

On 14 February 2004, a panel of officers, at the direction of Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel was to assess the command climate and the command and supervisory presence of the 800th Military Police Brigade chain of command.

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
MAJ [REDACTED], 265th Engineer Group, Interviewer
LTC [REDACTED], 165th MI Battalion, Respondent

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is LTC [REDACTED]. My current assignment is Commander, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion. My Battalion is currently located at Camp Doha, conducting re-deployment tasks in route to garrison, which is Darmstadt, Germany.

We were at Abu Gharib. I was responsible for augmenting the force protection, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance outside of the camp, and assisting COL Pappas with base operations. At the same time, we had a regular HUMINT mission, which was additional long-range surveillance, as well as tactical HUMINT teams, which were being deployed throughout Iraq, and we had the HUMINT Operations Cell, which did all the reporting for the general support task for HUMINT teams, none of which had anything to do with detention.

COL Pappas, at sometime in November, became the FOB Commander. At that point, we were still up at Bilad, and he called me and said, "I need some help with this, come on down," so I brought the Battalion down there on beginning the 28th of November.

COL [REDACTED] asks if LTC [REDACTED] is familiar with FRAGO 1108 published on the 19th of November, and LTC [REDACTED] responds, "I am not familiar with that FRAGO, Sir." COL [REDACTED] then reads PARA 3.C.8.A of FRAGO 1108:

"205 MI BRIGADE. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, COMMANDER 205TH MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CENTRAL CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF), AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHARAYB BCCF ARE TACON

ANNEX 50

TO THE 205 MI BRIGADE FOR SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."

COL [REDACTED] then continues the interview, and LTC [REDACTED] responds, as follows:

Reading that, as it related to the 165th, at the time, it had no impact. That's why I wasn't familiar with it. I was at Bilad, and although I heard discussions on the phone that COL Pappas was going to become the FOB Commander it didn't affect us. He commands the 205th MI Brigade. 205th is V Corps' MI Brigade, and 165th is subordinate to 205th, so anything that affects COL Pappas is eventually going to affect us, but that, in and of itself, did not require the Battalion to move down there. He has other battalions. I don't have any interrogators. I don't have anything involved with interrogating detainees. So that's why, when that came out, it really didn't strike an interest, because I don't have any involvement with interrogations. When he called me and said, I need your help with force protection, and infrastructure improvement. I did the Army math, O6 - O5, and off we went.

The FOB Commanders in charge, and everybody had to follow. The 320th MP Battalion is headquartered, there. LTC [REDACTED] was the Battalion Commander. I went down, and did my initial introductions, when I got there. I put out to the battalion, that we're going to use the Good Neighbor Policy. We don't want to go down there and make a bunch of changes, and have a lot of friction that would prevent infrastructure improvement. We need to work together. So, I went down there, and introduced myself to Jerry, and his first question was, "How many towers can you man on the perimeter?" and I said, "Well, I can man 3 of them right now. I'll take the northern half of the perimeter wall." The northern wall was down. You could actually walk out through there. There were some significant security issues. So, I took the northern part of the prison, and manned those towers immediately. I put dismounted patrols out there to make sure nothing comes through, during hours of limited visibility, and I put LRS teams out, along with A 1/504th, who was also working out there, as far as external security. Then, in a step beyond that, we built a Base Mayor's Cell. When you're an enduring base, there are certain things you have to do, that CFLCC puts out. None of that was happening. So, I said, "Jerry, I'ma start running with this, because COL Pappas is the FOB Commander, and he needs to have this done." I manned the towers, put out the R&S, built the mayor's cell, and I had 4 soldiers augment the Entry Control Point. Because the Entry Control Point is the most vulnerable point. It requires a great deal of resources to maintain the appropriate force protection posture, yet allow the visitation to go on.

To be perfectly candid, Sir, the 800th MP Brigade were out of site out of mind, except when an issue came up, and BG Karpinski would call COL Pappas. And they would be minor issues. Let me give you an example: We get there, and I brought 150 soldiers, and there was no place to live. I had the LRS guys in the shadows of one of the LSAs, with the 320th, and the guys were stacked, literally, cot-to-cot. There was an MWR Room, but nothing had been done to improve it, to make it an MWR Room. They had the frame of a pool table, but it wasn't put together or used, and there was a table with some

magazines on it. It was a big room, and my Company Commander said we need this room for the LRS guys, and they were like, no. LTC [REDACTED] said he'd look into it. Well, the next thing that happens is BG Karpinski calls COL Pappas, and asks, "Why are your guys taking the MWR Room away?" COL Pappas calls me, so I took him over there, and I showed him the MWR Room, which was a big concrete, unimproved structure, with the remnants of a pool table, and a wooden table with some magazines on it, and nothing else. I said, "This is the MWR Room that they're refusing to give up, meanwhile, I've got the LRS guys stacked on top of each other in the next room." He said, "I understand. I see the picture, but I don't know why a General Officer's getting involved with this." I didn't either. This was something that should have been handled by the First Sergeants or Platoon Sergeants.

I don't know this for a fact, but what I do know is the biggest roadblock to any type of relationship was LTC [REDACTED]'s XO. His XO had a direct line to BG Karpinski. That's what tied his hands from my observations. Whatever he did, if his XO didn't like it, his XO would call BG Karpinski, and she would come down. MAJ [REDACTED] was his XO. The junior level MPs understood more people coming in meant they didn't have to man the towers. The happy to see us, but MAJ [REDACTED], for some reason, he didn't like us. He was out there pointing his finger at my S4's chest saying, "You guys aren't moving in here." So, it went from my S4, to the Company Commander trying to talk to him. Then, my XO went down there. They said, "Hey, this guys getting animate over this room," so I went down there to look at it. It wasn't much to look at, but it would've been a good place to put my soldiers. We eventually took it.

I would say LTC [REDACTED] wasn't an effective commander. He's a little overweight. He had a speech impediment. He didn't communicate well, when he stood in front of soldiers, and there were a lot of things that weren't happening. There was discipline. There were no uniform standards. There was no saluting. I brought it up to COL Pappas. I said, "Sir, I recommend we institute saluting, right now. We got 6,000 detainees. here. A lot of these detainees are former military. We know for a fact that these guys are passing notes to their loved ones, during visitation. Former military recognize a well-trained, highly disciplined unit. Soldiers saluting are an indicator of a well-trained highly disciplined unit. We want that message to get out." That took a lot to get the MPs to do that. We put the base defense plan in a very simple chart on one sheet of paper, and passed it out to the Platoon Sergeants, so the information could get down to the soldier level.

Another indicator was graffiti in all the latrines. It was rampant. So, I had my Sergeant Major go through with black spray paint, and spray it all out. I told them, hey, if you keep this up, we'd have latrine guards and inspect, until this goes away. It is getting better, but there were some challenges, initially.

There were some things they were resistant to, until the end, even when we left. Like I brought up civilian clothes. I told COL Pappas. I told LTC [REDACTED] I told LTC [REDACTED] – that's another guy that was involved in all of this. He was in charge of the

JDIC, before COL Pappas went down there. And that's why COL Pappas went down there. There were a lot of problems in the JDIC, as far as not producing Intel.

But, civilian clothes were an issue. There were civilian clothes all over the place. I said we can't have this. This place comes under attack all the time. Somebody running across the compound with an M16 in his hand, when we have 6,000 detainees, that person may to be mistaken for an escaping prisoner, and he's liable to get shot. Therefore, I recommend we do not wear civilian clothes. It's too easy to stay in uniform. My guys stayed in uniform the whole time, but some of the MPs and interrogators were resistant to change.

LTC [REDACTED] was receptive. He'd say that does make sense, but push back would come from lower levels, and it would get around to BG Karpinski. So, BG Karpinski called COL Pappas.

There were a lot of positive things happening there. Some of the things I didn't weigh in on, like the base security net, because they were working good. If you go through my battalion, I'm sure there are things we could improve. But, it wasn't as effective as I've seen other units, Sir.

One time BG Karpinski came by on Christmas day, and we were getting ready to do a force capability demonstration. I was standing out there, and she came by and said hello. If I were the Brigade Commander, I would spend more time there. I just don't know what all her other requirements were.

I know COL Pappas had 7 battalions. He spent very little time with me, when I was up at Bilad, but I saw him everyday, when I moved to Abu Gharib.

I can't remember date, but the resident CID agent there stopped me, and he said, "I've got this CD, and it's got some pictures, that are fairly explicit. It looks like detainee abuse." I told him to go see COL Pappas, immediately. Tell COL Pappas what you have and give him your recommendation, as a CID agent, on the best way to proceed with this. I saw him later, and I asked if he saw COL Pappas, and he said he got it.

We get the annual training on Geneva Hague just like everybody else. We didn't do anything any additional to that, simply because we weren't going to have any interface with them.

LTC [REDACTED] is a good guy - nothing but good stuff coming from him. He'll do well there. Anything he touches will get better.

I went to the hard site in November, when COL Pappas had all of the Battalion Commanders come together for an OPD, and we did a walk through. That was the only time I was at the hard site. I didn't find anything remarkable.

One thing I did find weird was you have that big old CPA, and you have Iraqis in there guarding other Iraqis. I think that's going to be a problem in the future, especially, when they're talking about giving more of the LSA away. With the infrastructure centralized, Iraqis are going to have to leave their compound, and come across the Coalition area, to the power generation plant or to the water filtration plant, to see about that. All that's going to have to be controlled. It's going to take a company of guys just to watch all the Iraqis that are supposed to be there, not to mention the ones that are trying to come in the front gate. So, I think that's weird. I think that needs some more scrutiny.

And the other thing is we get mortared constantly, and the reason we can't fire back is because of where it's located. Abu Gharib is in an urban area. What you do, in my recommendation, is you pick up the Coalition's detainee operation, and you move it out in the desert. Then, you have mortar distance. That way the Iraqis can have the whole place, and you don't have any of these problems. The areas covered, but we still do not get counter-fire. The 504th goes out, the MP QRFs go out, I've sent LRS QRF out, but by the time we get there, they're gone.

Wrapping up their discussion, the panel gave LTC [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Camp Doha, Kuwait	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/02/15	3. TIME 0900	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS 05/Active Army	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), Darmstadt, Germany APO AE 09175			

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

1. There were numerous leadership challenges at Abu Ghraib in the Fall of 2003. The one person that rose to all those challenges and led by example, setting standards, enforcing standards and demanding nothing short of military professional excellence was Colonel Tom Pappas. Shortly after he became the Forward Operating Base commander, he called me and directed my unit to move from Balad SE Airfield to Abu Ghraib. I arrived with my battalion ADVON on 28 November 2003.

2. Duties and responsibilities at Forward Operating Base - Abu Ghraib (FOB-AG). Duty title: 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) Commander. From unit arrival on 28 NOV 03 to unit departure on 4 FEB 04, responsible for:

a. Sustaining ongoing HUMINT operations at other locations (Long Range Surveillance at Al Asad and Tactical HUMINT Teams at Mosul, Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, and Fallujah).

b. Sustaining ongoing HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) reporting

c. Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, responsible for:

(1) Augmenting the Base Defense posture (immediately occupied towers 92A, 98, and 97) and provided four soldiers to augment the entry control point operation.

(2) Increased Reconnaissance and Surveillance operations external to the base working counter-IED and counter-mortar missions with LRS teams in coordination with A Company, 1/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

(3) Facilitated the FOB commander's execution of base operations by establishing a FOB Mayor Cell (Mayor, DPW, Contractor management), designating LSA mayors, and beginning weekly updates concerning infrastructure improvement. Updated the Base Master Plan and the Base Defense Plan.

(4) Improved the standard of soldier living conditions in LSA Mustang. Facilitated adjacent LSA (Shadow and Trailblazer) improvements.

d. No soldier from the 165th MI Battalion had any interface with detainees. There are no interrogators in the 165th and we did not conduct or augment detainee security or interrogation operations. The only connection with the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) was that JIDC reports were sent electronically to the HOC (2.b. above) which logged the reports, entered the information in a database, provided tailored electronic feedback to MSCs, then sent the report to higher (CJTF7).

3. To improve good order and discipline at FOB-AG, the 165th implemented several initiatives. Each initiative was staffed with all tenant units then briefed to the FOB Commander for approval prior to implementation:

a. Revised the Base Defense Plan to establish easily understood standards so all tenant units could adhere (see attachment A). There were no common uniform or weapons posture standards. The chart outlined uniform and weapons status for varying levels of threat conditions. Initially, some company commanders in the 320th MP battalion questioned the policy of having to clear their weapons when not conducting detainee security duties. They stated they preferred leaving their weapons at Amber Status. They reluctantly complied with the standard.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Camp DohaDATED 2004/02/15

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

b. Recommended a salute policy. Although I never saw a policy, upon arrival, FOB-AG was a no salute area. The recommendation to institute a salute policy was based on the fact that the FOB contained several thousand Iraqi detainees and that many of these were former military. We knew the detainees communicated with friends and family members outside the camp (daily family visitation and illicit notes). We wanted the detainees to communicate that the soldiers working at Abu Ghraib were well trained and highly disciplined soldiers. A well-trained and highly disciplined military unit is a hard target for the enemy. Executing proper hand salutes is indicative of a disciplined professional military force. According to COL Pappas, shortly after implementation, BG Karpinski called him and asked him to reconsider this policy in the detainee area. COL Pappas discussed this with me and decided it was a good policy and continued to enforce same.

c. Recommended no civilian clothes. Upon arrival, soldiers were wearing civilian clothes after duty hours within the FOB. This recommendation was made in conjunction with the Base Defense Plan to mitigate the risk of fratricide in the event of detainee escape attempt or a perimeter attack that breached the wall. A person in civilian clothes sprinting across the compound carrying a M16 could easily be suspected of being an armed escaping detainee or an attacking terrorist. The MPs did not like this recommendation and wanted to keep the civilian clothes option available to their soldiers in the LSAs. That option was included for the MPs in the Defense Plan. The 165th soldiers remained in military uniform throughout our stay.

d. Leader presence at the Entry Control Point. The Entry Control Point (ECP) is the most vulnerable point of FOB-AG. The soldiers manning the ECP routinely search 800-1200 local nationals daily and inspect 300-500 vehicles. The volume is so high because of inherent nature of detention facility operations - family member visits, lawyer visits, Iraqi Police reporting for work, and the constant drop off and pick-up of detainees by Major Subordinate Commands. Additionally, the prisoner kitchen was not operational for most of the time we were there so caterers routinely arrived with multiple vehicles carrying food for approximately 6000 detainees twice a day. To exacerbate this further, numerous local national contractors were working a number of contracts for force protection and base infrastructure improvement so contractor vehicles and labor were constantly requiring base access. On top of this, the ECP was subject to random drive by shootings by hostile elements, not to mention the constant threat of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices. Our plan here was simple, augment the MP ECP operation with additional soldiers, then personally go out there and spend time at the ECP every day. We started out with four soldiers then increased our support to 8 soldiers daily.

4. Interface with 800th MP BDE.

a. I said hello to BG Karpinski on 25 DEC 03 when she stopped by the FOB. I never had an additional opportunity to speak with her, though I know she did visit the compound at least one other time during our time there.

b. Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, MAJ [REDACTED] the 320th MP BN executive officer was reluctant to share living space in the 320th LSA (Shadow). My LRS soldiers were packed in to a part of a building in the northern portion of Shadow LSA. The adjacent building had the bottom floor unoccupied because it had been designated a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation room for HHC, 320th MPs. There had been little to no infrastructure improvement to the MWR space. It was basically an empty room. Despite LTC [REDACTED] saying we could occupy the space with the LRS soldiers, MAJ [REDACTED] insisted that we could not. Within a day, BG Karpinski called COL Pappas and asked him why the 165th was trying to take over an "MWR room." I reengaged LTC Philabaum and we moved the soldiers in to the space. No further interaction with the 800th BDE on this issue. This is a trivial issue, but it speaks to how the 800th MP BDE chain of command operated. The 320th MP BN commander made a decision (move LRS soldiers into MWR designated room), the 320th MP XO did not agree with the decision and reported situation to 800th MP BDE CDR, she then engaged the 205th MI BDE CDR on an issue easily resolved at platoon sergeant level.

5. Counter Fire.

a. FOB-AG is routinely engaged by enemy mortar fire. There was no friendly counter fire during the time we were there. The primary reason stated by the 82nd unit representatives for a lack of counter fire is that the mortar points of origin (POO) determined by radar are routinely in populated areas. The risk of collateral damage prevented friendly units (1AD or 82ABN) from returning fire.

b. 82nd maneuver elements frequently moved quickly to the points of origin shortly after attacks but never caught any culprits red handed. LRS teams routinely conducted surveillance operations on previous POO but without success. As of this writing, the attacks continue.

6. Iraqi Detention operations. I had no interface with the ongoing Iraqi detention operations other than my soldiers assisted entry control point operations where the Iraqi police entered and exited the FOB. Additionally, I was privilege to some Coalition Provisional Authority planning initiatives (verbally from COL Pappas) that had the hard site LSAs within the FOB being turned over to the Iraqis for future Iraqi detention operations. No further visibility on Iraqi detention operations.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Camp DohaDATED 2004/02/15

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

7. Recommendation. I recommend we move the coalition detention facility operations to a remote location. This recommendation is based on the counter fire dilemma above and the fact that CPA planners have the hard sites within FOB-AG going back to the Iraqis. The base infrastructure (power, water, sanitation) is not designed to satisfy requirements of multiple isolated local national facilities within the compound. Currently Iraqis operate part of the hard site detention facility adjacent to the Vigilant Compound. The MPs have to watch the Iraqi police that are guarding Iraqis. The future plan has hard sites currently occupied as soldier LSAs to be turned over to Iraqis with the coalition forces occupying a modular (trailers) LSA that is currently under construction. The coalition forces will then be living in trailers and guarding/interrogating detainees that are housed in tents surrounded by concertina wire. The Iraqis will be guarding Iraqi prisoners at multiple hard sites within the compound, which will require more coalition soldiers to watch these additional Iraqi Police, and yet another major overhaul to the base infrastructure. Given this plan, the force protection challenges promise to be monumental. There will be no infrastructure benefits tying coalition forces to Abu Ghraib so lets move.

Nothing Follows

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of February, 2004, at Camp Doha Kuwait.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

RICHARD J. LAFATE Col, GS
CFLCC DM Camp Doha

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 16 USC (JA 16 USC)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



FOB – ABU GHRAIB SECURITY POSTURE



AS OF: 05 DEC 03

SECURITY POSTURE	THREAT	UNIFORM	WEAPON STATUS	TOWER STATUS	LSA /WORK AREAS STATUS	SOLDIER LSA POSTURE	QRF	BASE ENTRY
GREEN	ROUTINE REPORTING OR HARASSMENT	*DCU, WEAPON + AMMO, SOFT CAP COMPLETE ARMY PT	WPN WITH MAGAZINE ON PERSON	**PLANNED TOWERS MANNED	NO RESTRICTED ENTRY EXCEPT FOR NORMAL SOPs	DCUS, PT OR CIVILIAN CLOTHES (OFF DUTY & IN LSA ONLY)	MP QRF	LOCAL NATIONAL WORKERS ADMITTED
AMBER	BASE UNDER ATTACK OR ATTACK IMMINENT	ADD BALLISTIC HELMET & BODY ARMOR	LOADED MAGAZINE INSERTED INTO MAGAZINE WELL	ALL PERIMETER TOWERS MANNED	UNITS GAIN 100 % AND REPORT LSA ACCESS CONTROL	DCUS WEAPON WITH MAG IN WELL KEVLAR/IBA	LRS QRF ALERTED	NO LOCAL NATIONALS ADMITTED INMATE TRANSFER ONLY
RED	PERIMETER HAS BEEN BREACHED OR PRISON ESCAPE	ADD LBV + AMMO BASIC LOAD	WEAPON CHARGED, PLACED ON SAFE	INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TOWERS MANNED	LSAs LOCKED DOWN ENTRY/EXIT BLOCKED	DCUS WEAPON CHARGED ON SAFE KEVLAR/IBA/LCE BASIC LOAD	LR8/82 nd QRF ALERTED NOTIFY 82 nd FOR AIR QRF	ECPs CLOSED INMATE TRANSFER HALTED

*FROM 1700-0600 DAILY THE GREEN SECURITY POSTURE UNIFORM WILL INCLUDE IBA AND KEVLAR WHEN OUTSIDE OF LSA OR WORK AREA. THE LSA IS DEFINED AS THE PERIMETER WALL OF EACH LSA OR WORK COMPOUND

**TOWER UNIFORM IS LBV, IBA, KEVLAR, WPN, AND MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT. SOLDIERS PERFORMING OTHER SECURITY MISSIONS WILL WEAR COMBAT GEAR AS REQUIRED

***KEVLAR WILL BE WORN AT ALL TIMES WHILE OPERATING A MILITARY VEHICLE