

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1945 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]		6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS 05
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I volunteered to deploy to CJTF-7 with duties as the Deputy C2. When I arrived, some of the organization had changed and MG FAST was the C2 and [REDACTED] was in charge of the Intelligence Fusion Cell. On 13 Sep I met with [REDACTED] who told me that he did need some assistance at the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib. I did not know what the JIDC was. I was told that 205th MI BDE was in charge of the JIDC and COL PAPPAS was the commander. I was told I would be filling a Liaison Role. My responsibilities were to get the reporting done, establish target folders and get the flow of intelligence to the C2 started. I was told the JIDC was a purely Army Run with civilian and military personnel operation. I was not told of the role of Other Government Agencies (OGA). [REDACTED] stated that the 205th MI BDE had responsibility of all the MI units at Abu Ghraib. He stated that other smaller holding areas were going to be shut down and everyone was going to be transported to one facility and it would be Abu Ghraib. My understanding was that I was the Liaison for BG Fast to the 205th. I received [REDACTED] Support Form and I wrote mine based on his and my Liaison duties. I turned in my QER Support Form to C2 Admin. [REDACTED] I never received my Support Form back so I do not know [REDACTED] it: My duty description on my Support Form was Liaison officer or Senior Liaison Officer. The day after I met [REDACTED] introduced me to COL PAPPAS (15 September 2003). I told COL PAPPAS that I was not HUMINT BASE and had no experience with HUMINT operations. On 16 September, COL PAPPAS took me to Abu Ghraib. He introduced me to [REDACTED] He told him I was there to support with reporting and developing target folders and to check to see if there was a place for me. [REDACTED] as the operations officer and the senior MI officer on the ground. I stayed at Abu Ghraib and COL PAPPAS departed that same night. He left due to the threat on the roads. He had other places in Bilad and Camp Victory. He was all over the place because of his units. After COL PAPPAS left and [REDACTED] helped me get situated. He showed me the living spaces [REDACTED] made a statement to the effect, so you are the officer from CJTF-7 we heard about. I heard you were coming to assist us. I told him I was there to help get operations up and running, the reporting started and develop target folders so that the flow of intelligence can get to C2 [REDACTED] took me around and showed me the area. I found out there were other MI units there. B/325th MI, A/519th MI, and a company from 323rd MI. I visited the dining facility, Camp Vigilant, Camp Ganci, the isolation area in the Hard Site. The MP TOC and was introduced to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is in charge of the Interrogation Control Element. The first night I was there, 16 September, [REDACTED] arranged for me to sit in on an interrogation. The interrogation was held in Tier 1A (hard site). This was the MI Area where High Value Detainees were held. MI did not run it. The MPs did. MI did not have free access to get in. Before the interrogation, I met the team in the JIDC. The senior interrogator told me to just observe. He said he was going to use the fear up and was going to be very aggressive. We were given access by the MPs. The interrogation lasted an hour and a half. I didn't see any detainee abuse. The interrogator was calm and didn't really raise his voice. The interrogator didn't seem to have a plan to follow. (I used this to help develop the interrogation plan). Based on the interrogation I observed, I told [REDACTED] that we needed to develop target folders and come up with a diagram of who should be doing what. I also recommended to COL PAPPAS on some ideas I had on target folders. Prior to my first interrogation, I did not get the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. Within days of my arrival, I read and sign the IROEs. I don't quite remember when but I know it was before the mortar attack (20 September 04). I believe the IROEs were on a message format sent by LTG Sanchez. COL PAPPAS came back to Abu Ghraib and he and I along with [REDACTED] had an expanded discussion of my role. I told him that there was no SOP to run the operations and that I could help him out by starting to write one and making it happen. He chastised me. He said that the SOP was the brigade's responsibility and that they were already working on one. He told me, "Here is what I want you to do." He wanted me to work on ideas on developing target folders to help focus the interrogators. Once Target Folders are complete, work on an interrogation plan and then structure on a reporting format approved by C2. He was only on site for about two hours. After he left, [REDACTED] continued to introduce me to CACI personnel, the 321st MPs, the Engineers, the Chaplain. At that time, I believed COL PAPPAS was in charge of the MI operations and the MPs were in charge of their operations [REDACTED] I was introduced to [REDACTED] 320th MP BN CDR. [REDACTED] gave me a run down on what the MP Company's missions were. He stated that the MI folks were focus on Camp Vigilant. He told me the number MPs and Detainees on the ground and about the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] called me and stated that it appeared we might have a weapon in the Hard Site. He asked if I mind going in to assist them. (I didn't really know who [REDACTED] was) I went with [REDACTED] assist. I asked who the detainee was and the MPs were sorting this thing out. They were suing up for a cell search and I was trying to find out who the suspected detainees were. I knew there had been a threat of one of them trying to kill someone. I found out one of the suspects was at the far end of the hallway. I told them where to stand and leading them. I told them to be careful because they might be hiding the weapon. Next thing I knew, someone stepped up and around came flying out. There were shots fired (MPs had rubber bullets). Someone finally used a mirror to show where the detainee was in the cell and he was shot in the leg. The detainee was later medivac out and return at a later time. I questioned that decision. I saw myself as the leader since I was the ranking officer. In hindsight, I believe maybe my actions were not the best decisions. I notified COL PAPPAS and relayed to him what had occurred. I am not sure when he was notified. COL PAPPAS requested that the facility be locked down. The QRF came in and doors were used to sweep the facility. In reference to Ghost detainees, OGA would bring in detainees for a short period of time. [REDACTED] brought them in. These particular ghost detainees were not yet categorized and OGA was working on that. It was very difficult keeping track of these OGA because they were not processed until OGA decided to turn them over to us. COL PAPPAS was not happy with that procedure. [REDACTED] recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding be written up between OGA and MI on the procedures to drop off a ghost detainee. COL PAPPAS met with OGA and TF-121 and the memorandum on procedures for dropping ghost detainees was signed. COL PAPPAS introduced me to [REDACTED] and a couple of more guys from TF121. [REDACTED] stated he had heard of me from [REDACTED] and I would assist with possible linguist and logistics. [REDACTED] always accompanied his folks when they dropped off a detainee about twice a week. I never knew of him interrogating. I don't recall briefing MG FAST or [REDACTED] on ghost detainees. Some of the incidents of detainee abuse I was aware of are as follows: It was brought to my attention by [REDACTED] interrogator, and [REDACTED] analyst, were walking back a naked detainee from the interrogation booth to the isolation cell. I notified COL PAPPAS of the incident. He notified COL PAPPAS of the event. He told me to get [REDACTED] and explain to them the seriousness of this. I told [REDACTED] and their NCOIC and explained the seriousness of the incident. I told them it was wrong and did not follow the IROEs. [REDACTED] stated she didn't think it was wrong. [REDACTED] stated he had questioned [REDACTED] while she was stripping down the detainee, but that [REDACTED] said it was okay. I didn't follow up so I do not know if there was any disciplinary action taken. I did not have any more conversations with COL PAPPAS reference this event. [REDACTED] asked me if I had recommended UCMJ, I told her it wasn't in my lane. In reference to the death of a detainee around late October, this is what I remember. I was asked if I knew where COL PAPPAS was and I told them he was in a meeting. I was then told that someone had died in the Hard Site. I asked if it was military and they said no that it was a detainee. I walked over to the cell and saw [REDACTED] medical doctor on site. He told me that the detainee was dead. The detainee was facing down, handcuffed with his hands to his back and the shower stall. The handcuffs were taken off and he was turned over. I looked around for blood to see if there had been any beating and didn't find any. I asked the MPs if they had notified the battalion and the OGA onsite. [REDACTED] said he would notify his supervisor. [REDACTED] notified COL PAPPAS and he said he was on his way and to keep him abreast of everything. [REDACTED] Hard Site OIC came in and thereafter [REDACTED] arrived. [REDACTED] said he had to go to Washington and could we please take care of the body. I told him we didn't have the facilities to take care of a dead body. Meanwhile [REDACTED] brought in a body bag and we began looking for ice. [REDACTED] closed off the shower area to keep people from going in there. A litter was brought in and the body was taken out making it appear as if we were taking someone sick out. CID was informed and the body was taken to get an autopsy. [REDACTED] accompanied the body. OGA had apparently brought the detainee at around 0530. Seal Team 7 had captured the individual during one of their missions. The detainee was presumed to have been involved in the attack against the ICRC. The detainee apparently had several weapons with him. He was resisting arrest and apparently the Seal Team but stroked him on the side of the head. I never saw the results of the investigation CID conducted. I was asked after the report on the news came out, to speak to a case officer, [REDACTED] who was investigating the incident. I believe [REDACTED] was an attorney. In reference to clothing for detainees, I know there was a problem with getting jumpsuits. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, some detainees had torn jumpsuits. It September, it was very warm and detainees would take their top off, but they always had clothes on. I never saw any detainees without any clothing except for when they arrived and were being searched and a few who had mental problems would tear their clothes off. I never saw any detainees with women underwear on or on their heads. The only time I was aware of detainees with women underwear was when the ICRC mentioned that detainees were wearing women's underwear. I have no knowledge or ever saw any detainee being thrown off the back of a truck. I have no knowledge of dogs ever being used or approved for interrogations. Dogs were used to sweep the cells after the shooting to ensure no weapons were on site. I do not know if COL PAPPAS had received approval to use the dogs the night of the shooting. I was shown some photos in which I identified on several photos [REDACTED] Linguist, Possibly [REDACTED] interrogator, Analyst, and [REDACTED] MP and on one photo Possibly [REDACTED]. The photos were taken in the isolation site and depicted detainees naked and all bunched up together. I also identified [REDACTED] and a female TITAN Linguist on three other photos. On one photo, [REDACTED] appeared to be interrogating a detainee who was sitting on a chair facing back in a stressed position. [REDACTED] was standing by the side. The other photos were of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] together.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

End of Statement

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT [REDACTED]

DATED 2004/05/

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

He never mentioned any issues with MI or detainees. The relationship between the MPs and MI frequent mortar attacks and IEDs. He never mentioned any issues with MI or detainees. The relationship between the MPs and MI was a good one and professional one. [REDACTED] did not have an XO and I met his S3 [REDACTED]. I was asked by [REDACTED] to attend the morning briefings held by the MPs and so I became the MI Representative in those meeting. All units at Abu Ghraib attended the meeting. I interacted with everyone in that meeting. The topics discussed were basically logistical issues; DFAC, showers, weight room. By the first week I was improving the process and getting into operations. Basically doing what you were supposed to do. During his third visit, after I arrived, he told me I had no command and control nor did [REDACTED]. He said [REDACTED] was the operations officer and I was from another unit. By 10-12 Oct, I had outlined my roles and responsibilities. I never received any FRAGOs or OPORDS from CJTF-7 personnel. Within 2-3 days of my arrival, I began to read them. [REDACTED] had them all on his computer. The only problem was that there was only one computer available for use. The essence of what I read or reviewed were the IROE, Force Protection issues, Convoy FRAGOS, focus of Intelligence Estimate. I had also noticed it was not a smooth operation and I wanted to pull the despaired groups together, but COL PAPPAS basically told me to stay in my lane. Between the 1st and 2nd week, I spoke to COL PAPPAS about how no one was really in charge. He told me he was in charge but he wanted me to be the JIDC Commander. I told him I would think about it. This happened four or five days after the mortar attack. I spoke to [REDACTED] about what COL PAPPAS had offered me. I asked COL PAPPAS would have input on my OER and he said no. After about a week, I got back with COL PAPPAS and asked him if I would have Command and Control of soldiers. He said no and I replied with "I don't think that would work," and declined it. On 5 or 6 October, [REDACTED] came in the JIDC looking for [REDACTED]. He said that three interrogators along with a translator (of Egyptian nationality) were under the influence of alcohol, had gone in to get a detainee to interrogate. They went in on their own and the MPs allowed them to go in. No interrogations were supposed to occur at night because of the mortar attacks that were occurring in the evenings and our interrogations were sometimes held outside in tents. The interrogators took a female detainee and asked her to remove her top and kissed her. The same day I was made aware of this incident, I phoned COL PAPPAS and relayed to him what had occurred. He asked me to read them their rights and handle the Article 32. I checked with the magistrate cell, [REDACTED] for assistance. I got a copy of the rights statement and read each one of them their rights and the article 32. Their ISG and Company Commander were also present. All three invoked their rights and requested an attorney. The statements were taken to [REDACTED] the JAG officer. I told him what I knew. I believe CID also received a copy of the statements. To my recollection, the investigation was unfounded. Apparently, the interrogation coincided with the interrogation plan and there were no criminal charges. The Linguist was transferred to another location. The day following this incident, [REDACTED] went over the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I had an adhoc formation and told them that I was [REDACTED] and I wanted to make sure everyone knew the IROEs. I told [REDACTED] to make sure there was additional training. No one objected to me calling the formation because I was pretty involved. COL PAPPAS told me he was glad I had put that out. COL PAPPAS wanted operations to run 24/7 but I did not agree and he told me to stay in my lane. [REDACTED] did not want to do 24/7 operations and I told her that if she had someone conduct one interrogation early in the morning it would meet the BDE CDR's requirements. There was a problem with not enough equipment to conduct the mission. Units were showing up with personnel but no equipment, office equipment or even personal equipment. On one instance, I sent back CACI contractors because they did not have TA-50. I searched for crew served weapons, computers, and medical supplies. I brought this up to COL PAPPAS. His staff then told me not to go to the Cdr on these issues to bring them up to them. I started working with them but nothing was being done. After three weeks I stopped working with the staff because there was limited improvement. MG Fast came by Abu Ghraib in Mid October. She asked me to tell her how things were really going. I told her we needed computers, combat lifesaver bags etc., She said I needed to help with Mayoral type of duties. Within two day of speaking to MG FAST, we received radios, computers and other critical equipment. Plus we had JWICS. By mid October, COL PAPPAS gave me all Mayoral duties in support of interrogations with a duty description based on GTMO. I agreed and then spoke to [REDACTED] about what had happened. I wanted to go to MG FAST. He advised me to have all my ducks in order if I did. He also told me he agreed with my new duties and told me to go take care of soldiers. I never notified BG FAST of the changes to my duties. I didn't think it was appropriate for me to tell her that. This all occurred at the same time COL PAPPAS moved to Abu Ghraib. My duties were basically soldier care, maintenance, billeting, awards, and assistance with administrative support of the JIDC. I will provide a copy of my duty description. The MPs were still in charge of Abu Ghraib and ran their meetings. I met with the MPs twice a day and never saw or became aware of any abuse or heard of any rumors of mistreatment, never saw or was aware of any pictures or videos of detainee abuse and I never saw any dogs being used during interrogations. I never was aware of MI telling the MPs to "soften up" or give "the treatment" to detainees. During my daily meetings no one mentioned any such things. I didn't see anything that appeared the MPs were lacking oversight. There was a good feeling among the MPs. They were focused and were very professional. I simply believed they needed more MPs to assist with their mission. I never went to the MPs LSA. Within days of the Memorial, LTG Sanchez went to visit Abu Ghraib. [REDACTED] asked me to help him put some slides together and COL PAPPAS asked me to brief. Mortars were constantly hitting us but I don't know why there wasn't more aggressive patrolling or preplanned fires. COL PAPPAS brought in the 165th MI BN and the 82nd sent additional assets to assist with the Force Protection mission. COL PAPPAS spoke to BG KIRPINSKI but I don't know what the result of the meeting was. The International Red Cross visited Abu Ghraib and their report stated there were allegations of detainee abuse such as detainees wearing female underwear on their heads, electrocutions, and physical abuse. COL PAPPAS asked me if I had seen any of this and I said no. I am not aware of COL PAPPAS doing anything about it. This occurred mid to late October. A month later, JAG began to respond to the ICRC allegations. This was all news to me because prior to the ICRC, I had no idea this was going on. On 24 November, I was on my

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