

On 10 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED] DCG-CFLCC, Interviewer
CPT [REDACTED] CFLCC-SJA, Interviewer
SFC [REDACTED], U.S. Army MP School, Fort Leonardwood, MO, Interviewer
1LT [REDACTED] 372nd MP Company, Interviewee

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED]. My social security number is [REDACTED]. My rank is First Lieutenant. I am assigned to the 372nd MP Company.

I have been assigned to the 372nd MP Company for a little over five years. I was first platoon leader for about 3 1/2 years and then I was moved to third platoon at Fort Lee. We were mobilized on 24 FEB 2003.

We didn't receive any training at the MOB station; we did all of our training internally. We received some range support for one of the ranges but no organized training support exercises from a training support unit. We received the standard set of briefings on cultural customs, ROE, and other standard briefings.

None of the training was mission focus. We were not aware of our mission requirements, we just ready to do any kind of MP work. The company commander was CPT Reese, who took over in October 2002.

We arrived in theater on 15 May 2003. When we arrived in Arifjan we were in limbo for a couple of weeks. We ended up at the 310th than transferred to the 1st MEF. We moved north on 6 JUN 2003, to Al Hila.

We assumed a law and order/police liaison mission with the Marines. We had divided the city in sectors that we would patrol. We would mentor police station, tracked prisoner detention, assisting with arrest, dispose of excess weapons, and various other duties involved with helping out the Iraqi law enforcement. We did the mission for four months.

Annex 71

We arrived at Abu Ghraib around 1 OCT 2003. We received the Battalion instruction, which was ROE, Geneva Convention, riot training, witness of feeding, and a two-week handoff with 72nd MP Company. The 320th MP Battalion administered the training. I was assigned to the 372nd MP Company in November 2002. The entire company attended the training. We were given an outline and we gave the training. We didn't have a subject matter expert.

The purpose of the training was to prepare us for the new mission. The mission set we were given was transporting and escorting. Around November I was told to assist in the overseeing of Camp Vigilance, on 20 DEC 2003 I was asked to overlook the hard site, on 21 JAN 2004 I assumed duties as the company commander, and on 3 FEB 2004 I relinquished command as company commander. My platoon was split guarding the compound and continuing the transporting and escorting mission. SFC [REDACTED] was my platoon sergeant.

SFC [REDACTED] ran Camp Vigilance, I checked in two or three times a day. I worked all the special issues for the camp. I wasn't involved in the detainee counts; he was able to manage everything. He handles prisoner feeding, camp improvements, counts, and anyone who came by to visitors. I did not give SFC [REDACTED] specific guidance on the operations of the prison camp. It did not appear a need to give specific guidance. It was understood not to let anyone get away, make sure the detainees are feed, and make sure the detainees receive medical attention.

I am not familiar with the contents of Geneva Conventions. I probably should be. I understand that detainees should be treated humanely and with dignity.

When I assumed responsibility of the hard site, I didn't do any changeover with CPT [REDACTED]. I just took on the mission. There was no specific guidance given, I just ensured everything remained the same. I didn't ask for any guidance, but I probably should have. I was told SOP's were coming through Battalion and Brigade. We have yet to receive any SOP, SFC [REDACTED] had made some SOP's that are still under review.

Battalion dictated accountability. They wanted two counts by I.D. per week; we did actual prison counts two or three times daily. The wing NCOIC's conducted the counts and rolled the reports up to the SOG, the SOG then rolled the reports up to Battalion. My role was to make sure that the counts happened. I verified the counts by word of mouth; I didn't verify that records were kept because there was never a problem with the counts.

There were either two or three escapes out of the hard site. The first escape, a group of detainees had got out through the infirmary and jumped out of a vacant tower, the second time there was a work detail were someone just escaped from, and the last time it was an similar incident but the ICO's were involved. I don't know if any corrective actions were taken, I was not involved with any of the prisons when the escapes happened. I ended up directing search operations at the time of the incidents.

I assumed responsibility of the hard site on 20 December 2003. I thought I knew the personnel who worked the hard site, but things have come to light that has made me change my opinion of certain people. I been in the company for five years, so I know the personnel, but I don't know them that well. I never checked any records of the personnel who worked the hard site.

I familiarized myself with the hard site by meeting with the wing NCO's and touring the facility. I would stop by randomly twice a day; I didn't have set hours, because I still had other missions I was in charge of. I didn't have a defined principle duty; the hard site OIC was a title that I owned. I didn't get engrossed in the hard site. I considered platoon leader as my principle duty. I didn't categorize my duties; I should have prioritized them.

When I took over the hard site there was 4 Tiers, now there are 6 Tiers. Tier 1A and 1B are controlled by MI and we work there. I am responsible for the MP's at the hard site I was never responsible for the MI personnel. I understood my mission was to run the MP's in the hard site. MI took 1A and 1B from us, and CPA always had ownership of the property. I was responsible for the security of the Tier, and security only. CPT Reese appointed me OIC of the hard site. I was not given any guidance nor did I seek any guidance. I was responsible for the MP's guarding Tier 1A and 1B. We were responsible for counts, feeding, and medical attention.

When MI needed our assistance with detainees, they did their request through memorandums. The memorandums would dictate what MI wanted. The memorandums were signed by COL [REDACTED] and given to the NCOIC of the wing. The memorandums would give instructions on diet patterns; sleep patterns, music playing, and various other techniques that MI requested the MP's to carry out. I don't recall a directive for clothing removal. We fell in on clothing removal from the 72nd, but I don't know any specifics.

I heard of the shooting incident, but it was well before I took over at the hard site. I heard that an Iraqi Corrections Officer smuggled in a weapon to one of the detainees, three of our personnel had investigated and had been fired on, our personnel had returned fire and wounded the detainee, and they got the detainee to the CASH for medical treatment. I also had to respond to two Riots at Camp Ganci.

We frequently had visitors at the hard site, they were suppose to stop at the MP's office but because of its location it rarely ever happened. There were no firearms allowed on the tiers. I'm not aware of metal asps being authorized in the hard site, but everyone had knives we didn't do searches for knives.

I made checks about twice a day, I was looking for looking to make sure weapons weren't out; a general personnel and accountability check. I'm not aware of batons being allowed in the hard site, it is a touchy subject. No one is technically authorized to carry batons are asps. I did not pat my personnel down when they came for duty. It was established that body Armour and helmets were required and everyone was brought on-

line. I couldn't account for what personnel brought in their pockets, it is possible soldiers could have brought in foreign objects.

I wasn't aware of dogs working in the facility. I didn't know any of the MI interrogators. I have met the Chief, but I can't recall his name. I've seen him of and on until present he still works there. He is short, wears glasses, combat CIB, I just can't recall his name. I have met the interrogators also, but I can't recall any names.

I have been told that events with CPL [REDACTED] and SSG [REDACTED] occurred between 2200 and 0400. I usually made my checks during the day. SFC [REDACTED] was usually there during the night. I personally made no checks after 2200. I met SFC [REDACTED] during mobilization; he came with high recommendation from the rest of the E-7 in the company. I met CPL [REDACTED] during mobilization; he was assigned to my platoon in during the summer. He was having friction with the First Sergeant, and was transferred to my platoon. I used him as a team leader. He was selected by CPT [REDACTED] to man the hard site because of his corrections experience. I heard that he had lost a corrections job; he sued than he got his job back.

I have known SSG [REDACTED] for about five years. He was a corrections officer also. I have only known him professionally. He was the nighttime NCOIC in the absence of SFC [REDACTED]. He was also the SOG.

I didn't receive any report regarding any misconduct in Tier 1A and 1B. I didn't hear about the allegations until the investigation started.

My understanding that beyond feeding and basic care MI controlled Tier 1A and 1B. A memo was presented to the wing NCOIC when a detainee was needed for MI purposes. The Tier 1A and 1B wing daytime NCOIC was SGT [REDACTED], the Nighttime NCOIC is CPL [REDACTED].

From 20 DEC 2003 until present I haven't see any unclothed detainees. I have seen detainees made to stand for long periods, detainees with bags over their heads, playing of music, and sleep deprivation.

I knew of SGT [REDACTED], I have had no direct contact. SPC [REDACTED] was my platoon mechanic in Bosnia. SPC [REDACTED] I knew of. I had daily contact with SGT [REDACTED]. I never observed CPL [REDACTED] in the performance of his duties. I had no observations of SSG [REDACTED] either. Things were going smoothly I had no reasons to check up on the soldiers.

I checked in with SFC [REDACTED] one a day at the 1600 briefing. We would discuss if anything unique happened attempted escape, prisoner disturbance, and damage to the facility, and ICO behavior. CPT Reese and I would meet nightly to discuss issues.

The panel takes a break in the interview.

The command climate can be described as open most of everyone has been in the company a long time. Morale has been low for a while. Unit has been double tapped with back-to-back missions. The chain of command has been aware of the morale situation. They started to let re-frads go and made a relaxed LSA environment. Steps have been taken but morale is still low. It was considered an ideal deployment until the allegations surfaced.

We were increasing the amount of discipline; we had just processed 1 of 8 Article 15's for various offenses. The allegation of detainees abuse did not initiate the Article 15's in the unit.

Our soldiers were not directly involved in the escapes. The ICO's were responsible when the escapes occurred. The ICO's were not under our control they are under control of the CPA. We do not have the facilities, capabilities, or time to train the ICO's. They are incompetent.

The company commander priorities were to maintain security of the prison, feeding of prisoners, and health of prisoners. Detention Operations can mean a number of different things. My definition of corrections is a therapeutic program to rehabilitate someone to return to society. Detention Operations means to me holding someone because they gave themselves up. The train of thought at Abu Graib is to not let the detainees get away.

The ICO's were not allowed to be on Tier 1A and 1B, so I wouldn't have expect the ICO's to be held accountable. The conduct displayed by CPL [REDACTED] and SSG [REDACTED] is criminal behavior not incompetence. I feel that the individuals involved should be held responsible not the chain of command. They would wait till there was no supervision and then they did what they wanted to do. There is no other place in the world that these individuals could commit these acts and not be held accountable. They gained credibility in our minds by them having experience in the correctional field.

I feel discipline is ongoing regardless of mission and morale. In the absence of guidance I feel that soldiers can look upon the NCO Creed. I can't recite it, but I know it's content. I have received brief of the Geneva Convention. I couldn't tell you the bounds of my authority as far as being an military police, because we haven't done anything textbook since we have been here.

I have been a military police and an Officer for five years. My civilian job is a financial analyst. I don't know my bounds as a Military Police, but I should. I followed the instructions that MI gave me; I didn't question COL Pappas, because he is my superior and he is a subject matter expert. Detention at Abu Graib beyond feeding and medical treatment was not to let the prisoners to get away. During my tenure as OIC of the hard site I did not see nor hear of any nude prisoners at the hard site.

I have seen memos on sleep deprivation and feeding times only. During sleep deprivation they wanted the detainee to get 2 to 4 hours sleeps max. They enforce the

deprivation by making the detainee stand up, and playing loud music. The meal plans were meals given at random times during a 24-hour period.

I am not familiar with the interrogation ROE. I am not aware that the Geneva Conventions had to be posted in the detainee's language. It did not occurred to me to ask that question. I don't know my specific rights in regards to the Geneva Convention; I would be interested in anything that would improve my situation. I would be interested in whatever I was entitled to.

During in interrogation I am entitled to disclose name, rank, and serial number at a maximum. I would expect two meals a day, clothing, shelter, and basic medical treatment. This treatment was provided to all the detainees at the compound.

I am embarrassed about what happened in the allegations. My recommendation is the best thing that could happen to the company is the return of the First Sergeant and the Commander. Anything else would be too complicated or fanciful. Training is an unrealistic expectation due to the shortage of personnel in the unit. We have had a riot and two escape attempts in the past week. Everything is working, but barely. The only way things are going to improve is if we receive an influx of personnel.

CPT [REDACTED] is the new Company Commander. An MP company is not authorized an XO. I would never pass on an influx of personnel or more training regardless of how things were going.

Something that would be helpful would be a established disconnect between MP's, MI's, and CPA. The division of labor, there is a lot of things that need to be done that are not getting done. We had a serious problem with maintenance, upkeep, contracting, and so forth. My guys had to step up and do things in and around the prison that wasn't being done. My soldiers had to suffer because they aren't in control of the budget; they weren't involved in the management of the facility.

The ICO's can't be trusted. We can't hire them, fire them, pay them, nor reward them. They smuggle in drugs and weapons to the facility. They ICO's get searched; things still get in. If we go through the process to get them fired we wouldn't even have the illusion of some type of security. We have tried to discipline and train them but it is useless. We have brought it to the attention of the Battalion commander, the Iraqi Wardens, and the CPA representatives.

Once again, I strongly believe the return of the Company Commander and the First Sergeant is the best thing that can happen for this company. There are all levels of leadership starting from the Tier NCOIC on up, which have witnessed the allegations and nothing was reported, I feel the command should not have to be punished for the acts carried out by certain individuals.

Finished with the interview the panel dismissed 1LT [REDACTED]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN);
 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB ABU GHRAIB	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/10	3. TIME 2140	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS 02	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372ND MP CO APO AE 09335-1322			

9. I, 1LT [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q Track your unit from mobilization to today and who was in charge at any time and what they were in charge of.

A Unit was mobilized 24 Feb 03, reported to Ft. Lee VA 27 Feb 03, arrived in theater 15 May 03, arrived at Al Hilla Iraq 6 June 03, return to Arifjan Kuwait for refit late Sep 03, advanced party arrives at FOB Abu Ghraib Iraq 1 Oct 04, main body arrives at FOB Abu Ghraib in middle Oct 03, 2nd platoon arrives at FOB Abu Ghraib 3 Feb 04.

A Regarding the company chain of command. CPT [REDACTED] was CO from prior to mobilization to late January. 1SG [REDACTED] was 1SG from 2002 to late January 2003. 1st Platoon Leader was 1LT [REDACTED] and was replaced by MSG [REDACTED] in March 03. SFC [REDACTED] serves as Platoon SGT. CPT [REDACTED] served as 2nd Platoon PL until assuming company command in early Feb 04. 3rd Platoon Leader is 1LT [REDACTED]. CPT [REDACTED] was 4th Platoon PL with SFC [REDACTED] as the platoon SGT. Upon arrival at FOB Abu Ghraib CPT [REDACTED] became the hardsite OIC with SFC [REDACTED] as NCOIC and 4th platoon working the hardsite. MSG [REDACTED] became Camp Vigilant OIC and SFC [REDACTED] became NCOIC with 1st Platoon working Camp Vigilant. 1LT [REDACTED] along with 3rd platoon assumed escort missions, FOO Paying Agent, and various projects pertaining to the company in general. These additional projects were not prison related. Upon redeployment home of MSG [REDACTED] in mid Nov 03 1LT [REDACTED] assumed the position of Camp Vigilant OIC. Upon redeployment home of CPT [REDACTED] on 20 Dec 03 1LT [REDACTED] assumed the position of Hardsite OIC. Around 20 Jan 04 1LT [REDACTED] assumes acting command of 372nd MP pending return of CPT [REDACTED] or CPT [REDACTED] or additional orders. 4 Feb 04 CPT [REDACTED] assumes acting company command of 372nd MP CO.

Q Explain the training at the mobilization site, the training you got when you took over the hard site.

A Training at the mobilization site was a standard package of ranges, CTT training and Ft Lee sponsored lectures. Individual company level training was conducted focusing on Combat Support MP Operations (convoy escort, VIP escort, route recon, vehicle recovery, defend a site, vehicle checkpoints, searches, UXOs, and MOUT) in accordance with the 19-4 Manual.

A Upon arriving at FOB Abu Ghraib the company received Battalion directed or supported training on riot control, non-lethal munitions, ROE, and Ganci Feeding. The 372nd MP also had an extensive right seat/left seat ride hand off from the 72nd MP CO (the unit operating Camp Vigilant and The Hardsite prison prior to 372nd MP).

Q What was your mission at the Hardsite? Who gave you that mission? and What did you think that encompassed?

A My mission was to oversee MP operations of the hardsite prison effective 20 Dec 03.
 A CPT Reese appointed me to that position.
 A I thought it encompassed the secure operation of the hardsite ie. accountability, security, medical, and feeding of the detainees.

Q Tell us about meetings, accountability, briefings etc. with your company and/or battalion.

A The Company CO attends the daily morning brief to the battalion in which he briefs the number of beds available as well as power and water status of the hardsite to the Battalion Commander. The Company holds a nightly meeting at 1630 for company business.
 A Battalion requires 2 prisoner counts per shift to be phoned into them. These are verified by the NCOIC with 2 counts conducted by Iraqi Correction Officers (ICOs) independently. These counts are then phoned to Battalion. Additional counts (usually 1 or 2 a day) are not uncommon because of logistical needs or special requests. In addition there are 2 counts a week by prisoner ID bracelet. These too are delivered to battalion by the NCOIC.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT FOB ABU GHRAIB DATED 2004/02/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q Tell us about shift change, workers (guards) getting in and out of the hardsite.

A Shift change is very chaotic. The ICOs operate on a rolling shift. Rarely are they able to effectively pass on information effectively because of it. They often abandon posts or miss procedures because of this. Especially newly implemented procedures. During the renovation of the hardsite the numbers of workers posed severe security risks to the hardsite. Coupled with the large numbers of ICOs this severely complicated security within the hardsite. Since the conclusion of most of the CPA renovation projects the numbers of contractors has declined. Access points too the hardsite prison have also been restricted to 4. 1 of which can only be used by MI. I cannot provide additional details as I was not present at the hardsite during most of the renovation contracts. I arrived just as most were wrapping up.

Q When you were told/ordered to take over the hardsite what additional guidance were you given?

A I was told to just keep things running smoothly. Just check up with the NCOs and assist with any special needs or situations.

Q Tell us in detail what you would get from MI when being instructed to do certain things.

A Around my arrival (I don't know exactly when) at the hardsite it became procedure for MI to drop off at tier 1A/1B signed memos prescribing any special treatment that they required inmates to receive. These memos normally contained special instructions for feeding (times and types of food) as well as sleep plans (times, duration of sleep and methods of preventing sleep). These memos were required to be signed by the MI CO at Abu Ghraib. Since January I have had discussions with MAJ Price (MI) and CW4 Revas (MI) and we have all agreed that all such memos must be very simple and clear with instructions explained at the most basic level for the MPs operating in 1A/1B. MPs at 1A/1B with questions regarding these memos or their instructions are to utilize their chain of command for clarification.

Q Tell us about any escapes/riots/shooting- what happened why, when - what corrective action was taken.

A I had no direct role in any of these actions so my data will be sketchy. I am aware of 2 maybe 3 escapes from the hardsite prison. One was an escape that involved 2 or 3 prisoners escaping through their window. I think it may have happened in the infirmary but I'm not sure. No one (including the ICOs) heard them removing the barriers on their window. They ran across the unoccupied fields using cover to make it to an unmanned guard tower where they changed clothes climbed the tower and jumped the perimeter wall. I guess this was in Oct. I was part of the search effort which was unsuccessful. The second attempt was off of a work detail. A soldier (non 372nd MP) was using a group of Iraqis for something. 2 or 3 went to the bathroom and never returned. I was again called to assist with a fruitless search. I don't recall the date of this escape. A final escape occurred where a ICO selected a certain inmate for a work task. The ICO gave the inmate cloths to change into at a portable toilet and the two left together. Neither has been seen. Again I don't recall the date. I am not aware of any corrective actions other than additional ICO placement for these incidents.

A There have been no riots in the hardsite prison. A riot implies loss of control of at least a tier. That has not happened since before Oct 03 and I'm not aware if it ever happened before that. What has happened on 2 or 3 occasions are tier disturbances. Prisoners being loud and rowdy. Throwing things, breaking things, being hostile and disruptive. This is what occurred on 8 Feb 04 in tier 5A. While it is loud, messy, and destructive the prisoners were all confined to their cells. These disturbances cause a general "lock down" of all tiers, and the calling of the IRF and or QRF and sometimes K-9. MPs don riot gear and perform cell extractions on those deemed to be instigators. Instigators are punished with solitary confinement. Tiers can be punished with loss of privileges. For the 8 Feb 04 incident CPA [REDACTED] tried to quell the disturbance using ICOs. When this failed MAJ Dinenna assumed control and used the IRF with K-9 and 372nd MP support to perform the necessary extractions.

A To date there has been only 1 shooting in the hardsite prison. The rest have been in Ganci. There have been no shots fired in Camp Vigilant since the summer of 03 by the 72nd MP CO. The hardsite prison shooting consisted of a gun battle between a MI security detainee (that received a weapon smuggled in by an ICO) and several of the hardsite MPs. This act caused ICOs to be banned from traveling near and around the 1A/1B as was their custom prior to Oct/Nov 03. Again I cannot recall the exact date. The MPs on duty (1A/1B night-shift) were alerted by one MI security detainee that another had a weapon (firearm). The MPs suited up in body armor and kevlar and armed themselves and went to the suspected person's cell. He was ordered to come to the door. He ran to the back of the cell and opened fire with a handgun. The MPs returned fire striking the subject in the legs. Upon running out of ammunition the detainee surrendered. He was secured and moved for medical treatment. CID investigated the incident, numerous ICOs were apprehended and held and the prisoner returned to 1A/1B when medically fit to do so. Again I had no direct role in this action.

Q Recommendations you would make to processes, conditions, ect that needs to be done to prevent abuse.

A Knowing what I now know about the illegal acts committed by a select few on Tier 1A/1B I recommend we continue the nightly random checks by an E-7 or higher conducted at all sites.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT FOB ABU GHRAIB DATED 2004/02/04

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

I would also recommend that all soldiers involved in detainee handling undergo additional mission specific training as well as ethical instruction. My final recommendation would be for background screening to be performed periodically on all MPs. This should include input from the soldier's civilian employer.

Q Tell us about 3 escape attempts in past week as well as the riot - tell us about all escapes ect...

A I have already discussed some of this question at length so I will focus on the occurrences of the last 5 or 6 days now. On the morning of 4 Feb 04 the ICOs alerted the NCOIC to what the NCOIC perceived to be an escape. Once a translator was found it was discovered that no one had escaped but that 7 prisoners (the residents of a cell in tier 3B) had been found by the ICOs to have broken apart a bunk and were using it to chip away at their window. Damage to cell was minimal and the prisoners were put in solitary. The next attempt was on the night of 5 Feb 04. The night time NCOIC noticed that the yard lights were off. He instructed the ICOs to turn them on. Upon doing so he saw masonry on the ground. Tier 4A was locked down and 7 individuals were found in cell with a broken water pipe (take from their room's water feed line) to have chipped away about half of their window. They had also constructed a rope ladder from shredded blankets. Again all participants were put in solitary confinement. On 7 Feb 04 the occupants of tier 5A were using the improvised recreation yard. While the MP was distracted by correcting some ICO behavior an inmate squeezed between the concertina wire and the wall of the building and took off running. The MP present gave chase. Several other MPs saw the prisoner and gave chase. He was eventually caught by a soldier passing by and 372nd MPs in foot pursuit. He was then placed in solitary confinement. During his attempt Tier 5A inmates were rushed back into their cells. During the movement they surged on the ICOs and destroyed a table some chairs and a space heater before the ICOs and MPs got them back into their cells. The disturbance at Tier 5A on 8 Feb 04 was discussed previously on page 2 of this report.

Q Tell us about uniforms, standards and ect. for guards on duty at the hard site.

A Uniforms are in accordance with AR 670-1. Cold weather gear is authorized. Body armor and Kevlar are required when in proximity of prisoners as per 800th MP Brigade orders. These standards are enforced by the Company and Battalion Chain of Command.

Q Who was who in your company and platoon?

A In the company: CPT [REDACTED] CO (suspended), 1SG [REDACTED] 1SG (suspended), MSG [REDACTED] 1st Platoon Leader/OIC Vigilant (has left), SFC [REDACTED] 1st Platoon PSG/OIC/NCOIC Camp Vigilant, CPT [REDACTED] 2nd Platoon PL/Acting Company CO, SFC [REDACTED] Acting 1SG, 1LT [REDACTED] PL 3rd Platoon OIC Hard site Prison, CPT [REDACTED] 4th Platoon PL/OIC Hard site (has left), SFC [REDACTED] 4th Platoon PSG/NCOIC Hard site (suspended), SSG [REDACTED] 4th Platoon 1st SL/Daytime NCOIC Hard site/Acting 4th Platoon PL, SSG [REDACTED] 3rd Platoon Hard site night time NCOIC, SSG [REDACTED] 4th Platoon Operations/Hard site night time NCOIC (suspended), CPL [REDACTED] (now SPC) 3rd Platoon/Tier 1A/1B (suspended), SGT [REDACTED] 4th Platoon daytime Tier 1A/1B, SPC Harmon and Ambule 4th Platoon Tier 1A/1B (suspended), SGT [REDACTED] and SSG [REDACTED] (moved to new assignment) 4th Platoon and night time hard site operations, SPC [REDACTED] (mechanic) and SPC [REDACTED] (clerk) Operations Platoon 372nd (both suspended).

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of February 2004 at Victoria, Texas

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT FOB ABU GHRAIB DATED 2004/02/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q Who was your chain of command up to your Brigade Commander?

Ans My chain of command consisted of CPT [REDACTED], CPT [REDACTED], MAJ [REDACTED], MAJ [REDACTED], LTC [REDACTED] and BG [REDACTED]

Q Tell us how you interact with the ICOs.

Ans The Hard Site MPs act as mentors to the ICOs we provide constant spot corrections, and ensure they do not abuse the prisoners. The Hard Site MPs have are in constant contact with the ICOs.

Q If you had a problem with anything who would you go to?

Ans For any hard site problems I would first consult with the NCOs of the harsite for input. Upon determining the scope and scale of the problem and estimating the requirements for a solution various other people could be contacted depending on the nature of the issue. CPT [REDACTED], CPT [REDACTED], MAJ [REDACTED], MAJ [REDACTED], and LTC [REDACTED] were routinely available. For more specialized needs there are the ICO [REDACTED], the CPA [REDACTED], CPT [REDACTED] (Post Engineer Support), MAJ [REDACTED] (S-4) and the entire staff of 320th MP BN as well as various Abu Ghraib support staff.

I have answered these questions to the best of my ability. Should any clarification be required please contact me. 1LT Raeder Lewis C. [REDACTED]

Nothing Follows

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

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