

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

(b)(3) From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 18:34

(b)(3) (b)(6) To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: DR Guidance for SSCI mtg on Iraqi Prisoners

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

J2 is discussing the value question. Not sure what there is left for IZTF/COTF to cover. Looks like (b)(3) [REDACTED] is critical to this effort.

(b)(3) [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

(b)(3) From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 18:25

To: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) (b)(6)

Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: DR Guidance for SSCI mtg on Iraqi Prisoners

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

Per discussion with VADM Jacoby on Mon. 5/10 afternoon, he directed the following:

-Friday, 14 May: DIA meeting with SSCI staffers on, SSCI requested:

- DIA interactions with Iraqi prisoners;
- Methods used in these interactions (debriefings, interviews, interrogations);
- Types of DIA contact with Iraqi prisoners/detainees;
- Value of Intell gained from these interactions. (J2 piece)

--In addition, VADM Jacoby tasked the following:

- DH is to prepare a bfn for this session with SSCI staffers;
- explain recent arrival of contract interrogators and that they are not used solo;
- Explain the difference between our HVT prison and the Abu Gharib prison;
- Describe the upgrades to the HVT facility;
- Describe the monitoring done at the HVT facility during interrogations;

7/20/2004

- Send the charts to Gen Dayton for review;
- Explain the DHS activities at Abu Gharib—what, when, why.

The DR wants charts prepared and may want to meet with the bing team before the SSCI session on Friday (b)(3) (b)(6) DR asked that the mtg be on Friday to give us more time to prepare). DR wants the charts reviewed by Gen Dayton; he wants (b)(3) (b)(6) to call Gen Dayton and discuss the issues. DR would like us to send the expert team on Friday and try and address all the issues in one mtg, rather than going back over several weeks. Prep session in 2D-246 on Tues, 5/11, 1400-1

V/R

(b)(3)

DERIVED FROM: MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: MS

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CAVEATS: ~~NOFORN~~

TERMS: NONE

7/20/2004

ENVELOPE

(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

HEADER

R 020027Z SEP 04
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
R 311004Z AUG 04
FM HMSNG WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//

[REDACTED]

RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

INFO RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); JORDAN (JO).
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]
SECTION 1 OF 2
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CAPTURED AND RELEASED JORDANIAN TERRORIST MUSTAFA SAYYAM IN DECEMBER
2002 - (CORRECTED REPORT) (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI (U) 20030101.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE (C) (REL) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (C) (REL) IN JULY 2002, JORDAN REQUESTED THAT IRAQ FIND FIVE
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING MUSTAFA SAYYAM. M5 AND M7 CONDUCTED
AN UNPRECEDENTED JOINT SEARCH TO CAPTURE SAYYAM IN DECEMBER 2002.
SAYYAM WAS RELEASED ON ORDERS FROM SADDAM HUSAYN.

TEXT: 1. (C) (REL) BACKGROUND. THE JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(GID) REQUESTED THAT THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) LOCATE
FIVE INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF CRIMES IN JORDAN. MUSTAFA ((SAYYAM))
WAS INCLUDED IN THE LIST AND WAS CONSIDERED A TERRORIST. JORDAN
INCLUDED SAYYAM'S NAME AND PICTURE IN AS MANY AS THREE REQUESTS
BEGINNING IN AUGUST 2002.

2. (U) IIS REACTION.

A. (C) (REL) AGENCY-WIDE REQUEST. FROM THE TIME THE IIS RECEIVED THE
FIRST REQUEST FROM THE GID, IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL ((HABBUSH)),
DIRECTED THE IIS M5 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE TO FIND SAYYAM

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AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE DIRECTOR OF M5 JORDANIAN BRANCH,
LAWRENCE ((AZZAWI)), PERSONALLY HEADED THE INVESTIGATION. BY 15
(b)(2) OCTOBER 2002, M5 HAD AMASSED A SIZABLE DOSSIER ON SAYYAM. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IT WAS UNCLEAR WHY THE JORDANIAN REQUEST TO FIND SAYYAM

WAS SUCH A HIGH PRIORITY. THE IIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF, OR FOCUSED ON, THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THESE SUSPECTS IN BAGHDAD, OR IRAQ, PRIOR TO THE GID REQUEST.)

B. ~~(C/REL)~~ POSSIBLE AUTHENTIC MEMO. SEVERAL MEMOS WENT TO ALL DIRECTORATES AND EVERY EXTERNAL IIS UNIT IN IRAQ TO ASSIST THE SEARCH FOR SAYYAM. AN ORDER WENT WITH THE MEMO NOT TO USE THE PASSPORT NAMES TO FIND THE SUSPECTS, BUT TO USE THE ENCLOSED PICTURES. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

3. (U) INTRA-AGENCY COOPERATION.

A. ~~(C/REL)~~ UNPRECEDENTED ACTION. BY NOVEMBER 2002, AZZAWI APPROACHED M7 TO HELP LOCATE AND CAPTURE SAYYAM. M7 WAS EVEN CALLED IN TO ASSIST THE SEARCH BEFORE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WAS INITIATED. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME M7 WAS ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A CAPTURE, AND IT WAS NOT STANDARD PROCEDURE.

B. ~~(C/REL)~~ PERSONNEL INVOLVED. BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN INITIATING AND CONDUCTING THE SEARCH AND INTERROGATION OF SAYYAM. THEY WERE -

- IIS DIRECTOR, TAHIR JALIL HABBUSH
- IIS DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HASSIB SABR ((AL-RIFA'I))
- M5, DIRECTOR, AHMAD ((AL-JAFARI))
- M5, JORDANIAN BRANCH CHIEF, LAWRENCE AZZAWI
- M7, DIRECTOR, HAYTHEM ((AL-RAWI))
- M7, ARAB BRANCH CHIEF, AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM ((AL-ANI))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, SA'AD MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, RUKAN ((AL-JANABY))
- M7 INTERROGATOR, FADIL MADLOL ((ALSHALASH)).

(b)(2)

[REDACTED] WAS NOT AWARE OF A COMMITTEE CREATED TO HANDLE THE SEARCH, ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] IT WAS EASY TO SEE WHY IT LOOKED AS SUCH TO AN OUTSIDER) ONCE THE SEARCH HAD BEGUN, ORDERS WERE DISPERSED IN A LINEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND. MOST COMMANDS INITIATED WITH AZZAWI.

4. (U) THE SEARCH AND ARREST.

A. ~~(C/REL)~~ SEARCH. THE IIS USED ALL TECHNICAL MEANS POSSIBLE,

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INCLUDING WIRE TAPS, SURVEILLANCE, AND OTHER TECHNIQUES, IN THE SEARCH. M5 RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SAYYAM REGULARLY VISITED HIS HALF-SISTER AND USED THAT TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WHEN AGENTS SEARCHED THE HOUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ONLY FOUND THE HALF-SISTER'S FAMILY.

B. ~~(C/REL)~~ FAMILY CONNECTION TO M7 OFFICER. SAYYAM' HALF-SISTER APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED ONE OF THE ARRESTING AGENTS AS AHMAD KHALIL IBRAHIM AL-ANI. THE HALF SISTER CLAIMED THAT AL-ANI AND SHE WERE RELATED AND ASKED FOR CLEMENCY, BUT AL-ANI ARRESTED THE HALF-SISTER'S HUSBAND TO FORCE THE FAMILY TO ASSIST IN CAPTURING SAYYAM. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DETAINMENT, THE HUSBAND AGREED TO ASSIST IN SAYYAM'S APPREHENSION. THE HUSBAND REQUESTED THAT THE ARREST TAKE

(b)(2)

PLACE OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE. [REDACTED] IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED THAT AHMAD AL-ANI WAS DISTANTLY RELATED TO SAYYAM'S

HALF-SISTER THROUGH COMPLEX TRIBAL TIES ON HIS WIFE'S SIDE. AL-ANI PROBABLY ORDERED THIS RELATIVE TO BE HELD IN CUSTODY TO PROTECT HIS REPUTATION; HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS BEING LENIENT TO HIS RELATIONS.)

- (b)(2) C. (C/REL) AMBUSH. AROUND 5 DECEMBER 2002, THE COERCED HALF-SISTER AND HUSBAND INVITED SAYYAM AND HIS WIFE TO THEIR HOUSE AND THEN NOTIFIED M5, M7 AND M5 OFFICERS JOINTLY AMBUSHED SAYYAM AS HE EMERGED FROM THE HOUSE. M7 AGENTS PERSONALLY ESCORTED SAYYAM, HIS WIFE AND CHILD TO THE M7 DETENTION FACILITY. [REDACTED] M7 WORKED IN A SEPARATE BUILDING WITH ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES, WHICH WAS LOCATED ON 52ND STREET IN THE AR-RUSAFAH DISTRICT OF BAGHDAD [REDACTED] IZ. IT WAS A THREE-STORY BUILDING ACROSS FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF PASSPORTS. THE DETENTION FACILITIES WERE ON THE 2ND AND 3RD FLOORS.)
5. (C/REL) INTERROGATION. M7 DETAINED SAYYAM FOR UP TO 15 DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THEY CONDUCTED FOUR OR FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS. SAYYAM REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE THROUGH THE FIRST THREE SESSIONS. LAWRENCE AZZAWI THEN ORDERED M7 TO USE ROUGHER METHODS TO EXTRACT A STATEMENT. [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED THAT THE IIS INTERROGATORS DID NOT TORTURE SAYYAM.) AHMAD AL-ANI SUPERVISED TWO MORE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, WHERE RUKAN AL-JANABY AND FADIL AL-SHALASH USED OPEN SLAPS TO THE FACE, FISTS TO THE CHEST, AND BEAT THE BOTTOM OF HIS FEET WITH STICKS. [REDACTED] AT FIRST THE INTERROGATORS THOUGHT THE IIS WOULD BE TURNING SAYYAM OVER TO THE JORDANIANS, SO M7 WAS LENIENT. THEY DID NOT WANT EVIDENCE LEFT OF A HARSH INTERROGATION. ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THE IIS WOULD NOT TURN HIM OVER TO JORDAN, HOWEVER, M7 USED THE ROUGHER METHODS.)
6. (U) RELEASE ORDERS.
- A. (C/REL) M7 OBJECTIONS ON RELEASE. AFTER SAYYAM'S FIVE INTERROGATION SESSIONS, LAWRENCE AZZAWI GAVE M7 RELEASE ORDERS FOR SAYYAM, WHICH INFURIATED M7. AHMAD AL-ANI AND HAYTHEM AL-RAWI FELT SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE RELEASE ORDER, THEY WENT ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HABBUSH TO EXPRESS THEIR OBJECTIONS. HABBUSH THEN INFORMED THE PAIR THAT THE ORDER FOR RELEASE CAME DIRECTLY FROM

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SADDAM ((HUSAYN)). THE NEXT DAY LAWRENCE AZZAWI REMOVED SAYYAM FROM THE M7 FACILITIES.

B. (C/REL) REASONS FOR OBJECTIONS. AHMAD AL-ANI INITIALLY PROPOSED KILLING SAYYAM AND SENDING HIS BODY BACK TO JORDAN, ALLEGING A SUICIDE. AL-ANI REPORTEDLY BELIEVED THE RELEASE OF SAYYAM WOULD PROVOKE THE AMERICANS, WHEREAS KILLING HIM OR SURRENDERING HIM TO JORDAN WOULD BE IN IRAQ'S FAVOR. THE ACT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S INTOLERANCE FOR TERRORISM.

C. (C/REL) SPECULATION ON SAYYAM'S RELEASE. M7 AGENTS CONCLUDED THAT THE DECISION TO RELEASE SAYYAM WAS MADE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. SENDING SAYYAM, DEAD OR ALIVE, TO JORDAN WOULD REVEAL THAT HE HAD BEEN IN IRAQ IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND MIGHT SUGGEST TO HOSTILE OBSERVERS THAT IRAQ HARBORED TERRORISTS. IN ADDITION, THE ARABIC MEDIA MIGHT HAVE BEEN INCENSED THAT SADDAM WOULD SURRENDER A MUSLIM TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE.

7. (C/REL) PREVIOUS AMNESTY DECREE. ON 20 OCTOBER 2002, SADDAM HUSAYN ISSUED A NATION-WIDE AMNESTY DECREE TO RELEASE ALL PRISONERS.

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE DECREE ALSO AFFECTED M7, SINCE IT HAD ITS OWN DETENTION FACILITIES. M7 EMPTIED ITS ENTIRE FACILITY, WHICH AMOUNTED TO APPROXIMATELY 200 INDIVIDUALS. NONE OF THE DETAINEES HELD BY M7 WERE THOUGHT TO BE AL-QA'IDA RELATED. M7 DETAINEES WERE MOSTLY

SPIES, POLITICAL PRISONERS, ANTIQUITY SMUGGLERS, DRUG SMUGGLERS, EMBEZZLERS AND BLACK MARKETERS.

COMMENTS: 1. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

2. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

A. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

THE FIVE JORDANIAN INDIVIDUALS WERE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF A U.S. DIPLOMAT IN AMMAN AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF A GID OFFICER, COLONEL ((BURJAK)). ABU YASIM SAYYAM WAS THOUGHT TO BE LIVING IN BAGHDAD. [REDACTED] COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE OTHER FOUR JORDANIANS.

B. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

C. (C//REL) PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS CORROBORATED [REDACTED] STATEMENTS.

(b)(1) (b)(2)

3. (C//REL) [REDACTED]

4. (U) CONSUMER EVALUATIONS FOR THIS IIR CAN BE SUBMITTED ONLINE VIA

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[REDACTED]

(b)(1) (b)(2)

ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

[REDACTED]

(b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. [REDACTED]

HMSNG [REDACTED]

DRV FROM: [REDACTED] SEP 03

DECL: X1

(b)(2)

ENVELOPE

(b)(2)

[Redacted]

HEADER

R 170557Z JUL 04

[Redacted]

RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC


[Redacted]

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
~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(b)(2)



RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC



CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE
IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF (U)

CITE: (U) [REDACTED]

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE
IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET-NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20040710.

(b)(2) REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (S//NF) INFORMATION REGARDING CHARGES BY MALEEM FIDEL MOHAMMAD REGARDING ALLEGED DETAINEE ABUSE IN THE VICINITY OF GHECKO, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF.

TEXT: (S//NF) MALEEM FIDEL ((MOHAMMAD)) HAS BEEN DETAINED BY U.S. FORCES IN THE PAST. AFTER HIS RELEASE, MOHAMMAD HAS SPOKEN OUT AGAINST THE AMERICANS BY STATING THAT THEY USED TORTURE ON HIM, WHICH INCLUDED SEXUAL ACTS WITH DOGS. MOHAMMAD IS CONVINCED THAT BY STATING THESE CLAIMS, HE WILL TURN THE LOCALS AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY CURRENTLY SUPPORT. AMIR MOHAMMAD ((AGHA)) FROM JALAHOR VILLAGE (CNA), ARGHANDAB DISTRICT, KANDAHAR PROVINCE, AF, WAS ALSO DETAINED BY U.S. FORCES AND IS THE INSTIGATOR FOR THESE CRUDE STATEMENTS. AGHA ALSO CLAIMS THAT HE WAS PUT THROUGH THESE DEGRADING TORTURE METHODS.

(b)(2) COMMENTS:

1. (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MOHAMMAD IS USING THIS EXAMPLE BECAUSE IN HIS CULTURE THE DOG IS LOOKED UPON AS THE DIRTIEST AND LOWEST ANIMAL. IT IS DEGRADING TO HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE DOG, LET ALONE COMMIT SEXUAL ACTS.

2. (U) [REDACTED]

3. (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(CJTF-76 HARC COMMENTS)--1. (S//REL TO USA/ISAF) THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN SEXUAL RELATED REMARKS IN REGARDS TO U.S. AND COALITION TREATMENT OF DETAINEES AND OTHER AFGHAN NATIONALS. THIS IS LIKELY IN RESPONSE TO THE ATTENTION RECEIVED FROM IRAQI PRISONERS. ACM ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE LIKELY TO COPY THE TACTICS THAT THEY SEE AS SUCCESSFUL.

ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

(b)(2) PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) FIELD-- NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~-NOFORN. DRV FROM: (U) USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

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DECL ON: (U) X1.

DERIVED FROM: (U)USAINSCOM SCG 380-2, 5 AUGUST 1996.

DECLASSIFY ON: (U) X1.

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(b)(2) [REDACTED]

ENVELOPE

(b)(2) [REDACTED]

HEADER

R 172119Z MAY 04

[REDACTED]

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED]
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

(b)(2)

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[REDACTED]
RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/HQ DA WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]
RUCXCAC/ONI WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SECTION 1 OF 2

QQQQ

SUBJ IIR [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI NGO

CITE: (U) [REDACTED]

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION REQUEST A VISIT TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON.

IRAQ, IN ORDER TO SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ - [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20040515.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(2) (b)(1) SOURCE: TS [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (S) [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED LOCAL IRAQI NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, WATLI AL-RAFDIN, REQUESTS SIX INDIVIDUALS BE GRANTED ACCESS TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON, IRAQ, TO SUBSTANTIATE ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE. ENCLOSURES.

(b)(2)

TEXT: 1. (S) [REDACTED] ON 15 MAY 2004, AT APPROX 1230L HOURS, FOUR U/I IRAQI MALES APPROACHED ENTRY CONTROL POINT FORWARD OF ABU GHURAYB PRISON [REDACTED] IZ, IN A 4-DOOR, ORANGE AND WHITE TAXI CAB. ONE OF THE U/I MALES EXITED THE TAXI CAB AND PRESENTED A U.S. MARINE GUARD WITH THREE SEALED ENVELOPES. THE U/I IRAQI MALE RETURNED TO THE TAXI CAB THAT DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY. U.S. MARINE GUARDS WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN IDENTIFYING FEATURES OF THE FOUR IRAQI MALES OR LICENSE PLATE NUMBERS FOR THE TAXI CAB.
2. (S) [REDACTED] THE ENVELOPES WERE STAMPED WITH AN OVAL-SHAPED CREST BEARING THE NAME WATLI AL-RADIDAYN, ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. ALL THREE ENVELOPES WERE ADDRESSED TO MR JEFFREY MILLER, SUPERVISOR OF ABU GHURAYB PRISON. THE FIRST TWO ENVELOPES EACH CONTAINED SINGLE PAGE MEMORANDUMS BEARING THE SAME WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LETTERHEAD AND DATED 12 MAY 2004
3. (S) [REDACTED] THE FIRST MEMORANDUM WAS A REQUEST BY THE WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (NGO), REGISTERED WITH THE IRAQI

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AS NGO NUMBER 895, FOR SIX MEN TO VISIT ABU GHURAYB. THE SIX INDIVIDUALS LISTED WITHIN THE MEMORANDUM ARE DOCTOR AQEL ABD ((AL-TA'AY)), DOCTOR JASSIM MOHAMMAD ((MESHAL)), DOCTOR KAREM KADHOM ((ATIA)), HAYDER JAWAD ABDUL ((ALLAH)), HEATHEAM HAMODI ((DHAHY)) AND MONTAHA KRAEDEE ((MOEZE)), NFI. //SIGNED// ORGANIZATION LEADER, BASEM JABAR HAYWEE ((AL-MOSAWEE)).

4. (S) [REDACTED] THE SECOND MEMORANDUM WAS A DIRECT ARABIC COPY OF THE FIRST MEMORANDUM. THE THIRD ENVELOPE CONTAINED AN ARABIC MEMORANDUM, ON THE SAME LETTERHEAD, DATED 15 MAY 2004, FURTHER EXPLAINING THE DESIRES OF THE WATLI AL-RADIDAYN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. TRANSLATION OF THE THIRD MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS--
-- IN THE NAME OF ALLAH THE MOST MERCIFUL AND GRATEFUL. ISSUE 124.

DATED 15 MAY 2004. TO ABU GHURAYB PRISON SUPERVISOR REGARDING OUR DEMANDS. REGARDS FROM WATLI AL-RAFDIN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WE PRESENT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING REQUEST THAT WE FEEL IS LEGITIMATE AND JUSTIFIED, HOPING THAT THESE REQUESTS WILL GAIN YOUR ATTENTION AND BE APPROVED. WE HOPE THE REQUEST WILL SERVE EVERYONE, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND DEMOCRACY. OUR REQUESTS ARE AS FOLLOWS-- WE ASK THAT YOU ALLOW HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS TO VISIT THE PRISONS, ESPECIALLY ABU GHURAYB PRISON, REGULARLY AND AT RANDOM, IN ORDER TO MONITOR WHAT GOES ON INSIDE THE PRISONS IN REGARDS TO PRISONER TREATMENT AND RIGHTS. WE DEMAND THE STOP OF ALL TYPES OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND TREAT THEM ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACCORDS. DO NOT PRACTICE ANY PHYSICAL FORCE OR IMMORAL TREATMENTS DURING INTERROGATIONS. WE DEMAND THAT YOU HOLD THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTREATMENT AND ABUSE OF THE PRISONERS. THEY SHOULD BE SENT TO COURT AND JUDGED OPENLY AND FAIRLY. WE DEMAND THAT YOU OPEN JUST AND INDEPENDENT CASES FOR THOSE PRISONERS WHO WERE KILLED INTENTIONALLY DUE TO THE PHYSICAL ABUSE DURING INTERROGATIONS. WE DEMAND THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE PRISONERS THAT STILL DO NOT STAND ACCUSED OF ANY TERRORIST ACTS. WE HOPE THESE DEMANDS WILL RECEIVE YOUR ATTENTION AND THAT YOU WILL ENFORCE DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM. THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ATTENTION. //SIGNED// ORGANIZATION LEADER BASEM JABAR HAYWEE AL-MOSAWEE. ORGANIZATION LEADER - 07901420814, CONSULTING OFFICE MANAGER - 07901302071, PROGRAMS AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGER 07901385799. NFI.

- (b)(2) (b)(1) COMMENTS: [REDACTED] 1. (S) [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- (b)(2) 2. (S) [REDACTED]
- 3. (S) [REDACTED]
- 4. (U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****
 IIR [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI NGO

ADMIN

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

- ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW-- THREE ENCLOSURES.
- 1. DIGITAL FILE-- SCANNED DOCUMENT, DIGITALLY SCANNED MEMORANDUM COPY (U), ONE FILE, [REDACTED] 20040515, IN ENGLISH (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI).
- 2. DIGITAL FILE-- SCANNED DOCUMENT, DIGITALLY SCANNED MEMORANDUM COPY (U), ONE FILE, [REDACTED] 20040515, IN ARABIC (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI).

(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

ENVELOPE

[REDACTED]

HEADER

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[REDACTED]

TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUCNSE/US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJM/NIMA M3 WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RULSSEA/COMNAVSEASYS COM WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUCNFBA/FBI WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

RUEDMJB/NRO WASHINGTON DC
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

-SECRET

(b)(2) RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5//

[REDACTED]
RUEPINE/CIFAOPNS WASHINGTON DC
RUEPINS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC
[REDACTED]

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ

~~SECRET~~ -- [REDACTED]
SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ).
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]
SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MUHAMMED SADDAM, CORRUPT
IRAQI POLICE OFFICER COMMITTING ABUSE, TORTURE AND EXTORTION ON US
BASE IN BAGHDAD (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ -- [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20031227.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(1) SOURCE: TC//REL [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S//REL)~~ MUHAMMED SADDAM HAD DETAINEE ARRESTED BY COALITION
FORCES WHEN HIS EXTORTION ATTEMPT FAILED. WHILE AT A COALITION BASE
IN BAGHDAD DETAINEE WAS BEATEN AND OBSERVED TORTURE OF OTHER
DETAINEES BY MUHAMMED SADDAM AND A KUWAITI INTERPRETER WORKING FOR
COALITION FORCES.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S//REL)~~ FIRST CONTACT. MUHAMMED SADDAM (LNU) IS AN IRAQI
POLICE OFFICER WORKING FOR A UNITED STATES (US) ARMY UNIT LOCATED IN
BAGHDAD, IRAQ (IZ). IN THE MIDDLE OF RAMADAN, MUHAMMED SADDAM
ARRESTED DETAINEE'S BROTHER FOR REASONS UNKNOWN. DETAINEE SECURED THE
BROTHER'S RELEASE AFTER SPEAKING WITH MUHAMMED SADDAM. THE FOLLOWING

(b)(2) [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

NIGHT, MUHAMMED CAME TO DETAINEE'S HOUSE WITH COALITION FORCES AND SEARCHED IT, LOOKING FOR DETAINEE'S BROTHER. HE WALKED TO THE DETAINEE'S CAR, WHICH WAS PARKED IN A GUARDED PARKING LOT. DURING THE TEN MINUTE WALK, MUHAMMED SADDAM REPEATEDLY MENTIONED HIS BELIEF THAT DETAINEE'S FAMILY IS WEALTHY. DETAINEE PROMISED TO BRING THE BROTHER TO MUHAMMED SADDAM THE FOLLOWING DAY AND MUHAMMED AND THE COALITION FORCES PERSONNEL LEFT.

2. (S//REL) SECOND CONTACT. TEN DAYS FOLLOWING HIS FIRST INTERACTION WITH DETAINEE, MUHAMMED SADDAM RETURNED, AGAIN WITH COALITION FORCES. THEY FIRED ON THE FRONT DOOR OF THE HOUSE AND BROKE IT DOWN, ENTERING THE HOUSE, MUHAMMED SADDAM TOLD THE RESIDENTS THAT THEY WERE RESISTING ARREST. HE THEN JOINED COALITION PERSONNEL IN SEARCHING THE HOUSE. MUHAMMED SADDAM WAS THE ONLY PERSON TO ENTER THE MASTER BEDROOM. WHEN HE LEFT, A SIZABLE QUANTITY OF CASH WAS MISSING FROM THE MASTER BEDROOM. DETAINEE WAS ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO THE US UNIT. DETAINEE SAT BLINDFOLDED AND HANDCUFFED IN A BASEMENT ROOM, AND WAS SPOKEN TO BY MUHAMMED SADDAM AND THE UNIT COMMANDER. MUHAMMED SADDAM ASKED IF DETAINEE WAS RELATED TO ANOTHER PARTY DETAINED FOR NEBULOUS REASONS WHO ALSO ALLEGED THAT MUHAMMED SADDAM ATTEMPTED TO EXTORT A LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY IN RETURN FOR A CESSATION OF HARASSMENT. DETAINEE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. MUHAMMED SADDAM TOLD DETAINEE THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS VERY WEALTHY, AND THAT DETAINEE MUST GET 10,000 US DOLLARS FROM THAT PARTY FOR HIM. HE AND THE UNIT COMMANDER LEFT. DETAINEE REMAINED IN THE ROOM WITH THREE IRAQI MALES, ONE OF WHOM WAS ADDRESSED AS SIR. THE THREE IRAQIS BEAT DETAINEE FOR FIVE HOURS, USING OPEN HANDS AND THE HOSE FROM A NARGHILA FROM WHICH THEY WERE SMOKING. DETAINEE'S HAND OR WRIST WAS BROKEN DURING THE BEATING. THE FOLLOWING NIGHT DETAINEE WAS RELEASED.

3. (S//REL) THIRD CONTACT. TWO MONTHS FOLLOWING THE SECOND CONTACT, MUHAMMED SADDAM SAW DETAINEE WALKING ON THE STREET AND HAD DETAINEE ARRESTED BY THE COALITION FORCES HE WAS TRAVELING WITH. AT THE US UNIT, MUHAMMED SADDAM ASKED DETAINEE WHERE THE MONEY WAS THAT HE WAS EXPECTING. DETAINEE PROMISED TO GIVE HIM THE MONEY, BUT MUHAMMED SADDAM SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT PROMISES THIS TIME. LATE THAT NIGHT, DETAINEE WAS PUT IN A ROOM WITH DETAINEE'S SIBLINGS. DETAINEE REMAINED IN THAT ROOM FOR SEVERAL DAYS. DETAINEE AND SIBLINGS WERE SLAPPED REPEATEDLY FOR HOURS, BY MANY PEOPLE (NFI). UNDER THE BLINDFOLD, DETAINEE WAS ABLE TO SEE THE SIBLINGS AND THE OTHER PEOPLE, ALL MALES, WHO WERE BROUGHT IN. A KUWAITI INTERPRETER WAS PRESENT. THE INTERPRETER HIT THE DETAINEES AND FORCED WATER BOTTLES INTO THE RECTUMS OF FIVE OR SIX OF THE MALE DETAINEES [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

- DETAINEE'S BROTHER WAS NOT OBSERVED TO BE ASSAULTED IN THIS WAY, BUT LATER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN, INDICATING THAT THERE WAS MORE OF THIS TREATMENT THAN DETAINEE OBSERVED. DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OF THE VICTIMS OF THE ABUSE. DETAINEE IDENTIFIED A 1.5 LITER WATER BOTTLE AS BEING THE TYPE USED IN THE ABUSE). MUHAMMED SADDAM CAME AND WENT DURING THIS PERIOD. HE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE

[REDACTED]

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THE NEXT IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. ANOTHER BROTHER WAS BROUGHT IN, NAKED AND UNCONSCIOUS WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS AND LEGS. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, A DIFFERENT INTERPRETER TOLD DETAINEE THAT HE HAD DIED. IN THE ENSUING FOUR MONTHS OF CONFINEMENT, DETAINEE HAS SEEN OR HEARD NOTHING TO DISPROVE THIS REPORT.

4. (S//REL) MUHAMMED SADDAM. PICTURES OF MUHAMMED SADDAM ARE POSTED

ALL AROUND ADHEMIYAH, IZ IN PROTEST OF THE WAY HE INDISCRIMINATELY ARRESTS PEOPLE. HE CHANGES HIS APPEARANCE AS A RESULT OF HIS UNPOPULARITY, IN FEAR OF REPRISAL. ALSO FOR PURPOSES OF PERSONAL SAFETY, HE LIVES ON A COALITION POST, NFI. MUHAMMED SADDAM WAS A BODYGUARD FOR SADDAM ((HUSSEIN))'S BROTHER WATBAN ((HUSSEIN)), BUT WAS FIRED, NFI.

5. (S//REL) DESCRIPTION OF MUHAMMED SADDAM. THE DESCRIPTION OF MUHAMMED SADDAM IS AS FOLLOWS--

- AGE, 40-50 YEARS OLD;
- PLACE OF BIRTH, IZ;
- SEX, MALE;
- MARITAL STATUS, MARRIED TO A SUNNI MUSLIM WOMAN FROM ADHEMIYAH, BAGHDAD, IZ;
- CITIZENSHIP, IZ;
- FACIAL HAIR, HAD A BLACK-DYED MUSTACHE BUT SHAVED IT BEFORE LAST TIME OBSERVED;
- TEETH, GOOD CONDITION;
- GLASSES, NO;
- COLOR OF EYES, BLACK;
- BALD, NO, HAIR RECEDING AT SIDES;
- HAIR, DYED BLACK AND CUT VERY SHORT;

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

- HEIGHT, 65 INCHES;
- WEIGHT, 180-200 POUNDS;
- BUILD, FAT, HEAVY BUILD;
- CLOTHING, WESTERN CLOTHING;
- MEDIUM COMPLEXION;
- FACIAL FEATURES, ROUND, FAT FACE; ROUND NOSE;
- JEWELRY WORN, WEARS A WATCH ON RIGHT WRIST;
- AUTOMOBILE, BLUE FOUR DOOR LATE MODEL JAPANESE PICKUP.

6. (S//REL) DESCRIPTION OF THE KUWAITI INTERPRETER. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE KUWAITI INTERPRETER IS AS FOLLOWS--

- AGE, 50-60 YEARS OLD;
- PLACE OF BIRTH, KUWAIT;
- SEX, MALE;
- COLOR OF EYES, BLACK;
- BALD, NO;
- HAIR, SHORT BLACK WITH GREY HAIR;
- HEIGHT, 72 INCHES;
- BUILD, TALL, THIN, NARROW SHOULDERS;
- CLOTHING, PANTS AND SHIRT;

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
--VOICE, STRONG VOICE;
 --VERY DARK COMPLEXION;
 --FACIAL FEATURES, LONG FACE; LONG NOSE; SLIGHT SQUINT.
 COMMENTS: 1. (S//REL) [REDACTED] AT LEAST TEN DETAINEES AT ABU GHURAYB PRISON, FROM DIFFERENT FAMILIES AND GROUPS, ALLEGE THAT MUHAMMED SADDAM ABUSED THEM AND ATTEMPTED TO EXTORT MONEY IN RETURN FOR THEIR RELEASE.

2. (S//REL) DETAINEE IS WILLING TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED PROVIDED DETAINEE'S SAFETY IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

3. (S//REL) [REDACTED]

4. (S//REL) [REDACTED]

(b)(2)



ADMIN

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

ENCL: (U) NONE.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U) (200400410).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ --

DERIVED FROM: (U) CJTF-7 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND MARKING GUIDE
(VERSION 2), 18 SEPTEMBER 2003.

DECLASSIFY ON: (U) X1.

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JITF-CT EXPLOITATION BRANCH

GUIDELINES FOR PERSONNEL SUPPORTING INTERROGATIONS AND DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES

The Overall Classification of this
briefing is ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Purpose and Scope

- GUIDELINES REGULATE ACTIVITIES OF JITF-CT ANALYSTS SUPPORTING INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES
- REQUIRED ADHERENCE TO PRICIPLES OF PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES THAT THE U.S. IS A PARTY TO, INCLUDING, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, GENEVA CONVENTION
- APPLICABLE TO ALL JITF-CT MEMBERS

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Interrogation / Debriefing Support

- JITF-CT ANALYSTS PERFORM EXPLOITATION TO PRODUCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
- JITF-CT DIRECTS COLLECTION, FUSION AND DISSEMINATION OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
- JITF-CT PROVIDES ANALYSIS ON THOSE BEING INTERROGATED/ DEBRIEFED
- JITF-CT PROVIDES INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR DOD COUNTERTERRORISM (OFFENSIVE) AND ANTITERRORISM (DEFENSIVE) OPERATIONS
- JITF-CT IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE WRITING OF POLICY AND PLANNING OF DETAINEES DETAINED IN BAGRAM AND GTMO

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

JITF-CT PERSONNEL PROVIDE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO

- INTERROGATORS
- DEBRIEFERS
- HUMINT PERSONNEL
- LAW ENFORCEMENT

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

WHAT WE BRING TO THE GAME!!!

JITF-CT SUPPORT COSISTS OF:

- SUPPLYING INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND REQUIREMENTS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS
- SUPPLYING BACKGROUND INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS
- ACCOMPANYING INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS AND INTERACTING WITH COOPERATIVE OR NON-COOPERATIVE PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE.
- DIRECTLY POSING QUESTIONS TO AND OTHERWISE DIALOGUING WITH COOPERATIVE OR NON-COOPERATIVE PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE.
- PROVIDING POST-INTERROGATION ASSESSMENTS TO INTERROGATORS/DEBRIEFERS

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Other Activities

- UNLESS IN SELF-DEFENSE, ENHANCING THE SAFETY OR SECURITY OF OTHER U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE LOCAL PROXIMITY OR TO REASONABLY ENSURE THE ACQUISITION OF COMBATING TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, JITF-CT PERSONNEL ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE PHYSICAL CONTACT OR OTHER INTERACTION WITH PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Proscribed Activities

AS INDICATED IN FM 34-52

- USE OF FORCE, MENTAL TORTURE, THREATS, OR INHUMANE TREATMENT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW
- USE OF FORCE IS NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL PLOYS, VERBAL TRICKERY OR OTHER NON-VIOLENT/NONCOERCIVE RUES USED WHEN QUESTIONING HESITANT OR UNCOOPERATIVE SOURCES
- PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH UNAUTHORIZED TECHNIQUES, WHICH SERVE AS GUIDELINES TO OBTAIN THE WILLING COOPERATION FROM THE SOURCE

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**JITF-CT PERSONNEL DO NOT ENGAGE IN THE
FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES RELATING TO PERSONS OF
POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE**

- PHYSICAL ABUSE
- MENTAL ABUSE
- CONTACTING, QUESTIONING OR DIALOGUING WITH PERSONS OF POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE VALUE WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE SENIOR JITF-CT INDIVIDUAL IN CHARGE OF ALL JITF-CT PERSONNEL
- NO JITF-CT CONTRACTORS WILL BE ALLOWED UNACCOMPANIED (I.E., WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYED SPECIALIST) ACCESS TO DETAINEES
- EDUCATION: COPIES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION, APPROPRIATE DOD DIRECTIVES AND OTHER GUIDELINES ARE AVAILABLE

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Questions?

The Overall Classification of this briefing was ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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6 AUGUST 2004

Document Number: 1
Document Type: Letter
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Date of Document: 6AUG04
To/From: DIA
Subject: JITF-CT Guidelines for Personnel Supporting Interrogation and Debriefing Activities
Pages: 3
Document released in its entirety.

JITF-CT Guidelines for Personnel Supporting Interrogation and Debriefing Activities

Purpose and Scope

These Guidelines regulate the activities of JITF-CT analysts whenever they support any interrogation and debriefing activities, to include those conducted by DoD personnel, as well as by personnel from other U.S. Government agencies. These Guidelines apply to all JITF-CT members.

These Guidelines implement and require adherence to the principles of pertinent international treaties to which the U.S. is a party, and U.S. laws, directives, policies, and guidelines. These documents and legal provisions include, but are not limited to, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, primarily the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, both dated 12 August 1949; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, entry into force on 26 June 1987; DoD Directive 5100.77, "DoD Law of War Program," dated 9 December 1998; and U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, "Intelligence Interrogation," dated 28 September 1992 (hereinafter FM 34-52).

Support to Interrogations and Debriefings

The JITF-CT directs collection, exploitation, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of all-source intelligence for DOD counterterrorism (offensive) and antiterrorism (defensive) operations, planning, and policy.

As such, JITF-CT personnel may be directed or assigned to support DoD and other interrogation and debriefing activities conducted by interrogators, debriefers, other HUMINT personnel and law enforcement personnel relating to persons of potential intelligence value. Persons of potential intelligence value include cooperating assets, Prisoners of War, Enemy Combatants, Persons Under U.S. Control, and other special detainees or prisoners.

JITF-CT support consists of:

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1. Supplying information regarding intelligence gaps and requirements to interrogators/debriefers.
2. Supplying background intelligence materials to interrogators/debriefers.
3. Accompanying government employed interrogators/debriefers and interacting with cooperative or non-cooperative persons of potential intelligence value.
4. Directly posing questions to, and otherwise dialoguing with, cooperative or non-cooperative persons of potential intelligence value. However, contract analysts may only question detainees in the presence of government employed (e.g., GS or U.S. military) specialists. Contractor personnel will not be allowed unaccompanied access to detainees.
5. Providing post-interrogation assessments to interrogators/debriefers.

Other Activities

Generally during the course of supporting interrogations or debriefings, JITF-CT personnel will not have physical contact or other interaction with persons of potential intelligence value. JITF-CT personnel are authorized, however, to have physical contact with, or spend periods in proximity to, persons of potential intelligence value when such activity is required for self-defense, to enhance the temporary safety or security of other U.S. persons in local proximity, or to reasonably ensure the acquisition of combating terrorism intelligence information.

Proscribed Activities

As indicated in FM 34-52:

"The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.

The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and

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use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.

Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques."

To ensure compliance with these principles, JTF-CT personnel will not engage in the following activities relating to persons of potential intelligence value:

1. Physical abuse.
2. Mental abuse.
3. Contacting, questioning or dialoguing with persons of potential intelligence value without approval of the senior JTF-CT individual in charge of all JTF-CT personnel.
4. No JTF-CT contractors will be allowed unaccompanied (i.e., without a government employed specialist) access to detainees.

Education

Copies of the Geneva Conventions, appropriate DoD Directives and other guidelines are available through the JTF-CT General Counsel or the JTF-CT Chief of the Exploitation Branch.

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