

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT			
AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1993 (SSN).		
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.		
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.		
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.		
1. LOCATION OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/11	3. TIME 1318	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS LTC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS G2, HQ USAEUR, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102			
<p>9. [REDACTED] WANTS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:</p> <p>I arrived in Iraq the third week in April. I was assigned initially as the G2 Planner, then as the V Corps Deputy G2. Once MG FAST became the C2, I went to C2 Operations and eventually became the C2 Chief of Staff. I traveled to Abu Ghraib approximately five times from early October to Late January before I departed country on 6 Feb. My visits were related to checking on the support for CACI contracted personnel at the site. I had no relationship with the TITAN Contract, though the CJTF-7 Language Manager (not the CFLCC contract officer) fell under me. I do not recall who was the particular individual that had overall responsibility or was the senior TITAN Contractor at Abu Ghraib, if there even was one. My focus from a linguist perspective was on getting requirements from the units filled by CFLCC. V Corps was already a user of a CACI contract in place but it was for force protection, counter terrorism and analytical slots. The vehicle used for the interrogation and screening services in CJTF-7 was under an existing Army contract that CJTF-7 did not have purview of. The contracting office was Fort Huachuca. The first time we began considering expanding the Statement Of Work on the existing contract was in the summer of 2004. The year prior when the TPFDD and the Request for Forces for the war plan were being drawn, we identified a shortage of HUMINT and Counterintelligence assets to conduct Corps and Division level operations. We identified the shortage and FORSCOM had already begun the mobilization of numerous reserve units. We knew the reserves' mobilization would most likely be for one year and ultimately we had to look at who would replace these units. As the ground phase of the war ended and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) began, the pace of raids and number of captured personnel was increasing through the summer. The Tactical HUMINT Team and interrogation operations were quickly becoming the "core" of the SASO intelligence effort. The Corps and divisions did not have enough assets to screen and interrogate all detainees being captured in a timely manner to provide actionable intelligence. The demand for interrogation results was intense at times as the leadership struggled with defining the emerging threat. The screening of detainees at the tactical level was not being done due to a shortage in assets. The divisions needed their Tactical HUMINT Teams out with the maneuver assets, gathering intelligence for their next operation/raid. Detainees would arrive at the theater interrogation facility without proper screening, no background data, etc, making interrogation difficult. Around July 03 we began looking at options for future MI resources/rotations. We held a mid level conference and knew there were minimal HUMINT assets available long term because they had already been mobilized (and pending demobilization in about 6-8 months), or committed to other operations such as OEF. We began looking at the option of possibly filling the HUMINT and CI shortages at static locations such as division/theater interrogation facilities with civilian contract services to augment the military personnel. The Theater Interrogation Facility was in Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Camp Cropper at the time. Once time at Cropper, [REDACTED] myself and some other senior interrogators sat down to discuss the possibility of integrating civilian contractors (former interrogators and screeners) into the operation. Everyone agreed it made sense and we began developing the statement of work (SOW). I also discussed the concept with 205th MI Brigade personnel, specifically [REDACTED] the S3 and others on the C2 staff such as COL BOLTZ. I worked the SOW and would discuss it with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as we went through versions. The SOWs were actually for more than screening and interrogations. In June, V Corps was not fully staffed to become the CJTF-7 and did not have the resources required. Within the C2, Coalition partners began giving us staff but we didn't get any significant fill from other services for months, with the exception of the USMC. For instance, we did not have an officer really qualified to be a G2X/C2X until late September. It was a hectic time. Many in CJTF-7 looked to contracting solutions to provide services. As examples, we needed to stand up an open source analysis cell, which started with reserve component personnel and ultimately transitioned to contractors; the same with our SSO shop and locally employed persons (LEP) screening effort. For instance, we developed the concept to hire LEP screeners for vetting local nationals being employed by the US military (as done in the Balkans) so that some military CI assets could be freed for operational missions. At previously stated, the number of enemy personnel being detained by units was too large for the assets on the ground (and growing), and the detainees were often not being screened or processed fast enough. Often when the detainees came in to Camp Cropper, many were being dropped off without any paperwork. This was often due to the lack of resources at the divisional and below levels. We looked at using contract services as databasers/analysts, screeners and interrogators to help alleviate this shortfall. The package we put together for a [REDACTED]</p>			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]		PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

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STATEMENT (Continued)

division was for approximately 5 x screeners, 3 x interrogators, and 2 x analysts/databases. For the theater level, we needed more interrogators, so the package was approximately 6 x screeners, 8 x interrogators, and 4 x analysts. The SOWs were staffed in July. The final approval for the SOW and funding was the DCG, [REDACTED]. The money for the contract was MIPRed in August and we began to receive the first hires in September, onward. CACI would review all resumes and would forward to them, [REDACTED] or me, for those that met the required skills as specified in the contract. There were many resumes that were not even considered due to lack of skills required, and rejected by CACI without sending to us. We did specify in the SOW employees had to have the right skills such as prior interrogators, valid clearance etc, and that employees fell under local unit SOPs, regulations, etc for interrogation operations. Both [REDACTED] and I reviewed 99% of the resumes as a QC; I could never say 100% because life downrange was hectic and busy. There were occasions when [REDACTED] was the only one who reviewed the resume; such was the personal and professional relationship I had with [REDACTED] who I know as a HUMINT professional. We would approve the individual to come to theater based on the resume qualifications and clearance validation. I do not know if CACI actually conducted interviews with those meeting the requirements. The contract did not specify that interview had to be done. Those hired would travel to a CRC where they would receive their equipment and training. (I do not know what the specific training they actually received was but would assume the Geneva Convention was covered as a general topic). I did meet with the 205th S-3 [REDACTED] and I had a daily relationship on a range of issues) and discussed the integration of the contractors into the overall units, from both a support and operational standpoint. I believe it was clear that the contractors belonged to the unit, and worked for the unit. Either [REDACTED] or I did the same with the Divisions. Once in theater, the first green suiter they saw was usually when they arrived to the supported unit, because usually the contract country manager on site was the one who met them first at BIAP and arranged movement to the unit. We told the units that the contractors were just another asset that belonged to them; similar in concept to the individual augmentee military interrogators that came from other commands. I know there was a 205th MI Brigade training program at Abu Ghraib, but I do not know its content. The contract did not specify how a contractor could be fired or what steps needed to be taken. If someone left, I tried to find out why, but I cannot say that was always the case or always possible. I also can't say that I actually sat down with 205th leadership and laid out how the firing process went if any contractor did not perform to standard. But I believe they knew to go to me if there ever was a problem that could not be resolved on site - we (the Bde and the G2/C2 staff) were a close team. I only know of one individual fired due to her questionable suitability, and that was a staff position, and I directed the firing based on statements provided by the staff section and supervisor. She made inappropriate sexual comments, lacked the appropriate clearance and refused to respect military rank. She did not follow the CACI rules of conduct, and CACI took swift action to remove her. There was an analyst who was reported by the unit chain (302d MI BN) to have used alcohol one night (before the CACI rules of conduct were established); that individual was appropriately reprimanded by CACI, with my full knowledge and approval or their action. I have no other knowledge of any problems with performance of CACI employees. There were some who showed up and saw the austere conditions and quit. That was not at all unprecedented, because we were used to TITAN linguists quitting all the time because of the conditions since the beginning of the war. CACI did move some personnel between sites due to minor issues such as internal personality disputes, or to balance out teams between theater and divisions. However, I was never made aware of any problems with contractors at Abu Ghraib regarding their conduct or performance from CACI or the unit chain of command. Feedback that I got from [REDACTED] and COL Pappas was always good regarding their performance. I can say that when I visited Abu Ghraib, my intuition was that you didn't get a good feeling. I didn't see many mid level leadership or above on the MP's side. Conditions were very austere, with seemingly lax security/standards. I did have complaints from the contract screeners that they sometimes had to do prisoner escort, when the detainees initially arrived at the holding area and were being processed (which they are not required to do) and wanted to be armed for self defense. I reported the issue to COL PAPPAS and [REDACTED] and they resolved it. I also informed the C2, BG(P) Fast. At the time I left Iraq, the issue of arming contractors for self-protection was still under consideration, pending theater policy. The MI personnel I interfaced with were very professional, working under extraordinary conditions. I believe COL PAPPAS and staff were doing their utmost to improve the situation. [REDACTED] was one of the hardest working individuals there, a real professional. Regarding [REDACTED] I did not have a good intuitive feeling about what he was doing sometimes, though nothing tangible. For instance, he took me around the facility and I left thinking, "Is he really an MP or is he MI (I later found out he was CA, former MI)?" He seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time concerned with detention operations, vice interrogation. There were some professional issues between him and COL PAPPAS. COL PAPPAS never came out and told me, but through his S-3 and Deputy, I knew there was some tension between the two, but I do not believe it was related to inappropriate behavior [REDACTED] represented himself as running interrogation operations and we all understood that was his role while at Abu Ghraib. At some point (around DEC 04) COL PAPPAS made it known that he was not comfortable with [REDACTED] and I helped facilitate the move from Abu Ghraib to job within the C2.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

End of Statement

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

Nothing

follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [REDACTED]

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