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The Classification Level of this Briefing is:

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Detainee Cage Operations

3rd Brigade Combat Team

001767
AGENDA

Overview

Detainee Holding Facility Operations

- Detainee Procedures
- Tactical HUMINT Team SOP
- Military Police Holding Facility SOP
- Example Detainee Packets

Issues / Lessons Learned
Detainee Flow

Procedures
- MP/Medical in-processing
- CI/HUMINT Screening Report
- CIIR Generated
- HUMINT TM Recommendation
- OMT Recommendation
- BCT Staff Recommendation Memo

Procedures
- MP/Medical in-processing
- CI/HUMINT Screening
- CIIR Generated
- Review Board (G2/G3/SJA/PMO)
**Detainee Holding Facility Layout**

**BCT Detention Facility**

- Needs to build the cage:
  - 2 rolls of concertina wire to connect the cages
  - GP Small light inside of the GP small for night interrogation

- Needs for housing Detainees:
  - 0 mattresses
  - Wood floor
  - 0 wool blankets

DOD-046302

ACLU-RDI 2055 p.5
27 July 2003

A capturing unit has numerous requirements to ensure that

a. The Provisional Forces Apprehension Form is filled out ensuring all sections in yellow are complete. TheThis area is critical as it allows for precise questioning of

b. 2023 (Sworn Statement) from the soldiers who detained

c. The details of the reasons for the capture and the capture

d. The capturing unit will inventory the detainee’s items, and

e. The Brigade Cage will notify Assurgam TOC that the detainees have the proper

f. The Brigade Cage will notify Assurgam TOC that the detainees have the proper

3. Upon verification of the paperwork being complete by the THT:

a. The Brigade Cage will notify Assurgam TOC that the detainees have the proper paperwork and are able to be transferred.

b. Assurgam TOC will coordinate to have the detainees sent to the Division Cage

Assurgam TOC will notify the Division Cage (381-0972), attention MSG Robins or MSG Beaty, that there are detainees on route. They will provide the number, gender, and type of offenses to either MSG. If an aircraft delivers the detainees, the Division Cage MPs must be called and asked to meet the aircraft to transport the detainees.

c. The THT will call the CI Cage (381-9311), and email their reports to the Cage to allow them time to prepare for the interrogation. This ensures that the MPs running the cage and the interrogators within the cage are prepared for the detainees’ arrival.

4. Detainees will be delivered to the Division Cage, using a one guard per three detainees.

Unless it involves an aircraft transfer, then the ratio will be one guard per two detainees. A Mission Complete Report will be submitted to RAK TOC when the delivery mission is complete.

5. Detainees who are screened at the Brigade Cage and are without intelligence value will be recommended to RAK 2 for release. RAK 2 will take that recommendation, along with his recommendation, and present it to RAK 3 or RAK 5 for approval/disapproval. If approved, RAK TOC will notify Assurgam TOC. The capturing unit will also be notified and be directed to return the detainee to the point of capture.

6. Detainees who are screened at the Brigade Cage and are without intelligence value will be recommended to RAK 2 for release. RAK 2 will take that recommendation, along with his recommendation, and present it to RAK 3 or RAK 5 for approval/disapproval. If approved, RAK TOC will notify Assurgam TOC. The capturing unit will also be notified and be directed to return the detainee to the point of capture.

7. The point of contact for this is CPT (381-9311)

8. The point of contact for this is CPT (381-9311)

CPFAF
DA 2823
Screening report
DD 4137 of the detainee’s items
EPW Capture Tag (DD2746)

The THT will inspect all the paperwork at that time, ensuring that all the necessary items are present to get the detainees into the Division Cage.

The point of contact for this is CPT

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Screening report
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CPFAF
DA 2823
Screening report
DD 4137 of the detainee’s items
EPW Capture Tag (DD2746)
2745 (Capture Tags), and a screening report if detainees came from a battalion with a THT. If the captured personnel are from a battalion not augmented with a THT, they will not have a screening report. The Brigade THT team is responsible for screening these personnel. If the paperwork is missing or incomplete, the detainee will not be accepted into the Brigade Cage and the capturing unit is responsible for guarding the detainees until the corrected paperwork arrives and is approved. The SOG will notify Vulture CP if the paperwork is incomplete.

4. The SOC is responsible for the inventory of all property and evidence that accompanies the detainee, and is required to count any money received with him/her and document that amount on the DA 4137. Once the full inventory is complete, the SOG will sign the property/evidence and properly bag, tag, and secure it in a locked container. The SOG will ensure that documentation is provided on the DA 4137 for every person that handles the property/evidence, and will inventory the items against the form anytime the evidence is returned. When the detainees are released or transferred to the Division Central Collection Point (DCCP), the evidence and property will be signed over to the transporting unit.

5. The responsibilities of the guards are: adhere to the three General Orders, special instructions, and to silence, segregate, secure and safeguard the detainees. The detainees are not permitted to speak to each other or conduct written communication. They will be segregated according to gender, age, and intelligence value. If there are female or juvenile detainees in the BCP, they will be retained in the alternate detention facility. Also, if the Brigade captures a HVT, they will be separated and kept in the alternate detention facility.

6. The BCP, at a minimum, will have two guards and an SOG. They will maintain 360° coverage at all times.

7. Upon arrival of detainees, the unit transporting the prisoners will provide security until they are searched and placed in the living area. Detainees will be removed from the vehicle one at a time by two soldiers and escorted into the reception area. The escort team will then search the detainee. There will be a soldier in overwatch while the detainee is being searched, with his weapon in weapons condition Amber. The escort/search team will wear Kevlar, IBA and rubber gloves during the search. The guards will wear Kevlar, IBA and weapon.

8. Detainees will be medically screened by C626 FSB in the reception area. Any prescription medication will be maintained and administered by the guards. Should more serious medical problems arise, C626 will be notified and the guards will transport the detainees to C626's Inmate and provide security until he/she is released back to the BCP.

9. Once the detainees are fully processed and all paperwork completed, they will be searched with hands in front of them, issued a bottle of water, a non-pack or MRE (with heater and matches removed), a blanket, a mattress and a jumpsuit. After all
The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at Vulture CP.
Detainee was picked up by the Sinjar police under false allegations.

- **YES**

Detainee is suspected of being a weapons smuggler. After interrogation it became clear that he was accused wrongly, because of a family dispute.

Suspected of being a weapon smuggler.

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO**

**Location**

- Sinjar Range 54
- Sinjar Range 59

**Approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Interrogator</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sinjar Range 54</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sinjar Range 59</td>
<td>[Redacted]</td>
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</table>

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO**
Syrian Intelligence and security forces are collecting intelligence about Coalition Forces by conducting Human Intelligence collection born Iraqi citizens detoured in Syria.

- dell: 
  - Person of the alleged
  - Syrian Intelligence
  - Collection Center or
  - Other

Ref: On Last Name
First Name.
Middle Name.
Phonetic.
Fcontainer
Fcontainer Name.
Office Name.
Mayor’s Office
Facility
Facility Type.
Government Office Description
Hasaka governors house
Organization
Organization Name.
Syrian Intelligence
Organization Type.
Foreign Government
Intelligence Service Description
Syrian Intelligence Services Collecting Intel on US Forces
- Possibly targeting the Syrian border guard as a front

Location.

Indexical Source.
Yes.
Reliability of Source.
F.
Reliability of Information.
Can’t be judged
Source ID Number.
Information Reliability.
Truth.
Information Date (YYYY MM DD).
20031223
Last Date of Acquisition (YYYY MM DD).

On 23 August 2003, an individual was detained by Syrian security forces in Hasaka (Grid Coord: 375 N 341 1563411) and questioned regarding Coalition Forces. The individual does not remember the exact date of the incident. He only knew it was before the 23rd of August because that was the date printed on a business permit he carried in his notebook.

This individual sells merchandise in Kirkuk (Glick: xxxx) after purchase in Syria. The last time he

Document
entered Syria was approximately 16 August 2003. After being in Syria for one week, he was apprehended by Syrian border guards and detained in the Mayor's building in Hasaka. The individual was interrogated for approximately two hours by a Syrian security service officer. This is probably a false name. The Iraqi believed that was the chief of security for Hasaka. He did not explain why he thought this. The Iraqi citizen was asked about his location of Coalition Forces (CF), asked for names and activities of CF commanders, location of CF living quarters, and questions about the CF main force. He was further questioned about the number of CF, civilian guides, informants to the CF, and the names of local PDK members. The Iraqi was asked to provide names and home addresses of interpreters working for CF. He was also presented names and asked if he knew any of them. This person claims he did not know any of the names presented. He also states that he does not remember any of the names given by. He stated that he did not know anything about CF and did not know the home of used to be Saddam's cousin in Syria. The Iraqi currently lives in the village of Katana in Syria. He did not explain what type of counselor was. He stated that he did not visit and was accused of being a traitor to Iraq because he did not visit. Before being released, this Iraqi was told to return to Syrian security service before departing Syria. The Iraqi fled the country immediately, leaving all his merchandise and not returning to Syrian security. He was contacted later by his cousin who lives in Syria and told that he would be arrested if he returned to Syria. This Iraqi feels his life is in danger, but did not request protection from CF. He was brought to the main gate by another resident of Katana. He is available for recontact. Interviewer complimented INDIVIDUAL for coming to CF, for being a patriot for Iraq and for providing important information. Interviewer explained that CF would contact this Iraqi again and asked if he wanted anything from CF. The Iraqi citizen declined any protection or remuneration. Source is a first-time reporter. Reliability cannot be ascertained. Source is a Sunni Arab male. Source is approximately 35 years old. Source is available for recontact. Reliability cannot be determined.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense against Coalition Forces [check one] If &quot;Other&quot; then describe:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Violation of Curfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Illegal Possession of Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Assault/Attack on Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Theft of Coalition Force Property</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apprehending Unit:</th>
<th>[ ] Location Grid:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Date of Incident: (D/M/Y)</td>
<td>[ ] Time of Incident: hrs to hrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Date of Report: (D/M/Y)</td>
<td>[ ] Time of Report: hrs</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainee #:</th>
<th>Key Connected Person: [ ] Victim [ ] Witness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Last Name:</td>
<td>[ ] First Name:</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Given Name:</td>
<td>[ ] Given Name:</td>
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<tr>
<th>Hair Color:</th>
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<td>[ ] Eye-Color:</td>
<td>Weight: lb Height: in</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Eye-Color:</td>
<td>Weight: lb Height: in</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address:</th>
<th>Place of Birth:</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethn/Tribe/ Sect:</th>
<th>Sex: [ ] M [ ] F</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phone#: [ ] DOB D/M/Y: [ ] Mobile [ ] Regular</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Document #:</td>
<td>[ ] Passport [ ] Dr. license [ ] Other (specify)</td>
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| Total Number of Persons Involved | [ ] (list names/identifying info on reverse under "Additional Helpful Information") |

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<tr>
<th>Vehicle Information</th>
<th>Vehicle Number of Vehicle(s)</th>
<th>Owner:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make:</td>
<td>Color:</td>
<td>VIN:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model:</td>
<td>Type:</td>
<td>Plate No.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year:</td>
<td>Names of People in Vehicle:</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contraband/Weapons in Vehicle:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial No.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Details:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Name of Assisting Interpreter:</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[ ] Detaining Soldier's Name</th>
<th>(Print):</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Signature:</td>
<td>[ ] Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Email:</td>
<td>[ ] Unit Phone:</td>
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<tr>
<th>[ ] Supervising Officer's Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>[ ] Email:</td>
<td>[ ] Unit Phone:</td>
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001778
ACLURDI 2055 p.12
How was this person traveling (car, bus, on foot)?

Who was with this person?

What weapons was this person carrying?

What contraband was this person carrying?

What other weapons were seized?

What other information did you get from this person?

Additional Helpful Information:
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Determining Truth from Fiction

ON: Personal Vendettas against different groups caused influx of bogus reporting from interrogators and S2's created litmus test before acting. However, once you found someone giving info in their own clan/ethnic group (Kurd on Kurd or Arab on Arab), the report by itself held more weight.

ENDATION: Tactical patience is critical when taking detain host nation personnel during SASO. It's more of a Science, and usually learned after the unit makes mistakes.
y is the St the right choice by doctrine?

Institution of detainees tracking responsibilities across the
court station.

Facilitate communication through red crescent/red cross mailboxes at the
card to police and receive detainee status. Provide local police with roll up of detainees. Citizens

Provide a hand receipt for family

Database management within the AOR

PW Tag number is the sole tracking device (needs to be

INTRODUCTION:

Status of loved ones within the system

A routine system for the Iraqi public to contact detainees or

It was very difficult

Tracking detainees above division and retrieving interrogations

Names:

N: Tracking of detainees

Lessons learned
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them the information directly

avoid empowering tribal sheiks

civic leadership. Avoid empowering tribal sheiks

END AUTION: Keep strong positive relationships

1 citizens are within the system

Police should have visibility on where detained

personnel

detention facilities which are reserved for anti-

Draminal transferred over to local authorities and do

Releasing detainees of no intelligence value to

ion

Enforcement agencies.

operation and liaison with local law

TIPS & LESSONS LEARNED
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Detainee review/release procedures at BDE level.

ON: 3BCT's review process prevented any incarcerations and inadvertent release of intelligence value. At times a detainee from one sector affected working relationships with host nation or other sectors within the 3BCT and or Division review process enhanced the BDE Cdr's ability to maintain order throughout the AO.

ENDATION: Processing detainees for release or to higher should be a green tab decision with staff involvement.
TTPs & Lessons Learned

PR Net Access to Battalion Level Units.

ON: Once Secret network was established at non doctrinal) detainee operations were more effective. Ability to pass intelligence traffic and questions prehending unit to the interrogators increased and decreased amount of time a detainee spent at

ENDATION: Establish a Secret “digital bridge” to or both Operations and Intelligence traffic