

[REDACTED]  
SPC 96B

366-94-4697

B Co, 321 MI Bn

Dallas, TX

I understand my rights as read and told to me. I wish to waive my rights with the understanding that I can invoke them at a later time if I so desire.

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) on 15 September 03, after staging through Kuwait and a short-term assignment at Balad and the Cropper Interrogation Facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). During my train up time immediately after mobilization and initial assignments in Kuwait and Iraq I did not receive any training or instruction in Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), the handling of prisoners or detainees, or in the Geneva Convention as it pertains to the above. However during my assignment at the Cropper facility [REDACTED] my supervisor and I had conversations about the do's and don'ts of what we were allowed to do and what not to do in interrogations. At the Cropper facility it was well known that detainees who were brought into the facility complained of beatings from members of Seal Team 5 and TF 20 personnel. While at Cropper I did not see any instances of abuse or humiliation. These instances of beatings were photographed and documented by [REDACTED]. After I was assigned to AG, as part of my orientation and in processing, I was given a pamphlet to read which contained detailed instructions and definitions of IROE. This was later modified through a new listing of IROEs that reflected various authorities required for approval. I had to sign a memo indicating that I had read and understood the IROE. I was assigned as an analyst working in support of interrogations and later integrated into a "Tiger Team" [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was in charge of the interrogators [REDACTED] came shortly after wards. I believed [REDACTED]'s role to be that as a liaison officer, but he was very instrumental in getting better living and working conditions for the Soldiers (sports equipment, computers, etc). During the first month or so I was limited to observing interrogations and taking notes. Later on, as a Tiger Team member I took a more active role in the interrogation of detainees. When I first arrived at AG, it was common practice to use sleep deprivation and sleep management with the detainees. I do not know how it originated or who approved it, but it just seemed to be common practice. It was also common that the detainees on MI hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as an incentive to cooperate with us. The detainees in the tent area were clothed. I am not sure how the decision was made or by whom to make it a common practice to keep some of them naked. I felt it was a MI decision, not a MP decision and seemed to be made by [REDACTED] in screening, who was on an ego trip. The section I was in seemed to handle the "ash and trash" and we functioned more as secondary screeners to determine intelligence value.

My first interrogation session was in Block 1B; the detainee was brought to us by the MPs and was wrapped in a sheet. [REDACTED] were the interrogators, and [REDACTED] was the interpreter. About a week later, after the mortar attack, I participated in my second interrogation. This detainee was also naked, but clothed in a sheet. [REDACTED] did it in the shower area [REDACTED] was the interpreter. Right after this the second version of the IROE came out - the detainees were no longer kept

area. It was cold that night, maybe about 30 degrees. [redacted] called [redacted] and the other individual on the carpet over this incident and wanted both given an Article 15. [redacted] indicated he handled the matter himself. I do not know what punishment was given, but know that both were removed from interrogation duties. I knew about a previous incident involving two interrogators from the 519<sup>th</sup> that had been drinking and went to get a female detainee from the 1B area and made her remove her shirt. The MPs saw this and reported the matter. The two were relieved from interrogator duties. We had a change interrogator rules after this – when a female detainee was interrogated, there had to be another female present.

It was common knowledge that [redacted] used sleep deprivation and dogs while he was on his special projects, working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam on 14 Dec. It would not surprise me if [redacted] told the MPs how to treat detainees. I know that he had told the MPs that some of the detainees he was interrogating were "bad" – they had used IEDs and killed Soldiers. I do not know what he expected when he told the MPs that, but he might have been suggesting that they yell at them, or such things. However, he might have known exactly what the MPs would or would not do. I saw him use a dog on one other occasion (other than the night of the shooting). [redacted] and I were interrogating a female detainee and heard a dog barking. The female was really afraid of dogs and we had to return her to her cell. I went to see what was going on and saw a detainee in his underwear on a mattress on the floor with a dog standing over him. [redacted] was upstairs giving directions to the MP, telling him to "take him back home". The detainee was one of [redacted] but I did not see an interpreter in the area. The MP was [redacted] (Photo 196 that I viewed is a picture of this incident) [redacted] would come into our office at times, every other day or so, and tell us about detainees – who was sick, etc. He also told us about dogs being used while [redacted] was there. [redacted] and other MPs used to refer to the "doggy dance" sessions. [redacted] were close. [redacted] was [redacted] interpreter. I was with him and [redacted] on several occasions and I never saw them do anything out of the ordinary while I was working with them. [redacted] was well liked by the interrogators and interpreters and seemed quiet and shy. [redacted] used interesting tactics a lot, but was not abusive. He used the "fear up" technique a lot and thought all detainees were guilty.

[redacted] came to me one morning and said he had to tell me something. The night before [redacted] had come into the office and took to the 1A area to show him something. When he got there he saw two prisoners naked and on the floor. [redacted] was there and they were all yelling at the detainees and making them crawl around on the floor. [redacted] became disgusted over the matter and left after a few minutes. I told [redacted] that I would take care of it. I could not find [redacted] and went to tell [redacted]. [redacted] saw me and I think I told him I was going to tell [redacted] something but not what it was about. [redacted] saw me and said he would go with me. I spoke to [redacted] in private, as I did not want [redacted] to hear what I was telling [redacted]. I told [redacted] about the incident and that in the future if he saw any MI personnel in the vicinity of anything like that, he should tell them to leave immediately. [redacted] said he would tell his NCOIC about it. He left and came back later and told me it had been taken care of. I did not tell MI about it, as MI was not in charge of the detainees, the MPs were. I felt that by telling the MPs about it, it would be fixed. I probably should have told [redacted] about it, but felt that by telling [redacted] about it would be taken care of at the lowest level. In hindsight maybe I should have told someone in MI

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naked and sleep deprivation/sleep management had to be requested and approved. I know that the MPs had started to get more detainee jump suits and sandals flowing in through the supply system, where before the supply had been somewhat limited. During this time I became aware of incidents of possible abuse of detainees, reported to me during interrogation sessions by the detainees themselves. The first involved a Syrian named Hussein. He informed me that one of the MPs who pulled his 9mm pistol and put it to the detainee's head. The other detainee, an Iraqi named [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] one of the interpreters for the MPs hit him, cutting his ear to the extent that it required stitches. I saw the injury and asked the MPs about it and was informed that the detainee had fallen in his cell. [REDACTED] told me this while I was with [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to document it in his interrogators notes. I do not know if he did or not. [REDACTED] was notoriously bad in report writing. Another possible incidence of abuse occurred immediately after the shooting incident. I was scheduled to have a night interrogation session with a detainee we referred to as "Trigger" who was given a gun in his cell by one of the Iraqi policeman. When the MPs went to seize the gun there was a shooting incident. For a time right after, it was chaos in the area. [REDACTED] and I were in a meeting in the mess hall and [REDACTED] came in and indicated they needed every available interrogator and analyst to assist and asked for "volunteers" (I figured the Army volunteered me). He indicated there was a sense of urgency to get information about the incident and get it tonight. [REDACTED] said COL Pappas had given us blanket approval for harsher methods for that night. A couple of days later [REDACTED] said COL Pappas had instructed us to use whatever techniques we had to in order to get the required information that night. We got to the cellblock area later and saw that 15 - 20 of the Iraqi policemen had been stripped and lined up and were being interrogated. The MPs showed us the cell where the shooting had occurred. I heard a dog barking and when I went towards the barking, I could see [REDACTED] in a cell, interrogating one of the Iraqi policemen and a dog was also in the cell. Later on [REDACTED] had a team meeting and then went to interrogate one of the IPs. [REDACTED] used this interrogation session as a training session with [REDACTED] in how to employ the "fear up" technique. I did not see COL Pappas, [REDACTED] in the vicinity, other than seeing [REDACTED] in the mess hall earlier.

The GTMO team did limited training for us - more discussions on interrogation procedures. [REDACTED] gave a class on the role of the analyst in interrogations. A team from Huachuca came in after the GTMO team and gave us three days of classes, including Rules of Engagement and the use of sleep deprivation and sleep management. Our process for using sleep management was for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request with the interrogation plan. The memo would stipulate sleep and wake schedules, meals, etc., and could last for no more than 72 hours. Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the schedule. I do not know how the MPs kept the detainees - I suppose they went by the cells and yelled or noise to keep them awake. [REDACTED] commented that the MPs could do what was done to them in basic training (physical training, etc). I brought it up that [REDACTED] that the MPs appeared to have no ROEs of their own. The MPs seemed to have no NCOs or officers on duty at night.

Shortly after the shooting incident [REDACTED] told me that she had an uncooperative detainee that she stripped naked and walked from the conex area to the Camp Vigilant

about it. Within a couple of days I mentioned it to [REDACTED] so did [REDACTED]. This was more in confiding in a friend than reporting an incident. The three of us were close and confided in each other. [REDACTED] later heard that I had told [REDACTED] about the incident and asked if I had specifically told about him. I think that I mentioned that it was just three MI folks, but did not name names.

After the capture of Saddam, our team was given special extended authority from COL Pappas to use harsher techniques. We would still have to request authority by memo, but COL Pappas would approve it. My team never did request any of the harsher methods. Other than what I described above I did not see or hear about abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about unauthorized photos or videos. The NCOs, particularly the section chiefs, did not condone abuse – this was especially true of [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] I did hear about one occasion in which an Iranian detainee was bitten by a dog, but do not know the circumstances or who was involved.

Concerning Photo 23, File Mark 4: The individual leaning against the wall next to [REDACTED] is possibly [REDACTED], who was part of the 325<sup>th</sup>, but worked for COL Pappas at the 205<sup>th</sup> Headquarters.

Q: Is there anything you wish to add to this statement? A: No