MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of

1. On 17 June 2004, the undersigned interviewed hereinafter referred to as Source, concerning his knowledge of detainee file locations and procedures. Source provided the following response in a separate Word document:

Q: Where are the DAB assessments? Where are the detainee files?

A: From September 2003 through March 2004 I was the C2X of CJTF-7. As such I had responsibility for staff oversight of all interrogation operations in Iraq. From November 2003 through February 2004 I replaced MG Fast as the president of the Article 78 Board (Security Internee Appeal and Review Board.) From February to the time of my departure I participated as an MI rep (twice a week) on the standing release board.

Of the entire detainee population in Iraq, only a small percentage was considered as "MI holds." These "MI hold" detainees were physically kept at Camp Vigilant at the Abu Ghuraib prison complex, and they were interrogated at the JIDC. The remaining detainees were considered as "security holds" or "criminal holds." These security and criminal detainees were kept at separate camps within the Abu Ghuraib prison complex. Of the total number of "MI hold" detainees, only a small percentage were ever assessed by the DAB. Specifically, the DAB only assessed those detainees who were being considered for release from "MI hold" status. This typically occurred once they had been fully exploited and had no further intelligence value. When the DAB declared a detainee was of "no intelvalue" and no longer a "MI hold", the detainee was physically moved from Camp Vigilant over to Camp Ganci (general security hold population) within the prison complex.

SJA personnel out at the Abu Ghuraib prison complex maintained hard copy dossiers on each security internee. The assessments produced by the DAB were added to these hard copy detainee dossiers as appropriate. The dossiers of "security hold" detainees were considered by the release board. (Note: The board never considered any "MI hold" detainees for release.) Each week from SJA would make arrangements to have the hard copy dossiers of "security hold" detainees physically transported to Camp Victory, so they could be considered by the release board.

At Camp Victory the CJTF-7 C2X shop had an interrogation operations management section (comprised of about five to seven personnel). This section

was physically located in a trailer located immediately behind the HQ building (before the HQ moved to the Al Faw Palace.) was the head of that section from about November 2003 through February 2004. eplaced him and is presently in charge.

Within the interrogation operations management section there were a couple of NCOs who were responsible for supporting the release board. (Note: While I was there, these NCOs included They worked closely with

The SJA developed the docket for the upcoming boards. The NCOS from the interrogation management section ran name traces on the dockets through the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC). The NCOs from the interrogation management section would also physically review each hard copy detained dossier prior to the release board and annotate on a checklist in each file that the detained was not considered an "MI Hold." (Note: In preparation for the boards a CID officer would also review the dossiers and annotated on the checklist whether the detained was on "CID hold.") Once MI and MP had done their respective reviews, the dossiers were then handed back over to SJA

From September 2003 through November 2003 the release board was comprised of MG Fast (MI), BG Karpinski (MP), and In November 2003 I replaced MG Fast, an MP LTC replaced BG Karpinski, and a JAG MAJ replaced We met twice a week and reviewed an average of 100 files total per week. In February 2004 a USMC JAG COL from Camp Lejeune arrived and established a standing release board. The MP representative was a LTC and the MI representative was a COL (a duty rotated between four COLs in the C2 section.) The standing release board considered about 100 files per day, six days a week.

- 2. Source did not execute a sworn statement.
- 3. Point of Contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at Conn

