

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) [REDACTED]	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME MILLER, GEOFFREY	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS 08	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			

9. Geoffrey Miller WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My initial visit to Iraq occurred 31 August to 10 September 2003. I was in D.C. briefing the Deputy SecDef when I received a call from RON BURGESS, J-2. In my own words, he stated that there were some challenges with the transition from major combat operations to Support and Sustainment Operations (SASO). The intelligence fusion and intelligence capability was not established. I told him that the only way was to task SouthCom and that I would assist in looking into Detention Operations because we were good at it. Ten days later, SouthCom called and said they had a call from JCS and had a WARNORD to support CJTF-7 and that a FRAGO was coming out to deploy. I put together a combined interagency team with intelligence, law enforcement, DIA [REDACTED]. We took personnel who were currently at GTMO or those who had been there to assist on how detention operation should be done. Once we received the FRAGO, we departed to Iraq. This was apples and oranges as GTMO was under Geneva three and Iraq was under Geneva four. I stated that we needed to make sure from the beginning that was understood. We handed everyone a Geneva Convention handbook to all we met with. I met with LTG Sanchez and told him we would need 96 hours to conduct an assessment to look at the prison and see how it is established and how they are operating. We visited Abu Ghraib and conducted an assessment of the operations. I told LTG Sanchez once we completed the assessment that I was going to be blunt. Abu Ghraib was not working well. The Corps was transitioning to a CJTF and the focus at Abu Ghraib was tactical not strategic as it should be. A/519th was on the ground and they were literally conducting tactical operations. They had split operations at Camp Cropper where the majority of the interrogations were being conducted (6x booths) and Abu Ghraib where they were beginning to establish operations (1x RFAF and 1x Trojan Spirit). I told him how strategic interrogations worked at GTMO and how you go about gathering information and segmenting it from high and low level value. I told LTG SANCHEZ he needed to establish interrogation limits quickly because the soldiers on the ground didn't know what had to be done, but not because we had seen any abuse. They just needed to know what some of the limits were. I also stated that he needed to get leadership down at Abu Ghraib to oversee the operations and be ready to calm down, hold back or stop people when things started to go wrong. I wrote my report and sent it up to SouthCom J2 [REDACTED] and JCS J2 RON BURGESS and no one at DOD.

I spent time with COL PAPPAS and [REDACTED] as discussed with them how you go about establishing operations. We were laying out the baseline we used at GTMO. I told them that the working dogs were used in GTMO to help the MPs with the custody and control issue and that it was very effective. When you have a lot of detainees and few guards, the dogs help with reduce the risk of demonstrations. At Abu Ghraib you had Camp Ganai which was an open area with three strands of concertina wire. To use the dogs as a base would reduce noise or demonstration. Have the dogs when the detainees are awake not when they are sleeping. We have never used the dogs for interrogations at GTMO and I did not discuss this with them because I did not have this concept. When I left, I did not leave any documents at Abu Ghraib. I did leave a disc with GTMO SOPs with the C2 and CG. I did not leave instructions with the subordinate units. COL PAPPAS attended three to four nightly AARs we held while in Iraq. I wanted him to understand where we were going and to be ready to respond to MG FAST or LTG SANCHEZ. I was asked to send assistance to Abu Ghraib to help get the Tiger Team concept going by MG FAST. I told her to go through JCS and ask for the teams. I ended up sending five Tiger Teams lead by [REDACTED]. I do not know who were the team members who accompanied him. They were supposed to have been the best teams. I told MG FAST that the teams would work as a team and not be split. Other soldiers could be added to the team to learn from them. The teams consisted of an interrogator and an analyst. They deployed for 90 days and were OPCON to CJTF-7. They did continue to informally maintain contact with GTMO but not me. They would ask for SOPs and other information. It would be out of character for [REDACTED] to not have taken actions if something was wrong. He is a solid Warrant Officer. As far as removal of clothing, we had received SecDef authority to use the removal of clothing as a technique for about a six-week period between Dec 02 to Jan 03 but that was never done at GTMO. I did not elect to use that technique. That was rescinded.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In relation to the intense pressure: When I visited Iraq for the first time, the Corps was transitioning from combat operations to SASO operations but there was still a significant amount of fighting going on. In looking at actionable intelligence to help the fight, I didn't get to that level. I saw that at the operations level the ability to get information was bulky. There were a lot of calls being put out for request for information. There were about 90 priorities and the folks on the ground (Abu Ghraib) were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I told MG FAST that they were confusing the soldiers with what they wanted. They needed to reduce the number of priorities to help them focus because they did not know what they were looking for. C2X was not functioning and they needed to relook at how they were prioritizing the requirements. We helped them established SDRs and priorities. I never heard or was aware of pressure coming from higher up. There were no IIR process fro a long period of time. They were writing DIIR. We suggested to at least writing MFRs for their interrogation summaries.

When I first visited Abu Ghraib, I noticed there was a lack of equipment. They had a tent as an interrogation booth. The system they were using for interrogation was not working and we recommended they use the Tiger Team concept. In order for them to put in place the GTMO system they needed computer systems which they didn't have. To do the kind of linkage we had at GTMO and to link with the fusion cell for analytical support was just not there. They were not doing too many interrogation plans. We told them they needed to develop interrogation plans and then get it approved. The senior NCOs and Warrant officers need to get involve and check on their soldiers. The analyst need to get help get an interrogator on track by reviewing the interrogation plans for quality control, they need to provide an assessment based on what information they have gathered of the detainee and provide assistance by telling an interrogator where they need to go next with the interrogation. They were working very hard and trying to do their best and much of their work had to be done by hand. I didn't see the capability to move this very fast without the proper automation. My first priority was to get the organization of teams established and my second priority became establishing the computer system to help with linkage to the fusion cell and C2X. It is still an on going process and continues to get better.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add? A. No

End of Statement

AFFIDAVIT

_____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of JUNE, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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