

SWORN STATEMENT <small>For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS</small>			
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT			
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).			
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.			
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.			
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.			
1. LOCATION DEVENS, MASSACHUSETTS	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/28	3. TIME 1630	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS O4/MAJ	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 6th MI BN, 98th Division (IT)			
[REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
<p> I was mobilized with the 325th MI BN. My duty position was the Assistant S-3 (Plans). We reported to Fort Dix on February 22, 2003 and were there for about a month. We then deployed to Kuwait and were there for about a month. We crossed the Bern on April 26, 2003 and set up in Balad, Iraq. Sometime in May a tasker came down for personnel to work with in the C2 for CJTE-7. On 7 June, I was reassigned to the C2 Staff - in particular the C2X shop. My immediate supervisor was [REDACTED] until [REDACTED] replaced him. The first time I heard about Abu Ghraib, was when plans for Operation VICTORY BOUNTY were being developed. The operation was focused on a list of FEDEYEEN MEMBERS we had received. We had to identify a location to place personnel captured during the operation. CAMP CROPPER was not an option because they were overcrowded. I am not sure who selected Abu Ghraib, but this facility was good because it had been a maximum prisoner facility and it was being renovated already. [REDACTED] came in and told me about the plan to use Abu Ghraib. Within 48 hours, he and I were traveling to Abu Ghraib to assist in the set up of Abu Ghraib as an interrogation facility. This effort was part of the staff process to develop an OPORD for the interrogation facility. I do not remember when VICTORY BOUNTY took place. It must have been sometime in August. When [REDACTED] and I visited Abu Ghraib for the first time, the only personnel there were the MPs. Abu Ghraib was an overflow for civilian detainees identified as Iraqi on Iraqi crimes (Criminals). There was a huge pen with concertina wire around it already set up. The highest ranking individual I saw there was a major (I do not remember his name). There was another unit arriving and they were setting up. There were some detainees there already. They were all in civilian clothes but I did not see any abuse. A week later, both [REDACTED] and I visited Abu Ghraib to firm up and try to solidify what facilities were available to use for VICTORY BOUNTY, including the newly refurbished cells inside the former maximum security prison. We took photos and also looked at potential sites to deploy a TROJAN to Abu Ghraib. By this time, the 205th was also conducting its leadership reconnaissance on the ground but I can't really remember who was present. I then began traveling to Abu Ghraib twice a month or so and would coordinate with the 519th and the 325th until the middle of October. I never observed any detainee abuse during any of my visits and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. The direct coordination I did with Abu Ghraib was primarily with [REDACTED] or if she was not available it was with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. These coordination visits were not on a routine schedule; they increased when there was an operation going on and decreased when no operations took place. [REDACTED] did coordinate with the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) on a routine basis because he had a daily report he had to submit to the command group. My conversations were focused on HUMINT Requirements. My responsibility was to focus and reinforce priorities and discuss interrogation results. I provided BG(P) FAST information on all data collected and a summary on HUMINT Operations. I spoke to [REDACTED] to try to find out where interrogations were going, what information they were gathering and the production of the intelligence. I would go directly to [REDACTED] because most of the information I was requesting from her was being requested by higher and they wanted it immediately so I hardly went to the BDE. I would try to keep the BDE or the HUMINT Operations Cell informed of our inquiries and requirements via e-mails. There was an extraordinary amount of pressure from the chain of command to get results. I was sensing this pressure directly from COL BOLTZ initially and then BG(P) FAST when [REDACTED] was there. Once COL SUMMERS arrived, I was not as heavily relied upon by BG(P) FAST, although sometimes she tasked me directly. This pressure was occurring during the same time VICTORY BOUNTY was being planned and occurring. There was a concern we were not getting the feedback from interrogations and we needed to do better to fix it. We needed to find out a way to get more feedback. There was a sentiment that the CG and OSD were unhappy with the level of products coming out of interrogations. There was frequent expression of dissatisfaction. The CI/HUMINT mission took a back seat and we had HUMINT problems out in the field. The source handling was extraordinarily broken. The maneuver commanders were not adhering to the requirements in the umbrella concept for Countersintelligence and HUMINT Operations and were running sources. Untrained personnel were routinely tasking "informants" to collect information, in direct conflict with the requirements of the umbrella concept and long-established Army doctrine. The Division commanders would tell their G2X "this is how we're going to run it." In their views they were having success capturing a lot of folks, conducting raids [REDACTED] </p>			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]		
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES			
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

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STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED 2004/05/28

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

They would raid a house and take everyone. They refused to let anyone go due to the fear that the wrong guy might be let loose or they felt that they would simply be gathering this same individual the next day. By doctrine, this should not be done and sources could be placed in danger. The division commanders had the full authority to release detainees at their level. I would discuss this problem with the Division G2Xs and they would tell me that they knew about the problem, but their commanders didn't want to release anyone (they replied via phonecall). My e-mails to them were saved on my folder in the computer I had in Iraq. The computer was turned over to the individual who replaced me. The Divisions had Captains as their G2Xs. In the mist of all the pressure, [REDACTED] 205th MI SJA, was tasked to come up with some Interrogation Rules of Engagement. [REDACTED] developed a memorandum for CG's approval. I remember seeing a memorandum with the CG's signature block, but I do not remember if I ever saw a signed memorandum. There were certain things that required the CG's approval, but all of the methods and techniques in the memorandum were contained in the FM (according to [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] was frustrated and stated that if we wanted her to do something different than the authorized doctrinal methods, she needed written guidance. She was not going to go out on a limb. She refused to budge from the standard methods without written guidance. Anecdotally, people talked about sleep deprivation and stressed positions but I never saw any requests. I never heard any discussions about faked detainees or humiliating detainees. During MG Miller's first visit, I was in BG(P) FAST's office. I was made the POC for the initial Abu Ghraib visit. I coordinated for a convoy and took the team out to Abu Ghraib. We returned that same day after spending four hours on site looking at the facility and how operations were being run. We did not discuss interrogation techniques. Our focus was discussion of the Tiger Team concept. I did not go back to Abu Ghraib with the team. I did attend meeting with [REDACTED]. I was also tasked to develop an extensive detainee database and I met with a GTMO who had built a database in GTMO. There was some controversy when the GTMO Team came. The GTMO team was supposed to go to Abu Ghraib and show the 519th and the 325th how to run operations. The 519th and the 325th were some of the most tactically experienced interrogators under combat conditions. They had conducted operations in Afghanistan and now there was a team coming from GTMO to teach them how to run operations - to make our operations like GTMO's operations. It did not sit well, having outsiders whom had not operated under fire critiquing their work. I did not attend the out-brief MG MILLER gave. No one from C2X attended. The briefing, I believe, was directly given to LTG SANCHEZ. I never saw a copy of the outbrief. The only violation of IROEs I was aware of was from Umm Qasar (Camp Bucca). I coordinated with OGA and felt like we had a good working relationship. There was an OGA LNO in the C2X and we shared resources. We discussed how we could share intelligence they gathered and intelligence we gathered to answer each other's requirements. I visited the Chief of Station once and met with another individual at another time. CJTF-7 established a release board whose members were [REDACTED] BG KARPINSKI and BG(P) FAST (chair). The recorders were [REDACTED] an MP Assistant Recorder and myself as an MI Assistant Recorder. BG(P) FAST was tasked by MG WOJDAKOWSKI (DCG) to resolve the prison overcrowding problem as it related to the MI Holds. Although the overcrowding of Abu Ghraib was an overall concern, the reason for the establishment of the board was a legal reason. The Geneva Convention required that a detainee's status be reviewed every six months. Since we were closing in on six months for the first detainees, [REDACTED] SJA, was tasked by [REDACTED] to come up with a procedure to release detainees. The recorders screened all detainee files. I would look for circumstances of capture and assess their intelligence value. If no intelligence value was identified, they were sent up to the release board for review. As time went on the Coalition Provisional Authority began to press us to more quickly deal with the backlog. We then began a two-tier process. [REDACTED] and I would sit on a mini panel and look at 100's of cases. We would do our best to try to identify something in the file that would assist the board in determining whether they stayed or were released. Since we had so many cases to review, the Release Board began meeting twice a week. The last week I was there, I reviewed over 500 cases. As part of my battle handoff, I extended the involvement of the C2X Section to include three additional MI personnel to help expedite the review of backlogged cases. CJTF-7 held a commander's VTC every evening (the Battle Update Brief, or BUB) in the Joint Operations Center. Each C2 section was required to send a representative, including C2X. Periodically, I attended the BUB as a C2X representative. The purpose of our attending was to get insight into current and ongoing operations in order to stay in touch with the operational tempo. As a result, it was intended that we would be able to anticipate short-term interrogation requirements. One evening, after a BUB (I did not attend this BUB), I overheard several officers (I do not know remember who they were) returning from the BUB discussing how the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had made some startling remarks during the BUB. They said that during the BUB, one of the subordinate commanders had reported the capture of a number of Iraqis during a raid. In response to this report, LTG Sanchez allegedly replied something to the affect of "Why are we detaining this people, we should be killing them." This type of comment contributed to a command climate that fostered an atmosphere where ill intentioned personnel could perceive circumstances where deeds not consistent with military standards would be tolerated if not condoned. I was ordered not to discuss this investigation with anyone else. Q. Is there anything you would like to add to this statement? A. No.

End of Statement

Nothing
follows

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Devens, MA

DATED 2004/05/28

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Not
[REDACTED]
used

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28th day of MAY, 2004 at Devens, Massachusetts

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

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