

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/19	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME MILLER, GEOFFREY D.	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS O-8	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL-DETAINEE OPERATIONS			

9. I, Geoffrey D. Miller WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q. How did the JTF GTMO mission to assist CJTF 7 originate?
A. The requirement to establish a JTF Guantanamo Assessment Team for CJTF 7 was directed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SOUTHCOM. I was in Washington D.C. briefing the Deputy Secretary of Defense in May 03. I met with MG RON BURGESS, JCS J-2 and during our discussions he stated that there were some challenges in CJTF-7 with the transition from Major Combat Operations to Support and Sustainment Operations (SASO) in the areas of intelligence, interrogation, and detention. I told him if there was a request for JTF GTMO to conduct an assistance visit that JCS must task SOUTHCOM to conduct the mission. About ten days later, SOUTHCOM called and notified me they had a WARNORD to support CJTF-7 and that a FRAGO was coming out to deploy. [REDACTED] interrogation operations, and detention operations. The Assistance Team included personnel who were currently assigned to JTF GTMO or those who had recently been assigned to assist on how intelligence fusion operations, interrogation operations, and detention operation could be better integrated. Once we received the FRAGO, we departed to Iraq.

Q. What was the difference between the mission at JTF GTMO and the mission of CJTF-7?
A. The missions were significantly different. Operations conducted by CJTF-7 were conducted under the provisions of Geneva Convention 3 for EPWs and under Geneva Convention 4 for Security Internees. The operations at JTF GTMO conducted detention and interrogation of enemy combatants. JTF GTMO adhered to the provisions of the Geneva Convention except where military necessity dictated as directed by the Nov 01 Presidential Directive.

Q. Who at CJTF-7 did you discuss the JTF GTMO assessment visit strategy?
A. I met with LTG Sanchez soon after the Team arrived for an in brief and we discussed the assessment plan. We discussed the visit strategy and applicability of Geneva Convention requirements that applied in Iraq. I told him the Team would need 96 hours to conduct our initial assessment of intelligence fusion operations on the staff, the interrogation operations at the CJTF-7 level, and the CJTF-7 level detention operations. Following the initial assessment I would provide an in-process review of the findings. I had a similar discussion with MG Fast focused on the intelligence fusion and interrogation operations.

Q. What were the Team's assessments in the area of intelligence and interrogation and to whom were they provided?
A. The assessments of all areas and recommendations were provided in the assessment report on 9 September 03. I briefed both LTG Sanchez and MG Fast on that day and provided the assessment report and associated SOPs.

Q. Can you characterize the operational environment and focus of the intelligence and interrogation you observed during your assessment visit?
A. The Vth Corps has recently transitioned to a CJTF structure. The intelligence operations and interrogation operations at both the Camp Cropper facility and Abu Ghraib were focused at the tactical level, working to transition to operational level requirements for the CJTF. Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib were two separate interrogation facilities with their own independent collection focus. The majority of the interrogations were being conducted at Camp Cropper. Abu Ghraib was just beginning to establish intelligence exploitation and interrogation operations. I discussed our assessment and recommendation to establish a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center with MG Fast and LTG Sanchez. We discussed the process of intelligence fusion and how strategic interrogations were conducted at JTF GTMO.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT <i>[Signature]</i>	PAGE 1 OF <u>4</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF GEFFREY D. MILLER TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. It has been reported that [redacted] was notified of inappropriate interrogation procedures and did not report this further. Would this surprise you?

A. Yes. It would be out of character for [redacted] to not have taken actions if something was wrong. His performance at JTF GTMO was superb.

Q. Were there interrogation authorities at JTF GTMO that authorized the removal of clothing as an interrogation technique?

A. Yes. From 12 December 02 to 15 January 03 JTF GTMO had SECDEF approved the interrogation authority to remove items of clothing as a part of interrogations. To the best of my knowledge JTF GTMO never used this technique during that period. All personnel were notified in January 03 that this technique was no longer authorized.

Q. Was there intense pressure on COL Papas to produce intelligence from interrogations?

A. When I visited Iraq for the first time, the CJTF was transitioning from combat operations to stability and SASO operations, but there was still a significant amount of fighting going on. I did not detect any extraordinary pressure being applied to COL Papas. In my experience, there is always pressure to provide intelligence to help the commander better be prepared to win the fight. It simply saves soldiers lives and is always a priority. In looking at actionable intelligence to help the fight, I assessed that the challenges I observed was there were a large number of intelligence priorities and requirements for the unit to answer. The leadership and soldiers at Abu Ghraib were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I recommended to MG FAST that the C2 reports in a timely manner. This is one of the essential documents to assist in developing actionable intelligence for the commander. The Team suggested that the Intelligence Cell at Abu Ghraib at least begin producing Memorandums For Record for their interrogation summaries.

Q. What was your assessment of the Intelligence unit at Abu Ghraib's ability to accomplish its mission?

A. The Team noticed there was a lack of equipment and facilities to conduct interrogations. There were very few computers for the troops to use to leverage the information contained in other intelligence databases. They had a canvas tent that was being used as an interrogation booth. Their interrogators did not have analysis that acted as an integrated team. We recommended they use the Tiger Team concept where the interrogator and analysis routinely worked together so they could be more effective. To do the kind of system linkage to make the most of out the interrogation opportunities we recommended they should establish an intelligence fusion cell for analytical support. The unit was functioning a very basic level - lots of effort but not much intelligence output.

Q. Where they developing interrogation plans as the basis for interrogations?

A. The Team assessment was that the organization was not producing many interrogation plans as the basis for interrogation. We recommended they should develop interrogation plans and then get it approved prior to all interrogations. The senior NCOs and Warrant officers should be involved and train their soldiers in this task. The analyst needs to help the interrogator by reviewing the interrogation plans for quality control.

Q. Who did you provide your report after departing CJTF 7?

A. I sent the assessment report to SOUTHCOM J2, and it was forwarded to the JCS J2. I do not know how it was further distributed.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add?

A. No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

DM

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STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY D. MILLER TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

GDM

AFFIDAVIT

I, GEOFFREY D. MILLER, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Geoffrey D. Miller
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[Redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 22 day of JUNE, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[Redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[Redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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