • Traffic light operations • Traffic patterns • Widths • Surface materials • Rail <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lines • Terminals • Switchyards and junctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subways, bridges, elevated rail lines, and underpasses (clearances) • Track gauges • Types and number of rolling stock • Electrification • Air <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airfields and runways (including capabilities) • Heliports and helipads (including rooftop) • Types and number of aircraft • Cargo storage and handling • Trucking companies and delivery services • Available material-handling equipment • Rush hour and market time considerations • Seasonal (weather) effects • Rubble effects • Impact of dislocated civilians and migration patterns • Likely population congregation points • Identifiable primary and alternate lines of communications 	<p style="text-align: center;">Economics and Commerce</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types and Locations • Important companies (including US or allied) • Military production facilities • Sources of raw materials • Use of toxic industrial materials and biological agents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture (insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers) • Manufacturing • Cleaning • Research • Food types, quantities, and sources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirements and availability • Storage and processing • Cleanliness standards • Stores, shops, restaurants, hotels, and strip malls • Recreation facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outdoor and amusement parks • Stadiums and other sports facilities • Machine shops • Brick and lumber yards • Banking and investment institutions
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Figure B-5. Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics

<p>Administration and Human Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police and fire protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Headquarters, station, and key facilities locations • Organization and strengths • Equipment • Functions, authority, and jurisdictional boundaries • Contract guard services • Welfare and public assistance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary assistance • Orphanages • Elderly care facilities • Water supply systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water sources and storage (lakes, reservoirs, cisterns, pools, and public baths) • Water treatment and quality • Pumping stations and other distribution methods (trucks, bottles) • Hydrant locations • Snow removal capabilities • Street light operations • Health facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hospitals • Emergency medical services • Mental institutions • Medical supplies and equipment • Research and pharmaceutical buildings • Blood banks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governmental buildings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies • Capitol building • Legislative, judicial, and ministry buildings • Hall of records • Cultural resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious buildings (churches and mosques) • Shrines, monuments, and other historical structures • Schools, museums, theaters, and libraries • Waste and sanitation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types (solid, sewage, and toxic) • Collection, processing, and disposal • Dumps or landfills • Drainage systems • Effects of military control measures on providing vital human services <p style="text-align: center;">Energy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electric • Oil • Coal • Natural gas • Nuclear • Solar • Hydroelectric • Geothermal • Facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production and processing • Storage • Distribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pipelines (above and below ground) • Power lines (overhead and underground) • Water, rail, and road <p style="text-align: center;">Potential hazards</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Communication and Information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Print media <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets • Billboards and posters • Postal facilities • Telephone facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wire or wireless • Facsimile machines • Telegraph facilities • Radio facilities • Police, fire, and rescue systems • Security systems • Television facilities • Computers and the Internet • Antennas, towers, relay stations, and lines (surface and subsurface) • Integration of space-based capabilities • Public forums and speech • Low-technology media (cars horns, drums, graffiti, and burning tires) • Key media organizations and reporters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local • International • US
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Figure B-5. Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics (continued)

THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

B-20. Chapter 3 outlines the instability and uncertainty of the strategic environment. Commanders and staffs, and analysts identify and analyze the threat in steps three and four of the IPB process. They analyze the threat's composition, strength, disposition, leadership, training, morale, weapons and capabilities, vulnerabilities, internal logistics and external support, doctrine (if any), strategy or modus operandi, and tactics. The threat can take a variety of forms:

- Conventional military forces.
- Paramilitary forces.
- Guerrillas and insurgents.
- Terrorists.
- Militia or special police organizations.

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B-21. A general study of guerrilla and insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures may prove beneficial to many types of operations regardless of the actual composition or type of threat forces. Insurgent strategies and tactics may work especially well in this complex environment and will likely be a part of any threat COA. Particularly, commanders understand how a threat might restrict itself by the laws of land warfare and similar conventions, or exploit the use of these conventions to its own gain. Commanders can refer to FM 31-20-3 for more information. For many of the above threats, no doctrinal templates may exist. Commanders, staffs, and analysts evaluate, update (or create), and manage threat databases early (and continuously) in the IPB process.

⁴⁹ . . . [T]he adversaries of freedom . . . send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. . . [S]ubversives and saboteurs and insurre-ctionists . . . [possess] the power to conscript talent and manpower for any purpose, . . . and long experience in the techniques of violence and subversion. . . It is a contest of will and purpose as well as force and violence—a battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory.

John F. Kennedy
Message to Congress, 27 April 1961

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

B-22. While threats vary, they share a common characteristic: the capability and intent to conduct violence against Army forces to negatively influence mission accomplishmen

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Source Notes

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Appendix A—Siege of Beirut: An Illustration of the Fundamentals of Urban Operations

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Appendix B—Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

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Appendix C—Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to Support and Stability

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Appendix B

Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

⁴⁷Maneuvers that are possible and dispositions that are essential are indelibly written on the ground. Badly off, indeed, is the leader who is unable to read this writing. His lot must inevitably be one of blunder, defeat, and disaster.

Infantry in Battle


The complexity of the urban environment and increased number of variables (and their infinite combinations) increases the difficulty of conducting the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for urban operations (UO). Although more intricate, *the IPB process remains essential to the successful conduct of UO*. Conducted effectively, it allows commanders to develop the situational understanding necessary to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in successfully accomplishing the mission.

Contents	
Urbanization of IPB	Environmental Threats
Unaffected Process	Civilians
Increased Complexity	IPB Tools and Products
Amplified Importance of Civil (Societal) Considerations	Urban Imagery
Significant Characteristics	Three-Dimensional Representations
Multiple Overlaps	Infrastructure Blueprints
Urban Terrain and Weather	Hydrographic Surveys
Urban Society	Psychological Profiles
Urban Infrastructure	Matrices, Diagrams, or Charts
Threat Considerations	Various Urban Overlays

URBANIZATION OF IPB

DODDOA-004501

B-1. IPB is a systematic process for analyzing the environment and the threat in a specific geographic area—the area of operations (AO) and its associated area of interest. (The area of interest might include areas that are not contiguous with the AO.) It provides direction for the intelligence system, drives the military decisionmaking process, and supports targeting and battle damage assessment (see Figure B-1). The procedure (as well as each of its four steps) is performed continuously



throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of an urban operation.

UNAFFECTED PROCESS

B-2. The IPB process is useful at all echelons and remains constant regardless of operation or environment. However, urban IPB stresses some aspects not normally emphasized for IPBs conducted for operations elsewhere. The complex mosaic is comprised of the societal, cultural, or civil dimension of the urban environment; the overlapping and interdependent nature of the urban infrastructure; and the multidimensional terrain. This mosaic challenges the conduct of urban IPB. There is potential for the full range of Army operations to be executed near-simultaneously as part of a single major operation occurring in one urban area with the multiple transitions. Such precision stresses the importance of a thorough, non-stop IPB cycle aggressively led by the commander and executed by the entire staff. Overall, the art of applying IPB to UO is in properly applying the steps to the specific environment and threat. In UO, this translates to understanding and analyzing the significant characteristics of the environment and the role that its populace has in threat evaluation. FM 34-130 details how to conduct IPB; FM 34-3 has the processes and procedures for producing all-source intelligence. This appendix supplements the information found there; it does not replace it.

INCREASED COMPLEXITY

B-3. Uncovering intricate relationships takes time, careful analysis, and constant refinement to determine actual effects on friendly and threat courses of action (COAs). These relationships exist among—

- Urban population groups.
- The technical aspects of the infrastructure.
- The historical, cultural, political, or economic significance of the urban area in relation to surrounding urban and rural areas or the nation as a whole.
- The physical effects of the natural and man-made terrain.

A primary goal of any IPB is to accurately predict the threat's likely COA (step four—which may include political, social, religious, informational, economic, and military actions). Commanders then can develop their own COAs that maximize and apply combat power at decisive points. Understanding the decisive points in the urban operation allows commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable.

Blurred Situational Understanding May Lead to Mission Failure

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B-4. Commanders and their staffs may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of the urban environment and more adept at thinking and planning in other environments. Therefore, without detailed situational understanding, commanders

may assign missions that their subordinate forces may not be able to achieve. As importantly, commanders and their staffs may miss critical opportunities because they *appear* overwhelming or impossible (and concede the initiative to the threat). They also may fail to anticipate potential threat COAs afforded by the distinctive urban environment. Commanders may fail to recognize that the least likely threat COA may be the one adopted precisely because it is least likely and, therefore, may be intended to maximize surprise. Misunderstanding the urban environment's effect on potential friendly and threat COAs may rapidly lead to mission failure and the unnecessary loss of soldiers' lives and other resources.

Training, Experience, and Functional Area Expertise

B-5. Not all information about the urban environment is relevant to the situation and mission—hence the difficulty. Although it may appear daunting, institutional education, unit training, and experience at conducting an urban IPB will improve the ability to rapidly sort through all the potential information to separate the relevant from merely informative. (This applies to any new or difficult task.) The involvement and expertise of the entire staff will allow commanders to quickly identify the important elements of the environment affecting their operations. Fortunately, IPB is a methodology comprehensive enough to manage the seemingly overwhelming amounts of information coming from many sources.

B-6. As in any operational environment, tension exists between the desire to be methodical and the need to create the tempo necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative necessary for decisive UO. Quickly defining the significant characteristics of the urban environment requiring in-depth evaluation (not only what we need to know but what is possible to know) allows rapid identification of intelligence gaps (what we know versus what we don't know). Such identification leads to priority information requirements (PIR) and will drive the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan (how will we get the information we need). FM 3-55 and Chapter 4 discuss ISR. Commanders carefully consider how to develop *focused* PIR to enable collectors to more easily weed relevant information from the plethora of information. Commanders can make better decisions and implement them faster than a threat can react.

AMPLIFIED IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL (SOCIETAL) CONSIDERATIONS

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B-7. The Army focuses on warfighting. The experiences in urban operations gained at lower echelons often center on the tactics of urban offensive and defensive operations where the influences of terrain and enemy frequently dominate. At higher echelons, the terrain and enemy are still essential considerations, but the societal component of the urban environment is more closely considered. Moreover, the human or civil considerations gain importance in support operations and stability operations regardless of the echelon or level of command. In addition to the echelon and the type of operation, a similar relationship exists between the key elements of the urban environment and other situational factors. These factors can include where the operation lies within the spectrum of conflict or the level of war and the conventional or unconventional nature of the opposing threat. Figure B-2 graphically represents the varying significance of these elements to urban IPB. Population effects are significant only

in how they affect the threat, Army forces, and overall mission accomplishment.

B-8. Describing the battlefield's effects—step two of the IPB—ascribes meaning to the characteristics analyzed. It helps commanders understand how the environment enhances or degrades friendly and threat forces and capabilities. It also helps commanders understand how the environment supports the population. It also explains how *changes* in the "normal" urban environment (intentional or unintentional and because of threat or friendly activities) may affect the population. Included in this assessment are matters of perception. At each step of the IPB process, commanders try to determine the urban society's perceptions of ongoing activities to ensure Army operations are viewed as intended. Throughout this process, commanders, staffs, and analysts cannot allow their biases—cultural, organizational, personal, or cognitive—to markedly influence or alter their assessment (see FM 34-3). This particularly applies when they analyze the societal aspect of the urban environment. With so many potential groups and varied interests in such a limited area, misperception is always a risk.




Figure B-2. Relevance of Key Urban Environment Elements

SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

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B-9. For IPB to remain effective in UO, its analysis must include the urban environment's attributes—man-made terrain, society, and infrastructure—and an evaluation of characteristics traditionally included in IPB: the underlying natural terrain (to include weather) and the threat. Because the urban environment is so complex, it is useful to break it into categories. Then commanders can understand the intricacies of the environment that may affect their operations and assimilate this information into clear mental images. Commanders can then synthesize these images of the environment with the current status of friendly and threat forces and develop a desired end state. Then they can determine the most decisive sequence

of activities that will move their forces from the current state to the end state. Identifying and understanding the environment's characteristics (from a friendly, threat, and noncombatant perspective) allows commanders to establish and maintain situational understanding. Then they can develop appropriate COAs and rules of engagement that will lead to decisive mission accomplishment.

B-10. Figures B-3, B-4, and B-5 are not intended to be all-encompassing lists of urban characteristics. They provide a starting point or outline useful for conducting an urban IPB that can be modified to meet the commander's requirements. Commanders and staffs can compare the categories presented with those in the civil affairs area study and assessment format found in FM 41-10 and the IPB considerations for stability operations and support operations found in FM 34-7.

MULTIPLE OVERLAPS

B-11. Since the urban environment is comprised of a "system of systems," considerations among the key elements of the environment will overlap during urban IPB analysis. For example, boundaries, regions, or areas relate to a physical location on the ground. Hence, they have urban *terrain* implications. These boundaries, regions, or areas often stem from some historical, religious, political, or social aspect that could also be considered a characteristic of the urban *society*. Overlaps can also occur in a specific category, such as *infrastructure*. For instance, dams are a consideration for their potential effects on transportation and distribution (mobility), administration and human services (water supply), and energy (hydroelectric).

B-12. This overlap recognition is a critical concern for commanders and their staffs. In "taking apart" the urban environment and analyzing the pieces, commanders and staffs cannot lose perspective of how each piece interacts with any other and as part of the whole. Otherwise, their vision will be shortsighted, and they will fail to recognize the second- and third-order effects of their proposed COAs; the actual end state differing dramatically from the one envisioned by the commander. The increased density of combatants and noncombatants, infrastructure, and complex terrain means that a given action will likely have unintended consequences. Those consequences will be more widely felt and their impact will spread in less time than in other environments. These unintended results may have important strategic and operational consequences. The multiple ways these dynamic urban elements and characteristics combine make it necessary to approach each urban environment as a unique IPB challenge.

URBAN TERRAIN AND WEATHER

Terrain

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B-13. Earlier admonitions that civil considerations are more closely considered in UO do not necessarily mean that consideration for urban terrain is de-emphasized. In every urban operation, terrain and its effects on both threat and friendly forces is assessed and understood. Then commanders can quickly choose and exploit the

terrain (and weather conditions) that best supports their missions. Terrain analysis thoroughly assesses urban structures as well as the ground on which they stand (see Figure B-3 and FM 5-33). An analysis of urban terrain first considers broader urban characteristics and effects and progress to a more detailed examination.

<p>Forms and Functions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cores • Industrial areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic industrial material production and storage facilities • Standard signs and markings for toxic chemicals • Outlying high-rise areas • Residential areas and shantytowns • Commercial ribbon areas • Forts and military bases <p>Broad Urban Patterns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satellite • Network • Linear • Segment • Dominant or central hub (if any) • Area covered (square miles) <p>Street Patterns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radial • Grid • Irregular (planned and unplanned) • Variations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rayed • Radial-Ring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contour-forming • Combined • Widths <p>Construction and Placement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mass or framed • Light or heavy clad • Material (dirt, wood, stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel, and glass) • Density and thickness (roofs, floors, and interior and exterior walls) • Load bearing walls and columns • Height (floors) • Doors, windows, fire escapes, and other openings • Interior floor plan (including crawl spaces, elevators, and stairs) • Placement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Random • Close-orderly block • Dispersed • Ownership <p>Military Aspects of Terrain: OAKOC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observation and fields of fire <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smoke (fire), dust (explosions), and flying debris 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rubble • Engagement ranges (including minimum safe distances and backblast factors) and obliquity/angle (nichets) • Elevation and depression considerations • Lasers and reflective concerns <p>Avenues of approach (mobility corridors)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airspace • Surface • Supersurface (intrasurface) • Subsurface <p>Key terrain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landmarks • Buildings of significant cultural, social, political, or economic significance <p>Obstacles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rubble and vehicles • Masking of fires • Burning buildings or other fire hazards • Rivers and lakes <p>Cover and concealment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building protection • Weapon penetration (single shot and multiple rounds) considerations • Rubble and vehicles
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Figure B-3. Significant Urban Characteristics

B-14. **Natural Terrain.** The natural terrain features beyond the urban area and beneath urban structures significantly influence unit operations. They dictate where buildings can be constructed, the slope and pattern of streets, and even the broad urban patterns that develop over longer periods of time, thereby influencing a unit's scheme of maneuver. The military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC)—remain critical to the analysis of natural terrain in, under, and around urban areas. Fortunately, commanders and their staffs are accustomed to this type of analysis.

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⁴⁸ **Analysis of an Urban Area's Underlying Terrain
Mitrovica, Kosovo**

An urban area's underlying terrain provides many clues into its history, economy, society, and current situation. Mitrovica, Kosovo is an illustrative

example. The Ibar River creates a natural line of communications through the middle of the city as well as an obstacle that bisects the urban area. This bisection naturally divides the two resident ethnic groups: Albanians and Serbs. The separation became significant at both the strategic and tactical levels during 1999 deployments to Kosovo. Army forces had to ensure that the Orthodox Church located south of the Ibar was accessible to Serbs residing in the north. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeepers built a footbridge across the river that allowed reliable, safe passage. The natural feature separating the two groups assisted NATO troops in maintaining stability in the region.

B-15. Man-Made Terrain. Building composition, frontages, placement, forms and functions, size, floor plans, and window and door locations affect maneuver, force positioning, and weapons deployment considerations. Angles, displacement, surface reflection, and antenna locations influence command and control. Structures also influence ISR operations. The increased density and volume created by man-made structures increase how much information commanders and their staffs collect and assess as well as the number of forces required. Building materials and construction will also influence force structures to include weapons and equipment required. The ability to maneuver through the urban dimensions—airspace, supersurface (including intrasurface), surface, and subsurface—and shoot through walls, ceilings, and floors also creates increased psychological stress. The characteristics of man-made terrain can also be analyzed using OAKOC.

Weather

B-16. Weather and its effects are often considered when examining the military aspects of terrain. Military aspects of weather include temperature (heat and cold), light conditions, precipitation (cloud cover, rain, snow, fog, and smog), and wind. Their military effects during UO are similar to any operational environment (see FM 34-81 and FM 34-81-1). Extremes of heat and cold affect weapon systems and the soldiers that operate them. The extra luminescence provided by the ambient light of an urban area, unless controlled, may affect night vision capabilities and the ability of the Army to "own the night." Precipitation affects mobility and visibility. Smog inversion layers are common over cities. An inversion layer may trap smoke and chemicals in the air to the detriment of soldiers' health. (If the conditions are severe enough, it might require the use of protective masks.) Winds, which may increase as they are funneled through urban canyons, may—

- Increase other weather effects (wind chill, for example).
- Decrease visibility (blowing debris, sand, rain, and snow).
- Spread radiation, biological, and chemical hazards.
- Adversely affect low-altitude air mobility.

DODDOA-004507

However, commanders also analyze weather for its potential effect on civilians. Rain might create sewage overflow problems in refugee camps, increasing disease and even creating panic. (Rain and flooding may also make some subsurface areas impassable or extremely hazardous to military forces.) Other weather effects on UO can include—

- Heavy snowfall in an urban area that may paralyze area transportation and distribution infrastructure, hindering the urban administration's ability to provide vital human services (police, fire fighting, medical, and rescue). Heavy rains may have similar effects on poorly designed and constructed roads.
- Extreme hot and cold weather climates that increase the dependence (and military significance) of many elements of the infrastructure. For example, the energy infrastructure may be critical; without it, civilians may not be adequately cooled or heated.
- In urban areas located in tropical regions, it can rain at the same time each day during the wet season. Threat forces may attack during these periods knowing aircraft will have difficulty responding. Bad weather also reduces the effectiveness of surveillance, direct and indirect fire, and logistic support.
- Inclement weather may preclude demonstrations or rallies by threats. Good weather may mean a maximum turnout of civilians for events such as festivals, sporting events, and other social, cultural, or religious activities.
- Severe weather may affect psychological and civil-military operations. Heavy rains may disrupt leaflet drops, construction projects, and medical and veterinary assistance programs.

URBAN SOCIETY

B-17. This manual shows that societal considerations take on added importance. Critical to operational success is knowing which groups live in an urban area, what relationships exist among them, and how each population group will respond to friendly and threat activities. Often determining any of this is very difficult. Social and cultural understanding is also essential in helping commanders and their staffs to view the urban area as the residents view it. The demographics presented depict *what* conditions exist, while the other categories help to explain the root causes or *why* conditions exist (see Figure B-4). These other categories include health, history, leadership, ethnicity and culture, religion, and government and politics.

DODDOA-004508

<p>Population Demographics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General population size <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Village ▪ Town ▪ City ▪ Metropolis ▪ Megalopolis • Group size based on race, age, sex, political affiliation, economics, religion, tribe, clan, gang, criminal activities, or other significant grouping <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant US or allied populations ▪ Distribution, densities, and physical boundaries and overlaps ▪ Majority, minority, and dominant groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing or decreasing migration trends <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dislocated civilians • Nongovernmental organizations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local ▪ National ▪ International • Languages (distribution, dialects, relationship to social structure) • Educational levels and literacy rates • Crime rates • Birth and death rates • Labor statistics and considerations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Skilled and unskilled ▪ Imported and exported ▪ Unemployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standard wages and per capita income • Workday and workweek norms <p style="text-align: center;">Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diseases • Nutritional deficiencies • Local standards of care • Pollution and environmental hazards (air, water, food, and soil) • Health workers (types, numbers, and degree of skill) <p style="text-align: center;">History</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General and for a specific group <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Internal or external ▪ Recent conflicts
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Figure B-4. Significant Urban Societal Characteristics

<p>History (continued)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship with US, allies, and other participating multinational forces • Applicable international treaties • Status-of-forces agreements • Antagonists/protagonists • Heroes • Events, facts, and dates considered important or celebrated • Urban area's historical importance <p>Leadership and Prominent Personalities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affiliation (ethn.c, religion, military, government, industry, criminal, or entertainment) • Education attained • Organization and distribution of power • Associations among different leaders and groups <p>Ethnicity and Culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Values, moral codes, taboos, and insults (verbal and non-verbal) • Attitudes towards age, sex, and race (including same-sex interaction) • Role of the clan, tribe, or family • Biases between ethnic groups • Privacy and individuality • Recreation, entertainment, and humor • Fatalism or self-determination • Exchanges of gifts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displays of emotion • Lines of authority • Dating and marriage • Greetings, leave-takings, and gestures • Visiting practices • Alcohol and drug use • Important holidays, festivals, sporting, or entertainment events • Eating and dietary practices • Significance of animals and pets • Urban-rural similarities and differences • Driving habits • Clothing <p>Religion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sects, divisions, and overlaps • Religious biases and problems • Relationship and influence on government, politics, economics, and education • Impact on ethnic and cultural beliefs • Key events or celebrations (daily, weekly, monthly, or annually) • Funeral and burial practices <p>Government and Politics</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Present and past forms • Organization and powers (executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative divisions) • Scheduled elections and historical turnouts • Degree of control over the population <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Border-crossing procedures • Relationship with US or multinational governments, national governments, and criminal elements • Political factions and boundaries • Political traditions • Grievances • Censorship • Nepotism and other clan, tribal, or social ties • Civil defense and disaster preparedness (organization, plans, training, equipment, and resources) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evacuation routes • Legal system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System of laws • Applicable treaties • Courts and tribunals • Procedures • Records (birth and deaths) • Property control • Monetary system (formal and informal) • Domestic and foreign trade <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taxation and tariffs • Customs requirements • Rationing and price controls • Economic performance and contribution to gross national product • Economic aid • Perception of relative deprivation • Trade unions • Competition with the black market and organized crime
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Figure B-4. Significant Urban Societal Characteristics (continued)

B-18. Aside from friendly and threat forces, the society is the only thinking component of the urban environment able to rapidly impact the urban operation. (Even people going about their daily routines can unwittingly hamper the mission.) Urban residents create conditions for restrictive rules of engagement, increase stress on soldiers and logistic capabilities, and confuse threat identification (see Threat Considerations in this appendix). Demographic, health, safety, ethnic, and cultural concerns will be essential considerations in most UO. Other situational factors—the mission, enemy, and time available—dictate the balance between the level of detail and analysis to support the overall urban operation with the level of detail that commanders and their staffs can achieve. However, an IPB that fails to devote enough time and resources to societal analysis can find large elements of the population turned against the Army force. Analyzing the urban society first may help to focus or limit further analysis of the terrain and infrastructure, saving time and ISR resources.

URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

B-19. Functional and analytical overlap readily appears when examining urban infrastructures (see Figure B-5). They are composed of physical structures or facilities and people. Hence, much of the analysis conducted for terrain and society can apply when assessing the urban infrastructure. For example, commanders, staffs, and analysts could not effectively assess the urban economic and commercial infrastructure without simultaneously considering labor. All aspects of the society relate and can be used to further analyze the urban work force since they are a subelement of the urban society. Similarly, the OAKOC aspects used to evaluate terrain may also apply to the urban infrastructure, especially considerations of key terrain.

Transportation and Distribution		Economics and Commerce
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shipyards and other port and harbor facilities ▪ Inland waterways, canals, and locks ▪ Offshore pipeline berths ▪ Cargo storage and handling ▪ Types and number of ships, boats, and ferries ▪ Dams • Streets and roads <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bridges and fords ▪ Over- and underpasses ▪ Raised embankments, tunnels, culverts, and other subterranean features (widths and clearances) ▪ Parking areas (surface, subsurface, and supersurface) ▪ Weight restrictions ▪ Traffic light operations ▪ Traffic patterns ▪ Widths ▪ Surface materials • Rail <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lines ▪ Terminals ▪ Switchyards and junctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Subways, bridges, elevated rail lines, and underpasses (clearances) ▪ Track gauges ▪ Types and number of rolling stock ▪ Electrification • Air <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Airfields and runways (including capabilities) ▪ Heliports and helipads (including rooftop) ▪ Types and number of aircraft ▪ Cargo storage and handling • Trucking companies and delivery services • Available material-handling equipment • Rush hour and market time considerations • Seasonal (weather) effects • Rubble effects • Impact of dislocated civilians and migration patterns • Likely population congregation points • Identifiable primary and alternate lines of communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Types and Locations ▪ Important companies (including US or allied) ▪ Military production facilities • Sources of raw materials • Use of toxic industrial materials and biological agents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Agriculture (insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers) • Manufacturing • Cleaning • Research • Food types, quantities, and sources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Requirements and availability ▪ Storage and processing ▪ Cleanliness standards • Stores, shops, restaurants, hotels, and strip malls • Recreation facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Outdoor and amusement parks ▪ Stadiums and other sports facilities • Machine shops • Brick and lumber yards • Banking and investment institutions

Figure B-5. Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics

<p>Administration and Human Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police and fire protection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Headquarters, station, and key facilities locations • Organization and strengths • Equipment • Functions, authority, and jurisdictional boundaries • Contract guard services • Welfare and public assistance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary assistance • Orphanages • Elderly care facilities • Water supply systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water sources and storage (lakes, reservoirs, cisterns, pools, and public baths) • Water treatment and quality • Pumping stations and other distribution methods (trucks, bottles) • Hydrant locations • Snow removal capabilities • Street light operations • Health facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hospitals • Emergency medical services • Mental institutions • Medical supplies and equipment • Research and pharmaceutical buildings • Blood banks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governmental buildings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies • Capitol building • Legislative, judicial, and ministry buildings • Hall of records • Cultural resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious buildings (churches and mosques) • Shrines, monuments, and other historical structures • Schools, museums, theaters, and libraries • Waste and sanitation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types (solid, sewage, and toxic) • Collection, processing, and disposal • Dumps or landfills • Drainage systems • Effects of military control measures on providing vital human services <p style="text-align: center;">Energy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electric • Oil • Coal • Natural gas • Nuclear • Solar • Hydroelectric • Geothermal • Facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production and processing • Storage • Distribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pipelines (above and below ground) • Power lines (overhead and underground) • Water, rail, and road • Potential hazards <p style="text-align: center;">Communication and Information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Print media <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets • Billboards and posters • Postal facilities • Telephone facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wire or wireless • Facsimile machines • Telegraph facilities • Radio facilities • Police, fire, and rescue systems • Security systems • Television facilities • Computers and the Internet • Antennas, towers, relay stations, and lines (surface and subsurface) • Integration of space-based capabilities • Public forums and speech • Low-technology media (cars horns, drums, graffiti, and burning tires) • Key media organizations and reporters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local • International • US
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Figure B-5. Significant Urban Infrastructure Characteristics (continued)

THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

B-20. Chapter 3 outlines the instability and uncertainty of the strategic environment. Commanders and staffs, and analysts identify and analyze the threat in steps three and four of the IPB process. They analyze the threat's composition, strength, disposition, leadership, training, morale, weapons and capabilities, vulnerabilities, internal logistics and external support, doctrine (if any), strategy or modus operandi, and tactics. The threat can take a variety of forms:

- Conventional military forces.
- Paramilitary forces.
- Guerrillas and insurgents.
- Terrorists.
- Militia or special police organizations.

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B-21. A general study of guerrilla and insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures may prove beneficial to many types of operations regardless of the actual composition or type of threat forces. Insurgent strategies and tactics may work especially well in this complex environment and will likely be a part of any threat COA. Particularly, commanders understand how a threat might restrict itself by the laws of land warfare and similar conventions, or exploit the use of these conventions to its own gain. Commanders can refer to FM 31-20-3 for more information. For many of the above threats, no doctrinal templates may exist. Commanders, staffs, and analysts evaluate, update (or create), and manage threat databases early (and continuously) in the IPB process.

49 . . . [T]he adversaries of freedom . . . send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. . . . [S]ubversives and saboteurs and insurre-ctionists . . . [possess] the power to conscript talent and manpower for any purpose, . . . and long experience in the techniques of violence and subversion. . . . It is a contest of will and purpose as well as force and violence—a battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory.

John F. Kennedy
Message to Congress, 27 April 1961

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

B-22. While threats vary, they share a common characteristic: the capability and intent to conduct violence against Army forces to negatively influence mission accomplishment. These threats are often the most recognizable for forces trained for warfighting—these are often the enemy. Army units be able to conduct full spectrum operations—offense, defense, stability, and support. Commanders broaden their concept of the threat when analyzing the urban environment's terrain, societal, and infrastructure characteristics. This analysis includes many environmental dangers (potentially affecting both sides of a conflict as well as noncombatants) such as—

- Natural disasters (earthquakes, fires, floods, and heavy snows).
- Hunger, starvation, and malnutrition.
- Water shortages.
- Rampant disease.
- Pollution and toxic industrial materials.

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A critical difference between the latter forms of threat and the former is the lack of *intent* to do harm. The latter may stand alone as threats, or these conditions may be created, initiated, or used by the enemy or a hostile as a weapon or tool. Threat analysis includes identifying and describing how each relevant characteristic of the area of operation can hinder mission accomplishment. This analysis,

particularly during stability operations and support operations, may require extensive coordination and cooperation with urban civil authorities, law enforcement, and numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

CIVILIANS

B-23. In a major theater war where offensive and defensive operations are conducted against a clear enemy, the third step of IPB—identify the threat—is readily accomplished. Its well-established procedures include updating or creating threat models and identifying threat capabilities. This same analytic process includes modeling population subgroups. The process applies to smaller-scale contingencies, peacetime military engagement activities where stability operations and support operations dominate, and urban offensive and defensive operations where civilians are in close proximity to Army forces. This adaptation is necessary to further broaden the threat concept to include specific elements of the urban society and, in some instances, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civilian agencies working in the urban area. In many stability operations, this modification can account for opposing armed forces that are not an enemy but are a threat to the mission. As discussed in Chapter 8, Army forces in many stability operations and support operations must avoid classifying or thinking of these threats as *the enemy*.

Need for More Accurate Categories

B-24. Army forces recognized that the threat evaluation was not a straightforward assessment of the capabilities of a known, armed enemy. This resulted in developing categories for assessing the disposition of population subgroups within an AO: enemy, neutral, or friendly. Sectors of the population were labeled based on which side (if any) each group seemed to favor. This early method helped to mitigate Army forces' situational uncertainty. It provides a general idea of the level of support or resistance Army forces might expect by elements of the urban population.

B-25. Aside from the flawed labeling of every threat as an enemy, the initial attempt at categorization was a good first step. However, it required refinement to better indicate the level of threat or utility that civilian groups pose for Army forces conducting UO. It also provides a clearer basis for detecting and monitoring shifts in key or relevant relationships (see Figure B-6). Commanders note that where a group or subgroup falls along this continuum is relative to the perspective from which it is viewed. This is an especially important consideration in multinational and interagency UO. During operations in Somalia, US Army forces may have viewed a particular clan as a hostile element. The United Nations' Italian contingent, with their colonial background in the region, may have considered the same clan as neutral or even an ally.

B-26. Although necessary and greatly improved, commanders recognize that no system of categorization will precisely classify any given group; no system can reflect the overall nature and complexity of the urban society. A single group may fit in a particular category. It may also have components in two or more categories simultaneously. Often, it can shift among categories during an operation. A given

group may have individuals in it who have interests identical to or different from that group and these individual interests may change over time.




Figure B-6. Continuum of Relative Interests

B-27. A peace enforcement operation illustrates the varying nature of groups. An identified criminal group might be classified as an *obstacle* to the commander's mission because its illegal activities impede unit progress. Its compelling interest, however, is to make money rather than interfere with friendly forces. In the same operation, one of the armed belligerents may be intent on disrupting the peace process and would be, therefore, classified as a *hostile*. (Again, not as an enemy unless they engaged in prolonged combat operations against the peacekeeping force.) The belligerent force may finance the criminal organization to assist in further obstructing the peace mission. The criminal organization moves from being an obstacle to that of a hostile.

⁵⁰Shifting Civilian Interests and Intent

Among other applicable lessons (see also the vignette in Chapter 8), the Los Angeles riots of 1992 illustrate how urban population groups can shift their relative positions due to changing conditions in an urban AO. Several gangs exist in the Los Angeles area. Usually, these gangs are hostile to one another. During the riots, however, several rival gangs formed a "united front" against what was seen as a larger obstacle to their own interests: law enforcement. As a result, the hostile gangs became one another's aides during that time.

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B-28. This classification effort, therefore, is not a one-time undertaking; commanders constantly review and update it (like the entire IPB process itself). Groups or individuals can be influenced into assisting either the friendly or

opposing force. People will also act opportunistically, shifting support and alliances as perceived advantages arise. Even seemingly passive and law-abiding members of the urban society may conduct themselves in unexpected ways given the right conditions (mob violence, for example).

Similarities, Differences, Capabilities, and Vulnerabilities

B-29. Focal Points for Analysis. Similarities and differences in interests and interdependencies between groups are often focal points for analysis (and the allocation of ISR assets). They may indicate how commanders may influence, coerce, or align civilian interests and intentions with mission objectives. Simultaneously, commanders consider an analysis of the civilian element's (individual, group, or organization) *capability* to influence the accomplishment of friendly objectives. They also consider civilians' vulnerabilities and dependencies. If a civilian group's fundamental interests align with friendly objectives and this group has the intent to assist friendly forces, it is clearly an ally. However, with limited or no capability, a specific group will not help move the commander any closer to achieving his desired end state and accomplishing the mission. Then the commander would normally limit the resources expended on this group to those necessary for maintaining their commitment to common goals and objectives.

B-30. Creating Civilian Capability as Aide or Ally. In contrast, commanders may provide a group with resources to enhance or create the capability to assist in mission accomplishment. They may do this if they felt that the assistance gained (or reduction to threat support) exceeds the potential diminishment of their own force's capabilities from losing those same resources. Commanders would also consider the group's dependencies (such as food, infrastructure, and protection) and overall vulnerability to outside influence. If vulnerable to friendly influence or control (understanding urban societal considerations and matters of perception are critical in this regard), then forces are likely susceptible to enemy or hostile manipulation. Even if commanders can generate extra resources (and not significantly affect their own force's capabilities), they still conduct this same cost-benefit analysis to determine which civilian group (if any) should receive resources.

Greatest Potential Nearer the Center

B-31. The most critical population sectors often are those nearest the middle of the spectrum, particularly if their capabilities (or potential) significantly degrades or enhances mission accomplishment. These are the obstacle, neutral, or aide categories. If their interests can be adequately understood, commanders may have great chance to influence the population segment and significantly contribute to mission accomplishment.

Political and Strategic Concerns

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B-32. The aide category may be of significant political or strategic concern. An aide group may be invaluable for accomplishing intermediate objectives but become a vulnerability to accomplishing a larger stability operation. (Even an

urban offensive or defensive operation is likely to transition to a stability operation.) Commanders may provide resources to a criminal organization to assist in defeating insurgent forces during urban combat operations. Once these forces have been subdued, the interests (monetary gain and defeat of the threat) linking friendly forces with this criminal element disappear. What may remain is a criminal organization with more power than a reconstituted or newly established law enforcement agency and a truly destabilizing force. This also illustrates the second- and third-order thinking that will be required of commanders and their staffs during UO.




Figure B-7. Urban IPB Tools and Products

URBAN IPB TOOLS AND PRODUCTS

B-33. Adapting IPB to UO involves recognizing the intent of each of the steps of the process and adapting analytic tools and products to help meet those intentions in a complex environment (see Figure B-7 and FM 3-34.230). Standard tools and products include: modified combined obstacle overlays and doctrinal, situation, event, and decision support templates or matrices. In addition to these standards aids, staffs and analysts may develop or produce other innovative tools to assist commanders in their situational understanding of the complex urban environment. Staffs and analysts may also initiate requests for products (or information) from their higher headquarters or other agencies with the technical means or control over assets when the capability lies outside the Army force's means. The tools that developed or requested may include—

- Overhead imagery.
- Three-dimensional representations.
- Infrastructure blueprints.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (*Army*) follows the term. Definitions for which FM 3-06 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent or amplifying manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

- AD** anno Domini (in the year of the Lord)
- AF** Air Force
- A.F.B.** Air Force Base (graphics only)
- agility** the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily (FM 3-0)
- AI** air interdiction
- AIDS** acquired immune deficiency syndrome
- air defense battlefield operating system** the employment of all active measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft and missiles after they are airborne (FM 7-15)
- AMC** Air Mobility Command
- AO** area of operations
- area defense** a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0)
- area of interest** that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0)
- area of operations** an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

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- ARFOR** the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-0)
- ARVN** Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- assessment** (Army) the continuous monitoring—throughout planning preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments (FM 3-0)
- asymmetry** dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm. (FM 3-0)
- attack** an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0)
- attainability** one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: generating the minimum essential supplies and services necessary to begin operations (FM 100-10)
- attrition** the reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel (JP 1-02)
- avenue of approach** (Army) the air or ground route leading to an objective (or key terrain in its path) that an attacking force can use (FM 3-90)
- axis of advance** the general area through which the bulk of a unit's combat power must move (FM 3-90)
- battle** a set of related tactical engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0)
- battlefield operating systems** the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical- and operational-

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level commanders. The seven battlefield operating systems are: the intelligence system, maneuver system, fire support system, air defense system, mobility/countermobility/survivability system, combat service support system, and command and control system. (FM 7-15)

battlefield organization the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining. (FM 3-0)

battlespace the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 3-0)

BC before Christ

BDAR battle damage assessment and repair

Bde brigade (graphics only)

Benelux an area of Europe comprised of three countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg

Bns battalions (graphics only)

BOS battlefield operating systems

branch a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions. (FM 3-0)

breakout an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must be maintained. (FM 3-90)

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- buffer zone** a defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded. A buffer zone is formed to create an area of separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Also called area of separation in some United Nations operations. (JP 3-07.3)
- bypass** a tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force (FM 3-90)
- C2** command and control
- CA** civil affairs
- campaign** a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space (JP 3-0)
- canalize** (Army) a tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver (FM 3-90)
- capability** the ability to execute a specified course of action (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention) (JP 1-02)
- casualty evacuation** a term used by nonmedical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft (FM 8-10-6)
- CAV** Cavalry (graphics only)
- CBRNE** chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
- CCIR** commander's critical information requirements
- Cdrs** commanders (graphics only)
- CENTCOM** US Central Command
- center of gravity** those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (JP 3-0)

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- CHS** combat health support
- CI** counterintelligence
- CINC** commander in chief
- civil affairs** designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations (JP 3-57.1)
- civil considerations** how the attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations will influence the conduct of military operations (FM 6-0)
- civil disturbances** riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code. (JP 3-07.3)
- civil-military operations** the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. (JP 3-57)
- civil-military operations center** an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and

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- regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (FM 41-10).
- clear** (Army) 1. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area. (FM 3-90) 2. The total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire. (FM 3-34.2)
- close air support** air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-09.3)
- close combat** combat carried out with direct-fire weapons, supported by indirect fires, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. (FM 3-0)
- CMO** civil-military operations
- CMOC** civil-military operations center
- CNA** computer network attack
- CND** computer network defense
- CNE** computer network exploitation
- CNO** computer network operations
- COA** course of action
- coalition** an *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 3-16)
- COG** center of gravity
- collateral damage** unintended and undesirable civilian personnel injuries or materiel damage adjacent to a target produced by the effects of friendly weapons (FM 6-30)
- combatant command** a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander

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	established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 0-2)
combat configured load	a planned package of ammunition or other supplies that are transported as a single load to support a type unit or weapon system (FM 4-30.13)
combat power	the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time (JP 3-0)
combat service support battlefield operating system	the support and services provided to sustain forces during war and military operations other than war (FM 7-15)
combatting terrorism	actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum (JP 3-07.2)
combined arms	the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy separately or in sequence (FM 3-0)
combined arms team	two or more arms mutually supporting one another, usually consisting of infantry, armor, cavalry, aviation, field artillery, air defense artillery, and engineers (FM 3-90)
command and control battlefield operating system	all tasks associated with the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in the accomplishment of the mission (FM 7-15)
command and control system	(Army) the arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential to the commander to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations (FM 6-0)
commander's critical information	(Army) elements of information required by

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requirements	commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations (FM 3-0)
commander's intent	a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state (FM 3-0)
commander's visualization	the process of developing a clear understanding of the current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisioning a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently visualizing the sequence of activity that moves the force from its current state to the end state (FM 6-0)
common operational picture	an operational picture tailored to the user's requirements, based on common data and information shared by more than one command (FM 3-0)
computer network attack	operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves (JP 3-13)
computer network defense	defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction (JP 3-13)
concept of operations	(Army) describes how commanders see the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. As a minimum, the description includes the scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. It expands the commander's selected course of action and expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-0)
constraint	restrictions placed on the command by a higher command to dictate an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action the subordinate commander has for planning a mission by stating things that must or must not be done (FM 101-5)
contain	(Army) a tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing

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any part of their forces for use elsewhere (FM 3-90)

control (Army) 1. The regulation of forces and operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. It includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating information for creating the common operational picture (COP) and using information, primarily by the staff, during planning, preparing for, and executing operations. (FM 6-0). 2. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations (FM 3-90)

controlled exchange the removal of serviceable parts, components, or assemblies from unserviceable, economically repairable equipment and their immediate reuse in restoring a like item of equipment to a combat operable or serviceable condition (FM 4-30.3)

control measures directives given graphically or orally by a commander to subordinate commands to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control combat operations. Each control measure can be portrayed graphically. In general, all control measures should be easily identifiable on the ground. Examples of control measures include boundaries, objectives, coordinating points, contact point, and direction of attack. (FM 101-5)

COP common operational picture

counterattack (Army) a form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0)

counterdeception efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations. (JP 3-58)

counterdrug those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs (JP 3-07.4)

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- counterinsurgency** those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 3-07)
- counterintelligence** information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities (JP 2-01.2)
- countermobility operations** the construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. The primary purpose of countermobility operations is to slow or divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition, and to increase weapon effectiveness. (JP 3-34)
- counterpropaganda** activities that identify and counter adversary propaganda by exposing adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces situational understanding by providing friendly truth (FM 100-6)
- counterterrorism** offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism (JP 3-07.2)
- course of action** (Army) a feasible way to accomplish a task or mission that follows the guidance given, will not result in undue damage or risk to the command, and is noticeably different from other actions being considered (FM 101-5)
- cover** (Army) 1. Protection from the effects of enemy fire. 2. A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (FM 3-90)
- criteria of success** information requirements developed during the operations process that measure the degree of success in accomplishing the unit's mission. They are normally expressed as either an explicit evaluation of the present situation or forecast of the degree of mission accomplishment. (FM 6-0)

CSS combat service support

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- cultural resource** monuments, nationally identifiable or distinctive buildings and structures, archives and libraries, ancient artifacts and structures, archaeologically important sites, historically important sites or structures, mosques, cathedrals, temples, other churches or sacred structures, sacred sites or areas, museums, and works of art (FM 41-10)
- DA** direct action; Department of the Army
- D-day** the unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence (JP 5-00.1)
- dead space** 1. An area within the range of a weapon, radar, or observer, which cannot be covered by fire or observation from a particular position because of intervening obstacles, the nature of the ground, the characteristics of the trajectory, or the limitations of the pointing capabilities of the weapon. 2. An area or zone which is within range of a radio transmitter, but in which a signal is not received. 3. The volume of space above and around a gun or guided missile system into which it cannot fire because of mechanical or electronic limitations. (JP 1-02)
- debarkation** the unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft (JP 3-35)
- deception** those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests (JP 3-58)
- decision support template** a graphic record of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 2-01.3)
- decisive engagement** in land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand. (JP 1-02)
- decisive operations** those operations that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. They

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- conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements. (FM 3-0)
- decisive point** a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influences the outcome of an operation (FM 3-0)
- defeat** a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90)
- defeat in detail** defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once (FM 3-90)
- defense in depth** the siting of mutually supporting defense positions designed to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial observations of the whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to maneuver the reserve (JP 1-02)
- defensive information operations** (Army) the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes. (FM 3-0)
- defensive operations** operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. (FM 3-0)
- delay** a form of retrograde operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting

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- maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02)
- demonstration** (Army) In stability operations and support operations, an operation by military forces in sight of an actual or potential enemy to show military capabilities. (FM 3-07)
- depth** the extension of operations in time, space, and resources (FM 3-0)
- destroy** 1. A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. 2. To damage a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90)
- direct action** short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations-capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. (JP 3-05)
- direct approach** to apply combat power directly against the enemy center of gravity or the enemy's principal strength (FM 3-0)
- direct fire** gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or the director (FM 7-20)
- disinformation** information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence US decision makers, US forces, coalition allies, key actors or individuals via indirect or unconventional means (FM 100-6)
- dislocated civilian** (Army) a generic term that describes a civilian who has been forced to move by war, revolution, or natural or man-made disaster from his or her home to some other location. Dislocated citizens

include displaced persons, refugees, evacuees, stateless persons, or war victims. Legal and political considerations define the subcategories of a dislocated civilian. (FM 3-07)

displaced person a civilian who is involuntarily outside the boundaries of his or her country or as an internally displaced person is a civilian involuntarily outside their area or region within their country (FM 34-1)

display (Army) representing relevant information in a usable, easily understood audio or visual form tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the common operational picture for decision making and exercising command and control functions (FM 6-0)

disposition distribution of the elements of a command within an area, usually the exact location of each unit headquarters and the deployment of the forces subordinate to it (JP 2-01.3)

disrupt a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. Disrupt is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 3-90)

distribution system that complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units (JP 4-0)

DNBI disease and nonbattle injury

doctrine fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-01)

doctrinal template a model based on known or postulated adversary doctrine. Doctrinal templates illustrate the

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disposition and activity of adversary forces and assets conducting a particular operation unconstrained by the effects of the battlespace. They represent the application of adversary doctrine under ideal conditions. Ideally, doctrinal templates depict the threat's normal organization for combat, frontages, depths, boundaries and other control measures, assets available from other commands, objective depths, engagement areas, battle positions, and so forth. Doctrinal templates are usually scaled to allow ready use with geospatial products. (JP 2-01.3)

DOD Department of Defense

domestic support operations those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies (JP 3-07.7)

EAC echelons above corps

economy one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: providing the most efficient support at the least cost to accomplish the mission (FM 100-10)

economy of force one of the nine principles of war: allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts (FM 3-0)

EEFI essential elements of friendly information

electromagnetic spectrum the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity; it is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands (JP 3-51)

electronic attack that division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. EA includes: 1. actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and

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- electromagnetic deception, and 2. employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams), or antiradiation weapons. (JP 3-51)
- electronic warfare** any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (JP 3-51)
- electronic warfare support** that division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 3-51)
- embarkation** the process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft (JP 3-35)
- encirclement** an operation where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communication (FM 3-0)
- end state** (Army) a set of required conditions that, when achieved, attain the aims set for the campaign or operation (FM 3-0)
- engagement** a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0)
- envelopment** (Army) a form of maneuver in which an

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attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. (FM 3-0)

ENY enemy (graphics only)

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

essential elements of friendly information (Army) the critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection (FM 6-0)

event template a guide for collection planning. The event template depicts the named areas of interest where activity, or its lack of activity, will indicate which course of action the adversary has adopted. (JP 2-03.1)

EW electronic warfare

exfiltrate a tactical mission task where a commander removes personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means (FM 3-90)

exploitation 1. Taking full advantage of success in military operations, and following up initial gains, and making permanent the temporary effects already achieved 2. A type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (JP 1-02)

explosive ordnance disposal the detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. (JP 4-04)

FE Far East (graphics only)

firepower (Army) the potential capacity (product) of all weapons and attack systems available to the force commander (FM 3-0)

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- fires** (Army) the delivery of all types of ordnance through both direct and indirect means, as well as nonlethal means, that contribute to the destruction, disruption, or suppression of the enemy; facilitate tactical movement; and achieve a decisive impact (FM 6-20)
- fire support battlefield operating system** encompasses the collective and coordinated use of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, offensive information operations, and other lethal and nonlethal means against targets located throughout an area of operations (FM 7-15)
- fire support coordinating measure** a measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-09)
- fix** (Army) a tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period of time. Fix is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker's movement within a specified area, normally an engagement area (FM 3-90)
- flexibility** one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: being able to adapt combat service support structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operations. (FM 100-10)
- FM** field manual; frequency modulation
- force projection** the ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater in response to requirements for military operations. Force-projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces, to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. (JP 1)
- force protection** (Army) those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and

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- synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (FM 3-0)
- force tailoring** the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for a mission (FM 3-0)
- foreign internal defense** participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 3-07.1)
- forms of maneuver** distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. The choices of offensive maneuver are envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack. The choices of defensive maneuver are forward and in-depth. Commanders use these to orient on the enemy, not terrain. More than one may be applied during an operation and may be used in conjunction with a form of tactical operation. (FM 3-0)
- fratricide** the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly firepower (FM 3-0)
- frontal attack** (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front (FM 3-0)
- full spectrum operations** the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war (FM 3-0)
- GIS** geographic information system
- GTL** gun-target line
- guerrilla warfare** military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (JP 3-05)
- gun-target line** an imaginary straight line from gun to target (JP 3-09)

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- hazardous material** any substance which has a human health hazard associated with it. Special storage, use, handling, and shipment safety procedures and protocols must be followed to help protect against accidental human exposure. Hazardous materials are specifically identified under federal law. (FM 3-100.4)
- health threat** a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions; environmental, occupational, and geographic and meteorological conditions; endemic diseases; and employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (to include weapons of mass destruction) that can reduce the effectiveness of joint forces through wounds, injuries, illness, and psychological stressors (JP 4-02)
- high-angle fire** (Army) fire delivered to clear an obstacle (such as a hill) that low-angle fire cannot, or fire delivered to attack targets on the reverse side of an obstacle (such as a hill) that cannot be attacked with low-angle or direct fire (FM 6-30)
- host nation** a nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory (JP 3-16)
- host-nation support** civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-16)
- HQ** headquarters
- HRS** human resources support
- human intelligence** a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0)
- humanitarian and civic assistance** assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a

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country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 3-07)

humanitarian assistance programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 3-07.6)

HUMINT human intelligence

HWY highway (graphics only)

IDF Israeli Defense Forces

IED improvised explosive device

imagery intelligence intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media (JP 2-0)

IMINT imagery intelligence

imitative electromagnetic deception (Army) imitating enemy electromagnetic radiation (predominately communications) through his electromagnetic channels to deceive him or to disrupt his operations (FM 100-6)

indirect fire fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director (JP 3-09)

infiltration (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement

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through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-0)

- information** (Army) 1. The meaning assigned to sensing from the environment. 2. On the cognitive hierarchy consists of processed data that provides further meaning with further transformation. Processing activities include filtering, formatting, organizing, collating, correlating, plotting, translating, categorizing, and arranging, among others. (FM 6-0)
- information management** the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. (FM 3-0)
- information operations** (Army) the actions taken to affect adversary and influence others' decision-making processes, information, and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems (FM 3-0)
- information requirements** (Army) all of the information elements required by the commander and his staff for the successful execution of operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. (FM 6-0)
- information superiority** (Army) the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (FM 3-0)
- information system** (Army) the equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display and disseminate information. This includes computers-hardware and software-and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0)
- INFOSYS** information systems
- initiative (operational)** setting or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operation (FM 3-0)
- insurgency** an organized movement aimed at the overthrow

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- of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 3-05)
- integration** one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: the total inclusion of Army combat service support into the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, assess) as well as into other logistic components of the unified force (FM 100-10)
- intelligence** (Army) the product resulting from the processing and analysis of information collected by any means concerning enemies, potential enemies, or current and potential operational environments (FM 34-1)
- intelligence battlefield operating system** the activity to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and environmental features required by a commander in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations (FM 7-15)
- intelligence preparation of the battlefield** an analytical methodology employed as part of intelligence planning, to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is conducted during mission planning to support the commander's decision making and to form the basis for the direction of intelligence operations in support of current and future missions. It utilizes existing databases and identifies gaps in intelligence needed to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents this in an appropriate form to facilitate operational planning. It forms the basis for situation development. (FM 34-130)
- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance** the integration and synchronization of all battlefield operating systems to collect and process information about the enemy and environment that produces relevant information to facilitate decision making (FM 3-55)
- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan** an integrated plan for collection of information from all available sources and analysis of that information to produce intelligence to meet requirements. Specifically, a logical plan for transforming priority intelligence requirements (PIR) into orders or requests to reconnaissance and surveillance assets to collect pertinent

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- information within a required time limit. (FM 34-3)
- intention** an aim or design (as distinct from capability) to execute a specified course of action (JP 1-02)
- interagency** activities or operations conducted by or through coordination with two or more agencies or an agency and one or more services of the same nation (FM 3-07)
- interdict** a tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy's use of an area or route (FM 3-90)
- interior lines** a force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point (FM 3-0)
- IO** information operations
- IPB** intelligence preparation of the battlefield
- IRA** Irish Republican Army
- isolate** a mission tactical task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces (FM 3-90)
- ISR** intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- JFC** joint force commander
- JOA** joint operations area
- joint force** a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0)
- joint force commander** a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force (JP 3-0)
- joint operations** a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating

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authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces (JP 3-0)

joint task force a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander (JP 3-0)

JP joint publication

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JSTARS Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System

JTF joint task force

JUO joint urban operation

key terrain any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant in a given course of action (JP 2-01.3)

km kilometers (graphics only)

LAN local area network

law of war that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-04)

liaison that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 3-08)

line of communications a route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 4-0)

LNO liaison officer

LOC line of communications

LOGCAP logistics civilian augmentation program

logistics the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement,

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- distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 4-0)
- logistics over-the-shore operations** the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy; or as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities. (JP 4-01.6)
- logistics preparation of the theater** all actions taken by combat service support to maximize the means of supporting commander's plans (FM 100-10)
- LOS** line of sight
- LPT** logistics preparation of the theater
- MACV** Military Assistance Command–Vietnam
- MAGTF** Marine air-ground task force
- major operation** a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational, and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area (FM 3-0)
- maneuver** (Army) one of the nine principles of war: place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power (FM 3-0)
- maneuver battlefield operating system** the movement of forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force projection. (FM 7-15)
- MANPADS** man-portable air defense system
- Marine air-ground task force** the Marine Corps principal organization for all

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missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. (JP 3-02.1)

Marine expeditionary force the largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. (JP 3-02.1)

Marine expeditionary unit a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. (JP 3-02.1)

mass (Army) one of the nine principles of war: concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time (FM 3-0)

mass casualty any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or

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	armed attack that exceeds local logistical support capabilities (JP 4-02.2)
medical evacuation	the timely and efficient movement of patients while providing <i>en route</i> medical care to and between medical treatment facilities (FM 4-02)
meeting engagement	(Army) a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place (FM 3-0)
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METT-TC	1) in the context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (2) in the context of tactics, the major factors considered during mission analysis (FM 6-0)
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MEU(SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MG	major general
MHE	materials handling equipment
military deception	actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-58)
misinformation	unintentionally incorrect information emanating from virtually anyone, for reasons unknown or to solicit a response or interest that is not political or military in origin (FM 100-6)
mission	1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02)
mission command	the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission

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orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. (FM 6-0)

mission orders a technique for completing combat orders to allow subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions that leave the "how" of mission accomplishment to the subordinate (FM 6-0)

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

mobile defense (Army) a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (FM 3-0)

mobility operations (Army) those activities that enable a force to move personnel and equipment on the battlefield without delays due to terrain or obstacles (FM 3-34)

mobility corridors areas where a force will be canalized due to terrain constructions. They allow military forces to capitalize on the principles of mass and speed and are therefore relatively free of obstacles. (JP 2-01.3)

mobility/countermobility/survivability battlefield operating system mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces. Countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces. Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems. (FM 7-15)

modified combined obstacle overlay a joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace product used to portray the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations. It normally depicts militarily significant aspects of the battlespace environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives. (JP 2-03.1)

movement to contact a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (FM 3-0)

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- MSC** Military Sealift Command
- MST** maintenance support team
- MTMC** Military Traffic Management Command
- MTW** major theater war
- multinational operations** a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16)
- N** north (graphics only)
- NATO** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- naval coastal warfare** coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy and in the United States as part of this Nation's defense (JP 3-33)
- naval gunfire support** fire provided by Navy surface gun systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives. A subset of naval surface fire support. (JP 3-33)
- naval surface fire support** fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives (JP 3-33)
- NBC** nuclear, biological, and chemical
- NCW** naval coastal warfare
- neutral** (Army) an individual, a group of individuals, an organization, or a nation which is not hostile or in any way supportive of only one belligerent force in a hostile environment (FM 3-07)
- NGO** nongovernmental organization
- NIMA** National Imagery and Mapping Agency
- NKPA** North Korean People's Army
- no-fire area** a land area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are prohibited (JP 3-09)

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- noncombatant** 1. An individual, in an area of combat operations, who is not armed and is not participating in any activity in support of any of the factions or forces involved in combat. 2. An individual, such as a chaplain or medical personnel, whose duties do not involve combat. (FM 3-07)
- noncombatant evacuation operation** an operation directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States (JP 3-07.5)
- noncontiguous area of operations** when one or more of a commander's subordinate forces' areas of operation do not share a common boundary (FM 3-90)
- nongovernmental organization** a transnational organization of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-US organizations. (JP 3-07)
- nonlethal fires** any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities. Psychological operations, special operations forces, electronic warfare (jamming), and other command and control countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options. (FM 6-20)
- nonlethal weapons** weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross physical

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destruction to prevent the target from functioning. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: (1) They have relatively reversible effects on personnel and material. (2) They affect objects differently within their area of influence. (JP 1-02)

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment

OBJ objective (graphics only)

objective (Army) 1. A location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. (FM 3-90) 2. One of the nine principles of war: direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. (FM 3-0) 3. The most important decisive point. (FM 3-0)

offensive one of the nine principles of war: seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (FM 3-0)

offensive information operations (Army) the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives (FM 3-0)

offensive operations operations aimed at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory. (FM 3-0)

operation 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 5-0)

operational control transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational

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control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 3-0)

operational framework the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and the battlefield organization. (FM 3-0)

operational level of war the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

operations process plan, prepare, and execute with continuous assessment. (FM 6-0)

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operations security a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 3-54)

OPSEC operations security

order (Army) a written or oral communication directing actions. Orders are based on plans or the receipt of a new mission. (FM 101-5)

PA public affairs

paramilitary force forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JP 3-05)

patrol a detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security mission (JP 1-02)

PDF Panamanian Defense Force

peace enforcement application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07.3)

peacekeeping military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-07.3)

peace operations a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (JP 3-07.3)

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- peacetime military engagement** all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander's objectives as articulated in the theater engagement plan. (FM 3-0)
- penetration** a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-0)
- PGM** precision-guided munitions
- phase line** a line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually an easily identified feature in the operational area (JP 1-02)
- physical destruction** the application of combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of information and command and control systems, and installations. It includes direct and indirect forces from ground, sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations forces. (FM 100-6)
- physical security** that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-13)
- PIR** priority information requirements
- PL** phase line (graphics only)
- PLO** Palestine Liberation Organization
- PMCS** preventive maintenance checks and services
- PME** peacetime military engagement
- port of debarkation** the geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements, it may or may

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- not coincide with the destination (JP 3-35)
- port of embarkation** the geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. This may be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation; for unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. (JP 3-35)
- POW** prisoner of war
- principles of war** principles that provide general guidance for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The principles are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine. The nine principles of war are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. (FM 3-0)
- priority information requirements** those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making (JP 2-0)
- propaganda** any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 3-53)
- psychological operations** planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 3-53)
- PSYOP** psychological operations
- public affairs** those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal with interest in the Department of Defense (JP 3-61)
- pursuit** an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02)

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- push** in logistics, the delivery of a predetermined amount of supplies to a user on a scheduled basis without the user requesting them. (FM 100-10)
- PZ** Panzer (graphics only)
- QRF** quick reaction force
- R.** River (graphics only)
- railhead** a point on a railway where loads are transferred between trains and other means of transport (JP 4-01.5)
- rear area** for any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions and is where the majority of the echelon's sustaining functions occur. (JP 3-10)
- refugee** a civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety elsewhere (JP 3-07.6)
- relevant information** all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control (FM 3-0)
- relief in place** (Army) a tactical enabling operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit (FM 3-90)
- reorganization** action taken to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness (FM 100-9)
- responsiveness** one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: providing the right support at the right place at the right time (FM 100-10)
- reserve** that portion of a force withheld from action or uncommitted to a specific course of action, so as to be available for commitment at the decisive moment. Its primary purpose is to retain flexibility through offensive action. (JP 1-02)
- retrograde** a type of defensive operations that involves organized movement away from the enemy (FM

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3-0)

- riot control agent** any chemical that is not listed in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritate or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure (JP 1-02)
- risk** (Army) chance of hazard or bad consequences; exposure to chance of injury or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability or severity. (FM 100-14)
- risk assessment** the identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process) (JP 1-02)
- risk management** (Army) the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making an informed decision that balances cost with mission benefits (FM 3-0)
- ROE** rules of engagement
- ROK** Republic of Korea
- ROM** Romanian Army (graphics only)
- RPG** rocket-propelled grenade
- rules of engagement** (Joint) directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-0)
- SALT** supporting arms liaison team
- SBU** special boat unit
- SEAL** sea-air-land team
- search and attack** a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-0)
- secure** (Army) a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action. (FM 3-90)
- security** (Army) one of the nine principles of war: never

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- permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage (FM 3-0)
- seize** a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area using overwhelming force (FM 3-90)
- sequel** an operation that follows the current operation. It is a future operation that anticipates the possible outcome—success, failure, or stalemate—of the current operation. (FM 3-0)
- SF** Army Special Forces
- shaping operations** operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for success of the decisive operation (FM 3-0)
- show of force** an operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives (JP 3-07)
- SIGINT** signals intelligence
- signals intelligence** 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. (JP 2-0)
- simplicity** one of the nine principles of war and one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: prepare clear, uncomplicated plans, and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. (FM 3-0)
- situational understanding** the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0)
- situation template** a depiction of assumed adversary dispositions, based on adversary doctrine and the effects of the battlespace if the adversary should adopt a particular course of action. In effect, situation templates are the doctrinal templates depicting a particular operation modified to account for the

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effects of the battlespace environment and the adversary's current situation (training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, dispositions). Normally, the situation template depicts adversary units two levels of command below the friendly force, as well as the expected locations of high-value targets. Situation templates use time-phase lines to indicate movement of forces and the expected flow of the operation. Usually, the situation template depicts a critical point in the course of action. Situation templates are one part of an adversary course of action model. Models may contain more than one situation template. (JP 2-03.1)

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

SO special operations

SOCCE special operations command and control element

SOCOORD special operations coordination element

SOF special operations forces

SOFA status-of-forces agreement

SOP standing operating procedure

SOWT special operations weather team

SPOD seaport of debarkation

SPOE seaport of embarkation

space operations the employment of space system capabilities that provide the means to enhance command and control, facilitate the maneuver of forces, reduce the commander's uncertainty, and improve fire support, air defense, intelligence collection, and combat service support operations which will support strategic, operational, and tactical missions across the operational continuum in the near, mid, and far term (FM 3-14)

special operations (Joint) operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations

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are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 3-05)

special operations forces those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations (JP 3-05)

special reconnaissance (Army) complementing of national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods where there are constraints of weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures, and/or other systems availability. Special reconnaissance is a human intelligence function that places US or US-controlled "eyes on target" in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory when authorized. SOF may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations (FM 100-25)

SR special reconnaissance

SSC smaller-scale contingency

stability operations operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis (FM 3-0)

status-of-forces agreement an agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status

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of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. (JP 3-57)

- strategic level of war** the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 3-0)
- strategy** the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives (FM 3-0)
- striking force** a committed force organized to conduct the decisive attack in a mobile defense. It normally comprises the maximum combat power available to the commander at the time of the attack. (FM 3-0)
- strong point** (Army) a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain (FM 3-90)
- STT** special tactics team
- support operations** operations that employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering (FM 3-0)

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- surprise** one of the nine principles of war: strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared (FM 3-0)
- survivability** (Joint) 1. Concept which includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy. Survivability tactics include building a good defense; employing frequent movement; using concealment, deception, and camouflage; and constructing fighting and protective positions for both individuals and equipment. Encompasses planning and locating position sites, designing adequate overhead cover, analyzing terrain conditions and construction materials, selecting excavation methods, and countering the effects of direct and indirect fire weapons. (JP 3-34) (Army) 2. One of the eight characteristics of combat service support: being able to shield support functions from destruction or degradation (FM 100-10)
- sustainability** one of the eight characteristics of combat service support: the ability to maintain continuous support throughout all phases of the operations (FM 100-10)
- sustaining operations** operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development (FM 3-0)
- sustainment** the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective (JP 4-0)
- synchronization** 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 3-0)
- TAC** tactical (graphics only)
- TACON** tactical control
- tactical combat force** a combat unit, with appropriate combat support

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and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level II threats (JP 3-10.1)

tactical control command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (JP 3-0)

tactical level of war the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 3-0)

target acquisition the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons (JP 3-55)

targeting 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (JP 3-60)

task organization (Army) a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (FM 3-0)

task organizing (Army) the process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships (FM 3-0)

TC training circular

TCC transportation component command

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tempo	the rate of military action (FM 3-0)
terrorism	the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 3-07.2)
terrorist	an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result (JP 3-07.2)
terminal control	1. The authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft which are delivering ordnance, passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target. Terminal control is a type of air control. 2. Any electronic, mechanical, or visual control given to aircraft to facilitate target acquisition and resolution. (JP 1-02)
TF	task force
throughput distribution	the bypassing of one or more intermediate supply echelons in the supply system to avoid multiple handling (FM 100-10)
TIM	toxic industrial materials
time-phased force and deployment data	a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database located at Appendix 1 to Annex A of deliberate plans. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. This listing is to include both a. In-place units; and b. Units to be deployed to support the deliberate plan. (JP 4-0)
track	1. To display or record the successive positions of a moving object. 2. To keep a gun properly aimed, or to point continuously a target-locating instrument at a moving target (JP 1-02)
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
turning movement	(Army) a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat (FM 3-0)

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- UAV** unmanned aerial vehicle
- UN** United Nations
- unconventional warfare** a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 3-05)
- unexploded ordnance** explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material, and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 1-02)
- UNITAF** Unified Task Force
- unity of command** one of the nine principles of war: for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander (FM 3-0)
- unity of effort** coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command structure (FM 6-0)
- UNOSOM** UN Operations in Somalia
- UNSCR** UN Security Council Resolution
- *UO** urban operations
- *urban area** a topographical complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature
- *urban environment** includes the physical urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships between its key components—the terrain (natural and man-made), the population, and the supporting infrastructure—as an

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overlapping and interdependent system of systems.

urban operations (Army) offense, defense, stability, and support operations conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features (FM 3-0)

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USAID US Agency for International Development

USCG US Coast Guard

USCINCCENT Commander in Chief, United States Central Command

USFORSOM US Forces, Somalia

USN United States Navy

USS US ship

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM US Space Command

USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command

UXO unexploded ordnance

VC Vietcong

versatility the ability of Army forces to meet the global, diverse mission requirements of full spectrum operations (FM 3-0)

visualizing creating and thinking in mental images. See also *commander's visualization*. (FM 6-0)

vulnerability 1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished. 2. The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment. 3. In

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information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 3-11)

withdrawal operation a planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy (Joint)

WMD weapons of mass destruction

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FM 3-06 (FM 90-10)
1 JUNE 2003

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
xxxxxxx

DISTRIBUTION: *Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve:* To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 111233, requirements for FM 3-06.

PIN:

DODDOA-004580

- Hydrographic surveys.
- Psychological profiles.
- Matrices, diagrams, or charts.
- Various urban overlays.

OVERHEAD IMAGERY

B-34. Recent satellite imagery or aerial photography will be required for most types of UO. Such images clarify vague and inaccurate maps and other graphic representations. Satellite assets provide responsive data input into the geographic information systems (GIS). (The National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA] and other intelligence sources prepare data sets.) GIS will often form the basis for creating the three-dimensional representations and the various overlays described below. Frequently updated (or continuous real-time) satellite or aerial imagery may be required for detailed pattern analysis and maintaining accurate situational understanding. For example, imagery taken during an area's rainy season may appear significantly altered during the summer months.

THREE-DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATIONS

B-35. Often, physical or computer-generated (virtual) three-dimensional representations may be required to achieve situational understanding. These representations include specific sections of the urban area or specific buildings or structures. Such detail is particularly important for special operating forces and tactical-level units. These units require detail to achieve precision, increase the speed of the operation, and lessen friendly casualties and collateral damage.

INFRASTRUCTURE BLUEPRINTS

B-36. Urban police, fire, health, public utilities, city engineers, realtors, and tourist agencies often maintain current blueprints and detailed maps. Such documents may prove useful to update or supplement military maps or to clarify the intricacies of a specific infrastructure. They may prove critical in operations that require detailed information to achieve the speed and precision required for success. Without such detail, analysts determine interior configurations based on a building's outward appearance. That task becomes more difficult as the building size increases.

HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYS

B-37. Many urban areas are located along the world's littorals regions and major rivers. Therefore, commanders may need hydrographic surveys to support amphibious, river crossing, and logistic operations.

DODDOA-004581

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES

B-38. Psychological profiles analyze how key groups, leaders, or decisionmakers think or act—their attitudes, opinions, and views. They include an analysis of doctrine and strategy, culture, and historical patterns of behavior. The degree to which the attitudes, beliefs, and backgrounds of the military either reflect or conflict with the urban populace's (or civilian leadership's) core values is extremely important in this analysis. Psychological profiles help to assess the relative probability of a threat (or noncombatant group) adopting various COAs as well as evaluating a threat's vulnerability to deception. These profiles are derived from open-source intelligence as well as signals and human intelligence.

MATRICES, DIAGRAMS, OR CHARTS

B-39. Matrices, diagrams, and charts help to identify key relationships among friendly and threat forces and other significant elements of the urban environment. These tools and products include—

- **Association Matrix (or Link Diagram).** The association matrix helps identify the nature and relationship between individuals and groups. Similarly, the link diagram graphically represents key relationships between population elements. These tools are critical for identifying common interests. A significant matrix may be a comparison of cultural perspectives—ideology, politics, religion, acceptable standards of living, and mores—between urban population groups and Army (and multinational) forces to help understand and accurately predict a civilian element's actions.
- **NGO Matrix.** Potentially a form of the association matrix, this matrix contains each NGO's location, capabilities, and relationships (with specific elements of the civilian population, threat and friendly forces, and other NGOs). (See the discussion of Participating Organizations and Agencies in Chapter 8.)
- **Media Analysis Matrix.** This conceptual tool can be used to evaluate each information medium (and the multiple elements within each). Such mediums can include radio, television, print, word of mouth, Internet, and graffiti with its effect on specific sectors of urban population (or larger audiences). This can assist in the perception analysis.
- **Population Capabilities and Dependencies Matrix.** This matrix is similar to the NGO matrix. It describes the capabilities and dependencies of the urban population elements. It is essential in identifying each element's role (threat or friendly) and influence. Depending on their location along the threat-friendly continuum, dependencies may be vulnerabilities that must be attacked or sustained and protected.
- **Pattern Analysis Plot Chart.** This chart depicts the times and dates of a selected activity (such as ambushes, bombings, and demonstrations) to search for patterns of activity for predictive purposes as well as to discern

intent.

VARIOUS URBAN OVERLAYS

B-40. Staffs can produce various map overlays. These overlays depict physical locations of some aspect critical to the planning and conduct of the urban operation. NIMA can produce many overlays as an integrated map product (including satellite imagery). These overlays can include the—

- **Population Status Overlay.** This tool depicts the physical location of various groups identified by any significant social category such as religion or language. During offensive and defensive operations, it may simply be where significant numbers of people are "huddled" or located throughout the battlefield. Population dispersal can vary significantly through the day, particularly at night, and must be considered as part of the overall analysis leading to the development of this tool.
- **Forms and Functions Overlay.** Based on the urban model, this overlay depicts the urban core or central business district, industrial areas, outlying high-rise areas, commercial ribbon areas, and residential areas, to include shantytowns.
- **Infrastructure Overlay.** This overlay is actually a series of overlays. It depicts identifiable subsystems in each form of urban infrastructure: communications and information, transportation and distribution, energy, economics and commerce, and administration and human services. Each subsystem can be broken down into more detail. Infrastructure data may be used to develop three other overlays—
 - **Critical Infrastructure Overlay.** This tool displays specific elements of the urban infrastructure that, if harmed, will adversely affect the living conditions of the urban society to the detriment of the mission. These elements may include power generation plants, water purification plants and pumping stations, and sewage treatment plants. This information could be coded as part of the overall infrastructure overlay.
 - **Lines of Communications (LOCs) Overlay.** The LOCs overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes, such as railways, road, trails, navigable waterways, airfields, and open areas for drop zones and landing zones. It also includes subsurface areas and routes such as sewage, drainage, and tunnels and considers movement between supersurface areas. The LOCs overlay and the route overlay (below) consider traffic conditions, times, and locations, to include potential points where significant portions of the urban population may congregate.
 - **Route Overlay.** This overlay emphasizes mobility information to assist commanders and planners in determining what forces and equipment can move along the urban area's mobility corridors.

Pertinent data includes street names, patterns, and widths; bridge, underpass, and overpass locations; load capacities; potential sniper and ambush locations (which may be its own overlay); and key navigational landmarks. The structures over a specific height overlay and subsurface overlay may assist in its development. As with the LOCs overlay, commanders, planners, and analysts think in all dimensions.

- **Line of Sight or Intervisibility Overlay.** This product creates a profile view (optical or electronic) of the terrain from the observer's location to other locations or targets. It can show trajectory or flight-line masking as well as obstructed or unobstructed signal pathways.
- **Structures Over a Specific Height Overlay.** This level of detail may also be critical to communications, fires, and Army airspace command and control (air mobility corridors especially low-level flight profiles). Incorporated as part of this overlay, it may include floors or elevations above limitations for particular weapon systems at various distances from the structure.
- **Subsurface Area Overlay.** As an alternate to the building or structure height overlay, this product provides the locations of basements, underground parking garages, sewers, tunnels, subways, naturally occurring subterranean formations, and other subsurface areas. Similar to elevation "dead spaces," this overlay may show areas that exceed depression capabilities of weapon systems and potential threat ambush locations—again, affecting maneuver options.
- **Urban Logistic Resources Overlay.** This product identifies the locations of urban logistic resources that may contribute to mission accomplishment. It may contain specific warehouse sites, hospitals and medical supply locations, viable food stores, building material locations, fuel storage areas, car or truck lots, maintenance garages, and appliance warehouses. (NGO locations, taken from the NGO matrix, may be an essential, overlapping element of this overlay.)
- **Hazardous Facilities Overlay.** This overlay identifies urban structures with known or suspected chemical, biological, or radiological features, such as nuclear power plants, fertilizer plants, oil refineries, pharmaceutical plants, and covert locations for producing weapons of mass destruction. These locations are critical to maneuver and fire planning.
- **Protected Target Overlay.** This overlay depicts terrain that should not be destroyed or attacked based on restrictions due to international, host-nation, or US law and subsequent rules of engagement. These may include schools, hospitals, historical or other culturally significant monuments, and religious sites. This overlay may incorporate no-fire areas, such as special operations forces locations, critical infrastructure, logistic sources, and hazardous sites that must be protected as part of the commander's concept of the operation.

DODDOA-004584

- **Incident Overlay.** Similar to the pattern analysis plot chart, this product depicts the location of different threat actions and types of tactics employed to uncover recurring routines, schemes, methods, tactics, or techniques and overall threat interests, objectives, or the desired end state.

B-41. The above IPB tools and products constitute a small sampling of what staffs and analysts can produce. They are limited only by their imaginations and mission needs (not all tools presented above may be relevant or necessary to every operation). Many products can be combined into a single product or each can generate further products of increasing level of detail. This is similar to transparent overlays positioned one atop another on a map. Technology may allow for more urban data to be combined, compared, analyzed, displayed, and shared. The challenge remains to provide timely, accurate, complete, and relevant information in an understandable and usable form *without overloading the commander.*

DODDOA-004585

Appendix C

⁵¹Operations in Somalia: Applying the Urban Operational Framework to Support and Stability

⁵²It's impossible for an American mother to believe that a Somali mother would raise children to avenge the clan.

Major General Thomas M. Montgomery

Contents	
General Situation Somali Operations Initial UN Response PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOSOM I) RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) CONTINUED HOPE (UNOSOM II) Phased Withdrawal Assess Understanding the Clan (Human Dimension)	Threat Strategy and Tactics Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Shape Dominate Unity of Command (Effort) Measured Restraint Transition Summary

GENERAL SITUATION

DODDOA-004586

C-1. Following decades of political unrest and the fall of Somali dictator Siad Barre, a civil war broke out as 14 clans vied for power. The resulting nation composed of hostile social factions was held together by weak political alliances—none strong enough to unite and lead the country to national reconciliation. An ongoing drought led to famine and compounded the ethnic tensions and political instability. This volatile situation rapidly led to a phased US involvement (see Figure C-1). Army forces combined, sequenced, and proportionally emphasized

Operation	Dates	UN Security Council Resolution	Relative Proportionality Between Types of Operations
PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOSOM I)	Aug 92 - Dec 92	UNSCR# 751 24 Apr 92	
RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF)	Dec 92 - May 93	UNSCR# 794 3 Dec 92	
CONTINUED HOPE (UNOSOM II)	May 93 - Mar 94	UNSCR# 814 26 Mar 93	

Figure C-1. Phases of US Involvement in Somalia

the different types of operations to accomplish changing political objectives. Throughout all operations in Somalia, urban areas were critical to achieving mission success.

SOMALI OPERATIONS

INITIAL UN RESPONSE

C-2. The United Nations (UN) initially responded to requests for assistance from international relief organizations by sending supplies and other forms of humanitarian aid to Somalia. However, widespread looting, fighting between gangs, and other lawlessness prevented supplies from reaching the hungry and sick. Only 20 percent of the food entering the country reached the people who needed it. An estimated 25 percent of Somalia's 6 million people died of starvation or disease. In April 1992, the UN issued Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 which authorized 50 *unarmed* observers, but the action had little effect. Under continuing pressure for additional measures to ensure the delivery of supplies and relief, the UN authorized 500 *armed* peacekeepers (furnished by Pakistan and transported by US sea- and airlift) to protect humanitarian workers. The battalion's limited mission, designated UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), encompassed safeguarding the unloading of ships and providing convoy security.

PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOSOM I)

C-3. In July 1992, the UN requested an increased airlift of supplies and the US quickly responded. US Central Command (CENTCOM) activated joint task force (JTF) OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF. Based on careful mission analysis, CENTCOM limited the JTF's actions to—

- Deploying a humanitarian assistance survey team to assessing relief requirements.
- Providing an emergency airlift of supplies.
- Using Air Force cargo aircraft for daily relief sorties into Somalia.

CENTCOM restricted the sorties to flying during daylight hours and to locations that would provide a permissive and safe environment. In mid-September 1992, the US prudently expanded its role by stationing the amphibious ready group Tarawa offshore to provide support to the Pakistani security battalion and to provide security for US airlift operations. The 11th Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) was on board the *USS Tarawa* to rapidly respond to any change in mission (see Appendix D for a description and the capabilities of a MEU).

RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF)

DODDOA-004587

C-4. By November 1992, the magnitude of the task, UN organizational deficiencies, and a continued lack of security precluded delivery of sufficient

supplies to the needy. Notably, a ship laden with relief supplies was fired on in the harbor at Mogadishu, forcing its withdrawal before the supplies could be brought ashore, and a Pakistani peacekeeper was shot when his car was hijacked. Subsequently, the US offered to provide forces and lead an UN-sponsored operation to reopen the flow of food to where it was needed most. In December 1992, the UN issued UNSCR 794, which authorized member states "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somali" and demanded "all factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities." To allay concerns of colonialism by a number of African countries, the UN Secretary-General was given oversight of the operation. The resolution also required soldiers to be withdrawn once order was restored; however, it provided no exit strategy. As clearly as possible, the CENTCOM mission statement for OPERATION RESTORE HOPE reflected the UN mandate:

When directed by the [President or the Secretary of Defense], USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.

C-5. Mogadishu was the largest port in the country and the focal point of previous humanitarian relief activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It was also the headquarters of the coalition of 20 nations and over 30 active humanitarian relief organizations. As such, Mogadishu became the entry point for the operational buildup of the multinational force known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the key logistic hub for all operations in Somalia. UNITAF immediately gained control over the flow of relief supplies into and through Mogadishu and stabilized the conflict among the clans. In less than a month, UNITAF forces expanded control over additional ports and interior airfields. They secured additional distribution sites in other key urban areas in the famine belt to include Baidoa, Baledogle, Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet Uen, Oddur, Marka, and the southern town of Kismayo (see Figure C-2). With minimal force, the US-led UNITAF established a secure environment that allowed relief to reach those in need, successfully fulfilling its limited—yet focused—mandate.




Figure C-2. Map of Somalia

DODDOA-004588

CONTINUED HOPE (UNOSOM II)

C-6. In March 1993, the UN issued UNSCR 814 establishing a permanent peacekeeping force, UNOSOM II. However, the orderly transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was repeatedly delayed until May 1993. (The UN Secretary-General urged the delay so that US forces could effectively disarm bandits and rival clan factions in Somalia.) This resolution was significant in two critical aspects:

- It explicitly endorsed nation building with the specific objectives of rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of Somalia.
- It mandated the first ever UN-directed peace enforcement operation under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Charter, including the requirement for UNOSOM II to disarm the Somali clans. The creation of a peaceful, secure environment included the northern region that had declared independence and had hereto been mostly ignored.

These far-reaching objectives exceeded the limited mandate of UNITAF as well as those of any previous UN operation. Somali clan leaders rejected the shift from a peacekeeping operation to a peace enforcement operation. They perceived the UN as having lost its neutral position among rival factions. A more powerful clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aideed (leader of the Habr Gidr clan), aggressively turned against the UN operation and began a radio campaign. This campaign characterized UN soldiers as an occupation force trying to recolonize Somalia.

C-7. The mounting crisis erupted in June 1993. Aideed supporters killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and wounded 57 in an ambush while the soldiers were conducting a short-warning inspection of one of Aideed's weapons arsenals. UNSCR 837, passed the next day, called for immediately apprehending those responsible and quickly led to a manhunt for Aideed. The US deployed 400 Rangers and other special operations forces (SOF) personnel to aid in capturing Aideed, neutralizing his followers, and assisting the quick reaction force (QRF), composed of 10th Mountain Division units, in maintaining the peace around Mogadishu.

PHASED WITHDRAWAL

C-8. On 3 October 1993, elements of Task Force (TF) Ranger (a force of nearly 100 Rangers and SOF operators) executed a raid to capture some of Aideed's closest supporters. Although tactically successful, 2 helicopters were shot down, 75 soldiers were wounded, and 18 soldiers were killed accomplishing the mission. The US deaths as well as vivid scenes of mutilation to some of the soldiers increased calls to Congress for withdrawing US forces from Somalia. The President then ordered reinforcements to protect US Forces, Somalia (USFORSOM) as they began a phased withdrawal with a 31 March deadline. The last contingent sailed from Mogadishu on 25 March, ending OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE and the overall US mission in Somalia.

DODDOA-004589

C-9. Although US forces did not carry out the more ambitious UN goals of nation building, they executed their missions successfully, relieving untold suffering through humanitarian assistance with military skill and professionalism. Operations in Somalia occurred under unique circumstances, yet commanders may glean lessons applicable to future urban support operations and stability operations. In any operations, commanders balance changing mission requirements and conditions.

ASSESS

C-10. Although accomplished to varying degrees, US forces failed to adequately assess the urban environment, especially the society. Somali culture stresses the unity of the clan; alliances are made with other clans only when necessary to elicit some gain. Weapons, overt aggressiveness, and an unusual willingness to accept casualties are intrinsic parts of the Somali culture. Women and children are considered part of the clan's order of battle.

C-11. Early in the planning for OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, US forces did recognize the limited transportation and distribution infrastructure in Mogadishu. The most notable was the limited or poor airport and harbor facilities and its impact on the ability of military forces and organizations to provide relief. Therefore, a naval construction battalion made major improvements in roads, warehouses, and other facilities that allowed more personnel, supplies, and equipment to join the relief effort faster.

UNDERSTANDING THE CLAN (THE HUMAN DIMENSION)

DODDOA-004590

C-12. During OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, the UNITAF worked with the various clan leaders as the only recognized leadership remaining in the country. The UNITAF was under the leadership of LTG Robert B. Johnston and US Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley. In addition, UNITAF forces also tried to reestablish elements of the Somali National Police—one of the last respected institutions in the country that was not clan-based. This reinstated police force manned checkpoints throughout Mogadishu and provided crowd control at feeding centers. Largely because of this engagement strategy, the UNITAF succeeded in its missions of stabilizing the security situation and facilitating humanitarian relief. Before its termination, the UNITAF also worked with the 14 major Somali factions to agree to a plan for a transitional or transnational government.

C-13. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, retired US Navy admiral Jonathon Howe, worked with the UNOSOM II commander, Turkish General Cevik Bir. During OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, Howe and General Bir adopted a philosophy and operational strategy dissimilar to their UNITAF predecessors. Instead of engaging the clan leaders, Howe attempted to marginalize and isolate them. Howe initially attempted to ignore Aideed and other clan leaders in an attempt to decrease the warlord's power. Disregarding the long-established Somali cultural order, the UN felt that, in the interest of creating a representative, democratic Somali government, they would be better served by excluding the clan leadership. This decision ultimately set the stage for strategic

failure.

THREAT STRATEGY AND TACTICS

C-14. During OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, US forces also failed to properly analyze their identified threat's intent and the impact that the urban environment would have on his strategy, operations, and tactics. The UN began to view eliminating Aideed's influence as a decisive point when creating an environment conducive to long-term conflict resolution. Aideed's objective, however, remained to consolidate control of the Somali nation under his leadership—his own brand of conflict resolution. He viewed the UN's operational center of gravity as the well-trained and technologically advanced American military forces, which he could not attack directly. He identified a potential American vulnerability—the inability to accept casualties for an operation not vital to national interests—since most Americans still viewed Somalia as a humanitarian effort. If he could convince the American public that the price for keeping troops in Somalia would be costly, or that their forces were hurting as many Somalis as they were helping, he believed they would withdraw their forces. If US forces left, the powerless UN would leave soon after, allowing Aideed to consolidate Somalia under his leadership.

VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT

C-15. US forces failed to assess and anticipate that Aideed would adopt this asymmetric approach and attack the American public's desire to remain involved in Somalia. By drawing US forces into an urban fight on his home turf in Mogadishu, he could employ guerrilla insurgency tactics and use the urban area's noncombatants and its confining nature. Such tactics made it difficult for the US forces to employ their technological superiority. If US forces were unwilling to risk harming civilians, his forces could inflict heavy casualties on them, thereby degrading US public support for operations in Somalia. If, on the other hand, the US forces were willing to risk increased civilian casualties to protect themselves, those casualties would likely have the same effect.

C-16. However, an assessment of the Somali culture and society should have recognized the potential for Aideed's forces to use women and children as cover and concealment. Accordingly, the plan should have avoided entering the densely populated Bakara market district with such restrictive rules of engagement. As legitimacy is critical to stability operations, TF Ranger should have been prepared and authorized to employ nonlethal weapons, to include riot control gas, as an alternative to killing civilians or dying themselves.

C-17. US forces also failed to assess and recognize the critical vulnerability of their helicopters in an urban environment and the potential impact on their operations. TF Ranger underestimated the threat's ability to shoot down its helicopters even though they knew Somalis had attempted to use massed rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fires during earlier raids. (Aideed brought in fundamentalist Islamic soldiers from Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men in RPG firing techniques). In fact, the Somalis had succeeded in shooting down a UH-60 flying at rooftop level at night just one week prior to the battle. Instead, TF Ranger kept their most vulnerable

helicopters, the MH-60 Blackhawks, loitering for forty minutes over the target area in an orbit that was well within Somali RPG range. The more maneuverable AH-6s and MH-6s could have provided the necessary fire support. Planning should have included a ready ground reaction force, properly task organized, for a downed helicopter contingency.

C-18. Information operations considerations apply throughout the entire urban operational framework; however, operations security (OPSEC) is critical to both assessment and shaping. OPSEC requires continuous assessment throughout the urban operation particularly as it transitions among the range of military operations and across the spectrum of conflict. As offensive operations grew during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, US forces did little to protect essential elements of friendly information. Combined with the vulnerability of US helicopters, Aideed's followers used US forces' inattention to OPSEC measures to their advantage. The US base in Mogadishu was open to public view and Somali contractors often moved about freely. Somalis had a clear view both day and night of the soldiers' billets. Whenever TF Ranger would prepare for a mission, the word rapidly spread through the city. On 3 October 1993, Aideed's followers immediately knew that aircraft had taken off and, based on their pattern analysis of TF Ranger's previous raids, RPG teams rushed to the rooftops along the flight paths of the task force's Blackhawks.

SHAPE

C-19. One of the most critical urban shaping operations is isolation. During OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, US forces largely discounted other essential elements of friendly information and did not establish significant public affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) initiatives. In fact, Army forces lacked a public affairs organization altogether. Consequently, Aideed was not isolated from the support of the Somali people. This failure to shape the perceptions of the civilian populace coupled with the increased use of lethal force (discussed below) allowed Aideed to retain or create a sense of legitimacy and popular support.

C-20. During OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, Aideed conducted his own PSYOP efforts through "Radio Aideed"—his own radio station. UNITAF countered these efforts with radio broadcasts. This technique proved so effective that Aideed called MG Anthony C. Zinni, UNITAF's director of operations, over to his house on several occasions to complain about UNITAF radio broadcasts. General Zinni responded, "if he didn't like what we said on the radio station, he ought to think about his radio station and we could mutually agree to lower the rhetoric." This approach worked.

DOMINATE

DODDOA-004592

C-21. The complexity of urban operations requires unity of command to identify and effectively strike the center of gravity with overwhelming combat power or capabilities. Complex command and control relationships will only add to the complexity and inhibit a commander's ability to dominate and apply available combat power to accomplish assigned objectives. Stability operations and support

operations as seen in Somalia required commanders to dominate only within their supporting role and, throughout, required careful, measured restraint.

UNITY OF COMMAND (EFFORT)

C-22. During OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, UNITAF successfully met unity of command challenges through three innovations. First, they created a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate unity of effort between NGOs and military forces. Second, UNITAF divided the country into nine humanitarian relief sectors centered on critical urban areas that facilitated both relief distribution and military areas of responsibility. Third, to establish a reasonable span of control, nations that provided less than platoon-sized contingents were placed under the control of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force components.

C-23. On the other hand, during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, UNOSOM II command and control relationships made unity of command (effort) nearly impossible. The logistic components of USFORSOM were under UN operational control, while the QRF remained under CENTCOM's combatant command—as was TF Ranger. However, the CENTCOM commander was not in theater. He was not actively involved in planning TF Ranger's missions or in coordinating and integrating them with his other subordinate commands. It was left to TF Ranger to coordinate with the QRF *as needed*. Even in TF Ranger, there were dual chains of command between SOF operators and the Rangers. This underscores the need for close coordination and careful integration of SOF and conventional forces (see Chapter 4). It also emphasizes overall unity of command (or effort when command is not possible) among all forces operating in a single urban environment.

C-24. Following TF Ranger's 3 October mission, the command structure during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE was further complicated with the new JTF-Somalia. This force was designed to protect US forces during the withdrawal from Somalia. JTF-Somalia came under the operational control of CENTCOM, but fell under the tactical control of USFORSOM. Neither the JTF nor USFORSOM controlled the naval forces that remained under CENTCOM's operational control. However unity of effort (force protection and a rapid, orderly withdrawal) galvanized the command and fostered close coordination and cooperation among the semiautonomous units.

MEASURED RESTRAINT

DODDOA-004593

C-25. During OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, US forces dominated within their supporting roles. Their perseverance, adaptability, impartiality, and restraint allowed them to provide a stable, secure environment. Hence, relief organizations could provide the food and medical care necessary to reduce disease, malnourishment, and the overall mortality rate. However, during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, US operations became increasingly aggressive under the UN mandate. Peace enforcement also requires restraint and impartiality to successfully dominate and achieve political objectives. The increased use of force resulted in increased civilian casualties, which in turn reduced the Somalis' perception of US legitimacy. As a result, most moderate

Somalis began to side with the Aideed and his supporters. Many Somalis felt that it was fine to intervene in the country to feed the starving and even help establish a peaceful government, but not to purposefully target specific Somali leaders as criminals.

TRANSITION

C-26. Across the spectrum of conflict, Army forces must be able to execute the full range of operations not only sequentially but, as in the case of operations in Somalia, simultaneously. OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF began primarily as foreign humanitarian assistance (a support operation) and progressed to include peacekeeping (a stability operation), defensive operations to protect UN forces and relief supplies, and minimum offensive operations. As operations transitioned to OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, it became apparent that while foreign humanitarian assistance was still the principal operation, other operations were necessary. Peacekeeping, show of force, arms control, offensive, and defensive operations grew more necessary to establish a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations. In the final phase of US involvement during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, major changes to political objectives caused a transition to peace enforcement with an increase in the use of force, offensively and defensively, to create a peaceful environment and conduct nation building.

SUMMARY

DODDOA-004594

C-27. OPERATIONS PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE were unquestionably successes. Conversely, during OPERATION CONTINUED HOPE, the 3-4 October battle of Mogadishu (also known as the "Battle of the Black Sea") was a tactical success leading to an operational failure. TF Ranger succeeded in capturing 24 suspected Aideed supporters to include two of his key lieutenants. Arguably, given the appropriate response at the strategic level, it had the potential to be an operational success. After accompanying Ambassador Oakley to a meeting with Aideed soon after the battle, MG Zinni described Aideed as visibly shaken by the encounter. MG Zinni believed Aideed and his subordinate leadership were tired of the fighting and prepared to negotiate. Unfortunately, the US strategic leadership failed to conduct the shaping actions necessary to inform and convince the American public (and its elected members of Congress) of the necessity of employing American forces to capture Aideed. The president was left with little recourse after the battle of Mogadishu but to avoid further military confrontation.

C-28. Despite this strategic failing, the operational commanders might have avoided the casualties, and any subsequent public and Congressional backlash, had they better communicated among themselves and worked with unity of effort. Recognizing the separate US and UN chains of command, the UN Special Representative, along with the CENTCOM, USFORSOM, and TF Ranger commanders, should have established the command and control architecture needed. This architecture would have integrated planning and execution for each urban operation conducted. These commanders failed to "operationalize" their plan. They did not properly link US strategic objectives and concerns to the

tactical plan. The TF Ranger mission was a direct operational attempt to obtain a strategic objective in a single tactical action. Yet, they failed to assess the lack of strategic groundwork, the threat's intent and capabilities, and the overall impact of the urban environment, to include the terrain and society, on the operation. Such an assessment may not have led to such a high-risk course of action and instead to one that de-emphasized military operations and emphasized a political solution that adequately considered the clans' influence.

DODDOA-004595

Appendix D

Joint and Multinational Urban Operations

⁵³[Joint force commanders] synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

JP 3-0

As pointed out earlier, Army forces, division size and larger, will likely be required to conduct operations in and around large urban areas in support of a joint force commander (JFC). The complexity of many urban environments, particularly those accessible from the sea, requires unique leveraging and integration of all the capabilities of US military forces to successfully conduct the operation. This appendix discusses many of these capabilities; JP 3-06 details joint urban operations.

Contents	
Purpose	Urban Functional Combatant Command
Service Urban Capabilities	Capabilities
Air Force	Transportation Command
Marine Corps	Space Command
Navy	Special Operations Command
Coast Guard	Multinational Considerations

PURPOSE

DODDOA-004596

D-1. In some situations, a major urban operation is required in an inland area where only Army forces are operating. Army commanders determine if the unique requirements of the urban environment require forming a joint task force (JTF) or, if not, request support by joint capabilities from the higher joint headquarters. Sometimes the nature of the operation is straightforward enough or the urban operation is on a small enough scale that conventional intraservice support relationships are sufficient to meet the mission requirements.

D-2. Most major urban operations (UO), however, require the close cooperation and application of joint service capabilities. A JTF may be designated to closely synchronize the efforts of all services and functions in an urban area designated as a joint operations area (JOA). If a large urban area falls in the context of an even larger ground force area of operations, a JTF dedicated to the urban operation may not be appropriate. These situations still require joint capabilities. In such cases,

the responsible JFC designates support relations between major land units and joint functional commands. The major land units can consist of Army forces, Marine Corps forces, or joint forces land component command. The joint functional commands can consist of the joint special operations task force (JSOTF), joint psychological operations (PSYOP) task force, or joint civil-military operations task force.

D-3. This appendix describes the roles of other services and joint combatant commands in UO. It provides an understanding that enables Army commanders to recommend when to form a JTF or to request support from the JFC. It also provides information so commanders can better coordinate their efforts with those of the JFC and the commanders of other services or components conducting UO. Lastly, this appendix describes some considerations when conducting UO with multinational forces.

SERVICE URBAN CAPABILITIES

D-4. Army forces conducting UO rely on other services and functional joint commands for specialized support in the urban environment. These capabilities are requested from and provided through the commanding JFC. Army forces request the assets and capabilities described in this annex through their higher headquarters to the joint command. The JFC determines if the assets will be made available, the appropriate command relationship, and the duration of the support. Army forces prepare to coordinate planning and execution with other services and to exchange liaison officers. These capabilities can greatly increase the Army's ability to assess, shape, dominate, and transition within the context of UO.

AIR FORCE

D-5. Air Force support is an important aspect of the Army force concept for urban operations. Air Force elements have a role to play in UO across the range of Army operations.

DODDOA-004597

D-6. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems contribute significantly to assessing the urban area. These ISR systems include the E-8 Joint Surveillance, Target



Figure D-1. USAF E-8 JSTARS Platform

Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (see Figure D-1), U2S, RC-135 Rivet Joint, or RQ-4A Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle. Air Force ISR systems can provide vital data to help assess threat intentions, threat dispositions, and an understanding of the civilian population. These systems also can downlink raw information in real-time to Army intelligence processing and display systems, such as the common ground station or division tactical exploitation system.

D-7. Air interdiction (AI) can be a vital component of shaping the urban battlespace. Often, AI of the avenues of approach into the urban area isolates the

threat by diverting, disrupting, delaying, or destroying threat forces before they can be used effectively against Army forces. AI is especially effective in major theater war (MTW) circumstances where restrictions on airpower are limited and the threat is likely to be a conventionally equipped enemy. In 1991 during OPERATION DESERT STORM, AI helped prevent the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division from reaching Khafji.

D-8. Precise air-delivered fires can positively and directly affect the conduct of Army close combat actions in the urban area. Special munitions designed to penetrate hardened bunkers can provide unique support to land forces executing UO. Problems associated with dense smoke and dust clouds hanging over the urban area and laser scatter may restrict the use of special, heavy, laser-guided bombs. If the launching aircraft can achieve a successful laser designation and lock-on, these weapons have devastating effects, penetrating deep into reinforced concrete before exploding with great force. If launched without a lock-on, or if the laser spot is lost, these weapons are unpredictable and can travel long distances before they impact.

D-9. General-purpose bombs from 500 to 2,000 pounds can also be used; however, they are only moderately effective against enemy located in large buildings. High-dive angle bomb runs may improve accuracy and penetration but will increase the aircraft's exposure to anti-aircraft weapons. Low-dive angle bomb runs using high-drag (retarded) bombs may be appropriate to place bombs into upper stories but penetration is poor. On the other hand, aerial bombs can pass completely through light-clad buildings and explode on the outside with unwanted effects.

D-10. In addition to shaping and dominating the UO through firepower, commanders can use Air Force capabilities to improve and augment the urban transportation and distribution infrastructure. Air Force units can repair or improve airfields, revitalize civil aviation maintenance facilities, manage air-delivered cargo, and control civil and military air traffic. These latter capabilities particularly enhance urban stability operations and support operations. These capabilities may even be decisive. Air-delivered cargo and air traffic management, for example, were the decisive factors in US forces' successful resistance of the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948. In OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, from December 1992 to May 1993, Air Force operations in Mogadishu were critical to airlifting and staging supplies and forces. The Air Force determined the ultimate success of the humanitarian assistance operation (see the Somalia vignette in Appendix C).

D-11. In unique situations, such as the Berlin Blockade and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, exercising Air Force urban capabilities may be the decisive action of the operation. Air Force capabilities will play a shaping role, sustaining role, or both in joint urban operations because of the requirement to occupy terrain and interface with the population.

MARINE CORPS

DODDOA-004598

D-12. The Marine Corps can assault across water obstacles into a defended urban

environment. This capability is an invaluable tactical and operational tool. The mere threat of this capability can divert many enemy forces from other avenues of approach and obscure the true nature of an attack. The impact of the threat of amphibious assault was vividly demonstrated during OPERATION DESERT STORM where embarked Marine Forces diverted several Iraqi divisions to defensive positions along the coast and near Kuwait City.

D-13. The presence of Marine amphibious equipment, apart from Marine infantry, provides Army forces unique capabilities. In UO, the amphibious operation is often not an assault from the sea, but rather an assault river crossing. In 1950, the 7th US Infantry Division used amphibious tractor support from the 1st Marine Division to conduct an assault river crossing of the Han River into downtown Seoul.

D-14. The worldwide deployment of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) enables a short notice response into any urban areas accessible from the sea. Typically, a deployed MAGTF is a Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)). The MEU(SOC) can perform forcible entry operations; seize lodgments, and may execute these tasks anticipating reinforcement by Army or joint forces. They are also well positioned and equipped to rapidly reinforce Army forces already deployed in theater. The special-operations-capable training that these units accomplish before deploying includes urban warfare training and contributes to their value in UO. The MEU(SOC) is relatively small (its core unit is a Marine infantry battalion), is forward deployed, and has a wide spectrum of organic capabilities. It is an important asset in crisis stability operations and support operations.

D-15. The Marine expeditionary brigade is the MAGTF between a MEU and a Marine expeditionary fo

DODDOA-004599

Army Regulation 190-47

Military Police

The Army Corrections System

**Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
5 April 2004**

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 190-47

The Army Corrections System

This revision, dated 5 April 2004--

- o Makes a correction that will improve the victim-witness overall operational effectiveness and cost efficiency (para 13-2g).
- o Modifies the requirement that all notifications must be made by certified mail (para 13-2g).

This revision, dated 26 February 2004--

- o Establishes Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA (M&RA)) as the responsible agency for the functions and operations of the Army Corrections Council, the governing body of the Army Corrections System (ACS) (para 1-4a).
- o Establishes sitting committee members by agency for the Army Corrections Council (para 1-4a).
- o Establishes the Surgeon General and Chief of Chaplains as invitational advisors on the Army Corrections Council (para 1-4a).
- o Eliminates the Hospital Prisoner Ward as a separate component of ACS (para 2-2).
- o Eliminates the United States Disciplinary Barracks as the only ACS facility authorized to provide permanent incarceration for posttrial officer prisoners (para 2-2c).
- o Establishes that associated facilities must adhere to regulatory requirements of AR 190-47 when applicable (para 2-3).
- o Establishes the requirement to have a memorandum of agreement or a contract in place before incarcerating pretrial prisoners in a federally approved civilian facility (para 3-2c).
- o Establishes that installations without ACS facilities can confine a prisoner in a federally approved local civilian jail for 10 days. Also delegates authority to the installation commander to make exceptions for prisoners with sentences to confinement locally for 30 or fewer days in a federally approved civilian facility (para 3-2i).
- o Establishes Department of the Army Provost Marshal General, as the centralized agent to determine place of incarceration for prisoners with sentences of more than 30 days confinement within the ACS facilities (para 3-3).

- o Modifies disposition of prisoners to be confined in Federal institutions (para 3-4).
- o Modifies and integrates classification plans and adjustment programs to establish criteria of considerations for prisoner custody levels (para 5-4).
- o Establishes procedures for professional services support, health care services, and prisoner initial screening (para 7-2c).
- o Establishes the facility commander's responsibility to develop policies and procedures for chaplain support and handling of confidential material (para 7-4).
- o Substantially modifies the requirements for professional services, research, and evaluation (para 7-5).
- o Adds to disposition board actions the requirement that a prisoner have employment or assistance finding employment (para 8-9c(2)(e)).
- o Modifies the standards for facility management, physical plant, and equipment (para 9-4).
- o Establishes the ACS facility commander's responsibility to develop policy procedures to implement fire prevention program (para 9-5a).
- o Establishes authorization for ACS facilities to use oleoresin capsicum pepper spray as a use of force technique (para 9-7b).
- o Eliminates the prohibition against the use of rifles or automatic weapons as security measures (para 9-7c).
- o Eliminates the prohibition against the use of pistols and revolvers as security measures (para 9-7f).
- o Eliminates MACOM authority to approve temporary exceptions and establishes a centralized approving authority for provisions in chapter 9 (para 9-8).
- o Establishes criteria for management staffing requirements to be based on maximum capacity, mission, and operational requirements (para 9-9a).
- o Specifies criteria that persons with felony convictions will not be employed on the permanent, paid staff of ACS facilities (para 9-9b).
- o Establishes criteria for ACS commanders to develop a volunteer program (para 9-9f).
- o Establishes requirements for corrections personnel to be trained to respond to health-related situations within 4-minute response time (para 9-9g).
- o Establishes requirements for ACS facilities personnel training to maintain written orders for every security post (para 9-10c).
- o Specifies guidelines for DNA analysis processing (para 10-1b(20)).

- o Eliminates correctional treatment file requirement to maintain DD Form 512 (Installation Parole/Minimum Custody Agreement) (para 10-5).
- o Establishes the requirement that prisoner personal property and funds be held in a transparent 16x12 inch envelope for storage of prisoner personal property (10-7a).
- o Authorizes prisoner mail to be handled by a certified mail handler, regardless of rank (para 10-10b(2)).
- o Establishes referral of prisoner mail rejection appeals to the facility commander or the next level in the chain of command (para 10-10b(6c)).
- o Eliminates authorization for property and funds to receive second-party checks (para 10-10b(8)).
- o Eliminates authorization to open prisoner mail with civilian or individual military counsel listed on DA Form 2569-R (Attorney of Record Designation (Civilian and Individual Military Counsel)), unless there is reasonable doubt of its authenticity or reasonable certainty that the mail contains contraband (para 10-10b and c).
- o Rewrites portions of pay, subsistence, and gratuities procedures (para 10-17).
- o Eliminates the requirement that escorts of pretrial officer prisoners be of equal or greater ranks (para 10-19h(9)).
- o Authorizes ACS commanders to develop procedures for movement of maximum custody prisoners incarcerated in their facilities (para 11-3b(2)).
- o Rewrites procedures for security of controlled items (para 11-8).
- o Establishes the requirement that, during coordination for transport of prisoners by escorts, information about the prisoner must be provided to the passenger service officer (para 11-9b(1)).
- o Rewrites procedures for hospitalizing prisoners (para 11-12).
- o Establishes that prisoners in disciplinary segregation held for periods exceeding 60 days will be provided the same program services and privileges as prisoners in administrative segregation (para 12-4e).

- o Establishes authority for prisoners submitting appeals as a result of Disciplinary and Adjustment Board actions within 15 working days at a minimum (para 12-5b).
- o Establishes that prisoners considered suicide risks be checked at least every 5 minutes (para 12-6d(5)).
- o Establishes that prisoners in segregation will be allowed a minimum of 1 hour per day, 5 days a week, of physical exercise (para 12-6d(7)).
- o Establishes that the facility commander is responsible for investigation of incidents and must develop policies and procedures to guide appropriate investigations and establish timelines for investigating violations (para 12-10a).
- o Eliminates the requirement for a victim-witness coordinator to provide a cover letter with DD Form 2705 (Victim Witness Notifications) (para 13-2a).
- o Establishes the requirement that when the victim-witness coordinator does not receive DD Form 2704 (Victim/Witness Certification and Election Concerning Inmate Status) within 48 hours of a prisoner's arrival, the coordinator should immediately contact DAPM central repository manager or the victim/witness liaison at the location where the prisoner was court-martialed (para 13-2a).
- o Makes Department of the Army, Provost Marshall, responsible for a monthly report to other service central repositories of program enrollments at ACS facilities not later than the 25th day following the closing month (para 13-7b).
- o Establishes the policy for ACS facilities on sex offender registration (chap 14).
- o Rescinds DA Form 1478 (Prisoner's Summary Continuation Sheet).

Effective 5 May 2004


Military Police

The Army Corrections System

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:



JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Proponent and exception authority.

The proponent of this regulation is the Provost Marshal General. The Provost Marshal General has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The Provost Marshal General may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or a direct reporting unit or field operating agency of the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25-30 for specific guidance.

Army management control process.

This regulation contains management control provisions and identifies key management controls that must be evaluated.

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800.

Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army and D and E for the Army National Guard of the United States and the U.S. Army Reserve.

History. This publication is a rapid action revision. The portions affected by this revision are listed in the summary of change.

Summary. This regulation revises policies governing the Army Corrections System and implements DOD Directive 1325.4.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, the Army National

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Chapter 1

The Army Corrections System

1-1. Purpose

This regulation establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities associated with the U.S. Army Corrections System (ACS).

1-2. References

Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in Appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1-4. Responsibilities

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA)(M&RA)) will exercise Army Secretariat oversight for Army corrections, parole, and clemency functions. Additionally, the ASA(M&RA) has responsibility for the functions and operation of the governing body of the Army Corrections System, the Army Corrections Council, which is composed of the following members:

- (1) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Housing), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (OASA) (Installations and Environment).
- (2) Senior Deputy Counsel, Office of General Counsel.
- (3) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel Management & Equal Opportunity Policy), OASA (Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA)).
- (4) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Army Review Boards).
- (5) OASA (M&RA).
- (6) Provost Marshal General (DAPM).
- (7) Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 (one representative).
- (8) Office of the JAG (one representative).
- (9) Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (one representative).
- (10) Assistant Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
- (11) Surgeon General (invitational advisor only).
- (12) Chief of Chaplains (invitational advisor only).

b. The Army General Counsel will provide legal advice regarding Army corrections activities to the Secretariat.

c. The Provost Marshal General (DAPM), will provide policy for—

- (1) Annual technical staff inspections of ACS facilities under their jurisdiction.
- (2) Operational oversight for the ACS.

d. The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) will provide advice on ACA legal issues; provide advice on legal issues of confinement and corrections to the DAPM; and ensure that the necessary support is provided to meet the legal needs of prisoners incarcerated within the ACS.

e. The Surgeon General will establish procedures for ensuring availability of health care to prisoners in Army custody, consistent with that provided to active duty soldiers. Transfers of prisoners, whether temporary or permanent, outside the Department of Defense (DOD), will be coordinated with and approved by DAPM.

f. The Chief of Chaplains will ensure the necessary support to meet the religious and pastoral needs of prisoners incarcerated within the ACS.

g. Commanders of major Army commands (MACOMs) will—

- (1) Implement and execute the ACS, as delineated in this regulation and announced by DAPM.
- (2) Supervise the operation and administration of ACS facilities under their jurisdiction, per this and other applicable regulations.
- (3) Provide logistical and budgetary support of ACS operations.

h. Commanders of installations having ACS facilities are responsible for the safe operation of local ACS facilities and will ensure compliance with the policies set forth herein. Pursuant to this responsibility, commanders will provide health, legal, religious, recreational, employment, educational, training, food service, and transportation support to ACS facilities on their installations consistent with resources available.

(1) The correctional custody facility (CCF) officer in charge (OIC) will ensure that correctional custody is properly administered.

(2) The commander of the installation medical activity will inspect health services and sanitation monthly, when the facility is occupied.

(3) The installation provost marshal will exercise staff supervision over the CCF and, when the facility is occupied, inspect it monthly.

1-5. Policy

a. The ACS is an integral part of the military justice system and assists commanders in the maintenance of discipline and law and order by providing a uniform system of incarceration and correctional services for those who have failed to adhere to legally established rules of discipline.

b. ACS facilities provide intensive custody and control of military offenders while providing access to basic education, offense related counseling, selected academic courses, and training necessary to prepare military prisoners for return to military duty or to the civilian community.

c. All ACS facilities will strive to be accredited by the American Corrections Association.

1-6. Army Corrections System objectives

The objectives of the ACS are to—

a. Provide a safe and secure environment for the incarceration of military offenders.

b. Protect the community from offenders.

c. Prepare military prisoners for their release whether return to duty or civilian status with the prospect of becoming productive soldiers/citizens by conforming to military or civilian environments.

1-7. Reports

a. *Monthly Correctional Report (Requirement Control Symbol CGSPO-450)*. The Correctional Facility Statistical Report will be prepared by all ACS facilities at the end of each month and forwarded to the Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM-MPD-CI), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800, by the 15th day following the closing month, with copy furnished to appropriate MACOMs. This form is prepared as directed by DAPM.

(1) Data for the report will be compiled from 0001 the first day of the month to 2400 the last day of the month.

(2) Reporting format and instructions for the preparation of the report are prescribed by DAPM.

b. *Annual Correctional Report*. This report will be prepared by all ACS facilities at the end of each calendar year and forwarded to Department of the Army, Provost Marshal General (DAPM), by the 15th day of January, with copy furnished to appropriate MACOMs. This report is prepared as directed by DAPM. This report is a supplement to the December monthly report and will consist of data compiled from the previous calendar year using Department of Defense (DD) Form 2720 (Annual Confinement Report).

c. *Annual Historical Summary (Requirement Control Symbol CSHIS-6(R3))*, per AR 870-5.

(1) Annual historical report from each ACS facility will be prepared at the close of each fiscal year (not later than 45 days following the end of the reporting period), and forwarded to DAPM.

(2) This report will include, but is not limited to—

(a) A copy of the latest organizational chart.

(b) Assigned and authorized strengths, as of the beginning and end of the fiscal year.

(c) Major structural improvements in the physical plant, grounds, and facilities during the year, and recommended future improvements, alterations, and or construction programs.

(d) A concise narrative statement concerning activities of each major organizational element describing significant accomplishments, deficiencies, and changes in operating procedures.

(e) A brief summary of correctional treatment programs (for example, employment, training, education, counseling, recreation, work abatement, work release, special temporary parole).

(f) Statistical summary information concerning the receipt and release of prisoners.

(g) Clemency actions during the year (remission and suspension of sentences, return to military service, and parole, DD Form 2720-1 (Annual Clemency/Parole Report).

(h) In-service training for assigned personnel during the year.

(i) Financial summaries will illustrate operating costs of the facility

(j) A brief statement concerning problems and significant incidents (fires, riots, disturbances, investigated incidents of assaults of inmates on cadre and cadre on inmates, attempted escapes) encountered during the fiscal year.

d. *Monthly report on victim and witness notifications*. ACS facility commanders will submit a report by the 15th of each month to DAPM. The report will follow the guidelines stated in paragraph 13-7.

e. *Annual Report on Victim and Witness Assistance (Report Control Symbol DD-P&R(A)1952)*. ACS facility commanders will submit statistical data using DD Form 2706 (Annual Report on Victim and Witness Assistance), items 4 and 5, and DOD Instruction (DODI) 1030.2 to DAPM. The report will be submitted by January 10 for the preceding calendar year.

f. *Serious incident reports*. Serious incidents will be reported in accordance with AR 190-40. Escapes, major disturbances, prisoner and detainee deaths, and substantiated allegations of prisoner and detainee abuse will be reported as serious incidents.

g. Telephonic reports. Escapes and major prisoner disturbances occurring within ACS facilities will be reported telephonically to DAPM immediately.

Chapter 2 Organizations and Functions

2-1. Types of facilities

The ACS is composed of confinement facilities, Regional Corrections Facilities (RCFs), and a centralized, long-term corrections facility, the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB).

2-2. Components of the Army Corrections System

a. Confinement facilities (Level I). Level I confinement facilities provide pretrial and short-term posttrial confinement support. Level I confinement facilities are generally limited to 90 or fewer days. When necessary, Level I facilities may confine prisoners more than 90 days, but not to exceed 1 year. Level I facilities provide custody and control, administrative support, and limited counseling support for military prisoners.

b. Regional corrections facilities (RCF) (Level II). Level II RCFs provide multifaceted correctional treatment programs, vocational and military training, administrative support, basic educational opportunity, employment, selected mental health programs, custodial control, and training to prepare military prisoners for return to duty, if determined suitable, or to civilian society as a productive citizen. RCFs provide local installation pretrial confinement support. Pretrial confinement from other installations will be coordinated through the Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM-MPD-CI).

c. USDB. The USDB is the ACS maximum custody facility that provides long-term incarceration for military prisoners for all services. It is the only ACS facility authorized to incarcerate permanently posttrial prisoners with a prison sentence of death.

2-3. Associated facilities

The facilities listed below are not part of ACS; however, they must adhere to regulatory requirements of AR 190-47 when applicable.

a. CCFs. CCFs are established to implement the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and AR 27-10, which provide commanders with means other than court-martial for disciplining soldiers who commit minor infractions for which deprivation of liberty is warranted, without the stigma of confinement.

b. Detention cells (D Cells). Provide for the temporary detention of personnel under military police jurisdiction and temporary confinement of military prisoners when a military corrections or confinement facility is not available.

Chapter 3 Confinement of Military Prisoners

3-1. Prisoner status

a. A person subject to the UCMJ who is properly ordered to confinement pursuant to Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) 2002, Part II, Chapter III, Rule 304, pending referral of charges, disposition of charges, or trial by court-martial, or a person properly ordered to confinement while awaiting trial by a foreign court, is a pretrial prisoner.

b. A person whose sentence to confinement has been announced in open court but not yet approved by the convening authority is an adjudged prisoner.

c. An individual becomes a sentenced prisoner when the convening authority takes action to approve the confinement portion of the sentence. A prisoner becomes a discharged prisoner upon completion of appellate review and execution of the punitive discharge.

3-2. Authorized place of confinement

a. Sentence to confinement. A sentence to confinement adjudged by a court-martial or other military tribunal, whether the sentence includes discharge or dismissal and whether the discharge or dismissal has been executed, may be served in any place of confinement under control of any Armed Forces or in any Federally approved penal or correctional institution under the control of the United States, or which the United States may be permitted to use.

b. Confinement of prisoners under sentence to death. Except in time of war, the USDB is the only ACS facility authorized to incarcerate prisoners under the sentence of death. This does not preclude the temporary incarceration of prisoners under sentence of death pending their transfer to the USDB. During time of war, other facilities may be designated by the Secretary of the Army to confine such prisoners.

c. Incarceration of pretrial prisoners. Soldiers ordered into pretrial confinement shall be confined in Army confinement facilities whenever practicable. When memorandums of agreements/contracts are established, pretrial prisoners may be confined at any federally approved civilian confinement/corrections facility. Pretrial prisoners may not be confined at the USDB.

(1) A person will not be placed in confinement solely to await the outcome of administrative discharge proceedings. Confinement, other than that adjudged by a previous court-martial, will not be imposed pending trial or retrial unless permitted by military law.

(2) Prior to placing an individual in pretrial confinement, the commander ordering such confinement should inform the individual of the specific wrong of which he is accused. In the event the commander ordering pretrial confinement is unable to inform the individual prior to confinement, immediate steps will be taken to ensure the individual is informed of the specific wrong of which accused.

(3) Pretrial confinement in excess of 30 days will be permitted only when personally approved in each instance by the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.

(4) Standards for determining the appropriateness of pretrial confinement and procedures for placing a person in pretrial confinement are set forth in AR 27-10 or, where appropriate, in the applicable regulations of the other services.

d. Hospitalized prisoners. Hospitalized prisoners will be placed in a specifically designated medical treatment area for proper custody and control unless the hospital commander directs otherwise.

e. Incarceration with enemy prisoners of war. Members of the Armed Forces of the United States will not be incarcerated in immediate association with enemy prisoners of war (EPW) or other foreign nationals not members of the Armed Services of the United States, unless the EPW or foreign nationals are being detained under military control for suspected or proven criminal conduct.

f. Female prisoners. The procedures of this and other Army regulations that address incarceration, restoration, clemency, and parole apply to female prisoners with the following exceptions:

(1) ACS facilities designated for incarceration of female prisoners will be modified, to provide for separate living and personal hygiene areas from male prisoners.

(2) Female prisoners will be incarcerated in ACS facilities when directed by DAPM.

g. Prisoners of other services. Prisoners of other Armed Services of the United States can be incarcerated in Army facilities, per DOD directives and other appropriate inter-service support agreements (ISA) administered by DAPM and other services. Other service prisoners incarcerated in ACS facilities are subject to the policies contained in this regulation, except as directed by DAPM.

h. Correctional custody. ACS facilities will not be used to carry out correctional custody as defined in the MCM, Part V, para 5c(4), nor will correctional personnel (military occupational specialty 95C) be used to operate correctional custody facilities.

i. Installations without ACS facilities. Installations are authorized to contract to incarcerate pretrial prisoners in federally approved local civilian jails when military facilities are not available. Such facilities, however, may not be used to confine sentenced prisoners beyond 10 days pending transfer to an ACS facility. Installation commanders may authorize exceptions for prisoners with sentences to confinement of 30 or fewer days followed by notifying DAPM of such action. ACS agreements with civilian jurisdictions will provide for the segregation of pretrial Army prisoners by officer, noncommissioned officer, and enlisted, sex, and posttrial status. Copies of agreements will be forwarded to DAPM.

3-3. Determination of place of incarceration

Based on operational requirements and programs, DAPM will determine place of incarceration for prisoners who are sentenced to more than 30 days. DAPM will develop and announce specific prisoner assignment criteria and direct prisoner transfers, as appropriate. Copies of changes in the assignment criteria will be forwarded to Clerk of Courts, ATTN: JALS-CCZ, U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency 901 North Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203.

3-4. Transfer of prisoners to be confined in Federal institutions

a. Recommendations to confine ACS prisoners in Federal institutions will be forwarded to DAPM. Incarceration of a prisoner in a Federal institution may be approved regardless of whether the convening authority has approved the sentence to confinement. ACS facility commanders will deliver prisoners under their control to Federal institutions. The commander of the losing facility will act as the custodian of all records of that prisoner confined in Federal institutions.

b. Prisoners proposed for temporary transfer to a Federal Bureau of Prisons facility (FBOP) for medical or psychiatric care shall be coordinated with DAPM.

(1) *Pretrial prisoners who require mental treatment.* Army personnel who are determined unfit to stand trial or not guilty through reason of insanity, and in instances where the mental treatment requirements are beyond the custodial abilities of the ACS, may be transferred into the Federal system to receive mental treatment as directed by the convening authority of a General Courts Martial or determined by the appropriate health authority within the ACS.

Upon receipt of the verdict, the installation Staff Judge Advocate will notify DAPM to initiate and coordinate an administrative action with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to obtain the appropriate treatment and place of incarceration.

(2) *Posttrial prisoners who require mental treatment.* If the ACS facility commander determines, based upon evaluation of a medical authority, that a prisoner suffering from a mental disease or defect requires inpatient psychiatric care or medical treatment beyond that available within the ACS, the prisoner will be notified in writing of the intention to seek temporary transfer of the prisoner to the custody of the Attorney General for care or treatment. Upon determination, the ACS commander will notify DAPM to initiate and coordinate an administrative action with the FBOP to obtain the appropriate treatment and place of incarceration.

c. Action on psychiatric determination will include the following actions.

(1) Once a prisoner is provided the notice prescribed above, the ACS facility commander will request the installation commander to direct a hearing be held to determine whether the prisoner should be transferred to the custody of the Attorney General for care. The request will state the factual basis for the determination that the prisoner requires care beyond that available within the ACS and will include all relevant documentation that provides the basis for the determination.

(2) The installation commander may disapprove the request only for good cause. If approved, he or she will direct a hearing be held to determine whether the inmate suffers from a mental disease or defect that requires inpatient psychiatric care beyond that available within the ACS.

(3) The instrument directing the hearing will designate an officer as the presiding official who is certified by The Judge Advocate General for service as a military judge authorized to try General Courts-Martial under provisions of Article 26(c), UCMJ (10 United States Code (USC) 826(c)).

(4) The prisoner will be represented by an officer of TJAG Corps certified as competent to serve as defense counsel at General Courts-Martial, pursuant to Article 27(b)(2), UCMJ (10 USC 827(b)(2)). The Government will be represented by a military or Department of the Army (DA) civilian attorney detailed by the installation Staff Judge Advocate. The installation Staff Judge Advocate will request detail of a military judge and counsel for the prisoner having requisite qualifications, detail a court reporter, and promptly provide the prisoner written notice that a hearing will be held, to include an explanation of the prisoner's procedural rights.

(5) The Chief, United States Army Trial Judiciary, and Chief, United States Army Trial Defense Service, will detail the military judge and counsel for the prisoner, respectively. Such detailing will be done in writing. Once detailed, the military judge will schedule a hearing date, affording reasonable notice to counsel and the prisoner.

(6) A prisoner may consent or object to the contemplated transfer but the prisoner may not waive the hearing to determine whether transfer to the custody of the Attorney General for care is appropriate.

d. Hearing procedures involve the following steps.

(1) The prisoner will be afforded timely written notice of the hearing and of his or her procedural rights. The prisoner will be afforded a personal hearing before an impartial decision maker, with the opportunity to present testimony and documentary evidence in his or her own behalf, and confront and cross-examine Government witnesses. Appointed military or civilian counsel of his or her own choice at no expense to the Government will represent the prisoner. The prisoner will be provided a copy of the written findings.

(2) At the hearing, the military judge will advise the prisoner of the purpose of the proceedings and inform him or her that if the Government establishes by the preponderance of evidence that the prisoner suffers from such mental disease or defect, the prisoner may be temporarily transferred to the custody of the Attorney General. The military judge will ensure the prisoner understands the procedural rights specified above.

(3) Both the Government and the prisoner will then be afforded the opportunity to present evidence regarding the present mental condition of the prisoner and the necessity, or lack thereof, for transfer to the custody of the Attorney General. The military judge, within his or her discretion, may direct further examination of the prisoner by a different psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. This is an administrative proceeding to which the Military Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply. Evidence will be admissible subject to the guidance and limitations applicable to the conduct of formal investigations under AR 15-6.

(4) The military judge will determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the prisoner suffers from a mental disease or defect for which inpatient care and treatment is required beyond that available within the ACS. The military judge will make specific written findings, to include a brief statement of the factual basis relied upon for each finding, and will make a recommendation as to whether the prisoner should be temporarily transferred to the custody of the Attorney General.

(5) A verbatim transcript of the hearing will be prepared. All exhibits offered in evidence will be attached to the hearing record in the manner normally employed in trial by courts-martial.

(6) The installation commander will review the hearing record and approve or disapprove the findings and recommendations of the military judge. Following his or her action upon the hearing record, the hearing record and action will be transmitted to the ACS facility commander for retention in the prisoner's correctional treatment file or transmittal to the Attorney General, as appropriate. If transmittal to the Attorney General is appropriate, a request for temporary transfer of the prisoner with the hearing record and action, will be forwarded through the Office of the

Provost Marshal General (DAPM-MPD-CI), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800, and HQDA, Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) (DAJA-CL), Washington, DC 20310-2213, to the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, 320 1st Street, NW, Washington, DC 20534.

e. Army prisoners transferred to Federal correctional institutions who later are determined to possess military service potential may be returned to the ACS for possible return to duty upon approval of DAPM.

3-5. Sentence computation

Computation of sentences will be per AR 633-30 and DODI 1325.7.

3-6. Sentence notifications

When the court-martial order promulgating the sentence is received and when a court-martial order remits or suspends a sentence or vacates a suspended sentence, the ACS facility commander or a designated representative will read each prisoner's sentence to the prisoner. The prisoner will acknowledge that the court-martial order was read by signing a statement entered on the order containing the date of acknowledgment and the name and grade of the person who read the order. The signed order will be placed in the prisoner's file. If a prisoner refuses to sign, the ACS facility commander, or a designated representative will make an annotation to that effect. Any supplemental orders, suspensions of confinement, or final orders received by the facility after the soldier is placed on excess leave will be mailed, return receipt requested, to the prisoner's leave address.

Chapter 4

Administration of Other Service Prisoners within the ACS

4-1. Purpose

This chapter sets forth general policies and responsibilities concerning the confinement of other-service personnel within the ACS.

4-2. Policies

a. ACS commanders remain responsible for the control and correctional treatment of all prisoners confined in their facilities regardless of service affiliation. Other-service prisoners will be employed and receive professional services support at a level equal to that provided to Army prisoners.

b. Other-service prisoners in ACS facilities will be evaluated with respect to clemency, parole, and return to duty per DODI 1325.7 and an appropriate ISA. When disposition boards are conducted, the membership will include, at the option of the parent service, a member of the parent service.

c. The parent service of other-service prisoners in the ACS will be notified of all actual or alleged serious incidents, accidents, criminal acts, misconduct, or disturbances involving other-service personnel or prisoners through liaisons established according to service level ISA.

d. Other-service prisoners will be attached to an appropriate ACS facility for rations and quarters upon convening authority action approving the sentence. General court-martial convening authority will remain with the parent service until such time as the prisoner is formally discharged. Upon execution of the prisoner's discharge, the prisoner will be reassigned to the general court-martial (GCM) authority of the Army facility in which the prisoner is incarcerated.

e. As established in service-level ISA, the services of prisoners confined in ACS facilities will—

(1) Process service-unique administrative actions associated with prisoner shipments to other facilities and provide escorts required for their transfer.

(2) Escort prisoners to and from ACS facilities for service-unique and service-directed requirements.

(3) Provide service-unique administrative support for prisoners in ACS facilities to include maintenance of pay, health, and personnel and legal records.

f. Issues involving other service prisoners requiring special management will be resolved by DAPM and the respective service headquarters.

4-3. Criteria for incarceration of other-service prisoners in Federal institutions

Other-service prisoners recommended for transfer to a Federal institution will be coordinated by DAPM. Concurrence of the appropriate service secretary is required.

4-4. Disciplinary action

Other-service prisoners confined in ACS facilities are subject to all administrative disciplinary measures prescribed in this regulation and the rules of the facility.

Chapter 5 Correctional Programs

5-1. Scope

The ACS provides the environment, opportunities, and assistance to enhance living skills among posttrial prisoners, in preparation for their release from confinement. This chapter provides guidance and direction for commanders charged with operating ACS facilities, and does not create any right or other entitlement for any prisoner.

5-2. Prisoner activities

All prisoners, unless precluded because of disciplinary, medical, or other reason determined appropriate by the facility commander, will engage in useful employment supplemented by appropriate supervision, mental health programs, professional evaluation, education, training, and welfare activities. However, activities established and resources allocated to meet these requirements are not to be less arduous or more generous than for military personnel not incarcerated.

5-3. Inmate classification

Correctional evaluation and classification will be based, at a minimum, on an individual prisoner's offense, attitude, aptitude, intelligence, personality, adaptation to incarceration, record of performance prior to incarceration, and potential for further military service. Level I (incarcerating prisoners in excess of 90 days) and Level II facilities will use classification forms in DODI 1325.7, paragraph 6.4. Level III facilities will use classification procedures in accordance with DODI 1325.7, paragraph 6.5

5-4. Classification plans

a. Policy and procedure. The facility commander will establish an inmate classification plan that covers policy and procedure for inmate classification. The plan will specify objectives and methods for achieving goals to include monitoring and evaluating the classification process. The plan will be reviewed and updated annually. The classification plan, at a minimum, will contain and or implement the following:

- (1) Assessment of a prisoner's adjustment and progress to confinement.
- (2) Ensuring prisoners are assigned to a staff member/team to ensure supervision and personal contact.
- (3) Review of prisoner's classification at least every year.
- (4) Ensuring criteria and procedures for determining and changing an inmate's classification status to include at least one level of appeal.
- (5) Ensuring all prisoners appear at their classification hearing and are given notice 48 hours before the hearing, unless the potential security of the facility or others is at serious risk.
- (6) Ensuring prisoners have the opportunity to request and receive authorization, from the ACS commander or his designated representative, a review of progress and classification status as noted on the DD Form 2712 (Inmate Work and Training Evaluation).

(7) Risk assessment of the inmate.

b. Classification review boards.

(1) Classification review boards will consider and make recommendations to the facility commander or a designated representative regarding each prisoner's correctional treatment program including custody grade, quarters, training, work, planned disposition, and special treatment.

(2) When background information has been gathered, the classification review board will review and consider cases of prisoners to determine their individual correctional treatment program and initial assignment.

(3) Special reviews, those conducted within the cycles described below, may be conducted when directed by the facility commander.

(4) The prisoner classification review and DD Form 2711-1 (Initial Custody Classification) will be used by the assignment board to report findings and recommendations and the action by the facility commander or a designee.

(5) Recommendations made by classification review boards will not be divulged to any person not having a need to know.

(6) Classification review boards will be chaired by an E8/GS-12 or above with two enlisted members (staff sergeant or above). A civilian employee in the grade of GS-7 may be substituted for one of the noncommissioned officer members.

(7) Classification boards will review and make recommendations in the following areas:

(a) Review of custody and security grade assignments. Board members will carefully review previous custody and grade assignments and recommend changes as may be appropriate based upon special circumstances.

(b) Domicile accommodations. Quarters to be occupied by a prisoner normally will be dictated by safety, security, custody grade and controlled by work assignment and the general housing plan of the facility.

(c) Prisoner training needs. Assignments to vocational training shops, schools, and other details specifically for

training or subsequent transfer from such assignments will be made on the approved recommendation of the assignment board, or a panel of the board.

(d) *Prisoner work assignments.* A prisoner's work assignment will be determined on the basis of training needs, use of existing military or civilian occupational skills, and planned disposition, with due consideration for institutional needs and support activities, custodial requirements and similar limitations.

(e) *Treatment reviews.* Assignment to a treatment program may involve referral to a mental health professional who deals with group or individual therapy, scheduled counseling, corrective counseling in family or personal problem areas, or special types of occupational or training assignments to meet a particular custodial, health, therapeutic, or control requirement. Special treatment may preclude normal work and training assignments in order to best meet special needs of the prisoner.

c. *Disposition boards.*

(1) Disposition boards will consider and make recommendations to the facility commander regarding clemency actions (clemency, restoration and return to duty) and requests for parole.

(2) Disposition boards will be conducted per policies established in 5-4c.

(3) Procedures for conducting boards are established by the facility commander.

(4) A general orientation for prisoners will be presented to ensure that the prisoner fully understands the purpose and procedures of the board, to determine any unusual or special factors of importance, which should be brought to the attention of the board.

(5) Disposition board personnel will ensure that records and material prepared for the board are complete.

(6) A prisoner's refusal to appear before the board will be noted in the board record.

(7) Relatives or other nonstaff individuals will not be permitted to appear before the board.

(8) At a minimum, a mental health report will be prepared by mental health personnel for each prisoner appearing before the board who is confined for the following offenses: murder, rape, aggravated assault, aggravated arson, sexual offenses, child abuse, or the attempt to commit any of these offenses. These reports will require approval by a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or social worker. Other prisoners appearing before these boards will require a mental health report prepared by a member of the mental health staff at the discretion of the facility commander.

(9) Disposition boards will be chaired by an E8/GS-12 or above with two enlisted members (staff sergeant or above). A civilian employee in the grade of GS-7 may be substituted for one of the noncommissioned officer members. When requested by the respective service, a member of the prisoner's service will be a board member. If a member of the Navy or Coast Guard is not available, a Marine will usually sit as a board member.

(10) A board schedule will be established to ensure receipt of current recommendations by the disposition board and the facility commander by the Army Clemency and Parole Board (ACPB), 1941 Jefferson Davis Highway, Room 222, Arlington, VA 22202, not earlier than 30 days in advance a prisoner's maximum eligibility date for consideration by the secretary of the service concerned. Disposition evaluations and recommendations being submitted for annual consideration will be forwarded 30 days in advance of annual consideration dates. Minimum eligibility dates for consideration will be determined per references cited in DOD Instruction 1325.7, Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority. The disposition board will consider prisoners for restoration or reenlistment, clemency, and parole. The board will make a recommendation regarding restoration or reenlistment only if the prisoner has applied for restoration or reenlistment.

(11) The board will make recommendations regarding clemency for each prisoner requesting clemency consideration. Consideration for parole will be per AR 15-130 and chapter 8 of this regulation. Annual clemency and parole review dates will occur per AR 15-130 and chapter 8 of this regulation, except when an interim consideration for parole or clemency is directed. When interim consideration occurs, a new annual review date will be established as of the date of the interim consideration. When action on restoration/reenlistment, clemency, or parole has been taken, the prisoner will be promptly informed of the decision.

(a) The disposition board will review DD Form 2710 (Inmate Background Summary), DD Form 2715 (Clemency/Parole Submission), DD Form 2715-1 (Disposition Board Recommendation), DD Form 2715-2 (Inmate Summary Data), DD Form 2719 (Continuation Sheet), or computer-generated reports will be prepared for use in compiling and presenting information regarding the prisoner, which becomes available following preparation of initial admission summary or a prior progress summary. Additionally, the board will review the original copy of a prisoner's DA Form 1704-R (Parole Statement) and/or a letter application for restoration/reenlistment, as appropriate, will be forwarded to the ACPB with classification material. A single copy of reports prepared by U.S. probation officers exercising supervision over parolees will be forwarded with progress summaries and basic incarceration data. Basic incarceration data will contain no reference to race or national origin and will provide an update on the current status or disposition of codefendants, if any. In unusual circumstances, a record may not be available. In those cases, the ACPB will be notified and further instructions requested.

(b) The facility parole officer's recommendation, when applicable, will be included for review by the disposition board.

d. Future reviews. An approximate date will be established for review of each prisoner's progress. Custody classification will be conducted annually at a minimum; boards may recommend earlier reviews as appropriate.

5-5. Prisoner counseling

a. Counseling is a continuing process, which often involves every member of the staff and cadre. However, no right is afforded by this regulation to any prisoner regarding participation in any particular counseling or treatment program.

b. ACS facilities will establish prisoner counseling programs commensurate with staffing levels and the policies set forth in this regulation. Counseling will, at a minimum, be available in all facilities for immediate problem solving and crisis intervention. ACS regional facilities and the USDB will, at a minimum, provide the following counseling/treatment programs:

- (1) Chemical abuse counseling.
- (2) Anger management counseling.
- (3) Stress management training.
- (4) Adjunct therapy programs, that is, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA).
- (5) Impact of crimes on victims training.
- (6) Other programs consistent with staffing, professional support, and prisoner needs.

c. RCF will rely primarily on those counseling/treatment programs available to all soldiers. Those installations unable to provide the basic regional counseling services will request a waiver from DAPM.

5-6. Prisoner employment

a. Nature of work. Prisoners will be employed in maintenance and support activities that provide work of a useful, constructive nature, consistent with their custody grade, physical and mental condition, behavior, confining offense, sentence status, previous training, individual correctional requirements, and installation/facility needs.

b. Coordination of work projects. Close coordination between the facility commander and the garrison commander or equivalent will be maintained to establish worthwhile work projects for the employment of prisoners. Approval for and assignment of prisoners to work on projects are the responsibilities of the facility commander.

c. Employment activities. Prisoners may be employed in the manufacturing and processing of items of equipment, clothing, and other useful products and supplies for DOD activities or other Federal agencies, in agricultural programs, in manufacturing, or in preparing items to meet institutional or installation needs.

d. Vicinity of work. Prisoners will not work away from the installation or subinstallation on which the facility is located, except as part of an approved work release program per chapter 6, or upon the facility commander's approval.

e. Selection of projects. Care will be exercised in the selection and approval of work projects for prisoners to avoid involving the Army in controversies with organized labor, employers, and agricultural groups. Prisoners will not be assigned to work projects that are inherently unsafe.

f. Public exhibitions. Prisoners may participate in public exhibitions, such as county or state fairs, through the display of products produced in prisoner work projects, unless a victim/witness lives within a 50-mile radius of the event location.

g. Length of workday. When not engaged in prescribed training or counseling, prisoners will be required to perform a full day of useful, constructive work. In general, prisoners will be employed through a standard 40-hour workweek. Supervisors may determine that failure to complete 40 hours was due to factors outside the control of the prisoner, such as weather, sickness, and so on. This restriction is not intended to limit the authority of commanders to direct extra work during emergencies, to prevent the assignment of prisoners to details that normally encompass weekends, or to prevent prisoners from volunteering for extra work.

h. Work assignment. Prisoners may be employed on any work assignment that is consistent with the intent and purposes of this regulation. Individuals designated by the facility commander, usually the supervisor of the work activity involved, will render specific job placements and work evaluation reports. Reassignment of a prisoner from the activity will be approved by the facility commander or a designee, except in cases involving an alleged rules violation related to the work assignment or that may have bearing on the security and safety of the prisoner or ACS.

i. Motor vehicle operation. Prisoners may be employed as operators of Army and civilian motor vehicles and vehicles undergoing maintenance on military installations only, provided they have been issued driving permits and have demonstrated the necessary proficiency. Security considerations will be carefully evaluated before authorizing a prisoner to operate a vehicle. Prisoners employed in the work release program may operate vehicles off the military reservation, subject to the restrictions of the facility commander.

j. Work restrictions.

- (1) A pretrial prisoner will not be assigned work details with posttrial prisoners.
- (2) Prisoners will not attend children; exercise dogs, except as part of authorized duties on properly established and recognized work details; clean and polish others' shoes, except in shoe repair and shoe shine projects operated by an ACS facility; do laundry work except in the installation or ACS facility laundry; act as cooks or serve meals in individual quarters; cultivate or maintain private lawns or gardens; or make beds and perform orderly or housekeeping duties in Government or privately owned quarters.

(3) Prisoners will not perform labor that results in financial gain to prisoners or other individuals, except as specifically authorized by the garrison or ACS facility commander.

(4) Prisoners will not be given work assignments that require the handling of, or access to, personnel records, classified information, drugs, narcotics, intoxicants, arms, ammunition, explosives, money or institutional keys. Prisoners will not have access to automation equipment unless approved by the ACS facility commander and properly supervised.

(5) Prisoners will be required to perform useful work to the same extent as soldiers available for general troop duty. However, they will not be used on work such as police details, area maintenance, janitorial duties, or kitchen police within unit areas. Such work projects may be performed in direct support of the ACS facility and of other installation functions, when approved by the garrison commander or equivalent.

(6) Prisoners will not be placed in any position where discharge of duties may reasonably be expected to involve the exercise of authority over other prisoners. Skilled prisoners may be used as assistant instructors to help other prisoners with academic work and vocational education/training.

(7) Prisoners may be employed in work assignments in exchanges, clubs, or in comparable work in other service-regulated activities on a military installation, provided such employment does not violate the prohibited practices listed above.

5-7. Vocational training and education

Organized vocational training and academic classes will be conducted at ACS facilities when resources are available.

a. Vocational training. Vocational training includes preparation for training in trades, industry, business, and other vocations designed to assist prisoners for assumption of employment in private industry upon release. Vocational training and supporting academic instruction may include the following:

(1) Practical work/vocational training projects, under the supervision of a trained instructor or a skilled employee of the DOD. These will be organized and operated per applicable educational, military, or industrial standards and should be designed to be self-sustaining. Such programs may provide for both practical and classroom instruction.

(2) Maintenance details using skilled supervision and modern equipment available on the installation. Detailed training objectives will be developed whenever a maintenance detail is to be designated as a vocational training position. Related military or civilian correspondence course participation to supplement the work experience will be permitted.

(3) Individual vocational/academic counseling closely correlated with work placement opportunities upon the prisoner's release.

b. Academic vocational programs. Prisoners may be permitted to pursue other nonmilitary correspondence courses at no expense to the Army. Prisoners may be required to participate in formal, vocational training classes and correspondence courses.

c. Apprenticeship Training Program. The Apprenticeship Training Program, in coordination with the Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, and craft labor unions, may be established at ACS facilities.

d. Prisoners in vocational or trade training. Most prisoners entering a vocational or trade training shop will be inexperienced and will need close supervision, instruction in principles/techniques of the trade, and supervised practice in the fundamental skills of the trade before engaging in actual work. To meet this need, each vocational training activity will plan and develop projects designed to continually evaluate the prisoner's progress and development according to clear performance standards.

e. Textbook and teaching aids. Whenever applicable, Army publications will be used. When appropriate and available, textbooks, job instruction sheets, industry standard textbooks, and teaching aids/devices may be furnished by the ACS facility.

f. Vocational training funds. Appropriated funds may be used to pay for vocational training programs per this regulation and may be supplemented with the use of nonappropriated funds (NAF) per appropriate NAF regulations. Vocational training funds may be established and operated to sustain practical work experience projects for prisoners. Prisoner generated NAF revenues will be used to support only those programs approved by the ACS facility commander per appropriate NAF regulations.

5-8. Prisoner compensation

Prisoners may be compensated for demonstrated excellence in work, according to policies established below. Only prisoners in a nonpaying status may receive wage compensation.

a. Appropriated funds. When authorized by public law or other regulation, appropriated funds available to the ACS facility may be used to pay prisoners for work performed. When authorized, DAPM will issue specific pay for work policy.

b. Good conduct time. Good conduct time shall be accorded each prisoner serving a sentence(s) imposed by a court-martial or other military tribunal for a definite term or terms of confinement. Prisoners who have a life sentence will not receive good conduct time. Good conduct time will be credited monthly with a deduction from the term of sentence(s) beginning with the day that the sentence begins. The military services may elect to calculate an anticipated

release date at the beginning of a prisoner's sentence to confinement based on the regular good conduct time that could be earned for the entire period of the sentence. A parole or probation violator, on return to confinement, shall earn good conduct time at the rate applicable to the sentence in effect at the time of violation of parole or probation. Good conduct time shall be credited in accordance with AR 633-30 and at the rates described below:

- (1) Five days for each month of the sentence, if the sentence is less than one year.
- (2) Six days for each month of the sentence, if the sentence is at least one year but less than three years.
- (3) Seven days for each month of the sentence, if the sentence is at least three years, but less than five years.
- (4) Eight days for each month of the sentence, if the sentence is at least five years but less than ten years.
- (5) Ten days for each month of the sentence, if the sentence is ten years, or more.

c. Earned time (ET) abatement. Facility commanders can grant ET as an additional incentive, from the schedule at paragraph 5-8d, to prisoners who demonstrate excellence in work, educational, and or vocational training pursuits. The facility commander will designate jobs for which ET is granted, in writing. Facility commanders will require work supervisors to report the prisoner's conduct and work performance at least quarterly. Work evaluations will be used to award ET. Those prisoners enrolled in earned timed programs who receive unfavorable evaluations or who otherwise do not work because of disciplinary reasons will not be awarded ET.

d. ET computation. ET for actual work in assignments for which ET has been authorized will be awarded at the below listed rates. ET will be awarded effective the first day of the month following eligibility so that increases occur on the first of the month. As a one-time occurrence, when closing out records, a prisoner will receive prorated credit for the month in which he/she is being released.

- (1) Level 1: Those prisoners continuously employed 1 to 5 months receive 1 day per month.
- (2) Level 2: Those prisoners continuously employed for 6 to 10 months receive 2 days per month.
- (3) Level 3: Those prisoners continuously employed for 11 to 15 months receive 3 days per month.
- (4) Level 4: Those prisoners continuously employed for 16 to 20 months receive 4 days per month.
- (5) Level 5: Those prisoners continuously employed for 21 to 25 months receive 5 days per month.
- (6) Level 6: Only applicable to prisoners in level 6 earning rate prior to publication date of this revision on AR 190-47 and per authorization of DODI 1325.7. Those prisoners serving as assistant instructors/supervisor's assistants, following attainment of Level 5, may receive 6 days per month. Prisoners, including trustees, who lose an assistant instructor/supervisor assistant position will be reduced to level 5 or the earning level held prior to elevation, whichever is less.
- (7) Level 7: Only applicable to prisoners in level 7 earning rate prior to publication date of this revision on AR 190-47 and per authorization of DODI 1325.7. Those trustees who have maintained level 6 for 6 months may be upgraded to 7 days per month. The one-level increase will be removed if the prisoner is removed from trustee status.
- (8) Prisoners receiving earned abatement at earning levels 6 and 7 computations prior to the date this revised publication is published will continue to have the opportunity to earn abatement at the level 6 or 7 rate. However, prisoners that loose their earning rate on or after the publication date of this revised AR 190-47 will not be eligible to regain the level 6 or 7 earned rate computation.

e. Enumeration qualifications. For the purposes of pay and ET credit, a prisoner will be considered as actually employed when regularly assigned to work or training for which ET has been authorized. Pay and ET will not be allowed merely because of assignment to the detail, but must be earned and allowed per this regulation. To receive abatement for a month, the prisoner must have spent at least 85 percent of the duty days on the job. Prisoners assigned to earned time detail (ETD) who are absent through no fault of their own for more than 5 work days may have a pro-rata share of their monthly credit removed. Allowance of ET may be disallowed or downgraded for any month a prisoner fails to meet the established and published work standards.

f. ET credit. Credit will be allowed by approval of the ACS facility commander or a designee. Half-day employment is considered part time. The facility commander may authorize prorata share ET for details that are less than full time.

- (1) The forfeiture and restoration of ET will be per AR 633-30.

(2) Forfeiture of ET that may be earned in the future is not authorized. An additional abatement may be authorized for participation in community service programs, over and above that which is normally scheduled; special projects supportive of institutional goals or missions; or other activities as specifically designated, in writing, and approved by the facility commander. Such ET will be awarded in a lump sum amount. Facility commander may authorize up to 5 days additional abatement.

g. ET records. ET will be recorded separately from good conduct time. A record of ET for each prisoner working on an authorized ETD will be maintained.

h. ET time for prisoners with life sentences. Prisoners with life sentences may earn ET. Such ET will be held in abeyance and only credited if the life sentence is reduced to a determinate sentence length. ET so held may be subject to forfeiture/restoration.

5-9. Academic instruction

a. Program establishment. Facility commanders will establish academic programs that ensure eligible prisoners are

afforded the opportunity to participate. Facility commanders must establish a system/procedure, or when available, use external resources to ensure academic programs are assessed and validated to determine quality of instruction and academic instruction standards are met every 3 years. Upon availability of resources, community facilities, and local businesses, the program will contain, at a minimum, the following requirements:

- (1) Educational philosophy and goals.
- (2) Communication skills.
- (3) General education.
- (4) Basic academic skills.
- (5) GED preparation.
- (6) Special education.
- (7) Vocational education.
- (8) Postsecondary education.
- (9) Other education programs as dictated by the needs of the prison population.

b. Prisoners with disabilities. Prisoners that possess physical, mental, emotional, and or learning disabilities and have the desire to participate in academic and vocational programs will have the same opportunities as other prisoners.

c. Vocational training integration with academic programs. Facility commanders must ensure vocational training programs are integrated with academic programs and are relevant to the vocational needs of prisoners and to employment opportunities in the community.

d. Academic courses. Academic courses offered for general education will be designed to contribute to the prisoner population's social adjustment.

(1) All prisoners without a high school education, or equivalent, will be afforded the opportunity to complete the general education development (GED) program. Those with serious reading and/or writing deficiencies will be afforded the opportunity to pursue Army-sponsored, locally available remedial training.

(2) Enrollment in postsecondary courses will be voluntary, normally at no expense to the Government. The College Level Examination Program, Defense Activity for Nontraditional Education Support, and similar Army sponsored programs may be made available to prisoners. Class schedules will be arranged to reduce conflict with work schedules, whenever possible. Weekend and nonduty hour classes will be encouraged.

e. Educational counseling. As an integral part of the initial assignment procedure, each prisoner will be counseled with respect to educational opportunities/needs. A definitive education and career plan to meet personal needs will be established and every practicable opportunity to complete it will be provided.

f. Prisoner instructors. The facility commander may approve the use of qualified prisoner instructors when qualified military or civilian personnel are not available. In addition to full-time personnel, part-time services of qualified instructors recruited from the surrounding community, such as high school and college teachers, will be used whenever possible.

g. Testing. Educational testing, diagnosis, and appraisal of factual information concerning the prisoners' academic and vocational education will be conducted as an essential part of planning academic and vocational training programs during in-processing.

(1) As soon as possible and within available resources, all prisoners will be given educational achievement tests, as well as tests to determine their educational level and mechanical aptitudes. In addition, a brief presentation of educational and vocational opportunities will be given each new prisoner. On the basis of resources available, a training program suited for each particular prisoner will be recommended.

(2) Physical handicaps discovered as a result of medical examination and their bearing on training will be considered in formulating a prisoner's academic training program.

(3) Brief statements on the results of testing, interviewing, and proposed training recommendations will be included in the prisoner's admission summary.

h. Academic file. The facility will maintain an academic file on each prisoner, to include achievement test results, interview sheets, and school records.

5-10. Prisoner welfare activities

a. Facility commanders will establish policy and procedure and implement a comprehensive recreational program that includes leisure-time activities and outdoor exercise. Additionally, the program will describe policy and procedures for the selection, training, and use of inmates as recreation program assistants.

b. Welfare activities will include provisions for reading material and physical recreation facilities. Prisoners will be authorized to retain in their possession the following welfare items, with reasonable restrictions as to quantities and sizes as directed by the facility commander:

(1) Bibles, prayer books, religious pamphlets, and other scriptures appropriate to the prisoner's faith, as recognized by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

(2) Textbooks and appropriate military and vocational training manuals.

(3) Books and magazines approved by the facility commander or a designee.

- (4) Personal letters and photographs.
- (5) Official and personal documents.
- (6) Writing materials. Facility commanders may, for good cause, designate the type of writing instrument, such as a ballpoint pen or pencil.

c. ACS facilities will maintain and/or provide access to comprehensive library services that include, but are not limited to, a reference collection containing general and specialized materials, and planned and continuous acquisition of materials to meet the needs of the institutional staff and prisoners. Facility commanders will establish policy that defines the principles, purposes and criteria used in selection and maintenance of library materials. Additionally policy will outline the selection, training and use of prisoners as library assistants. Library services must be available daily, including evenings and weekends. A branch or field library, with sufficient legal material, to include the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and other legal resources to support the prisoner population of the ACS facility, will be established at ACS facilities or made reasonably available through installation or locally available assets. Installation librarians and the Staff Judge Advocate will provide technical advice to the facility commander and assist in providing adequate and suitable library resources. The facility library should contain a varied and authoritative collection of reading material aimed at encompassing the various reading levels, interests, and cultural backgrounds of the prisoners confined.

d. Facility commanders will establish written policy, procedure, and implement recreation programs for activities that are initiated by inmates and carried out under staff supervision. Additionally, equipment that supports the recreation program will be suitable for the planned leisure of activities and is available in proportion to the inmate population and maintained in good condition. The prisoner's schedule will be considered to avoid unnecessary conflict with work, training, and education activities. The prisoner recreation program may include sporting events, hobby shops, radio, television, indoor games, motion pictures, videocassettes, creative writing, painting, and other appropriate activities. In accordance with AR 215-1, ACS facilities are exempt from the provisions that prohibit the use of arts and crafts facilities and equipment for the making of articles for private resale. Prisoners are required to purchase raw materials when the end product is for personal use or sale. Spectator events will also be part of the recreational program.

e. Free admission motion picture or videocassette service may be provided to Army confinement and correctional facilities under the provisions of AR 60-10 and AR 60-20.

f. American Red Cross (ARC) assistance will be requested from the ARC representative serving the host installation.

g. Facility commanders will establish policy, procedure, and implement health care (sick call) support that is conducted by a physician and/or other qualified personnel and is available to all inmates. Health services will be available to the inmates daily and will include at a minimum daily triage of inmates requesting health services by a health care professional. Clinical services will be provided to inmates in a clinical setting at least 5 days a week by a physician or other qualified health care professional.

(1) Prisoners reporting on sick call will receive medical attention at the facility, where practical. Those segregated for disciplinary or administrative reasons will be visited daily by a medic.

(2) When a prisoner is hospitalized in a medical treatment facility, a custody and conduct history will be briefed to the medical treatment facility commander or a designee if required.

(3) When a posttrial prisoner is hospitalized, the ACS facility will provide appropriate guard services, unless the prisoner is to be hospitalized in a prisoner ward where an established guard force exists. Properly trained guards of the prisoner's assigned unit will secure pretrial prisoners. Properly trained guards of the prisoner's parent unit will secure prisoners hospitalized outside the continental United States (OCONUS).

(4) Religious services will be provided to prisoners, who will be allowed to worship according to their faith, subject to the security and safety of their confinement, this regulation, and AR 600-20.(4)

Chapter 6

Work Release Program

6-1. Establishment

a. Work release programs provide for the conditional and part-time release of selected trustees for voluntary employment or training within NAF activities, appropriated fund activities, and civilian firms while serving sentences to incarceration. Trustees enrolled in work release programs may be compensated by the employing activity.

b. The Commander, USDB, is authorized to establish work release programs. RCF commanders may establish work release programs in coordination with the garrison commander.

6-2. Objectives

The objectives of the work release program are to—

- a. Assist selected trustees in the development of better attitudes, improved motivation, self-discipline, and employment skills.
- b. Provide an extension to the individual correctional treatment program through community-based employment on a conditional basis.
- c. Provide a transitional work environment to help selected trustees adjust to the environment anticipated on their release from confinement.

6-3. Policies

- a. Trustees may be assigned to work release programs, provided—
 - (1) Local labor union officials are consulted.
 - (2) Such employment will not result in the displacement of employed workers; be in applied skills, crafts, and trades in which there is a local labor surplus; or impair existing contracts for services.
 - (3) Such employment meets the requirements specified in paragraph 5-6.
- b. When compensation is paid to the prisoner, he/she will receive established minimum wage for work performed, or additional pay for working in conditions that are less than minimum acceptable standards. Prisoners will not be exploited in any manner.
- c. For the purposes of accountability, participating trustees will remain in the custody of the ACS facility commander. A participating trustee who is willfully absent from his work assignment will be placed in an escapee status.
- d. All work proposals will be analyzed to determine their validity, suitability, and potential to fulfill objectives of the work release program. The work will be integrated into the participating trustee's individual correctional treatment goals, and, where feasible, the trustee will be placed in work related to prior vocational training, previous work experience and anticipated employment on release from confinement. A work agreement with an employer does not constitute or imply a contractual agreement between the employer and the Army or the Government, although a mutual responsibility is recognized.
- e. Prior to employment of a participating trustee, the ACS facility commander will ensure that the employer's liability insurance policy recognizes the participating work release trustee as an employee for whose acts the employer's insurance company will respond.
- f. While fully recognizing the employer's rights of hiring and dismissing an employee, approval for participation or removal of a trustee from the program is within the sole authority of the ACS facility commander. When approved for participation in the program, a trustee will be furnished a list of standards of conduct and work performance and will be advised that noncompliance with those standards may be the basis for termination of participation in the program.

6-4. Selection criteria

- a. Care will be exercised in screening and selecting trustees for participation in the work release program. Safeguards will be established to protect the military and civilian community from the potential hazards of the work release program.
- b. Any trustee, except one against whom charges are pending, may apply for participation in the program as prescribed by the ACS facility commander.
- c. Criteria for participation are as follow:
 - (1) Prisoner trustee status is a prerequisite for participation in the program.
 - (2) Applicants must be physically and mentally qualified to perform duties required in proposed work assignments.
- d. Applicants for specific types of employment will be approved for participation in the program on a best qualified basis.
- e. The restrictions imposed in chapter 5 of this regulation, regarding prohibited work activities, apply to work release programs.
- f. Each participating trustee will be required to sign an agreement setting forth conditions prescribed by the ACS facility commander for participation in the program. Each participating trustee will carry a copy of the agreement when outside the ACS facility.
- g. Trustees receiving any portion of their military pay are excluded from participation in the work release program.
- h. To be eligible for consideration for appropriated fund employment, the trustee must have been discharged from the military service.
- i. To be eligible for, or remain in, the work release program, the trustee must not have waived parole consideration or refused an approved parole release. Facility commanders may, however, retain a trustee in the program to complete any time period previously coordinated with the work release employer.

6-5. Transportation

- a. Participating trustees will not be permitted to operate privately owned vehicles but may be permitted to use commercial or employer-provided transportation. If commercial or employer-provided transportation is not available or

feasible, vehicles owned by the ACS NAF may be used for transportation to and from the place of employment. Government transportation may be used only when authorized by the garrison commander.

b. Cost of transportation will be borne by the trustee, to include reimbursement for the use of ACS, NAF, or other government vehicles. The ACS facility commander will establish, in coordination with the appropriate installation transportation officer or director of logistics, standard transportation fees when ACS funds, NAF, or Government vehicles are used.

c. Participating work release trustees are not authorized to transport other work release trustees.

6-6. Work-site visits

The ACS facility commander will designate a senior member of the staff to make unscheduled periodic visits to work sites where participating prisoners are employed.

6-7. Financial procedures

a. The ACS facility commander or a designated staff member will administer all individual and special financial transactions in connection with the program.

b. All trustees selected to participate in the program will execute written assignments or agreements for collection and disbursement of their wages, salaries or any other stipend received in the course of their work. The agreement will contain provisions for direct transmittal of wages by check from the employer to the custodian of each prisoner's personal deposit fund for credit to the participating trustee's account.

c. If a participating trustee needs money for the purchase of suitable clothing, tools, equipment, or other expenses pursuant to employment, the employer may agree to advance or loan the trustee the money or the ACS facility commander may determine that another source is more appropriate. In either case, the trustee must agree to repay the full amount promptly. Funds may be advanced to fill the participating trustee's immediate needs only. Future needs will be paid for with funds from the trustee's accumulated balance in each prisoner's personal deposit fund.

d. The ACS facility commander may authorize participating trustees pocket money to cover miscellaneous daily expenses.

e. Participating trustees may not open charge accounts or time credit installment accounts unless such action has direct connection with or is a necessity for employment, and then only when authorized by the ACS facility commander. Opening of savings accounts or purchase of U.S. Saving Bonds is authorized provided that deposits, withdrawals, purchases, and redemption are transacted under provisions of this regulation.

6-8. Tools and equipment

If the work approved requires procurement of special tools or equipment, the cost will be borne by the participating trustee and items accounted for as personal property. Arrangements will be made to store the items at the work site; however, if such storage cannot be accomplished and the items are returned to the ACS facility, arrangements will be made to secure them in a manner that does not compromise the security of the ACS facility.

Chapter 7

Professional Services Support

7-1. Functional relationships

The services of psychiatrists and other medical doctors, dentists, psychologists, social workers, lawyers, chaplains, and other professional specialists are essential ingredients in the corrective process. At some facilities, selected specialists may be assigned to the staff of the facility commander. At other facilities, all professional service support will be provided by the installation. Facility commanders will request and installation or medical treatment facility commanders will approve the appointment, on orders, of those specialists not authorized or on hand at the correctional or confinement facility in sufficient numbers to accomplish their necessary functions.

7-2. Health care services

a. Health services support.

(1) MACOMs responsible for health services will ensure that health services support is provided to all ACS facilities. Medical personnel in support of an ACS facility will assist in providing medical and mental health care, counseling, and social services.

(2) Medical officers, nurse clinicians, or physician assistants will perform medical examinations to determine the fitness of any newly confined prisoners and those who have been outside military control for more than 24 hours; these examinations will be completed within 24 hours of their initial arrival/return to confinement. Examinations should take place at the ACS facility.

(3) Dental services will be provided, as required, for all prisoners.

(4) A person from a healthcare provider or medical technician designated by the commander of the supporting

medical treatment facility, will perform a monthly inspection of the facility, to ensure that the operation of the facility is consistent with accepted preventive medicine standards. The facility commander or designated representative will be provided a copy of all such inspection results at the time of the inspection.

(5) Routine and emergency psychiatric treatment is the responsibility of the medical treatment facility commander. Personnel who provide health care services to prisoners must have appropriate State and Federal licensure, certification, or registration requirements and restrictions. The duties and responsibilities of these personnel are governed by written job descriptions approved by the health authority. Facility commanders will verify current credentials and have job descriptions on file in the facility.

(6) A medical officer, nurse clinician, physician assistant or medic will evaluate each prisoner in segregation daily, per paragraph 12-6.

(7) Within established parameters for protection of medically sensitive information, supporting medical treatment facility commanders will provide ACS commanders with diagnosis, prognosis, and current status of prisoner patients undergoing treatment.

b. Army medical department personnel.

(1) Licensed professional officers in the health care disciplines and professional specialties will be provided to assist in the evaluation of prisoners, especially those who show difficulty in adjusting to their confinement. They will provide guidance and recommendations on the correctional treatment requirements of individual posttrial prisoners, provide professional supervision for behavior science specialists and assist in the training of correctional personnel.

(2) Medical officers, nurse clinicians, or physician assistants will be provided daily to conduct medical examination, evaluation, and treatment of prisoners at ACS facilities. Medical facilities equivalent to an outpatient dispensary will be established at all ACS facilities. If more extensive medical treatment is required, prisoners will be transferred under appropriate custodial supervision to a medical treatment facility.

c. Initial screening of prisoners. Upon the prisoner's arrival at the facility, qualified health care personnel will perform medical, dental, and mental health initial screening on all prisoners within 14 days of arrival at the facility. All findings will be documented and approved by the health authority. When screening prisoners, prisoners that were identified for alcohol and drug abuse problems must undergo a thorough assessment and reassessment to determine the treatment needs for the prisoner. The screening, at a minimum, will cover—

(1) Current illness and health problems, including venereal diseases and other infectious diseases.

(2) Dental problems.

(3) Mental health problems.

(4) Use of alcohol and other drugs, including type(s) of drugs used, mode of use, amounts used, frequency used, date or time of last use, and history of any problems that may have occurred after ceasing use (for example, convulsions).

(5) Past and present treatment or hospitalization for mental disturbance or suicide.

(6) Possibility of pregnancy.

(7) Other health problems as designated by the responsible physician.

(8) Review of prescribed medication the prisoner consumes.

(9) Observation of:

(a) Behavior, including state of consciousness, mental status, appearance, conduct, tremor, and sweating

(b) Body deformities, ease of movement, and so on.

(c) Condition of skin, including trauma markings, bruises, lesions, jaundice, rashes and infestations, and needle marks or other indications of drug abuse.

(10) Medical disposition of prisoner:

(a) General population

(b) General population with prompt referral to appropriate health care service.

(c) Referral to appropriate health care service for emergency treatment.

d. Professional care during pregnancy.

(1) At a minimum, facility commanders will implement policy and procedures that address the following areas regarding pregnancy for female prisoners:

(a) Pregnancy testing

(b) Routine prenatal care

(c) High-risk prenatal care

(d) Management of the chemically addicted pregnant inmate

(e) Postpartum followup.

(2) While confined, pregnant prisoners will be provided prenatal, natal, and postnatal care as appropriate. Arrangements for placement of any child born while the mother is in custody will be made as soon as possible after the pregnancy is known, but in no case later than the seventh month of pregnancy. AR 40-400, paragraph 2-18, governs abortions performed in military treatment facilities at Government expense.

7-3. Legal services support

a. The installation Staff Judge Advocate will supervise the administration of military justice and provide legal assistance services for prisoners. Whenever possible, these services will be provided within the facility. Prisoners will be kept informed concerning the status of their cases or sentences and other pending legal matters.

b. The installation Staff Judge Advocate will serve as legal advisor to the facility commander and staff and will assist in providing the legal materials necessary to support prisoner needs for access to legal libraries.

7-4. Chaplain support

Facility commanders will establish policy, procedure, and religious support where prisoners have the opportunity to participate in practices of their faith deemed essential by the faith's judicatory. Practices of religious faith must not cause disruption to the order and discipline within the institution and/or pose a threat to the safety of persons involved. Commanders will ensure adequate space and equipment are available for the conduct and administration of religious practices. Commanders will make provisions for regularly scheduled worship of the major faith groups. Commanders will make religious practice provisions for other than major faith groups as resources dictate. The senior facility chaplain is the commander's staff officer responsible for performing or providing opportunity for religious faith practices for prisoners. The installation chaplain is responsible for performing or providing religious opportunities for religious practices and pastoral care facilities without a Unit Ministry Team authorization. Chaplains in an authorized confinement facility position must have completed four quarters of clinical pastoral education. Annually, the facility Chaplain submits a Command Master Religious Plan (CMRP) to the Commander for signature. The facility Chaplain forwards the CMRP to the installation Chaplain. Requirements for volunteers and/or contractors for religious support must be included in the CMRP and comply with the provisions of AR 165-1. Except in cases of privileged communication, chaplains provide observations and recommendations pertaining to individual prisoners to the Commander or appropriate staff officers.

7-5. Research and evaluation

All requests to conduct research and evaluation among ACS prisoner populations will be forwarded for review by DAPM-MPD-CI prior to approval. When conducting research, facility commanders will—

a. Ensure research is compliant with professional and scientific ethics and with state and federal guidelines for the use and dissemination of research findings.

b. Review and approve all institutional research projects before implementation to ensure it conforms to policies and Army regulations.

c. Ensure prisoners only volunteer to participate in nonmedical, nonpharmaceutical, and noncosmetic research programs.

7-6. Mental health support

Social workers and psychologists will provide ongoing mental health, social work, and consultative services in support of the correctional treatment program. At those facilities where a mental health or social work professional is not assigned, the Chief, Community Mental Health, of the supporting medical facility will serve as consultant to the facility commander on all matters pertaining to mental health, welfare, and personal well-being of individuals referred for services.

Chapter 8

Return to Duty, Parole, and Clemency

Section I

Temporary Parole and Clemency

8-1. Temporary parole

a. *Emergency home parole (EHP)*. ACS facility commanders may authorize EHP for prisoners that require a home visit for extreme emergency reasons. Prior determination must be made that circumstances exist that justify such special action and that such action is consistent with correctional requirements and public safety. A prisoner who requires overnight quarters will reside in federally approved facilities only. Victim witness notification will be made in accordance with chapter 13, paragraph 13-3e. Travel and subsistence expenses of a prisoner incident to home visit will be borne by the prisoner. Travel and subsistence expense of any accompanying guard(s) determined by the facility commander to be necessary will be borne by the Government, subject to the availability of funds. Normally, visits will be granted only in the case of critical illness or death of an immediate relative. The facility commander will consider limiting the number of days necessary. EHP usually will not exceed 1 week, inclusive of travel time. For this purpose, "immediate relative" will include spouse, dependent children, parents, brothers and sisters, and persons in loco parentis.

b. *Temporary home parole (THP)*. In addition to EHP, the facility commander may authorize THP not to exceed 7

days per 12-month period for selected prisoners. The purpose of THP is to strengthen family relationships and provide an incentive and reinforcement to positive behavior and morale. Notification of victims and witnesses participating in the witness/victim notification program will be made by the most direct means practicable, prior to the release of prisoner on THP. Telephonic notification will be confirmed with written confirmation. Prisoners eligible for THP have been sentenced to at least 1 year in confinement and must—

- (1) Have served a minimum of 6 months of the sentence.
- (2) Be within 2 years of eligibility for parole.
- (3) Have served at least one-sixth of the total sentence, or 10 years (whichever comes first), and have more than 90 days remaining upon return.
- (4) Be in trustee or equivalent status and agree to such restrictions as the facility commander may deem necessary for reasons of security, custody, and control.
- (5) Possess sufficient personal funds to defray the cost of round trip transportation.
- (6) Reside with members of immediate family while on home parole and provide a telephone number at which the prisoner can be reached. Facility commanders may waive the requirement to reside with members of immediate family as necessary.
- (7) Sign an agreement to abide by the THP instructions published by the facility commander.
- (8) In addition to meeting the requirements listed above, prisoners will submit in writing to the facility commander, no later than 90 days prior to departure, justification for being released on THP.

c. Additional considerations. Additional considerations include the prisoner's background, offense(s) of which convicted, sentence, progress while confined, the effect of the release upon the victim's mental/physical welfare, potential for positive adjustment to society, and compliance with any applicable violent offender or sex offender reporting. Additionally, prisoners under consideration for THP must demonstrate to the ACS facility commander compliance with court-ordered support payments, payment toward military fines and/or debts, restitution payment to victims, and payment toward other debts and obligations.

8-2. Clemency, restoration, and reenlistment

Prisoners within the ACS will be considered for clemency per AR 15-130. Non-Army prisoners will be considered for clemency per their parent service regulations. Clemency actions include the mitigation, remission, and suspension of courts-martial sentences and return to military service (restoration/reenlistment) of prisoners with approved sentences. All U.S. Army prisoners will be evaluated for return to military service. Neither clemency nor parole is a right. The programs set forth in this chapter and in AR 15-130 are primarily for the benefit of the Army, not for any individual prisoner. All prisoners will be clearly informed that there is no right to either clemency or parole.

a. Authority to grant clemency. A convicted soldier may request clemency from the general court-martial convening authority, TJAG, and the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of AR 27-10 and 15-130, and Article 74, UCMJ. ACS facility commanders should consult these regulations to determine what, if any, responsibilities the facility has in forwarding command recommendations or other matters, with the prisoner's clemency request, to the clemency authority.

b. Procedures for prisoners within ACS facilities. ACS facility commanders will convene disposition boards per paragraph 5-4c to consider prisoners confined within their facilities for clemency in such a manner as to ensure timely consideration of each case by the Army Clemency and Parole Board (ACPB). Prisoners may be recommended for clemency at any time following formal sentencing action by the convening authority. Prisoners with approved sentences will be considered, at a minimum, at intervals specified in AR 15-130.

c. Consideration of other category prisoners. All prisoners confined in Federal institutions, those who are hospitalized, and those released on parole who remain on the rolls of an ACS facility will be considered for clemency action per AR 15-130 by the ACS facility to which the prisoner remains assigned.

d. Waiver of clemency review. Prisoners may waive clemency review in writing and the ACPB will be notified of such waivers. ACS commanders will ensure persons eligible for clemency review are given a free choice in requesting or waiving clemency review each time their cases are subject to review. ACS commanders will assure that clemency packets are prepared and forwarded to the ACPB for each prisoner who waives clemency considerations.

e. Written application for special consideration. In addition to considerations for clemency otherwise required, written application for a special clemency consideration that sets forth a basis for the application and contains sufficient grounds for further clemency consideration may be made by the prisoner, or on behalf of a prisoner at any time. If the facility commander deems the application worthy, the facility disposition board prior to the next regulatory date of consideration will hear the application. Prisoners confined in Federal penal or correctional institutions may request special clemency considerations through the warden of the confining institution to the commander, USDB, who will, if the request is deemed appropriate, forward Federal recommendations with the prisoner's case file to the ACPB. If a special consideration requested by a prisoner is approved and a board held, a new annual review date will be established as of the date of the special consideration.

f. Victim/witness impact statement. Commanders of ACS facilities will offer the victim(s) or witness(es), the sponsor(s) of underage (minor) victims, and the next of kin of victims enrolled in the Victim Witness Program the

opportunity to submit an impact statement for inclusion in clemency considerations. In cases of espionage, the U.S. Government will be considered the victim, and victim notification will be provided the appropriate service through DAPM. The victim witness impact statement will be included in packets provided any disposition board. All officials making a recommendation concerning clemency, and the ACPB. If the victim declines to make a statement or cannot be located, the commander will include a statement in the clemency and parole packet explaining why a victim impact statement is not included. If parole and clemency are later approved, the victim/witness will be notified prior to the prisoner's release. Telephonic notification will be followed by written confirmation.

g. Clemency considerations for prisoners on parole. A prisoner released on parole will be considered for clemency, as well as restoration/reenlistment, 12 months after release on parole and, upon request, annually thereafter until expiration of the full term of sentence or sentences. Discontinuance of annual reviews will not preclude special clemency reviews at the request of the individual prisoner.

h. Announcement of clemency actions.

(1) To preclude possible irregularities in departmental documents announcing clemency actions (that is, reduction, remission, or suspension of sentences, or mitigation or suspension of discharge) each document received will be carefully scrutinized to determine its authenticity. Any apparent irregularity will be reported to the appropriate court-martial convening authority or the ACPB for advice prior to taking action on the document(s) therein.

(2) A prisoner will be promptly notified of clemency action taken.

(3) With the exception of return to military service, a clemency action affecting a sentence imposed by court-martial announced in a departmental directive becomes effective when delivered to the prisoner concerned. Secretary of the Army approval of restoration is implemented through the completion of the following actions, all of which are contingent upon the other.

(a) The unexecuted portion of the sentence to confinement is remitted.

(b) Simultaneously, the individual completes the enlistment process to include the enlistment oath. Because restoration to duty is a voluntary action, the individual may elect to withdraw the request any time prior to completion of the enlistment process. In that event, remission of the sentence to confinement will not become effective, but the prisoner will be eligible immediately to submit a request for clemency in the form of parole per this regulation. Once implemented, a clemency action may not be revoked unless it is determined that the original action was in error or upon reconsideration by the Secretary per (2) above.

(c) Completion of return to duty training determined appropriate by the appropriate ACS commander per paragraph 8-4.

8-3. Return to military service

a. Policy. In the spirit and intent of public law, the Army may return to military service those Army prisoners and parolees who are physically, mentally, and morally qualified and possess the requisite potential for successful reintegration into the active force. Actions to return a prisoner to military service include restoration and reenlistment, which are defined below:

(1) *Restoration to duty.* Defined as the return to active duty status of an individual whose court-martial sentence does not include a punitive discharge or includes a punitive discharge that is either suspended or unexecuted.

(2) *Reenlistment.* Defined as the return to active duty status of an individual whose court-martial sentence includes an executed punitive discharge.

b. Consideration of cases. Decisions to return prisoners to military service will be made on individual merit, with due regard to the effect restoration to duty or reenlistment will have on the esprit and good name of the service. The prisoner's civil, military, and confinement records will be considered in determining suitability for this action. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, conviction of a crime generally recognized as a felony or serious offense in civil law, or a serious crime perpetrated under circumstances showing disregard for the rights or feelings of others that is willfully malicious, brutal, heedless, and lacking in serious provocation will ordinarily disqualify that prisoner for restoration to duty or reenlistment. Desertion or absence without leave with intent to avoid hazardous or important service or, regardless of offense of which convicted, a history of repeated drunkenness, narcotic addiction, or continued difficulty in adjusting to military life may also disqualify a prisoner for restoration to duty or reenlistment. Exceptional circumstances that may be considered include—

(1) A demonstrated behavioral change in the prisoner's demeanor from that evidenced at the time of the commission of the offense(s) for which convicted, supported by an established motivation for honorable service.

(2) A demonstrated ability to perform military duties in a creditable manner and a positive potential for honorable service.

(3) A substantially clear civil and military record.

(4) A reputation for honesty, integrity, and good behavior.

(5) Age at time of offense(s) for which convicted.

c. Evaluations. All return to military service evaluations will include consideration of the prisoner's performance in offense related counseling and training, work assignments, and behavior performance reports while incarcerated.

d. Service category. Prisoners and parolees eligible for return to military service must have been an enlisted member

of the active Army at the time of conviction. Reserve Component personnel called to active duty who later become prisoners or parolees are not eligible for return to military service. Officer and warrant officer prisoners are not eligible for restoration in their former status. Restoration approval for such personnel will be for duty in an enlisted status and will not become effective until dismissal or discharge has been executed. Individuals in this category may submit an application for waiver to permit enlistment under procedures outlined in AR 601-210.

e. Restoration standards. A prisoner will not be recommended for return to military service unless the minimum physical, mental, and administrative standards for enlistment of prior service personnel as prescribed in AR 601-210 are met. Necessity for maximum utilization of available manpower during hostilities may warrant exception to these restrictions. In any case, the needs of the service govern return to duty programs, not the desires of individual prisoners. No prisoner who is not selected for such a program may appeal or otherwise contest nonselection.

f. Additional training. Restored or reenlisted personnel may be required to repeat basic combat training or basic training subsequent to their return to duty when the period of confinement has exceeded 12 months.

g. Term of service. Army enlistment resulting from restoration action constitutes a new term of service. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Army, enlistment will be in the lowest enlisted grade for a period of 1 year and will not afford any choice of enlistment option. Individuals will be advised that restoration has no bearing on legal appeals and is a new term of service that leaves the earlier term of service unaffected, including the character of any approved, executed punitive discharge.

h. Restoration and reenlistment procedures. All prisoners confined in the ACS will be evaluated for restoration to duty and or reenlistment potential per paragraph 8-3b. The Secretary of the Army is the approval authority for the restoration of prisoners. The appropriate ACS facility commander through the general court-martial convening authority will forward all prisoner requests for restoration to the ACPB.

(1) *Application.* Prisoners desiring restoration will submit a written application for consideration. Applications will include a statement that the prisoner understands that restoration may be subject to a period of limited training at an ACS facility or completion of formal training at an Army training center. Prisoners applying for restoration may also apply for parole. However, applications for restoration must include a statement from the prisoners acknowledging that if restoration is approved, parole will not be executed if approved. Prisoners applying will be considered for restoration whenever eligible for clemency consideration.

(2) *Board procedures.* Upon receiving a written application for restoration from a prisoner incarcerated in an ACS facility, the facility commander will submit the application for review by the facility disposition board. The disposition board's recommendation and that of the commander may be forwarded to the GCM convening authority-exercising jurisdiction over the facility. If not reviewed by the GCM authority, the recommendations will be forwarded directly to the ACPB. If reviewed by the GCM authority, the application will be forwarded to the ACPB following review and comment. Those not approved for restoration by the Secretary of the Army will remain in confinement until formally released per this regulation.

(3) *Approved recommendations.* Upon approval for restoration, the prisoner will be removed from the prisoner population pending actions specified at paragraph 8-2h(3) and provided minimum training determined appropriate per paragraph 8-4c by the facility commander. The GCM authority will remit the unexecuted portion of the sentence and request assignment instructions. Secretary of the Army approval will constitute a waiver to the enlistment qualification criteria.

(4) *Reenlistment procedures.* ACS commanders, per the criteria specified at paragraph 8-3b and 8-3c, will evaluate prisoners with an executed punitive discharge, for reenlistment. Those with potential for continued service may reenlist upon approval of the GCM authority. Prisoners who reenlist normally will have the unexecuted portion of their sentences suspended; however, at the discretion of the approving authority, the unexecuted portion of the sentence may be remitted. A sentence may be suspended for a period not to exceed 1 year or expiration of the soldier's term of service, whichever is less. The action suspending the sentence should specify the period of suspension (for example 1 May 1993 until 2 May 1994) and contain a provision for automatic remission unless the suspension is sooner vacated. At any time it is warranted, the officer exercising GCM jurisdiction over the service member may remit a suspended sentence. Action to remit or vacate suspension may be postponed pending disposition of any current charges.

(5) *Duty status.*

(a) Commissioned and warrant officer prisoners. An Active Army officer who has been sentenced to dismissal (commissioned) or dishonorable discharge (warrant officer who is not commissioned) will not be discharged prior to completion of appellate review without the prior approval of the CG, PERSCOM (see AR 600-8-24, paragraph 1-17). An RA officer whose sentence includes dismissal or dishonorable discharge may be returned to duty or processed for excess leave while appellate review is pending (see AR 600-8-24, paragraph 1-17). An RA officer whose sentence does not include a dismissal or dishonorable discharge will be returned to duty upon release from confinement. A reserve officer whose sentence includes a dismissal or dishonorable discharge may be released from active duty prior to completion of appellate review, upon completion of confinement (see AR 600-8-24, paragraph 2-35b). When the sentence after final appellate review does not include dismissal or discharge, the officer will be returned to active duty, under the provisions of AR 600-8-24, paragraph 2-35c.

(b) Enlisted prisoners.

1. If a sentence to confinement expires before receipt of notification that the appellate review is complete, an enlisted prisoner with a remaining service obligation reverts to a duty status, unless the prisoner is pending a punitive discharge and is placed on excess leave. If the soldier's enlistment or service obligation expires prior to completion of appellate review and the soldier is pending a punitive discharge, the soldier will be retained on active duty until appellate review is complete (see AR 635-200, paragraph 1-22d). In that case, the soldier may be returned to duty or placed on excess leave until appellate review is complete and the punitive discharge is executed.

2. Prisoners in an enlisted status who are returned to duty prior to completion of appellate review will be returned to duty under their previous enlistment or service obligation; however, a soldier who is pending a punitive discharge may not be discharged before appellate review is complete, unless so directed by HQDA (see AR 635-200, paragraph 1-22d). Enlistees with less than 1 year obligation remaining may be required to extend their enlistment to serve out at least 1 year at the discretion of the approving authority. Prisoners who entered the service under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, may not voluntarily extend their term of service. Such individuals having an insufficient service obligation remaining to demonstrate entitlement to an honorable discharge will be granted a waiver to reenlist or extend in the RA for a term of service, per AR 601-280. Administrative action on extension will not be taken until the appellate review process affirming discharge has been completed. The final court-martial order will incorporate the return to duty/remission action.

(6) *Processing.*

(a) Recommendations for return to duty of prisoners confined in ACS facilities will be submitted to the commander having GCM jurisdiction over the prisoner. The Secretary of the Army has the final approval for directing return to duty.

(b) Prisoners designated for return to duty may be required to complete training specified at paragraph 8-4 under direction of the ACS commander as directed by the approving authority.

(c) If a sentence to confinement expires prior to receipt at the place of confinement of notification that appellate review is complete, a prisoner, other than a nonregular commissioned or warrant officer who has been relieved from active duty, reverts to a duty status unless the prisoner is pending punitive discharge and is placed on excess leave.

(d) A sentenced prisoner's status changes to civilian when he is retained under military jurisdiction after discharge or expiration of a confinement sentence pending additional charges or transportation to continental United States (CONUS). Such individuals are authorized the same medical care as those who have been discharged, but have not completed their sentence.

i. Assignment upon return to military service.

(1) Assignments for personnel in ACS facilities who are to be returned to military service will be requested from CG, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (appropriate career division). Soldiers returned to military service may be granted ordinary leave providing that the leave is not in excess of that authorized by law and regulation.

(2) Such personnel will be considered as immediately available for assignment and reported as such, per instructions contained in AR 614-200, AR 614-30, or other directives as applicable.

(3) When formal training is required, as determined by the GCM authority, assignment at a formal Army training center will be requested.

(4) Assignment of returned personnel, including reassignment to the major command of origin or to overseas or continental Army commands, will be based on current screening criteria and on overall requirements of the command concerned. Assignments will be determined based the needs of the Army. Soldiers, returned to duty, except as otherwise provided in this regulation, will be assigned, trained, and employed as any other enlisted person. Commanders who have such enlisted persons under their control will ensure they are treated in the same manner as other enlisted personnel of their command. Segregation in any form will not be practiced.

(5) When the court-martial sentence to dismissal or punitive discharge of an officer or warrant officer is set aside without a rehearing, disapproved, commuted to a lesser sentence, or remitted, the facility will request assignment telephonically, to be followed by message, from the same branch or service as that in which serving when tried by court-martial. The headquarters directing an assignment, change of assignment, or release from active duty of a commissioned or warrant officer prisoner will immediately notify by telephone the facility; the assigned command; the commander; the Clerk of Courts, ATTN: JALS-CCZ, U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, 901 North Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203; and the Human Resources Command, to be followed by message or facsimile transmission.

(6) When the court-martial sentence to a punitive discharge of a noncommissioned officer (NCO) or enlisted soldier is set aside without a rehearing, disapproved, commuted to a lesser sentence, or is remitted, the soldier will be assigned to the same branch of service, if he or she has not passed the date of his or her expiration of term of service (ETS).

(7) The officer exercising immediate general court-martial jurisdiction over the command in which the accused is assigned or attached will notify U.S. Army Judiciary by electronic or other expeditious means of communication of expiration of the appeals period if an accused officer prisoner does not file a timely petition for grant of review (not applicable to warrant officers). (This notification is exempt from reports control under AR 335-15.)

8-4. Prerestoration/return to duty training

a. Training is provided to prisoners who, as a result of the length of their incarceration, require reorientation with general military subjects prior to returning to a military unit. It is not intended to provide prisoners basic soldier or military occupational specialty (MOS) skills. Only prisoners who have been incarcerated for a period of more than 2 years may be eligible for formal training at an Army Training Center.

b. Restoration/return to duty of those prisoners who do not successfully complete training may be rescinded by the GCM authority

c. Training will include, as a minimum, the following subjects:

- (1) Physical training.
- (2) Military courtesy.
- (3) Drill and ceremonies.
- (4) Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- (5) Use of the chain of command.
- (6) Benefits of an honorable discharge.

d. Restoration/return to duty trainees will wear the battle dress uniform.

e. Training will be conducted by cadre of the ACS facility.

Section II

Parole of Prisoners

8-5. Policy

Army prisoners will be released from confinement at the times and under the conditions most likely to ensure their earliest assumption of responsibilities as productive law-abiding citizens.

8-6. Procedures

Policy and procedural guidance for parole of U.S. Army prisoners is contained in AR 15-130. ACS commanders will convene disposition boards to evaluate and make recommendations regarding prisoners confined in Army facilities, per criteria established by the ACPB. Disposition boards will refer to the considerations in AR 15-130 when evaluating ACS prisoners for parole consideration.

8-7. Jurisdiction

a. A prisoner on parole will remain under the legal supervision and control of the releasing facility and a local United States probation officer assigned by the Probation Division of the U.S. Courts, until the expiration of the full term or aggregate terms of the sentence without credit for abatement.

b. The U.S. Parole Commission, Department of Justice, has jurisdiction over Army prisoners confined in Federal penal and correction institutions in matters concerning parole.

c. Prisoners from an ACS facility who have parole approved will remain under the releasing facility's control at the time of release on parole, unless otherwise directed. Hard copy records will be transferred by U.S. mail or most expeditious means. The facility commander or designee will electronically notify the USDB in advance, but not later than the day prior to the date of release on parole. Such notification will include, at a minimum, the inmate's name, parole address and contact number, probation officer, confining offenses and sentence, victim/witness information, and projected parole expiration date.

8-8. Preliminary parole consideration

a. DA Form 1702-R (Parole Officer's Reference Data) and DA Form 1703-R (Eligibility Cross-Reference Data) or equivalent computer-generated forms will be maintained for each prisoner in confinement who is eligible for parole.

b. Each eligible prisoner will execute a DD 2715-3 (Inmate Restoration/Return to Duty, Clemency, and Parole Statement) or equivalent automated form in duplicate, indicating whether parole is desired. The original of the form will be forwarded to the ACPB and the duplicate copy retained in the prisoner's correctional treatment file.

(1) In cases of prisoners who do not desire parole, only sections I, II, and IV of the form will be completed. If the prisoner is unable or refuses to sign the parole statement, it will be forwarded with an appropriate explanation.

(2) Each prisoner desiring parole will complete all sections of the form and submit it to the commander or designated representative at least 5 days, but not earlier than 45 days, prior to local parole consideration. The prisoner will be provided necessary assistance in developing a satisfactory tentative parole plan, and will be encouraged to take the initiative in developing a parole plan. The prisoner will agree in writing to abide by that plan. Officials of the Federal Probation Service will not be requested to establish or verify any element of the prisoners tentative parole plan prior to parole approval.

(3) Processing of requests for parole will not be discontinued or delayed because of inability to develop a satisfactory parole plan. In such instances, the tentative parole plan representing the best efforts of the prisoner and the correctional facility staff will be used in processing the prisoner's request.

(4) Prisoners who do not desire parole when eligible, or prisoners whose previous requests for parole were disapproved by HQDA, may request consideration prior to their next annual eligibility date, if sufficient justification exists for an interim consideration of their cases as determined by the ACS facility commander.

8-9. Disposition board action

a. Request for parole. Normally, requests for parole will be considered by the disposition board and forwarded to the ACPB to arrive not later than 30 days prior to the prisoner's parole eligibility date. Requests may be considered as much as 120 days in advance of eligibility date when such action will permit concurrent consideration of remission of sentence or restoration to duty. Requests for parole will be accompanied by documentation described in AR 15-130, chapter 4, to include a Victim Impact Statement if appropriate.

b. Institutional action.

(1) The disposition board will consider each parole applicant on an individual basis in consonance with the policy and objectives of parole, as specified in AR 15-130 and this regulation. The board's recommendations for or against parole will include a statement whether the policy and objectives of parole will be accomplished by release on a specific date.

(2) Prior to convening the disposition board, the facility commander or designated representative will advise appropriate victims and witnesses of the parole consideration and inform the victims/witnesses of the address to which impact statements may be forwarded.

(3) Inmates under consideration for parole must acknowledge in writing that they will comply with state violent or sexual offender reporting or registration requirements. Similarly, candidates for parole should demonstrate compliance with court-ordered dependent support or restitution to victims or have made arrangements to the courts' satisfaction.

(4) The ACS facility commander or a designee will review the disposition board's recommendation to ensure the policy and objectives of parole have been considered in the evaluation and recommendation. Whenever the ACS facility commander's parole recommendations differ from those of the Disposition Board, the reasons will be stated.

c. Action prior to dispatch. The following matters will be considered carefully in preparing material and forwarding recommendations for final action:

(1) Special precaution should be taken to not place the Army in a position of approving or condoning illegal or immoral relationships in the proposed community of residence. Particular care will be taken to ensure that information submitted concerning the prisoner's marital status is both clear and adequate.

(2) In cases where parole is recommended because of family hardship, the progress summary will include, wherever practical, verification of the following:

(a) The amount and source of income or assistance being received by dependents, including salaries, public assistance grants, or contributions by relatives and others, and whether this income is sufficient to meet the family needs.

(b) Immediate relatives who are in a position to assist dependents.

(c) Extent to which the prisoner contributed to family welfare prior to entrance into service, while in service, and during absence from service.

(d) Whether the family conditions were aggravated by the prisoner since coming into service, or whether the present hardship has been created by circumstances surrounding the family.

(e) Ensure the prisoner has employment or has assistance in obtaining employment.

8-10. Departmental actions

a. The ACPB will approve or disapprove Army parole applications submitted to that board, using a DA Form 4459 (Parole Action Record) to record its determinations.

(1) Announcement of parole will include authenticated copies of a DD Form 2716-1 (Certificate of Parole).

(2) Prisoners who are denied parole will be provided written notification of the reason(s) their request was denied. The ACPB will make notification to the prisoner through the ACS facility commander within 30 days of the board's decision.

b. Using DD Form 2716 (Parole Acknowledgement Letter), the ACS facility commander will ensure that prisoners are informed of the denial and given the opportunity to appeal the decision. The prisoner will sign and date the notification of parole denial, in memorandum format, upon receipt.

c. Release on parole is conditioned upon approved parole and completion of a parole plan considered to be satisfactory to the U.S. Probation Service.

d. Misconduct subsequent to receipt of parole approval may delay or preclude release on parole. The ACS facility commander may, with the approval of the ACPB or the ASA(M&RA), delay the normally scheduled parole release date and may recommend to the ACPB that the parole approval be rescinded in the event of a major violation of institutional rules.

8-11. Appeal of parole disapproval

a. A prisoner whose application for parole has been denied may submit an appeal through the ACS facility

commander, within 30 calendar days of receipt of written notification of the denial. New or additional material information, which was not previously considered, should be included in the appeal.

b. The Secretary of the Army or a designee will inform the prisoner of the action on the appeal. Decisions of the Secretary shall be final.

8-12. Completion of parole plan

On receipt of notification that parole has been approved, and prior to release, the Federal Probation Service will be requested to establish the validity of the residence arrangement, employment, and other elements of the tentative parole plan. The officer will be promptly furnished complete information concerning the proposed parole plan, including proposed residence, proposed employment, the names and addresses of close relatives, and admission and progress summaries.

8-13. Employment requirements

Unless a waiver is granted for cogent reasons, no prisoner will be released on parole until satisfactory evidence has been furnished that the prisoner will be engaged in a reputable business or occupation. Employment requirements for release on parole will be deemed to have been met when one of the following applies.

a. A prospective employer has executed a letter offering employment.

b. A recognized trade union or similar organization has provided documentation that, subsequent to release on parole, the prisoner will be considered a member of the organization in good standing and that, through the normal functions of the organization, the prisoner will be afforded employment rights and assistance equal to that furnished other members in good standing.

c. A Federal probation officer has given assurance that a job has been secured for the prisoner.

8-14. Waiver of employment

a. Prior to furnishing employment agencies information from a prisoner's record, the written authorization of the prisoner will be obtained. If, after parole approval, every effort to obtain employment has been made without success, the ACS commander with the approval of the ACPB or DASA, may grant a waiver of employment in accordance with the following:

(1) If a reputable prisoners' aid, welfare, or employment organization has given assurance that it will assist the prisoner in getting employment after release on parole and will assure the prisoner's livelihood pending permanent employment, a waiver may be granted. Because of the heavy burden already carried by prisoners' aid organizations and similar agencies, the use of these agencies will be limited to those cases in which such action appears absolutely essential to a suitable release plan.

(2) State and/or local agencies may be considered in granting waivers of employment since these agencies are unable to obtain and offer assurance of employment for individuals prior to release from confinement and personal interview. The use of these agencies will be limited to the following conditions:

(a) When known factors, such as the particular qualifications and experience of the individual, demonstrated placement ability of these agencies, and employment opportunities in the community, give reasonable assurance that employment will be available to the prisoner following release.

(b) When an adequate means of support is available for the prisoner until suitable employment is obtained.

(c) When an officer of the probation service concurs with the release without the promise of employment and agrees to furnish necessary assistance in obtaining employment.

b. In addition to the types of waivers authorized in a above, waiver of employment may be granted for—

(1) Those prisoners who have been approved for on-the-job training or schooling under the laws authorizing Government-sponsored benefits.

(2) Those prisoners who present evidence of adequate means of support and sufficient funds to defray the expense of education, and have been accepted by an accredited educational institution.

8-15. DD Form 2716-1

On a date approved by the ACPB and specified on the Certificate of Parole, or as soon thereafter as an acceptable plan is completed, the prisoner will be released.

a. The prisoner will be required to execute a written agreement of the specific conditions of parole. All copies of this agreement will be signed by the prisoner and witnessed by the ACS facility commander or an authorized representative. The parole agreement appears on the reverse side of DD Form 2716-1. The prisoner will be instructed to execute and return a Notification of Arrival of Parolee on arrival at parole destination. Additional conditions may be added as conditions of parole as directed by the ACPB.

b. The ACS facility commander or a designee will complete and sign the endorsement portion of the Certificate of Parole and deliver the original copy of the certificate to the prisoner. A signed copy of the completed Certificate of Parole and Parole Agreement, together with front and side view identification photographs of the prisoner, if not previously provided, will be furnished to the Federal Probation Officer under whose supervision the prisoner is to be

released. Distribution of the remaining copies of the form will be made according to instructions appearing at the bottom of the certificate.

8-16. Medical examinations

Prisoners being released on parole will be given a medical examination per AR 40-501.

8-17. Identification card

If release is implemented prior to completion of appellate review, the prisoner will be furnished DD Form 2A (Active Duty Military Identification Card), completed to show rank and expiration date not to exceed 1 year from issue. Family member identification card will bear the same expiration date as that of the prisoner. The ACS facility commander will instruct the prisoner to return all identification cards through the Federal Probation Officer on completion of appellate review.

8-18. FBI Form I-12 (Flash-Cancellation Notice)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Form I-12 provides a uniform means of filing requests with the FBI to ensure notice to the ACS facility commander of the arrest of an individual on parole by an apprehending officer who files prints with the FBI. The ACS commander will ensure that flash notices are prepared on each prisoner released on parole and that indication is made on the form that the USDB is to be notified of any arrests reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Box 2 'Flash' of the form will be checked and all available information requested on the form for filing flash notice will be provided. The form will be forwarded directly to the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ATIN: Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537.

8-19. Parole limits

Geographical areas in which a prisoner released on parole will reside and the U.S. Probation Office will prescribe limits of movement, unless otherwise directed by the ACPB.

8-20. Gratuities

Prisoners will be furnished gratuities set forth below upon release on parole:

- a. Prisoners in a nonpay status will be provided one pair of civilian pants, one civilian shirt, and one civilian coat (if required), gratuitously at the time of release.
- b. Transportation to parole destination, per Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR).
- c. A cash discharge gratuity, per DOD 7000.14-R.

8-21. Supervision of prisoners on parole

Individuals released on parole (parolees) are under the direct supervision of Federal probation officers.

8-22. Clemency considerations

- a. Parolees are eligible for and will continue to receive clemency consideration on the established annual review date. The ACS facility commander will obtain a report of a parolee's adjustment from the probation officer concerned. This information will be included in the recommendations submitted to the ACPB for clemency consideration by the Secretary of the Army. The probation officer and the commandant will furnish recommendations relative to restoration to duty if the parolee personally submits an application for restoration to duty. A deposition will be forwarded through the probation officer to the commandant in cases where the parolee is unable to pay all or part of a fine. The deposition will be forwarded, with a recommendation to the Clemency and Parole Board, which will determine whether or not the individual is liable for the fine.
- b. The date of the parolee's next annual clemency review will appear on all correspondence concerning clemency and parole from the ACS facility to the probation officer, subsequent to the prisoner's release on parole.

8-23. Change in status

a. If the sentence to confinement of a parolee expires prior to completion of appellate review, the commander, USDB will—

- (1) Transfer the prisoner to an excess leave without pay status. A DA Form 31 (Request and Authority for Leave) is required to grant excess leave.
- (2) Furnish the individual information and instructions regarding the change in status, the address of the military commander of the unit to which assigned, and other information that clearly establishes the status change and obligation.

b. If, on completion of the appellate review, the parolee's sentence is ordered executed, the commander, USDB will—

- (1) Obtain a medical examination for the parolee as prescribed in AR 40-501, if required.
- (2) Process separation document, DD Form 214 (Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty).

(3) Furnish the individual instructions regarding the appellate action and request the return of identification cards that were furnished for use pending completion of the review of the case.

8-24. Medical care

a. Individuals on parole pending completion of appellate review, or whose parole changes to excess leave status following completion of sentence to confinement while on parole, are members of the military service. Accordingly, they are authorized the same medical care provided other service members. At the time of release, the parolee will be instructed to seek medical care, as needed, from the closest uniformed service medical treatment facility.

b. An individual on parole whose latest military service was terminated by a punitive discharge is not a member of the military service. Individuals in this category are authorized medical care only in exceptional cases as approved by the Secretary of the Army. When the need for hospitalization in exceptional cases occurs, such as further treatment for an injury incurred in line of duty or as a military prisoner, the case, with complete information, should be forwarded to Medical Command for consideration. A parolee requiring hospitalization before a decision can be obtained should seek admittance to a civilian hospital, consistent with the individual's ability to pay. In no case will the Department of the Army be responsible for such hospitalization.

8-25. Line of duty determination

While an individual is on parole pending completion of the appellate review of the case, the ACS facility commander from where the prisoner was confined when paroled is responsible for the proper determination of line of duty for all injuries, diseases or deaths suffered. The appointing authority may request, through channels, that the Provost Marshal responsible for the area in which the prisoner is located conduct the investigation (see AR 15-6, para 2-1a(6)).

8-26. Termination of parole

a. By expiration.

(1) Parole will terminate at expiration of sentence. If a discharge has been executed and the parolee has complied with the conditions of parole, the parolee will be discharged from supervision when the full term of the sentence(s) is completed.

(2) When the sentence expires before completion of appellate review, the unit commander designated by the ACS facility commander will assume supervision and the precompleted DD Form 2717 (Department of Defense Voluntary/Involuntary Appellate Leave Action) is activated.

(3) On completion of the aforementioned actions, DA Form 1708-R (Certificate of Release from Parole) will be prepared in duplicate. The original copy, signed by the commander, will be forwarded to the probation officer by a letter of transmittal for delivery to the parolee. The duplicate copy of the certificate will be retained for file.

b. By suspension.

(1) When departmental authorization for assignment of a parolee to a military retraining course for ultimate restoration to duty is received, the chairman, ACPB, is authorized to suspend parole without prejudice returning the parolee to military custody for necessary training and further consideration for qualifications for restoration to duty. (Transportation costs incident to return to military custody under these conditions will be borne by the Government).

(2) Whenever it appears reasonably certain the conditions of parole have been materially violated (including failure to pay a fine ordered into execution while the parolee is under supervision), the ACS facility commander will transmit by the most expeditious means information concerning the alleged violation and personal recommendations concerning suspension of parole to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), ATTN: Army Clemency and Parole Board, for a determination as to whether suspension of parole should be authorized. If it is determined that parole should be suspended, and if it is deemed necessary to assure the presence of the parolee pending determination of the parolee's status, on receipt of such authority, the ACS facility commander will execute suspension order issued by the chairman, Army Clemency and Review Board, to have the violator taken into custody. Upon issue of the warrant, the facility will contact DAPM. DAPM will notify the facility from which the prisoner was initially paroled for further action and disposition.

c. *Additional administrative actions.* Subsequent administrative actions to adjudicate an alleged violation of parole will be conducted per AR 15-130. In cases of suspension or revocation of parole, this regulation provides no benefit or right of any prisoner whose parole is suspended or revoked. Computation of sentence remaining to be served will be computed under AR 15-130 and AR 633-30. This also applies to Army prisoners who have been transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

d. Revocation of parole.

(1) ACPB decision regarding parole revocation actions will be transmitted by the most expeditious means to the commanders of ACS facilities, who will notify the prisoner(s) if returned to military custody or the parolee through the probation officer concerned if not returned to military control.

(a) If parole is revoked and the parolee is confined in a civil institution, a detainer will be lodged by the USDB with civil authorities. If the parolee has remained at large in the district of violation pending decision on revocation, the

ACS facility commander, will initiate action to have the parolee return to the custody of the Army at Government expense.

(b) If a flash notice, filed per paragraph 8-18, is to be canceled because of parole termination by clemency action or revocation prior to the original date of expiration, the applicable portion of the FBI Form I-12 will be completed and forwarded directly to the Department of Justice, FBI

(2) Personnel records and allied papers of Army parolees confined in civil institutions following revocation of parole, or of parolees whose whereabouts remain unknown for 90 days after suspension of parole, will be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, ATTN: PCRE-RP, 8899 E. 56th Street, Indianapolis, IN 46249-5301. Correctional treatment records will be retained at the USDB.

(3) A parolee who has violated the parole agreement to the extent that the parolee's activities can no longer be monitored or controlled by the assigned parole officer is termed a parolee at large. Parolees in this category whose paroles have been suspended or revoked, or are pending such action, except where suspension is without prejudice, will be considered the same as escaped military prisoners whose return to military control is desired. When individuals in this category are apprehended, DAPM will be notified and disposition instructions requested.

(4) In posting the FBI Form I-12 "Wanted" notice on a parolee whose apprehension or location is desired, a check should be inserted in the first box, "Wanted for." The reason for posting the notice should be given, such as "Wanted for" alleged parole violation. Filing an FBI Form I-12 "Wanted" notice does not mean the FBI will initiate the arrest of a wanted parolee; the FBI will merely notify DAPM of arrests coming to the attention of the FBI's Identification Division. When the parolee has been apprehended, the "Wanted" notice will be canceled in the same manner indicated in (2) above.

8-27. Prerelease program

a. A prerelease training program designed to prepare prisoners for return to military duty or the civilian community will be established at each ACS facility. Facility programs will be designed to prepare the prisoner for reintroduction to his family, friends, and community and to help him to anticipate and cope with problems upon his reintroduction. Emphasis will be placed on development and self-understanding, toleration of frustrations and disappointments, and the importance of initial motivation toward the new environment. Practical training, such as checkbook maintenance, resume preparation, and military benefits, will be included. Provisions will be made for limited prerelease preparation for prisoners who, by reason of their aggressive, antisocial, impulsive behavior and extremely disruptive influence are not amenable to the prerelease program. Prisoners arriving with short sentences will attend only as much of the prerelease program as the facility commander deems appropriate.

b. Each prisoner will be interviewed approximately 90 days prior to his or her release date and assisted in preparing and forwarding applications to prospective employers and other agencies or services that provide such assistance. Subject to the prisoner's written authorization, information will be furnished employment agencies or employers regarding the prisoner's occupational experience and training.

c. Each prisoner will be interviewed to ensure compliance with applicable state laws concerning violent or sex offender registration requirements and completion of the impact of crimes on victims training prior to release

d. When releasing prisoners, facility commanders must ensure operation procedures contain, at a minimum, the following requirements:

(1) Verification of identity and release papers.

(2) Completion of all release arrangements, including notification of the parole authorities in the jurisdiction of release.

(3) A personal effects check on all prisoners to ensure that no facility property leaves the facility.

(4) Review of pending legal actions, that is, grievances or claims for damages or lost possessions.

(5) Medical screening and arrangements for community followup where needed.

(6) Forwarding of prisoners' mail.

Chapter 9 Facility Management

Section I Policies and Administration

9-1. Policies

a. ACS facilities will be operated and administered on a corrective rather than a punitive basis.

b. Military prisoners will not be subjected to any form of punishment except as specifically provided for by law and regulation. Facility commanders will ensure policy and procedures protect inmates from personal abuse, corporal punishment, personal injury, disease, property damage, and harassment.

c. Personnel assigned to operate and administer Army confinement and correctional facilities will be specifically trained in corrections management and operations. They will be fully oriented on the missions, objectives, and policies set forth in this regulation, prior to assuming such duties.

9-2. Establishment, change of designation, and discontinuance of facilities

Commanders of major Army commands desiring to establish, close, reduce, or increase the scope of operations of ACS facilities will submit requests (exempt from report control per AR 335-15) to Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM-MPD-CI) 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800.

9-3. Correctional holding detachments

a. Correctional holding detachments (CHDs) and personnel control facilities (PCFs) will be established and organized at each RCF and the USDB. The Troop Program Sequence Number for a CHD is 78391. The Unit Identification Code (UIC) will be a derivative UIC of the unit to which the cadre of the facility are assigned.

b. CHD and PCF provide the organizational structure against which Army prisoners confined in the ACS are assigned. Prisoners confined in other-service facilities will be assigned to a personnel control facility designated by MACOM. Discharged prisoners from other services will be assigned to the CHD. Facility cadre and support staff will not be assigned to a CHD.

c. Commanders of ACS facilities, or their designees, will serve as commanders of a CHD as an additional duty. A senior noncommissioned officer, under the supervision of the facility commander or his or her designee, will serve as the detachment first sergeant as an additional duty. Personnel management and military pay functions for prisoners assigned to a CHD for which the detachment has not been staffed will be performed by the facility's assigned higher headquarters.

Section II Standards for ACS Facilities

9-4. Physical plant and equipment

a. The physical plant requirements for confinement and correctional facilities include buildings for administration of the facility, housing of prisoners, training, recreation, employment, and the means for making the buildings and areas secure against escape.

b. New construction or modification of existing structures for incarceration purposes will be based on designs approved by the chief of engineers.

c. ACS facilities should be located away from installation perimeter fences, public thoroughfares, gates, post headquarters, swimming pools, post exchanges, theaters, family quarters, troop billets, service clubs, open messes, foliage or wooded areas, active firing ranges, or any facility or activity where persistent noise levels would interfere with normal sleeping hours for prisoners.

d. Minimum standards for buildings used for billeting or segregation of prisoners are as follows:

(1) Separate accommodations will be provided for female prisoners and prisoners in a pretrial status. Officers in pretrial status will be segregated from other pretrial status prisoners.

(2) There should be sufficient disciplinary and administrative segregation cells to house prisoners equal to 15 percent of the facility capacity, based on the standard allocation. Means for artificial lighting will be provided to the same extent (minimum of 20 foot-candles) provided to prisoners not in segregation. A minimum of 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) of outside air will be circulated per cell. Construction after 1 January 1995 requires a minimum of 15 CFM of outside air. The temperature in each cell will be maintained per installation standards. A prison-type toilet and lavatory will be provided in each cell. Prisoners must have access to the following:

(a) Toilets and hand-washing facilities 24 hours per day, to include toilet facilities without staff assistance when they are confined in their cells/sleeping areas. Toilets are provided at a minimum ratio of one for every 12 inmates in male facilities and one for every eight inmates in female facilities. Urinals may be substituted for up to one-half of the toilets in male facilities. All housing units with three or more inmates have a minimum of two toilets. These ratios apply unless national or state building or health codes specify a different ratio.

(b) Operable wash basins with hot and cold running water in the housing units at a minimum ratio of one basin for every 12 occupants, unless national or state building or health codes specify a different ratio.

(c) Operable showers with temperature-controlled hot and cold running water at a minimum ratio of one shower for every eight inmates. Water for showers is thermostatically controlled to temperatures ranging from 100 degrees to 120 degrees Fahrenheit to ensure the safety of inmates and to promote hygienic practices. The floors, walls, and ceilings of these cells will be of smooth surface and free of physical hazards. Windows and doors will be of maximum-security type. The use of chains and padlocks in securing cell doors is prohibited.

(d) Commanders will ensure policy and procedures provide for single occupancy cells/rooms to be available for prisoners that meet the following criteria:

1. Severe medical disabilities

2. Suffering from serious mental illness
3. Sexual predators
4. Prisoners likely to be exploited or victimized by others
5. Prisoners who have other special needs for single housing.

(e) Commanders will ensure that policy and procedures specify the means for the immediate release of inmates from locked areas in case of emergency and provide for a backup system. Standards for locking devices will meet established safety and security requirements as described in appropriate Army engineer guide specifications. In combustible buildings, manually operated locking devices permitting the opening and closing of all cells simultaneously will be installed on each line of three or more cells. Noncombustible buildings with power-operated locks will have a manual backup system to provide a means for the immediate release of inmates in case of emergency. This requirement includes exit or corridor doors throughout the facility. Lightweight locks in the builders' hardware class are not authorized for use in securing prisoners. The security and management of keys and locks will conform to the policy and procedures outlined in AR 190-51, appendix D.

(3) Facilities will be provided for the safeguarding of tools and equipment. In facilities of permanent type construction where the arms, tool, and supply rooms are in the secured area, inaccessibility is to be achieved by using security doors to isolate prisoners from these rooms.

(4) A visitors' room will be provided and will not be divided by any type barrier to keep visitors separated from general population prisoners. High-risk prisoners may be required to visit in a secured area utilizing an intercom system and transparent barrier to keep prisoners and visitors separated. A locked storage area will be provided for securing visitors' hand-carried items during visits.

(5) Double exterior fencing will be installed around all facility recreation, exercise, and work yard areas. Fencing will be constructed of a type indicated in appropriate engineering guide specifications. Fencing will be a minimum of 12 feet in height plus an 18 to 24 inch top guard, preferably spring-type, constructed on all vertical perimeter fences and on interior fences when added security is desirable. Based on local determination, some fencing may require installation of a double overhang (overhang fencing both outward and inward). Razor or concertina wire may be substituted for overhangs when determined appropriate by the ACS commander. Perimeter fencing will be installed so that escape underneath the fence is not possible. A minimum 12-foot clear zone will be maintained between perimeter fences. A minimum 20-foot clear zone will be maintained on the exterior of the outer most perimeter fence. The use of concertina or razor wire as additional barrier protection at the top and bottom of perimeter fencing is authorized.

(6) Guard towers should be constructed of materials that are compatible or the same as the overall facility's material and will be spaced so guards have an uninterrupted view of a minimum of 80 yards in any direction along the perimeter fence. The entire perimeter should be completely observed as well as all parts of the exercise yard. The towers will be of such height that the exercise yard exterior fencing and the roofline of the confinement facility can be observed.

(7) Security lighting will be provided as follows:

(a) Adequate outside security lighting will be provided and will have wire mesh or safety glass covering for protection against breakage by thrown objects. Lights will be focused or shaded to prevent a glare in the eyes of guards at fixed posts. Perimeter and interior lighting will be used to ensure observation of all likely avenues of attempted escape.

(b) An emergency power generator will be provided and will be located outside the perimeter fence, when possible. If located inside the perimeter fence, the generator will be adequately secured and controlled. A weekly inspection and a monthly load-bearing test of the generator will be conducted and made a matter of record in the daily blotter.

(8) Patrol roads or paths will be provided around the perimeter of the facility, as required for access by motor or foot patrols. Equipment required for effective administration and operation of the facility will be provided. This includes—

(a) Necessary tools for prisoner work and vocational training projects as well as tool repair and storage space.

(b) Space and equipment for producing identification photographs and fingerprints.

(c) An intercommunications system, independent of and in addition to an adequate telephone system, for communication among guard towers, gates, prisoner living and segregation areas, prisoner processing areas, dining facility, and a central communication station.

(d) Adequate space and necessary equipment/supplies for religious services.

(e) Recreational equipment, recreational equipment space, and secure outdoor areas for prisoner recreation and training programs.

(f) Riot control devices will be readily available in the event of an emergency. Such items will be secured and located in an area separate from the prisoner population.

(g) First aid kits, medical protective clothing and equipment, and medical litters will be placed where they are readily available to custodial personnel.

(h) Appropriate space and necessary equipment will be provided for outpatient health services support activities.

(i) Space will be allocated for attorney interviews.

(j) Prisoner cell furnishings will be of the prison style (metal and/or hard plastic/rubber) construction, not combustible. Specifications for the selection and purchase of facility furnishings indicate the fire safety performance requirements of the materials selected.

(k) Phones to which prisoners have access will be of commercial, heavy duty, prison type construction and operation.

9-5. Fire prevention and protection

a. *Emergency evacuation plans.* Facility commanders will establish policy and procedure for and implement fire prevention programs. Programs include but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Provision for an adequate fire protection service.
- (2) System of fire inspection and testing of equipment at least quarterly or at intervals approved by the authority having jurisdiction, following the procedures stated for variances, exceptions, or equivalencies.
- (3) Annual inspections by local or state fire officials or other qualified person(s).
- (4) Availability of fire protection equipment at appropriate locations throughout the institution.

b. *Noncombustible storage/disposal containers.* ACS facilities must be equipped with noncombustible receptacles for smoking materials and separate containers for other combustible refuse at accessible locations throughout living quarters. Special containers are provided for flammable liquids and for rags used with flammable liquids. All receptacles and containers are emptied and cleaned daily.

c. *Fire safety inspections.* Facility commanders will ensure comprehensive and thorough monthly inspections of the facility by a qualified fire and safety officer for compliance with safety and fire prevention standards. Additionally, a qualified staff member conducts weekly fire and safety inspections. These policies and procedures are reviewed annually and updated as needed. Fire prevention and protection will be provided per AR 420-90.

d. *Evacuation drills.* Coordinated emergency plans for evacuation of personnel, control of fire, and salvage of property will be prepared. Evacuation drills will be conducted at irregular times at least once each month and will be recorded in the facility blotter. Prisoners will not be moved from the controlled area of confinement or correctional facilities during the conduct of the evacuation drill.

e. *Automatic sprinkler systems.* Both local and transmitted water flow alarms will be provided for all automatic sprinkler systems except for patient-occupied areas of hospitals where local alarms will be omitted. Transmittal alarms will activate at continuously attended duty desks (in addition to those at fire department headquarters). Where feasible, automatic sprinkler systems will be installed in buildings of combustible construction confining military prisoners under lock and key, and in prison shops regardless of the type of construction.

f. *Automatic fire alarm systems.* Automatic fire alarm systems will be installed for the protection of life and critical material. They will be installed at isolated small locations requiring installed protection, but where automatic sprinkler protection is not feasible. Automatic fire alarm systems will also be installed in combustible buildings confining military prisoners under lock and key, if automatic sprinkler protection is not feasible. (Both local and transmitted alarms must be provided for these systems.)

g. *Fire reporting telephone systems.* Normally in all built-up areas, exterior fire reporting facilities will consist of fire reporting telephone systems. Where economically justified, fire alarm systems of the telegraphic type may be authorized, in lieu of fire reporting telephones. Extensions of existing systems will be compatible with existing equipment. Fire reporting telephone systems, including switchboards, enunciators, telephones, and connecting circuits, will be installed and maintained per AR 420-90.

h. *Smoke detectors.* Hard-wired detectors will be used. Battery powered detectors may be used as an interim measure. If battery powered detectors are used, monthly checks for proper operation are required.

9-6. Space allocation for prisoners

Criteria to be used in determining space allocation for prisoners in Army confinement and correctional facilities follow.

a. *Standard allocation.*

(1) *Maximum custody and segregation prisoners.* Single cells are required for inmates assigned to maximum custody and segregation. All cells in which inmates are confined will conform to the following requirements:

(a) There must be 35 square feet of unencumbered space for the single cell occupant.

(b) When confinement exceeds 10 hours per day, there must be at least 80 square feet of total floor space per occupant.

(c) "Unencumbered space" is usable space that is not encumbered by furnishings or fixtures. At least one dimension of the unencumbered space is no less than 7 feet. In determining unencumbered space, all fixtures must be in operational position and must provide the following minimum areas per person: bed, plumbing fixtures, desk, and locker.

(2) *Minimum/medium custody prisoner.* Single cells/rooms and multiple-occupancy cells/rooms may be used for housing inmates in medium/minimum custody when the classifications system, cell/room size, and level of supervision meet the following requirements:

(a) There must be 35 square feet of unencumbered space when there is one person and 25 square feet of unencumbered space when there are 2 to 250 persons.

(b) When confinement exceeds 10 hours per day, there must be at least 80 square feet of total floor space per occupant.

(c) Housing units should strive to be in compliance with applicable ACA standards.

(d) Medium-security inmates housed in multiple-occupancy cells/rooms require direct supervision. A classification system is used to divide the occupants into groups that reduce the probability of assault and disruptive behavior. At a minimum, the classification system evaluates the following: mental and emotional stability; escape history; history of assaultive behavior; medical status; age; and enemies of record.

(e) Male and female inmates are housed in separate cells/rooms. Prisoners will be allocated space per this standard except under circumstances described in *b* and *c* below.

b. Reduced allocation. While not desirable, it is recognized that, under certain conditions, the standard allocation is not possible. A reduced allocation of 55 square feet of sleeping space per prisoner, except those in close confinement, is authorized when priority conditions exist that preclude the use of standard allocations. The reduced allocation will be used to determine mobilization prisoner capacities for the facility. MACOM commanders may approve operations under the reduced space allocation rule.

c. Emergency minimum allocation. Under conditions of temporary peak confinement facility population periods, not to exceed 7 consecutive days, an emergency minimum allocation of 40 square feet of sleeping space per prisoner is authorized, excluding the segregation area. Only DAPM may approve emergency minimum space operations for any period beyond 30 consecutive days.

9-7. Prohibited security measures

The following actions are prohibited for use on prisoners:

a. Dogs to guard prisoners. Patrol dogs may be used to track escaped prisoners.

b. Chemicals, except for riot control agents and OC pepper spray.

c. Machine guns, at guard towers or fixed posts, except in times of war or declared hostilities and only as a means of defending the facility from enemy or hostile action by a belligerent power.

d. Electrically charged wire.

e. Securing a prisoner to a fixed object, except in emergencies or when specifically approved by the facility commander to prevent potential danger to the prisoner, correctional personnel and/or the community. Medical authorities should be consulted to assess health risk to prisoners.

f. Use of restraining devices, such as leg irons, during prisoner employment to create a chain gang.

9-8. Reporting requirement

Facilities that fail to meet the minimum standards established in this regulation will be reported by the appropriate MACOM to DAPM. Reports will detail the areas where standards are not met.

Section III

Personnel

9-9. Personnel staffing

a. Staffing requirements at ACS facilities will be based on maximum capacity, mission and operational requirements, as established by the MACOM concerned and in consonance with ACS mission requirements established by DAPM. Staffing requirements will be reviewed at least annually and adjusted as required.

b. Prisoner work supervisors within ACS facilities may be either military or civilian, but will be selected on the basis of capability to train, supervise, or oversee. Personnel, other than correctional (MOS 95C) personnel, may be used to supervise prisoners upon approval of the ACS commander. Persons with civilian felony convictions will not be employed on the permanent, paid staff of ACS facilities. A record of noncustodial supervisors who are trained to supervise prisoner work details will be maintained. Each noncustodial supervisor authorized to supervise prisoner work details will complete refresher training at least annually.

c. All corrections personnel will be trained in self-defense and the use of force. As part of their duties, corrections personnel will be qualified for the weapon with which they are assigned, at least annually, and will complete a specialized training course on guard duties and responsibilities conducted by the ACS facility prior to commencing duties as prisoner guards. Training will consist of the use, safety, and care of firearms and the constraints on their use. All personnel authorized to use chemical agents must receive thorough training in their use and in the treatment of individuals exposed to a chemical agent.

d. Personnel assigned to ACS facilities normally will not be assigned duties other than those in direct support of the facility's mission. If facility personnel are assigned other duties not in direct support of the facility, the performance of such duties will not degrade, or otherwise compromise the security of the confinement facility.

e. Male and female personnel may be used to supervise or guard prisoners of either sex.

f. A volunteer program is recommended and will be conducted in accordance with 10 USC 1588 and DODI 1100.21. When volunteers are used, they will be recruited from persons who are representative of the community. Each volunteer will complete an appropriate, documented orientation and/or training program established by the ACS facility prior to assignment. All volunteers will agree in writing to abide by all facility policies, particularly those relating to security and confidentiality of information. Suggestions and comments regarding the establishment of policy and procedure for the volunteer service program are welcomed from volunteers. Volunteers may perform professional services only when they are licensed or certified to do so.

g. Corrections personnel will be trained to respond to health related situations within a 4-minute response time. The training program will include administration of CPR, methods of obtaining assistance, signs, symptoms of illness or deviant behavior and recognition of potential illness requiring immediate emergency assistance and actions to take in potential emergency situations.

h. Male and female personnel may be used to supervise or guard prisoners of the either sex outside immediate living areas.

9-10. Personnel training

a. Commanders of ACS facilities will establish and conduct a continual in-service training program of at least 40 hours annually designed to ensure all personnel assigned duties at the facility are trained in the custody, control, management and correctional treatment of prisoners. Training records will be maintained on all cadre per applicable regulations.

b. Facility commanders will establish standing operational procedures (SOPs) and conduct training on cadre standards of conduct. This training will become a part of cadre training records.

c. There will be written orders for every correctional security post. The orders will be reviewed at least annually and updated as required. Personnel will read the appropriate post order and/or SOP each time they assume a new post, and will sign and date acknowledging they have read and understood the order.

Chapter 10

Administration and Management of Military Prisoners

Section I

Admissions and Records

10-1. Admission procedures

a. Commanders will establish policies and procedures for the admission of inmates new to the system. At a minimum these procedures include—

- (1) Determination that the prisoner is legally committed to the institution.
- (2) Thorough search of the individual and possessions.
- (3) Disposition of personal property.
- (4) Shower and hair care, if necessary.
- (5) Issue of clean, laundered clothing as needed.
- (6) Photographing and fingerprinting, including notation of identifying marks or other unusual physical characteristics.
- (7) Medical, dental, and mental health screening.
- (8) Assignment to housing unit.
- (9) Recording of basic personal data and information to be used for mail and visiting list.
- (10) Explanation of mail and visiting procedures.
- (11) Assistance of prisoners in notifying their next of kin and families of admission.
- (12) Assignment of registered number to the prisoner.
- (13) Provision of written orientation materials to the prisoner.
- (14) Documentation of any reception and orientation procedure completed at a central reception facility.

b. The inmate in-processing checklist will be used to document prisoner admissions. The following actions will be taken:

(1) All newly assigned prisoners will be briefed on facility rules and regulations, parole and clemency procedures, counseling procedures, educational opportunities, earned time accumulation procedures, UCMJ and disciplinary authorities and procedures, and work assignment procedures as soon as possible. Rights of prisoners and procedures governing presentation of complaints and grievances per AR 20-1 will be fully and clearly explained.

(2) Pretrial prisoners will be oriented as to their status, rights, and privileges, including the following factors:

- (a) Control, custody, employment, training, health, and welfare.

(b) Incarcerated officer and noncommissioned officer prisoners will not exercise command or supervisory authority over other persons while confined. They will comply with the rules and regulations of the ACS facilities to the same extent as other prisoners. They will not be permitted those special privileges normally associated with those of equal rank.

(3) Newly incarcerated prisoners will be segregated from other prisoners while they undergo processing. ACS commanders will implement procedures to ensure in-processing is complete as soon as practical to minimize the duration of segregation for new pretrial prisoners.

(4) Prisoners will be required to bathe and will be strip-searched for unauthorized articles, at the time of in-processing. Tattoos, scars and identifying marks will be noted on the inmate's background summary record. Those facilities without an automated system will use DD Form 2710. Each prisoner will be interviewed to obtain information for completion of DD Form 2710.

(5) All of the prisoner's clothing, money, official papers, documents, and personal property will be examined. Only items of clothing, as prescribed by AR 700-84, and other articles, as determined appropriate by the facility commander, will be returned to the prisoner. A receipt for the retained articles will be furnished the prisoner per AR 210-174.

(6) Health and comfort supplies will be provided within 24 hours after the prisoner is incarcerated. When necessary, authorized health and comfort supplies will be provided immediately.

(7) Each prisoner will be examined and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing and tuberculosis screening will be initiated by a medical officer, physician assistant, or nurse clinician, within 3 duty days after initial incarceration. The HIV test and the results of the tuberculosis screening will be recorded on DD Form 503 (Medical Examiner's Report).

(8) When record checks have not been conducted prior to the prisoner's incarceration, files will be requested, per AR 190-27. Army investigation records may be requested by letter addressed to Director, Crime Records Center, ATTN: CICR-FP, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21222-4099. These requests must include full name, date of birth, social security number and, when computerized criminal history records are requested, full justification.

(9) Individual identification photographs will be taken of all prisoners. The prisoners will use a name board, if available. The last name, first name, and middle initial will be on the first line with the SSN on the second line. A prisoner registration number may be added on the third line. Two front and two profile pictures are required.

(10) Routine in-processing of prisoners at ACS facilities within CONUS will include an operational inquiry of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) wanted person file if one has not already been accomplished. Whenever the prisoner is in the NCIC "Wanted" person file as an Army deserter, the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point will be notified immediately of the subject's status. The date and results of the NCIC check will be maintained in the prisoner's correctional treatment file.

(11) Routine in-processing of prisoners will include checking prisoners against accompanying confinement or transfer orders to ensure positive identification. An institutional registration number may be assigned to each prisoner.

(12) A safe arrival form letter or locally approved equivalent will be prepared and forwarded to the primary next of kin upon in-processing of the prisoner.

(13) A review of the prisoner's records will be conducted to determine appropriate victim/witness notification requirements in accordance with Chapter 13.

(14) Urinalysis testing of prisoners during in-processing is authorized.

(15) A summary admissions report will be completed on all newly assigned prisoners. The admission report will include: special need, summary of criminal history, if any, special medical and/or dental needs, recommended evaluations and areas in need of followup or special emphasis.

(16) DD Form 2709 (Privacy Act Statement) will be completed on each prisoner.

(17) During prisoner in-processing, a sentence computation, DD Form 2710-1 (Inmate Sentence Information) will be completed and explained to the prisoner. The prisoner will acknowledge in writing he/she understands the computation.

(18) DD Form 2711 (Initial Custody Classification) and DD Form 2711-2 (Custody Initial/Reclassification Summary Addendum) will be completed when during the classification process.

(19) Prisoners that are convicted sex offenders requiring registration with the state and local law enforcement will be informed of this requirement by completing DD Form 2791-1 (Notice of Release/Acknowledgement of Convicted Sex Offender Registration Requirements).

(20) DNA analysis for qualifying offenses will be processed only with the findings of a general court-martial (10 USC 818) or special court-martial (10 USC 819) and after the action the court-martial convening authority pursuant to 10 USC 860 (see app B for offenses).

10-2. Fingerprint cards

Fingerprint cards will be prepared as follows:

a. FBI Form FD 249 (U.S. Department of Justice Arrest Card) will be prepared and mailed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ATTN: Automatic Fingerprint Division, Washington, D.C. 20537-9700, requesting an offender's criminal history record, if not previously obtained. The block "REPLY REQUESTED" must be marked "Yes" to receive a

criminal history report. The form must also show the charge, final disposition, and sentence related to the offender's current confinement. Each FBI Form FD 249 will include the originating agency identifier (ORI) of the facility making the submission and will be mailed directly to the FBI. Facilities without an ORI will request an ORI assignment as prescribed in AR 190-27, chapter 3. In the interim, criminal history checks will be coordinated with the Director, Crime Records Center, ATTN: CICR-ZA, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21222-4099.

b. On receipt of a final judicially approved sentence that meets any criterion set forth below, action will be taken to report a prisoner's offense(s) and sentence for entry on FBI records, per c below.

(1) Any sentence that includes dismissal or punitive discharge.

(2) Conviction of an offense that carries a possible sentence of confinement of 1 year or more in confinement. (The length of the actual sentence adjudged has no bearing on whether the information is to be forwarded. The criterion is conviction of an offense for which the maximum possible sentence includes confinement of one year or more.) Convictions for military unique offenses, such as, absent without leave will not be reported.

c. FBI Form R-84 (Final Disposition Report) will be prepared and submitted to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ATTN: Identification Division, Washington, DC 20637, according to paragraph 10-2b above. FBI Form R-84 will show the charge(s) and final judicial disposition. All information included in the report must be similar to that reported on FBI Form FD 249. Fingerprint cards will be submitted for all prisoners whose offense(s) meet the criteria set forth in paragraph b above and whose sentence to confinement expires prior to completion of appellate review and affirmation of sentence. On receipt of the final appellate review and affirmation of sentence, FBI Form R-84 will be forwarded to the FBI.

10-3. Alien notification

In all cases where non-U.S. citizens convicted of crimes are confined in an ACS facility, information on charge(s), final judicial action, and place of incarceration will be forwarded to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigrations Services (BCIS), ATTN: Investigations Division, 4420 N Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22203. Additionally, facilities will coordinate with the BCIS to review records for possible deportation of prisoners. Access to diplomatic representatives will be made available to foreign nationals.

10-4. Facility records

a. *Automation.* When available, facilities will use an automated system, as the primary means of information management within ACS. All outputs of the system will be maintained, per the provisions of The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS). Records and reports required below will be developed and maintained. ACS facilities may use computer-generated forms with like information.

b. *DD Form 506 (Daily Strength Record of Prisoners) (RCS CSGPA-1365).* This record will be prepared at all ACS facilities. Those facilities not equipped with an automated system will use DD Form 506.

(1) This form will be prepared each day for the 24-hour period beginning 0001 and ending 2400.

(a) Section I-Part A—Gains will reflect persons incarcerated during the period, or received on transfer from other facilities.

(b) Section I-Part B—Losses will reflect losses (by release, transfer, death, escape, or other action) during the period.

(c) Section I-Part C—Changes will reflect changes of each prisoner in status and custody grade. (Sick in hospital and return from hospital, are examples of changes in status.)

(d) Section II-Summary, "Brought Forward" (column b), will contain figures from column "e" of the previous day's report. In additional columns, appropriate changes will be entered. Column "e" entries will be total of "Brought Forward" (b) and "Gains" (c) column, less the "losses" (e) column. Total "Present" column (column o) will be total in "Hospital" (m) and total in "Confinement Facility" (n) column.

(2) ACS facility commanders will advise unit commanders to whom prisoners may be assigned or attached of any change in status of prisoners that should be submitted as a Standard Installation/Division Personnel System change.

(3) If incorrect entries are discovered on previously completed strength reports, a statement of correction will be entered in Section I, Part C, for example: "DD Form 506 (Daily Strength Record of Prisoners), 30 June 1993 as reads 20 should read 120. Correction had been incorporated in the present strength report and noted on the file copy as a pen and ink addition."

c. *Blotter report.*

(1) A daily chronological record of ACS facility activity will be maintained and published using DA Form 3997 (Military Police Desk Blotter Report). Facilities without CRS will prepare the daily report using DA Form 3997 or a computer generated equivalent.

(2) The facility blotter will provide a record of activities at the facility and will include as a minimum the following events:

(a) Head counts, bed checks, and roll calls.

(b) Staff visits and inspections.

(c) Tests of emergency plans and equipment.

(d) Fires, escapes, riots, disorders, suicides, or serious injuries, and other similar incidents.

(e) Each change of relief of the guard.

(f) Admissions and releases from confinement, to include temporary releases.

(g) Any other information deemed of value by the facility commander.

d. *Visitors' register.* A record of all visitors to the prisoners at the facility will be contain the following:

(1) Date.

(2) Name of visitor.

(3) Time in.

(4) Time out.

(5) Address or organization.

(6) Prisoner visited.

(7) Relationship of visitor to prisoner.

e. *Prisoner medication issue register.* A record of all medication dispensed to prisoners per the medical officer's instruction will be maintained to reflect—

(1) Date.

(2) Name of prisoner.

(3) Medication issued (name and quantity).

(4) Time and frequency of issue.

(5) Printed name and signature of person issuing medication.

(6) Prisoner's acknowledgment for receipt of medication.

f. *Roster of prisoners.* The Roster of Prisoners Report will be generated as of 2400 the last day of each month. Those facilities without Army Corrections Information System (ACIS) will use DD Form 515 (Roster of Prisoners). The report will provide an alphabetically ordered roster of prisoners confined. Names of prisoners subsequently incarcerated will be added to the list in the order in which they are incarcerated. Sufficient space will be left above the name of the first prisoner incarcerated during each 24-hour period for notation of date of incarceration (for example, "Incarcerated 30 June 93"). The following instructions apply to applicable columnar entries:

(1) Entries in the "Sentence" column will be made immediately after information becomes available.

(2) When a prisoner is released, transferred, escapes, or dies, a notation will be made in the "Remarks" column, stating date and authority for release or transfer, or date of escape or death. The prisoner's name will be lined out and initialed by the facility commander or a designee.

(3) Entries in the "Minimum Release Date" column will reflect minimum release date.

(4) Orders modifying a sentence and forfeiture or restoration of good conduct time will be entered in the remarks column opposite the name of the prisoner affected. Date of expiration of sentence recorded will be adjusted by appropriate entry in the column for minimum release date.

10-5. Correctional treatment file

a. A correctional treatment file (CTF) will be established and maintained for each prisoner in the ACS. At a minimum, the CTF will include the prisoner's records as outlined in 10-5b and any requirements for counseling, special training, employment needs, and or personal problems that may affect treatment. Records required below will be of the format at those facilities supported by the automated system. The CTF may include other documents as determined appropriate by the facility commander.

b. Individual personnel documents regarding a prisoner's correctional treatment will be maintained in a file folder separate from personnel records contained in DA Form 201 (Military Personnel Records Jacket, U.S. Army) or corresponding file for prisoners of other services, for each prisoner. Disposition of these records will be per AR 25-400-2. All ACS facilities will operate in accordance with AR 25-400-2 and as prescribed by this regulation.

(1) *DD Form 2718 (Inmate's Release Order).*

(a) DD Form 2718 will be used as authority to release a prisoner from confinement. The facility commander or designated representative with prisoner release authority may authenticate DD Form 2718 but only in the cases of prisoners who have been acquitted or have had charges against them dropped; or whose sentences have been mitigated or otherwise released by proper authority for return to their unit without armed guard.

(b) DD Form 2718 will not be used when a prisoner is transferred to another confinement location. Orders will be sufficient authority for accomplishing transfer of prisoners. When entering data on reason for release, terminology contained in appendix B will be used. DD Form 2708 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person) will be executed at the time of release of the prisoner for transfer.

(c) Temporary release of prisoners will be accomplished using the Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person form. DD Form 2708 may be used at those facilities not supported by the automated system.

(d) When a prisoner is hospitalized in a medical facility, the travel orders pertaining to the prisoner and a properly executed DD Form 2708 will be sufficient authority for confinement in the hospitalized area so designated for hospitalized prisoners and upon release for return to a designated place of incarceration.

(e) A DD Form 2718 will not be required for those individuals being transferred on orders from another ACS facility.

(2) *DD Form 2707 (Confinement Order)*. DD FORM 2707 will be executed per instructions contained thereon for each prisoner on initial incarceration. The DD Form 2707 also includes the medical certificate, to be completed on each prisoner within 24 hours after initial incarceration by a medical officer, physician assistant, or nurse clinician. This form will be completed each time, subsequent to initial incarceration, that the prisoner is given a medical examination or placed in disciplinary segregation. The authority ordering an individual into confinement or a designated representative will deliver to the ACS facility two copies of a properly executed DD Form 2707 at the time the individual is incarcerated. The DD Form 2707 will contain the name, grade, and organization of the individual and the specific offense(s) of which the person was convicted or accused. The officer ordering confinement will sign DD Form 2707.

(3) *DD Form 2710*. DD Form 2710 may be used in lieu of the ACIS-generated report when the facility is not automated. The report will be prepared within the first duty day following the prisoner's incarceration. Information not available initially will be entered as it becomes available. The DD Form 2710 will accompany the prisoner upon transfer to any subsequent place of incarceration both in hardcopy and automated diskette formats.

(4) *DD Form 504 (Request and receipt for health and comfort supplies)*. DD Form 504 will be used when the facility is not supported by the automated system. DD Form 504 will be—

(a) Used for requesting health and comfort supplies by gratuitous issue, by purchase from a prisoner's personal funds, or by deduction from a prisoner's pay account.

(b) Prepared in duplicate for gratuitous issue; one copy will be placed in prisoner's correctional treatment file and one copy will be retained for file.

(c) Prepared in duplicate when supplies are purchased from a prisoner's personal funds; one copy will be placed in a prisoner's correctional treatment file and one copy will be forwarded to the custodian of the Prisoner's Personal Deposit Fund.

(d) Prepared in triplicate when the cost of supplies is to be deducted from prisoner's pay. The form will be annotated with the account to be credited with the collection. One copy of the form will be placed in the correctional treatment file; one copy will be forwarded to the facility's supply section; and one copy will be furnished to the personnel officer of the unit to which the prisoner is assigned for preparation of the military pay order.

(5) *DD Form 508 (Report of/for Recommendation for Disciplinary Action)*.

(a) This form will be prepared in triplicate for each prisoner at the time disciplinary action is imposed or recommended.

(b) The original copy of the form will be forwarded to the appropriate commander for action or information and returned for inclusion in the prisoner's correctional treatment file after the approved action or acknowledgment is recorded thereon. The commander's action will be annotated on all copies. One copy will be filed chronologically in the facility records in an ACS facility record folder. The third copy is given to the prisoner.

(6) *DD Form 509 (Inspection Record of Prisoner in Segregation)*.

(a) DD Form 509 will be prepared for each prisoner in disciplinary segregation. It will also be prepared for those prisoners in administrative segregation considered suicide and escape risks, prisoners in restraining devices, and in circumstances where the commander considers such a record necessary.

(b) DD Form 509 will be signed each day by the ACS facility commander or designated representative, medical officer, nurse clinician or physician assistant, and duty officer when they inspect the prisoner.

(c) Special instructions will be entered relative to the prisoner's behavior.

(d) Part II (Hourly Inspection Record) of DD Form 509 will be initialed, at least every 30 minutes and or on an irregular schedule, by cadre personnel as required by local policy and this regulation.

(e) Upon completion, DD Forms 509 will be maintained in the prisoner's CTF.

(7) *DD Form 510 (Request for Interview)*.

(a) This form will be used by prisoners who desire an interview or communicate with ACS staff.

(b) Approval or disapproval and pertinent remarks relative to the interview will be entered on the form. DD Form 510 will be filed in the correctional treatment file.

(c) Depending upon the complexity of the request, responses to prisoner requests for interviews will normally be provided within 10 working days. The specific action taken by the individual specified in response to the prisoner's request will be recorded in the "Remarks" portion of DD Form 510.

(8) *Inmate Classification Approval List and Inmate Classification Profile Report*. These reports will be generated and added to the prisoner's CTF each time a review of the prisoner's classification is conducted.

(9) *Inmate In-processing and Release Checklists*. Reports will be generated, completed, and posted at the time of in and out-processing from the facility.

(10) *Inmate Transfer Checklist*. This report will be generated, completed, and posted to the CTF upon transfer of the prisoner to another ACS or other facility of incarceration.

(11) *Inmate Release Date Computation Report and Inmate Release Date Change Notification*. These reports will be generated and included in the CTF at the occurrence of a change in release dates.

c. Facility commanders will ensure record management within the facility adhere to policy and procedures and act in accordance with ARIMS. The establishment, use, and content of prisoner records; right to privacy; secure placement and preservation of records; and schedule for retiring or destroying inactive records will be strictly enforced. These policies and procedures will be reviewed annually.

(1) CTFs are privileged and will be safeguarded from theft, compromise, and unauthorized disclosure. These files are used, among other purposes, to assist the ACS in making parole and clemency determinations and recommendations. The files are therefore considered part of a law enforcement file and access to these files by prisoners is limited. Access to information in these files by others is governed by AR 25-55 and AR 340-21.

(2) Information in the correctional treatment file obtained under an expressed or implied promise of confidentiality will not be released to the prisoner if release would reveal the source of the information.

(3) In the event the facility commander is served with a subpoena ordering the production of a prisoner's correctional treatment file or any information contained within, the supporting Staff Judge Advocate or legal advisor should be promptly notified. AR 27-40 will govern all actions concerning the subpoena.

d. Prisoners transferred from one institution to another, with exception FBOP, will have their CTFs/records transferred simultaneously or mailed not later than 72 hours after departure from the losing facility.

Section II Personal Property and Funds

10-6. Prisoner clothing

All prisoners confined in corrections facilities will wear the distinctive prisoner uniform as prescribed in CTA 50-900. Clothing will be properly fitting, climatically suitable and durable when possible. Markings affixed to the uniform may include the designation of the facility at which the prisoner is confined and a white name tag with black letters spelling the last name of the prisoner over the right pocket of the shirt. Commanders of ACS facilities may designate a distinctive female uniform and may prescribe color variations of the distinctive uniform to reflect custody levels. Markings affixed to distinctive uniforms will not be degrading or otherwise subject the prisoner to ridicule. Pretrial prisoners will wear a different color badge than posttrial prisoners.

a. All prisoners, except those with executed discharge, will wear their appropriate class A service uniform during appearance before a court-martial.

b. Distinctive clothing for prisoners incarcerated in the ACS facility will be furnished at the expense of the Government.

c. Issue and expense of clothing supplied to prisoners and distinctive clothing prescribed for the ACS will be per AR 700-84 and CTA 50-900. DA Form 3078 (Personal Clothing Request) will be maintained on personnel with fewer than 6 months active duty service and on personnel receiving clothing on an issue-in-kind basis. Organizational clothing, within allowances prescribed in CTA 50-900, may be provided to prisoners per AR 710-2.

d. Clothing of prisoners will be laundered or dry cleaned without charge per AR 210-130.

10-7. Personal property and funds

a. *Personal property.* Prisoners may be permitted to place in safekeeping personal property not authorized for personal retention by the facility commander. Such items may include wallets, pictures, official papers, drivers license, keys, and pens. Items of value such as checks, savings bonds, charge cards, and jewelry will be retained in personal property. The number of items stored will not exceed the capacity of a 16- x 12-inch transparent envelope, unless the facility commander grants exception. Personal property will be accounted for per AR 210-174. Disposition of civilian clothing, excess military clothing the property of the prisoner, and other personal property that prisoners might have in incarceration will be per paragraph 10-8. Personal property held in safekeeping for the prisoner will be returned to the prisoner upon release.

b. *Personal funds.*

(1) Personal funds of prisoners will be placed in the prisoner deposit fund of the facility and will be safeguarded per AR 210-174. Prisoners will not be permitted to have money in their personal possession, except as attendant to an authorized work release program. The facility commander will appoint, in writing, a person to witness the clearing of a prisoner's personal deposit account in the absence of the custodian.

(2) Subject to approval of the facility commander, prisoners with funds on deposit that are greater than their anticipated needs may withdraw excess monies from their account in the personal deposit fund for investment in U.S. savings bonds or for transfer to a personal savings accounts in banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or in banks or branches eligible to be designated a U.S. depository under provisions of 12 USC 265. Administrative procedures for withdrawal of funds from a personal deposit fund for investment purposes will be limited to transactions authorized per AR 210-174. A personal deposit fund custodian will not act as a co-depositor or as an operating agent between a prisoner and a commercial banking or investment institution. Care will be exercised to ensure that such outside banking does not result in unauthorized financial transactions between prisoners.

(3) A prisoner may be permitted to spend personal funds in amounts established by the facility commander for such

additional items as the purchase of educational material, remittance to dependents, payment of legitimate debts, and other special purposes approved by the facility commander. Prisoners in a pay status or with available funds are required to provide financial support to dependents in accordance with AR 608-99.

(4) Prior to the prisoner's release date, the prisoner's personal deposit fund will be closed and reconciled.

(5) Prisoners departing upon expiration of sentence or excess leave will normally be provided a Government-furnished ticket for the least expensive mode of transportation to his home of record, last place of enlistment, or anywhere of equal or lesser amount, which includes a ticket for transportation from the place of confinement to the nearest bus station or airport. However, reimbursement will be for the least expensive mode of transportation. Other service prisoners in ACS facilities will apply for and be reimbursed per individual service procedures.

10-8. Disposition of clothing and personal property

Any conflict between accounting procedures described in this chapter and AR 700-84 will be resolved by following AR 700-84.

a. Upon confinement, Army prisoners outside continental United States (OCONUS) will be transported to the appropriate facility with personal military clothing items listed in AR 700-84. Civilian clothing, excess military clothing, and other items of personal property will be retained at the inmates assigned unit for safekeeping.

(1) Prior to an individual's departure to a CONUS corrections facility, a clothing inventory and inspection will be conducted in accordance with DA Pam 710-2-1 by an officer, warrant officer, or NCO (staff sergeant to sergeant major) of the parent unit. DA Form 3078 will be used to document the following:

- (a) Excess military clothing retained at the unit for safekeeping.
- (b) Civilian clothing and personal property retained at the unit for safekeeping.
- (c) Clothing (military and civilian) accompanying the prisoner (see AR 700-84).

(2) Inventory listings will be prepared in four copies. All copies will be signed by the unit commander or a designated representative and the prisoner; the original will be placed with the individual's personal clothing; the second copy will be placed in the unit administration record; the third copy will be given to the prisoner to retain; and the fourth copy will be forwarded for filing at the ACS facility. In the case of individuals with fewer than 6 months active duty, the inventory listing will be prepared in four copies. For individuals released from incarceration for return to duty or discharge, all copies of the clothing list will be destroyed; the original will be receipted by the individual being released and retained by the unit, filed with unit administration records.

(3) Unit commanders will ensure that authenticated inventory listings of excess military clothing and personal property accompany the prisoner when reporting to the ACS facility. The commander will also explain to the prisoner the options available concerning the disposition of excess military and personal property.

b. Subsequent to court-martial, the losing unit commander will perform the following actions, as appropriate:

(1) For individuals sentenced to unsuspended punitive discharges, all items of excess personal outer military clothing and personal equipment retained at the unit will be turned in through supply channels.

(2) If the individual has a suspended punitive discharge, or no discharge, military clothing retained in the unit pursuant to *a* above will be shipped to the correctional facility at Government expense.

(3) The unit commander will dispose of civilian clothing and excess military clothing and other personal property retained at the unit for safekeeping, per instructions received from the prisoner. Copies of such instructions will be attached to the inventory listing prepared at time of initial confinement. Prisoners will be informed of the alternative dispositions of clothing should the prisoner refuse to give instructions. If the prisoner refuses to give disposal instructions for property, it will be disposed of by the unit commander per *f* below. Authorized options for disposal of prisoner's personal property are as follows:

(a) Ship at the prisoner's expense to a person designated by the prisoner. Such property will be assembled, carefully identified, and securely packed before shipment. Prisoners may be authorized shipment of personal property and household goods. Such shipment may be made to the member's home of record or place entered on active duty. If the member requests shipment to a further point, all excess costs will be at the member's expense. Copies of shipping receipts/documents will be forwarded to the prisoner upon shipment (see the JFTR, paras U5125, U5240-F, U5360, and U5370-F).

(b) Property may be sold, and the money from such sales deposited to the prisoner's account. Members of ACS facility staff will not purchase a prisoner's personal property from either the prisoner, his family or a third party acting as an agent for the prisoner.

(c) Donated to a charitable organization.

(d) Donated to another individual, not a prisoner or a member of the facility staff.

(e) Destruction of such property.

(f) Disposition of as abandoned or unclaimed property, per DOD 4160.21-M.

(g) Prisoners transferred will be sent with only those military garments necessary for health and comfort during travel, within a time limit designated by the facility commander.

(4) When a prisoner has personal property located outside of the unit and such property will not be retained at the unit for safekeeping, the unit commander will obtain a written statement from the prisoner that states—

(a) The prisoner was counseled on safeguarding his or her property at the unit.

(b) The prisoner disposed of the property outside of the unit.

(c) Details of the disposition of the property including name of recipient, location of the property, and nature of the property. The statement will be prepared in two copies with the original placed in the unit administration record, and the second copy retained by the prisoner.

c. Items of clothing and personal property authorized for retention at the facility, together with clothing records, will accompany the prisoner to the facility, where clothing will be retained in safekeeping or for use per the requirements of the facility. Clothing records will be maintained per AR 700-84.

d. ACS facility commanders will ensure that proper disposition of all a prisoner's effects is accomplished prior to his or her transfer to another ACS facility.

e. If a sentence to confinement is set aside on appellate review and the individual is returned to duty status, the individual will be issued only a seasonal uniform. Initial allowances will be reissued at the new duty station. This authorization does not apply to prisoners who have no punitive discharge and who continue to receive a monetary clothing allowance while incarcerated.

f. Questions concerning the disposition of household goods and dependent travel will be referred to the prisoner's prior unit commander and the supporting transportation officer. The JFTR apply.

10-9. Health and comfort supplies

a. *Basis of supply and stockage.* Supplies necessary for the personal hygiene and health and comfort of prisoners will be furnished on either a reimbursable or gratuitous basis. Items directly related to the inmate's personal hygiene/health may not be taken away from the prisoner except when based on destructive tendencies or safety and security reasons. Those prisoners in a military pay status or work release will be charged for such supplies; those not in a pay status will be furnished the supplies gratuitously. The monthly value of the supplies issued, exclusive of postage and haircuts, will not exceed an amount per prisoner established by DAPM. The health and comfort item inventory will be maintained at a minimum level. Stockage levels will be replenished based on issue documents. Health and comfort supplies will be purchased through normal procurement channels. Replenishment of health and comfort supplies directly from post exchanges or other sole source procurement actions without the approval of the local contracting official is unauthorized. Prisoners may use personal funds to purchase approved personal items from the post exchange system.

b. *Items of issue.*

(1) When such items are not already in the prisoner's possession, all prisoners committed to ACS facilities will be issued the following personal hygiene/health items, which will be made available to all persons per limits established by the ACS Commander:

(a) Disposable razor. (An electric razor may be substituted at the discretion of the ACS Commander.)

(b) Toothbrush.

(c) Toilet soap, soap dish.

(d) Towel (bath and face).

(e) Toothpaste.

(f) Shaving cream.

(g) Shower shoes.

(h) Deodorant.

(i) Sanitary napkins/tampons (female prisoners).

(j) Shampoo.

(k) Nail clipper (without file).

(l) Lip balm.

(m) Hairbrush or comb.

(n) Toothbrush holder.

(2) The following comfort items may be stocked for purchase at the option of the ACS commander.

(a) Cigarettes, pipe tobacco, or cigars (only one selection is authorized).

(b) Matches (safety, if no permanent lighter has been affixed to the facility or another means has been established to light items).

(c) Shoe polish and brush.

(d) Skin lotion.

(e) Face cream.

(f) Hair brush or comb.

(g) Pipe.

- (h) Writing instrument (as approved by the facility commander).
- (i) Writing tablet.
- (j) Envelopes.
- (k) Stamps.
- (l) Detergent (if no laundry detail).
- (m) Panty liner.
- (n) Hair grease.
- (o) Curlers (sponge).
- (p) Barrettes/hair ties.
- (q) Underwear (male and female) (boxer or briefs).
- (r) T-shirts (brown or white).
- (s) Socks (white or black).
- (t) Tennis shoes (high top or low).
- (u) Other items as determined by the facility commander.

(3) Food items (which may be used as an incentive for custody grade) may include potato chips, candy bars, crackers, soda, and cookies. This is not an all-inclusive list. ACS commanders may approve additional food items per sanitation standards. Other items may be authorized at a particular place of confinement. Generic items may be purchased as a means of controlling cost. ACS commanders will designate in facility standing operating procedures who is authorized specific items. Health and comfort items will be issued at a frequency prescribed by the facility commander. Prisoners will not be required to purchase an item for purposes of uniformity.

c. Issue to prisoners in an unverified pay status. Until acknowledgment is received from the finance and accounting officer stating that the prisoner is either in a verified pay status or a verified nonpay status, the activity issuing required health and comfort supplies will forward the DD Form 504 to the appropriate unit personnel officer or finance and accounting officer for entry on the pay voucher. Those requests marked "gratuitous issue" by the finance and accounting officer will be returned to the issuing activity for filing.

d. Issue to persons in a pay or work release status. The activity issuing health and comfort supplies will forward the DD Form 504 to the appropriate unit personnel officer or finance and accounting officer for entry on the pay voucher or record.

e. Issue to persons in a nonpay status. Health and comfort supplies furnished to persons in a nonpay status will be paid from appropriated funds.

f. Health and comfort items to accompany prisoners on transfer or hospitalization. As a minimum requirement, prisoners will be issued health and comfort items in amounts deemed adequate for a 3-day period.

g. Forfeiture of health and comfort items. Should a prisoner lose or damage Government and or private property temporarily entrusted to the Government, he or she will be held financially accountable. If the loss resulted from misconduct, Disciplinary and Adjustment Board proceedings may be initiated. The affected prisoner will forfeit his or her monthly health and comfort allotment up to the amount of the depreciated value of the loss but no more than 25 percent of his or her monthly allotment for 4 months.

h. Obtaining and safeguarding supplies.

(1) The least expensive source of health and comfort supplies will be used. Purchases may be made from a prisoner's personal funds furnished for this purpose.

(2) All health and comfort supplies will be retained in bulk storage for issue to prisoners. Schedules for issue will be established to assure that prisoners have necessary health and comfort items in their possession. At least once each month a physical inventory will be reconciled and balanced with the record of the previous inventory, supplies received, and those issued to prisoners in the intervening period. The facility commander will verify this inventory, in writing, or a specifically designated commissioned or warrant officer. Excessive inventory balance will be avoided.

i. Postage. Prisoners may, at the discretion of the facility commander, be permitted to have postage stamps in their possession. Those commanders not permitting prisoners to maintain stamps will use DD Form 499 (Prisoner's Mail and Correspondence Record) to ensure proper accountability of individual stamp accounts.

(1) Prisoners in military pay or work release status will be required to pay the postage on all personal outgoing mail.

(2) Postage for all personal outgoing mail of prisoners in a nonpay status will be furnished at Government expense subject to the following:

(a) Official envelopes secured through normal supply channels not to exceed 10 envelopes per month, must be used.

(b) Return addresses will show a post office box or building number and the installation.

(c) Mail may not exceed 1 ounce in weight and will be limited to first-class mail not requiring special services, such as airmail and special delivery. Pictures and clippings that are incidental to the message of the letter sent may be enclosed therein. Christmas cards and other seasonal greeting cards will not be transmitted under the official mail indicia.

(3) All mail to commercial suppliers/vendors will be at the prisoner's expense regardless of pay or work release status.

j. Hair care for prisoners. Facilities operating barber shops or hair care facilities for women as training activities will furnish hair care gratuitously to all prisoners. Where such activities are not operated, prisoners in a military pay status will be required to pay for hair care. Prisoners in a nonpay status will be furnished hair care at Government expense. Prisoner haircut standards will comply with AR 670-1.

10-10. Prisoner mail

Prisoner mail privileges will be limited only by security, control, and corrections requirements. Restrictions on mail will not be imposed as a disciplinary measure.

a. Correspondents. No limitations will be imposed as to the number of persons who may be approved for the purpose of corresponding with a prisoner except as necessary to maintain security and control. A prisoner's spouse, children, parents, brothers, and sisters should uniformly be approved unless disapproval is required in the interest of safe administration, the prisoner's welfare, or furtherance of his correctional treatment. Other persons may be approved as correspondents when this appears to be in the best interest of the prisoner, providing that such correspondence does not pose a threat to the security and control of the individual or the facility. Prisoners are prohibited from soliciting pen pals through the mail. Mail to and from unauthorized correspondents will, however, be rejected or censored only per paragraph 10-10b(3) below.

b. Mail.

(1) Prisoners will be authorized to retain reasonable quantities of mail in their immediate possession. They will not be required to destroy excess retained mail, but will be given the opportunity to forward it at personal expense to an authorized correspondent for retention. If unable to forward, mail will be destroyed.

(2) Prisoners' nonprivileged mail (nonprivileged envelopes and packages, both incoming and outgoing) may be opened and the correspondence read by the certified handler. The mail may be rejected for mailing or delivery on the basis of content per (3) below. A certified mail handler may examine the outside portion of both privileged and nonprivileged mail to determine the authenticity of the addressee.

(3) Rejection of mail, incoming or outgoing, on the basis of content is authorized only when it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, discipline, or correctional mission of the institution, or it might facilitate criminal activity. Mail that may be rejected on the basis of content includes but is not limited to material which meets one of the following criteria:

(a) Any material that violates postal regulations or contains obscenity, blackmail, contraband or threats. Obscenity is defined as writings or pictures that, taken as a whole under contemporary community standards, appeal to prurient interest in sex, are offensive because they depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and, taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Any material advocating criminal activities, violence, or racial and ethnic unrest.

(b) Any material that contains plans for criminal activities or plots for escape.

(c) Any material pertaining to gambling or a lottery.

(d) Codes or plans for activities in violation of confinement or correctional facility rules.

(e) Solicitation of prohibited gifts or money.

(f) Solicitation of pen pals.

(4) Additionally, failure of correspondence to conform to the following guidelines may be the basis for rejection or censorship:

(a) As far as possible, all letters will be written in English, but every effort should be made to accommodate those prisoners who are unable to write in English or whose addressees would not be able to understand a letter written in English. The criminal sophistication of the prisoner and the relationship of the prisoner to the correspondent are factors to be considered in deciding whether correspondence in a foreign language should be permitted.

(b) No prisoner may be permitted to conduct a business while incarcerated but may initiate the correspondence necessary to protect personal property and funds legitimate at the time the prisoner was committed to the facility.

(c) In addition, incoming letters may also be rejected if the letter contains material that would cause severe psychiatric or emotional disturbance to the prisoner. Rejection of a letter for this reason will be based on the opinion of a qualified officer of the Army Medical Department following consultation with the prisoner's social worker or counselor.

(5) Neither outgoing nor incoming mail may be rejected solely on the grounds that it contains criticism of the institution or its personnel. Caution will be exercised before rejecting correspondence because of its religious, philosophical or social views. A decision to exclude material expressing such views must be based on a clear showing that it would promote violence and thereby seriously affect the good order of the facility. The commanding officer of the ACS facility will make a record of the reasons for an exclusion of this type for the facility's administrative files.

(6) If mail, outgoing or incoming, is rejected or censored, the following procedures will apply:

(a) A prisoner must be notified of the rejection or censorship of all incoming or outgoing correspondence.

(b) The prisoner writing or receiving a rejected letter, must be advised of the reason that the mail is determined to be objectionable.

(c) Appeals will be referred, in accordance with facility policy and procedures, to the facility commander or the next level in the chain of command, whose decision will be final.

(d) Envelopes bearing the official mail indicia may be used for returning rejected incoming mail to addressee.

(7) Mail material diverted to investigative agencies will be handled and processed as evidence under the provisions of AR 195-5.

(8) Prisoners will inform their prospective correspondents of articles they are permitted to receive as determined by the facility commander. Valuables or other costly articles received through the mail that are not authorized will be returned to the sender at the prisoner's expense or destroyed. The prisoner will be notified, in writing, and a notation entered on his or her DA Form 1132-R (Prisoner's Personal Property List Personal Deposit Fund). Upon receipt of articles not authorized for retention, other than valuables or costly articles, the prisoner will be required to authorize disposition by storage with personal property if space is available, by return to the sender at personal expense; or by destruction. Only certified checks and money orders will be deposited to his personal account.

(9) Stationery and envelopes used by prisoners will be free from any indication that the prisoner is confined. The prisoner's return address on envelopes will show a post office box number, building number, or other appropriate designation. Inspection stamps or marks will be placed on prisoners' incoming or outgoing mail that has been read or censored. Such stamps or marks will not be placed on envelopes.

(10) Privileged correspondence is defined as follows:

(a) Privileged mail is defined as all mail between a prisoner and the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, Attorney General, TJAG (or their representatives), State and Federal Courts, defense counsel, or any military or civilian attorney of record. Correspondence with any attorney, for the purpose of establishing an attorney-client relationship, or for any purpose once an attorney-client relationship is formed, and all correspondence with the inspector general or members of the clergy, will be regarded as privileged. Privileged mail may be opened by a certified mail handler when there is a reasonable basis for confinement facility personnel to believe that the mail contains contraband or when there is reason to doubt its authenticity. Privileged mail must be opened in the presence of the prisoner and the correspondence may not be read by anyone other than the prisoner without the prisoner's permission.

(b) Correspondence addressed to, or received from, the appropriate appellate agency of TJAG of the department concerned will be delivered or forwarded without inspection except when there is reason to doubt its authenticity or when there is reason to believe that the correspondence contains contraband.

(c) The prisoner will complete DA Form 2569-R (Attorney of Record Designation (Civilian and Individual Military Counsel)) as soon as possible. Confinement facility personnel must not open prisoner's mail with civilian or individual military counsel listed in DA Form 2569-R, unless there is a reasonable basis for such personnel to believe the mail contains contraband. Completion of the DA Form 2569-R is not required for military appellate defense or trial defense counsel detailed to represent the prisoner.

(d) The commander of the facility may determine the authenticity of counsel, if necessary, by any appropriate means subject to the provisions of (a) above.

c. *Reading material.* Prisoners will be permitted to subscribe to newspapers, periodicals, magazines, and books per paragraph 10-10b, and in quantities to be established by the facility commander. Approved publications must be received directly from the publisher or commercial vendor. These materials are not considered privileged mail.

10-11. Telephone communication

Telephone calls to prisoners at the expense of the caller may be permitted in emergencies or when the facility commander or designated representative deems it desirable for the prisoner's welfare. These calls may be monitored or recorded unless they are between the prisoner and an individual who is considered a privileged correspondent under paragraph 10-10b(10). When telephone conversations are monitored, the tape will be retained for at least 30 days. In the absence of an automated recording capability, a memorandum of record will be used. Prisoners are authorized to make collect and prepaid calls.

Section III Public Affairs

10-12. Public access to facilities

Access by the public to ACS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism on grounds of defamation, embarrassment, and mental anguish to prisoners confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

a. *Photographing prisoners.* Prisoners will not be photographed, except in support of medical documentation and for official identification purposes. Photography that does not reveal the identity of individual prisoners when undertaken for official purposes and that will not reflect adversely upon the Army may be authorized per paragraph 10-12b(1)(b), (c) and (d) below.

b. Photographing facilities. Photographing ACS facilities is not permitted unless authorized by the facility commander as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include—

- (1) Areas where detailing fences, restraining walls, bar, locks, and other restraining devices are located.
- (2) Scenes including prisoners who are identifiable.
- (3) Scenes depicting prisoners under custodial control.
- (4) Use of irons or similar restraining devices.

c. Prisoner communications with the news media. Face-to-face and telephonic communications between military prisoners and members of the news media (print and broadcast) are not authorized. Written communications including those prepared by prisoners for publication on the internet, are permitted subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10-10 and 10-13d of this regulation.

d. Release of material prepared by prisoners for publication.

(1) Written material prepared by prisoners for publication, in whole or in part, in print or through the broadcast media, other than clearly identified expressions of personal opinion, must be submitted for review prior to release under the criteria contained in paragraph 10-11b of this regulation.

(2) In addition, such material may, as appropriate, be subject to national security and policy review under the provision of AR 360-1.

e. Institutional publications. MACOMs may approve establishment of institutional publications containing prisoner prepared articles when such publications are for use within a facility only.

10-13. Visits

a. Authorized visits (number and length). Restrictions on the number and length of visits and/or the number of authorized persons permitted to visit at any one time will be limited to those necessary for the safe handling of visits, prisoner control, and those made necessary by operational routines or limited facilities. Prisoners who do not desire a visit will not be made available.

b. Authorized visitors. The prisoner's spouse, children, parents, brothers, and sisters should be uniformly approved unless disapproval is required in the interest of safe administration, the prisoner's welfare or furtherance of his or her correctional treatment. Other persons may be permitted to visit subject to the above conditions. Visits will not be authorized when the commander determines them contrary to good order and discipline within the facility or likely to bring discredit upon the U.S. Army.

c. Visits by members of civilian support organizations.

(1) Members of civilian support organizations may be approved to visit any prisoner who requests such a visit. However, commanders will not permit advertisement of the availability of such organizations nor grant personnel representing such organizations routine access to prisoners.

(2) Members of civilian support organizations who desire to visit a specific ACS facility will submit written applications to the commander of the facility. Applications will include documentation identifying the organizational affiliation of the requester, the names of the prisoners to be visited, and a statement as to whether a visit has been requested by each listed prisoner. When a prisoner has not requested a visit, the commanding officer of the facility will have the prisoner interviewed to determine if a visit is desired.

(3) Approved visitors will contact facility commanders in advance of their visits. Written correspondence between approved visitors and prisoners is not considered privileged communication.

d. News media visits. Incarceration of any individual is a sensitive matter and the Army is morally obligated to treat information concerning incarceration as confidential. For this reason, news media visits to ACS facilities normally are not authorized. Instances may arise when it is in the best interest of the prisoners and the Army to authorize special visits to designated facilities by media having a legitimate public information purpose. Visits of this type may prove enlightening to the public and help correct false impressions gained by hearsay and other unreliable sources. In such instances, ACS facility commanders for the purpose of making available specific information about the facility, program, or activities may authorize media visits. Commanders' approval for media visits will be based on coordinated information from the public affairs officer and other staff members concerned regarding the impact of such visits. In authorizing these visits, it should be noted that approval given to news agencies requires equal consideration be given to all news agencies. DAPM will be contacted 72 hours prior to any programmed news media at an ACS facility.

e. Briefings. When authorized, news media representatives will be advised to make advance appointments for visits. Specific staff members of the facility will be designated as guides. Such staff members may respond to requests about facilities, programs, and activities but will refer all questions about policy and individual prisoners to the commander of the facility. The ACS commander of the facility or designated representative will brief personnel on the total operation of the facility prior to the tour, and ensure minimum disruption of facility operations.

f. Members of Congress. Visits to ACS facilities by Members of Congress and their staff are authorized per AR 1-20. Identifying credentials for members of Congress and written authorization for staff representatives of a member of Congress should be verified through the tenant installation prior to such visits.

g. Official visits by service representatives. Visit requests and requests for interviews of prisoners confined in ACS by service representatives will be forwarded to HQDA (DAPM) for approval.

h. Individual or group orientation visits.

(1) Individual and group orientation visits may be authorized by the ACS facility commander and will be coordinated with appropriate installation representatives.

(2) Regular tours are authorized as a means of informing the local community of the mission and functions of the facility. Care will be taken to ensure that the prisoner population is not put on display or subjecting them to ridicule or other forms of real or perceived public curiosity.

(3) Additional considerations prior to approval are—

(a) Requests for special tours/visits must be made in advance and include the stated purpose and intent of the visit.

(b) Approval of a special visit will cite time, date, and conditions of the visit.

(c) A senior staff member of the facility normally will be designated as guide for all tours.

(d) Individuals or groups approved for a visit to facilities will be informed that a violation of conditions of the visit will be cause for termination of the visit.

(e) The taking of still or motion pictures will be per paragraphs 10–12a and b.

(f) Tours will be planned to avoid occupied prisoner living areas.

(g) The personal histories and offenses of individual prisoners will not be discussed. Normally, individual prisoners will not be identified.

(4) Restrictions are not imposed on official visits except that they should be scheduled by appointment, where practical, to avoid any interference with work or training.

i. Visits by civilian clergy. Religious needs of certain prisoners may be such that chaplains (assigned to the facility) cannot fill them. In this event, the prisoner may consult the commander of the facility for assistance in securing visitation of civilian clergy.

(1) Clearance of civilian clergy to give religious counsel to prisoners must be obtained from the facility commander or a designated representative. Criteria for clearance by the facility commander or a representative include—

(a) An individual concerned must be the personal pastor of the prisoner or an authorized representative of the denomination of the prisoner.

(b) Civilian clergy must present proper credentials to attest to the fact they are actively engaged in religious work. The facility/installation chaplain should authenticate these credentials.

(2) Any member of the civilian clergy may request clearance per (1) above for the purpose of visiting a prisoner of a specific parish or congregation.

10–14. Complaints and interviews

a. Prisoners will be advised at the time of their incarceration of their rights to submit complaints and grievances to the facility commander or a designated representative and the inspector general under provisions of AR 20–1.

(1) Complaints will be submitted to the facility commander or a designated representative on DD Form 510.

(2) The facility commander or a designated representative will promptly advise the prisoners on the action taken regarding their complaints.

(3) A copy of the notice prescribed by AR 20–1 will be permanently posted on the prisoner's bulletin board.

b. Facility commanders will establish procedures whereby individual prisoners can request interviews or assistance from responsible officials. Such procedures will be explained to the prisoner and will include a system, which is responsive to the prisoner's desires to be heard. Requests made by prisoners and responses taken or not taken will be recorded and made a part of the prisoner's correctional treatment file.

c. Prisoner's letters containing accusations, charges or complaints shall be forwarded through proper channels to the official who is empowered to correct the complaint or alleged wrong. Petitions or writs for release addressed to the proper authority will be forwarded through normal mail channels.

10–15. Smoking

ACS commanders will comply with the provisions of DODD 1010.10 and AR 600–63.

Section IV

Pay, Subsistence, and Gratuities

10–16. Pay and allowances

Prisoners will be paid per the provisions of their sentences. Such payments will be placed with the prisoner's personal fund account and held in safekeeping per AR 210–174. Upon release, any money remaining in the prisoner's account will be returned to the prisoner.

10-17. Subsistence

a. All prisoners normally will be supplied the full complement of eating utensils (for example, a knife, fork, and spoon). They will be provided with wholesome and sufficient food. The facility commander must approve nonissue of eating utensils for security or other reasons.

b. Facility commanders will ensure that a qualified nutritionist or dietician ensures meals meet the nationally recommended allowances for basic nutrition and reviews the institution's dietary allowances at least annually. Institution food service supervisory staff verify adherence to the established basic daily servings and conducts menu evaluations at least quarterly.

c. Food service staff will plan menus in advance and substantially follow the plan, ensuring that the planning and preparation of all meals take into consideration food flavor, texture, temperature, appearance, and palatability. Additionally, special diets as prescribed by appropriate medical or dental personnel will be available for prisoners, to include religious beliefs that require the adherence to religious dietary laws.

d. At least three meals (including two hot meals) are provided at regular meal times during each 24-hour period, with no more than 14 hours between the evening meal and breakfast. Variations are authorized based on weekend and holiday food service demands, but basic nutritional goals must be met.

e. Alternative meal service may be provided to a prisoner in segregation who uses food or food service equipment in a manner that is hazardous to self, staff, or other prisoners. Alternative meal service is on an individual basis, is based on health or safety considerations only, meets basic nutritional requirements, and occurs with the written approval of the facility commander and responsible health authority. The substitution period will not exceed 7 days. At no time will food be used as a form of punishment.

f. Facility commanders will ensure meals are served under conditions that minimize regimentation, although there should be direct supervision by staff members.

g. Facility commanders will establish a health and hygiene program that implements adequate health protection for all prisoners and staff in the facility and other persons working in food service. The program will include—

(1) In accordance with Army regulations, food service personnel will receive a preassignment medical examination and periodic reexaminations to ensure freedom from diarrhea, skin infections, and other illnesses transmissible by food or utensils; all examinations are conducted in accordance with Army regulations.

(2) In the event food services are provided by an outside agency, the facility has written verification that the provider complies with Army regulations regarding food service.

(3) All food handlers are instructed to wash their hands upon reporting to duty and after using toilet facilities.

(4) Prisoners and other persons working in food service are monitored each day for health and cleanliness by the food services supervisors or designated representatives.

10-18. Release gratuities

Discharged prisoners released from the service by punitive discharge, whose sentences include confinement, may be furnished the gratuities set forth below on release:

a. Enlisted prisoners may receive a discharge gratuity as provided in DOD 7000.14-R, volume 7A, chapter 35, table 35-11.

b. Prisoners separated from the service with a punitive discharge or an other than honorable discharge may be provided civilian outer clothing, if needed, in accordance with AR 700-84, paragraph 12-8.

10-19. Transfer and disposition of prisoners

a. Except in those instances where suitable military ACS facilities are not available, all military prisoners will be incarcerated initially in military facilities. Authority to transfer prisoners to ACS or to Federal institutions is retained by DAPM. Cost of transportation and subsistence incurred in the transfer of a military prisoner from place of trial to initial place of incarceration will be at the expense and responsibility of the losing unit. Any other subsequent place of incarceration for the convenience of the Government, to include Federal Institutions, will be at Government expense.

b. Pretrial prisoners will be retained at a local ACS, other-service or other federally approved civilian facility through completion of courts-martial. Eligible posttrial Army prisoners will be expeditiously transferred to the appropriate correctional facility within 7 working days (coordinate with DAPM for OCONUS facilities) following courts-martial unless exceptional circumstances, as determined by the GCM Convening Authority, warrant deferring transfer. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to—

(1) Prisoner's presence is required within the command's jurisdiction subsequent to court-martial to complete procedures essential to judicial and administrative requirements, or to appear as accused in civil or criminal proceedings under the provisions of articles 14 or 58 of the UCMJ or to appear as a witness at the request of the local district attorney.

(2) Convening authority has initiated clemency action in the form of remitting or suspending prisoner's sentence to confinement.

(3) Prisoner's command has initiated administrative discharge procedures for the prisoner under the provisions of AR 635-200.

c. If a prisoner whose sentence as initially promulgated includes confinement and punitive discharge or dismissal and he or she is transferred to another command prior to completion of appellate review, the command transferring the prisoner will inform the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, 901 North Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203 by expeditious means. Should the decision of the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, be received in the command from which the prisoner was transferred, that commander will forward expeditiously the decision of the court to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the prisoner. An information copy of the endorsement will be provided the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency. Information concerning status of a prisoner's case may be obtained from the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, 901 North Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203 whenever doubt exists as to whether final action has been taken by the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, or the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

d. Transfer notifications will be conducted as outlined below:

(1) Before actual transfer of prisoners, a minimum of 2-duty days advance notice will be given to the appropriate service agency/CHD or commander of the gaining facility. Notification will include time and place of arrival, mode of transportation, number of prisoners being transferred, number of accompanying guards, and any additional information (for example, escape risk, medication). Direct coordination between commanders of ACS facilities is authorized. Prisoners will be delivered to ACS facilities during normal duty hours, when possible. Prisoners will not be transferred prior to publication of official permanent change of station (PCS) orders.

(2) When the transfer is to the USDB, the prisoner will be assigned to the CHD or other services administrative agencies.

(a) Prisoners transferring to RCFs will be assigned to the PCF servicing the RCF, as prescribed in AR 600-8-11. Prisoners will be attached to the RCF for courts and boards.

(b) Commanders of PCFs, upon receipt of prisoner orders, should review the files and consider initiating chapter action proceedings against prisoners without an adjudged punitive discharge.

(3) A prisoner who has completed a sentence to incarceration at the USDB and who has been adjudged a punitive discharge not yet ordered, executed will be placed on excess leave and allowed to depart to their release address. A prisoner who completes a sentence in an RCF will be sent to the PCF of assignment.

e. Prior to transfer of any prisoner, the following action will be completed by the transferring commander:

(1) The prisoner's pay status will be reviewed and any payments due will be placed with the prisoner's personal funds for transfer to the receiving facility. The financial documents will be placed in a DA Form 2356 (Payroll Suspend Documents Envelope) and will accompany inmates to ACS facilities, unless the convening authority has approved total forfeiture, in which case the final pay voucher will be filed in the personal financial record and forwarded to Claims Division, Settlement Operations, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis, IN 46249.

(2) Action will be taken to reinstate Serviceman's Group Life Insurance, when appropriate.

(3) Prisoner's personal funds will be transferred as prescribed in AR 210-174.

(4) The commander of an ACS facility from which a prisoner is transferred has the responsibility to ensure that the prisoner's military clothing listed in AR 700-84 is serviceable and transferred with the prisoner.

(5) Prisoners will not be transferred prior to issue of permanent change of station orders directing the prisoner's official movement by the losing unit.

f. In all cases where posttrial or officer prisoners are transferred to ACS facilities, commanders will—

(1) Establish procedures to expedite completion of convening authority action and subsequent transmittal of court-martial orders.

(2) Ensure prisoners arrive accompanied by documentation that clearly indicates their legal status and sentence as imposed by the military court (or as modified by subsequent convening authority action), copies of pretrial agreements, and a description of the offense involved, accurate documentation of pretrial confinement data, explanation of judicially ordered administrative audit per MCM (2002), part II, chapter III, Rule 305(K), deferment orders, record of trial, and documentation relative to any emotional or behavioral problems.

(3) Protect the legal rights of prisoners by establishing procedures to notify ACS facilities immediately when proper authority has modified the legal status or court-martial sentence of a transferred prisoner. Notification may be made by telephone and confirmed by followup written or electronic communication. ACS facility representatives may be contacted telephonically; however, no prisoner will be released on the basis of an unverified telephone call.

g. ACS facility commanders will send with the guard the following items in a sealed package:

(1) Letters covering transmittal of items and showing disposition of all personal property.

(2) Permanent change of station orders directing travel and reassignment of the prisoner to the gaining facility.

(3) Orders promulgating or modifying sentences. In addition to promulgating orders, a properly executed and

authenticated report of result of trial will be sent. The result of trial report should detail the offense(s) involved or be amplified by comments, which do so, and include pretrial agreements, if applicable.

(4) Statement of conduct, including amount of good conduct time and abatement earned, forfeited, or restored to date of transfer, mental status, escape risk, disruptive behavior, sexual deviation tendencies, suicide risk, gang affiliation, civilian charges/detainer, and any additional sentences or charges pending against the prisoner.

(5) The personal financial record for military personnel whose sentences do not include total forfeiture of pay, or who are awaiting action of the convening authority.

(6) Statement indicating the date the prisoner's pay account was closed and amount of money received by the prisoner or amount due the Government. If payment cannot be made prior to member's departure, the statement will indicate that Claims Division, Settlements Operations, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS-I), Indianapolis, IN 42649, will close the member's account. This statement will be furnished in cases of all military personnel whose sentences include total forfeitures, which have been ordered into execution.

(7) A voucher and check covering personal money of the prisoner per AR 210-174.

(8) A copy of the assignment order, DA Form 268 (Report to Suspend Favorable Personnel Action (Flag)), and medical and dental records will be hand carried by the escorts. AR 600-8-104 governs the transmittal of these records with the guard.

(9) Signed copies of DD Form 553 (Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces) and DD Form 616 (Report of Return of Absentee) or other documentary evidence that reports escapes and return to military control in all cases where escape affects a prisoner's release date.

(10) All psychological psychiatric evaluation reports.

(11) Reports on file, which might be appropriately considered in connection with classification, clemency, restoration to duty and parole. If applicable, enclose a copy of the reports any disposition boards conducted.

(12) Lists of clothing, equipment, and health and comfort items in possession of, or accompanying, the prisoner on departure.

(13) Prisoner's CTF.

(14) Decision of the Clerk of Courts (ATTN: JALS-CCZ), U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, 901 North Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203, in the case of a prisoner for whom a decision has been received and not finally disposed of by promulgation of a supplementary court-martial order.

(15) Status of appellate review to include an indication as to whether the sentence was affirmed and ordered into execution.

(16) A statement indicating whether the prisoner has petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces for a grant of review.

(17) Notice of any additional sentence pending promulgation.

(18) Any detainer for prisoner's return to military custody or to civilian authorities.

(19) DA Form 268.

(20) Listing of authorized visitors, showing current address and relationship.

(21) Notice of special problems or risks (for example, suicide, escape, special diet).

(22) Victim/witness notification file.

h. Actions required at the time of prisoner transfers include—

(1) Ensuring that documents, records, and other items required in the preceding paragraph, which do not accompany prisoners on transfer, are listed on the letter of transmittal and forwarded as expeditiously as possible to the gaining Army facility.

(2) Making group shipments, when possible, utilizing Government or chartered transportation to reduce costs and to provide for greater security.

(3) Providing guards from point of origin within their commands to the gaining facility. Major commanders and subordinate commanders in whose jurisdiction ports of arrival are located are responsible for assisting in scheduling travel within CONUS and providing billets for guards and detention facilities for prisoners during temporary layover periods. Notification of transfer made by the overseas commander to the ACS facility commander will also be made to the CONUS commander in whose area ports of arrival are located.

(4) Ensuring that medical personnel examine the prisoner and all appropriate documents, to include health record, prior to shipment. Those prisoners determined by a medical officer to be mentally unstable will be segregated from other prisoners. A medical officer will determine whether a medical attendant should accompany the guard. If a prisoner appears to require special medical attention en route, transfer will be accomplished through medical channels and required guard personnel will be furnished to assure custody.

(5) Making arrangements for obtaining qualified guard personnel. When possible a female guard will be assigned to the movement detail whenever a female prisoner is to be moved.

(6) Requiring the movement senior escort to report to the point of origin of shipment in sufficient time to inspect adequacy of transportation equipment, guards, security plan, and preparation of prisoners.

(7) Ensuring that prisoners' clothing and equipment are serviceable and adequate, and that both guards and prisoners

are in proper dress prior to departure; that documents required to accompany prisoners on transfer are in the possession of guard personnel, and that guards understand the penalty for allowing a prisoner to escape.

(8) Immediately prior to departure and in the presence of the senior escort, having prisoners and their effects searched thoroughly for unauthorized articles.

(9) Ensuring guards are knowledgeable of their assigned duties and responsibilities. Guards will be instructed as follows:

(a) A prisoner who cannot be controlled will be turned over to the military police or civilian police authorities for safekeeping until assistance can be obtained.

(b) Escorting prisoners through crowds, or actions calling public attention to the status of prisoners will be avoided.

(c) When a stopover occurs, or it becomes necessary for guards to rest, they may turn their prisoners, records, and personal effects over to the nearest military ACS facility or military police station having the capability to provide detention. With the concurrence of civilian police authorities concerned, guards may place their prisoners, records, and personal effects in civilian jails for safekeeping. Payment for cost of such confinement will be accomplished by processing of Standard Form 1034 (Public Voucher for Purchases Other Than Personal).

10-20. Appearance of prisoners as witnesses in civil proceedings

In legal proceedings in which the Federal Government does not have an interest, temporary absence of prisoners from ACS facilities for appearance as witnesses requires prior approval of the ACS facility commander. In certain cases, appearance may be directed by DAPM pursuant to AR 27-40, chapter 7. Approving authorities will cooperate to the extent practicable with civil authorities in the appearance of prisoners as witnesses in civil criminal legal proceedings. There are no provisions whereby prisoners can be released from the control of the Department of the Army for this purpose; therefore, the cost of transportation, housing, and subsistence (to include health and comfort items for prisoners) of prisoners and accompanying guards must be borne by the requesting civil authorities. A formal acknowledgment of these provisions will be required before approval and release of a prisoner for this purpose.

Chapter 11 Custody and Control

11-1. Custody procedures

a. Degree of Custody. The degree of custodial supervision appropriate for individual prisoners will be based on a review of all available records pertaining to the prisoner, including DD Form 2713 (Inmate Observation Reports), DD Form 2714 (Inmate Disciplinary Report), DODI 1325.7, and recommendations of correctional supervisors and professional services support personnel. Prisoners will not be assigned to a permanent custody grade based solely on the offenses for which they were incarcerated. Classification will be at the minimum custody grade necessary to be consistent with sound security requirements and DODI 1325.7.

(1) Custody grades include trustee, minimum, medium, and maximum-security classifications. Facility commanders may subdivide these custody grades, as required to facilitate additional security controls. Special consideration will be given to the potential for suicide, escape, and the safety of all other prisoners and correctional personnel. ACS facilities will place prisoners under sentence of death into administrative segregation until they are prepared for transfer to the USDB. Every precaution will be taken to protect the prisoner and others from possible injury by lessening the possibility of escape and suicide.

(2) A posttrial prisoner who requires little custodial supervision may be classified as a trustee. Trustees may be permitted to live, work, and train with minimum supervision, and may be granted other privileges, as deemed appropriate by the facility commander. Trustees will be required to execute a locally devised agreement prescribing area and time limitations deemed necessary for correctional treatment, training, and control purposes.

b. Custodial segregation.

(1) Pretrial prisoners will be segregated from other prisoners in employment and recreation areas. Pretrial prisoners will be billeted separately from posttrial prisoners.

(2) A noncommissioned officer in a pretrial status will be segregated from other pretrial prisoners unless he or she voluntarily waives, in writing, the right to be segregated and the waiver is approved by the facility commander.

c. Screening. Prisoners will be assessed for risk to preclude assignment of escape-risk and prisoners who present a danger to the community to work details outside of the facility.

11-2. Restrictive procedures

a. ACS facility commanders may restrict the movement and actions of prisoners and may take measures necessary to maintain control of prisoners and to ensure the orderly administration of the facility. All reported infractions of institutional rules and violation of the articles of the UCMJ will be properly investigated, as will escapes and major disorders.

b. The welfare and safety of the military and civilian communities in which ACS facilities are located necessitate establishment of adequate controls to protect those communities from potentially dangerous prisoners. Accordingly, the following criteria for approval of prisoner trustee status are established:

- (1) The prisoner must have served at the facility, unless granted an exception by the facility commander.
 - (2) Prisoners with sentences of 1 year or less may, as an exception, be elevated to resident status at the direction of the ACS facility commander.
 - (3) The prisoner has received a minimum custody classification.
 - (4) For prisoners convicted of murder, rape, aggravated assault, arson, child abuse, or sex offenses, the following additional criteria apply:
 - (a) A positive recommendation must be made by a facility classification board and approved by the facility commander.
 - (b) If favorably recommended by the facility commander, the installation commander may approve the recommendation. Favorable board recommendations will then be forwarded to the installation commander for final approval.
 - (c) Elevation to trustee status for prisoners convicted of violent crimes will be based on careful evaluation of their overall record, to include adjustment to incarceration, stability, physical and mental conditions, and potential for trouble-free behavior.
 - (5) Prisoners will not be granted trustee status until local victim/witness have been notified.
 - (6) Prisoners with life sentences are not eligible for trustee status.
- c. Evaluation of maximum custody grade prisoners will be as follows:
- (1) Prisoners who have been classified as maximum custody for lengthy periods of time often experience difficulty in adjusting to the routines and rigors of residing within the general population.
 - (2) Facility commanders may develop programs whereby prisoners thought to be ready for custody elevation are provided a period of social adjustment.
 - (3) Prisoners may be allowed to attend work, training, recreation, and other activities for a designated period of time to enhance their adjustment to increased responsibility and to provide a means for sound prognostic evaluation of their ability to return to the general population.

11-3. Control procedures

a. Strength verification.

(1) The facility commander or a designated representative will conduct physical counts of prisoners each day as specified below. Physical counts will include at a minimum—

- (a) Roll call, or a similarly accurate accounting method at the morning, noon, and evening formations.
- (b) Head count immediately on the return of all prisoners from work details.
- (c) Bed check between taps and midnight, and again between midnight and reveille.

(2) The correctional facility staff duty officer or military police duty officer will conduct a bed check between midnight and reveille, and at such other times as the installation or facility commander may direct. The reports made by the military police duty officer to the installation and facility commanders will include the report of verification of the prisoner strength.

b. Movement control.

(1) Normally prisoner movement within a facility will be under escort or guard. A facility commander may, if necessary, establish an intrafacility pass/badge system to control prisoner movement without escort.

(2) When movement is necessary for prisoners requiring escort, no pass need be issued. The facility commander may authorize maximum custody prisoners to move without escort but will require an escort when departing the facility. Hand irons or other restraining devices may be used during movement within an ACS facility.

(3) Facility commanders will establish specific procedures to ensure control of mass group formations and movements.

(4) Correction specialist requirements for prisoners being transported outside an ACS facility by means of foot, motor vehicle, or aircraft (other than AIREVAC or U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) aircraft) are as follows:

(a) *Trained correctional, military police or security personnel.* Under maximum custody circumstances, there will be one correctional specialist per restrained prisoner, two unarmed correctional specialists or one armed correctional specialist guard per unrestrained prisoner. Under medium custody circumstances, there will be one guard per five prisoners. In minimum custody circumstances there will be one guard per ten prisoners. The ACS facility commander will determine trustee corrections officers.

(b) *Noncorrectional escorts.* It is required that at least one escort be a sergeant or above. Under maximum custody circumstances, prisoners will have two guards per prisoner. In medium custody circumstances, prisoners will have one guard per two prisoners, and in minimum custody circumstances there will be one guard per five prisoners.

(5) Medium and minimum custody level prisoners assigned to work details will be supervised at a level of supervision determined appropriate by the facility commander. Civilian supervisors, upon completion of formal training, may supervise prisoner work details.

(6) Pretrial prisoners temporarily released from ACS facilities and posttrial prisoners from OCONUS facilities under unit guards will have both leg and hand restraints applied. Both restraints may be removed only when directed by a judge during official judicial proceedings or when requested by a physician to facilitate medical treatment. Hand restraints may be removed at other times when approved by the facility commander to allow the prisoner to complete essential administrative requirements.

(7) Unit guards and other noncorrectional personnel will be thoroughly indoctrinated regarding these rules before being allowed to assume custody of pretrial prisoners. They will certify in writing that they have been provided a copy of written instructions prior to assuming control of a pretrial prisoner.

(8) When a military prisoner is to be temporarily removed from the facility to under trial or for other purposes, the prisoner's unit commander will assure safe custody, control, and welfare of prisoner during such period. Normally, a prisoner who is to be removed from a facility will be placed in immediate custody of mature military personnel of the command who will provide for the prisoner's physical welfare and ensure humane treatment. On request, the confinement facility commander will provide technical advice and equipment (hand and leg irons, and so on).

c. Visit supervision and control.

(1) All visits of prisoners will be supervised.

(2) Communication between the prisoner and military or civilian counsel will be respected as confidential. Where practical, a private visitation room will be made available to facilitate client/attorney visits.

(3) Visitors will be briefed on, or provided a copy of, published rules on arrival at the facility.

(4) The visitor room/area will be searched before and after visits.

(5) Normally, visitor searches will be limited to checks of their person with a metal detection device and checks of handbags and parcels, before entering the facility. The facility commander or his designated representative (SFC or above) has discretion to direct physical searches of visitors when deemed appropriate. Visitors who have preapproved articles for prisoners will deliver them to the facility commander or a designated representative for subsequent inspection, prior to delivery to the prisoner.

(6) The facility commander or designated representative will determine if an inmate will be authorized contact or noncontact visitation. Noncontact visitation may be authorized in those instances of substantiated security risks. Physical contact between visitors and prisoners will be limited to a short embrace at the beginning and termination of the visit and to holding hands during the visit.

(7) All prisoners will be frisk-searched immediately before entering and strip-searched immediately after leaving the visitor area.

(8) Visitation may be canceled at any time for intentional violation of facility visitation rules.

d. Urinalysis testing. ACS facility commanders will establish procedures to administer urinalysis testing of prisoners.

e. Body cavity searches. Body cavity searches are to be conducted only when there is a reasonable belief that the inmate is carrying contraband or other prohibited material, and only by medical personnel. Body cavity searches will be conducted by a member of the same sex as that of the inmate being searched and must be authorized by an appropriate level supervisor (as designated by the ACS facility commander).

11-4. Escape and return from escape

All ACS facilities will establish escape and apprehension plans and test them at least semiannually. Tests of escape and apprehension plans will be recorded in the facility blotter.

a. Escape.

(1) For purposes of apprehension and return to military control, any prisoner who is absent from custody or confinement, including violations of trustee agreements; fails to return from temporary parole; or has been released on parole as provided in chapter 8 and fails to return after proper authority has suspended or revoked the parole, except those suspended without prejudice, will be considered as being in an escape status.

(2) In cases of prisoners who are members of other services, procedures in this paragraph regarding reporting, disposition of records, and detainers should be modified to meet requirements of the service of which the prisoner is a member.

(3) A prisoner who escapes will be reported on DD Form 553 (Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces). The form will be prepared and distributed pursuant to the provisions of AR 190-9. In addition, the facility commander, installation commander, or a designated representative will communicate directly and expeditiously with the military or civilian police agency of the military installation nearest an escaped prisoner's home of record, home of prisoner's spouse, close friends, and other logical sources to request assistance in apprehending the escaped prisoner.

(4) When an escaped prisoner is located in the custody of civil authorities, a detainer will be placed with the civil authorities for return of the prisoner to military control for the completion of any remaining period of incarceration. DD Form 616 (Report of Return of Absentee) will be completed and distributed per instructions in AR 190-9.

(a) Correspondence placing detainers on prisoners who escape will contain a request that the facility commander be notified 30 days prior to release of the prisoners.

(b) The correspondence placing the detainer will also be accompanied by a request for complete information from

civil authorities as to the offense committed, the length of sentence and pertinent social history. On receipt of the information, consideration should be given to determining whether return of the prisoner to military control following release by civil authorities is in the best interest of the Army and the prisoner. If it is determined that return to military control is not desirable, necessary action should be taken to remit the unexecuted portions of the sentence to confinement, if appropriate, discharge the prisoner from military service, if appellate review has been completed, and cancel the detainer.

(5) The personnel records and personal property and funds of prisoners in escape status will be disposed of as follows:

(a) Personnel records and associated papers will be disposed of per AR 630-10 in case of escape from ACS facilities.

(b) Correctional treatment records will be retained at the facility.

(c) Personal property and funds of escaped prisoners will be disposed of per AR 210-174.

(d) Clothing of escaped prisoners will be disposed of per AR 700-84.

(6) If a prisoner being transferred escapes, the installation from which he or she transferred will be responsible for the procedure indicated above as well as telephonic notifications and reporting serious incident. For OCONUS prisoners who escape in CONUS, the gaining installation will be responsible.

(7) All escapes and major disorders will be formally investigated.

b. *Return from escape.* The commander of the installation to which the prisoner is returned will accomplish the following:

(1) Have the prisoner examined by a medical officer, physician assistant, or nurse clinician for signs of communicable or contagious diseases. HIV and drug testing will be completed within 72 hours of a prisoner's return.

(2) Verify the prisoner's status and determine the location of the facility from which the prisoner escaped.

(3) Notify the nearest provost marshal or staff law enforcement officer, who will notify the United States Army Deserter Information Point pursuant to instructions contained in AR 190-9, and initiate serious incident reporting procedures per AR 190-40.

(4) In the case of prisoners who escaped from an ACS facility, disposition will be directed per AR 630-10.

(5) Unless otherwise directed by DAPM, CONUS prisoners who escape will be returned to the installation from which they escaped.

c. *Dropped from rolls.* Escaped prisoners who are not captured within 90 days will be dropped from the rolls of the facility.

11-5. Use of force

a. Instruction on the use of force will be incorporated in orders, plans, standing operating procedures, and instructions at all Army confinement and corrections facilities. These procedures will protect prisoners from personal abuse, corporal punishment, personal injury, disease, property damage, and harassment. Only such force as is reasonably necessary under all attendant circumstances will be employed. The use of firearms or other means of deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity as a last resort.

b. No person will use physical force against a prisoner except in self-defense, to prevent an escape, to prevent injury to persons or damage to property, to quell a disturbance, to move an unruly prisoner, or as herein otherwise authorized.

c. In the event of imminent group or mass breakout from an ACS facility, or other general disorder, it will be made evident to the prisoners concerned that authority prevails, that order will be restored, and that means are available to restore it by vigorous application of force, if necessary. If the situation permits, an attempt will be made to reason with prisoners engaged in any disorder prior to the application of any force. If reasoning fails, or if the existing situation does not permit reasoning, a direct order will be given to prisoners to terminate the disorder. This order will not be given until it can be enforced effectively by application of force as the situation may require. Before escalating beyond a show of force, prisoners not involved in the disturbance may be given an opportunity to voluntarily assemble in a controlled area away from the disturbance.

d. When use of force is necessary, it will be exercised according to priorities of force and limited to the minimum degree necessary. AR 190-14 prescribes the use of deadly force. The application of any or all the priorities of force listed below, or the application of a higher numbered priority without first employing a lower numbered one, will depend on and be consistent with the situation encountered during any particular disorder. Priorities of force for confinement and correctional facilities include—

(1) Verbal persuasion.

(2) Show of force.

(3) Chemical aerosol irritant projectors/nonlethal munitions (subject to local and host nation restrictions).

(4) Use of physical force, other than weapons fire.

(5) Presentation of deadly force capability.

(6) Deadly force.

e. Installation commanders having ACS facilities under their command will take necessary action to designate in

appropriate plans, order, SOPs, and instructions, their specifically designated representative(s) authorized to direct the use of firearms and riot control agents in the event of a riot or other disturbance. Such instructions will specify types of weapons to be used, which need not be limited to the shotguns and pistols used for guarding prisoners. In any event, when weapons fire or use of chemical aerosol irritants are employed, a written report will be submitted to the ACS facility commander or a designee no later than the end of shift tour when the usage of weapons or irritants occurred.

f. In those instances when a prisoner refuses to bathe or comply with haircut or shave standards, refuses to eat, accept necessary medical attention, or be vaccinated in accordance with Army health regulations, the prisoner may be restrained with the reasonable force necessary to administer the appropriate action. Whenever it is necessary to use reasonable and necessary force for this purpose, the following will be accomplished:

(1) A properly licensed barber, or in the case of female prisoners, beautician, as established by the Army/Air Force Exchange System, will be used if available. If no exchange barber or beautician is available, a senior correctional supervisor may administer haircuts or shaves. Senior female correctional supervisors will be used in this case when haircutting for female prisoners is required. A vocational barber instructor may be used to cut the hair of male and female prisoners.

(2) The prisoner must be advised that failure to comply will result in the application of force to accomplish the act. The ACS facility commander or a designated representative must approve the application of force in such cases.

(3) An officer or senior noncommissioned officer from the facility will be designated to witness the action.

(4) The haircut or shave or other necessary action will be administered away from the general prisoner population.

(5) Electric hair clippers and shavers will be used exclusively.

(6) An entry will be made in the facility blotter, DA Form 3997, to record actions taken as authorized above.

g. All applications of physical force will be recorded in the facility blotter. All applications of planned use of force (force cell move team) will be recorded on videotape, to include preparatory announcements and warnings to the prisoner. A restraint chair is an approved item of equipment that may be used for situations listed above.

h. A detailed written report will be initiated to document action taken.

11-6. Use of weapons to prevent an escape from a confinement or corrections facility

Before using deadly force in response to an attempted prisoner escape, the prison official must balance the need to maintain order against the risk of harm inherent in the use of deadly force. Corrections officers may use deadly force to prevent an escape only if they reasonably believe that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or other prisoners or have committed a violent offense or threatened death or serious bodily harm.

a. Each corrections officer will be provided with a whistle or such other means of alarm as may be suitable.

b. The use of firearms to prevent an escape is justified only per AR 190-14 and when there is no other reasonable means to prevent escape.

c. In the event a prisoner attempts to escape from the confines of the facility, the guard will take action according to the following priorities:

(1) Alert other corrections officer personnel of the attempted escape by blowing three short blasts on a whistle or by sounding such alarm signal as is suitable.

(2) In a loud voice, three times order the prisoner to halt.

(3) Fire only at such time as the prisoner has passed all barriers of the facility and is continuing the attempt to escape.

(a) Location of barriers will be determined by the physical arrangement of each facility. Normally, this will include barriers such as fences or walls enclosing athletic, drill and recreational areas, and prisoner housing areas in which administrative buildings are located.

(b) A corrections officer will not fire on an escapee if the fire will endanger the lives of other persons.

(c) When necessary to fire, the correctional specialist will direct shots that are aimed to disable rather than to kill the prisoner.

(d) Instructions for the use of firearms by corrections officers escorting prisoners outside the facility are the same generally as those for the use of firearms at the facility proper.

11-7. Weapons

Facility commanders will ensure that all correctional specialists are trained in the use of the weapon with which they are armed. All personnel will be thoroughly oriented on policies regarding the use of force and the provisions of AR 190-14.

a. M-16/M-4 rifles and only 12-gauge shotguns with cylinder (unchoked) barrels will be issued for the use by ACS guards. Barrels will not exceed 20 inches in length.

b. Authorized ammunition for armed corrections officers (perimeter and escort corrections officers) is number 9 shot in trap loads of 2 3/4 grams equivalent of powder, 1 1/8 ounces of shot for shotguns, and 5.56 ball ammunition for M-16/M-4 rifles. Tower guards may use number 00 buckshot ammunition.

c. Tower and escort corrections officers will be instructed that the shotgun can be fired to prevent prisoner escapes.

Such instructions will appear in prisoner guard training programs and in special instructions prepared for corrections personnel.

- d.* The 9-mm pistol may be used when prisoners are under escort.
- e.* Machine guns and submachine guns will not be used to supervise military prisoners.
- f.* Weapons will not be taken inside the controlled area of the ACS facility except at the expressed direction of the facility commander or designated authorities.

11-8. Security of controlled items

a. Facility commanders will establish policy, procedures, and implement guidance that provides for the proper management of pharmaceuticals and address the following subjects:

- (1) Formulary specifically developed for the facility.
 - (2) Prescription practices, including requirements that—
 - (a)* Psychotropic medications are prescribed only when clinically indicated as one facet of a program of therapy.
 - (b)* "Stop order" time periods are required for all medications.
 - (c)* The prescribing provider reevaluates a prescription prior to its renewal.
 - (3) Procedures for medication receipt, storage, dispensing, and administration or distribution.
 - (4) Maximum security storage and periodic inventory of all controlled substances, syringes, and needles.
 - (5) Dispensing of medicine in conformance with appropriate Federal and State law.
 - (6) Administration of medication by persons properly trained and under the supervision of the health authority and facility administrator or designee.
 - (7) Accountability for administering or distributing medications in a timely manner, according to physician orders.
- b.* Medical supplies in a clinic or treatment room, particularly alcohol, narcotics, dangerous drugs, hypodermic syringes, and needles, will be properly stored, controlled, dispensed, and disposed of in accordance with AR 190-51 and AR 40-61.

c. Medicines prescribed for prisoners on an outpatient basis will be delivered to the corrections supervisor at the ACS facility and will be maintained in a locked container and dispensed by medical personnel, per instructions of the medical officer. Only medicines currently prescribed for prisoners will be kept in this locked cabinet and medicines no longer required will be returned to the clinic. A record of the use of medication by prisoners will be maintained, per paragraph 10-4e. Facility procedures will require medical treatment personnel to issue medications. If medical personnel are not available during nonduty hours, the supporting medical officer may authorize custodial personnel to issue medications, per specific medical instructions.

d. Alcohol, flavoring extracts, and those products from which alcoholic beverages may be brewed, such as vegetables, sugar, yeast, raisins, prunes, grain, and other dried or fresh fruit, will be controlled. Close and constant supervision by dining facility personnel will be maintained to prevent theft or diversion of items, which may be converted into intoxicants.

e. Pesticides and janitorial supplies, including compounds used for pest and rodent control, cleaning powders and liquids, bowl cleansers, soap, and detergents will be secured and dispensed under close supervision. All pesticides must be stored in the original container with a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency label and in a secure space, which can be locked. Accurate inventories of pesticides and poisons will be maintained per AR 420-70 and AR 40-5.

f. Paints, varnishes, thinners, "ditto" fluid, and antifreeze solutions will be secured and only such amounts as are necessary for work will be dispensed. Mixing of paints or varnishes requiring use of commercial thinners or alcohol will be done under immediate supervision of cadre personnel. Bulk storage of these items will be in approved paint storage areas outside of buildings used for quarters, offices or shops.

g. Tools will be issued each day on a check-in and checkout record. Tools will be accounted for daily and inventoried at least twice a month.

h. Kitchen knives, cleavers, and similar kitchen equipment will be locked in a secure container when not in use. Supervisors must be able to account for such equipment at all times. Knives, cleavers, silverware, and similar dangerous kitchen equipment will be inventoried following each meal.

i. Precautions will be taken to prevent prisoners from converting items of equipment into weapons of attack or escape tools. Potentially dangerous equipment will be eliminated from the facility or modified with the concurrence of the responsible supply agency.

11-9. Movement of prisoners by aircraft

When aircraft transfers prisoners, plans for guarding prisoners at transfer points and at points of debarkation will be coordinated with the commander concerned prior to the movement. Each escort officer will be equipped with hand irons, additional restraining devices (for example, leg irons and restraining jackets) as required. The use of hand and leg irons aboard aircraft will conform to air carrier rules and regulations. Escort officers will not secure prisoners to any portion of an aircraft nor will they carry mace, tear gas, or weapons. Personnel escorting prisoners on aircraft will not be armed. Weapons and ammunition considered necessary for that portion of the movement not performed by air

will be stored in a locked container not accessible to prisoners and secured aboard the aircraft as specified by the aircraft commander.

a. Commercial aircraft.

(1) General provisions.

(a) At least 24 hours prior to boarding a prisoner(s) on a commercial aircraft, guard personnel will coordinate with a responsible representative of the air carrier (for example, the duty supervisor in charge of passenger service) of the pending transfer of prisoner(s) and coordinate plans for complying with specific air carrier requirements, unless such requirements are in direct conflict with the provisions of this regulation.

(b) The air carrier will be notified at least 1 hour before departure of the prisoner(s), the flight on which the prisoner(s) will be carried, and whether the prisoner(s) needs to be restrained during flight.

(c) The noncommissioned officer in charge/officer in charge (NCOIC/OIC) will assure the air carrier that the prisoner has been searched.

(d) Escort officers and prisoner(s) will be seated in the rearmost passenger seats that are not located in a lounge area or next to or directly across from an aircraft exit.

(e) The air carrier may not serve food or beverages or provide metal eating utensils to prisoners unless authorized by the escort officer.

(f) Escort officers will be thoroughly briefed on their responsibilities and procedures and a seating plan developed to ensure maximum surveillance of prisoners and security.

(g) Escort officer(s) and prisoner(s) will board the aircraft in advance of other passengers.

(h) Prisoners will remain in their seats at all times, except to use the latrine facilities. No more than one prisoner will be allowed to move to the latrine at any one time. They will be escorted and kept under surveillance when visiting the latrine.

(i) Escort officers will be positioned to allow optimal control of the prisoners at all times.

(j) Neither the guard nor the prisoner will drink intoxicating beverages.

(k) Escort officers will not take action during a hijacking attempt unless requested to do so by the captain of the aircraft.

(l) The escort officer(s) and the prisoner(s) will deplane after all departing passengers have left the aircraft.

(2) Requirements for prisoners considered dangerous and for maximum custody prisoner.

(a) Each prisoner considered dangerous or in a maximum custody grade will be escorted in accordance with paragraph 11-3b(4) and will remain adequately restrained throughout the flight.

(b) Prisoners considered dangerous, or in a maximum custody grade, will not be transported with other prisoners on the same commercial aircraft, unless traveling aboard a U.S. Marshal Service or privately contracted prisoner shipment flight.

(c) In addition to the requirements identified in paragraph 11-3b(4), there will be one NCO in charge (sergeant or above) per 10 prisoners.

b. Military aircraft.

(1) Maximum custody prisoners may be transported on the same aircraft with medium or minimum custody prisoners, as long as the proper guard to prisoner ratio is maintained. The passenger service officer will be furnished a list containing the name, rank, and social security number of prisoners and escorts, at least 24 hours prior to the movement.

(2) Prisoners who are in patient status will normally be transferred by aero-medical evacuation. Two guards will normally accompany each dangerous or maximum custody prisoner-patient while in the aero-medical evacuation system. Applicability of other provisions of this paragraph will be determined by the aero-medical evacuation control center, after consultation with the originating physician. The medical crew director will be responsible for supervising control of prisoner/patients aboard aero-medical aircraft. Prisoners determined to be psychotic normally will be moved in a patient status. If aero-medical evacuation is not available, psychotic prisoners may be moved as a maximum custody shipment with four escorts assigned each psychotic prisoner.

(3) Provisions of this regulation pertaining to the search of prisoners also pertain to searching prisoners in aircraft.

(4) The area approaching the flight deck or crew compartment will be declared off limits to prisoners. If the configuration of an aircraft permits, a separate latrine should be designated for prisoners. The lock will be removed from the door and loose equipment or gear removed and secured elsewhere.

(5) Escort officer personnel will be thoroughly briefed on their responsibilities, procedures, and seating plan developed to ensure optimal surveillance of prisoners and security.

(6) The aircraft will be inspected before loading to ensure that all equipment or gear that could be used as a weapon is removed or secured.

(7) Prisoners will remain in their seats at all times, except to use the latrine. No more than one prisoner will be allowed to move to the latrine at any time.

(8) While on board aircraft, dangerous, escape risk, and maximum custody prisoners are escorted at all times. Other

prisoners may move about, subject to the restrictions of (7) above, without escort, but will be kept under surveillance at all times.

(9) Escort officer requirements are as previously outlined for commercial aircraft.

c. Chartered aircraft. Use of U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command aircraft charter and military aircraft and special assignment airlift mission aircraft is authorized. Normally, prisoners are not transported on Air Mobility Command category B missions. Aircraft chartered through commercial carriers is also authorized. Guard requirements are identified above. Maximum custody prisoners may be transported on the same aircraft with medium and minimum custody prisoners, as long as the proper guard to prisoner ratio is adhered to. No more than one prisoner in this category should be on an aircraft, if carrying other (nonprisoner) passengers.

d. USMS.

(1) *Air transportation.*

(a) At least 72 hours in advance of USMS movement, a manifest of prisoners and guards will be provided to the USMS prisoner transportation division by DAPM after coordination with the shipping facility. The manifest will include name, Social Security number, and any special remarks/classifications for each prisoner.

(b) USMS personnel will assume responsibility for military prisoners who board the USMS aircraft. Prisoners will be afforded the same treatment as other Federal prisoners being transported by the USMS.

(c) The senior military guard (OIC or NCO in charge) with the prisoners will coordinate with the supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal for identification and a briefing on USMS procedures prior to having prisoners board the aircraft.

(d) Prisoner records will be maintained by the military OIC or NCOIC of the movement.

(e) For each destination for military prisoners, a maximum of two escort officers will accompany the prisoners unless DAPM has granted exception. The OIC and NCOIC of the movement will travel with the military prisoners to the last destination where military prisoners are transported by USMS aircraft.

(2) *Ground transportation.*

(a) Ground transportation to the USMS airfield location from the losing ACS facility and from the USMS airfield to the gaining ACS facility is the responsibility of the ACS facility involved in the movement.

(b) Escort officer ratios and other requirements for ground movement are per paragraph 11-3b(4).

(3) *Notifications.* DAPM will be immediately informed of any deviations from the arranged USMS movement or any changes in the prisoner manifest data.

11-10. Emergency planning

Facility commanders will publish formal plans for the apprehension of escaped prisoners; fire prevention; evacuation of the facility and quelling of prisoner riots and disorders; nuclear, biological, and chemical evacuation; and procedures for conducting special confinement or prisoner processing operations. Plans will be tested every 6 months. All emergency plans tests will be recorded in the facility blotter. These plans and the essential elements of each are set forth below:

a. Alarm, notification, and escape validation procedures.

b. Manning of critical points on the exterior of the facility, for example crowd control, likely escape routes, and observation points.

c. Procedures to secure prisoner population during execution of emergency plan.

d. Both prisoner and cadre recall procedures as well as the means of organizing forces (for example, search parties and riot control teams).

e. Designation and coordination of installation activity support of the plan.

f. Procedures to terminate the plan and followup actions, for example, reporting investigation.

11-11. Suicide prevention

All correctional facilities will have a detailed suicide prevention plan that addresses each of the following components:

a. Training.

b. Identification/screening.

c. Communication.

d. Housing and special clothing/bedding requirements. If applicable, a suicidal prisoner should be provided a suicide blanket and smock to wear.

e. Levels of supervision.

f. Intervention.

g. Reporting.

h. Followup/administrative review.

11-12. Hospitalized prisoners

The commanders of medical treatment facilities may provide treatment within the medical treatment facility or other

facilities approved by DAPM for hospitalized prisoner patients. The following policies apply to the custody and control of hospitalized military prisoners:

a. Custody and control of hospitalized pretrial prisoners and OCONUS posttrial prisoners are the responsibility of the prisoner's parent unit commander.

b. Inpatient psychiatric prisoner patients may be treated only in a military, Department of Veterans Affairs, State, or Federal prison facility approved by DAPM.

Chapter 12

Administrative Disciplinary Measures and Disciplinary Action Procedures

Section I

Administrative Disciplinary Measures

12-1. Administrative control and operation

Subject to the limitations of public law and this chapter, ACS facility commanders are authorized to restrict the movement and actions of prisoners and to take other action, as required, to maintain control; to protect the safety and welfare of prisoners and other personnel; and to assure the orderly operation and administration of the ACS facilities.

12-2. Privileges

a. A prisoner is considered in an on-duty status except for periods of mandatory sleep and meals and during reasonable periods of voluntary religious observations, as determined by the facility commander in coordination with the installation chaplain. Therefore, as part of an administrative disciplinary action, a prisoner who has been determined not to deserve the recreation time privilege may be required to perform duties deemed necessary by appropriate authority. Such performance of duties is not a performance of extra duty.

b. Privileges will be withheld from prisoners on an individual basis, without regard to custody requirements or grade, and only as an administrative disciplinary measure authorized by this regulation. When a prisoner in segregation is deprived of any usually authorized item or activity, a report of the action is filed in the prisoner's case record. Attractiveness of living quarters and the type or amount of material items that may be possessed by prisoners, may differ by custody grade to provide incentives for custody elevation.

12-3. Salute

Post trial prisoners are denied the privilege of rendering the military salute. Pretrial prisoners will salute when in appropriate service uniform.

12-4. Authorized forms of administrative discipline

The only authorized forms of administrative disciplinary action and punishments to be administered to military prisoners are those described in this chapter and in the UCMJ. Procedures, rules, regulations, living conditions and similar factors affecting discipline will be constantly reviewed in reference to violations and disciplinary problems. Physical or mental punishments are strictly prohibited. Authorized administrative disciplinary actions and category (major or minor) include—

a. A written or oral reprimand or warning (minor).

b. Deprivation of one or more privileges. Visits may be deprived or restricted as a disciplinary action only when the offense involves violations of this particular privilege. Restrictions on mail will not be imposed as a disciplinary measure (60 days limit) (minor).

c. Extra duty on work projects (may not exceed 2 hours per day or 14 consecutive days). Extra duty will not conflict with regular meals, sleeping hours, or attendance at regularly scheduled religious services (minor).

d. Reduction of custody grade or classification (major).

e. Disciplinary segregation may be imposed for an indefinite period but normally should not exceed 60 consecutive days. Prisoners held in disciplinary segregation for periods exceeding 60 days will be provided the same program services and privileges as prisoners in administrative segregation and protective custody. Prisoners will be informed as to the reason(s) for being placed in segregation and that they will be released when the segregation has served its intended purpose. Segregated prisoners will receive the same diet as the prisoners who are not segregated except for nonessential items, such as soft drinks and candies, which are an addition to the basic diet (major).

f. Forfeiture of all or any part of earned military good conduct time or extra good conduct time will be per AR 633-30 (a forfeiture of good conduct time first, then extra good conduct time). Both forms of abatement may satisfy forfeiture; however, forfeiture will be taken from good conduct time before it is taken from extra good conduct time (major).

g. Vacation of any previous suspended punishment (minor or major depending on the suspended punishment being vacated).

12-5. Authority to impose disciplinary measures

a. ACS facility commanders are authorized to administer punishments per paragraphs 12-4. Authority may be delegated by the facility commander to a subordinate officer (captain or above). The installation commander is empowered to act upon recommendations for disciplinary segregation, reduction in custody, vacations of suspended punishment, and/or forfeiture of accrued good conduct time. The installation commander may delegate this authority to the first field grade officer in the ACS facility chain of command empowered to administer UCMJ punishment. This authority may not be further delegated. At the USDB, the commandant will act upon all recommendations for disciplinary segregation, reduction in custody, and forfeiture of good conduct/extra good conduct time. The USDB commandant may act or may delegate the authority to a subordinate officer (captain or above) to act upon all recommendations per paragraph 12-4.

b. Prisoners may appeal only those punishments specified at paragraph 12-4e and f. Appeals will be submitted, not later than 15 working days after notification of punishment. Appeals will be submitted to the next commander in the ACS facility chain of command beyond the commander approving the punishment. Other punishments ordered per paragraph 12-4 may not be appealed.

c. Appeals will be acted upon and results communicated to the prisoner within 30 days of submission. Failure to process an appeal within this period is not grounds for reversing approved disciplinary and management actions. Prisoner will be promptly notified.

12-6. Segregation

Segregation measures provide special billeting for prisoners requiring additional controls. Segregation includes administrative segregation, disciplinary segregation, assignment to special quarters, and special restrictions resulting from a sentence to death.

a. Administrative segregation.

(1) An ACS facility commander or designee may direct administrative segregation for prisoners for medical reasons, protective custody, prevention of injury to the prisoner, or while prisoners are pending investigation or final disposition of an alleged offense. Prisoners placed in administrative segregation will be advised as to the purpose of the action.

(2) Prisoners who may require administrative segregation include those who demonstrate aggressive homosexual behavior; those with psychological disorders who do not adjust to living with other prisoners; and those who otherwise cannot be controlled. They will be provided normal cell furnishings, full rations, medical care, and normal privileges, including recreation, so far as health, welfare, control, and physical facilities permit. Beds, bedding, and other cell furnishings will not be removed while prisoners are confined therein, except as provided for in paragraph 12-7.

(3) A prisoner may be placed in administrative segregation during the preliminary investigation of a case when the facility commander or designee determines that such action is required to maintain order, protect evidence or testimony, or when necessary to expedite the investigation. In such cases, the individual will be released from administrative segregation immediately upon determination that it is no longer required.

(4) Prisoners requiring administrative segregation on a 24-hour basis may be assigned available work within the segregation area, if such work is consistent with the control and purpose of their segregation and if reasonable facilities and resources are available.

(5) Some prisoners, including those under investigation, those requiring protection from other prisoners, and those who are easily influenced by other prisoners, may require segregation only at night. These prisoners will participate in normal work and training activities. They do not require hourly observation or medical examinations, as required for prisoners in disciplinary segregation. DD Form 509 need not be maintained on these prisoners.

(6) A prisoner may, for any other valid reason, request in writing to be placed in administrative segregation. The facility commander or a designee will act upon requests for administrative segregation.

(7) ACS facility commanders will ensure policy, procedure, provide for a review of the status of prisoners in administrative segregation and protective custody by the classification committee or other authorized staff group every seven days for the first two months and at least every 30 days thereafter. Additionally, facility commanders or designee will review all cases of administrative segregation in an effort to keep the use of these restrictions to a minimum.

(8) A review will be conducted concerning the need for continued administrative segregation of the prisoner within 72 hours following its imposition. The review shall be conducted by a member of the facility staff appointed by the facility commander to review and make recommendations to the commander. The facility commander or designee will advise in writing the prisoner of any decision to continue administrative segregation beyond the initial 72-hour period. This notification will include the reasons the measure is necessary. The classification committee or other authorized staff group will conduct a review of the status of prisoners in administrative segregation and protective custody every seven days for the first 2 months and at least every 30 days thereafter. A qualified mental health professional will personally interview and prepare a written report on any prisoner remaining in segregation for more than 30 days. If confinement continues for an extended period, a psychological assessment is made at least every 3 months.

(9) Prisoners in segregation will receive laundry, barbering, and clothing and linen exchange on the same basis as prisoners in general population. Exceptions will be recorded and justified in writing.

b. Prisoners under sentence of death. Prisoners who have been adjudged a sentence of death will be segregated from the remainder of the prisoner population at all times. These prisoners will not be commingled with other than death sentence prisoners in billets, recreation, employment, or subsistence that is separate from general population.

c. Special quarters.

(1) Prisoners may be quartered in an area used for administrative segregation, if their emotional state, adjustment to confinement, or mental or physical characteristics warrants such action. Normally, special quarters will be determined based upon recommendations of the professional support staff or correctional treatment staff or medical authority.

(2) If determined necessary by a medical authority, prisoners designated for special quarters should be allowed to participate in work/training activities, consume meals with the general population, and participate in recreation programs. Special quarters will be terminated as soon as it is determined that the prisoner can be quartered satisfactorily within the general population.

d. Disciplinary segregation. Disciplinary segregation is a formal disciplinary measure and will be administered per paragraph 12-4e.

(1) The detention of prisoners in disciplinary segregation for long periods is considered undesirable and will be avoided. Prisoners in disciplinary or administrative segregation will be kept under close supervision. Medical staff will assess each prisoner's medical history within 24 hours of the prisoner's entry into administrative or disciplinary segregation. Medical staff representatives will visit each prisoner at least once daily to observe the prisoner's health and the sanitary conditions of the area. Such visits will be recorded in the facility blotter and DD Form 509 as applicable. The facility commander shall be informed immediately of all unhealthy or unsanitary conditions. A noncommissioned officer, experienced in correctional supervision, will be in charge of the administrative and disciplinary segregation areas at all times.

(2) Special precautions will be taken in the preparation, equipping, inspection, and supervision of administrative and disciplinary segregation cells to prevent escapes, self-inflicted injury, or other serious incidents or unhealthy conditions of confinement. Standards for segregation cells are prescribed in paragraph 9-4.

(3) Disciplinary segregation may be terminated as a disciplinary measure if a medical officer, physician assistant, or nurse clinician certifies that a deterioration of the prisoner's health is anticipated as a result of continued segregation.

(4) In addition to visits specified, persons who require an Inspection Record of Prisoner in Segregation (DD Form 509) will be visited once daily by a chaplain and a counselor and twice daily by the facility duty officer, the facility commander, or a designated representative.

(5) Prisoners in disciplinary segregation (administrative segregation when considered necessary by the facility commander or a medical officer, physician assistant, or nurse clinician) will be observed at random intervals no more than 30 minutes apart, by on-duty custodial staff personnel. Prisoners considered as suicide risks will be observed at least every 5 minutes. A record of such visits and observations will be maintained and posted on DD Form 509.

e. Other considerations.

(1) The medical officer, nurse clinician, or physician assistant, facility commander or a designated representative, and duty officers will inspect all occupied segregation cells during each visit to determine the adequacy of sanitation, ventilation, lighting, heat, and other conditions which may adversely affect the health of the prisoner. Medical personnel will keep the facility commander advised regarding the state of health and conditions of confinement of prisoners in segregation and will recommend changes in diet or conditions of segregation as necessary, to preserve the health of prisoners. Such recommendations will be acted upon without delay.

(2) Prisoners placed in segregation will be required to clean their own quarters. They may be permitted to do constructive work within the segregated area. Prisoners placed in administrative segregation or special quarters may be employed in work or required to undergo training consistent with their custody and classification and the circumstances necessitating their segregation. Prisoners in segregation will be allowed a minimum of 1 hour per day of physical exercise per 5 days a week unless security or safety considerations dictate otherwise. The facility commander may deny physical exercise, outside their individual cell, to prisoners classified as intractable.

12-7. Temporary removal of cell furnishings

a. The facility commander or designee (SFC or above) may control the property authorizations for prisoners in segregation. Prisoners in segregation will be provided adequate clothing and sleeping accommodations with sufficient bedding, and religious books if requested by the prisoner, except when the facility commander or designee determines that the temporary removal of such articles is necessary to prevent damage to property or injury to the prisoner or others. If the prisoner shows sufficient destructive tendencies that preclude the use of a bed, a sleeping board, elevated from the floor and constructed with heavy materials to keep damage to a minimum, may be provided at the discretion of the facility commander or designee (SFC or above). Sleeping boards will not be used routinely when disciplinary segregation is prescribed.

b. When a suicidal or destructive tendency is suspected, those articles of clothing or cell furnishings with which the prisoner could do personal bodily harm will be removed as a temporary safety measure. The facility commander or

designee (SFC or above) may order removal of beds, bedding, and other essential cell furnishings when the prisoner demonstrates suicidal or destructive tendencies, or when the prisoner is classified as intractable. Removal of furnishings will be reviewed every time the prisoner status is reviewed.

12-8. Intractable prisoners

a. ACS facility commanders or designee appointed by the commandant, USDB, may designate a prisoner as intractable. Such designation may be imposed when a prisoner is consistently destructive, or when he or she consistently and flagrantly refuses to comply with orders and instructions issued by the custodial staff. Intractable designations will be fully justified, in writing, and will be maintained in correctional treatment files. If the above named personnel are not available, authority to designate a prisoner intractable may be extended to the facility staff duty officer (SDO). The facility commander will review facts relevant to the intractable designation on the succeeding duty day.

b. The intractable designation will be immediately removed when the prisoner demonstrates that destructive or flagrant refusal to comply with rules and instructions has ceased. The facility commander will review the intractable designation every 72 hours.

c. Prisoners designated as intractable will remain within the confines of their immediate quarters. They may be denied physical exercise outside the confines of their individual cell. They may leave their immediate quarters only when authorized by the facility commander or a designated representative.

d. Prisoners to be designated as intractable will be advised of the reason(s) for such action. This notice will include the reasons for the designation and an explanation of those actions on the part of the prisoner, which will cause revocation of the designation.

12-9. Prohibited punitive measures

a. Clipping prisoner's hair excessively close.

b. The lock-step.

c. Requiring silence at meals.

d. Breaking rocks.

e. The use of irons, restraining straps and jackets, shackles, hand irons, or leg irons as punishment

f. Removing prisoner's underclothing, clothing or other debasing practices.

g. Flogging, branding, tattooing, or any other cruel or unusual punishment.

h. Domicile in a tent as a means of punishment.

i. Any strenuous physical activity or body position designed to place undue stress on the prisoner.

j. The use of hand irons, leg irons, belly chains or the like to create or give the appearance of a chain gang.

Section II

Disciplinary Measures

12-10. Investigation of incidents

a. Facility commanders will establish policy and procedures for when an alleged rule or UCMJ violation is reported. An appropriate investigation will begin within 24 hours of the time the violation is reported and will be completed without reasonable delay, unless there are exceptional circumstances for delaying the investigation.

b. In cases where a prisoner is alleged to have committed a serious rule violation or a series of violations that might warrant major disciplinary action, ACS commanders should consider conducting the investigation in accordance with the procedures of AR 15-6.

c. Before being interviewed, prisoners suspected or accused of violations will be advised of their right under Article 31, UCMJ. If requested, arrangements will be made for the prisoner to meet with an attorney as soon as practical. Relevant witnesses will be interviewed as deemed appropriate by the investigator. Written sworn statements will be obtained when necessary. The investigation will be completed expeditiously and a disciplinary report will be submitted to the facility commander or designated representative.

d. Upon receipt of the disciplinary report, the facility commander or designated representative will take action to reduce the report to a memorandum for record; refer the case for counseling and or reprimand; refer the case to the discipline and adjustment board; or take other appropriate action.

12-11. Notice to prisoners

a. If a three-member discipline and adjustment board is to be convened, the prisoner will be notified in writing—

(1) That a discipline and adjustment board will be convened to decide the case.

(2) Of the time and place the board will be held.

(3) Of the right to present relevant evidence before and during the hearing, both in defense and in extenuation and mitigation.

(4) That he/she may consult with an attorney before undergoing a disciplinary board, but there is no right to have an attorney represent the prisoner at the board.

(5) Of the right to call witnesses and present relevant documentary evidence in his/her defense when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Correctional officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses who may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other prisoners to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.

b. Notification to prisoners of one-member boards will conform to the provisions of paragraph 12-12c(1), except that, pursuant to paragraph 12-12c(1)(a), the prisoner is not entitled to counsel.

12-12. Discipline and adjustment boards

a. A discipline and adjustment board will be convened for the purpose of evaluating facts and circumstances surrounding alleged prisoner violations of institutional rules set forth in the facility handbook and for violations of the UCMJ. Based on its findings, the board will make recommendations to the appropriate commander for corrective action. The board will recommend action that will have a constructive effect on the individual prisoner's attitude and behavior and contribute toward the prevention of future violations or misconduct. Each case will be considered individually on its particular merits. Infractions that are relatively minor may be adjudicated by a one-person board, where as more serious infractions warrant a three-person board. Recommendations will be based on a thorough and impartial evaluation of all relevant facts and circumstances. Discipline and adjustment boards will be scheduled as soon as possible after the alleged violation.

b. Actions taken in connection with discipline and adjustment boards do not preclude trial by court-martial or action under Article 15, UCMJ.

c. For all instances wherein formal resolution is required, staff members will prepare a disciplinary report and forward it to the designated person. These reports will contain specific rules violated, statement of charges, unusual prisoner behavior, staff witnesses, physical evidence and its disposition, any immediate action taken, including use of force, and the reporting staff signature and date and time of the report. The administrative disciplinary measures recommended will be forwarded to the facility commander or a designee (captain or above) for review and appropriate action.

(1) One-member boards are empowered to recommend warning or reprimand, deprivation of one or more privileges for up to 60 days, extra duty on work projects not to exceed 2 hours per day for 14 consecutive days, or vacation of previously suspended minor administrative disciplinary actions.

(a) Prisoners who are scheduled for a hearing at a one-member board will not be offered the opportunity to request a three-member discipline and adjustment board nor are such prisoners entitled to consult with Government counsel or be represented by counsel at the board.

(b) The ACS facility commander may appoint a master sergeant or above to serve as a one-member discipline and adjustment board. The person appointed to serve as a one-member board will be impartial. Any person who witnessed or investigated the alleged violation or who took part in the initiation of the incident report will be disqualified from serving as a one-member board.

(c) Approval authority to impose administrative disciplinary measures (reprimand or warning, deprivation of one or more privileges, extra duty on work projects not to exceed 2 hours per day not to exceed 14 days and vacation of previously suspended minor administrative disciplinary action) rests with the ACS facility commander or an appointed officer (captain or above). The approving authority may not impose punishments greater than recommended by the one-member board. Actions taken or approved by the approval authority, the facility commander or a designee (captain or above) will be effective immediately.

(d) A board recorder may be present to record the proceedings and prepare a summarized record of the testimony presented. The use of a tape recorder for this purpose is not authorized.

(e) Recommendations of the board are advisory; however, the approving authority may not impose punishments greater than those recommended by the board.

(f) The appointing or approving authority may not reverse a finding of not guilty by a one-member board.

(2) The three-member Discipline and Adjustment Board consists of any combination of officers and NCOs (SFC or above). A civilian GS-7 or above may be substituted for either an officer or NCO member, except for the board president, who will be E8 or above. If appropriate, reasonably available, and requested by the service, one member of the prisoner's respective service will sit on the board. If a member of the Navy or the U.S. Coast Guard is not available, a Marine may sit for this purpose.

(a) Prisoners appearing before a three-member board may consult with their attorney before undergoing a disciplinary board, but there is no right to have an attorney represent the prisoner at the board.

(b) A board recorder may be present to record the proceedings and prepare a summarized record of evidence presented. The use of a tape recorder for this purpose is not authorized.

(c) The president of the board will ensure that each member of the board is impartial and will disqualify any member who witnessed or investigated the alleged violation or who took part in the initiation of the incident report.

- (d) Members of the staff who wish to attend the board are encouraged to do so.
- (e) Recommendations of the board are advisory in nature however; the approving authority may not impose punishments greater than those recommended by the board.
- (f) The appointing or approving authority may not reverse a finding of not guilty by a three-member board.
- (g) Three-member boards are empowered to recommend all forms of administrative discipline set out in paragraph 12-4.

12-13. Discipline and adjustment board procedure

a. The following are minimum guidelines for the conduct of discipline and adjustment boards.

(1) Written notice of the charges shall be given the prisoner, at least 24 hours before the discipline and adjustment board meets to consider the case. A prisoner may waive, in writing, the 24-hour notice requirement. If the offense charged occurs during the prisoner's final 24 hours of confinement, written notice of the charges will be given the prisoner, as soon as possible, and the board may be convened during the period.

(2) There must be a written statement by the fact finders that cites the evidence relied upon to reach its conclusions (or that it is omitted for individual or institutional security) and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.

(3) Except as specifically provided for in this paragraph, prisoners will be allowed to question adverse witnesses through the board president; to call witnesses for the presentation of relevant evidence; and to present documentary evidence in their defense. The prisoner's rights to question the witness, to call witnesses, and to present relevant documentary evidence is not absolute and may be denied when the discipline and adjustment board specifically finds and indicates on the record of proceedings that:

- (a) The confinement or correctional security would otherwise be jeopardized.
- (b) The safety of informers would otherwise be jeopardized.

(c) Informants may be called by the board president to present testimony without the presence of the accused. The accused will not be afforded the opportunity to identify or question the informant. Investigators may be called to testify in place of properly registered confidential sources.

(d) A witness or document is not reasonably available, is not relevant, or would be unneeded duplication. If a witness is not reasonably available, a telephonic sworn statement may be taken during board proceedings, provided the identity of the witness has been verified and a speaker amplifier is used.

(4) In all cases, the prisoner has the right to appear and make a statement in defense and to be present during all open sessions of the board, except as provided in (3)(b)(above).

(5) The prisoner has the right to consult with an attorney at no cost to the government prior to the convening of the three-member board but there is no right to legal representation at the board. When a prisoner is having difficulty comprehending English or the complexity of the issues requires special assistance, a request may be made to have a competent staff member act as an interpreter, advisor, or spokesperson and assist in presenting evidence. If the prisoner is verified illiterate or if the issues are complex, the staff will assist the prisoner. This may include appointing a spokesperson for the prisoner.

(6) The discipline and adjustment board should consider, but is not bound to give credit for, the time spent in administrative segregation pending investigation in reaching an appropriate disposition.

(7) The board will not hear the results of polygraph examinations or evidence that the accused requested or refused the opportunity to take a polygraph.

b. The prisoner will be present for all open sessions of the discipline and adjustment board hearing unless the prisoner refuses to appear or must be removed due to misconduct and except as provided in paragraph 12-13a(3)(b) above. The president of the board will inform the prisoner of the charges against him. Documentary evidence to be considered will be shown or read to the prisoner. All witnesses will be sworn in by the president of the board.

(1) The proceedings will be conducted so the highest quality of evidence obtainable and available will be used and considered. Formal rules of evidence need not be adhered to. All oral or written material that is relevant to the case will be admitted into evidence without regard to technical rules of admissibility.

(2) The prisoner will be informed of the right to make a statement to the board and advised that anything said may be used in the board's determination.

(3) The prisoner will not be questioned or called by the board to testify without consenting to do so.

(4) When all evidence has been presented, the board will enter closed session to consider its findings and recommendations. Each finding of the board will be supported by substantial evidence and by a greater weight of evidence than supports any different conclusion. If found not to have committed the alleged misconduct, the prisoner will be acquitted of any charges and no entry concerning the proceedings will be placed in the correctional treatment file. The board must provide a written statement as to the evidence relied on for their findings and reasons for the disciplinary action recommended.

c. A majority vote of all board members is required for a finding of guilty. Appropriate recommendations concerning corrective action will be decided by majority vote. When the board completes its deliberations, it will reconvene in the presence of the prisoner who will be advised of its findings and recommendations.

d. Proper recommendations of the board may include any or all of the following administrative disciplinary or management actions subject to the limitation of paragraph 12-12c(1):

(1) *Administrative disciplinary actions.*

(a) Reprimand or warning (minor).

(b) Extra duty not to exceed 2 hours per day and for not more than 14 consecutive days (minor).

(c) Deprivation of one or more privileges for a specified period of time not to exceed 60 days (minor).

(d) Disciplinary segregation for an indefinite period, normally not to exceed 60 days for any single discipline and adjustment hearing (major).

(e) Reduction of custody grade or classification (major).

(f) Forfeiture of all or part of good conduct time and earned time abatement (major).

(g) Vacation of suspension of previously suspended disciplinary actions (minor or major).

(2) *Management actions.*

(a) An Article 72 board be convened to determine whether a suspended sentence concerning punitive discharge and or forfeiture of pay and allowances should be vacated.

(b) Trial by court-martial.

(c) Recommended suspension of any action imposed for not more than 180 days.

(3) *Other recommendations.* In addition to the measures described above, the board may recommend a work detail change, a domicile change, a change in classification, or make any other recommendations that seems to be meritorious considering the circumstances of the prisoner or the violation.

12-14. Appeals

Prisoners may appeal only those punishments enumerated in paragraph 12-4d, e, and f. Such appeals must have substantive merit and will not be acted upon by the appeal authority if the appeal is submitted pro forma without any substantive merit.

a. Approved disciplinary actions may be ordered into execution without regard to appeal procedure.

b. Appeals must be submitted through command channels within 15 calendar days subsequent to notification of approval action. The 15 calendar days begin the day after the prisoner is notified of the approval action. Appeals will be addressed through the commander who imposed the punishment to the next higher authority. Formal appeal procedures will be established and posted at each ACS facility designating the appeal authority.

c. Appeals will be acted upon and results communicated to the prisoner normally within 30 days of submission. Failure to process an appeal within this period is not grounds for reversing approved disciplinary and management actions.

d. Prior to accepting an appeal, the prisoner will be informed that—

(1) The appeal will not be acted upon if it is without substantive merit.

(2) Classification actions, including appearance before boards and pending action by commanders or Secretaries of the service involved, will not be suspended pending outcome of the appeal action.

e. Appeal action that results in modification or disapproval of disciplinary action taken will cause all records and correctional treatment files to be corrected and modified as appropriate.

Chapter 13

Victim/Witness Notification Program

13-1. Establishing program

ACS facility commanders will establish a victim and witness notification program in accordance with DODD 1030.1 and DODI 1030.2. Procedures described herein apply to prisoners of all services who are confined in Army correctional facilities. Facility commanders will appoint, in writing, a victim/witness coordinator (VWC). Prior to assumption of duties, the VWC will be thoroughly familiarized with all duties and responsibilities associated with the position as stated in this regulation and AR 27-10, chapter 18. The VWC must be a mature individual who will be sensitive to the needs of victims and witnesses and will ensure strict confidentiality. Appointment orders will be forwarded to the Army Central Repository (DAPM) within 10 days of assignment.

13-2. Initial contact

a. Within 5 duty days of receiving the DD Form 2704 (Victim/Witness Certification and Election Concerning Inmate Status) from the Staff Judge Advocate, the facility VWC will prepare a DD Form 2705 (Victim/Witness Notification of Confinee Status) to notify victims and witnesses of their enrollment into the program. Once a VWC advises an enrolled victim or witness of their obligation to inform VWC of any changes of address, the burden of maintaining an accurate and current address on file rests with the enrolled victim or witness. Enrolled victims or witnesses should notify the VWC with whom they are working of any change of address. If the DD Form 2704 is not

received by the ACS facility within 48 hours of the prisoner's arrival, the VWC should immediately contact the Army central repository manager or the victim/witness liaison at the location where the prisoner was court-martialed.

b. Requests for notification received by an ACS facility directly from a victim or witness will be honored by the VWC who will annotate the name and address in the appropriate DD Form 2704 and enroll the victim or witness into the program, provided the record of trial is available to verify the victim or witness status. When the record of trial is not available, the VWC will contact the Staff Judge Advocate to verify status. The VWC will notify the Army central repository manager of the direct enrollment.

c. In the absence of specific statutory or regulatory authority permitting or requiring disclosure, the identity of a victim or witness will not be disclosed to the prisoner or any unauthorized third party at any time.

d. The VWC will maintain a secure, confidential, victim/witness notification file for each victim and witness who elects to receive notifications. The VWC will notify victims and witnesses in accordance with paragraph 13-3 below and maintain records of each notification and victim/witness input into correctional decisionmaking. All contacts (written or verbal) with a victim or witness, including unsuccessful attempts, will be documented in the victim/witness notification file.

e. The VWC will ensure the prisoner's CTF is discreetly flagged or annotated indicating the requirement for victim or witness notification.

f. The VWC will create and maintain confidential files for each enrolled victim or witness. Such files may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and Privacy Act Release. The file will include enrollment election forms, notification forms, records of telephonic contacts, and correspondence received from the victim or witness.

g. All facilities using ACIS for victim and witness tracking and notification are not required to make notifications by certified mail, return receipt. Notifications will be made by first class mail. Those facilities not using ACIS for victim and witness tracking and notification must continue to use certified mail, return receipt requested, when making notifications and to maintain receipts in victim-witness files.

13-3. Notification procedures

a. *Release.* The VWC will notify victims and witnesses 45 days prior to the prisoner's projected release from confinement. Notification will include prisoner's tentative release date, reason for release and, if known, the city and state the prisoner has provided as a release destination. If the prisoner is unexpectedly released, the VWC will, as soon as feasible, notify the victim or witness, by telephone, of the release and send a letter containing the same information as soon as possible thereafter. There are certain occasions when a prisoner's release date will change. This may result because of clemency, the loss of good conduct time, or the earning or forfeiture of earned good conduct time. The victim or witness will be notified when there is a change of more than 30 days in a prisoner's release date from the last notification.

b. *Death.* The VWC will notify victims and witnesses of the date of death of a prisoner, as soon as possible after the death.

c. *Escape.* Victims and witnesses will be notified telephonically of the escape of a prisoner, no later than 4 hours after the discovery of the escape. If telephonic notification is not possible, assistance from local law enforcement officials in the area where the victim or witness resides will be requested. Victims and witnesses will be notified of apprehension and return to confinement by the same means.

d. *Clemency and parole hearings.* Notify victims and witnesses that a hearing is to be held by the service's Clemency and Parole Board. Requests received by the facility from victims and witnesses to appear before a parole hearing will be referred to the appropriate service Clemency and Parole Board. Victim/Witness Impact Statements may be considered at facility Disposition Boards. The Impact Statements and the most current DD 2705s Victim/Witness Notification of Inmate Status will be forwarded to the appropriate service Clemency and Parole Board for consideration.

e. *Temporary home parole.* Every attempt should be made to notify the victim or witness, in writing, prior to the prisoner's release on THP. If circumstances do not permit advance written notification, telephonic contact will be made.

f. *Transfer.*

(1) If a prisoner is transferred to another confinement facility, victims and witnesses will be notified in advance of the planned transfer and location of transfer. Regardless of service, victim and witness information will be forwarded via separate correspondence to the commanding officer of the receiving facility. A letter of transmittal is required. The cover page of the transmittal for the prisoner record shall clearly state "Victim Notification Required."

(2) Upon receiving victim and witness information on a prisoner transferred from another facility, the gaining facility program coordinator will notify the victims and witnesses of the prisoner's new location. The coordinator will also inform them that they have been enrolled in the facility's notification program and confirm their desire to continue in the program.

(3) If a prisoner is transferred to the FBOP, notification will be sent to the Victim/Witness Notification Coordinator, FBOP, 320 First Street, NW, Washington, DC 20534.

g. Parole. Victims and witnesses will be notified of any prisoner being released on parole.

13-4. Canceling the notification request

a. Victims and witnesses may request removal from the notification program by submitting a request in writing to the VWC or service central repository. If the request is submitted to the facility, a copy will be forwarded to DAPM with the monthly report.

b. Prior to terminating a victim/witness from the notification program because of the inability to contact the victim or witness, the VWC will document in the file the reasons for believing the file is no longer active and the efforts made to contact the victim or witness. If nondeliverable certified mail is returned, the VWC will attempt to telephone the individual, using directory assistance if necessary. If neither mail nor telephonic attempts to contact the victim or witness are successful, the VWC will inactivate the file and prepare for disposition in accordance with paragraph 13-5 below.

13-5. Disposition of files

a. ACS facilities will seal the files in a separate envelope and identify as victim/witness files.

b. The envelope will be clearly labeled "May be EXEMPT from Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Release."

13-6. Pretrial confinement

a. Review by military magistrate. If a military magistrate determines a prisoner should be released from pretrial confinement and the offenses with which the prisoner is charged indicate a victim or witness may exist, the prisoner's commanding officer will be informed of the need to notify any potential victim or witness of the release.

b. Escape. In the event of an escape while in pretrial confinement, the Staff Judge Advocate will be notified within 4 hours of detecting the escape and be informed of the need to notify any potential victims or witnesses.

13-7. Reports

a. Facility commanders will submit a monthly report by the 15th of each month to DAPM. Information provided will include:

(1) Name, social security number, and service of the prisoner involved, minimum release date and parole eligibility date.

(2) Date of confinement (indicate whether a new confinement or transfer from another facility).

(3) Date of admittance into the program and the number of victims or witnesses for each prisoner.

(4) Location (command) where court-martialed.

(5) Number of victims/witnesses notified, if any, and the reason for notification for each prisoner status change during the month.

(6) Information regarding the inability to contact a victim/witness.

(7) Copies of the enrollment and terminating DD Forms 2705 used for notification during the reporting period. Facilities with no prisoners involved with the program will submit a negative response.

b. DAPM will provide a monthly report to other service central repositories of their service members confined in Army facilities no later than the 25th day following the closing month. They will also receive copies of the DD Form 2705.

c. In accordance with AR 27-10, paragraph 18-27*b*, DAPM will provide a report no later than 15 January of each year utilizing DD Form 2706 to the OTJAG (DAJA-CL) 1777 North Kent Street, Rosslyn, VA 22203.

13-8. Training

All ACS personnel will receive preservice and annual training concerning staff responsibilities associated with the victim/witness program.

13-9. Internal control

It is the responsibility of the facility commander to establish internal controls to ensure that information submitted by victims and witnesses remains confidential and that no unauthorized person has access to victim/witness files. The Victim/Witness Notification Program will be included in the facility standard operating procedures.

Chapter 14 Notice to Prisoners Subject to Sex Offender Registration

14-1. Requirements

a. Facility commanders will establish a system to track and ensure compliance with registration requirements of all prisoners who are required to register.

b. Facility commanders will ensure a review of all available records on a prisoner to determine if the prisoner has any prior convictions of a sexual or criminally violent nature against a victim who is a minor before the prisoner enters into confinement. Upon final release from confinement, facility commanders will advise prisoners convicted of an offense, in accordance with DODI 1325.7, requiring registration as a sex offender in the State in which the prisoner will reside upon release from confinement. The notice provided to a prisoner shall contain information that the prisoner is subject to a registration requirement as a sex offender in any State where the person resides, employed, carries on a vocation, or is a student. Confinement facilities shall obtain the prisoner's acknowledgement, in writing, that informs the prisoner in using DD Form 2791. The documentation will be part of the prisoner's CTF and be maintained in accordance with AR 190-47.

14-2. DD Form 2791 (Notice of Release of Military Offender Convicted of Sex Offense, to State and Local Law Enforcement Officials)

Prior to release of prisoners convicted of sexually violent offenses against a victim who is a minor, facility commanders will provide written notice of the release to the chief law enforcement officer of the State; the chief law enforcement officer of the local jurisdiction in which the prisoner will reside; and to the State or local agency responsible for the receipt or maintenance of a sex offender registration in the State or local jurisdiction in which the person will reside. The chief law enforcement officer of the local jurisdiction is the appropriate municipal or county law enforcement agent with jurisdictional authority consistent with the prisoner's release address. When multiple jurisdictions have overlapping authority, the most geographically specific agency should be notified. Facility commanders may refer to the Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators to identify appropriate State and local chief law enforcement officers. A copy of DD Form 2791 will be forwarded to DAPM-MPD-CI at the time of notification to the state and local law enforcement agencies by the releasing confinement facility.

14-3. Written notifications

The written notice will include the place where the prisoner intends to reside and information that the prisoner shall be subject to registration. The notice shall also include the criminal history including a description of the offense of which the prisoner was convicted and any restrictions or conditions of release. Notices shall be provided at least 5 days before release date, if the expected place of residence is known. Notice about a subsequent change of residence by a prisoner falling within this subsection during any period of supervised release or parole shall be provided to the agencies and officers identified in paragraph 14-2, above. For parolees under supervision of the U.S. Parole Commission, the Commission shall make the notice of changes in a parolee's residence while on parole. Notification to State officials is not required for prisoners transferred to another correctional facility. However, upon the transfer of a military prisoner who is subject to this paragraph to a facility under the control of the Bureau of Prisons, the facility of the prisoner shall provide written notification to the Bureau that the prisoner was convicted of a sexually violent offense or an offense against a victim who is a minor. If a military prisoner remains confined in a facility under the control of the Bureau of Prisons until the time of release, the Bureau of Prisons shall provide notice of release and inform the prisoner concerning registration obligations.

Chapter 15 Correctional Custody

Section I General, Management, and Operations

15-1. Objectives

The goals of correctional custody are to:

- a.* Provide a closely supervised military setting to administer the correctional custody and extra duties of the nonjudicial punishment authorized by Article 15, UCMJ.
- b.* Improve conduct, attitude, and modify behavior through correctional treatment programs.
- c.* Act as a deterrent to further offenses.

15-2. Standards

- a. CCFs should be established at division or installation level to provide for more efficient treatment programs and use of resources. Facilities may be located contiguous to regular troop areas but must be separate.
- b. Facilities must have a sufficient number of sleeping and assembly rooms to provide adequate housing of correctees and efficient conduct of work and treatment programs. Female correctees will be housed separate from male correctees.
- c. The housing area should provide a minimum of 72 square feet of space for each correctee. There will be adequate heating, lighting, and air circulation to meet the standards established in housing regulations. Beds, bedding, and latrine facilities will be provided. Buildings must conform to fire, safety, and emergency evacuation standards.
- d. Physical barriers such as heavy wire window screening, fencing, concertina wire, or guard towers will not be used.
- e. No doors of the facilities will be locked, except those required to secure the property of the correctees.
- f. Physical restraining devices are not authorized.

15-3. Personnel staffing

- a. The commander establishing a CCF has the responsibility to provide qualified personnel to maintain and operate the facility and its treatment program.
- b. Unit commanders should involve officers, noncommissioned officers, and other selected personnel in the treatment process of correctees.
- c. Operations of CCFs will not be assigned to military police or confinement facility personnel as an additional duty. They may, however, be used as a technical advisers or in an inspection role.
- d. Post chaplains, judge advocates, social workers, psychologists, and other qualified personnel should be used to perform counseling and related services.

15-4. Personnel not acceptable for correctional custody

- a. Soldiers in the rank of specialist or corporals and above.
- b. Personnel who were correctees on two prior occasions.
- c. Personnel with physical profiles that prohibit physical training, marching, or outside work for more than 72 hours.
- d. Personnel within 30 days of ETS or pending discharge.
- e. Personnel who have a history of emotional disturbance or are under psychiatric treatment.

Section II Treatment Program

15-5. General

The overriding purpose of correctional custody is correction, not punishment. The program will consist of normal and extra duties, counseling, and referral services. Correctees will enjoy the full status of soldiers, wear the service uniform appropriate to assigned duties, and render salutes when appropriate. Use of armbands or other distinctive devices to identify correctees is prohibited.

15-6. Duty time

Correctees may work and train with their units or in the CCF, at the discretion of the unit commander. When at the facility, individuals must be allowed sufficient time for eating and personal hygiene and a minimum of 8 hours sleep each night. All other time should be used for duties and training along with other aspects of the treatment program. Extra duties will be administered in accordance with AR 27-10, paragraph 3-19b(5), and will not be hazardous, harmful to health, or demeaning to the individual soldier.

15-7. Counseling

- a. *Counseling and referral services.* The OIC of the facility, in coordination with utilizing commanders, will develop a comprehensive program of counseling and referral services. The general program may be altered or supplemented to meet individual needs. The program should include group and individual counseling by chaplains, commanders, legal assistance officers, and behavioral science specialists. Use of available services (such as mental health, Red Cross, Alcohol and Drug Prevention and Control Program, Army Emergency Relief, and Army Community Service) is recommended. The facility cadre members will also counsel personnel regularly.
- b. *Inprocessing counseling.* All personnel placed in correctional custody will receive a thorough orientation concerning—
 - (1) CCFs SOPs and other rules of the facility.
 - (2) Procedures to register complaints and grievances and the local agencies available to assist in issue resolution.
 - (3) Available social assistance agencies and programs.
- c. *Unit counseling.* The unit commanders play the central role in the counseling and treatment process. Unit

commanders and first sergeants will visit correctees weekly at the CCF and remain informed of each individual's progress by reviewing the performance reports and through discussion with the facility staff.

Section III Conduct

15-8. Privileges

Correctees will be permitted to—

- a. Send and receive mail without inspection or restrictions.
- b. Have writing and reading material authorized by the CCF OIC.
- c. Attend religious services and have visits with friends and relatives.
- d. Have interviews with unit commander or representatives.
- e. Address oral or written complaints through proper channels.

15-9. Supervision

Correctees will be under the immediate supervision of the CCF cadre members when billeted at the facility or performing correctional custody duty. They will not be employed, trained, or secured by armed guards. Female personnel will supervise female correctees when privacy is required in their billeting areas.

15-10. Discipline

a. *Unit commander.* Maintenance of discipline is a function of command. Additional correctional custody will not be imposed for additional offenses committed during the custodial period.

b. *Facility OIC.* The facility OIC will ensure the unit commander is informed of the correctee's conduct when formal disciplinary action is appropriate. The facility OIC may impose nonpunitive measures for minor infractions, including reprimand or warning and loss of consideration for a recommendation for clemency or remission of punishment. The dignity of the individual will be respected at all times. Repressive regimentation and degradation is prohibited.

15-11. Use of force

Use of force or physical contact by cadre personnel is prohibited, unless necessary to prevent harm or injury to an individual or to prevent destruction of Government property. Use of force will be in accordance with AR 190-14. Sufficient supervisory personnel must be used to control unruly persons in order to preclude the necessity for striking or inflicting injury.

Section IV Administration

15-12. Clemency actions

Commanders establishing CCFs will design merit systems to mitigate, remit, or suspend the unserved punishment for correctees whose duty performance and record indicate that correction has been accomplished. This merit system should rely on DA Form 4407-R (Correctional Custody Daily Performance Report). The report should reflect evaluation used by cadre and other personnel to accomplish treatment goals.

15-13. Standing operating procedure

Every CCF will have a written SOP posted where accessible to all cadre personnel and correctees. The SOP will cover the mission, designation and duties of cadre personnel, administration and disciplinary rules, program outlines, reports required, and standards expected of correctees.

15-14. Reports

a. Commanders will notify Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPM-MDP-CI), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800, through command channels, when a CCF is established or closed. Reports will include the designation, location, and capacity of the facility.

b. A DA Form 4407 will be maintained on each correctee. The first performance report is required upon completion of 5 days at the CCF. However, this does not preclude the OIC from submitting reports any time an objective evaluation can be made.

Chapter 16 Detention Cell Operations

Section I General

16-1. Purpose

This section prescribes policies and responsibilities applicable to the detention of personnel under Army police jurisdiction and establish design standards for military police detention cells.

16-2. Objective

The objective of this section is to standardize military police detention operations to ensure that detained personnel remain in custody only when necessary, for minimum periods, under proper supervision, are treated in a humane manner and in an environment, which will not impair their health or subject the detainee to unreasonable discomfort.

Section II Detention Operations

16-3. Policy

a. Military and civilian personnel apprehended by military police may be detained in a military police detention cell (D cell) only when necessary to prevent escape or to ensure safety of the detainee or others. Detention of military personnel in excess of 24 hours, not to exceed 72 hours, must be approved by a commissioned officer designated by the installation commander, normally the installation provost marshal. At installations where the provost marshal is a civilian, that individual may be designated by the installation commander to approve detention of military personnel in excess of 24 hours, not to exceed 72 hours.

b. Detention of civilian personnel must be approved by a commissioned officer or civilian provost marshal and is authorized while pending release to civilian authorities. Detention of civilian personnel will be done only in the case of a serious felony and when the individual is a flight risk, or is a risk to him or others. Civilian authorities should be notified immediately of the detention. In no case will detention exceed 12 hours.

c. Use of force will be in accordance with AR 190-14.

d. Male and female personnel will not be detained in the same cell simultaneously.

e. The use of other military service or civilian detention facilities to detain personnel in military police custody is authorized. When other military service facilities are used, the time limitations and other procedures described above apply. Only those civilian facilities that have been evaluated by the U.S. Marshal Service and deemed appropriate for use will be utilized.

f. Juveniles will not be detained in military police D cells.

16-4. Procedures

a. When a person is placed in a D cell while in military police custody, the Military Police Desk Blotter will be annotated to reflect the reason, time and date of the detention, and the name of the person authorizing the detention. If force is used, an entry describing why the use of force was necessary will be made.

b. Apprehended personnel will be thoroughly searched before being placed in a D cell. Money, other valuables, and personal property other than clothing and wedding rings will be removed, inventoried, and secured, per procedures outlined in AR 210-174. Items of clothing that could be used to inflict self-injury (such as belts, shoelaces, neckties, garters, and suspenders) will be removed, if determined appropriate by the military police supervisor. All such items will be recorded on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custodian Document.

c. Personnel in military police custody who appear to be heavily intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, injured, or ill will be examined by a medical officer or a physician assistant prior to, or immediately after, being placed into a military police D cell. The name and rank of the attending medical officer or physician assistant and the time and the results of the examination will be annotated in the Military Police Blotter.

d. On release from detention, all property taken from the detainee and not seized as evidence will be returned. Such articles will be accounted for in accordance with AR 190-45, Military Police Forms. The detainee will sign DA Form 4137 acknowledging return of property. If the detainee is released to another individual, that person will sign the DA Form 4137. A military detainee may be released on his own recognizance and ordered to return to his or her unit. The time and circumstances of release and the disposition of personal property will be recorded in the Military Police Blotter.

e. Personnel in military police custody may be visited by legal counsel and a chain of command representative. An officer designated by the installation provost marshal may approve visits by family members and others.

**Section III
Confinement in Detention Cells**

16-5. Temporary confinement

Temporary confinement will be implemented when—

a. A military prisoner in a confined status is returned to an installation without a confinement facility to appear as a witness in a court-martial or a pretrial investigation or to consult with counsel.

b. A military prisoner is awaiting transfer to a Department of Defense corrections facility as a result of a court-martial sentence to confinement.

16-6. Pretrial confinement

Prisoners may be confined, pending trial by court-martial, in Army confinement facilities, the confinement facilities of other services, civilian detention facilities evaluated for and approved for use by the U.S. Marshal Service, or military police D cells. When confined in military police D cells, the following policies apply:

a. Approval to direct pretrial confinement must be in accordance with AR 27-10, Military Justice.

b. The confinement of pretrial prisoners will be limited to those facilities with cell areas that provide a minimum of 72 square feet per prisoner.

c. Standards as described in paragraphs 15-11 and 15-12 apply.

16-7. Administration

a. Confined personnel will not be commingled in D cells with detained personnel. Pretrial prisoners will not reside, work, or be permitted to mingle with prisoners who have been sentenced to confinement.

b. A daily chronological record of confinement activity will be maintained for confined personnel, using DA Form 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log).

c. Personnel temporarily confined in military police D cells in accordance with paragraph 16-6 will be examined by a medical officer or physician assistant within 24 hours of confinement. The examination will be recorded on DD Form 503.

d. Pretrial and posttrial prisoners confined in military police D cells will use DD Forms 510 to facilitate communications with supervisory personnel. Supervisory personnel will respond to all requests received from prisoners on DD Forms 510, within 48 hours of receipt.

e. An abbreviated CTF will be established and maintained for each prisoner confined in a military police D cell, in accordance with paragraph 10-5a through 10-5b(7). The file will be forwarded to the gaining confinement facility commander upon transfer or return of the prisoner.

**Section IV
Supervision and Inspection**

16-8. Supervision

Personnel detained or temporarily confined in military police detention cells will be closely supervised. The interior of occupied cells and the activities of detainees/prisoners will be maintained under direct or indirect observation of qualified unit guard or military police personnel. Closed circuit video equipment may be used for this purpose. A normal ration of food and water will be provided. In the event of detention overnight, or detention in excess of 24 hours, appropriate bedding will be provided. Duty personnel will not enter occupied D cells or remain in close proximity wearing firearms, military police clubs, or other weapons.

16-9. Inspection

D cells will be clean, adequately lighted and ventilated, and maintained in a good state of repair. Required inspections will be recorded on DA Form 1594.

a. D cells will be inspected daily by a military police officer or a noncommissioned officer in the rank of staff sergeant or above.

b. A representative of the installation health services will conduct a monthly inspection of D cells to ensure operations and the physical plant are consistent with accepted health and environmental standards.

16-10. Emergency measures

Installation commanders with D cells will develop detailed emergency and evacuation plans in the event of fire or disorder. Appropriate first aid and other emergency equipment will be maintained in close proximity to cell areas.

Section V
Detention Cell Standards

16-11. Structural standards

a. D cells should not be visible to the general public. Single occupancy cells are preferred and, except as required for pretrial confinement in paragraph 16-6b, D cells will adhere to standards set in paragraph 9-4a(3)(a) through (c). If multiple occupancy cells are used, a minimum of 40 square feet per detainee will be provided.

b. Floors should be of steel or reinforced concrete construction pitched 1 inch to 2 inches above the outside floor, to facilitate drainage and cleaning. Drains must be located outside cells. When equipped with windows, they will be secured by steel bars spaced no greater than 6' apart.

c. Sliding doors of steel grill with snap lock as well as key lock is desired. If hinged doors are used, hinges and hinge bolts will be located outside the cell and will be spot-welded to prevent easy removal.

d. The use of chains to secure cell furnishings is not authorized. Automatic sprinkler systems or automatic fire alarm systems will be installed in all buildings housing D cells. All water piping, fixtures, switches, conduits, and light and heating controls will be inaccessible to detainees and prisoners.

e. Cells will include a bunk permanently affixed to the floor per prisoner. Bedding provided will be of fire-retardant materials.

16-12. Field expedient detention cells

Detention cells used during field and combat operations will correspond to established design standards to the maximum degree possible under existing conditions. Medical representatives, to ensure that conditions do not impact unfavorably upon the health of prisoners or detainees, will inspect field expedient detention cells weekly.

Appendix A References

Section I Required Publications

AR 15-6

Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. (Cited in paras 8-25 and 12-10*b*.)

AR 15-130

Army Clemency and Parole Board. (Cited in paras 5-3, 8-2*c*, and 8-6.)

AR 20-1

Inspector General Activities and Procedures. (Cited in paras 10-1*b*, 10-14*a*, and 10-14*a*(3).)

AR 25-55

The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program. (Cited in para 10-5*c*(1).)

AR 25-400-2

The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS). (Cited in para 10-5*b*.)

AR 27-40

Litigation. (Cited in paras 10-5*c*(3) and 10-20.)

AR 40-5

Preventive Medicine. (Cited in para 11-8*c*.)

AR 40-501

Standards of Medical Fitness. (Cited in paras 8-16 and 8-23*b*(1).)

AR 190-9

Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program and Surrender of Military Personnel to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. (Cited in paras 11-4*a*(3) and 11-4*a*(4).)

AR 190-14

Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties. (Cited in 11-5*d*, 11-6*b*, 11-7, 15-11, and 16-3*c*.)

AR 190-27

Army Participation in the National Crime Information Center. (Cited in para 10-1*i* and 10-2*a*.)

AR 190-40

Serious Incident Report. (Cited in para 11-4*b*(3).)

AR 210-130

Laundry and Dry Cleaning Operations. (Cited in para 10-6*d*.)

AR 210-174

Accounting Procedures for Prisoner's Personal Property and Funds. (Cited in paras 10-1*f*, 10-7*a*, 10-7*b*(1), 10-7*b*(2), 10-16, 10-19*g*(7), 10-1*e*(3), and 16-4*b*.)

AR 340-21

The Army Privacy Program. (Cited in para 10-5*c*(1).)

AR 360-1

The Army Public Affairs Program. (Cited in para 10-12*d*(2).)

AR 601-210

Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program. (Cited in paras 8-3*d*, *e*.)

AR 601-280

Army Retention Program. (Cited in para 8-3h(5)(b)(2).)

AR 630-10

Absence Without Leave, Desertion, and Administration of Personnel Involved in Civilian Court Processings. (Cited in paras 11-4a(4)(b)(5)(a) and 11-4b(4).)

AR 633-30

Military Sentences to Confinement. (Cited in paras 5-8b, 12-f, and 8-26c.)

AR 670-1

Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia. (Cited in para 10-9j.)

AR 700-84

Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing. (Cited in paras 10-1 and 10-18b.)

AR 710-2

Inventory Management Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level. (Cited in para 10-6c.)

DODI 1325.7

Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority. (Cited in paras 3-5, 4-2b, 5-3, and 5-4c.)

DODI 1100.21

Voluntary Services in the Department of Defense. (Cited in 9-9f.)

CTA 50-900

Clothing and Individual Equipment. (Cited in paras 10-5, 10-6, and 10-6c.)

Section II

Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication.

AR 1-20

Legislative Liaison

AR 5-9

Area Support Responsibilities

AR 27-1

Legal services, Judge Advocate Legal Services

AR 27-10

Military Justice

AR 40-2

Army Medical Treatment Facilities: General Administration

AR 40-61

Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures

AR 40-400

Patient Administration

AR 60-10

Army and Air Force Exchange Service General Policies

AR 60-20

Army and Air Force Exchange Service Operating Policies

AR 165-1
Chaplain Activities in the United States

AR 190-45
Law Enforcement Reporting

AR 190-51
Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive)

AR 195-5
Evidence Procedures

AR 215-1
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Activities and Nonappropriated Funds Instrumentalities

AR 215-3
Nonappropriated Funds Personnel Policy

AR 215-4
Nonappropriated Fund Contracting

AR 335-15
Management Information Control System

AR 360-1
The Army Public Affairs Program

AR 420-70
Buildings and Structures

AR 420-90
Fire and Emergency Services

AR 600-8-11
Reassignment

AR 600-8-24
Officer Transfers and Discharges

AR 600-20
Army Command Policy

AR 600-63
Army Health Promotion

AR 608-99
Family Support, Child, Custody, and Paternity

AR 600-8-104
Military Personnel Information Management/Records

AR 614-30
Overseas Service

AR 614-200
Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management

AR 635-200
Enlisted Personnel

AR 870-5
Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures

Pam 710-2-1
Using Unit Supply System (Manual Procedures)

DOD 4160.21-M
Defense Materiel Disposition Manual. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

DODD 1030.1
Victim and Witness Assistance. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

DODD 1010.1
Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

DODI 1030.2
Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

DODI 1325.7
Administration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

DODI 7000.14-R, v. 13
DOD Financial Management Policy and Procedures. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.)

Manual for Courts-Martial (2002)
Part III, section III, Rule 304, Confessions and Admissions (Available from <http://www.apd.army.mil>)

UCMJ, Art. 15
Commanding Officer's Non-Judicial Punishment. (Available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm>.)

UCMJ, Art. 31
Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited. (Available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm>.)

UCMJ, Art. 74
Remission and Suspension. (Available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm>.)

JFTR, U5125
Separation from the Service or Relief from Active Duty Except for Discharge with Severance or Separation Pay. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/perdiem>.)

JFTR U5360
Separation from the Service or Relief from Active Duty Except for Discharge with Severance or Separation Pay. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/perdiem>.)

JFTR, U5370-F
HHG Transportation Under Emergency/Unusual Circumstances, Member reduced in grade. (Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/perdiem>.)

Pub. L. 106-546, 114 stat 2726, 2728 (2000)
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. (Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ546.106.)

10 USC 1588
Authority to accept certain voluntary services. (Available at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html>.)

Section III
Prescribed Forms

The following forms are available on the Army Electronic Library CD-ROM and the APD Web site (www.apd.army.mil) unless otherwise stated. DD forms are available from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Web site

(www.dior.whs.mil). FBI forms prescribed in this regulation are available from HQ, FBI, Identification Division, 9th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20535.

DD Form 499

Prisoner's Mail and Correspondence Record. (Prescribed in para 10-9.)

DD Form 503

Medical Examiner's Report (Prescribed in para 10-1.)

DD Form 504

Request and Receipt for Health and Comfort Supplies. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 506 or Automated Equivalent

Daily Strength Record of Prisoners. (Prescribed in para 10-4.)

DD Form 508 or Automated Equivalent

Report of/or Recommendation for Disciplinary Action. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 509

Inspection Record of Prisoners in Segregation. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 510

Request for Interview. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 512

Installation Parolee Minimum Custody (Air Force Only) Agreement. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 515 or Automated Equivalent

Roster of Prisoners. (Prescribed in para 10-4.)

DD Form 2704

Victim/Witness Certification and Election Concerning Inmate Status. (Prescribed in para 13-2.)

DD Form 2705

Victim/Witness Notification of Inmate Status. (Prescribed in para 13-3.)

DD Form 2706

Annual Report on Victim and Witness Assistance. (Prescribed in para 1-7e.)

DD Form 2707

Confinement Order and Medical Examiner's Report. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 2708

Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person. (Prescribed in para 10-5b(1).)

DD Form 2709

Privacy Act Statement. (Prescribed in para 10-1b(16).)

DD Form 2710

Inmate Background Summary Data. (Prescribed in paras 5-4 and 10-5.)

DD Form 2710-1

Inmate Sentence Information. (Prescribed in para 10-1b(17).)

DD Form 2711

Initial Custody Classification. (Prescribed in para 10-1b(18).)

DD Form 2711-1

Custody Classification. (Prescribed in para 5-4b.)

DD Form 2711-2

Custody Initial/Reclassification Summary Addendum. (Prescribed in para 10-1b(18).)

DD Form 2712

Inmate Work and Training Evaluation. (Prescribed in para 5-4f.)

DD Form 2713

Inmate Observation Report. (Prescribed in para 11-1a.)

DD Form 2714

Inmate Disciplinary Report. (Prescribed in para 11-1a.)

DD Form 2715

Clemency/Parole Submission. (Prescribed in para 5-4c.)

DD Form 2715-1

Disposition Board Recommendation. (Prescribed in para 5-4c.)

DD Form 2715-2

Inmate Summary Data. (Prescribed in para 5-4c.)

DD Form 2715-3

Inmate Restoration/Return to Duty, Clemency and Parole Statement. (Prescribed in para 8-8.)

DD Form 2716

Parole Acknowledgement Letter. (Prescribed in para 8-10b.)

DD Form 2716-1

Department of Defense Certificate of Parole. (Prescribed in para 8-10a.)

DD Form 2717

Department of Defense Voluntary/Involuntary Appellate Leave Action. (Prescribed in para 8-26a.)

DD Form 2718

Inmate's Release Order. (Prescribed in para 10-5.)

DD Form 2719

Continuation Sheet. (Prescribed in para 5-4c.)

DD Form 2720

Annual Confinement Report. (Prescribed in para 1-7b.)

DD Form 2720-1

Annual Clemency/Parole Report. (Prescribed in para 1-7g.) (Available through normal forms supply channels.)

DD Form 2791

Notice of Release/Acknowledgement of Convicted Sex Offender Registration Requirements. (Prescribed in paras 10-1b(19) and 14-2.)

DD Form 2791-1

Prisoner's Acknowledgement of Sex Offender Registration Requirements. (Prescribed in para 14-2.)

Section IV

Referenced Forms

DA Form 31

Request and Authority for Leave

DA Form 201

Military Personnel Records Jacket, U.S. Army

DA Form 268
Report to Suspend Favorable Personnel Actions (FLAG)

DA Form 1132-R
Prisoner's Personal Property List—Personal Deposit Fund

DA Form 1594
Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log

DA Form 1702-R
Parole Officer's Reference Data (LRA).

DA Form 1703-R
Eligibility Cross Reference Data (LRA).

DA Form 1704-R
Parole Statement (LRA).

DA Form 1708-R
Certificate of Release from Parole (LRA).

DA Form 2569-R
Attorney of Record Designation (Civilian and Individual Military) Counsel)

DA Form 3078
Personal Clothing Request

DA Form 3997
Military Police Desk Blotter

DA Form 4137
Evidence/Property Custody Document

DA Form 4407-R
Correctional Custody Daily Performance Report (LRA)

DA Form 4449
Clemency Action Record

DA Form 4459
Parole Action Record

DD Form 2A
Active Duty Military Identification Card. (Limited Access Form) (Available through normal forms supply channels.)

DD Form 214
Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (Available through normal forms supply channels.)

DD Form 503
Medical Examiner's Report

DD Form 553
Deserter/Absentee Wanted By the Armed Forces

DD Form 616
Report of Return of Absentee

FBI Form I-12
Flash-Cancellation Notice.

FBI Form R-84
Final Disposition Report.

FBI Form FD 249
Department of Justice Arrest Card.

SF Form 1034
Public Voucher for Purchases and Services Other Than Personal. (Available from <http://contacts.gsa.gov/webforms.nsf>.)

Appendix B
DNA Analysis Qualifying Offenses Under Public Law No. 106-546

The following table lists the Federal offenses and the equivalent military offenses that require DNA analysis.

Table B-1 DNA Analysis Qualifying Offense Under Public Law No. 106-546	
FEDERAL OFFENSE	MILITARY OFFENSE
Murder (18 U.S.C 1111)	Murder UCMJ, Art. 118
Voluntary Manslaughter (18 U.S.C 1112)	Voluntary Manslaughter UCMJ, Art. 119
Other Related Homicide Offenses (18 USC 1113, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1120 and 1121)	N/A. Conduct otherwise cover by listed UCMJ offenses Aggravated Assault (with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm) UCMJ, Art. 128 Aggravated Assault (in which grievous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted) UCMJ, Art. 128
Sexual Abuse (18 USC 2241-2245) Sexual exploitation or other abuse of children (18 USC 2251-2252) Transportation for illegal sexual activity (18 USC 2421, 2422, 2423, and 2425)	Rape UCMJ, Art. 120 Carnal Knowledge UCMJ, Art. 120 Forcible Sodomy UCMJ, Art. 125 Sodomy With a Child UCMJ, Art. 125 Indecent Assault UCMJ, Art. 134 Indecent Acts With Another UCMJ, Art. 134 Indecent Acts or Liberties With A Child UCMJ, Art. 134 Indecent Language To A Child UCMJ, Art. 134 Pandering (By compelling or by arranging or by receiving consideration for arranging) UCMJ, Art. 134 Conviction for conduct described in chapter 117, 18 USC 2421, 2422, 2423, 2425, when charged as UCMJ, Art. 133 or 134, offenses Conviction for conduct described in chapter 110, 18 USC 2251, 2251A, 2252, when charged as UCMJ, Art. 133 or 134, offenses
Peonage or Slavery (18 USC 1581, 1583, 1592, 1591, 1594, 1961)	Conviction for conduct described in 18 USC 1581, 1583, 1592, 1591, 1594, 1961, when charged as UCMJ, Art. 133 or 134 offenses
Kidnapping (As defined in 18 USC 359(c)(2)(E))	Kidnapping UCMJ, Art. 134
Robbery and Burglary (18 USC 2111-2114, 2116, 2118, and 2119)	Robbery UCMJ, Art. 122 Burglary UCMJ, Art. 129 Housebreaking UCMJ, Art. 130

**Table B-1
DNA Analysis Qualifying Offense Under Public Law No. 106-546—Continued**

FEDERAL OFFENSE	MILITARY OFFENSE
Violation of 18 USC 1153 (re: Murder, Manslaughter, Kidnapping, Maiming, Sexual Abuse, Incest, Arson, Burglary, and Robbery) when committed within Indian Country.	N/A. Conduct otherwise covered by listed UCMJ offenses Maiming UCMJ, Art. 124 Arson UCMJ, Art. 126
Attempt to Commit Above Offenses	Attempt to Commit Above Offenses UCMJ, Art. 80 Assault With Intent to Commit Murder, Rape, Voluntary Manslaughter, Robbery, Sodomy, Arson, Burglary, Housebreaking UCMJ, Art. 134 Solicitation Of Another To Commit Above Offenses UCMJ, Art. 134
Conspiracy To Commit Above Offenses	Conspiracy To Commit Above Offenses UCMJ, Art. 81
	Conviction for any conduct similar to the above offenses, any conduct which involves any form of sexual abuse, and any conduct of a sexual nature that involves a minor, when charged as an assimilative offense under UCMJ, Art. 134
	Conviction for any conduct similar to the above offenses, any conduct which involves any form of sexual abuse, and any conduct of a sexual nature that involves a minor, when charged as conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in violation of Article 133, UCMJ or conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or is service discrediting, under UCMJ, Art. 134

Appendix C Management Control Evaluation Checklist

C-1. Function

To ensure the evaluation of key management controls for administration of the Army Corrections System (ACS) at HQDA, MACOM and installation level. Major Army Commands will use the biannual technical staff inspection established in AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, to evaluate above listed key management controls (minimum standard).

C-2. Purpose

The purpose of this checklist is to assist [users] in evaluating their key management controls. It is *not* intended to cover *all* controls.

C-3. Instructions

Answers must be based on the actual *testing* of key management controls such as document analysis, direct observation, interviewing, sampling, and simulation. Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and corrective action indicated in supporting documentation. These management controls *must* be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that this evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 11-2-R (Management Control Evaluation Certification Statement).

C-4. Test questions

- a. Have uniform DA policies for the scope and responsibilities of The Army Corrections System been established and coordinated with appropriate/interested DOD elements? (HQDA ONLY)
- b. Are policies updated to reflect changes in public law and DOD guidance to ensure mission compatibility? (HQDA ONLY)
- c. Are U.S. Army prisoners incarcerated in the appropriate confinement facilities in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 3? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- d. Is the incarceration of other service prisoners within the Army Corrections System being conducted AR 190-47, chapter 4? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- e. Are correctional and work release programs conducted in accordance with AR 190-47, chapters 5 and 6? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- f. Are adequate professional services support being provided to all prisoners at all facilities in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 7? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- g. Is the consideration and administration of clemency, parole, and restoration to duty, conducted in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 8? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- h. Are staffing, training, and physical plant standards of confinement and correctional facilities, to include key and lock control, in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 9? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- i. Is the administration and management of military prisoners, their records, health/comfort supplies, property, funds, and mail, conducted in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 10? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- j. Is the custody and control of military prisoners conducted in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 11? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- k. Are the facility's administrative disciplinary measures and disciplinary action procedures conducted in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 12? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- l. Is the Victim Witness Program administered and managed in accordance with AR 190-47, chapter 13? (HQDA, MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- m. Are installation detention cells properly managed, operated, and meet the physical standards in accordance with AR 190-47, Chapter 14? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)
- n. Are prisoner's sentences to confinement computed in accordance with AR 633-30? (MACOM, and INSTALLATION)

C-5. Supersession

This process replaces the Internal Control Review Checklists for AR 190-47, AR 190-55, and AR 633-30, previously published in DA Circular 11-88-7.

C-6. Comments

Help make this a better tool for evaluating management controls. Submit comments to Office of the Provost Marshal General, 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2800.

Glossary

Section I Abbreviations

ACA
American Corrections Association

ACIS
Army Corrections Information System

ACPB
Army Clemency and Parole Board

ACS
Army Corrections System

AICS
The Army Inmate Classification System

AR
Army regulation

ARIMS
The Army Records Information Management System

ASA
Assistant Secretary of the Army

BCIS
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

CCF
correctional custody facility

CFM
cubic feet per minute

CHD
correctional holding detachment

CMRP
command master religious plan

CONUS
Continental United States

CTA
Common Table of Allowances

CTF
correctional treatment file

D cell
detention cell

DA
Department of the Army

DAPM
Department of the Army, Provost Marshal General

DCS, G-3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3

DD
Department of Defense (forms)

DOD
Department of Defense

EHP
emergency home parole

EPW
enemy prisoners of war

ET
earned time

ETD
earned time detail

ETP
earned time programs

ETS
expiration of term of sentence

FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBOP
Federal Bureau of Prisoners

GCM
general court-martial

GED
general education degree

GS
general schedule

HIV
human immunodeficiency virus

HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army

ISA
Interservice Support Agreement

JFTR
Joint Federal Travel Regulation

MACOM
major Army command

MCM
Manual for Courts-Martial

mm

millimeter

MOS

military occupational specialty

M&RA

Manpower and Reserve Affairs

NAF

nonappropriated fund

NCIC

National Crime Information Center

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NCOIC

noncommissioned officer in charge

OCONUS

outside continental United States

OIC

Officer in Charge

ORI

originating agency identifier

OTJAG

Office of The Judge Advocate General

PCF

personnel control facility

PTF

patient's trust fund

RA

Regular Army

RCF

regional correctional facility

RCM

rules for courts-martial

SFC

sergeant first class

SOP

standing operating procedure

SSG

staff sergeant

TAPC

Total Army Personnel Command

THP

temporary home parole

TJAG

The Judge Advocate General

USADIP

United States Army Deserter Information Point

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

UIC

unit identification code

USC

United States Code

USDB

United States Disciplinary Barracks

USMS

United States Marshals Service

VWC

victim/witness coordinator

Section II**Terms****abatement**

Deduction of time from the term of a sentence to confinement which may be earned for actual work employment, education achievements, life/property saving acts, or for services performed other than that normally associated with regular work assignment.

appellate/excess leave

Leave a soldier may be ordered to take involuntarily when a sentence to an unsuspended punitive discharge/dismissal is pending completion of appellate review.

administrative segregation

The incarceration of a prisoner or prisoners apart from the general prisoner population done for the good of the prisoner or good of the larger population.

approved

The term used to describe action taken when the convening authority sanctions the findings and the sentence or a part thereof.

correctee

A term use to address and report personnel undergoing correctional custody.

detainee

A suspect of a crime that is held in temporary custody by the military police while waiting for determination of further status.

contraband

Any item accessible by a prisoner forbidden by law, regulation, or directive of the facility commander inside or outside the confinement/correctional facility.

correctional custody

The legal restraint of a person during duty or nonduty hours, or both, imposed as punishment under Article 15.

correctional facility

A facility providing correctional treatment to military prisoners to motivate them for return to military duty or return to the civilian community.

deferment of confinement

Postponement of the service and of the running of the sentence to confinement.

disciplinary segregation

The incarceration of a prisoner apart from the general population as a result of punishment for offenses committed while confined at an ACS facility.

escape

Any instance of a prisoner breaching the authorized limits of military custody or incarceration before being released by proper authority.

earned time (ET)

The abatement earned by prisoners through work performance, program participation, or extraordinary achievements, which is used to reduce sentence to confinement.

earned time detail (ETD)

Work programs that the facility commander designates as qualifying for award of ET.

earned time programs

A program (E.G., alcohol or drug counseling relating to rehabilitation for certain criminal activity that the facility commander designates as qualifying to be awarded earned time, or a Service mandated program (e.g., remedial reading)

commander

An officer appointed by appropriate orders as the commanding officer of an ACS facility. Responsible for the facility's administration and operation. Also oversees the custody, control, and correctional treatment of prisoners assigned to the facility.

final orders

Orders publishing the proceedings of courts-martial, and all action taken pursuant to those proceedings binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject only to action upon a petition for a new trial under Article 73, UCMJ; to action by TJAG under Article 69(b), UCMJ, to action by the Secretary concerned as provided in Article 74, UCMJ, and the authority of the President (R.C.M. 1209(b)).

good conduct time

Regulatory deduction from a definite term of sentence awarded to a prisoner for good conduct.

inoperative time

Any period(s) of time during which a prisoner is not credited with serving sentence to confinement.

installation parolee

Post trial custody grade prisoner requiring minimal custodial supervision.

maximum custody

Classification assigned to newly arrived prisoners until an initial assignment board is conducted. Also the classification assigned to a prisoner considered requiring continuous correctional supervision or who is considered extremely violent or an escape risk.

minimum custody

Prisoner considered being sufficiently dependable as to require little correctional supervision.

mitigated sentence

A sentence that is reduced in either quantity or severity; its general nature remaining the same.

posttrial confinement

Confinement adjudged by courts-martial including death or confinement (R.C.M. 1101(b)).

pretrial

Any person who is subject to trial by courts-martial and has been ordered by competent authority into pretrial confinement pending disposition of charges.

pretrial confinement

Physical restraint imposed by order of competent authority depriving a person of freedom pending disposition of charges. (R.C.M. 305(a)).

prisoner

A person sentenced by a court-martial to confinement or death and ordered into confinement by competent authority whether or not the sentence has been ordered approved by the convening authority. A person placed into confinement by competent authority pending trial by court-martial is a pretrial prisoner.

reenlistment

Procedures taken to return a prisoner to duty whose sentence includes an executed punitive discharge.

remission of sentence

Action whereby any portion of the unexecuted punishment is canceled.

report of result of trial

After final adjournment of the court-martial in a case, the trial counsel shall promptly notify the immediate commander of the accused, the convening authority, or the convening authority's designee, and, if appropriate, the officer in charge of the confinement facility of the findings and sentence (R.C.M. 1101(a)).

restoration of duty

Procedures taken to restore a prisoner to duty whose court-martial sentence does not include a punitive discharge or includes a punitive discharge that is either suspended or unexecuted.

sentenced

An individual becomes a sentenced prisoner when the convening authority approves the confinement portion of the sentence.

suspended sentence

A sentence or portion thereof held in abeyance by the commander who imposed the punishment or a successor in command.

setting aside

Action whereby the punishment or any portion thereof, executed or unexecuted, is set aside and any property, privileges, or rights affected by that portion of punishment set aside are restored.

unencumbered space

Usable space that is not obstructed by furnishings or fixtures. In determining unencumbered space, all fixtures must be in operational position and must provide the following minimum areas per person: bed, plumbing fixtures, desk and lockers.

Section III**Special Abbreviations and Terms**

This section contains no entries.

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DODDOA-004703