

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF (b)(6) who was interviewed on 10 January 2005 at a Conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). His statement was substantially as follows:

I am the current Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) Chief. I work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. I was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) for a two year assignment. I took over the JIG in late summer 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I am not aware of any military working dogs being used in an interrogation. (b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

When the FBI complained about military interrogators impersonating FBI, we discussed the issue and the practice was stopped. I do not believe it violates any laws but the practice was stopped.


(b)(6)

I am aware that (b)(6) was given a Letter of Reprimand by LTC (b)(6) for her involvement, as the NCOIC, of the "lap dance" incident. She was one of the best interrogators. In fact, I believe that Major General Miller sponsored her so she could obtain a commission.

The interrogation teams and the individual interrogators draft the interrogation plans and the approaches to be used for the interrogation. If the plan doesn't involve techniques requiring additional approval, as detailed in the 16 April 2003 SECDEF Memo, it is approved by the ICE Chief. If the approaches require additional approval, the interrogation plan is forwarded to me for review and if necessary, notification is sent to SECDEF. If a response is not received within 7 days, I instruct the interrogation team to proceed with the implementation of the approach.

The atmosphere at JTF-GTMO has gradually improved during my tenure. The pressure in the beginning was tremendous because of the need to get information. The atmosphere was tense and the agencies didn't always get along. That is not the case now.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, (b)(5) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

AR 15.6 GTMO Investigation

(b)(6) Chief, JIG, GTMO, was interviewed and made the following statement on or about 1600 hours, PST, 15 April 2005, via telephone from GTMO to Davis-Monthan AFB. This statement is a summary of that interview only:

This interview was conducted for the sole purpose of clarifying facts and circumstances surrounding the interrogation of ISN (b)(6)

Mr. (b)(6) was sworn in as a witness and advised of his rights under the 5th Amendment. He was told that he was suspected of being a co-conspirator in communicating a threat to detainee ISN (b)(6). He said he understood his rights, did not want a lawyer, and was prepared to answer questions.

He stated that he arrived and began work at GTMO on 14 Jul 03. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

He commented that FM 34-52 permits fear up during the course of interrogation and that it is a proper and authorized interrogation technique. He stated that under the SECDEF 16 Apr 03 guidance that fear up can be approved by the interrogator and that it would not have required higher-level approval.

(b)(1)

He stated that MG Miller would have weekly staff meetings in which they would specifically discuss interrogations but he would not have briefed or discussed this level of detail with MG Miller. He cannot recall any specific guidance that MG Miller had in place that had to do with threats to detainees in interrogation.

Exhibit 23

~~SECRET~~

He cannot be certain if LCDR (b)(6) ran this by the JAG prior to acting or in what level of detail he would have briefed the JAG. He does not doubt LCDR (b)(6) testimony, he just cannot confirm it.

(b)(1)

(b)(1) He was not aware that it occurred and did not approve this approach.

I swear that the above statement is a fair and accurate summary of the testimony of Mr.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)