

Admin Law Control Sheet

HD	Date received	Action	Name/Unit
12		CDRs inquiry	1st BDE
Summary	Attorney	Status	
Translator missing items		Sent back to bde (see DA 200)	
Date Completed			

RECORD

Part Form

*1st BDE LAC*

Received by Gate



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**TRANSMITTAL RECORD**

For use of this form, see AR 25-50; the proponent agency is DCSPER

1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

2. SHIPMENT NO.

3. TITLE/FILE IDENTIFICATION

Cdr's Inquir

4. AS OF DATE (YYYYMMDD)

20020717

5. SHIPMENT DATE (YYYYMMDD)

20020717

6. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

7. NUMBER OF RECORDS TRANSMITTED

1 Packet

8. PERSON TO CONTACT (Name and telephone)

9. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL (AR 335-15)

10. SHIPPED FROM

11. SHIPPED TO

1Bde LNO

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED (When box is checked, sign below and return copy to sender.)

10a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF SENDER

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11a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF RECEIVER

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10b. SIGNATURE OF SENDER

11b. SIGNATURE OF RECEIVER AND DATE

12. TYPE OF MEDIA TRANSMITTED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HARD COPY	<input type="checkbox"/> PUNCHED CARDS	<input type="checkbox"/> CASSETTES
<input type="checkbox"/> MICROFILM	<input type="checkbox"/> PHOTO	<input type="checkbox"/> FICHE

13. NUMBER OF BOXES (Packages)

14. NUMBER OF ITEMS

15. METHOD OF SHIPMENT

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COURIER	<input type="checkbox"/> FIRST CLASS	<input type="checkbox"/> PARCEL POST
<input type="checkbox"/> EXPRESS MAIL	<input type="checkbox"/> REGISTERED	

16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

17. TYPE COMPONENT USED (For magnetically recorded data)

18. REMARKS

Cdr's Inquir for 1st Bde  
- Tikrit University Translator Missing  
Personal Items - 6 sub 103

6341

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY  
1ST BRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
TIKRIT, IRAQ APO AE 09323

AFYB-IN-S6

6 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

SUBJECT: Commander's Inquiry – Tikrit University Translator Missing Personal Items

1. Summary of Findings. At the time this particular incident happened, procedures for detainee handling were not well-defined. Sloppy accountability of detainee personal property appeared to be the norm until several complaints put more focus on the problem. Within days of this Tikrit University raid on 27 May, new procedures were put in place to ensure proper tracking of detainees and their personal property. The current procedures noted during this inquiry appear to be well within standard and are being adhered to. There was no evidence of any kind that pointed to a specific person's wrong-doing but rather a series of events that led to the loss of accountability of these personal items.

2. Background. On 28 May, 2003 the 1st Brigade, 4ID conducted a raid to detain individuals suspected of conducting subversion and espionage against U.S. forces. There were two groups of detainees this day: one group detained at the university and another group who worked as translators at the 4th Infantry Division Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) located at the main palace complex. This particular inquiry focuses on the translators who were detained once they arrived to work at the CMOC. They were screened at the CMOC and moved to the 1BCT holding cell for two days and then to the division holding cell for 6 days. In the process some of their personal belongings were taken and never returned. My findings are based on a series of exhibits which include Division and Brigade-level fragmentary orders and interviews with soldiers and Iraqi civilians involved.

3. References:

- a. Email from 1BCT Legal, subject "Missing Property", dtd 241156DJUN03. (Exhibit A)
- b. TF IH FRAGO 122 (STORAGE AND SECURITY OF HIGH VALUE, PILFERABLE ITEMS) TO TF IH OPORD 03-05/IV (REGIME REMOVAL) DTD 252330ZAPR03. (Exhibit B1)
- c. 1BCT FRAGO 36 (DETAINED PERSONS/CIVILIAN INTERNEES RELEASE PROCEDURES) TO 1BCT OPORD 03-04-II (RAIDER STRIKE 2) DTD 280300ZAPR03 (Exhibit B2)
- d. TF IH FRAGO 592 (INTERNMENT AND DETENTION OPERATIONS AND CG DIRECTED ASSESSMENT) TO TF IH OPORD 03-05/IV (REGIME REMOVAL) DTD 042346D03. (Exhibit B3)
- e. TF IH FRAGO 867 (HANDLING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY) TO TF IH OPORD 03-05/IV (REGIME REMOVAL) DTD 042215DJUL03. (Exhibit B4)

4. Names of Complainants and alleged missing personal property:

- a. [REDACTED] - 130,000 ID (had 40,000 ID returned)
- b. [REDACTED] - 2003 diary; Arabic-English dictionary; 30,000 ID
- c. [REDACTED] - 2001 diary; Oxford English dictionary; \$29; 230,000 ID (had 100,000 ID and \$20 returned)
- d. [REDACTED] - 3 books; 30,000 ID (had \$210 returned)
- e. [REDACTED] - 3 CDs; 110,000 ID

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5. During the scope of this inquiry, the following personnel were interviewed:

- a. [REDACTED] at Division CMOC - 27 June (Exhibit C)
- b. [REDACTED] 720 MP Battalion - 27 June (Exhibit D)
- c. [REDACTED] 411 MP Company - 27 June (Exhibit D)
- d. [REDACTED] at Division CMOC - 28 June (Exhibit E)
- e. [REDACTED] at Division CMOC - 28 June (Exhibit F)
- f. [REDACTED] - 28 June (Exhibit G)
- g. [REDACTED] - 2 July / 4 July (Exhibits H, L)
- h. [REDACTED] holding cell NCO - 2 July (Exhibit I)
- i. [REDACTED] holding cell NCO - 2 July (Exhibit J)
- j. [REDACTED] holding cell soldier - 2 July (Exhibit J)
- k. [REDACTED] - 2 July (Exhibit K)
- l. [REDACTED] - 4 July (Exhibit M)
- m. [REDACTED] THT 24 - 4 July (Exhibit N)
- n. [REDACTED] THT 32 - 4 July (Exhibit O)
- o. [REDACTED] THT 20 - 5 July (Exhibit P)
- p. [REDACTED] translator - 6 July (Exhibit Q)
- q. [REDACTED] translator - 6 July (Exhibit R)

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6. Findings. On 27 May, 2003 the 1BCT conducted a raid which involved several members of the staff of Tikrit University. There were two groups detained this day which has led to some confusion during the gathering of statements and details. The fact that these raids occurred five weeks ago and that the two groups were both labeled by many as "Tikrit University professors" has caused some inconsistencies in the statements and has caused this investigating officer to decipher in some cases which information is specific to the "Tikrit University translators".

The CMOC personnel have received many complaints since opening the CMOC and believe that Iraqi personal property is being lost by U.S. forces either due to theft or mismanagement of property. In this specific case, the translators worked for them and there was a bond and trust established. CMOC personnel assisted in placing the personal articles (mostly books, dictionaries, and CDs) in white plastic bags. The 411th MP [REDACTED] and CMOC personnel both admit that there was no inventory or paperwork done to [REDACTED] account for these items (Exhibits E, F and G). A confusing piece of this investigation was that [REDACTED] remembered giving the white bags of personal items to the CI teams to examine for intelligence value yet the CI teams both say they never were provided such items (Exhibits G, M, and N). Either way they both admit no wallets or money were seized at this time.

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The detainees departed the CMOC approximately 1700 enroute to 1-22IN/1BCT holding cell. Detainees were searched by [redacted] (1-22IN [redacted]) and rings, watches, and "wallets" were placed in an MRE pouch with the detainee's ID number written on the pouch. The 1-22IN Mortar platoon soldiers use the word "wallet" but the complainants say they did not have wallets but instead just wads of money (Exhibits J, Q, and R). [redacted] does remember the white bags but describes them more as a consolidated bag without anything distinguishing the items to match them up with a specific detainee (Exhibit J). However, once again there was no paperwork done while transferring this property and the complainants statements match this administrative oversight (Exhibits Q and R). He admits that he provided the white bags and the MRE box full of pouches to the CI team who was using a small building outside the holding area. Once again no paperwork was done during this transfer. As per [redacted] statement the CI teams left the bags, box and pouches unsecured when they were done screening and [redacted] took the items back under his control. The items spent the night next to his bed which was at that time in the platoon CP/radio room - a room manned 24 hours a day.

After a few days the items were provided to the S2 and then passed onward to the division holding area to link up with the detainees. Once again there was no paperwork done at this time to track the movement of these items. The detainees' statements to match that the MRE pouches did transfer to division since once they were released they mention opening their MRE pouches to retrieve most of their items (Exhibits Q and R).

The Mortar Platoon mentioned to me that many others had questioned them about missing items before [redacted] had been told of missing items a few days after this raid and had his own investigation going on. At some time after the detainees were dropped off the 411th MP Company returned to drop off a white plastic bag left in one of their vehicles of the mortar platoon recalls that in that bag was found 2-3 items on [redacted] list and his also did an unannounced platoon inspection which turned up nothing unusual [redacted] and his section were very eager to answer my questions in hopes of clearing their name. They explained they were grateful for the new procedures to help them show they are doing a professional job and not involved in any wrongdoing.

To the best of my ability I was able to determine the chain of custody of the detainees property as:

- CMOC personnel take some interpreter items at the division CMOC (white/clear bags)
- 411 MP Co at CMOC transport items to 1BCT cell (white/clear bags)
- 1-22IN [redacted] at 1BCT holding cell; also takes watches, rings, "wallets" for MRE pouch
- CI team at 1BCT holding cell
- [redacted] at 1BCT holding cell (finds items unattended in "interrogation shack")
- 1-22IN S2
- Division holding cell
- Interpreters (never sees the white/clear bag items but does receive most of the MRE pouch items)

All these transfers occurred without any inventory or supporting documentation reference personal items belonging to the detainees. All those inventoried were very aware of the DA Form 4137 "Evidence/Property Custody Document" but all admit that during this early part of

the operations in theater the procedures were still very loose. At any time it is possible that an item or items were not present from one transfer to another.

Division FRAGO 122 is dated one month prior to this day's raids and tasks G4 to "provide guidance for storage and accountability of high value items. POC [redacted] n." Brigade FRAGO 36 is a few days later and states in paragraph 3.C.5.A.3 "store and give receipt for any property confiscated." Division FRAGO 592 dated 4 June states "units must account for each captive and his equipment when they arrive at the forward collection point." Much later on 4 July Division FRAGO 867 states "For all property seized, complete DA Form 4137 (Appendix A) to track the items from origin to storage facility...when seizing property from an individual, provide a copy of the DA Form 4137 to the individual..." (Exhibits B1, B2, B3, and B4). There may be some other FRAGOs whose titles did not catch my eye but the trend here shows very broad guidance early on about "providing receipts" when taking property. Then it appears the division realized it needed to provide stricter guidance and provided more detail as to exact forms and procedures for soldiers to follow.

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On 27 May, 2003 it appears to me that basic hand receipt accountability was not adhered to until guidance from higher forced the use of the DA Form 4137. Today's procedures seem to be much more tightly controlled with paperwork tracking ensuring a proper chain of custody.

[redacted]

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process

[redacted]

MAJ, SC  
1BCT S6

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4ID 1BCT S6

From: 4ID 1BCT LEGAL  
Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 8:56 PM  
To: 4ID 1BCT S6  
Subject: FW: Missing Property

Importance: High

Sir:

The email that started it.

Raiders:

[Redacted]

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-----Original Message-----

From: 4ID SJA  
Sent: Saturday, June 14, 2003 03:31  
To: 4ID 1BCT LEGAL  
Subject: Missing Property  
Importance: High

[Redacted]

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The CMOC has received a credible complaint regarding the failure to return property after apprehension and placement in the 1BCT confinement facility. According to [Redacted] the MP LT who apprehended the translators at the CMOC remembers dropping them off with property at 1BCT. The DCCP claims the property was not transferred to them.

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To make matters worse, when [Redacted] called the 1BCT Confinement [Redacted] to see if he had the property, [Redacted] told [Redacted] it was not his responsibility to keep track of property. Huh?

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

130,000 ID  
- Diary of 2003; Arabic English Dictionary, 30,000 ID  
- Diary of 2001, Modern Oxford English Dictionary, \$29.00; 230,000 ID  
- 3 books, 30,000 ID (they returned a separate \$210.00)  
110,000, 3 CDs

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Please advise.

fdd

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EXHIBIT C [REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

27 June 2003. Location: Division CMOC. Has a strong feelings that many of his local contacts have been mistreated or apprehended without proper cause. It has forced many of them to quit or to be afraid to work with US forces. [REDACTED] told me that there is one interpreter who is still in contact with the team after the 27 May apprehension.

[REDACTED] had saved money to go that day to Baghdad to purchase a washing machine and that money was taken and never returned. He was detained for 7 days. All interpreters had dictionaries as well. When asked if anything was given back he told me that their watches were returned. He also mentioned [REDACTED] had his house in Al Ouja raided and \$35K removed and never returned. These are educated men who have even said "you wouldn't do this in the United States" reference taking property from detainees and never returning. Recommends I talk to [REDACTED] (speaks VERY highly of this man) and [REDACTED]

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EXHIBIT D (720th MP INTERVIEWS)  
27 June 2003. Location: 720th MP HQ.

-talked to the [REDACTED] who was unable to verify that any personal property from detainees has come up missing. His unit mission does not deal with personal property but rather the handoff of detainees to the 1BCT detention cell.

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] OPS Cell of 411<sup>th</sup> MP Co

This interview was later deemed to be of no value because [REDACTED] account below relates to a different group of University detainees - not the ones for the scope of this inquiry.

-27 May events. His purpose was to set up an LZ in support of the raid. His mission was to transport detainees in the back of a M998 to the detention cell. Prepositioned his team in support of 64<sup>th</sup> MP Co and stayed with his vehicle by the main entrance. The first action was a supposed VP/dean who was escorted by 2 soldiers. He was padded down and put in the back of the HMMWV. He was handcuffed but not blindfolded. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were present. After a while he was told to move the vehicle around to a different doorway. [REDACTED] provided cravats to blindfold the detainees. 2x M998s with about 10-16 detainees total. Driven to 1-22IN holding cell. Remembers [REDACTED] from 411<sup>th</sup> escorted the detainees. [REDACTED] was in the other M998. Remembers a [REDACTED] (CI) soldier at the 1-22 holding cell but not his name. They segregated the president and vice president from the other detainees. [REDACTED] did NOT see any personal property transported or taken by anybody throughout his participation. This was his only mission so he can has no information pertaining to this inquiry. Does NOT know of any other soldiers who would have information that would be useful to me for this investigation.

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EXHIBIT E (██████████ INTERVIEW) (b)(7)(C)-4 (b)(6)-4  
28 June 2003. PHONECON to Division CMOC.

██████████ Night prior he was told this screening would happen. CMOC invited them all in so CI could talk with them. 7 from this pool were detained by CI and taken to 1BCT detention. ██████████ with 720<sup>th</sup> MPs was the ██████████ at the scene. He recalls they had books, dictionaries, 3 CDs. ██████████ and ██████████ personally placed these items in white/semi clear plastic bags. No money was placed in the bags. No inventory was taken at this moment. Those bags were given to E5/SGT of the MPs. They were released from U.S. custody 7 days later. Interpreter, ██████████ returned back and was visibly shaken up. He announced of the 7 detainees, 5 had items taken and not returned. It was possible that the other two may have had their belongings returned. Once ██████████ heard they were still being held he went to the holding cell to meet with them to ensure they were alright. It was 3 days after the screening at the CMOC that he visited and talked to ██████████ but nothing was mentioned at that time of any missing personal belongings. ██████████ wanted the interpreters to know that he was doing what he could to help their situation. Since this event, only ██████████ has come back to discuss the problem of missing property. ██████████ has heard many complaints pointing fingers at 1<sup>st</sup> and 2d BCT holding cells losing/misplacing detainee personal property.

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EXHIBIT F (SFC ██████████ INTERVIEW)

██████████ was present with ██████████ After the CI screening the detainees stood for flex cutting. At that point it was identified that they had books, translation items, pads, pens, etc. ██████████ got some bags to put these items in. Any one who had an item had their own bag. ██████████ carried all the bags out of the building handed off to MP SGT/E5. All of these items drove away with the MPs and detainees. He recalls that detainees were in one vehicle and the personal items in the other vehicle. He recalls the MP team consisted of a ██████████ LT, SGT/B5 and a SPC. No property was catalogued at the division CMOC by anybody.

EXHIBIT G (██████████ INTERVIEW) (b)(6)-4 (b)(7)(C)-4

28 June 2003. PHONECON with 411<sup>th</sup> MP Co. ██████████  
██████████ from her platoon went to CMOC to detain university workers who were to arrive that morning. When the interpreters first arrived they were put in a main room and then individually interviewed by CI teams. Her team would pad down and show items to the CI teams to see if it was of any intelligence value. To her knowledge all items were given back to the individuals at that time. The CI teams decided who was to be detained and who was to be released. At that time items were taken from those to be held but no forms were on hand. She remembers university books, dictionaries, and personal notebooks. ██████████ remembers allowing them to keep their wallets. She did not have any DA Form 4137s at that time but items were put in white bag and moved with the detainees. To her recollection there was no money put in any of the white bags. When they showed up at the 1BCT detention cell they handed over the white bags to 1BCT personnel and explained that there was no paperwork yet done. The 1BCT team said they would take care of it. The inventory was not done in front of her. She does not recall the name of the person at the detention cell that day. Her team has done drops to 1BCT cell many times and it can be any one of a number of soldiers who will be on shift. She remembers one bag being found later and that bag was brought to the holding cell. She does not recall what the items were that were in that bag. Normally paperwork is filled out. Does not recall any bad situations in dealing with 1BCT holding cell. Nothing of financial value was in the white bags

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given to 1BCT. [REDACTED] does not know what 1BCT does with the property once detainees and property are handed off.

EXHIBIT H ([REDACTED] PHONECON)

2 July, 2003. PHONECON with 1-22IN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] says they came to the holding cell after 6pm so S [REDACTED] Articles would have been given to [REDACTED]. DA Forms 4137 and 2823 did not come in to effect until a division frago mandated a few days later. Prior to that, items were collected and written on his tag. There are some items that were taken from a raid that netted #4 but no property from drop-offs is still on hand. [REDACTED] will look thru the log and find out who was on shift that day and have them write up statements as to how that hand-off went with 720<sup>th</sup> MPs and if any personal items were collected.

[REDACTED] INTERVIEW- 3 JULY

Was around that day but does not recall any white garbage bags with personal items in it. He remembers a group of 12 and that [REDACTED] was looking for a black organizer, a women's purse, and a watch. He did not recall seeing any money brought in to the holding cell but knew there were wallets.

[REDACTED] called after looking up the names I provided and tells me the detainees were held from 29 May thru 3 June and they were delivered by 104MI. In checking with [REDACTED] of 1BCT S2 he feels that it would be strange for 104MI to be the unit credited with dropping off EPWs. It should be a maneuver unit who captured and tagged the individual.

EXHIBIT I ([REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

3 July 2003. He is one of the [REDACTED] of the holding cell and watches over them once they are inside. He is not involved directly with the hand-off from the MPs or the delivering unit. He showed me how they use MRE pouches to put detainee personal belongings in and then label with the detainee number. Then the MRE pouch is placed in an MRE cardboard box. Items are annotated on the DA Form 4137 and then that paperwork is placed inside the MRE pouch. When asked about his receiving of the detainees and the white/clear garbage bags from the MPs he said he did not recall any bags of that type. It is common practice that his team will remove belts, rings, wallets, and watches from the detainees once they arrive to the holding cell. The CI team will interrogate the detainee and they are provided the MRE pouch with the detainee number on it to determine if the objects lead to any questions. The DA Form 4137 was not used during this raid - it wasn't until a few days later in early June that the standards became very strict and the process was tracked with detailed paperwork. [REDACTED] did not recall any of the detainees names nor the names of the MPs who dropped them off. He did not see any money out in the open. He showed me his log matching name, detainee number, date in and date out but that did not start until 4 June so the names in question were not logged.

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EXHIBIT J ( [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

3 July 2003. [REDACTED] is another NCO in the holding cell process but was not yet on board at the time of this specific detaining. He was able to explain to me the current processes which matched SGT [REDACTED] explanation.

[REDACTED] A soldier of [REDACTED] He was the actual soldier who received the detainees and searched them removing their watches, rings, and wallets and placed them in MRE pouches with a matching detainee number. He did not ever look inside the wallets nor did he fill out any paperwork listing the items. He does remember the clear garbage bags provided by the MPs but said they were all bunched up and had multiple people's items in one bag - there was nothing identifying which bag belonged to which person. He said there was a special CI team there that day and not one he was used to seeing. He remembered providing the bags to the CI team to look thru as well as the MRE box with pouches. The CI team used a separate building which was known as the "interrogation hut". He brought the items there. Usually afterwards the CI team or the S2 themselves would deliver the items to the S2 for further processing/analysis. Later, before going off shift he checked in the hut and found the box, pouches, and bags all laying about the table but no one was inside the hut. As best he could tell the same amount of bags and pouches were present but he has no idea if all the items from before. There was no paperwork so nothing to compare with. He also recalled someone returning with a missing garbage bag which cleared up some missing items from [REDACTED] list. When I asked him what he did with the box of MRE pouches and garbage bags he said it was late so he brought it back to his hooch and slept with it next to his cot. That same room housed the platoon CP so it was manned 24 hours and he figured it a safe place for the night. It took a few days but the box finally made it up to [REDACTED] in the Bn S2 [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] then and now commands a company.

EXHIBIT K ( [REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

3 July 2003. [REDACTED] He does in fact remember clear garbage bags with books and CDs and also remembers a computer tower. He remembers one large consolidated bag, not a bunch of smaller bags. Recalls several days later a vehicle returning with a missing bag that had some items in it that [REDACTED] as looking for [REDACTED] list had 4 items and [REDACTED] personally looked in the bags and found 2 or 3 of these items. The items were given to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] remembered calling [REDACTED] to tell him there were still items from the university detainees that had not been picked up. It took 4-5 days before the Mortar section decided to bring the items themselves up to the S2.

After hearing that many items were coming up missing, [REDACTED] conducted his own inspection without telling any of his soldiers what he was looking for. They dumped rucks and checked the entire building and found nothing. No large amounts of money nor was anything out of the ordinary found or anything found in strange places (ie. socks, etc).

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EXHIBIT L ( [REDACTED] ) PHONECON

4 July 2003. [REDACTED] (1-22IN [REDACTED]) Does not recall who the CI team was that day but would look it up. He checked on the names of the complainants and remembers that the same night this group arrived at 1-22IN holding cell they were taken to the division cell. He did not recall any accompanying bags. However, mortars platoon brought another box to the S2 a few days later. The division drop was with detainees and the MRE bags with personal items. No 4137 was done. Remembers BDE FRAGO 158 creating new rules and chain of custody in effect when dealing with detainees. Division did not do DA Form 4137 at this time. Does not recall any money in bag provided to division. He believes the mortar section does a good job and has not taken any detainee property.

EXHIBIT M ( [REDACTED] ) INTERVIEW

4 July 2003. 1400- talked to [REDACTED] to find out which CI teams were involved with this event. He informed me that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conducted the CMOC screenings that day. [REDACTED] is a division DS team and is currently collocated with 4-42FA.

EXHIBIT N ( [REDACTED] ) INTERVIEW

4 July 2003. 1730- She did conduct screenings at the division CMOC but never came in contact with any personal items. She filled out the CI screening sheet and MPs filled out EPW tags. Believes that the detainees drove away approximately 1700 that day. Was not aware of anyone involved with any wrongdoing.

EXHIBIT O ( [REDACTED] ) INTERVIEW

4 July 2003. 1800 - He conducted his screenings upstairs at the division CMOC building while many were held downstairs in the big room. He operated in a different room than THT 24. MPs brought the detainees up and he recalls looking at some paperwork provided by the CMOC personnel from the translators personnel file. There were some pictures and personal info provided by the CMOC S2 team for employee records. He never handled or saw any personal items of the detainees.

EXHIBIT P ( [REDACTED] ) INTERVIEW

July 5, 2003. 1630- When asked if he was involved in the screening during the Tikrit University raid he said he was at the 1BCT holding cell for the daytime only which allowed him to screen the group that came directly from the university. However, he was not on hand for the evening arrival of the translators. I asked him if he ever saw white garbage bags with personal belongings and he said he did not. He admitted that he often has problems with the chain of custody of property and even the "capture tags" needed to be filled out by him on many occasions. [REDACTED] admitted that back then procedures were very lax.

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EXHIBIT Q ( [REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

6 July, 2003. 1700. Met [REDACTED] at the Division CMOC. He described his day starting with his arrival at the CMOC and being made to wait in the big room on the first floor until called forward to be screened. Nobody took any of his belongings until after the screening. At that point, someone took his Modern Oxford Dictionary English-English and his black day planner and put it in a shopping bag but he does not recall the name of the logo on the bag. He was tagged with Q6 he recalls and that was put on his shirt. He was flex cuffed with hands behind his back and eventually taken with 6 others to a holding cell. Once delivered, his belt, watch, wad of money, and ring were taken and put in an MRE pouch – no receipt was provided to him. He recalls having 330,000 Iraqi Dinar and \$49. The same night he was taken to the first holding cell they were all taken to another holding cell (presumably the division holding cell) where they waited for 5 minutes and then were loaded back up and returned to the first holding cell (presumably the 1BCT cell). He believes there was some confusion by the guards as to who they were because once they were identified as interpreters that seemed to trigger their return back to the first holding cell. The other university professors were already at the division holding cell. Two days later the group was taken back to the division holding cell. They were being yelled at and paper tags were placed on them and in the process a soldier in a brown t-shirt slipped some Iraqi Dinar in his left breast pocket – later identified as 100,000 ID. After being interrogated and found of no value on day 8, he was provided his MRE pouch and released. In the pouch was his watch, belt, and \$20. He was still missing 230,000 ID and \$29. He showed me a wad of ID in his pocket and explained that even 100,000 ID is too thick to put in a wallet so it is carried folded in the pocket. Made perfect sense to me once I saw how thick the "wad" was. He values his dictionary at \$7 and his day planner at \$10 but is certainly upset to have lost all of his contact information, calendar entries, etc. When asked to identify his day planner he said it was black with all the writing on the inside in English. [REDACTED] drove him home early on the morning of his release.

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EXHIBIT R ( [REDACTED] INTERVIEW)

6 July, 2003. 1730. Describes similar CMOC experience as [REDACTED] with his black notebook put in a bag but nothing else taken until arriving at the first holding cell. There he had his pen, watch, and money (170,000 ID; no wallet) put in an MRE bag – no receipt was provided. He remembers the round trip on the first night to the second holding cell. Two days later they were sent to the second holding cell (division holding cell) again. He recalls a female soldier filling out a small piece of paper and pinning it on his left breast pocket. With his eyes to the ground, he felt someone put something in his left breast pocket which later turned out to be 40,000 ID. Other detainees asked him and the other interpreters to read what it said on their pocket tags and he remembers that it listed personal items like watches and rings. However, when they looked at their own (the interpreter) tags that area was blank. When he left at 0600 on day 8 he was handed an MRE pouch and he recovered his belt and watch but there was no money. He is missing 130,000 ID.

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