
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AUTHORITY Title 10 USC Section 301; Ti	tie 5 USC Sectio	n 2951; E.O. 939	7 dated November	22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and i	iaw enforcement	itional/alternate n	and by which allotti leans of identification	on to facilitate filing and retrieval.
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