IFIT-35-117 Major [redacted] b(6)-1

Q: Hi. This is Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-2 with the 377th Theater Support Command Historians Office. Today's date is 20 May 2003. The time now is 1347 local. I'm here at Camp Buka, Iraq. And I'm interviewing Major [redacted] b(6)-1

A: [redacted]

Q: [redacted] b(6)-1 sorry, sir. And if I could get you to please spell out your first and last name.

A: [redacted] capital [redacted] b(6)-1

Q: Thank you sir. All right. And what is your unit and your duty position?

A: It's the 320th Military Police Battalion Internment Resettlement. And my duty position is the S3.

Q: OK, and which regional support command do you belong to?

A: The 99th Regional Support Command.

Q: OK, I know in the military we tend to use acronyms. If you could, please try to avoid them, I -- right there, I said RSC, instead of regional support command. All right, I'm going to read some boilerplate language if that's all right. Do you understand that the tape and the transcript resulting from this oral history to be retained by the United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection and/or Seacliff Military History Group will belong to the

United States government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interest of the United States Army as determined by the command historian or representative? Do you also understand that subject to security classification restrictions you may be given an opportunity to edit the resulting transcript in order to clarify and expand your original thoughts? The United States Army may provide you with a copy of the edited transcript for your own use subject to any classification restrictions.

A: Yes.

Q: Thank you, sir. Could you please provide me a brief biography of your military career? b(6)-2 A71

A: I was an ROTC cadet in [redacted] I was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the Military Police Corps in May of [redacted] Left for observation course Fort McClellan, Alabama at the time, through the MP school in October of [redacted]. Finished that in February or March of [redacted] Went to Germany, [redacted] Germany as a platoon leader in the [redacted] MP Company. Was a platoon leader there for about a year and a half, and then I was a [redacted] in [redacted] Germany for about nine months. Came off active duty. I was in the reserves. In [redacted] I was in the [redacted] Civil Affairs Brigade in Riverdale, Maryland, participated in a couple of exercises in [redacted] and I was there. And

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then in [redacted] I met up with Brigadier General [redacted] who was the commander of the [redacted] Military Police Brigade, and he asked me to be the HAT Company Commander. So I transferred units to the [redacted] in [redacted] Maryland. I was a company commander there for about two and a half years. And then in [redacted] I put in an AGR packet, Active Guard Reserve packet. I was selected and PCSd to [redacted] Germany, where I was the full-time operations officer for the [redacted] Crew Operations Center in the 1st Infantry Division in Hamburg, Germany. I was mobilized there in, see, [redacted] for -- we ran the Division Deployment Center for the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters in [redacted] for the deployment to [redacted] PCSd from there in July of [redacted] to the [redacted] MP Group, which is also in [redacted] Pennsylvania where the [redacted] is located. I was the acting S3 there and my position was eliminated there, to eliminate the full-time slot. So I moved over to the 320th MP Battalion in October [redacted] to the present.

Q: And that was a full-time slot at the 320th.

A: Correct.

Q: OK. Good deal. Thank you, sir. Let me ask you, during Desert Storm then, you were in Germany at that time?

A: I had just come off active duty, when it started.

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Q: OK and about your experience in [redacted] has that helped you at all for this experience?

A: Oh tremendously. The culture and the people and the desert. b(6)2

Q: And your Civil Affairs training?

A: Oh yes. I did a lot of downtown work in [redacted] when I was in Civil Affairs. So you got to know a lot of the ins and outs of the culture and the people. So it helped a lot over here.

Q: OK. And you deal with Iraqi prisoners and probably some civilians to a certain extent as well. Could you give some specific examples where you might use that training in this operation up here?

A: Well, when we came here, the British Air Defense Artillery Unit was running the holding area. They had about 4,200 prisoners. A lot of which were civilian internees. And actually they had civilian internees and EPWs in the same facility. It was a facility designed for about 2,000 prisoners. When we took it over at 4,200, we then had a population of [redacted]000 in this facility. b(7)-3 More than half of which were civilian internees and half EPWs. We also had civilian criminals. We also had some mentally disturbed individuals. So we had a variety of everything. And my past experience in dealing with -- in Egypt, helped me

tremendously understand and be prepared for the customs and how the people -- how their customs are. For instance, when they talk loud and fast, it's not necessarily that they're angry. It's their culture, and they talk very -- they're very close to you, which I then had to -- we had to explain to the MPs that were guarding them. So it helped a lot.

Q: I've heard that has happened a couple times. MPs, US soldiers, aren't used to someone talking to them within six inches. All right. Good deal. Then if we could, you joined the unit in October of 2000, and I'm curious from that point on what was an average drill weekend like for you? And for the unit? Because as I understand it, you set the training for the unit during peacetime.

A: Correct. I've been associated with many reserve units and active duty units. Even when I was at the 367th MP Group, the 320th was one of our subordinate battalions. The 320th has always had a reputation of being extremely proactive, non-lackadaisical, and a high degree of energy. A normal training weekend would be hit the ground, run and don't stop running until you left on Sunday afternoon. So we did many FTXs, field training exercises, which prepared the unit for handling of prisoners and civilians, riot control, riots and civil disturbances, and we trained that as well

as the National Detainee Reporting System, which was previously called the IRIS, which was the Internment Resettlement Information System, every weekend.

Q: And that's a software program.

A: Correct.

Q: OK, thank you, sir.

A: And we were actually the first battalion to field test that, the new IRIS system, when it came out, we went to an annual training in Korea. We trained the 8th MP Brigade in Korea on how to use the system during an exercise, and then field tested the system, took the results back to the Pentagon, they fixed the system, and then we did it again and then they changed over to NDRS and here we are today with that.

Q: OK. And where would you train for these field exercises?

A: Usually at Toby Hannah Army Depot. If it was a weekend exercise. Sometimes at the Reserve Center if we couldn't get Toby Hannah. Because Toby Hannah's about 45 minutes away from the Reserve Center. Annual trainings besides Korea were conducted at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Some with the 800th MP Brigade that we're under now. Others where the group, the 367th MP Group, was running the exercise with subordinate battalions underneath, and set up a process in line with the prisoner compounds.

Q: OK, as I understand it, in wartime you're traced to the 800th MP Brigade, but in peacetime you're traced to the 220th Brigade?

A: That's correct.

Q: OK, does that affect operations or training at all?

A: Well, actually we just changed to the 800th MP Brigade. Before that, the 320th and the 4th traced to the 8th MP Brigade, the active duty brigade in Korea. So you can run a tactical SOP, standard operating procedures, based on your mission. A lot of it changes depending upon your area of operations. So when we converted over to the 800th, fall under them, they had to readjust slightly the culture more than anything, and the difference in the prisoners, their attitude, how they would be. The 220th MP Brigade being a combat support brigade, basically they were our C2 for administrative -- we would run our training through them, but they allowed us the opportunity to go on exercises that dealt with internment resettlement versus combat support.

Q: OK, and I'm just curious. When you trained, you brought up this point, with the 8th MP Brigade, they're Korea, the 800th MP Brigade I'm not sure -- they've been here to the Gulf twice. So I assume that they're prepared -- OK, do you get training, special training, or give special

training on the culture? Because I haven't heard that before.

A: Actually when we were mobilized, normally we were focused underneath the 8th MP Brigade, we had all the rules of engagement, rules of interacting, compound rules, in both Hangrul and English to get the soldiers the languages as well. And then when we switched over to the 800th, it then goes into Arabic. So there is a specialized training in customs as well besides the little things of the rules.

Q: Just out of curiosity, when you were working with the 8th MP Brigade, did they go back to the Korean War and examine like in the 1952 and '53 I think it's the Kojay Islands?

A: No, not really. We were there for about three weeks each year. So it was hit the ground running there as well. Which is what this battalion is used to.

Q: And how about annual training exercises? What does this battalion do for annual training?

A: Well, when I was in the 367th MP Group, one year at Fort Dix, this battalion due to their reputation and knowledge were split up and used more as a support for the exercise and other subordinate battalions were used to run facilities. But this battalion has participated in exercises at Fort McCoy, Fort Dix, where they would

actually set up and run the facility, and then role-players would be processed through the facility.

Q: OK and were those like Operations Bright Star and Gold Sword or --

A: They have participated in Bright Star, a portion of them, they participated in Gold Sword, Platinum Sword and Silver Sword.

Q: OK sir. I had a question, it just disappeared. So when did you first get notice that you were going to be moved?

A: Well, the rumors were flying with all the IR battalions that they were going to need, because I had attended some 800th MP Brigade conferences, and so I knew the rumors were out there. But it was approximately just a week or so before we received our loc order.

Q: OK, so about 3 February '03 you were told hey you're probably a unit of interest and --

A: Well, we were a unit of interest for a couple months.

Q: OK, so as a matter of fact, I believe I understand that the 99th sent a team down to help you all prepare for mobilization.

A: That's correct. They also took -- after they did that, well, prior to them doing that, we conducted SRPs ourselves.

Q: Leaning Forward and Looking Ahead.

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A: Correct and we were actively recruiting and filling holes in the unit. As well as the 99th filling some of our vacancies in the unit. Down to the soldier level, they were being prepared for mobilization for the families, getting their personal lives in order. And also the 99th put together SRP teams to go to other units, most of which were filled out of people in the battalion. It took most of the people out of the 320th to create this 99th Regional Support Command SRP Team. Because the 320th had been SRPing for so many months.

Q: And so let me ask, during peacetime do you have any subordinate units in the battalion?

A: We did have the 305th MP Company. They were moved out from under us, let's see, sometime, maybe nine months ago, a year ago. But I think they're coming back underneath us when we get back.

Q: And are they from Wheeler, West Virginia?

A: Wheeler, West Virginia.

Q: Now, let me ask how this affects operations, or at least relations between operations. Because you have this unit, you trained with them, you get to know the people, then you get over here and what happens?

A: It's a tremendous disadvantage to deploy to an area of operations, have two MP companies placed underneath your

control, and you don't know them. Versus the MP company, which is a Guard company as well, the 305th, that we've worked with for many years, we know the people, we know the personality of the company, the demeanor of the company as a whole. You don't bring them, you come over here, you pick up a foreign company, so to speak, which has the same mission as the 305th, but every unit has a different personality. So you have to quickly dive in and see if you can determine the personality and how to best utilize them, and it's just a tremendous disadvantage. The Reserves are set up with the geographical C2 versus the war train C2 is a disadvantage.

Q: All right. So could you go in a little more detail on how you'd like to see that changed if you could?

A: Yes. If an IR battalion is supposed to have two Guard companies or two MP companies -- the way they did it over here was you didn't necessarily always get a Guard company. You may have a combat support company, which is a doctrinal change. Only because they're so short of MPs. If you're supposed to have two Guard companies, then those Guard companies need to be placed under your peacetime control. There's enough on the east coast to do that with a battalion. And then when you get deployed, those Guard companies go with you. That's the way it should be.

Q: All right. Thank you, sir. And on 10 February you get the notice -- actually that's when you're supposed to report to the Reserve Center, start going. What are your major concerns as an operations officer at that time?

A: Well, it's a dual hat. Because I was also the senior AGR officer at the time. So I had my hand in a little bit of everything. But operationally speaking, are we prepared to move to the mob station? Has all coordination been made with the mob station? Have they received our post training support requirements, training schedules? Have we received all key personnel in the positions? Have they reported? Do we know that they're coming? Simultaneously keeping in touch with someone in the 800th MP Brigade, looking for an op plan, any type of operational guidance? This is all simultaneous.

Q: So what type of information were you getting from the 800th at that time?

A: Well, they did have a forward deployed element at that time in Kuwait. So we were mostly communicating with them versus the one in New York. And timelines, they tried to give us timelines. Which was all subject to the TPFD, transportation, which is probably the biggest disaster of this entire operation, transportation.

Q: And TPFD is time phase deployment --

A: Force -- TPFD -- time phase force deployment.

Q: All right. Good deal. All right. Now you're talking how that's the biggest disaster of this war. Please, go into some detail on that and what can be done to correct it as well, personal opinion.

A: Personal opinion, you're going to move soldiers, you have to have transportation. Get the mob station into flight. A lot of units that I talked to officers in the units were set up to deploy out of Fort Dix and they couldn't leave because there was not an aircraft to take them. And then it came back, as well as transportation, over in Kuwait, Arifjan and different camps around there, there wasn't room to put them. So the TPFD was not time phased properly to bring forces over, move them forward to a degree so you can bring other forces over. So the biggest issue was transportation, which I think has been one of the biggest issues in redeployment. I think we're going to sit around and wait for a flight.

Q: All right, sir. Now you coordinated with Fort Dix. You all moved your equipment. How did you move your equipment to Fort Dix, which is actually -- and about how far is Fort Dix from --

A: Fort Dix is about three hours.

Q: OK, so it's not too long of a trip.

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A: We moved our equipment, the rolling stock we loaded up as much as we could there. We received the tractor-trailer type equipment to move the rest of our stuff. Brought it down to the station at Fort Dix. Had everything technically inspected, everything packed up when we were told to. Went through the processing, went through all their steps, and we stayed their three weeks, but we could have left in two weeks.

Q: And just to make sure, 18 February is when the advance party arrived and 19 February is when --

A: When the main body arrived.

Q: All right. And of course, operations officer, training is a key part doing a mob process there. So first the unit goes through SRP and that's pretty much I believe out of your lane at that point.

A: Right. Your force type training, each mob station, then you have similar requirements that the units must go through. So the issue became you could develop a training schedule internally at the unit and turn it in, but chances are it would be changed based on ranges availability at Fort Dix, what they had scheduled, so it was a challenge. It changed daily. Transportation at Fort Dix was a tremendous challenge as well.

Q: And why was that a challenge?

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A: They had too many soldiers at Fort Dix because they couldn't get them out.

Q: And could you use your own vehicles for transportation or --

A: We did. We had very limited POVs, but those that did used them when they had to to transport, make runs, coordination.

Q: And what about your military vehicles, sir? Were those still locked up or --

A: We used them up until the point where we had to have them technically inspected, put in a sterile area, because once they were inspected if you used them again, they broke down, they wouldn't fix them, they had to be fixed in theater. So we didn't want to take any chances, because the vehicles are probably older than both of us put together. As a matter of fact, the oldest deuce and a half we have is 1961.

Q: Vietnam veteran possibly.

A: He had been through more wars than most people.

Q: All right. If you don't mind me asking, how much equipment does EPW battalion need? Or AJC company --

A: We set up a city. We literally set up a city. When you look at an EPW battalion or an internment resettlement battalion, the problem is EPWs are civilians, and you set

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up approximately up to [redacted]000 internees, with the capability of going to [redacted],000, you set up an entire city. So with the tents, the wires, the poles, lights, electric, feeding equipment. It's a city, a miniature city.

Q: And how many vehicles? Like Humvees, deuce and a halfs?

A: I think we have [redacted] deuce and a halfs, maybe [redacted], [redacted] Humvees. We can't move ourselves. We don't have the organic equipment to move our battalion.

Q: But you have the equipment to move the camp for the prisoners.

A: Yeah, we require a lot of outside logistical support in order to take care of -- especially when you have a capacity of [redacted]000 as we had down here.

Q: How many personnel are in the 320th?

A: It's an MTO strength of [redacted] and we brought over -- we had [redacted] mobilized under a derivative UIC. Three I believe remained at Fort Dix for a while, so we came over I think [redacted]

Q: OK, and as I understand it, there was a lot of cross-leveling as well. When you first got called up, there were about [redacted] and then --

A: Well, we always maintained a high strength, either close to [redacted] or over. In fact you had so many people that were double-slotting because they had same MOSs. But we then

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had a lot of the support MOSs were not filled, and that's why they brought people in from I think North Carolina, Virginia and all over the place, to fill the slots.

Q: And how does that affect operations as well? Or has that been a positive experience?

A: Actually it's been a tremendously positive experience. The soldiers that came in were high-quality soldiers. Sometimes when you get people you don't know you're leery when they fill specific critical positions. Most of the soldiers that came, that were forced into our unit, so to speak, it was a lateral transfer, personnel to fill units, most of them want to stay when they go back, if they're local to us. So we received top quality soldiers.

Q: That's a pretty high compliment that they want to stay. All right, so you go back -- or let's go back to the training at Fort Dix. So how much time, you said you sent an initial plan. Fort Dix has the right to change it as conditions permit. How much of what you submitted was actually practiced at Fort Dix? And in particular I'm looking for the EPW mission.

A: We actually didn't do any -- the only EPW training that we did at Fort Dix was for the processing line. We didn't have to go through a mission readiness exercise. I visited a couple other battalions that were doing their exercises.

Felt that the 320th above and beyond going through that type of exercise. And we were prepared to do it, but we didn't do it, based on whose decision I'm not sure. I think probably Fort Dix, I think they're the only ones I think that can let you out of a mission readiness exercise.

Q: All right, and at that time you did not have your subordinate units.

A: No.

Q: Did you know who they were at that time?

A: We were originally told it was 314th MP Company, who did fall under us here, and the 1138th MP Company, but I don't even know if they're in theater.

Q: All right. Now the unit's preparing to move to Iraq. Again, a lot of this was going to fall on you, operations to ship the equipment, make the coordination. Who are the key people you're trying to contact? Or the key units? And what was the process like? Because I know nothing about this process.

A: Well, a lot of the moving of the equipment falls under -- and the coordination falls under the S4. And the R&U officer, which is repair and utilities officer, which is Captain [redacted] b(6)-1 is like an assistant S4, took most of that and did it all. The loading of the CONEXs, the coordinating, the tagging, the sealing of the CONEXs, when

the CONEXs were going to be shipped, when the vehicles were going to be shipped. My key focus had to be on when we get there what we're going to do, who we're going to see, who we're going to talk to, and of course hoping that it all falls together where the equipment and the personnel get there at the same time. We basically operated a [redacted]man facility with resources that were begged, borrowed or stolen because we didn't have any of our equipment. b(2)-3

Q: OK, let me ask, the equipment, who provided, did the 800th MP Brigade provide some or --

A: Well, we used a lot of the tents that they were actually going to use for the different facilities which they didn't end up building. So the tents we were able to get from 800th. Our R&U section built our tables and chairs out of wood.

Q: Actually, where did you get the wood from? Or should I not ask that question, because I think that's --

A: We actually made legitimate requests to the engineers to get their wood as far as I know.

Q: Because I've heard wood's a rare commodity here, or was during the initial setup.

A: It was. Soldiers will be soldiers. When you give them a mission, their goal in life is accomplish that mission. Sometimes the rules are followed. Sometimes they aren't.

But they accomplish the mission, which worked well for a unit that didn't have any equipment. So when they showed up with a table, I didn't ask where they got the table.

Q: And how about the value of an R&U unit for this type of operation?

A: Couldn't survive without them, period, couldn't survive without them.

Q: Could you provide some specific examples where they helped out?

A: Sergeant 1st Class [redacted] b(6)-1 and his crew of seven or so, their main focus is to fix, repair the facility that you're housing the prisoners in. Well, not only did they do that, but they also had to build furniture. They built wooden floors. They built showers, latrines, as well as the engineers gave them some latrines. They augmented -- they worked with the engineers to help them accomplish their mission. At the same time coming down to the facility and running wire, pounding pickets, building doors, putting locks on, it's endless, it's endless.

Q: You gave a good sampling there, thank you, sir. All right. So you arrive at Arifjan and you're contacting the 800th MP Brigade. And have they told you about the original Camp Buka yet? Or --

A: No. And originally members of the 320th were not supposed to be on the advance party.

Q: Pardon me. Let me go back a little bit. You arrived in Kuwait on 14 March, the unit arrived. All right, and at that time, did you know who your subordinate units were going to be and were you communicating with them?

A: No. We didn't know who they were going to be at that time.

Q: OK. When did you find out who they were --

A: I think we found out right before -- the advance party went up to Buka North. And some of the MPs came up to Buka North in the R&U section. I think we found out up there that when we went down here 314th and 447th were going to be our subordinate companies.

Q: So, the war's already started and that's when you find out who your subordinate units are going to be.

A: Correct.

Q: That's definitely going to make operations difficult at that time.

A: Extremely, yeah. Now I did have communication with the 314th before we came over here, because they were supposed to be -- I sent them our tactical SOP --

Q: And that's tactical standard operating procedures.

A: But we didn't know when we got here if they were here, and then the whole thing -- they also didn't have equipment.

We didn't have equipment, the battalion, the 314th MP Company didn't have equipment. The 447th MP Company did not have equipment. And then when we were given the 814th MP Company, they didn't have equipment either. And we ran a b(2)-3 [redacted]an facility.

Q: Equipment seems to be a big issue here.

A: They need to match the soldiers up with the equipment. That was the biggest problem.

Q: So let me ask what did you do while you were at -- I believe you landed at the APOD on the 14th, then drove up to Arifjan in a couple of hours, loaded your equipment on the buses, did you all have to do the security precautions, close the shades and --

A: Yes.

Q: Lock and load weapons?

A: We didn't lock and load.

Q: Full battle gear?

A: We were in full battle gear. We weren't b(2)-3 [redacted] as a matter of fact. They had an escort take us from the APOD to Arifjan, an MP escort from the unit that was here. Got into Arifjan and arrived there, downloaded a few personal equipment and some footlockers that you were allowed to bring on the flight over. And set up in a warehouse.

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Q: Actually, let me ask you yeah, how many duffel-bags and footlockers were the soldiers allowed to bring?

A: Four, four total.

Q: Good, a substantial amount, and usually I've seen two or three sometimes.

A: Yeah, we originally thought it was going to be two, but they allowed four. So two you brought with you and two were packed in CONEXs, which of course got here in May.

Q: God help you if you had any chocolate.

A: Exactly. So they came with the rest of the equipment, which was late.

Q: OK, sir, and when you were at Arifjan, what type of training are you having the troops go through? And I expect nuclear, biological, chemical was one of the base --

A: Most definitely. That was daily. There wasn't a great deal of areas -- there weren't a lot of training areas in Arifjan. It was packed. So a lot of their training consisted of hip pocket refining procedures and reports and how things would operate when they're operating in either their compounds or their sections. So it was more of a polishing off of the training that they had received all the way up to that point.

Q: Good. So they were still practicing EPW -- OK, good deal. And I believe that -- now, describe the living conditions that you all lived in.

A: At Arifjan?

Q: Yes sir.

A: Actually they were much better than Fort Dix.

Q: All right. Do me a favor. Let's go back, describe Fort Dix.

A: Go back to Fort Dix. Fort Dix, we were crammed in like sardines. I think the entire unit was on one floor and I think we had four showers for approximately 130 males and three for the females. And then when they put other units on the floor as well, everyone was sick.

Q: They put more units on the floor.

A: So you had to get up usually at 3:00 in the morning to take a shower. Everyone was crammed in. Everybody was sick. Strep throats. Strep throat ran throughout the barracks. As well as all kinds of things. Bronchitis and colds and so when we left Fort Dix and we came to Arifjan, we were in a warehouse, it was a little bit more open. Of course it was sandy and dusty. Everybody expected that. But you had a bunk and we would walk down and take a nice hot shower. And it was actually much better than Fort Dix.

Q: That's sad when you leave CONUS and come overseas and say that was the better site.

A: Get a better shower.

Q: Was it the old World War Two barracks?

A: No. The running joke was when you first got to Arifjan and took a shower, the first twitch when they heard a toilet flush, because at Fort Dix, if a toilet flushed you got scalded with hot water. So you really couldn't take a shower, because when the toilet flushed anywhere in the building. So when they got to Arifjan and could actually stand underneath the shower the whole time, it was a great thing.

Q: How about food compared between the two?

A: Army food always gets old. It's old now. Fort Dix was pretty good. They weren't bad. There were the good days and bad days. Arifjan was -- they had a good base set up. The steak and lobster for the troops once a week was tremendous. I loved it. It was a good morale booster. Overall the food was pretty good in Arifjan. And then those that went on the advance party of course lived on MREs for a very long time.

Q: Let me ask. The Surgeon General I believe says he recommends 21 days of MREs. Did you all go past that?

A: I don't think we passed that mark. It was probably pretty close though. I don't think we passed that mark.

Q: And like you said, Army food can get pretty old.

A: It can get very old, yes.

Q: Sometimes, especially meals ready to eat. All right. Before you crossed into Iraq, I believe you had to stop off at a different point first, a jumping off point, like Camp Coyote or something.

A: Well, we left Arifjan.

Q: And how many is we --

A: OK, the actual plan was the 800th MP Brigade -- 724th occupied Coyote.

Q: MP Battalion.

A: Correct. 724th MP Battalion, I guess our sister battalion throughout all this. They occupied Camp Coyote. The 800th MP Brigade's advance party of approximately three or four, maybe a couple more, was a Colonel [redacted] b(6)-2 who was an inspector of I think preventative medicine, I can't remember, he was out of Germany, he was a brigade commander in Germany, great guy, the plan was on D-day or D plus one or two, the 800th and the advance party from the 724th and the engineers to go forward to Buka North.

Q: All right. This is Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-2 I'm resuming the interview. Sir, you were just talking about the plans to go north.

A: Correct. The members of the 320th, which were myself, my operations sergeant major, Sergeant Major [redacted] b(6)-1 two of my operations NCOs, Staff Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-1 and Staff Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-1 we were the five -- or four from the battalion that were going to move up on D plus four. And then elements of the battalion were going to come up to D plus six or eight. And then the rest of the battalion was to follow on D plus ten I believe. When we got up to Camp Coyote and met up with Colonel [redacted] b(6)-1 of the 800th and the 724th was there, I desperately wanted to be on the advance party. Because they were going to set up an area from which our battalion was also going to be operating with the 724th. So I had an interest operationally, that our best interest was served, so to speak. So I convinced Colonel [redacted] b(6)-1 to allow us to go in the advance party. And he's told me many times he's glad that I did that, because I then became his Brigade 3 Forward. Sergeant Major [redacted] b(6)-1 was his operations sergeant major forward. And we utilized the members of the 320th within his brigade staff forward.

Q: As a supplemental staff basically, all right.

A: So we all moved up to Coyote and then the next day is when he said they were leaving. With me on his coattails pushing to get my soldiers to get out there with him. He called back to the general and the general said OK. So that's how we ended up on the advance party.

Q: Good deal, and as I understand it, you crossed over on the 20th of March, you believe, the day after the ground war, or it was the 24th of March?

A: Oh no, it was the 20th.

Q: 20th of March.

A: Yeah, we went up to the Marine Expeditionary Force holding area out of Coyote. The advance party. The 724th didn't go, they were going to come a couple days later. So members of the 320th who had joined in on the 800th MP Brigade's advance party and the engineers, we went out and stayed at the MEF Marine Expeditionary Force holding area. We did recons with Colonel [redacted] to find a place to put the facility. b(6)-1

Q: Let me ask you, have you seen any satellite imagery, photographs, or any type of maps of this area you were getting --

A: Prior to leaving Arifjan, in Colonel [redacted] b(6)-1 office we went over that.

Q: OK, good.

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A: And so we did see some. It was a great place to set up a facility. It was flat, extremely flat, it was a great place. But then it was found that it had a lot of unexploded ordnance in the area and it was in between Talil and Al Nasriye, and not far from Basra, which is a town which we were still fighting -- actually started fighting after we got there. So it was too hot to set up an EPW facility.

Q: I also heard that it had running water by it as well, and that was one of the reasons for its selection.

A: Correct. When you select an EPW facility site, one of the things we look for is water.

Q: Now how come an EPW camp wasn't set up in Kuwait? As I understand it, and Saudi Arabia, the 800th set up EPW camp in Saudi Arabia during the first Desert Storm. So --

A: I think that because of the way the parties involved in this war, they weren't going to allow Iraqi EPWs to be brought into those countries. So that's why they had to in essence wait for the ground war to push the forces back, beat the forces, bring in the IR battalions, and then set them up.

Q: And I heard that makes of course more difficult internment issues as well, by bringing the prisoners into a different country and then releasing them.

A: Correct. Because then they had to be repatriated whereas here they're being released back to their homes.

Q: OK, good deal, thank you, sir. All right. While you're at Camp Coyote, the air war begins, and then you're going to leave the first day of the ground war. There's still time for SCUD attacks. Were there any --

A: Oh yes. Oh yes. Communication's been a tremendous issue as well. If it wasn't for satellite phones I don't think we would have known what was going on. A lot of times when we called back to Arifjan and they were under a SCUD alert we of course donned our protective gear as well. And when we first arrived here, it was the same situation, where a SCUD had actually hit not far from this area. And we worked with the Brits on that. That was constant. Constant alerts for SCUD attacks.

Q: And what would you do for a SCUD attack?

A: Automatically go to a MOP posture 4, well, our suits we actually were wearing the entire time. So it was basically just donning your mask and zipping up the suit over the top.

Q: With a helmet last. All right, sir. What was the temperature like outside though? Because I expect you put on the full MOP, the air can get pretty hot.

A: You had to make sure your canteen was able to hook up to that drinking hose and into the mask. Otherwise you were in trouble.

Q: And temperature was 80s or so?

A: Oh, it was in the 90s, high 90s back at that point.

Q: And when you put on the suit, about how much --

A: Had 150 degrees --

Q: So it felt like an oven.

A: Yeah most definitely.

Q: I heard that because the SCUD alerts were so constant that some troops just learned to sleep in the JLIST --

A: One of my NCOs in the advance party slept in his MOP 4.

Q: Including the full mask.

A: Had the mask, had the gloves and the boots. Because we were getting them back to back. And so he just took a nap, he went to sleep that night in MOP 4.

Q: OK, sometimes you have to do -- and about how many SCUD attacks do you think -- or SCUD warnings were you given? Just an approximate amount.

A: From the time we hit Arifjan or from Coyote and further?

Q: Arifjan.

A: Probably a dozen at least. That I'm aware of.

Q: And do you think that helped bring home to some of your soldiers that this is war?

A: Oh most definitely. Most definitely. Especially when they found out there was actually one fired on a Patriot or take it down. The SCUD did hit the ground, it didn't contain chemical weapons, but it definitely brought the point home.

Q: OK, and did any land near you? You mentioned one about the British --

A: I think it was about 30 kilometers from here. I think that that's what it was. It wasn't that far.

Q: And now there's a rumor I've heard and I was wondering if you have any intel reports on this, that Saddam wanted to hit the current Camp Buka.

A: Yes. That's true as well as that's why that one came so close, as well as when the British were still here before we took control of the facility, one of the patrols found a mortar site, they just happened to be driving up and they took a break, and they saw these two Iraqis carrying ammunition up to the site, and they of course apprehended them and took the ammunition. They looked at the site of the weapons and they were hitting -- they were aimed at the facility itself, not the living areas, but the actual facility, where the EPWs were.

Q: OK, so it wasn't going to be an attack against US troops.

A: No, it was precoordinates on the facility. Which the British colonel and I briefed to the highest ranking general in the EPW facility at the time.

Q: And who was that, sir?

A: General [redacted] b(6)-3 He was pretty much the facility commander of all the internees.

Q: And he was an Iraqi or --

A: He was an Iraqi general, correct.

Q: Thank you, sir, I just wanted to clarify that. So you're having to wear your JLIST suit and from when to when do you have to wear the JLIST suit?

A: Well, we took it off -- or we were allowed to take it off the first day we came down to here. So that was the 29th of March I believe, around that time.

Q: And when did you have to start wearing it? Was it Arifjan or --

A: The day we left Arifjan, March 18th.

Q: OK, so almost 11 days wearing the JLIST suit. Constantly.

A: Yes.

Q: All right, sir. All right, let's go with moving the operation up to Camp Buka. We discussed a little bit why it was selected up there, and other alternatives that didn't work out. How was the actual move? Actually you were in the advance party. Were you able to leave your

responsibilities with a subordinate, or did you have everything planned out for the battalion before you moved out?

A: Well, approximately 60 of our MPs came up to Buka North, additional MP support for force protection.

Q: And that was in the second wave.

A: Right. The advance party was already there. And then 724th and the engineers were there. Not all the 724th Battalion, but most of it were there. Most of the engineers were there. They brought up additional 320th Battalion MPs for force protection, and they remained there two, three days at the most. And the move down here went in serials, from Buka North down from here to Camp Buka. Because the engineers had so much equipment to move. So it's a big coordination piece between the units that were up there to insure that A as the area began to shrink with forces that they still maintained a force protection atmosphere, so that was just all just a big coordination piece that was locked in and went very well actually. So we came down --

Q: If I can -- all right, moving up from Camp Coyote to the original Camp Buka, your soldiers are crossing the berm that day. You're crossing the berm, which is the border

between Kuwait and Iraq. What's going through your mind at that moment when you crossed the border?

A: When we crossed the border, we went into the city of Safwan, and I saw the condition that people had to live in. And while driving down the MSR Tampa, just looking at the houses that were made of mud and rock. Children without shoes and begging for food and water in a country that's full of riches with their oil. That's when I said to myself it's a good thing we're here. So it's actually the first thing I thought of.

Q: And what about fears of ambush? Because that was a major concern back in the United States.

A: Oh, it was there. It was there. Even with the children approaching the vehicles, you always had to watch them as well. Because the adults would let the children carry up -- use them as tools. Versus themselves. So that fear was there. The force protection policy was never lowered. The entire time.

Q: And what were you hearing as far as intel summaries about like you had mentioned, suicide bombers and --

A: Suicide bombings, and one of the biggest threats that we heard was civilian vehicles. Light trucks, pickup trucks, a lot of ambushes occurred with civilian vehicles. And as a matter of fact, I believe the two Iraqis that were killed

outside of Buka North were in a civilian vehicle that had fired upon I think it was the British soldiers. So that was the biggest threat that we had heard for that type of activity.

Q: OK, and how many vehicles went up in the advance party approximately?

A: Well, from the 800th MP Brigade and the 320th actually we caught rides, because we didn't have any vehicles. They had a couple up-armored Humvees for security. One deuce and a half. And a couple soft-top Humvees. It wasn't a long train originally.

Q: So you had the armored Humvees. So I assume you had some true cert weapons with those as well.

A: Oh yeah, [redacted] and [redacted] b(2)-3

END OF SIDE

Q: All right. This is Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-2 I'm resuming the interview. And sir, I was asking did you feel safe going up with the convoy.

A: Yes. It had growing concerns when originally hit the site, watching all the firefights and bombs.

Q: Well, let me ask, driving on the way up, did you see many wrecked or ruined vehicles or vehicles that had just broken down?

A: A lot of destroyed tanks --

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Q: Iraqi tanks?

A: Iraqi tanks, one with the bodies sticking out of the turret as a matter of fact. A lot of destroyed civilian vehicles. Some coalition forces vehicles that had been left there and just picked apart. Scavenged off of I suppose. I didn't see any destroyed vehicles based on fire, artillery, for the coalition forces. They were all Iraqi.

Q: All right. You'd mentioned scavenged. What happens to a vehicle if you just leave it by the side of the road?

A: It's quicker than a chop shop in New York City. Within 24 hours there won't be anything left.

Q: And where do the parts go? They don't have Iraqi Humvees.

A: No, I think actually what they do is a lot of the fenders and the metal pieces, whether it's off the APCs, armored personnel carriers, or tanks, or vehicles, they're actually used for the roofs and the walls of their houses. And then the mechanical parts, they just take them to hopefully use them in their own vehicles.

Q: AM General will always be surprised by this I'm sure. All right, you arrive at Camp Buka. There is literally nothing there?

A: Buka North?

Q: Buka North.

A: Buka North, the engineers, a couple of the engineers were there. And that was it. There was nothing there, absolutely nothing, big open desert with berms.

Q: So what are your first steps that you take?

A: Well, my first concern was force protection. Talked to the engineers and a couple of the other folks that were there, and established a force protection, part of the MP company that had come up. I think it was the I want to say the 223rd MP Company, I think it was them.

Q: Or 267 --

A: Or 267, 267.

Q: Good deal.

A: They provided force protection. And then of course as more folks came into the site itself, and expanded, which also led to more force protection assets, and then the engineers started scraping and berming out where the facility was going to be.

Q: OK, and can you describe what life was like at Buka North? Some of the sites --

A: Austere.

Q: -- you partly described -- OK.

A: Very austere environment. Originally there were no latrines. Actually, I believe it was the first or second day we were there, we had a sandstorm that started at 9:30

in the morning, and I lived in a Humvee from 9:30 in the morning till approximately 6:30 the next morning.

Q: All right, and how were the Humvees? Were they in formation? Were they just scattered all over the place?

A: No, we were inside the perimeter, so to speak. And we tried to put the Humvee and the deuce and a half in line to best shield us against the weather. But with 60-mile-an-hour winds in a sandstorm that lasted almost 24 hours, we lived in the vehicles.

Q: How many soldiers were in the vehicles? Did you leave a soldier alone in a vehicle?

A: No, we had myself and two others were in the Humvee, and two sat in the back of the deuce and a half, two in the front of the deuce and a half. Everybody was in the vehicles. Because we didn't have tents up because of the wind.

Q: Now being in a cab, I've heard you received a lot of sand. And even water, because I heard it rained as well.

A: Yes.

Q: What was it like? Did you ever talk to the soldiers being in the back of the deuce and a half?

A: Well, actually they were completely covered with sand and dirt. One soldier, Master Sergeant [redacted] b(6)-1 said when he woke up and he opened his eyes, he felt the dirt come off

of his eyelid and roll down his face. Which made him sneeze, and when he sneezed he rolled all the sand and dirt off of his body. And they were in the back of the deuce and a half. The cargo Humvee which I was in, sand and wind would find a hole and it would come in the hole and then shoot out like a funnel, like the reverse of a funnel. Blow throughout the Humvees. There's just no safe haven from sand. None.

Q: And did operations stop at that point?

A: Oh yes. Two of my soldiers left the engineers TOC, which was approximately 30 meters away from our vehicle, and about an hour and a half later they found the vehicle.

Q: And they were only 30 meters.

A: They were 30 meters away. You really couldn't see your hand in front of your face. Literally. That's how bad it was.

Q: And someone said they actually saw sparks when the sand struck the windshield. Did you notice that?

A: I don't know. I kept my eyes closed most of the time to keep the sand out. I didn't notice. When it rained, it rained, though. That was a hard rain. It was a very hard rain.

Q: And did that help keep the sand down?

A: It did for approximately a minute. But when the 60-mile-an-hour winds moved the sand around, it just started up again.

Q: As I understand it, the sand is grainier up there than it is down here.

A: Oh yeah. The sand here is much more fine. Up there it feels like little rocks smacking your face, that was the worst night I've ever had in my life, that was terrible. The only time you got out of the vehicle was to go to the bathroom, and you had to hang onto the vehicle. Because if you got too far away, you don't know if you'd find your way back to the vehicle. It was pretty bad.

Q: And you better be upwind.

A: Yeah, exactly.

Q: All right. Now you're in a dangerous situation. You described part of the reason why you all moved. Other reasons I've heard for the move south was that there was a rumor that the 6th Armored Brigade, the Iraqi 6th Armored Brigade, being loose in the area.

A: That as well as the -- they had an artillery division that we were in their umbrella, and that no one had neutralized them yet. So that was a tremendous concern. Because the fighting in Al Nasriye, Basra and near Talil had taken a lot longer than they had expected I think. So it was going

to take time to get this artillery division into the armored unit. So with the capturing of prisoners we couldn't wait. So we had to move south.

Q: All right, and could you describe the fighting that you could see? You were close to Al Nasriye I believe.

A: You could hear the bombs, you could hear the aircraft flying above at night especially. You could hear a lot of machinegun fire, a lot of artillery rounds. A lot of just a lot of explosions. Especially at night when you could see it. That brought home the reality of this is a war and we're right in the middle of the desert.

Q: And as I understand it, there were some Iraqis who tried to ambush you all at Buka North as well.

A: Yes, as a matter of fact, since the biggest terroristic type threat that we had was civilian vehicles. When a civilian vehicle was recognized in the area, they were hunted down and found what their purpose was. But the day we left, or the day before we left, one or the other, there was actually gunfire towards our perimeter. Some type of small arms fire. So that was when we said oh it's time to leave now.

Q: How about that Iraqi vehicle with the civilians that the British or Marines had hit? Did you hear any story about that?

A: No. I didn't get the full story. I know that one was killed instantly and one was wounded. I think he was taken for medical care. But the one that was killed instantly, they left him there because they wanted to evacuate the other one to give him medical care, and I think I wasn't sure who took his body away. I didn't hear the circumstances of how it occurred, except for I think they approached them at that control point. And then we found a lot of caches of weapons throughout the area around our perimeter, which were destroyed.

Q: How would you destroy them?

A: I think they used the -- matter of fact, the 1st Sergeant of the HC 724th, they used frag grenades. He didn't have access to EOD at the time.

Q: That's what I was wondering.

A: We were too far north. And they used frag grenades.

Q: Frag or fire? Like thermite or --

A: I'm not sure.

Q: OK, sir. All right, were the Marines still there when you left?

A: When we left the --

Q: Buka North.

A: No. No, they weren't there. They were down the road a bit. As a matter of fact, that's one of the reasons why we

had to leave there because -- that's another reason why we had to leave was because the Marines were moving north and we had nothing between us and Al Nasriye or us and Talil or us and the Iraqi Armor or the artillery division that we were underneath their umbrella, there was nothing there for protection.

Q: All right. Now Main Supply Route Tampa ran right by Buka North. Did you ever see any ambushes out there or Iraqi soldiers?

A: No, I didn't. I know that elements of our advance party that had gone up to Talil actually assisted in the capturing of some Iraqi soldiers. Ambushes got hit quite a bit from MSR Talil where Buka North was to -- I mean MSR Tampa, from where Buka North was to Talil. Quite a few ambushes there.

Q: And you could hear the firing or --

A: Oh yeah.

Q: All right, so you head back to Buka South, the current site on which date, sir?

A: I think it was -- they came up the 27th. Somewhere around March 29th I believe.

Q: That's right, I think you did mention that before, I'm sorry. So March 29th you arrive at Buka South. What are

your responsibilities there? Because you're not with the game forward anymore.

A: Right. When we came down here, it was I had a gut feeling that the British were going to turn over their holding area to someone. And the other -- the 724th MP Battalion was in the process with the engineers of building the internment facility, the larger internment facility. So my gut feeling turned out correctly where we were directed by the brigade to assume the mission of the British holding area. Because the Brits had to move out. The 320th and our two companies with no equipment --

Q: So you met your companies though.

A: Correct. The 447th MP Company and the 314th MP Company.

Q: And they had no equipment either.

A: Right, very little.

Q: And you just said that, sir. All right.

A: So we had to coordinate how we were going to do that. Due to the fact it was a very small facility with a lot of people, it took a lot of assets to guard and protect EPWs as well as ourselves. So we had not only MPs out there, there were cooks and mechanics and administrative type soldiers that we had to use to guard prisoners, because we just didn't have enough resources.

Q: OK, and what type of shifts were they working at that time?

A: 12-hour shifts, seven days a week. 12-hour shift, in other words usually about 14, 16 hours.

Q: Thank you. And what were the living conditions? Like you mentioned at Buka North it was austere. So how was it at the current Buka?

A: Well, they set up living areas up here. The engineers began constructing latrines and R&U sections building latrines and showers. Down by the facility we ended up with a shower unit made out of wood with a bucket on top. We did have carpet on the ground, which didn't stop the scorpions and the rats though. Now we moved up here since then because the rats won down there. And now we have wooden floors. So it was pretty austere as well.

Q: I'm surprised scorpions and rats were a big problem.

A: Oh yeah. Yes, they still are. The rats -- once a unit leaves, the engineers just pulled out, the rats need to find a home. So they come to the closest other tent.

Q: And any plans to combat that or is there anything --

A: Well, Brown and Root is supposed to be responsible for vector control. We proceed to sticky traps. That works. We caught a rat in our tent two days ago. The tent next to mine has caught several mice. So that's the best that we can do.

Q: And now the unit, they've arrived, the 320th has actually -- your sections of it have arrived before you, because you were up there at Buka North with about 60 MPs from -- and there's 150 people, so I assume the remaining 90.

A: No, they came up after we arrived here. The rest came up here after we arrived.

Q: Oh, OK. OK. So how soon were you tasked to begin operations for the 390th and the two companies?

A: Probably a week. Maybe a week. We pretty much hit here running as well. So it wasn't even a week I believe. We then had to assume the work with the Brits, until they felt comfortable and we felt comfortable based on resources, communication, transportation, etc. that we could assume the entire operation and that the Brits would then leave and go north. And the big thing with that is they have different rules of engagement than we do. So we've conditioned MPs to our rules of engagement, and when they're working side by side with the Brits, but it's still under British control, the prisoners were still under the British control. Therefore we had to go by their rules of engagement. Big difference is the United States military is allowed to shoot an escaping prisoner, the Brits are not. So it was difficult for a while. Doctrinally not a doctrinal facility that our soldiers are trained to

operate. Normally in an EPW facility you don't carry weapons. Well, our compound guards actually had to carry weapons. Because it was so packed in with so many people. And the Palm Sunday riot proved that. Approximately [redacted] prisoners rioted, and we had to literally take the b(2)-3 facility back compound by compound. That took a couple hours. Resulted in two prisoners being shot. Neither one died. They were superficial wounds, but they were shot. And that was the Palm Sunday riot, that's what that was.

Q: All right, you said this wasn't built according to doctrine. As I understand it, it was the British Air Defense Artillery people who actually first built the Buka compound here.

A: Correct. The Gurkhas.

b(2)-3 All

Q: Oh, the Gurkhas.

A: The Gurkhas built it. They built [redacted]man compounds, which you can put [redacted]men in that compound for a very short period of time. Compounds were too close together. They weren't even ten meters apart, where they should be at least [redacted]meters apart.

Q: So if there's a collapse in one compound you want to try to avoid it spilling over into the next.

A: Correct. Correct.

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Q: You mentioned bringing weapons into the compound. You don't want to do that because --

A: Yeah, we [redacted] the compound itself. But in the runway and around the compounds we had [redacted] Normally doctrinally our MP guards outside the compounds [redacted] Because the compounds would be built in one facility, and no one would be allowed [redacted]

Q: Because you're concerned [redacted]

A: Right. And that's why you had [redacted]

Q: OK, and what were some of the other changes in doctrine that you had to adapt to?

A: The battalion is set up with four compound control teams. We would normally run a [redacted]man compound or [redacted]-man compounds. Here we had -- we ended up with [redacted] total compounds instead of [redacted] or [redacted] So the compound control teams had to actually split their personnel, and they just ran [redacted] guards per compound on a 12-hour shift. So we were using [redacted] platoons for every shift, [redacted] control teams every shift, and then [redacted] more would come in. So there were very limited resources. The Guard companies, they'd be the outside, and they'd do the feed teams, which

is not doctrinal. Of course, not having communications or transportation is not doctrinal either. But we made it through that.

Q: Let me ask you, the 320th mission, then, when you hit the ground running about April 6th or so, that was going to be the compound guards and the tower guards, is that correct?

A: Taking over the British holding area.

Q: Taking over the British holding area.

A: Right, the entire battalion was tasked with the mission. But the meat of running a facility is your compound guards and your external security, which are your Guard companies.

Q: OK, good deal.

A: I'm more or less the warden of the facility.

Q: Right, OK. And let's see, so you said there were 16 compounds at that time. I've been told that there were trenches dug to --

A: Yeah, well originally there were 12 compounds, 13 -- the Brits had built a 13th compound far down, that was for their bad boys, escapees, people who started trouble. They then built a Compound 14, 15 and 16 at a later date. As a matter of fact our R&U section was in the process of building one of the compounds during the Palm Sunday riot.

Q: OK. So let's jump to the Palm Sunday riot. What happened and what caused it?

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A: Well, I was awakened that morning by one of my soldiers, who said that there was rock-throwing in the compound.

Q: And is that a frequent occurrence?

A: It was. A lot because the compounds are so close together.

Q: Right, OK.

A: So it's easy for them to throw rocks at each other. Well, that led to them throwing rocks at us. Which led to 6,000 prisoners throwing rocks and rioting. And what we ended up having to do was my operation sergeant major took MPs at one end of the facility, was talking directly with the 1st Sergeant in the 314th MP Company, [redacted] b(6)-1 at the other end of the facility. And they would literally walk down and take compound by compound either by force or intimidation. We didn't have canine military working dogs. We didn't have non-lethal support at all or weapons.

Q: Gas. Oh. OK.

A: We didn't have that at the time.

Q: Non-lethal shotguns hadn't arrived.

A: Right. So it was basically with access to the QRF that we had, which we only had five shields that the Brits had left for us. Which they later took back. We had approximately 70-80 MPs on shift at the time. And when I met up with my operations sergeant major, realized that we were going to lose the facility unless we called in support. Made a

phone call up here to the living areas, to the rest of our battalion and two companies, who sent down every MP that they had. I had to call the 800th MP Brigade TOC and request an external QRF for the outside of the whole base camp to bring down as a show of force. After the shooting occurs and everything's settled, but the main reason why we took back the facility was because not one MP left their post. Not one ran. They stood there, weapons pointed, and didn't leave their post. And that's the only reason why we took it back.

Q: And they remained in the towers --

A: They remained where they were supposed to be.

Q: Good, and that must have been a hairy moment for them as well I'm sure.

A: Oh yes.

Q: And were the prisoners making threatening movements towards the towers at any point?

A: No, the gates were very -- the gates on the compounds were [redacted] So they could get outside the gates [redacted] b(2)-3 [redacted] which they ended up doing. That's when two were shot. It started because allegedly -- actually right after we had retaken the facility itself, we moved the officers down to Compound 13 because allegedly they had started -- the night before they had told people to riot, go on hunger

strikes, not eat. So we moved them out, took them down to 13, got approved through the 800th to have the officers ship right over to the 724th immediately, and we did that, and after that day we only had a couple of incidents afterwards.

Q: And as operations officer, warden if you will, how do you handle hunger strikes? I've heard that's happened a couple of times and --

A: Well, I learned that running an EPW facility you're more of a diplomat than you are an officer in a lot of ways. If people go on hunger strikes, you let them be hungry. If it reaches the point where it's medically dangerous for them, then it's going to get taken to the facility, the aid station. But if you allow them to use the threat of we're going on a hunger strike, we're not going to eat until we get more cigarettes or we can go home, and then it becomes a game of chicken, who's going to win.

Q: And someone had told me, and I'd like to hear your opinion on this, that the British were a little more lax. Someone said their policy was a little bit more like appeasement actually was the word used.

A: Well, they would handle things very diplomatically. But they also handled prisoners a lot more intensely than we did when it became one on one. They would rather talk out

a situation, as I would, and when you bring an MP in, or you bring any soldier in, because we had mechanics, everybody out there, when you put them there and they're looking at [redacted] b(2)-3 prisoners in this little tiny area the size of a couple of football fields, and if they have to walk down the middle and stand there and guard them and there's no escape from them if they get out, because you're totally surrounded if you're in the middle of the facility, it's very difficult for a soldier to be a diplomat at that time. So that's why I had to assume that role. And they were just constantly briefed on the rules of engagement, the rules of interaction, and how to deal with the prisoners.

Q: Could you please state what the rules of engagement were?

A: Well, originally CFLCC had put out general rules of engagement. Which then when you deal with any prisoners of war, the 800th MP Brigade has to put out different rules of engagement, which we hadn't received till at least a week in running the facility.

Q: Which you had or hadn't, I'm sorry.

A: Had not. So we pushed them. They finally produced them from the rear and brought them up. It's pretty long. I probably couldn't recite them word for word. That's why we have so many copies hanging around the TOC so that we don't

have to memorize them all the time. But the levels of force was the biggest issue. The example I used to give to my soldiers was that if I walked up to you every day and pointed a weapon at you, the first time it'll scare you, the second time it'll scare you, the third, fourth, fifth, sixth times it's not going to have any impact. Now if I walked up without my weapon pointed at you, seven days in a row, and on the eighth day I pointed my weapon at you, that is now a little bit more scary, and you've increased the level of force. So that's how we had to do it. It was verbal, physical, obviously firing a weapon was the last step to use. But then, when we received the canine, the military working dogs, and then when we finally received the non-lethal equipment, there were two more levels of force we could use first before firing a weapon. Now granted, if a soldier's life is in danger, as occurred approximately one week later after the Palm Sunday riots, Compound 1, an EPW went into the tent, got a tent pole with a very sharpened end, and swung it at an MP, missed. The MP just moved. He was on the feed team. So he was in the compound. The exterior guard shot at the EPW and missed him because he'd swung. And when the EPW went to swing again is when the guard shot and killed him with his second shot.

Q: And let's go to feed team. What is the procedure for that? How does it work? Because you're responsible for feeding them. I expect that's a tough operation in itself.

A: Well, in theory we have a food service section in the battalion that's supposed to teach the prisoners to feed themselves.

Q: But you just said in theory, so --

A: Right. What the Brits did was they would prepare the food, bring it down, line up the prisoners, 20-man fronts and however far back they had depending upon the number that were in the compound. They'd send approximately 11 soldiers in. Prisoners come out, get the food, they line the food up inside the compound. You had soldiers that would control the crowd, tell them which ones could get up and go eat. You'd have prisoners serving, with feed team members behind them watching that they don't steal the food, give too much to certain people. And then you had MPs or feed team personnel behind. Because once they receive their food they were supposed to go back to the tents and eat it. The reason why you had to put them behind is because they would drop it, come back with another bowl and spoon and get in line again. So once everybody did that, the feed team was to keep them back until all the food was moved out of the compound, not allow

them to go to the water or to the latrines, which were up front, until all the feed team members were out of the compound for safety. So sounds really easy. But as many times as we fed some of the prisoners, and they just couldn't understand the concept of get in line, sit down and be quiet and you'll eat very quickly. At times it would take hours, two hours, three hours, to get them to sit down and eat. Then the feed teams would just go to another compound. Which would then start a problem because they didn't feed that compound. So the feed team concept was brand new to anybody who did it. When the Brits had it I participated in the feed teams, just so I knew what we were going to have to do, because it was not a facility designed to teach prisoners how to feed themselves. It wasn't designed that way. Now later as the population reduced, and when people started getting released, we would allow the prisoners to feed themselves. And the EPWs did a much better job than the civilians.

Q: OK. I've heard that EPWs were better than civilians. Now you mentioned that you let prisoners feed themselves. So let's talk about you're the warden, what are the ways you reward the prisoners for good conduct, and how do you punish them for bad conduct?

A: A point that was discussed over and over again with many different opinions, of which mine was always the winning opinion. Punishment is a difficult thing. If you threaten and you don't follow through you lose face. Because while they were fed, they were also receiving three cigarettes per meal. So it's a culture that smokes. So one form of punishment, if it was a compound, or even if it was individuals, they wouldn't receive six cigarettes a day, they'd only receive four. Doesn't sound like a big deal, but when they only get six cigarettes a day, for them it's a big deal. And it would escalate to no cigarettes for the next day. If it was individuals or a group of individuals, we would extract them during a feed time. We'd wait for them to get the food in their hands. Then we'd escort them out, because they won't spill their food. So that's how you do it peacefully without any trouble versus going in with nightsticks and that only causes problems with people getting hurt. We didn't do that. And then we'd remove them, we'd put them in segregation for 24 hours. If they didn't straighten up while they were in segregation, they would then be put down in Compound 13 away from everybody. Rewarding them, soccer. They love soccer ball, playing soccer. So if a compound was being extremely good we'd give them a soccer ball. They'd get extra food or

cigarettes. If we received something new in that we could give to the prisoners, we had one compound that was always good, they'd be the first ones to get it -- sandals, jumpsuits, towels, and that sort of thing. So it worked out very well. The levels of discipline and punishment were you don't always jump to the extreme. You start out slowly and see if you can end it there. But they were pretty persistent. They're a very proud people. They're a very proud people, and they don't -- they're difficult to bargain with, that's for sure.

Q: And how about cigarettes? I've heard you discuss it somewhat as rewards and I almost understand it's like you said, it's a smoking culture. What about the juveniles? Do they smoke or --

A: They do.

Q: It's a different culture than America.

A: They do, and that was a point of discussion at brigade meetings very often, was don't give the juveniles cigarettes. It's not our culture. However, a juvenile over the age of 15 is not considered a juvenile here. A lot of them are soldiers. A lot of them -- some of them came over and joined the fedayyin, the militia. But the decision was made, under the age I think of 16 or 17 they don't get cigarettes. Then it finally came to the point

where the British were giving them cigarettes, we didn't, because my commander and 800th said no, so we didn't give it to them. Now I don't know what happened when they were transferred over to the 724th. But they were juveniles but they were soldiers too. And some of them were Syrian that came over to fight the US and coalition forces. So juveniles, difficult time to sometimes follow the -- started out with three or four and I adopted them in a way. I'd take them a soccer ball or give them shoes or something like that. But then we had up to 18 or 19. It was mixed. Because some of the ones that were in the juvenile facility were 19-year-old individuals that were not doing well in their compounds because they were weak and small stature.

Q: Well, let's go ahead and you were speaking about the differences earlier about civilians and military and we're speaking about juveniles. Let's break down the compounds into the different how they were segregated.

A: They were segregated with officers, anything above the rank of lieutenant, anything -- a warrant officer is not considered an officer in the Iraqi Army. They won't allow them in their compound. So we don't put them in there. They would go into an enlisted compound, or other ranks it was called. Because they would have junior officers and enlisted in that compound. Civilians, we had civilian

compounds. Originally we had four compounds, officers, other ranks, which were enlisted and junior officers, civilians and juveniles. Because we had so many, we couldn't segregate, put the Syrians here, put the Algerian here and we just didn't have that capability. When we discovered personalities or conflicts within a compound, where one was a Sunni and Shiite, and most of them are Shiites, or whatever, we would take that person out, put them in another compound. So we did that 1,000 times a day. Just to make the personality of the compound better. But we had Compound 9 for instance, was a civilian compound, that was just the worst compound we have. It just rioted all the time.

Q: And was that because they weren't used to military discipline? Or were they angry at being here at what they might have felt unjustifiably?

A: Combination, combination. A lot of them were civilians just walking down the street they say or pulling up to a checkpoint, and that's why they increased the screening process, they got a lot more JAG officers up here to increase that to release a lot more people. So when that started happening, tempers started going down, because then they knew that we're doing something to get them out of here. So that worked out well.

Q: So you take away that feeling of hopelessness or you give them hope that they'd be getting out, that actually brought about better behavior as well. All right. What about -- you've mentioned the canine and non-lethal weapons. If you could describe the value of both of those in your operations as well.

A: When we did receive the MWD, the military working dogs, after the Palm Sunday riot, and after the shooting of the one prisoner, the fatal shooting of the one prisoner, we didn't tolerate a pebble being thrown. If someone was seen throwing a rock into another compound or at the guards, we'd get the compound representative. He was someone who usually spoke English, or if he didn't speak English, he just had a power over the compound. We would tell him to bring that prisoner out or we would come in and get the prisoner. And if the compound wouldn't bring them out, and we couldn't identify him, the compound would be punished. Instead of six cigarettes they'd get five. But when we got to the point where we weren't able to tolerate that. We wanted the individual who threw the rock because we wanted to show the other thousands of prisoners that we weren't going to put up with this. So when you bring a QRF, when you tell the compound rep to have all the prisoners sit on one side, sit down, 20-man fronts, and you bring in two,

three or four MP dog teams, with the QRF, we're extremely effective. Even prisoners won't fight a dog. And we used the dogs to sweep the tents, because sometimes prisoners would hide in the tents when they were supposed to be out. They would hide in the tents. But basically the use of the dogs was for going after escapees and for security when we had to go into the compounds and do an extraction.

Q: Now I've heard that when the prisoners get unruly, dogs are very -- a calming force if you will, extreme calming force.

A: Yes, I use that very often. When I personally witnessed a prisoner throw a rock at the juvenile compound, and I got the compound rep, my compound guards weren't getting anywhere, sometimes we have to escalate that to me. And I basically told him he had three minutes to go back into the tent and bring out the prisoner. He argued a little bit, I said you now have two minutes or I will get the dogs. Well, he walks back in, he comes back out, says I don't know. So I pick up the radio and call the dogs. We bring the dogs in and we do a shakedown of the tent. If you can't find the prisoner while we're in there, we search for weapons, anything illegal, so we bring the dogs in, which is very effective.

Q: So did you get him?

A: Yes we did. We got him. And while we were there, we took out another one who started trouble earlier that day. You want to avoid, the key is to avoid going into the compounds as much as possible and harassing them. So if we have to do one extraction, we always have in the log of another troublemaker. So we just bring him out at the same time, so we don't go in five, six times a day. It's ridiculous.

Q: Building that resentment, and also familiarity with your operations.

A: Right. So we try to limit that as much as possible.

Q: All right. Now you mentioned escapees. Have there been many escapes or were there at first?

A: The British had reported ten at night. When we took over we reduced it to -- we had several attempts. We had one night where supposedly three prisoners got away and we never found them. Once they get out into that desert, there's holes that are hundreds of feet deep and valleys and if you don't get out there right away you'll never find them. So I only know three prisoners that ever escaped from when it was under our control. We had approximately ten attempts and all were caught. And the quicker you get the dogs out there, the quicker you find them. Now some prisoners because you have berms around, they can't really see a lot, and maybe that or lack of intelligence --

escaped and went over the berm into the living areas. They went into our living areas, where you got a battalion of MPs. So of course every unit has been briefed that when you see a white star cluster be on the lookout for an EPW running somewhere. So one did escape in a mild sandstorm and ran into an MP who was at the time burning the shit barrel. And he tackled and subdued the EPW.

Q: But that seems like a bad situation to me, having your living conditions so close to the EPW compound.

A: Oh yeah, it is, it is.

Q: OK, what was done to rectify that? Or --

A: Well, when they built the 724th facility and we shut that one down, that's where the Brits had it. There's not much room here to move. So it wasn't real close, but it was too close. So the building of the other facility eliminated that.

Q: OK, good deal. Now you've talked about using dogs to search for prisoners. What about night vision gear?

A: We had no night vision gear. Many problems exist with the IR community's intel. Many problems.

Q: Let's say you're doing an after action review. Would you go ahead and list some of the equipment issues, like night vision goggles?

A: Yes. [redacted] Quick Reaction Force [redacted] b(2)-3 radios that aren't 20, 30 years old. Vehicle changes from soft top Humvees to hardtop Humvees. More medics, more medical support, more R&U support. The list is endless actually. I could go on and on. It's just people at the MP school or DA that design the centers need to actually come out and experience how they don't work.

Q: Will you write an after action review and send it to them?

A: Oh most definitely, yes. My sergeant major, my operations sergeant major, is doing an article for the MP Times or the MP Regimental Magazine in reference to the Palm Sunday riot. And we're also drafting up an AAR to send to the schoolhouse itself. And what could have possibly contributed to soldiers getting hurt based on the lack of intel equipment. So we're going to definitely do that.

Q: Now the school, I understand it, is at Fort Leonard Wood now.

A: Correct.

Q: When you went there, you were at Fort Rucker or Fort McClellan --

A: Fort McClellan.

Q: -- in Alabama, sorry, mixed on my Alabama posts there. But when you were there at Fort McClellan how much EPW training was devoted at the MP school?

A: Hardly any, hardly any, just the handling, just the five Ss, search, seize -- seize, search, segregate, secure and speed to the rear. That's about all we did.

Q: You're the first person to give me the full five Ss there. All right. And has that changed do you know at Fort Leonard Wood or --

A: I think the emphasis is -- when Brigadier General [redacted] b(6)-1 was the commandant of the schoolhouse, his guys, all MP inclusive, they would train on all MP missions, regardless if they were an IR battalion, combat support, physical security or law and order. So one thing that Sergeant Major [redacted] b(6)-1 and I did with this battalion is we would train IR, IR, IR, complete an exercise or mission, and then we would train law and order, combat support missions, physical security, civil disturbances. We mixed it up so these MPs would be trained in all areas of MP missions.

Q: OK, but at Fort Leonard Wood it's --

A: I'm not sure if the emphasis is there yet.

Q: OK. Thank you sir. Now what about the International Red Cross? How did they affect your operations as well?

A: Well, they had full reign, so to speak. One thing though, my compound guards would not let them go into the compounds freely. They had to -- if the compound was not good that day, the compound guard would advise the ICRC representative and say I'm advising for your safety not to go in today. If they went in, they went in.

Q: And were they escorted?

A: No. They made good recommendations. I actually got along with all the representatives. I really did.

Q: That's something to be written down.

A: I got along with them very well. They said this probably needs a little bit of work. Now because the ICRC says that this needs to be cleaned up, doesn't mean we drop everything and clean it up. If it meets a standard, or if it's a purpose, like the segregation units for individual CONEXs, they said you shouldn't leave them in there any more than 24 hours. Well, one time they came, they were there a week, they saw this guy, they said hasn't he been in here for a while. I said actually he went to the compounds, but he came back. They came back a week later and saw the same guy there. And they said why is he still here. I said well he's been in seven different compounds. Five minutes within going in every compound, he fights or picks up a tent pole and starts swinging it at the

prisoners. As you can see, he has two black eyes. That's from the last two compounds he was in. So once we explained that to them and say this is for his safety and the safety of others, they leave it alone. But they didn't hinder our operation in any way. They made suggestions. We looked at it and said yes. Good suggestion. We'll fix it. One suggestion they said was Compound 1 doesn't have showers in the compound. I said well, if they give us back the buckets and rebuild the showers that the buckets were hanging from, they will have showers. But due to the fact they stole the buckets and tore them down, I'm not giving them showers again. That's part of the discipline of the compound. So they understood that.

Q: And who was in Compound 1?

A: Civilians. Civilians. So they understood that. They didn't have any hindrance on the operation at all.

Q: Sir, all right, this is Sergeant [redacted] b(4)-2 I'm resuming the interview. All right, sir. We were talking about working with the Red Cross and you just gave the example of the one prisoner that had been thrown in the compounds. What are some other examples of working with the Red Cross?

A: Well, they had issues of sanitation, their toilets, showers, notifying relatives of prisoners, which is totally

out of our control, that was basically the big ones that I heard about.

Q: Matter of fact, I understand that was a big concern, because there would be civilians outside the gates here trying to find out about their relatives.

A: That's correct. And that did lead to some problems. Part of the April -- the Palm Sunday riots in April was allegedly the general, the officers were passing around to different compounds that their families were outside waiting for them. So yeah, that led to problems.

Q: OK, and another subject I've heard about was razors. The Red Cross wanted razors issued.

A: The British had originally issued razors. We did not. We acquired clippers. Hair-clippers and if they wanted to shave we would give them razors, have them shave, and return the razor to us.

END OF TAPE b(a)-2

Q: Sergeant [redacted] resuming the interview yet again and sorry about that, sir. All right, so you were talking about you would search -- or after the razors you would go ahead and search the tents.

A: Correct. We would find amazing ways they would take little holders and take apart the razors and put the blades inside the holder. Which they could use cupped behind their hand

for slicing or stabbing either each other -- which they did attack each other quite a bit -- or use against the MPs. So we took away the razors. We gave it to them when they wanted to shave. Took them back. And we set up every week or so, we'd set up six or seven stations for haircutting where we'd rotate the clippers, we'd bring them out, they'd cut each other's hair. So that they could maintain their sanitation as well.

Q: OK. So they are not issued razorblades anymore.

A: No.

Q: And it sounds like you have an efficient means of going around and taking care of that. Yesterday I was at the tribunals, and one prisoner had sliced himself. How do you handle prisoners who hurt themselves?

A: Well, that is a tool that they use to get demands met. They will take the wire, they will slice their chests or their arms and they'll relay to us that they're going to continue to do that until they go to the tribunal, until they go home, until whatever it is they want they want. I don't want to say we let it go to a point. But we do, we usually bring down a medical person, or if it's to the point where -- we have a lot of combat lifesavers -- determine that this could be dangerous to the individual's safety, we then subdue them and take them up to the medical

facility. You'll probably see -- if you look much at all of them, you see a lot of them with scars from where they've cut themselves. When they feel that that's a way of getting demands. The threat to kill themselves was also very high.

Q: OK, and had any actually ever killed themselves?

A: No, no.

Q: OK, and sorry, I had a question again lined up, it's frustrating when I lose my train of thought here. All right. So prisoners, it's a pretty rough business working with the prisoners, and sometimes force has to be used. Now I've heard different times guards have been told don't yell at the prisoners, don't touch the prisoners, what is the policy or how has that changed?

A: Well, there's again rules of interaction and there's rules of force -- or elevations of force. Depending upon the situation. Yelling at a prisoner is permitted, if your other means have not worked. Vulgarity is not a means of an escalation of force. Because most of them don't understand the language anyway. And it just shows a sign of disrespect for both the prisoner and the individual who's using it. So that's not permitted. Does it happen? Of course. If you stand in front of prisoners for 12 hours, it becomes very taxing in the mind. And it can lead

to vulgarity being used. Touching a prisoner is if they're complacent and passive, you may have to touch them to guide them. If they become non-complacent and non-passive, then there are levels of force that MPs are required to use for their own protection and for the protection of the prisoner. The mission of running an EPW facility in essence is providing protection for the EPWs. Of course equal to that is providing protection for the individuals who are guarding the EPWs. So there's levels of force or levels of touching that are required. Depending upon who they're escorting or who they're guarding. And inflection of voice is a level of force.

Q: Like you said, a degree of elevation.

A: Correct.

Q: All right, sir. All right. Now you've spoken about how in this culture smoking is acceptable, even by juveniles. It's a male-driven culture here. And you have female MPs.

A: Correct.

Q: How does that work out? Have there been some difficulties due to that?

A: Well, originally -- turn it off for a second.

Q: All right. Sergeant [redacted] resuming the interview. Thank you.

b(6)-2

A: We were discussing --

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Q: Let's see, oh, female guards and male-dominated Arab culture.

A: They don't like it. The prisoners originally didn't like it, and then it got to the point where they would ridicule, make fun of the female MPs. However, due to the fact that the female MPs are professionals, it was water off their back, didn't bother them, they enforced the same standard and rules. And then the prisoners quickly adapted to the fact that they were females and they were going to tell them what to do. So one of my best young E4 MPs that really surprised me, she's a very quiet person, she would control her compound better than some of the male big MPs. She did an excellent job. So it didn't affect them at all. But the effect it had on the prisoners was immaterial.

Q: Now do you have punishments for the prisoners? For example if they expose themselves or something?

A: They automatically go to segregation. Automatically. And that has occurred.

Q: And how long do they go to segregation?

A: 24-48 hours depending upon their behavior when they're in segregation. Once they come out of segregation, they may go right back to the same compound or they may go to Compound 13, depending upon their history.

Q: And does that seem to work as a punishment?

A: It does. The ones who did it never did it again that we know of. So it must have worked.

Q: All right. We're actually getting to the end of the interview. You mentioned the Palm Sunday riot, but what other riots have there been, and what have been the root causes for those?

A: Well, there were quite a few, a lot of the fights and disturbances began during feeding or later in the evening. It would occur during the feeding because they would fight to get in line. In front of each other. Knowing that we're never going to run out of food, because if we run out of food we have to get more. That would then create a fight between two of them, which would escalate. It would escalate to the point where they would go in their tents and pull out the pegs and the poles and the weapons they've made and come out. Now the result of that is they just put their feeding back hours. Because now we line them up, bring in the QRF and the dogs and we do a shakedown in the tents for their weapons. Then we pull out the troublemakers. Who will then end up eating less anyway.

Q: Have any prisoners killed other prisoners in the compound?

A: No. One was very close. One actually pulled out a very long knife that he had made out of a pole. And luckily, the MP was there and a warning shot was fired at that time

and it stopped him for a second, and we were able to get the QRF in and grab him and bring him out. So the one where the prisoner was shot and killed was as I talked about earlier, it was probably the worst incident in an individual compound that we had. But most of the other disturbances were rock-throwing for it could be reasons, they want more water, they would receive over 6,000 gallons of water a day, and when they spill it all and use it all and waste it all and then they wanted more, it wasn't programmed that way, they were receiving more than what was required by the Geneva Convention or the Army Regulation 190-8. And that's just a condition, a discipline. This is the water you receive. Use it. Don't waste it. You can't get any more. So that water started it. Medical care. If we saw -- if a medic saw 100 men a day, maybe 30 actually needed to see him. They would do anything to get out of the compound. The medics even identified no, seen me 300 times, you're not coming back. They want to go home. They don't know why they were here. It's just endless, the reasons that would cause a disturbance.

Q: Your soldiers are right among the prisoners. Is there much interaction? I know there's not supposed to be interaction between prisoners and soldiers.

A: There's always going to be -- you can't have personal relationships develop. You must have interaction with the prisoners. The most interaction that they'll have with the prisoners is with the compound representative. The one who has identified within his own group as the leader of the compound. They had a lot of interaction with the compound representative. Because they don't talk, the idea is not to talk to the other prisoners. Is to talk to the compound representative only. Unless of course one of the other prisoners is doing something wrong. No, they didn't develop personal relationships. That's fraternization. It's also not safe for themselves. But they had a great deal of interaction with the prisoners. Again because of how the facility was built. If you back up from your compound to get away from it for a little while, you're now standing right in front of another compound. And that's only 15, 20 feet away. Over in the 724th's facility, if you back up you have 30 yards, 40 yards that you can go before you hit another compound. So you have room to get away from the prisoners and still see them. So the facility was not designed to support no interaction or -- it was a very taxing job for the MPs. Very taxing. My sergeant major and I put in 20, 23 hours a day. We've got [redacted]risoners, we're going to have incidents all the

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time. And especially towards the end of the shift when an MP has had 12 or 13 hours of constant verbal abuse so to speak from the prisoners, that's when we spent most of our time down there because we knew people can lose their patience and it's just human nature. They never did. The prisoners did. But the MPs didn't. Which is very impressive.

Q: How do you maintain the morale of your MPs who go down there? It's a little bit outside your field perhaps.

A: It is but it isn't. All the MPs work for me. They all belong to the S3. So I care about the frame of mind they come down in. The frame of mind while they're there. And the frame of mind when they leave. I've told all of my NCOs that I may have concern over one MP that seems a little bit out of it today, is taking things very -- is very short-tempered, why don't you pull him off and talk to him and see what's going on, come to find out the MP did have a little family issue at home, which was affecting his job, which could affect prisoners, which could lead to problems.

Q: Affect your job.

A: Right. So he was replaced just for the day, just to get him away from things for a while. Because they work 12 hours a day for a month and when you're surrounded by

thousands of people, 12 or 14 hours a day for 30 days in a row, that's a long time.

Q: And you're eating MREs.

A: Yeah and you're eating MREs.

Q: Or MKT.

A: Yeah or trying to get rotated out, eat something real quick and go back. And then we took a concern of course as to when they left, how were they, anything significant happen that you didn't tell us about, the NCOs took care of their soldiers, and I talked to the NCOs and the soldiers all the time. So we didn't have any situations where any MP from the battalion or the company lose their temper guarding the compounds. And the 314th, they were the feed team. The 314th MP Company, the 1st Sergeant came up to me and said hey sir, I'm going to start making some changes on my feed teams. Feed team is the worst job in the world. Twice a day you go in there and talk to people or try to get people to listen, so you can feed them. You do it twice a day, but for some reason they never listen to you, and it takes forever, so he was pulling them off because it was taxing, it was very taxing on them. So he rotated people on the feed team. So the NCOs are well on top of the mental condition of the MPs.

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Q: OK, good deal. Let's talk about the layout a little bit. Because you've mentioned you have towers there. So how are they positioned?

A: The towers were actually CONEXs, empty CONEXs, that the MPs built their own shade on. And they're positioned at all [redacted] as well as [redacted] at the [redacted] and then [redacted] in [redacted] on [redacted]. And in between the towers there are [redacted] So you would surround them with [redacted] MPs just on [redacted] Plus all of your MPs on the inside of the facility itself. Plus your external Buka force protection security, plus the QRF.

Q: And when did you get the non-lethal weaponry? And what types did you get?

A: We received that actually towards the end of the mission. I thin it was a CFLCC issue as to who was going to receive it. I wish we'd have had it during the Palm Sunday riot and I wish we would have had it a week after the Palm Sunday riot. We received the shotgun shells that have beads in them. Which we ended up using one time. We did fire non-lethal.

Q: What was that incident?

A: This incident was actually a very -- it was unfortunate. It was a compound that we were transporting over to the

724th's which was actually a bigger compound that had more room, more tents, so it was a good thing. And the beginning of the transfer, they all rushed the gate, they tried to get out of the gate, they were backed off once, and then they rushed the gate to the point where a couple of them came out of the gate. So the non-lethal was fired, the shotgun, approximately 30 meters away, and the result was one prisoner got hit in the hand, so he was treated for the pellets making him bleed, and the other one was hit in the leg and he was treated. So you get the shotgun, you get concussion grenades, which we never used, and you get the QRF shields and riot batons and facemasks and kneepads, which were only used for presence, no one -- the QRF never had to hit anybody with a baton or use their shields. Well, against rocks they did on the Palm Sunday riot.

Q: So there were shields out for the Palm Sunday riot.

A: Oh yeah but we only had five. We ended up with 500 MPs after the call went out for help. But initially we only had five shields.

Q: OK, let's see, I'm pretty much getting winding down here. Is there something you'd like to add, something I need to elaborate on, sir?

A: No. If this goes in the history books, for what it's worth, the original plan was for a hell of a lot more IR

battalions and a lot more prisoners. The 320th MP Battalion did 90% of the EPW operations for this war. We had the most prisoners for the most amount of time. The other battalions mostly handled the holding areas. They may get up to 400 prisoners and ship them out and ship them all down to us. We doubled our capacity and a facility that was built for only 2,000. And the battalion and two companies did it without proper equipment and resources that they should have had if their equipment was here. And it really needs to be noted somewhere that the battalion, the 320th -- or 314th MP Company, the 447th and the 814th who later came under us towards the end --

Q: And are they still here, the 814th?

A: No, they were pulled out either for a customs mission or Baghdad, I'm not sure. It really should be noted that these units did the bulk of the work. Now when I go back, I won't be -- I'll PCS from the 320th, being ATR.

Q: Permanent change of station.

A: Right. But it's a good battalion, probably one of the best battalions, and they need to get the credit for this. But a definite thing that we're going to write to the MP school and the MP journal, but in the history books that's where it needs to be.

Q: All right. Let's get some statistical information. It was two meals a day for prisoners, I believe?

A: Correct.

Q: All right, and what was the highest number of prisoners you had to the lowest number of prisoners you had?

A: The initial balance we started with was approximately [redacted] The highest we had, I think it's around [redacted] The reason why it's difficult to give the exact number is because they were doing transfers over to the 724th facility but we were still receiving new prisoners. The lowest amount of prisoners we had for the longest period of time is we had ten individuals in the segregation unit in the CONEXs. That's after we had emptied the facility but we kept them because they were high-risk, three are wanted for -- are probably going to be prosecuted for rape of a fellow prisoner. Three are other suspected rapists and murderers. One's a British criminal who shot two British soldiers. They have since been transferred over to the 724th's high-risk compound. But that would be the least amount that we had.

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Q: OK, let's talk a little bit about the segregation compound. What were the cells? I believe you said they were CONEXs.

A: CONEXs.

Q: When the Red Cross came by.

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A: Yeah, they were CONEXs that our R&U sections built faces on the front of wire and wood with a door on it.

Q: OK, and how many CONEXs did you have?

A: Ten.

Q: All right and now for the transfers, what was the procedure for moving the prisoners over? Because you mentioned there was the near riot with that, where the non-lethal round was used.

A: The procedure was we would get deuce and a half trucks. We'd take out [redacted] at a time, write down their ISN, put them on the truck. b(2)-3

Q: And the ISN is individual --

A: Serial number.

Q: That sounds good.

A: Yeah, I think it's individual serial number. It's the number that's registered in the National Detainee Reporting System.

Q: Oh, internee serial number probably.

A: There it is. We put them on the truck, take them over to the 724th. If they were a British captured prisoner, they would be reprocessed over there under the American system. So they would then fall into the American National Detainee Reporting System. And that was the process. It was that easy. We'd do that until the compound was fully moved.

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We'd go in and sweep and clean up the compound in case we had to use it again.

Q: And how many guards would be with the [redacted] prisoners at that time?

A: You had [redacted] or [redacted], we had people counting, searching, putting them on the trucks, riding the trucks over, driving the trucks over. And there was usually myself, the sergeant major or the battalion commander would lead all the transfers.

Q: OK, so it was about a [redacted] to [redacted] or even [redacted] to [redacted] prisoner to guard ratio.

A: Correct.

Q: OK. Just trying to get that out. You elaborated on the 320th, what they've accomplished. Is there any other statistical information, short -- some people look for short bites of information. Like you said, 7,200 prisoners in 30 days now. Meals, escape attempts, you said there were about ten and you believe they were all caught except for possibly the three, the rumored three.

A: Correct.

Q: All right. Let me ask do you have an idea what the next mission is or whether or not you're going home?

A: No. At this time consulting the brigade yesterday, there isn't, not another mission slotted for the 320th. And in a

way I'm glad, and I hope for the unit that we don't. They did their mission. They did a mission in one month with 7,200 prisoners. And after a while --you don't burn out, but after a while you get to a point where either give us a bigger facility or reduce the number of prisoners. So what we did in a month would take another unit six months to reach burnout on. These soldiers can be told tomorrow that there's another mission and they'd do it. But in my mind they did their mission and they did it for the entire war. No one ran a facility the size that we ran. Especially as small a facility as it was. So there isn't one slotted for us. I personally hope it's redeployment.

Q: Now frequently during my interviews I'll ask senior leadership about the conditions of the camp. But I will pass over that unless you want to touch on it. Like frequently I'll ask how it improved, but you're operations, you're training. So won't go into that with you. I'll hit your commander on that for sure, but I am curious, what do you think about retention? Because that's a big issue with Reserve component units returning home.

A: Well, a lot of MPs not only within this battalion but in other battalions just came home from mobilization before they got mobilized for this. The MP Corps is too small. We don't have enough MPs. Most of the missions out there

are now MP missions. Rumor has it that units could be redeployed now and six months later be deployed back over here. If that's the case, they won't have an MP reserve anymore, because Reserves are not active duty. If they were, they'd be active duty. People have civilian lives. Families yes, but so do active duty soldiers have families. But they need to relook at the use of the MPs in the Reserves. A lot of them are on homeland defense, not necessarily in their own state. So I think it's going to have a tremendous effect on retention. Every deployment does. I just think this one's going to have a bigger one because a lot of them just came home from mobilization. So I hope that someone doesn't redeploy this unit in six months after they redeploy -- or doesn't -- yeah, deploy them again, because that would be a mistake. They're going to ruin units if they do that.

Q: Do you have any idea what percentage are going to stay? Granted, not everyone leaves just because they're dissatisfied with the Army Reserve National Guard. Some switch branches, services, or even just join different units.

A: Some might go back to their old unit. I'd say at least 30% will either get out of the unit, get out of the MP world, or get out of the Reserves.

Q: Let me ask, do you have your 20 years in the military or --

A: No, I hit 16 years in seven days, May 27th will be 16 years.

Q: All right. Last question, sir, what's the first thing you're going to do when you get home?

A: Kiss my wife and kids.

Q: All right. On that note I'm going to go ahead and conclude the interview.

A: OK.

Q: Thank you sir.

END OF TAPE