

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/09	3. TIME 1052	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME FAST, Babara G.	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS O8/RA	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS C2, CJTF-7, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq			

Barbara G. Fast

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reported to CJTF-7, Baghdad, Iraq on 29 Jul 03. I was assigned as the C2 for CJTF-7. I was tasked by SecDef thru CENTCOM to complete an assessment of the intelligence architecture in Iraq and specifically address intelligence resources, processes and priorities. I spent the first part of the month with the newly arrived C3, visiting all the divisions and various activities, with an eye on the intelligence system. In both my interim and final assessments for SecDef, I highlighted my concerns with detainee operations as a number one problem and an area where we have the greatest challenge. At that time, interrogation operations were strung across the country, from Camp Bucca to Camp Cropper to Ashraf. It was about the time I arrived when Abu Ghraib was opened for interrogation business--bringing in detainees associated with a major CJTF-7 operation. Against that backdrop, I greatly welcomed the visit of MG Geoff Miller and the GTMO team. Although GTMO is a very different effort (no combat, no ongoing operation into which it must fit in a timely manner, a singular effort vice a coherent full spectrum HUMINT effort), I believed we could map GTMO best practices into something that would work in Iraq. There was much work to be done--from organization to facilities to reporting and management. The C2 and the MI Bde immediately began to implement the recommendations from MG Miller's GTMO report. In the C2 area specifically, this included standing up a robust C2X (which, lacking even a competent OIC, I had already identified as my most critical fill) and an analytic effort that capitalized on debriefing reports and focuses interrogations. COL Pappas also began to implement GTMO recommendations, to include an internal reorganization to establish Tiger Teams, as well as receiving GTMO teams augment his effort and provide additional expertise and mentorship. Arrangements were made for a Huachuca MTT, which come in and conducted additional interrogation training. In Sep, the CG published an interrogation policy letter which outlined proper and authorized conduct for interrogation (updated in Oct 03). All of these aforementioned initiatives were implemented from mid-Sep to the end of Nov (being in part dependent on resourcing). Meanwhile, the CG's goal was to close Camp Cropper (less the HVD facility) and consolidate all detention operations into Abu Ghraib by 1 Oct 03. When the first detainees from Camp Cropper began to arrive at Abu Ghraib, interrogation operations were conducted in tents. Up until that time, the Cdr, A Co, 519th MI Bn, [REDACTED] was the senior officer on the site. Soon, MI personnel from the various MI units began to arrive at Abu Ghraib and operate. In terms of responsibility, the MI Brigade was responsible for interrogation and the MP Brigade was responsible for detention operations. COL Tom Pappas, 205th MI Bde Commander, initially operated from his headquarters in Camp Anaconda, but found it necessary to relocate to Baghdad in order to be closer to CJTF-7 and key components of his command, such as interrogation. I am not familiar with the timing of [REDACTED] assignment to Abu Ghraib. That assignment was made by [REDACTED] my deputy and the V Corps G2. He did personnel assignments, due to the backbone of the intelligence coming out of V Corps assets and the close working relationship he had with the CJTF-7 C1, who was also the V Corps G1. The first time I recall meeting [REDACTED] was just after the mortar attack which killed and injured numerous MI soldiers. It was just before this incident that COL Pappas began spending more and more time at Abu Ghraib, often overnighing. After the mortar attack, COL Pappas made a decision to move all operations and billeting into the hardened buildings to prevent injuries from future attacks (CPA had previously said these buildings were off-limits to CJTF-7 use). During my visits, I was normally briefed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on operations; however, [REDACTED] was always in the wings and often discussed various operational and life support issues with me (eg. computers, showers). From an austere, bare bones installation, interrogation operations steadily improved. Facilities were rehabilitated to allow for segregation of detainees. Interrogation booths were built. Databases were built and software improved to link detainees to interrogations and reporting. Unfortunately, there were different databases being used by MI and MP's for detainee/interrogation operations. The decision to begin using BATS was slow in being implemented (just now being fielded to satisfaction). During my visits to Abu Ghraib, I observed areas of concern--shortcomings in defensive preparations, lax conduct among MP's, and a general laxity in cleanliness standards. MI personnel were forced to conduct their own escort of detainees, pull guard duty--something COL Pappas raised as an issue. I voiced my concern to the DCG, MG Wodjakowski, about the need for someone to be in charge of the entire facility, as did the JAG, [REDACTED] LTG Sanchez made the decision to appoint COL Pappas as the Forward Operating Base Commander at Abu Ghraib. The MP Bn was placed under his TACON. This decision was published in a FRAGO. [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Despite this being around the time of the detainee abuses (as founded in the Taguba 15-6), the command leadership was not aware of this abhorrent behavior to the best of my knowledge(I simply can't speak for all others, but have no reason to believe that other staff and the MI Bde Cdr knew about it) and it therefore played no role in the timing of the [REDACTED] COL Pappas uncovered several disciplinary problems at Abu Ghraib, and to the best of my knowledge, he immediately and thoroughly investigated and took action on each one. These included soldiers having pets and local nationals living on and running a cafe. The relationship between the MI Brigade and the MP Brigade was a frustrated one, with COL Pappas unhappy about the level of MP support. COL Pappas' rater was the DCG, MG Wojdakowski, with LTG Sanchez as Senior Rater. BG Karpinski's rater was LTG McKiernan (I thought it was MG Wodjakowski until just this week) as 800th MP Bde was only TACON to CJTF-7 and LTG Sanchez. My responsibility as the C2 was one of staff supervision for interrogation operations. The C3 was designated by LTG Sanchez as the overall staff supervisor for detention operations, with the PMO being responsible for detainee operations. It is my belief that there was a premise that most units would surrender during Phase III, resulting in there being few detainees. I just don't believe that folks envisioned ever needing a robust detainee operation on a scale not seen since WWII, either during or after hostilities. There are doctrinal and training lessons to be learned and which have been developed throughout OIF. With regard to the detainees abuse--I never saw nor was I made aware of the alleged detainee abuse, the use of dogs during interrogations by MI or MP's (if it occurred), nor was I aware of any photos until the investigation was being initiated. I do not recall if it was just before the investigation began (but after the notification to the CG) or if it was after the investigation commenced when I actually became knowledgeable do recall being absolutely sickened by the description, and later, by the pictures (I have never seen the CD). Clearly, had I been aware of this activity, I would have reported it, just as I immediately actioned a reported violation in the December time frame (reported to me one day, went to JAG the next day and we went to CG--forwarded initial report to CENTCOM as they owned the unit).  
I served as the President of the Appeal and Release Board from its inception in August 2003. The board consisted of three voting members, the CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate, the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and me. There was also a Board Recorder, Military Intelligence representative, CID representative and Provost Marshall(all non-voting members) The votes are formulated a decision on each case, which was documented by the legal recorder. There was never a refusal on my part to approve the release of such prisoners after a recommendation for release was made by the board.  
Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?  
A. No.

## DOD 000653