

SWORN STATEMENT			
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS			
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT			
AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).		
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately		
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.		
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.		
1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
MNF-I HQ, Iraq	20040620	1130 AM	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS	
		O-8/USA	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			
MNF-I, DCS-OPS			
9. _____ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
<p>I arrived in Iraq, early August 2003, possibly the 4th or 5th. I did not discuss the consolidation of operations at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility with General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interrogations until mid to late October. I don't recall sitting down with either General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. I was more involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility, concentrating on the quick reaction force and the counter battery fire, things of that nature. Myself and General Wodjakowski had numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As for General Sanchez being frustrated in the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frustration that I witnessed was not until the January time frame, General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of, "who is my enemy", was not being articulated to him to his satisfaction. However, interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not the sole reason for it. In mid January 2004, General Sanchez, at a staff meeting voiced his frustration with the overall detainee operations situation and said something on the order of, "so who in the staff is bringing all this together?" Our _____ stated that he had staff responsibility, and I followed up by saying that since I supervised the PMO that I would oversee the issue. Approximately one week later I e-mailed General Ryder and requested his assistance because I felt we did not have the proper expertise on the staff with regards to detainee operations. This resulted in two formal requests: (1) dated 16 January 2004, for a Mobil Training Team for military corrections specialists, and (2) dated 29 January 2004, requesting a detention operations cell to augment the PMO staff. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did we discuss military intelligence implications as far as interrogations is concerned. The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they were conducting very aggressive offensive operations. The volume of detainees being collected by them was high, that being said, they were conducting operations in a very hostile environment and their operational tempo was one of the highest in theater. I have never heard of the, "50 meter rule", concerning the 4th Infantry Division or any other unit. I recall that from mid October on, there were discussions concerning the slow release of detainees. General Sanchez was concerned that maybe the procedures were not what they should be as for the release of the detainees. Generals Fast and Sanchez discussed the, "board issue" on a number of occasions. Some of the problem seemed to be that the division holding areas were becoming too full and needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant to the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them to be released in their area of operations. As for the force protection posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. The tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the changing situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the facility. Continuous tactical attention was given to the facility. I do not know who made the decision to use that particular facility, Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Do you have anything to add to this statement? _____</p>			
NOT USED			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

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STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]	TAKEN AT <u>MNF-I, HQ, Iraq</u>	DATED <u>20 June 04</u>
9. STATEMENT (Continued)		
<div>NOT USED</div>		
AFFIDAVIT		
[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.		
		[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)
WITNESSES:		Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this <u>20th</u> day of <u>June</u> , <u>2004</u>
		at <u>MNF-I, HQ, Iraq</u>
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS		[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)
		(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS		(Authority To Administer Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE <u>2</u> OF <u>2</u> PAGES

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