

On 10 February 2004, a team of officers, lead by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED] DCG-CFLCC, **Interviewer**
[REDACTED] Lackland AFB, TX, **Member**
[REDACTED], CFLCC – SJA, **Member**
[REDACTED], U.S. Army MP School, **Member**
[REDACTED] HHC, 229th MP Company, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED] I'm assigned as the Commander of the 229 MP Company of the 320th MP Battalion. I took command on 16 January 2003, 4 days prior to this mobilization. The 229 is from Virginia Beach, Virginia. We're with the Virginia Army National Guard. My peacetime trace, I was Commander with the 229 Chemical Company, and then was transferred to the 229 MP Company. The higher headquarters is 91st Troop Command out of Richmond Virginia. We mobilized to Camp Atterbury, Indiana, where we were placed under the Post Commander's operation, also the authority of the Mobilization Assistance Team (MAT), and the Unit Assist, to ensure that we met the requirements to deploy. Prior to deployment, we were organized as a Combat Support Company, with 186 personnel. A day or two prior to mobilization, I found out from my Brigade Commander and the XO that we were going to be mobilized as an I/R Guard company. After my company completed the basic requirements needed, such as weapons qualification and CTT, we trained to be an I/R Guard. I had previously been an enlisted MP soldier with 157 MP Company out of West Virginia. I was a squad leader, and we were in charge of EPW and I/R operations. I took these experiences and used them to train my soldiers on what to expect and how to interact in theater. I briefed on these topics as time allowed in home station. I focused the training on guard of EPW and CIs. I am not particularly familiar with AR 190-8. I was more concerned with the external guard of the facility. I did not concentrate on the caring of inmates because that was not in my companies' scope of operation. Based on my prior experience the Battalion is responsible for the intake of the inmates. We spent 2 weeks training at home station, then we arrived at Camp Atterbury, Indiana.

I was using the MTP as a basis for the training that my soldiers were undergoing. I pretty much had to take it from ground zero, because my soldiers had not been exposed to EPW

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Operations, prior to this. I indoctrinated them on the basis of the operation, what their job was, and some general ROE and ROI that I had devised from my past experience. I informed them they would be doing the mounted roving, dismounted roving, guard towers, and Internal Reaction Force. I taught everyone from scratch to ensure that all of my leadership could create OPORDERS and organize their platoons within the confines of the mission.

I let everyone know that, although we were there to provide security, everyone needed to show restraint, when interacting with the prisoners. I instructed my leaders to ensure that all soldiers understood the big picture including the Geneva Convention and humane treatment of the detainees.

I had not trained with this company before mobilization, and did not know them very well. I had met them the month prior, at Fort Picket while they were doing their SRP. I did this as a professional courtesy; their commander hadn't stepped out of the picture yet. When I took command everyone knew I was in charge, and we moved forward. Before we arrived in theater on 14 April, there were about five different Battalions that I thought I was going to be assigned to.

I found out that I would be assigned to 304th MP Battalion, an I/R Battalion. By this time the need for I/R companies had evidently dissipated because we sat at Arifjan for a few weeks. At this time, the Customs mission became a hot priority. So, I was directed to have all of my soldiers certified as Customs Borders Clearing Agents to do customs in the Theater of Operations for redeployment. We did this from May 1 through August 15th. August 18th we re-deployed to Abu Ghraib Prison. From May through August we were detached from the 304th, and attached to the 220th MP Brigade. After that, we were then assigned to the 317th MP Battalion, and relinquished from the 304th MP Battalion. I soon realized that to maintain a state of normalcy I had to adapt and overcome.

On 10 August it was determined that we would move to our current unit of assignment. The FRAGO was signed on 17 August. I was assigned to the 320th MP Battalion under the 800th MP Brigade. There were no specific instructions for my company in this FRAGO. It was assumed that we would be an external guard company. When I found out that this was going to be our final realignment, I attained contact information for the 320th MP Battalion, and started making phone calls to the S3 section. August 19th I met with the Battalion Commander, LTC [REDACTED]. We received a tasking from the Battalion, to provide personnel for external security for the two compounds at Camp Ganci (it now has eight). We were tasked with providing personnel to operate external security, the Internal Reaction Force (IRF), and prisoner escorts for all of these compounds. When I say external security, I do not mean for the base camp but for the camp itself. I had a dismounted roving guard to secure inside the camp during high traffic hours such as chow. We were not responsible for accounting for the detainees. 1LT [REDACTED] was in charge of the IRF. We got the mission around the 23rd of August.

I was aware that the 447th MP Company, 72nd MP Company, a quartermaster element, and some military intelligence soldiers were in the Abu Ghraib facility. The prisoner transport guards were involved with the MI soldiers, because occasionally they would go to the MI compound.

I am aware of four to six detainee escapes. I am aware of three incidents of detainee abuse inside of the entire complex. My company was not involved in any of the abuse. They did witness some of it though. One of these was inside Ganci, one was in the hard site, and the third one was in a common area. My IRF does not go into these areas on a regular basis, only to quell situations.

My soldier did report the incident in the common area in August. I did not witness this personally but was told by my soldiers. The Abu Ghraib complex often came under mortar fire. After one of the mortar attacks, a man and a woman were brought in, in connection with this attack. The soldiers handling the male detainee were yelling at him in an excessively loud voice. There were reports of physical contact between the U.S. soldier and the male detainee. I believe MI soldiers perished that night from the mortar attack, and a few were severely injured. Whether he was the most senior officer, I don't know, but the 320th Battalion S3, MAJ [REDACTED] was there. 1LT [REDACTED] and SFC [REDACTED] informed me about this. I had them write their statements, and I turned them in to LTC [REDACTED]. He said he would involve CID, because this was something he would not tolerate. As far as the final outcome, I don't believe he ever informed me of one. I believe my soldiers reported events honestly, and accurately, and without the intent to harm anybody else.

My soldiers didn't respond to the situation, when one of the IPs delivered a weapon to the hard site. They assisted searching the people within that wing. I do not recall them reporting any instances of detainee abuse from that specific event to me.

The ROI and ROE were posted in each of the towers, so the soldiers could be familiar with them. I did not have a Company SOP. We revisited the principles learned from the training we conducted, once we arrived at Abu Ghraib, to make sure the soldiers understood them. I did not receive written guidance from the Battalion. I did not attempt to link up with them. I should have. There's no defense for that. I feel my soldiers have conducted themselves with restraint and respect.

One morning we went to the Staff Meeting, and LTC [REDACTED] wasn't there. I believe MAJ [REDACTED] talked to us about it, after a Staff Call. I believe that he said the 800th directed the suspension of the Company Commander of the soldiers involved, and the Battalion Commander, to preserve the impartiality of the 15-6 investigation. There were two policies passed down from LG Sanchez. I passed them down to the platoon leaders, and they read them. I believe they did a sign-in roster. I didn't understand that I was to read it myself.

I have three platoons organic to me. I deployed with one hundred fifteen. I have sixty-four left, assigned. Three of those are not in Theater, and two more are going to be

REFRADs. I've had people hit their 24-month mark. I had a huge group of those leave in December, and there have been few personal situations, which have warranted REFRAADs of individuals. I learned that there was no alternative, or method of getting troops in, to supplement the companies facing depleted strength levels. We have had a decrease in our mission requirements, due to the limited personnel that we have.

I would say LTC [REDACTED] has a very open style. Whenever I've had problems, I would try to resolve them with the various section OICs, or whoever was the immediate source of the problem. Sometimes things did not reach the resolution that one would think logical. It just comes down to the fact that whenever people speak, you have to execute. You're allowed to voice your disagreement, but things just...

All along, at Abu Ghraib Prison, and throughout the entire operation, I realized that as a Company Commander, the only person I could rely on is myself, and my staff members. If it had not been for my junior officers, and NCOs, my soldiers would not have had basic soldier care things.

LTC [REDACTED] has surprised me. Whenever I heard we were getting an active duty Battalion Commander, I was like, "This is going to be interesting," but he has been a very reserved, and professional commander. He is firm. He allows you to voice your concerns, and he takes your advice into consideration. I have enjoyed working with him these past few weeks.

Typically, in my experience, people in our organization, i.e., the Reserve Components are more practical in nature. We are not just focused upon the Engineering aspect, or the Military Police things, or the Transportation Corps things. One of the benefits that our organization shares, and relishes is the variety of backgrounds and experiences that our soldiers have. People in an active duty unit may not share such a diverse view within their soldiers. I would say there was concern that an Active Duty unit might misunderstand us.

It was my understanding that LTC [REDACTED] would take action, by informing CID, of the incident reported to me by 1LT [REDACTED]. I would reiterate to my soldiers that the Battalion Commander said it was taken care of. I felt that they were satisfied with my response. I don't think they voiced anything other than that, and I had no reason not to trust my Commander.

I can't understand why we're there, as opposed to a more safe location. From what I've always seen of those types of operations, the entire base camp always seems to be in the middle of nowhere. I don't think anybody expected the post-war climate we have right now, but now that we have it, we need to be flexible, and adapt to the situation.

Force protection needs to be given ten times more support. I feel, and my soldiers feel that we're just sitting out there, waiting to die. That may be a harsh way to say it, but whenever you have mortars coming in, at such frequency, and such close proximity, I feel, as a Commander, I'm charged with bringing my soldiers home, but how do I control that? It's frustrating. It's frightening.

I just try to keep my men focused on the mission, and make sure that they're safe, and careful in the actions that they execute, that they don't do anything stupid, i.e., beat up prisoners, or steal other people's shit, or do any of the other things Joes do now and then.

As far as improvements, there should have been SOPs from Battalion, and when the companies didn't get them, they should have asked for them.

The prisoners' living conditions are abysmal. I don't know how they're not rioting everyday. There was a major riot, toward the end of November. I point to that, specifically, in how the Battalion's soldiers showed great restraint, in trying to resolve a situation with less-than-lethal force. It would have been very easy to crack open a 249 that day, and lay a hundred rounds down range, but the soldiers realized the situation they were in, and they wanted to be sure they were operating within the confines of the chain of command's guidance, and also maintain security. That day, everybody who works at Abu Ghraib Prison saw how their action or inaction would effect their colleagues life. That was very much impressed upon them. But again, that comes back to having the prisoners walking around in knee-deep mud, defecating, and urinating all over the compounds. Undoubtedly those human excrements are going to become airborne. Our soldiers are going to be breathing them. I'm going to be breathing them. The chow the detainees receive has always been inadequate. I haven't seen any of it, recently, but the quantity and the calorie content of that stuff is not sufficient.

One other thing, the fact that my soldiers did not know when they're going home has caused me great pain. Our experiences have caused us to lose a tremendous amount of faith, in the Army. Besides not knowing the going home date, it was the soldier care items that my soldiers needed, the fact that we didn't have heat 'til the latter part of December. It was a culmination of things together. As leaders, it's our job to give leadership to our soldiers, but eventually, after a while of telling them things in expectation of so on, and so forth, they lose faith in us. It's a challenging situation. I just often told them I understood their situation. I would thank them, frequently. I would go out 2 o'clock in the morning, 8 o'clock at night, and sit in the tower with them, share their misery. If I had something good in my care package, like a cigar, or some nice coffee, I would take that out to them, and just let them know, again, that I thank them for their service, and their professionalism, because out of 15 years in the Army National Guard, I firmly believe this is the best company I've ever been with, and that's not simply because I'm their Company Commander, either.

The interview complete, MG Taguba advises CPT ██████ to not discuss, or reveal the contents of the interview, and he is released, subject to recall.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSDPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Gharaiib Prison, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/12	3. TIME 1100H	4. GRADE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	HEAD STATUS CPT US	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 229 MP CO			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT (IN REGARDS TO):

Events and locations from 10 FEB03 until today.

- 10-26 FEB 03-Home Station-prepped for move to MS and trained on individual CTT and NBC tasks
26FEB-13 APR 03-Camp Atterbury, IN-completed individual and unit tasks for mobilization validation. After validation was accomplished, the unit focused on guard company training.
14APR-01MAY 03-Camp Arifjan, Kuwait-assigned to 304 MP BN, 800 MP BDE. Reassigned to customs clearing by redeploying units. Assigned to the 220 MP BDE.
01MAY-15 AUG 03-Camp Doha, Kuwait-performed the customs clearing mission here and at other sites as directed. Was assigned to the 317 MP BN.
15AUG 03-present-Abu Gharaiib, Prison, Iraq-assigned to 320 MP BN and 800 MP BDE. Assigned to perform external security on Camp Ganci; provided prisoner escorts with the complex; provided a 10 soldier IRI to respond to emergencies within the complex.
- Training at Abu Gharaiib-the soldiers completed training on less-than-lethal weapons (shotgun and clay more). Also reviewed the ROI/ROE.
- Abuse cases
 - Case 1-In SEP/OCT 03, Abu Gharaiib received some incoming mortars. This particular night, two MI soldiers perished and a few others were seriously injured. Elements of the battalion were dispatched outside of the perimeter to apprehend some suspects. One of these suspects was a male and the other was a female. According to my soldiers, other US personnel were on site and directing the detainees. The US personnel were yelling very loud at the male detainee and pushing him and shoving him. Additionally, the US personnel were observed to have struck the male detainee for no reason. The male detainee did not attempt to escape or inflict injury upon any of the US personnel, yet, they levied blows to various parts of his body.
 - Case 2-In compound 5 of Camp Ganci, one of the tower guards was shooting the prisoners with lead balls and a slingshot. I don't know what company the soldier was from, but it was not my company nor the 320 MP BN. NTC leader of the 320 MP BN told me about it. No punishment was levied against the soldier because the BN Staff said that a prisoner's complaint was not a firm basis for punishing a soldier even though we had the steel balls.
 - Case 3-The 372 MP CO operates the hard site at BCF. Some soldiers of this company were alleged to have forced prisoners to abuse other prisoners. I believe the alleged events included sodomy. The accused soldiers were to have recorded these acts on film. This information is second-hand. I did not witness any events.
- The command climate of the 320 MP BN is no different from any other unit that I have been with. The commander is easily accessible as are all of his section OICs and NCOICs. If I have issues with any directives, I address them with the respective section OIC. In the end, they are my higher HQ and I do what they tell me.
- Players at Abu Gharaiib:
 FOB CDR: COL [REDACTED] 320 MP BN CDR: LTC [REDACTED] 320 BN S3: MAJ [REDACTED]
 320 BN CSM: SGM [REDACTED] 320 BN OPNS SGM: SGM [REDACTED] 320 BN Assn S3: CPT [REDACTED]
 Compound NCOIC: MSG [REDACTED] 165 MI BN CDR: LTC [REDACTED] 372 MP CO CDR: CPT [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF	PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF _____

TAKEN AT

Abu Gharaib, Iraq

DATE

2004 02 12

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

6. Shootings/riots at Abu Gharaib

Shootings: There was one occurrence of a prisoner obtaining a handgun from an Iraqi Corrections Officer. Another detainee informed the US forces of this weapon. A soldier of the 327 MP CO donned his IBA and entered the cell where the prisoner was located. The prisoner shot the US guard and the guard returned fire.

Riots: There have been several small uprisings within the three sites, too numerous to mention in detail. The general resolution was to deploy the IRF and search the living areas of the detainees. No major violence resulted from these incidents. In late Nov 03, there was a major riot in Camp Ganci. The prisoners threw rocks at our guard towers. All personnel of the battalion were deployed to the site in order to increase security. The guards exercised great restraint with their actions. In the end, it was necessary to implement lethal force in order to regain control of the complex.

7. Attached are the memos from LTG Sanchez.

8. I would say the command climate of my unit is average. I have tried to be open and honest with my soldiers about all matters pertaining to the unit. I encourage feedback from my subordinate soldiers and implement positive suggestions they raise and address issues of concern. As with any commander, I bear the brunt of policies and decisions made by my superiors and sometimes my subordinate soldiers fail to see this. I attempt to communicate with soldiers of all ranks within my company and visit them regularly at their duty posts.

9. Changes I would implement:

- a. Develop a more proactive force protection plan
- b. Inform the soldiers of when they are going home
- c. Bring in soldier care resources such as chow hall, laundry, PX, etc., for the soldiers sooner
- d. Search for SOP's for duty positions
- e. Improve the prisoner living areas and prisoner food
- f. Increase US strength at Abu Gharaib
- g. Modernize the gear that my unit has
- h. Fire back at the locals who fire mortars and rockets at us!
- i. Hasten the prisoner release process
- j. Keep the TOTAL deployment for reserve component units to one year

10. The 205th MI BDE was the FOB commander of Abu Gharaib prison complex. My company performed the same before and after their arrival.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

B STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of FEB 2004 at Abu Gharaib, Iraq
[REDACTED] Signature of Person Administering Oath
1LT [REDACTED] Typed Name of Person Administering Oath
Judge Advocate Authority To Administer Oaths

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS