

On 15 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED] CFLCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, Member
CPT [REDACTED], 265th Engineer Group – SJA, Member
CPT [REDACTED] 800th MP Brigade, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [REDACTED]. My social security number is [REDACTED]. I am a Captain, U.S. Army Reserve. I'm assigned as the assistant S-2 for the 800th Military Police Brigade.

I was assigned to the 800th Military Police Brigade as a lateral transfer in January 2003. I transferred from the 306th MP Battalion, where I was the S-4 for 1 year. Prior to that I was a Platoon leader for the 340th Military Police Company in Kosovo.

I started out as assistant S-2 focusing on counterintelligence. We worked on preventing information to be shared among the prisoners. We tracked the internal threat and I assist the S-2 in reestablishing the external threats. From July on we learned all of the inner workings of the S-2 shop and was able to free up [REDACTED] so that he could perform other duties. At the time I assumed the duties of the S-2, but hadn't been formally assigned. I didn't actually figure out it was my title for a couple of months. I'm relatively a junior captain so I took as a compliment that I was trusted to assume the S-2 position.

I am a MP by MOS, although in the Army Reserve I have had to branch transfer twice in order to be stabilized, upon the completion advance course I will be branch qualified. I have learned the S-2 job by OJT and doing left seat right seat training with the previous counterintelligence officer.

The threat we track is a potential for a riot, escape, criminal acts, and potential troublemakers. We are providing the information for the commander on our side to make

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the decision. Our policy was to share all information with any MI that was on the ground.

In July we jumped TOC from Camp Arifjan to Baghdad. [REDACTED] was the S-2 in Camp Arifjan, as an assistant S-2 I went forward to Camp Bucca. I am not sure if the logistical stag left behind at Arifjan when we jumped TOC. The operations cell consisted of the S-1 shop, because they managed the leave. Even though we were in the heart of V Corps territory we were still logistically supported by the 377th so when we through leave we wouldn't have to go all the way back to Arifjan. We had to leave [REDACTED] behind; she stayed back in the rear. She was the commander of the 724th while I was at Bucca.

I never saw any 15-6's or derogatory information on personnel in the unit. I never submitted any DEROG's. I haven't seen any cases that warrant DEROG's. I believe the soldier involved in detainee abuse at Camp Bucca, belonged to the 320th MP Battalion. I don't know if the soldiers. I assume DEROG's are handled at the battalion level. There are S-2's at the Battalion level. I have heard of DEROG's they are derogatory statements towards an individual's security clearance. If that is my duty I have failed to perform my duty.

The philosophy of [REDACTED], the deputy commander, was that he wanted to know the threat status every town we were potentially going to open up a prison in. He also stated that he wanted the SIPRNET used to the maximum, and to maintain open contact with our down trace units S-2's because most didn't have SIPR capabilities.

From July until November I made it a point to visit each facility. While I was visiting I made sure my counterintelligence agents assigned to my section go one way while I went the other so every was seen rather quickly to do a threat vulnerability analysis on each facility. Some of the structures we inherited were quite derelict and not up to force protection standards so we concentrated a lot on identifying the force protection vulnerability.

I believe when the Deputy Commander went back to the states BG Karpinski started to participate in the daily staff meetings. That is when I would inform her on the status of the prisons. Occasionally she would ask for a sidebar, a few times I would have a list to submit to her.

I had a relatively positive relationship BG Karpinski I had been BG Hill's aid beforehand and I wanted to make sure that I didn't assume a degree of informality that I had with him. So at first I kept things very formal and distant so that is the reason I brought most of my issues to the Deputy Commander. I could approach the general in an informal matter, especially when it was mission related.

In regards to the incident at Camp Bucca it is unacceptable. It happened once and by the MP standard, and once is too much. I am proud of the fact that other MP's reported the incidents. I didn't here of what happened in November until January, by the end of December I was assigned to Camp Ashcraft with the MEK capitulation mission. I didn't

here about the incidents until I made it back to Camp Arifjan and I was told I was on a list. I wasn't read in on the picture taking incident, because I was at the MEK. BG Karpinski was at MEK for a little while also, but she had to go back. The MEK was a place where we negotiated with high-ranking Iraqi Soldiers to capitulate. From my understanding there was a FRAGO for BG Karpinski to be there at the MEK, but she was only there for about 3 to 4 days.

By August we realized that CPA was not able to fulfill their obligation to build the prison, so the focus was to build something bigger at Abu Graib which later became known as Camp Ganci. We need Camp Ganci in order to be able to hold the vast amount of prisoners we were getting because the building of hard stands were getting slower. At that time we had prison operations being done at Mosul, and several other locations.

Our OPLAN was based on EPW operations and that something we had prepared for a very long time.

I know BG Karpinski made it a point to visit all of the facilities including the smaller ones on several occasions. When I came off of leave the 205th MI Brigade was named the land-owners of Abu Graib prison. In July and August we weren't getting any support for force protection, and we had started accumulating numerous mortar attacks, one of which we sustained fatalities in the prison population, it was until a month and a half later when some MI soldiers were killed by a motor attack that we received force protection.

The MEK was never a TOC for the 800th MP Brigade. The FRAGO said for her to be there not to move the operations there. She was needed there for the delicate operations going on at the time.

I had about 8 drill weekends back home as an S-4, I did receive an OER for my time at that position. My civilian occupation is a Network Administrator for computers. I was a Signal Corps officer and went into the IRR in 1996 because of the closing of 5 or 6 units simultaneously. In 1988 I came out of the IRR into the 800th MP Brigade and became a lieutenant in the S-3 shop. I was assigned as the EPW plans officer. As an EPW plans officer I fell in love with the MP mission, and that is why I did not cease being a reservist after my 8-year obligation. When I was being branch transferred I became BG Hill's aid. When the Kosovo mission came up I saw the opportunity to become a platoon leader. I had been a platoon leader a couple of times before, but I volunteered for Kosovo to be an MP platoon leader.

I have used our SOP to refer to as a guideline; I couldn't quote you the regulation right now that covers our operation here.

The greatest threat to the Brigade is during the escort missions there would be IED's and small arms fire on the road. As far as the facilities, the facility that received the greatest threat was Abu Graib, due to the amount of mortar attacks it received.

There was usually 1 or 2 CIA agents on the MTOE, although over the course of the year battalions' loss their agents and MP's were loss also because there was no replacement system in place. The CIA agents are usually were usually specialist and sergeants; they are not granted badges with the credentials. They are actually working for the MP unit's and not MI, so they were not involved with interrogations. Their job was to sensitize the MP's on what to look for. Those who had the language skill would talk to Iraqi's who could possibly offer information to us.

The Brigade's main effort was detainee operations. When we first arrived our mission was find out what CPA wanted and what CPA was able to do. We had Camp Cropper at BIAP, which was constantly at over capacity. [REDACTED] was constantly stating he couldn't run Camp Cropper at over capacity; he finally received relief when Camp Ganci was stood up.

My first experience with BG Karpinski was as part of the staff on the MDMP. We made plans on how we would expand facilities in order to accommodate all the detainees. I identified how hostile things were at Abu Graib, so to expand there was solely based on us establishing force protection. Our MTOE was designed to exist in a rear environment; we didn't even have crew served weapons. So establishing our own Force Protection deterred or ability to take in prisoners. We had to improvise by having units do missions they were not trained for. Everyone assumed since we were MP's we had turrets and up-armored vehicles, so we would always tasked to conduct escort mission, but we were not properly equipped. I constantly identified these issues as vulnerabilities, but still had to perform the missions.

I never saw a priority of one Battalion over the other because all the mission we extreme, what I can say is that Camp Bucca, the 724th Military Police Battalion, was eventually self running. Camp Bucca didn't need very much intervention on our part, so I would say the main effort was BCCF, Baghdad, and then Camp Ashcraft.

I was located at Victory Base. I traveled to BCCF on 5 occasions. I stayed there once for 3 days straight. I went there to check up on the reporting procedures and found out that the intelligence analysis was too busy tracking mortar launches and impacts to send the internal reports to higher. In October we started receive support for Force Protection. I submitted RFI's to C-2 for imagery and we were not priority. We were in between 2 Q36 zones and they could track what left us, but not what came in.

I asked BG Karpinski for replacements, but that was a request that could not be filled. During a period I would take the day shift will my NCO took the night shift. BG Karpinski supported me when the S-3 wanted us to track patterns; she said that we would not be responsible for that.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT <small>For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS</small>			
LOCATION Camp Doha, Kuwait	DATE 20040215	TIME 1300	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [REDACTED]	GRADE/STATUS O-3	
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIADE (I/R), Camp Arifjan, Kuwait APO AE 09366			
<p>I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNOER OATH:</p> <p>As a non-MOSQ Captain executing the duties of a Brigade S-2 Major's position, I did the best I could to learn the job to the utmost of my abilities. During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, I concentrated on tracking/reporting the threat to detainee operations, both from external hostile forces and internal populations. I received verbal counselings, guidance, advice and eventually praise from most senior officers in the 800th MP BDE headquarters.</p> <p>Q: How many soldiers in the 800th MP BDE (I/R) had DE-ROG reports submitted during Operation Iraqi Freedom? A: I do not know. From 16 July 2003 until 31 January 2004, the 800th MP Brigade S-2 Section submitted no report of derogatory information on any soldier directly. As Brigade S-2, I did not emphasize nor track DE-ROGs. I did not understand that such tracking was part of my duties. Subordinate Battalions' own Security Managers may or may not have done so. As partial reparation, I will immediately obtain from Brigade SJA the list of all accounts of negative investigative findings (Article 32s, Article 15, etc...) and submit the list to the Brigade Security Manager.</p> <p>Q: When did Brigadier General Karpinski relocate to Camp Ashraf and by what order? A: BG Karpinski came to Camp Ashraf on 10 January 2004, and stayed for two to three days a week from then until transfer of authority. To the best of my knowlege, it was directly ordered in a FRAGO from CJTF-7 that she do so. While BG Karpinski was at Camp Ashraf, the 800th MP BDE TOC continued to operate at Victory Base in Baghdad. The 530th MP BN provided dedicated phone and computer assets for BG Karpinski to maintain communication with the Brigade TOC. At this time, I do not recall the FRAGO number. (I will look it up and try to submit a hard copy.)</p>			
EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]		PAGE 1 OF <u>1</u> PAGES
<small>ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.</small>			

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72

SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

USAPPC V2.00

STATEMENT (Continued)

Noted 5/6

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15 day of February, 2004 at Camp Doha Kuwait

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath,

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Judge Advocate
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, [REDACTED], DCG-CFLCC, **Interviewer**
[REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**
[REDACTED], JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**
[REDACTED], 95th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**
[REDACTED], 520th Military Police Battalion, **Interviewee**
[REDACTED], 27D30, CFLCC – SJA, **Recorder**

The interview is summarized as follows:

This matter of proceeding is a formality because [REDACTED] invoked his rights, and is seeking legal counsel.

The panel briefed [REDACTED] on the scope of the investigation. [REDACTED] wished not to speak on any matters regarding this investigation. [REDACTED] was dismissed by the panel.

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 180-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <u>Victory Camp</u>	2. DATE <u>9 Feb 2004</u>	3. TIME <u>1318</u>	4. FILE NO.
5. NAME (Last, First, MI) [REDACTED]	8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS <u>320th MP BN</u> <u>APO AE 09355</u>		
6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS <u>C5 / Reserve on Active Duty</u>		

PART I - RIGHTS WAIVER/NON-WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he/she is with the United States Army C FULL CMD GROUP and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected/accused: Dereliction of Duty

Before he/she asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he/she made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

- I do not have to answer any question or say anything.
- Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
- (For personnel subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or both.

- or -

(For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.

- If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver below.

5. COMMENTS (Continue on reverse side)

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me.

WITNESSES (If available)		3. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
1a. NAME (Type or Print)		
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE		4. SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
2a. NAME (Type or Print)		5. TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR
b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE		6. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR

Section C. Non-waiver

- I ☒ do not want to give up my rights
☒ I want a lawyer
☐ I do not want to be questioned or say anything

2. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
[REDACTED]

ATTACH THIS WAIVER TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT (DA FORM 2823) SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

DA FORM 3681, NOV 89

EDITION OF NOV 84 IS OBSOLETE

USARPC V1.00