

STATEMENT OF MG BARBARA G. FAST TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
DATED 20 JULY 2004

BARBARA GRACE FAST
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
C2, MNE-I

CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

On 13 July 2004, I was interviewed via Video Tele-Conference by LTG Anthony R. JONES, and MG GEORGE R. FAY. Present during the VTC was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

When I first arrived on 29 Jul 03, V Corps was transforming into CJTF-7. I think there was an order that established CJTF-7 on 15 June 03; however I never saw the order. There was an initial JMD. Just after I arrived, the CG and I spent a number of days visiting the divisions and getting an orientation. It also gave me a chance to review intelligence and the intelligence architecture in Iraq. Coupled with my orientation here in Baghdad, I began to understand how V Corps needed to morph to a combined joint task force. The CJTF was beginning work on an updated JMD that was more reflective of CJTF missions and functions. The first revision was submitted in Sep 03, with modifications in Oct and Nov, and a final approval in Dec 03. These latter revisions reflected, among other things, a far more accurate picture of our operation. At the same time, manning was decreasing and we never got anywhere near our fill (about 60% is about the best I can remember). The JMD was, in part, done by CENTCOM—for example, we were told what our coalition make-up was going to be and slots were developed for these positions. We had to create a new intel architecture from scratch, including intel analytic fusion. I focused on the staff and analytical level development on the intel structure needed to be CJTF-7. Aside from capabilities, the MIBL is not what I dealt with his brigade structure task organization. I made several fundamental decisions. For instance, should the heart of our intel be Coalition-based or a US-UK-Australia heavy operation? Given the importance of employing and empowering all of our intelligence to save lives, it became more important to weight the effort to the big U.S. engine which could bring in intel at all classification levels. In past contingencies, the C2 depended largely on a coalition staff, with help from a supporting U.S. National Intelligence Cell—this was a first step to what we did here. I decided on a U.S. and US-UK-Australia core model, but also built a coalition intel cell that would provide significant value in areas like tribes, religion, attacks, infrastructure, and coalition intelligence. Seventeen nations wanted to place individuals into our intelligence cell, so we were able to embed them and find tasks which would contribute to the intelligence picture (in these areas, they often bring much greater value because of unique experience and perspective). What we undertook was non-conventional. I created the Intelligence Fusion Cell as a place where we threw everyone together, without stovepipes, to focus on the huge and growing intelligence task – CJTF, Corps, DIA, OGA, NSA, CENTCOM, JSOTF, etc, as they came on station – not just a little NIC. While there was a U.S. only area, the Brits and Australians were otherwise completely integrated into the effort. I also directed a shared Collection Management, Imagery/geospatial intelligence and CEX that organized to support all classification levels. On the interrogation/detention side, before I arrived, the CG had directed consolidation at Abu Ghraib by 1 Oct (this had to be right about the time I arrived, but believe it was just before). As I mentioned, we modified the JMD over time to make it reflect the way we were operating, per CG guidance. This was an enormous

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
were some practices outside of the approved techniques, but I do not know where the failure occurred. I've thought a lot this. I believe the policy was good and clear. Exceptions to authorized techniques could only be approved by LTG SANCHEZ. Training teams, assistance visits, and command and staff visits occurred. More experienced interrogators were brought in. And while there was pressure to perform, I never felt nor do I believe there was pressure or encouragement to exceed the authorities in order to produce timely, relevant intelligence. When in war, no one jumps to Inspector General inspections/visits (although our IG did make trips to Abu Ghraib), but maybe we need to have them a little more regularly to spend some time around detention / interrogation operations, do a quick sensing and give folks the chance to talk to a disinterested person.

What would I change? I would staff the JMD, to include the JDC. I am disappointed that as the main effort for the nation, intelligence is staffed only at about 51% even today. We did a good scrub of requirements to ensure we were not excessive in our requests—the JMD was validated, but just not filled. We are operating at a C4 rating, working with what we have in 24 hour a day, seven day a week combat operations. One additional capability I think we needed was Behavioral Psychologists to help not only with detainees but with our forces (MI/MP) as well. The environment was rough. Maybe they would have been able to pick up on the first hint of trouble.

We lacked 2/3 of our intelligence capability. Intelligence is organized as a nested set of capabilities, from tactical through operational to strategic. Beginning in Oct. we were able to get INSCOM (operational) help, but there is no strategic DHS presence. Given the mission, all three echelons must be invested. We also need to have robust automation and communications in place. This has been a real challenge. There were days when we couldn't speak to the brigade. If we are going to be collaborative and relevant, we need a robust communication system.


You have Corps service members who are real heroes—fought hard and magnificently, and did the best they could do in a post-conflict mission they had not trained for. No one knew what was going to unfold—a year later after hostilities ended we are still in combat while nation-building. Intelligence is about saving lives, protecting our force, shaping operations. I don't know how many coalition soldiers are alive today because of the interrogations that have been done, but the efforts of interrogation were key to interdicting and neutralizing many, many enemy activities that had every intention of killing our men and women.

Barbara G. Fast HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THAT STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT FEAR OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.


(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, person authorized by law to

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received specific instructions from higher headquarters. I am not aware of any Special Access Programs (SAP) at Abu Ghraib or other detainee locations.

CONCLUSION: The Field Manual in existence is good basis for doctrine but we need to update it to reflect the realities of how we operate in 2004. We are experiencing various scenarios where there are detainees and also individuals we may debrief—our doctrine needs to help us through these kinds of contingencies and operations. There is a lot that technology can do for interrogations now. We do not need to throw FM 34-52 away—we need to update it.

We have learned over the last three contingencies how valuable a C2X is and the important role it plays. It needs to be in doctrine and on our manning documents. We need to get best practices into implementation. For example, the Tiger Team concept is a great concept for just about any scenario. We need to train on it, practice it, and do it. Dissemination: there is work to get done here. HUMINT reporting formats must be standardized and used—reports must be able to make their way expeditiously into message handling systems so they can really be used by consumers at all levels and in all organizations. The Portal we use is great—we're getting rave reviews. For the first time, all HUMINT reporting, from Division and below to the operational level command, is going into the portal and is available to all users in an easy-to-use way. Ultimately, as we work with data, and not databases, this will be even better. We cannot afford to have to reinvent something for the next crisis—we need to fix this now.

MI and MP, and other relationships. I personally think that everyone needs to understand the do's and don'ts of this MI/MP relationship. On the staff, we need to establish who is responsible for overall detention operations. Who synchronizes the building of facilities, manning, operating, resourcing, force protection, movement, detainee release, etc.? Someone has to take ownership. These operations cut across the entire staff but short of the CG and the DCG, no one has full control or responsibility. We also must figure out those responsibilities within the Services and Joint Staff.

Training. Over the years, interrogation took a back seat, especially during force restructuring (although I'm not subscribing to scaling back other intelligence capabilities). There were few operations of large scope, and DHS assumed responsibility for HUMINT operations previously done by the services. Corps and below lost much of their capability and competency. As a result, we have paid a price. We haven't been able to train up like we need as an Army—MI, MP, combat units. We must conduct collective training beginning from the point of collection (rapid capture tasks, segregation procedures, pocket litter to stay with detainee). We need to train on this at our CMTCs (they might already be training on this, but it needs work). Leader training—we must train our leaders on detention operations. We are now experiencing the largest detention and interrogation operation since the Korean War. The whole detention issue is a very fragile human dimension kind of issue and there is a very fine line where things can go wrong. It is a leadership issue to ensure soldiers are trained and disciplined to treat detainees humanely even after their bodies have been killed by the now detained attacker.

Why did abuse happen? I believe there was likely a leadership failure. I don't know at exactly what level—team, platoon, company. . . . Individuals made wrong decisions; others accepted them, or looked the other way. It will be up to the investigative team to judge whether MI contributed to the abuse. As I looked at the photos of the MPs humiliating those detainees, it appears to me that no one was forcing them or perhaps even encouraging them to commit these abhorrent acts. They decided to do this on their own and took advantage of detainees who could not protect themselves. The photos show unacceptable behavior. I cannot believe someone was directing them to do those things. With regard to interrogations, it's apparent now that there

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inaccurate comment came from. I did not veto or refuse to release anyone after the board adjourned. I stopped sitting the boards on 11 Nov 03.

High Value Detainees (HVD): CJTF-7 had no official direct command relationship with the ISG. The ISG was responsible for running the interrogation operations of the High Value Detainees (HVD)—they made it crystal clear that this was their mission alone. CJTF-7 was required to support them in detention and with other non-interrogation parts of their mission. The 800th MP Bde had a responsibility for running the detention operation in the HVD facility. Those who were not on the Blacklist but were of high value would come to CJTF-7. We always got ISG's Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). They didn't always ask the questions we wanted them to ask because of the difference in mission, so we submitted Source Directed Requirements (SDR) to answer any questions we might have.

Other Government Agency (OGA): The direction I received was to work as closely as we can as a team—a one team, one mission, one effort. [REDACTED] encouraged a close working relationship, as did DOD from the senior leadership to the CG. From division level and below to CJTF-7, operations brought OGA and the military into a close working relationship. I believe that we probably got most, if not all OGA reporting, less what went through operational channels. There wasn't written direction on a command relationship. They were just another organization in theater, albeit a key one. I was rarely advised of their specific operations or sources in the theater. As it relates to interrogation, OGA had to abide by the CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policy at all times in CJTF-7 facilities. Their Chief specifically advised me that they had to operate under military authority and that there were no other authorities for them. OGA approached me and asked if it would be possible to place detainees of OGA interest in a small number of cells. There were continuous problems with the MP accountability of detainees. They constantly were having to look for detainees they could not find. Sometimes, it would take up to two days to find them. COL PAPPAS was highly frustrated (as was I), as this really distracted the interrogation effort. He advised on times when detainees assigned to a cell would not finally be found back in the general population. This completely desynchronizes the ability to do sound interrogations, not to mention the fact that it was embarrassing. It made sense to segregate their high value detainees in particular cells, so they could always be found and not be out in the general population where they could collaborate with other detainees. I asked COL PAPPAS to work with the MP's and see if this could be accommodated, as the facility was under MP control. When they came to our facilities, our rules and policies applied. There was no specific guidance we received with respect to OGA, FBI or other non-DOD agency. We operated as a team, collaborated and did not create stovepipes. Folks worked hard to develop cross talk between interrogators, as many detainees would have overlapping ties.

One example of the need for cross-talk case was when another DOD organization had a detainee who was on a terrorist website and a detainee from Abu Ghraib was also on the same website. The interrogators discussed this and connected the dots. There was a plan to consolidate all DOD interrogation operations, but the other organizations determined they wanted and needed to keep their own operations. I am not aware of CIA or any non-DOD organization providing guidance to our interrogators but they did sit in on some of our interrogations. I have no recollection of knowing about "Ghost Detainees" held at Abu Ghraib prior to the investigation. The detainee who died on 4 Nov had apparently just been brought in and had not yet been registered. I am aware only of one other detainee on which CJTF-7

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environment as behind the wire. At the time, there were no interrogation booths and a layout that, by design, permits a more controlled environment. "More in terms of detention/prisoner security operations, not interrogation operations." In general, I am not in favor of dogs in interrogation, and certainly feel there is no need or requirement for dogs in the small Abu Ghraib interrogation booths.

Actions upon learning of Abuses at Abu Ghraib: As far as having knowledge of detainee abuse, I was aware of a detainee dying at Abu Ghraib during an interrogation being conducted by OGA on 4 Nov 03. I believe the first notification came from COL PAPPAS to me, and he sought my counsel. I told him to get an on site Army Doctor to examine the detainee immediately. I called the CG and advised him of the situation and that we needed to initiate an investigation. He said no, that it was an OGA issue and that I needed to call OGA and have them initiate an investigation. I called the Deputy and notified him. Apparently, OGA headquarters personnel called CID for assistance, and they began an investigation on 4 Nov. I saw an interim report but I do not know if the investigation has been completed. In the evening of 2 Dec 03, I was notified of a report of detainee abuse (not at Abu Ghraib). I notified JAG that evening and we went to see the CG on the morning of 3 Dec. The unit accused was not part of our organization and CENTCOM was notified. It wasn't until MG TAGUBA or perhaps CID (just don't recall which investigation I knew of first) initiated an investigation that I first became aware of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. On 19 May 04, I was notified by [REDACTED] 504th MI Bde and JIDIC Cdr, of a potential case of abuse stemming back several months. I turned it over to the JAG immediately. Any other cases of potential abuse were already being investigated by the time I became knowledgeable of them.

Alleged Statement made at a Battle Update brief (BUB): In reference to a statement [REDACTED] might have made about "by are we detaining these people, we should be killing them" I do not recall him making that statement.

Guidance from Higher Levels: I never received any specific day-to-day direction or guidance from higher levels. We did get Source Directive Requirements (SDR) from the intel community, but this is a normal procedure for requesting additional collection. CJTF-7 was responsible for detention and interrogation operations. [REDACTED] never raised any concerns that he was getting pressured from MG BURGESS or DR CAMBONE. CPA had a lot of interest on detention matters, but I never got any guidance from them. They were briefed on interrogation and detention operations because there is a convergence of interest. CPA was helping set up the Iraqi criminal court system and advising the various ministries on processes. CPA also often received requests for release of certain detainees by various Iraqi's, often through AMBASSADOR BREMER and his office.

Review & Release Board: I am not sure why BG KARPINSKI stated that I was overly reluctant to release detainees. We sat the board together. There were three young members in the Appeals and Release Board. [REDACTED] BG KARPINSKI and me (President of the Board). [REDACTED] crafted up the initial framework for the Board and the CG approved the document promulgating the board. All votes were to release, release conditionally, transfer, or intern. Occasionally, a detainee was deferred to a subsequent board due to additional time needed for closure (CID or MI usually). Usually this was for not more than two weeks. The overwhelming number of votes were unanimous. I recall very few disagreements. Of the over 4200 detainees who went before an Appeal and Release Board from Aug 03 to Jan 04, records indicate that 77% of them were released on their first appearance. I do not know where her

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
Executive highlight summaries were sent via the C2X to me every night; later the JIDC was asked to send all interrogation summaries. We had many operational successes that stemmed from interrogations. I have previously compiled some of the unclassified successes and they are attached to this statement.

LTC SANCHEZ is a tough, no nonsense commander who takes his responsibilities very seriously. He recognized and believed that intelligence drove operations. As far as if there was any pressure, there is always pressure on the battlefield and since intelligence helps build the framework for the operations, you are going to get and feel pressure. Lives were at risk—and the country, too. I never felt that there was any pressure that would cause or encourage someone to go beyond authorized authorities. LTC SANCHEZ had an eye for detail, with no detail too small. Once he took a trip to visit the JIDC and he walked through every aspect of how interrogation occurred. He made some adjustments and that might have been perceived as pressure on the unit. I believe his intent was to provide direction and guidance to make the JIDC a better operation that was responsive to his needs.

LTC SANCHEZ was very focused on intelligence. I finally felt that by the late November timeframe the whole intelligence organization was sufficiently matured to meet the CCF's requirements and to produce the intelligence necessary to shape and contribute to operations—to begin to get our arms around the foreign regime elements and other threats. Up until then, we were incrementally receiving our personnel and systems, getting comms that could support our effort, getting the architecture into place, and getting the tactics, techniques, and procedures solidified. This is not to say that there was not quality intelligence being produced, but it was not at the level it needed to be. I believe that LTC SANCHEZ was very satisfied after we were set in November. This is a very HUMINT-centric environment. Virtually the whole insurgency is about HUMINT. HUMINT has not been our strength in the Army or intelligence in recent years. We have a lot of work ahead of us. Timing is critical in order to interdict the enemy. HUMINT must meet these timelines for time sensitive targeting, as well as for long term intelligence.

The LTC directed the creation of a Task Force (TF) to focus on SADDAM-related detainee interrogations. COL PAPPAS organized a number of Tiger Teams to put all their effort against this task. The idea behind it was to synchronize and create the momentum and expertise necessary to successfully exploit and rapidly use the results to bring down more of the SADDAM network. We had nightly briefings to LTC SANCHEZ during that time. LTC Sanchez personally went over the day's efforts (including interrogations), read each interrogation report, and provided guidance. I estimate that we were able to unravel about 50% of the network that Saddam had reorganized. While interrogation was key, all of intelligence worked very hard to accomplish the mission. Everyone did some incredible work. It's hard to put a finger on what you were able to prevent, but I believe it to have been a significant disruption to the enemy's plan.

Effective 12 Oct 03, the only time dogs could be used in interrogation was with an exception to policy signed by LTC SANCHEZ. If authorized, the policy was that the dog had to be muzzled and controlled by a trained dog handler at all times. The use of dogs for MP detention operations as a whole is within the policy and can be very useful in the kind of facility we have at Abu Ghraib. I had a very brief discussion with COL Pappas on 28 Aug 03 concerning the use of dogs at Abu Ghraib. Based on our discussion, I thought that the intent for use of dogs dealt with using them for safety of personnel, such as the general security of the camp and movement of detainees within the camp or when they were not in as secure an

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detainees and the vast variety of detainees (from thugs to terrorists) also create a different environment and needs. I personally never saw the Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) from GTMO although I know the JIDC got a copy of them and perhaps the MP's and C2X. I did not personally know what authorities GTMO used, except that their detainees were categorized, I believe, as enemy combatants. We followed the Geneva / Hague Convention rules. In Iraq, our detainees were either EPW's or civilian detainees. We made some changes to our operation as a result of his recommendations. The brigade established the JIDC and organized into Tiger Teams, along with a management structure, analytic section and collection management section. I had already asked for an experienced colonel for C2X, but added the requirements for Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) representation and reports writers. I also ensured the IFC incorporated procedures and the ability for an analytic-to-interrogation link to enable better interrogations and better use of interrogation reporting.

CJTF-Policy Memos: Interrogation & Counter-Resistance: Before MG Miller visited Iraq, we were already having discussions on establishing policy. [REDACTED] was very clear on the Geneva / Hague authority. [REDACTED] was quite adamant about Geneva Hague in being the right basis for operations, and believed it to be more than adequate for our operations. I was not part of the group who developed the 14 September Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. I was gone out of theater for medical treatment during this time. The policy was created via the legal channels and I believe LTC SANCHEZ felt comfortable with the policy. Effective 12 Oct 03, any technique that was not in the policy letter had to be requested to and approved only by LTC SANCHEZ. These exceptions were staffed through C2 (met) and went to the JAG for a legal review. There was some question concerning a 205th Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) training aid that was used for interrogators to understand the authorities. On the left of the slide were those authorities you could use in an interrogation (what you could do). On the right side of the slide were those techniques which interrogators may have seen in previous drafts, signed documents, or elsewhere, but that you absolutely were not allowed to use without requesting and gaining CG approval. My take was that it was meant to be restrictive in nature and eliminate any doubt on the part of an interrogator. This training aid was posted in the JIDC so that the interrogators could see it. I only recall seeing requests for segregation of a detainee beyond 30 days. I heard there were other requests drafted by interrogators, but I'm told that they never made it to the CJTF-7 staff.

The ranks of interrogators ranged from about E-4 to CW3. Most had had excellent medical experience by the time I arrived, but were limited in strategic level debriefing skills. Interrogators with these skills are most often found at the INSCOM and DHS level. This was a void and a need I recognized immediately. Most of the experienced debriefers left when CFLCC redeployed in Jan 03. In Oct 03, we received 27 interrogators from INSCOM to augment our effort at Abu Ghraib. To this date we do not have any DHS debriefers. GTMO also sent a Tiger Team of experienced interrogators to the JIDC in late Sep 03. We also were fortunate to get a Fort Huachuca Mobile Training Team (MTT) to help train interrogators in early Oct 03. Contractors were also brought in because we didn't have enough interrogators. One of the good things about the contractors was that many of the contractors were a little older. In the Arab culture, age is important and is a sign of maturity. It is a positive attribute for more instant credibility and respect. Many were retirees from the military.

Interrogation Successes, Conditions and Abuses at Abu Ghraib: I cannot state what or if certain interrogation techniques worked better than others to gather intelligence. The techniques to be used were in the interrogation plans internally generated and kept in the unit.

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I wasn't aware that LTG SANCHEZ had appointed COL PAPPAS as the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cdr until the FRAGO came out. My understanding was that PAPPAS was responsible for force protection and the installation as a whole. Especially given that there were a lot of mortar attacks at Abu Ghraib, the CG wanted to ensure there was a unity of effort and a tight security plan for defense of the facility. I do know that COL PAPPAS identified several incidents of misconduct or substandard behavior and addressed these issues. The MPs were TACON to the 205th but I never got the impression that COL PAPPAS was in charge of detention operations or MP operations. It never came through to me that way. The MPs were responsible for detention operations, managing the entire detention facility, security and protection of detainees. They are not responsible for interrogation operations. They are not responsible for actively assisting interrogation. The only place I view their involvement is in relaying general background information on a detainee as they have an opportunity to observe the detainees—eg. was the detainee in a good/bad disposition, did he interact with other detainees, if so, with whom? This is very passive, not active activity. There is a very clear dividing line between detention and interrogation operations. I am not sure how they might have viewed their role on implementing such things as sleep management. COL PAPPAS would know what dialogue they had with the MPs as this would have been done at the unit level. Effective 12 October, sleep management was not an authorized technique and would have had to have been approved by the CG as an exception (I saw no requests for this exception). I didn't get involved in the overall planning or running of the prison facility.

The MPs have a U.S.-only classified system to track detainees world wide, but it was not user friendly and was not sufficient for running this type of large scale, coalition operation. LTG ALEXANDER would be the best person to tell you about the MLMP collaboration on BATS. It was a system nearly ready for prime time and not a lot of training is required—it seemed like the best solution for us. It permits one single database for detention operations which tracks detainees from time of capture to time of release. It helps account for detainees and their pocket litter as they move from location to location without losing the data. Additionally, because it's UNCLASSIFIED, should a policy decision permit, the records could then be transferred to the Iraqis as detainees are transferred to Iraqi control. The BATS developers have been working to allow us to map over detainee data to MI operations so that intelligence reporting could also be linked to detainee data. Use of this type of technology and procedures is not yet in any doctrine. We fielded it as an expedient prototype to get our hands around the problem.

The visit of MG GEOFFREY MILLER was initiated by either the Joint Staff or OSD. We were in the process of shifting over from a tactical mission to an operational mission and LTG SANCHEZ willingly accepted the visit. As far as the RYDER visit, I do not recall how it was generated, as it was an MP visit. MG G. MILLER's original focus was to have been on the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), but it expanded to CJTF-7. ISG decided they were not going to sponsor so my role became to help facilitate the visit by providing office space and help his team travel to where they needed to go. We had several conversations and he provided an In-Brief and Out-Brief to LTG SANCHEZ. I was in those briefings. I do not know what MG Miller's instructions may have been beyond his In-Brief. He looked at both detainee and interrogation operations. We agreed that there were a number of things that didn't apply because CTMO was different than Iraq, ie CTMO does not equal Iraq. Authorities were different, CTMO was a self contained operation operating in a relatively sterile, strategic environment. For us, interrogation operations were only a small part of all the things we do in intel, interrogations feed ongoing operations and shape new ones, and we operate in a combat environment. Sheer numbers of

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[REDACTED] was assigned by [REDACTED] as the JIDC OIC. [REDACTED] did all the assignments for the C2 in his role as the Deputy C2 (and V Corps G2). The majority of the C2 (and CJTF-7 staff) folks were from Corps, and [REDACTED] had a natural relationship with the Corps G1/CJTF-7 C1 Corps leadership made it a natural for him to work assignments. Knowing there was a need for a LTC to go to the JIDC, he selected [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had good credentials--he was coming from INSCOM where he was the Intelligence Oversight Officer, had analytic duties in his civilian job, had a good reputation, and had arrived at the right time. Circa 18 September 2003, [REDACTED] went to Abu Ghraib and began to work for COL PAPPAS as the JIDC OIC, with COL PAPPAS as his rater. The JIDC was part of the 205th MI Bde. He got his guidance from COL PAPPAS, not [REDACTED] or me. I am told that he did not receive an OER due to insufficient time in the position. COL Pappas made a decision to head the JIDC operations when he moved to Abu Ghraib in Nov and [REDACTED] was reassigned from Abu Ghraib to new duties at the end of December. [REDACTED] is now on the C2 staff, with duties as the OIC of an initiative to train and build Iraqi capacity. His current rater is the Deputy C2 and I am his Senior Rater. I senior rate all field grades on the staff.

[REDACTED] was the ICE OIC. She was part of the 519th MI Bn element assigned to the 205th MI BDE. COL PAPPAS placed her as the ICE Chief. I wasn't involved in the details managing the JIDC as that was a unit level responsibility. I wasn't aware that she had departed her assignment and was curtailed while she was on emergency leave. She was the principle individual who briefed me on interrogation operations when I visited Abu Ghraib (until her departure). The ICE Chief was responsible for approving the interrogation plans and ensuring they were in compliance with approved policies.

[REDACTED] was the 32nd MP BN Cdr. I only recall meeting him once. He was responsible for detention operations at Abu Ghraib.

When I visited the JIDC, I generally tried to sit down with soldiers of the Tiger Teams in a round table forum and give them a sense of the big picture--how we were seeing the insurgency, give them a better feel of where their piece fits into the overall effort, why what they were doing was important. On two occasions I sat with them and asked them how things were going on. I had a conversation with them on one of those occasions on what their left and right limits were (authorities) and asked them if they understood them. They all said yes. I told them that the CG had some concerns on folks being very cautious and that maybe they didn't understand their left and right limits. I told them they did not have to be in the middle but they also absolutely could not go over the limits. They indicated they understood and were comfortable. There were a total of about 10-15 interrogators in the group that day. I also believe some of the Bde leadership was standing around (general officers generally are not left alone!). I felt comfortable they understood their left and right limits when I left that day. I never had a one to one with interrogators and no one ever approached me separately on that issue. I was approached on other things, like lack of laptops, JWICS connectivity and accounts (all of which we fixed)--but never on an issue of abuse or authorities. I suspect most individuals wouldn't feel comfortable just walking up to a general officer and reporting abuse--that would more likely come through their chain of command. I've also met with JIDC leaders during Sunday Interrogation Review Meetings at Abu Ghraib. In those sessions, I do a similar rundown of providing the overall picture, what's important to the command, priorities, what they're doing that matters greatly, etc.

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a CPA morning update. Part of my staff was located in CPA to work intelligence issues and also as part of the Joint Operations Center staff. We worked with CPA on designing and helping build the Iraqi security capacities, especially focusing on the MOD and MOI.

COL PAPPAS didn't work for me but we worked together in what could be considered the normal G2/MI Cdr relationship. MG WOJDAKOWSKI was COL PAPPAS' rater and LTC SANCHEZ was his senior rater. I did not know how often they talked. Until recently, I did not realize that BG KARPINSKI was TACON to CJTF-7; I always thought she worked for MG WOJDAKOWSKI. I recall MG WOJDAKOWSKI working MP command related issues, resourcing, missioning, support to detention activities, unit sequencing, etc. I didn't work with BG KARPINSKI much except during the Detainee Appeal and Release Boards. I would see her periodically in the Joint Operations Center, usually at the evening update, but really never had much time to develop any kind of a personal relationship—those were busy times for me. She and MG WOJDAKOWSKI didn't appear to have a close relationship. MG WOJDAKOWSKI didn't get involved much with interrogation operations. COL PAPPAS would know best about MG WOJDAKOWSKI's involvement from a command perspective, but MG WOJDAKOWSKI and I spent very little time on the subject. He did have a good degree of interface when it came to detention operations and he did spend more time on overall detention operations. He was involved with allocation of fiscal and personnel resources (MPs were scarce), and force protection issues (attacks on Abu Ghraib were nearly daily events). He was also involved with engineering aspects related to detention facilities. He was the driver of a couple of detention summits held over an entire day to work through detention operations. Commanders and action officers provided briefings to him and the CG in order to get guidance and the way ahead. The first of these I experienced occurred during the August / September timeframe.

The CG, MG THOMAS MILLER, was the operations officer for CJTF-7. He had staff responsibility for operations. He oversaw the Provost Marshall. In February, the CG asked who should be run for detention operations and MG T. Miller offered that he was the CG's man. The Provost Marshall was supposed to be responsible for detention operations, but the quality and training was thin.

My office administers two contracts relating to interrogation. The first one was a TITAN Contract which was part of an INSCOM worldwide contract. We have a Titan manager at Camp Victory for all of Iraqi operations and Titan representatives in various regions for oversight and administration. The linguists are assigned to a unit and the unit has responsibility for them. The other contract is a CACI contract for interrogators. The first contract was done in July 2003. The contract was through the Contracting Office of the Department of Interior at Fort Huachuca. This Contracting Office apparently was selected last summer under a Department of Defense initiative. All CACI contractors fall under military management when they are assigned to a unit. There is a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) for both contracts—[REDACTED] was the COR until January 2004 and he was replaced by [REDACTED]. The COR served as a conduit for the contracting officer, responsible for tracking performance, helping ensure that we were getting what we paid for/getting the right service.

With regard to the line of authority for MP units and MI units. The MPs are responsible for detention operations and everything that goes with that. MI is responsible for interrogation operations. The only crossover I'm aware of was when BG KARPINSKI no longer allowed the MPs to escort detainees to and from the interrogation booths for interrogations. I personally do not know exactly why she refused to continue that task. LTC PAPPAS would know the real reason.

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actions as quickly as possible. During a visit I made in January, I lauded the interrogators for their heroic efforts. Their work, in great part, contributed to the far lower number of attacks and casualties our soldiers experienced in the Decilan timeframe.

TECHNOLOGY. Building an intelligence architecture and intelligence capabilities were key to intelligence success. First, appropriately cleared individuals at all levels and organizations needed to be able to access data. As I mentioned, from my pre-deployment visit to DC and with other senior level visits to this command, it was constantly stressed that we should eliminate any stovepipes and work together as one intelligence effort. While all the agencies had their own databases, the collocation of agency reps in one analytic center allowed agencies to access their databases and information and make it available to appropriate analysts. Additionally, many accesses were provided to analysts so they could access information themselves—the national reps were instrumental in navigating through these databases. The INSCOM Information Dominance Center was a centerpiece to access and to analytic tools. It was very hard in the beginning because everyone was on a different system and software. The linkage was provided down to the CJTF-7 divisions and brigade through the All Source Analysis System—Light (ASAS-L), which the DA G2 and we worked hard to field. For the first time, this put all units on the same baseline and using the same system. One of the biggest winners we worked hard to field was the Analyst Notebook application, which allowed for linked analysis and collaboration between individuals and units. It saves countless hours of analyst time and contributes greatly to better analysis and common situational awareness. We procured enough copies for the CJTF-7, JDIC, the divisions, and brigades. Our goal is to field it below the brigade level. JWICS was available to CJTF-7 when I arrived, but we could only talk to higher echelons. There were challenges getting it to the divisions as modifications to the VTC and Trojan Spirit communications had to be made. We levied the requirement in Aug, but it we've only had JWICS down to the US division level since December 2003. It's worth its weight in gold. For example, we have a daily G2 NTC to discuss intelligence support in the AO and collection management. We still do not have JWICS capability at the JDIC due to bandwidth constraints but we are working on it. The enemy is too complex and it is hard for us to be going in different directions. What is tactical could be operational or strategic or vice versa. The battlefield doesn't delineate tactical or strategic, it merges it all. We are now working on getting better SIGINT access to the divisions.

Command and Staff Roles & Relationships – Iraq-wide: The C3, C4 and I were the first non-V Corps general officers to join CJTF-7, all of us arriving within weeks of each other in late July/early Aug 03. I was concerned about creating any impression that I was being sent in to fix something that was broken—after all, V Corps had performed brilliantly during the war. Creating a team was important. So I wore the V Corps patch. Our command relationship was like any other. There was a command chain and a staff chain. My responsibilities are staff responsibilities as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO). LTG SANCHEZ was the Commanding General (CG) and MG WOJDAKOWSKI was the Deputy Commander (DCG). The DCG looked after the separate units (MI, MP, et al) and focused on support activities. The CG focused on the combat operations. Most of my interaction was with LTG SANCHEZ. I was the principal individual in the command for the intelligence picture, including interface at that time with Ambassador Bremer and the Iraqi's.

I spent roughly 50% of my time at Camp Victory and 50% at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). I spent a lot of time with CPA personnel and AMBASSADOR BREMER. We provided an intelligence brief to AMBASSADOR BREMMER every morning, followed by

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staff supervisory role, focusing on providing timely, relevant intelligence to the commander and the force, the intelligence architecture, and capabilities that enable intelligence operations. The IFC was comprised of Corps assets, and World-Wide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS) positions on the Joint Manning Document (JMD). We had billets, but they were not ever filled beyond about 60%. We had good representation from the National Security Agency (NSA), who had a robust cryptologic section and INSCOM, who provided support from the Information Dominance Center (IDC). We also acquired personnel from CENTCOM OGA, DIA, Counterterrorism Cell, and Special Operations. As a concerted effort to merge efforts, eliminate stovepipes, and have reachback to the theater and national level, they all sat together to mass the focus, energy and agency capabilities on the very hard insurgency and terrorism threats. We also were fortunate to have British and Australian participation. I reorganized them topically to provide operational level value and not be redundant with division intelligence analysis. When the Corps was in pre-hostilities and hostilities (thru May), geographic organization was necessary, but this needed to change to reflect the current environment, mission, enemy, and other Iraqi dynamics. Space was at a premium as this architecture was a departure from the original small, traditional National Intelligence Center (NIC) plan. When we stood up the JIATF around the rest of the year, there was not enough space and so JIATF was co-located in a trailer right outside. Similarly, we also had the Red Cell and a C2X node in trailers due to space constraints. Their work has been outstanding and I'm convinced this was the right decision.

COALITION ANALYSIS CELL. The Coalition cell was in the Palace and was made up of 17 nations, to include the U.S. They operated at the coalition classification level, which provided some grants on intelligence they could access. Rather than give them the same types of tasks and have one hand tied behind their back, I gave them tasks at the coalition classification level where I felt they could bring great value and relevancy. So, for example, they were responsible for infrastructure intelligence, human information, religious dynamics, attack analysis, and all daily briefings to the commander and staff. They helped provide releasable products to contractors who had to spend a lot of time on the road and helped the United Nations with threat reporting. They really have done some superb work.

INTERROGATION TO ANALYSIS. All reports were available to the IFC and the analysts in each area. Once we were finally able to get reporting into the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) (Dec due to technical and personnel issues), interrogation reports were also automatically available to the National Level Agencies.

Interrogation reports were highly useful and often provided the best information available on an issue. Example: As you know, more of our soldiers die from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than anything else. We had an expert from DIA who focused on this problem. He drilled in on where they were coming from and who was making them. He would read the reports and then worked closely with the interrogators at the IDC. He would send questions or would go out there to help with the interrogation of those detainees having connections with IEDs. The analyst would work with the IDC to help the interrogator. The targeting guys at the IFC would take the reports and helped build the next set of targets to go after bomb makers and employers. An entire Saddam related organization was uncovered and we successfully interdicted activities.

Another example: Due to interrogations and document exploitation, we were able to unravel what we believe to be about fifty percent of a network that Saddam was attempting to reestablish. The interrogators did really terrific work on this very hard and time sensitive task. In these types of operations, time is of the essence, so it's imperative to turn information into

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leadership. The C2X is the staff management and synchronization element for HUMINT and Counterintelligence (CI), providing collection emphasis, priorities, statistical analyses, working staff actions, interface to CENTCOM and Army, and dissemination of reporting. There were two superb captains who were go-getters and really helped make progress. There was no representation from DIA's DHS. I was familiar already with the C2X structure of Bosnia, and had also adopted this organization at ELCCOM. The C2X matured with the arrival of personnel, the first being the Colonel who arrived at the very end of September. Like many other organizations, it took until late October/early Nov before it was reasonably capable of full spectrum HUMINT and CI operations (principally due to personnel arrivals and getting processes in place). We had already begun a formalized collection emphasis in August and it got much better over time, until that which you see today. The C2X folks were out at Abu Ghraib every week, principally to work out collection priorities and understand the JIDC's ability to satisfy information requirements, as well as surface any issues from either the JIDC or CJTF-7. Visits were also imperative as the comms were so poor that there could be a gap of days without good contact. The JIDC products we expected to see at the C2 were interrogation reports, statistics to help understand the population at Abu Ghraib and who was of intelligence interest. The provision of selected interrogation summaries was also an oversight mechanism designed to monitor quality control and gain more immediate information on more significant interrogations. Reports were disseminated and available for the all source analysis effort. A combination of the reporting and initial information on incoming detainees also allowed for better collection emphasis, priorities, and potential answers to the CQ's PIRs. As the detainees files were sent to the Appeal and Release Board, the C2X and JIDC worked in tandem to provide information on who was or was not an MI hold and what reports we had received on that particular detainee. The reports also helped us identify resources required for the interrogation operations. While the brigade was responsible for ordering equipment, etc. the C2 provided help, advice, assistance, and as worked technology solutions to build the architecture.

JIATF: The Joint Inter-Agency Task (JIATF) force was not part of the JIDC interrogation operations mission. The JIATF was focused initially on cutting off the money supply of terrorists and insurgents. Money is a key enabler and if you deny it, you limit the ability of an organization to operate. The FBI, CIA, Treasury, Homeland Security and NSA are all members of the JIATF. All the agencies have a charter within their organization, so it permits an ability to analyze information collaboratively and develop courses of action or operations by agencies who have primacy. There were detainees who provided intelligence of interest to the JIATF. They would provide questions to the interrogator, go out to the JIDC to do an interrogation or piggyback an interrogation providing technical expertise. JIATF did some excellent work, identifying and supporting the interdiction of hundreds of millions of dollars. Seized money flowed back into Iraq Development Fund to help in the development, reconstruction, of Iraq. The JIATF also helped with identifying and registering the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) within Iraq. There are a large number of suspect NGO's affiliated with terrorist/extremist support that operate in Iraq. We worked closely with CPA to get the NGOs registered to operate in the country, in part because it provides legs for shutting down a bad organization. Some NGO's and companies were actually helpful to our effort—they were basically legitimate companies who worked with us to shut down accounts affiliated with terrorism. Others required other types of operations.

IFC: The Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) worked for me. The Brigade commander focused on actual collection as the commander and asset manager, and I, as the staff C2, had the

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next phases. We didn't have time to plan it like you would do a normal operation, ie plan, organize, train, deploy, set-up, and execute. You do the best you can with what you have knowing there isn't going to be much help in the near term. You morph and operate as you can stand up resources, procedures, and capabilities, and you try to make every day a little better and treat your soldiers right. And, you produce intelligence as you go, as the enemy is not waiting for you to organize against him. You make countless decisions every day, with little time to stuff and write things, like in a peacetime environment. At some point in the Fall, we believed we needed one person to run the entire facility and recommended such—the detention-interrogation operation is incredibly complex with mountains of issues. In this regard, MI and MP still would have separate missions, but it would build unity of command and someone to look out for and address all the issues. We felt that a Flag Officer was appropriate, but there was no extra Flag on the CJTF-7 Staff who could take this on and we never did get anyone until MG Geoff Miller arrived. The visit of MG Geoff Miller was directed by the Pentagon, but LTC Sanchez said he would welcome anyone who could help us. We realized and stated that OTMO did not equal Iraq. That was quite clear. We operate under different authorities; we have a much larger operation than the insular OTMO operation; interrogation is only one smaller part of the Human Intelligence effort and part of a much larger all source intelligence effort; we're in a combat environment and taking enemy fire; the numbers and types of detainees are vastly larger and varied. That said, we were looking for best practices from something that at least had detainees and conducted interrogations above the tactical level. From MG GEOFFREY MILLER's September visit, my takeaways included the power of analysis fueling interrogations and the need for a strong C2X management capability; and COL PAPPAS took the Tiger Team concept—the teaming up of interrogator, analyst and linguist to form the team. COL PAPPAS and I both supported the reorganization to a Tiger Team concept. He decided to adopt the JIDC model. MG Miller also brought blueprints from various types of interrogation booths. I believe the engineers and COL Pappas reviewed these. Ultimately, the quick to construct, wooden booths were selected due to expediency. These rooms had one-way mirrors for viewing interrogations as an oversight mechanism. The CG endorsed the Miller recommendations. There was no order I'm aware of establishing the JIDC nor doctrine on how to establish the JIDC. We took the best Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) which were already being practiced, looked to apply applicable doctrine and policies, and mapped it over into CJTF-7 operations. COL PAPPAS reorganized from within his own Brigade (just as I organized the C2 operation to meet our needs (HUMINT management, plus analysis, collection management, etc)). He worked with the personnel he had on the ground.

The Interrogation Control Element (ICE) had responsibility for managing and running the day-to-day interrogation operations. The element made all assignments of interrogators to detainees, approved interrogation plans and monitored every interrogation done at AG. COL PAPPAS did not explain the details on the operations of the JIDC since it was his operation. As with all operations, improvements were made as they could be made. But, I believe it took COL PAPPAS personally moving to Abu Ghraib to really provide the changes and the leadership necessary. I personally believe it wasn't until December 2003 that the JIDC was fully capable and I felt pretty comfortable with the operations. Then in Jan/Feb 04, the Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the 205th MI BDE and the 504th MI BDE occurred. That slowed down operations a bit, but by late Feb, they were fully mission capable.

C2X. The C2X was discussed at some length during the Miller visit. Although we had a very small C2X already, it was only partially capable and lacked experience and senior

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V Corps was transferring from a Corps mission to a combined joint task force mission. A PERSONAL FOR message from CJCS was the tasking mechanism. I submitted my results in written format. Key personnel from the Pentagon took my comments very seriously and I was told that initiatives were generated to provide support. [REDACTED] of the CIA was also an addressee on the message due to him being an info addressee on the original tasking message.

LTC Alexander and MG BURGENS/LTC Boykin took a trip to Iraq in an effort to look at each area themselves and decide what help they could render. Their trips were separate and it probably in part as an adjunct to my report. LTC Alexander put together a game plan on how DA-G2 could help meet some of the shortfalls in the technical arena. LTC Alexander provided significant help, to include the Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) to help us with HUMINT and detainee accountability (with a goal of being able to have one system help both the detention and interrogation mission); Analyst Notebook, which effectively linked the all source intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) divisions, etc.; Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS); ASAS-Lites to replace the ASAS systems that were not of utility in this environment; the INSCOM IDC Portal which facilitated intelligence fusion and allowed the interrogator to leverage worldwide information. These improvements allowed for accountability, analytic/interrogator collaboration and exchanges, enhanced analysis, quick name checks on bad actors, an intelligence system, etc. The other important thing was to get everyone using the same software and up on the same baseline. It was a monumental task, but put us ahead by quantum leaps once fielded.

Decision to Use Abu Ghraib as the Main Detention & Interrogation Location: The decision to site operations at Abu Ghraib was made before I arrived (or at least just as I was arriving) and I do not recall why it was selected. I do remember hearing snippets about the use of Abu Ghraib--its availability and proximity to Baghdad. My initial visit to Abu Ghraib was 20 Aug 03. My goal was to visit Abu Ghraib once a month. With interrogation being 15% of my effort and major spikes in enemy actions and activities, I found times when I couldn't meet my objective. I visited there in August, September, November, January, February, March, May, and June. I was not able to make it in October because my deputy, [REDACTED] was on leave and I was trying to get the IFC stood up--additionally, we were facing a greatly increased enemy activity as we entered into Ramadan. In December I did not make it because of the capture of SADDAM HUSSEIN. In April, we were focused on the large scale enemy activity in Baghdad and Iraq (and other hot spots). I did see continued improvements in Abu Ghraib as time went on. In August 2003, the interrogation operations were barebones and it was stifling not. There were a couple of tents and a small number of detainees who were of intelligence interest. The detention operation was up and running before the interrogators arrived, with a moderate population. Interrogation management at that time was fractured, chaotic, and not a coherent operation. Folks were doing the best they could, but nothing had prepared them for what they were facing--it required mass-scale organization. At that point, Abu Ghraib was not set up for long term use. Quality of life was an issue for both the MPs and MIs for months, and COL PAPPAS worked those issues (showers, dining facility, et al) with MG WODJAROWSKI. The operations, however, had improved greatly by Dec.

JIDC

Tactical interrogation locations were sited in areas where detainees ended up on the battlefield. LTC SANCHEZ wanted to consolidate the operations for longer term beyond the tactical interrogations, with focus on the operational level. It was a challenge and we had to do everything on the fly. There was no operational pause between cessation of hostilities and the

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undertaking, as we documented billets and positions. The JMD took a long time to be finally approved, which hindered fill and our ability to operate.

In terms of official investigations or official testimony, I have been questioned about the Abu Ghraib and intelligence operations in Iraq by the SCHLESINGER Independent Panel, VICE ADMIRAL CHURCH, and twice by MG FAY. I have also helped in answering a number of questions by the SENATE and others. I am currently the C2, MNF-I and was the C2 for CJTF-7 since 29 July 2003. I was probably selected as the C2 for CJTF-7 because I was the most readily available general officer and had some experience in the area of operations. As the C2, my rater was MG WOJDAKOWSKI, Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7. My directions came from LTG SANCHEZ. I did have a lot of dialogue with the J2, CJCS (MG RONALD BURGESS) and J2, CENTCOM (BG JOHN CUSTER), but my guidance came from LTG SANCHEZ. BG CUSTER and GEN ABUZAID, usually thru BG CUSTER, would relay any other intent or issues that might relate to what the enemy was doing, assessments, technology, or other substantive intelligence issues. I had the most dialogue with MG BURGESS, who represented any Pentagon or community interests. These were usually general discussions, ensuring our intel picture was synchronized, topics of interest, etc—not directives. In terms of concerns from Washington, I do recall SecDef and [REDACTED] concerns about our intelligence reports not being available at the national level. In my opinion, this was a bona fide concern. Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting was not getting into national level databases and analysts/decision makers were missing good information. We had a portal, which was marginally user friendly, but far better than anything we had had before. There were overwhelming communications and automation issues that took a long time to be fully resolved. We required report format changes, reports writers to help train/write proper reports, an M3 connection, and collector codes. This took until Dec to resolve. Just getting reports offsite was a struggle. Once this was in place, we were able to drop our reports in and have them available over the national automated message handling system. In fact, it took us until May 04 to really get a user friendly portal into place—this has been a huge winner with all positive feedback (developed locally as just couldn't get there any other way). There were also concerns over detainee tracking as I recall, most of this being on the detention vice interrogation end. There was also interest in what we were getting out of detainees. We were directed to begin providing a Weekly Management Report to SecDef via CENTCOM/JCS/USD-I in late Oct/early Nov 03. EXHIBIT 1: Theater Interrogation Highlights. GTMO was already providing a weekly report and we were asked to do the same. The report would provide what kind of detainees we had who were of intelligence interest. We also provided Interrogation Highlights for the week. There was interest from the Pentagon on what we were getting, but they were not giving us day-to-day directions or telling us who or how to interrogate. In January 2004, I met with DR. CAMBONE and MG BURGESS. Our discussion was on intelligence writ large. Interrogation was not the predominate topic. The purpose of the meeting (attended by many leaders in the intel community) was to have a discussion of intelligence organization—Iraq was a key topic, hence the request for my attendance.

Regarding the initial assessment, before I left for Iraq, I had an orientation trip to DC to get spun up. I met with DR. CAMBONE, MG BURGESS. I do not recall if I saw DepSecDef WOLFOWITZ, but I did not see Sec RUMSFELD. I also visited the National Intelligence Agencies. The SecDef, through JCS and CENTCOM, tasked me to do an evaluation of intelligence in Iraq. I do not know what the genesis of this directive was. I assumed at the time it was because major hostilities had ended and we were shifting from Phase III to Phase IV, and

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[REDACTED]
MNF-I C2 AG
Camp Victory, Iraq
Organization or Address

[REDACTED]
MNF-I C2 AG de Camp
Camp Victory, Iraq
Organization or Address

administer oaths, this 21st day of JUL, 2004
at Camp Victory, Iraq

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Authority to Administer Oaths)

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