

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION NMF-I HQ, Iraq	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS O-8/USA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS NMF-I, DCS-OPS			

... I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Iraq, early August 2003, possibly the 4th or 5th. I did not discuss the consolidation of operations at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility with General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interrogations until mid to late October. I don't recall sitting down with either General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. I was more involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility, concentrating on the quick reaction force and counter battery fire, things of that nature. Most of these discussions were with General Wojdakowski. Myself and General Wojdakowski had numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As for General Sanchez being frustrated in the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frustration that I witnessed was not until the January time frame. General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of "who is my enemy" was not being articulated to him to his satisfaction. However, interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not the sole reason for it. Sometime after the new year, General Sanchez talked to me directly at a staff meeting and voiced his frustration with lack of results concerning the entire detainee operations and asked, "who is bringing this together?" The [REDACTED] responded by saying that he was the guy, and I told General Sanchez that I was the PMO's supervisor and therefore I would look into it. In mid January I talked with General Ryder concerning detainee operations and said that I needed someone senior in charge. This happened just before the incidents became known. I told General Ryder that we needed help with detainee operations because we didn't have the experts. We needed an O-6 or an O-7 and a Mobil Training Team; [REDACTED] did not have the expertise. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did we discuss military intelligence implications as far as interrogations operations is concerned. The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they were conducting very aggressive offensive operations. The volume of detainees being collected by them was high, that being said, they were conducting operations in a very hostile environment and their operational tempo was one of the highest in theater. I have never heard of the "50 meter" rule, concerning the release of detainees. General Sanchez was concerned that maybe the mid-October on, there were discussions concerning the release of detainees. Major General Fast and General Sanchez discussed the "board issue" on a number of occasions. Not enough of the detainees were being released, General Sanchez seemed to be frustrated at the lack of progress with the situation. Some of the problem seemed to be that the division holding areas were becoming too full and they needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant sending them to the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them released in their area of operations. As for the force protection posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. Given the dynamic nature of the population in that area of Iraq and the hostility towards coalition forces it is no wonder that there were a number of attacks. There are not enough resources to protect every facility 100 percent of the time, the tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the changing situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the facility. Constant tactical attention was given to the facility with General Wojdakowski being personally involved. The Division was given more battle space to better support the area, someone was always working it. I do not know who made the decision to use that particular facility. (Baghdad Central Correctional Facility) :////////////////////

Do you have anything to add to this statement? \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 0 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_ CONTINUED."  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

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STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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