On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL	MP, CFCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC	JA, CFLCC – SJA, Interviewer
LTC	, 705 th MP Battalion, Interviewer
SFC	372 ^{no} MP Company, Respondent
SSG	27D30, CFLCC – SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:

My assessment is that morale is stable. We have 54 days left, before we re-deploy to Kuwait, so people are upbeat. There's a lot of negativity in the Command Climate, because people feel that the Commander, and SFC for the being made sacrificial lambs for something they had no control over. Other than that we're proceeding on with the mission, doing the job and getting it done.

We've had a sensing session with the Chaplain, and the Sergeant Major's come out, sat down and talked to people. The problem is with the shifts – you can't get everybody out with the odd hours. We've tried. Combat Stress Team has been out, to talk to the unit. I give everybody the opportunity to talk to me, at anytime, and they know that.

We're writing the SOP's, which in my personal opinion, is totally wrong. SOP's should be handed down to us. We are a Combat Support MP Company. We're not I/R. We're not EPW. As far as our training, we pick them up off the battlefield. We take them to a holding area. We drop them off. An Escort Guard Company comes, and they take them back to the holding area. I don't feel, that we are qualified, to write SOP's on how to handle civilian detainees.

ANNEX 85

ACLU-RDI 291 p.1

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At the MOB Station, we basically did our Combat Support Training – running MSR patrols, route re-cons, and area security. I had no idea that we would be doing the mission we're doing now. The EPW training, you deal with handcuffing, transporting detainees, and dropping them off. But, other than that, it's very limited.

A new soldier in Tier 1A would receive about 2 days worth of training from the NCOIC of the Tier, before he would be allowed to be there by himself. Even at that time, because Tier 1A is an MI Hold section. There are always 3 people on duty. The training is OJT. They go up there, they work, they observe, they see how things operate.

We're meeting the minimum manpower requirements right now. At the hard site, it's all MP's. At Camp Vigilant, I have one cook out there. She mans the tower. She has no direct contact with the detainees. She received training from the NCOIC of Vigilant, SFC Before he lets anybody go to work, he makes sure they receive training on how to deal with the detainees that are in his site, and that includes other MP's. I know there are other units that are very short, because of REFRAD's.

I check my soldiers everyday and every night.

I understand that there was a CD Rom dropped off at CID, with photographs on it, and that's how this whole thing started. I know the boy who did it. I don't blame him for doing it. I just wish he went to his chain of command. Apparently, the individuals who are under investigation for this matter decided to pass CD's around.

If it were brought to my attention, and I have some knowledge of what's on the pictures, because I saw them, during the first investigation, there's no doubt in my mind that those people would be relieved and facing charges, just like they are now.

Most of the escapes or attempted escapes, about 99%, have been at the hard site. At the hard site, you're dealing with the ICO's. We've had an incident where an ICO actually smuggled a weapon in. He shot an MP. Just the other day, we had an ICO smuggling in clothes to a prisoner, to try and help him escape. We had, just this week, 3 attempted escapes.

When an inmate is caught, trying to escape, he is put in isolation, the Tier is locked down, and he gets no cigarettes, no privileges for a week. There have been no coordinated escape attempts.

I feel that these were individual actions. If individuals choose not to do the right thing, I can stand there and harp all day, if they don't want to do that, it's not going to change their attitude. From what I've seen, and what I've heard, this was a failure of human decency.

The Geneva Hague Convention is part of your yearly mandatory training. You have to have 100% signed in. I don't know why it's not posted at the facility. It should be.

We had, what I thought, was a very good relationship with the MI people that were running 1A, 1B. There were a lot of things that were done by word of mouth. That has changed. My MPs have been instructed, they will not do anything, unless it's in writing. From what I was told it would have to be approved by the O6 from the MI. They had us doing their sleep deprivation, and I have no problem doing that, but you will put it in writing. My soldiers have been instructed, as far as that's concerned, that would be as much as walking by their cells, telling them to wake up. They're not touching anybody. After everything that has come down, my soldiers will question.

I believe people just took it to a level they wanted to. There's no doubt in my mind, that if somebody told me to do the things purported to have been done, it's definitely an illegal order. It's definitely an immoral order.

To get right? First of all, the hard site is a CPA function. The CPA needs to be doing their job. We are beating our heads against the wall, with ICO's, who have gone through a 2-week course. That disturbance, yesterday, Tier 5, we have 7 CPA guys out there, telling us what we should do, and it's not us who should be doing it. It's the CPA's facility, the ICO's facility. The Iraqis should be the one who are doing it, but when push comes to shove, it's thrust upon us to do. One day we're not going to be there. These people need to start picking up the ball, and doing their jobs.

Number 2, this REFRAD crap, I understand it's the law, but it's tearing units apart. You're winding up with units that are short of personnel. We're lucky right now. We have enough people to get the job done. I have 5 REFRADs scheduled this month. There's another 5 MP's, that I'm gonna to lose, and eventually it's going to get to the point where I'm not going to have a choice - I'll wind up having to pull a mechanic or a cook. They won't be in direct contact with inmates, but they're going to work somewhere else.

These REFRAD's are for the 22 - 24 month rule. They've been on active duty 2 years, because of Homeland Defense Measures. I realized Congress passed the law, but we need to look at getting that straightened out. It's hurting, not just my unit, but a whole lot of other units. There needs to be systems like the active army – you lose somebody, you can get somebody. I have prior service people sitting back in the states, that could have possibly been pulled over to fill slots that are vacant, but there's no mechanism to do that. In the Reserves you deploy with what you have, and when they're gone, there's no replacement.

I have seen General Karpinski 2 or 3 times. She was hanging her hat, here at Victory. I'm an old school guy. I believe you lead from the front, not from the back. I have seen the new commander, COL about about four times already, and the Sergeant Major Butler is out, constantly. He's only been here a few weeks. There's a major difference in the support we're getting. They volunteer to find a way to fix things.

ACLU-RDI 291 p.3

The biggest issue, logistics – getting the basic things for our soldiers, boots and uniforms. has turned into such an ordeal. If you can't get soldiers what they need to survive, you're failing them.

Unfortunately Sir, most our logistical support I did. The only place you can get anything, it seems, is Arifjan. If you move S4 forward, then you run into the problem of them having to go down and get things for you, and it turns into a nightmare. Right now, because of doing a little horse-trading, and the companies pooling assets, our vehicle readiness is about 90 - 92%, which is outstanding in the conditions we're in. But, it took a lot of pooling to get it that way. Everybody's been out working their own side deals, so the soldiers are getting what they need, but working it through the normal channels doesn't work. It was the same in Desert Storm. You have to "wheel and deal." This time... it's been deplorable this time.

CSM I saw quite a bit. He was always there, and very much a troops-oriented person.

The panel stopped, to discuss SFC statements.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave SFC **sector** a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

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AUTHORITY:	Title 10 HSC Section 301: Title 5 HSC Se			77 1943 /SSMI					
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:									
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an								
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number	is voluntary.							
1. LOCATION Camp Victory Iraq		2. DATE	(YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/09	3. TIME	4. FILE NUME	BER			
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDR 372nd Military Poli	ESS ce Company Abu Gurab Iraq					E7/Active			
9.			VANT TO MAKE THE FO	DLLOWING STATEMENT U	NDER OATH:				
 A. Unit training is b Q. What kind of training w 	ining did unit receive at home based on MTP 19-313-30 and M ining did unit receive at Mob S as based on combat support Mi	ATP 19-313 tation?				with displaced			
persons civilian refu Q. What kind of tra A. Unit received let control, cell extract	ining has unit received in theat ft seat right ride training from 7	er? '2nd MP C() when we reliv	ed them. ROE tra	ining less lethal	training, Riot			
A. Soldiers are wor	ing minnium manpower require king 12hr shifts with limited tir non MP soldiers in Towers that	ne off. HO	personnel are b e direct detaine	eing tasked with e e contact. There a	scort missions w are no NON 31B	when MP assets ar soldiers at the			
	eformed random checks at irre eir times apparently stopped wi				is once they left.				
Q. How did MI Bre A. Detainees were to periods of time and	ak New detainees? prought in subject to sleep depr PT i.e.: push-ups side straddle	avation, col hops etc.	d showers every	30 mins. cuffed	and forc e d to sta	and for long			
A. We had a very g	ationship between MI and MPs ood working relationship MI be and control and tried to assists	rought detai	n ce s in and hand d.	dled interrogation	s and punishmer	nts. MP's			
Q. Was direction or A. Very little was e	how to deal with detainees giv ver put in writing until recently	en either ve when it wa	erbally or in wri s requested mos	ting? stly verbally.					
A. As of this date 1	ciplinary actions have been cor 4 Article 15's 4 of which are su uniform i.e. helmet etc. Has be	spended 3	h <mark>e unit?</mark> p e nding. Cousul	ing statements are	e numerous. Cor	rective training fo			
Q. Is there a concep A. With the article	tion in the Unit that misconduc 15's and the other actions that h	t will be tol ave taken p	erated? lace. I think the	majority of the u	nit knows action	will be taken.			
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10. EXHIBIT		11. IN	ITIALS OF PERSON MA	KING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 DF				
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AUDITIONAL PAGES MUST LI									

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PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, OEC 1999

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