

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D.  
MILLER

MG Miller was interviewed on 18 March 2005 at WFO, Arlington, Virginia. The witness was sworn by LtGen Schmidt. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 4 November 2002 to 26 March 2004.

My overall responsibility was interrogation and detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. JTF-160 was set up for detention and JTF-170 was set up for interrogation. My task was to integrate them so that they were in synchronization. USSOUTHCOM wanted to improve intelligence and detention. I was told to fix it. It was broken. I did not perceive that I worked for the SECDEF. General Dunlavey and I had four days of overlap. We had a change over from 4-9 November 2002. We did not have a conversation about whether he had authority beyond GTMO. JTF-180 in Afghanistan was not in my command relationship. It was a coordination and information relationship. The detainees did come from JTF-180. Detainees and interrogators all came through JTF-180. There were no detainees that came from IRAQ or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I was there.

The command climate at GTMO was dysfunctional when I arrived. There were two separate organizations with senior leadership that was at odds with each other regarding how they would integrate their missions. My first job was putting that together. The leadership had a single mission focus that was separate. Single unit disparity did not allow the units to be successful. There was no abuse or torture going on. The organization was not working together efficiently. It did not affect the detainees. SOPs needed to be updated. The basic standard was going on. The detainees were treated in a humane manner.

I did receive FM 34-52. The additional techniques that were requested went up to GEN Hill. I was uncomfortable with Category III. I was not comfortable using Category III techniques in interrogations. We were going towards incentives. Category III would not help develop intelligence rapidly and effectively from the detainees there. I did not intend to use them. They were approved, but not directed. I had the latitude to use them. It was an order that came down through the SECDEF. I did not question them about not using the techniques in interrogation. They wanted to do aggressive techniques. Special Interrogation Plans (IPs) had to be done in detail and sent to a higher authority. The purpose of the techniques was to support the nation's effort. There were two Special IPs; they were enormous documents. The IPs were the way to set standards. Everyone understood where the limits were.

How controlling was I? I'll be frank with you, when you put an organization together you say here are the new standards. Some thought they were more aggressive. I would state how to do and what to do. It is part of team building for success. You win the battle one day at a time. Senior leadership got on board right away. That is why GEN Hill asked me to come down to GTMO.

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AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation  
Exhibit 45 of 76 Exhibits

We had incidences of good faith mistakes. We stopped them. I would do a Commander's Inquiry and corrective action was done on an interrogator. Retraining was done. The interrogator would go back under the supervisor and then interrogate again. A junior interrogator needed oversight. It was a handful of occurrences. The occurrences did not rise to torture, maltreatment, or inhumane treatment. I had an interrogator that exceeded the bounds. It was a female interrogator who took off her BDU shirt and inappropriately rubbed on the detainee. The female rubbing was brought to my attention by a contract interrogator. We pulled her out. We found she did cross boundaries. She was given an administrative Letter of Reprimand and retained her. One incident, the interrogator asked the MP to help in an interrogation and the MP was actively involved. I got it fixed. We continued to refine the policy. We built the SOPs. It was a continuously evolving operation. We had a weekly meeting that had enormous leadership involvement about staying within standards. Whoever violated the standards received appropriate action. In another incident an MP could not control his temper. He struck a detainee. He was a pretty good soldier. It occurred in the cell block. The standards were well known. If any standards were violated, appropriate action would be taken. When a mistake was made we took appropriate action.

The detainees are ruthless, murderous people. We had to teach interrogators and MPs not to hate. I spent a lot of time with the chain of command and how to control them professionally. We had to talk about this to all interrogators.

There was a high leader touch. We had to lead the led. I was down there engaged at the Camp. I spent enormous amount of time going through the cell block. It was difficult keeping that balance. We had weekly meetings. The lawyer went over the standards. The lawyer would tell the interrogators that if you cross the line call me. It got to be a joke sometimes. I said call [REDACTED] Do not cross those standards. B G

General Hill told me that you are the Commander. Here are the basic guidelines, go ahead, and go forward.

We had numerous actions routed through the J2 [REDACTED] I worked for General Hill. A direct line to him would interrupt his command authority. I was very clear of my chain of command. I talked to OSD almost every day. There was lots of talk. I understood for whom I worked for. I had informal conversations with OSD. I sent a report to DEPSECDEF through USSOUTHCOM. B G

I have known General Hill for 20 years. If I had a problem, I would call him. We talked once or twice a week. I got guidance and all the support I needed.

The contractors probably made up roughly 50% of the personnel. There were a higher number of contract analysts that supported the interrogation mission. I gave the same talk to the contract analyst, their supervisor, and contract interrogators. I told them they were soldiers without the uniform.

The FBI was at the established weekly meeting. I had an FBI agent come down. They had opportunity to come to the meeting every week. We had a meeting and I gave the FBI Special Agent (SA) an hour. I told him it was anything he wanted to talk about. They had a different perspective. They had a law enforcement perspective. There was significant friction between the FBI, CITE and JTF on how interrogations were done. It was the first one and then SSA [redacted] came later. I said here are the standards. No FBI SA questioned interrogation methodology. For segregation, we had to go to General Hill for 30 days. No one from the FBI came to talk to me about that. One of the Doctor's of CITE came to talk to me about interrogations. B6

I am not an expert on detention or interrogation. I spent an enormous amount of time to help me understand how I can do this business better. I had a talk with every leader, CITE, FBI and the JTF and told them that they would follow the standards. We would come in on occasion and look at interrogations.

[redacted]

Nothing placed me in a compromising situation.

There was an interrogation SOP in place when I got there. I split the JIG, ICE, and J2. They were counterproductive. It was the most dysfunctional I've ever seen. I could not believe it. It was senior leader's squabbling on personal matters. It was debilitating to the organization. The JIG did normal 2 stuff.

Military working dogs- No, not in interrogations. They were [redacted] B6  
They were used for detention, not interrogation.

Duct tape - Not that I knew of. After I left I was told that a senior interrogator duct taped someone's mouth. I was told it was [redacted] but that is only speculation. I was surprised. I don't know when it happened or the dates. B6/  
B7

I knew about the false flag. I don't know any instance. It was an authorized technique in the IP.

Impersonating FBI- No.

Yelling at detainee and loud music - [redacted] It was an approved technique. The interrogator was authorized to do that.

Interference with FBI - There was an FBI and CITE focus on law enforcement on DoD guidance to develop intelligence. Their focus was on evidence. We were developing intelligence. They had a different focus. We followed DoD. FBI followed public law.

Sleep deprivation - [redacted] B6/  
B1

Short shackling. While I was there the detainees were chained to the eye-bolt for security. Every interrogator saw the detainee's legs and feet. I saw hundreds of interrogations. There were no stress positions. I gave guidance.

Food and water we do not use as a weapon. [REDACTED] gained 30 pounds. ~~ex~~

B 6

Hot and cold temperature – Not to my knowledge.

Inappropriate touching is not authorized. It was brought to my attention and we took care of it. The touching was done by a [REDACTED] ~~ex~~

B 6

SGT [REDACTED] ever came to my attention.

B 6

Ink and menstrual fluid – No.

There were no ghost detainees that were under the control of JTF-GTMO.

What humane treatment means to me are adequate food, shelter, medical care, and an environment that would not cause physical or mental abuse.

Some interrogation techniques that SECDEF granted authority for was beyond what I was comfortable with.

I never saw a memo or received a memo from the FBI that commented on SIPs.

It was clear to all the standards. The boundaries were for all. FBI and CITF had the same boundaries for all DoD included. In our discussions, everybody understood the standards. We have the same guidance. Everybody was formally notified that the superior commander made the guidance for interrogations.

I recognize the CITF memo objecting to the Special IP. I sent the interim plan up and it was approved by higher headquarters.

My focus was on the relationship between the CITF and the JTF. My focus was to improve it. They were at odds professionally and personally to the detriment of the mission. I called the CITF commander personally. We discussed that they were trying to develop evidence and the JTF position is not to develop evidence, but intelligence. The meeting was attended by General Ryder (the CID Commander), the CITF commander, and myself. We talked about an effective relationship about doing the mission. Subordinates are to work together effectively. An interrogation plan was approved and we followed the plan.

I directed the Director of the JIG to conduct an investigation into the lap dance allegation. I agreed with his recommendations and findings. The Director of the JIG was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was an effective leader and did a good over watch. He was a senior leader down there that would execute the mission.

B 6

~~SECRET~~

The standards were known across the mission. I found out about the duct tape later. It never came to my level. I believe it came to [redacted] attention [redacted] took appropriate action.

I had several counseling sessions with [redacted] He is very fine man. He did o manner that demonstrated what the standards are.

I am a standards guy. If you don't follow the standards, I'll take the appropriate action. When honest mistakes are made, you counsel, coach, and mentor.

I came to a dysfunctional organization not with mission success. I spent a large amount of time fixing it.

1.4(1a)  
1.4(1c) [redacted] B 6

I am aware of the 2 May 2003 memo I signed. It was in response to the up and down incident. The letter was signed in response to an AR 15-6. It was a Fear up. The MPs were told not to do it anymore. This particular incident was a single incident. There were some cases of the MPs being actively involved in interrogation; that was not my guidance.

The ICRC brought several general statements for review [redacted] B3

The guidance every week revalidated the guidance. It was very important.

The FBI and CIA representative came every 30 days.

Interrogations require that we would restate the standards every time. I knew the contract interrogators. I gave them the same speech for standards.

There was fairly large friction between JTF and ICRC. One of my focuses was to make it effective. It was producing unnecessary friction.

1.4(1c) b6 [redacted] B 6 / B 1

~~SECRET~~

B1/  
B6  
~~SECRET~~

1.c.c.

[REDACTED]

I have not been through SERE. I don't believe to my knowledge that the interrogators went through SERE. The Psychologist, Forensic Psychologist, and Clinical Psychologist were trained through SERE.

Most interrogators were school trained on tactical interrogation. Tactical debriefing in strategic interrogation, some were trained. It was a small number. Some picked up training while there at GTMO.

1.c.c.  
cc

We established the Tiger Team [REDACTED]

I have seen several hundred interrogations now. When I showed up at GTMO I had never before witnessed one.

I believe one of the things we found out holistically. Unity of command for success and standards demonstrated success on a regular basis.

JTF-160 and JTF-170 was an ad hoc organization that started from a cold start that we normally would have in our institution. There were a lot of developmental operations and procedures for strategic interrogation on how things should be done.

Abuse problems are simply about discipline setting, standards and developing these standards. You need leadership involvement that clarifies and focuses on the importance of the mission.

GTMO and Iraq are different. I have had a year and a half to look at GTMO. GTMO used standards, how to treat detainee that are not combatants, how to interrogate, and incentive based interrogations. GTMO was successful.

1.c.c.  
cc

[REDACTED]

Those interrogations did not involve torture.

GTMOize inappropriately reads bad information. I have heard of it. If you apply a leader and standard there is adherence to the standards. In another context, it brings discredit to all the leaders.

~~SECRET~~

On 26 March 2004, I departed the island and went to Iraq three days later.

MG Geoffrey Miller was interviewed, via secure telephone, a second time on 31 March 2005 at 1843 EST. At that time Lieutenant General Schmidt advised MG Miller of his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller several questions regarding events that have been documented in the interrogation logs obtained from GTMO. Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller if he had ever read the interrogation logs and MG Miller responded that he had not. MG Miller responded that he was unaware of the following events:

- on 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while [redacted] straddled the detainee without placing weight on the detainee

B6

- on 4 Dec 02, SGT [redacted] massaged the detainee's back and neck over his clothing

B6

[Large redacted section]

2/B6

2/B6

B1

b2

1

b1

b2

1.4(2)  
B6  
B1

~~SECRET~~

B6/B1/B7

that [redacted] showed [redacted] fake letter from the White House that spelled out his authorization to make [redacted] disappear

B1


MG Miller stated that had he known of the threats to [redacted] his family, he would never have allowed it.

B1/B6  
B7

MG Miller stated that he was aware of the following:

- that detainees were yelled at and that music was used in interrogations
- that [redacted] was interrogated for 20 hours a day with 4 hours of sleep from 23 November 2002 until 15 January 2003
- that [redacted] was separated from the detainee population from 8 August 2002 until 15 January 2003
- that [redacted] impersonated a Navy Captain from the White House

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statements given by the witness, MG Geoffrey Miller. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 31 March 2005.

  
 RANDALL M. SCHMIDT  
 Lieutenant General, USAF  
 AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

1.4(a)  
C2

B6/  
B1

B6/  
B7