

SWORN STATEMENT <small>For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSDPS</small>			
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT			
AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN/)		
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.		
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.		
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.		
1. LOCATION 205th MI BDE HQ, WAAF Bldg 1031 Rm 104	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/19	3. TIME 1530	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS O4/AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HHD/205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE APO AE 09096 (USAREUR)			
9. _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: <p>In response to a question about when I first became involved with Abu Ghraib and what was my role, I first became involved with Abu Ghraib when I assumed the position of Deputy Commander (DCO), 205th MI BDE at the end of July 2003. At that time, our Brigade had tasked the 519th MI Battalion to stand up the Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF), a temporary facility in support of CJTF-7 Operation Victory Bounty in August. In September the CJTF-7 made the decision that all interrogation operations would be consolidated at Abu Ghraib and in October it was deemed an enduring Base camp. As the DCO, I had brigade staff oversight for many of the improvements the brigade was trying to make at Abu Ghraib. The S-4, _____ worked closely with the 800th MP Brigade S4 and the CJTF-7 C4 staff to purchase quality of life enhancements and infrastructure needs for the soldiers at Abu Ghraib; throughout the fall, the S-3, _____ and his staff were working on multiple actions related to standing up a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC); they worked with CJTF-7 on the Request for Forces (RFF) that would allow us to structure the JIDC along the lines of the GTMO organization; they worked with the C2 staff to request a GTMO Tiger Team to embed into operations and train the JIDC; they built the line and block chart and identified the required resources, where we had gaps and how we were going to overcome them; they developed the JIDC battle rhythm and the interrogation prioritization process. The S-2, _____ was focused on ensuring the soldiers and civilians in the JIDC either had Top Secret clearances or were being processed for them; establishing the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (TSCIF); and, establishing the intelligence architecture that would allow the JIDC to access JWICS and TS databases, which was a recommendation from MG MILLER'S visit. The S-2 also attended CJTF-7 Targeting meetings to ensure that the JIDC priorities were in concert with the CJTF-7 targeting priorities. The S-6, _____ and the Information Management Officer (IMO), _____ were focused on tactical communications for command and control throughout the brigade, information management support for the servers in Balad and Abu Ghraib that housed our intelligence databases, improving the intelligence architecture (in concert with the S2), and installing the MWR packages for Abu Ghraib and other brigade locations.</p> <p>COL PAPPAS was working on a strategy for how we would implement the findings and recommendations from the MG MILLER report and the CJTF-7 CG's guidance from a briefing COL PAPPAS gave to LTG SANCHEZ on 11 September. In particular, COL PAPPAS was focused on aligning our operations with a GTMO-like model and on consolidating our three interrogation facilities at Camp Cropper (run by the 325th MI Battalion), Camp Bucca (run by the 323d MI Battalion), and Abu Ghraib (run by the 519th MI Battalion) into one. Placing the right staff out to the JIDC was a high priority. COL PAPPAS immediately placed _____ then the Assistant Brigade S3, at Abu Ghraib as the operations officer. The CJTF-7 CG, LTG SANCHEZ, told COL PAPPAS that the JIDC probably needed an O-5 on the ground to run the JIDC. The 205th MI Brigade did not have any O-5s available to fulfill this role. I was present for a conversation between _____ and COL PAPPAS reference placed _____ a newly arrived C2 staff officer, at the JIDC. If I remember correctly, _____ thought that based on _____ civilian experience, he would be a good candidate to run the JIDC. My understanding was that _____ was sent to the JIDC to serve as its director.</p> <p>Part of standing up the JIDC included moving the Brigade's interrogation operations at Camps Bucca and Cropper to Abu Ghraib by the 1 October consolidation deadline set by CJTF-7. _____ was in charge of a small team of interrogators that had been operating at Camp Bucca for months. He was selected to be the JIDC operations officer because of his experience in Bucca. Upon _____ arrival on or about 25 September _____ transitioned his title to XO, second in charge to _____.</p> <p>In response to a question about how it is possible that _____ saw their roles differently from the way COL PAPPAS did, it would not surprise me if _____ said he was the one in charge of interrogation operations at the JIDC. COL PAPPAS initially told him that he would be the 'go to guy,' prior to the C2 staff offering _____ to run _____.</p>			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

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STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

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DATED

2004/05/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

the JIDC. I think that [REDACTED] was very proud that COL PAPPAS had the confidence in him to make him the initial operations officer at Abu Ghraib and he worked very hard to make it work. Once [REDACTED] was placed in charge, there were numerous occasions when COL PAPPAS called out to the JIDC and [REDACTED] was readily available to answer any questions when often [REDACTED] was either not readily available or did not know the answer.

[REDACTED] often seemed more focused on resources and quality of life improvements than on interrogation operations. I had members of the brigade staff in Baghdad and members of the brigade at Abu Ghraib working on resourcing issues and I understood that to be the brigade's responsibility - COL PAPPAS held me responsible for infrastructure and resources. [REDACTED] repeatedly brought supply and administrative issues to COL PAPPAS who redirected those issues, appropriately, to me to fix. At one point, I sat down with [REDACTED] at Abu Ghraib and told him that COL PAPPAS needed him to focus on interrogation operations and that the brigade would resource Abu Ghraib; and I asked him to trust that the brigade would get it done as fast as possible, given the constraints of being in Iraq. The brigade had already placed a lot of resources in the JIDC, to include an E-7 [REDACTED] to serve as the JIDC "Mayor" working quality of life issues as the mission expanded. [REDACTED] was there from late September to late October.

I suppose COL PAPPAS saw [REDACTED] role differently than [REDACTED] did because [REDACTED] was sent to Abu Ghraib to do, and [REDACTED] did weigh in on operational issues. I believe [REDACTED] was involved in developing the Joint Manning Document, establishing Tiger Teams, and he seemed to be involved in the handling of several incidents that happened out at Abu Ghraib. When asked if I could recall those incidents, I explained that I did not live out at Abu Ghraib and I was out of Iraq from 12 November to 5 December, but to the best of my recollection, the first incident [REDACTED] was involved in was identifying the A/519th soldiers who conducted inappropriate interrogations of a female detainee. The second incident was the International Community Red Cross (ICRC) visit in October. I do not think the facility was prepared for the visit and the JIDC did not know the ICRC was coming on that day. [REDACTED] had a disagreement with the ICRC concerning access to detainees on 1A and that made the ICRC angry. The third incident was the shooting in 1A on the 24th of November, during which time I was on leave. As it was related to me after I got back to Iraq in December, [REDACTED] and the MPs resolved this issue prior to bringing it to COL PAPPAS' attention. The last incident I recall was the alleged inappropriate treatment of a detainee by a female specialist attached to the 205th. [REDACTED] brought this to COL PAPPAS' attention and told COL PAPPAS that he would discipline and retrain the soldier. In response to a question about how frequently I went to Abu Ghraib, I responded that I traveled to Abu Ghraib once or twice in August and three to four times in September. Our headquarters was still in Balad at that time and it was dangerous to travel back and forth. Once we moved the brigade headquarters to Camp Victory in early October, I would travel to Abu Ghraib once or twice a week. Many high-ranking personnel visited Abu Ghraib and I would often accompany COL PAPPAS as he briefed them and walked them around Abu Ghraib. I was at the Hard Site at least half a dozen times and all of the visits except one were during hours of daylight. Once or twice I was there alone, but usually with a small group.

In response to a series of questions regarding my knowledge of the alleged abuses: I never saw any naked detainees - they wore jumpsuits or civilian clothes; I never witnessed or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse or photos or videos of detainees; I never saw dogs used during interrogations. I did see dogs at the front gate and saw the dogs being walked around the camp.

In response to a question about my observations of the atmosphere, morale and level of training at Abu Ghraib, I stated that the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib changed over time and it changed with every unit. Many of the soldiers in the 519th were upset because they were supposed to redeploy in August but instead were given the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. I also think that as we transformed from the SFIF to the JIDC there were many changes from the MG MILLER report and from our own assessments that they either did not want to implement or didn't think were necessary - there may have been some bruised egos in the process. My impression was that the 325th soldiers were content to leave Camp Cropper, which was overcrowded, and they looked forward to the new mission. After the 20 September mortar attack that killed two and wounded about 11 soldiers, the soldiers' morale dipped. Then the JIDC began to take shape and had some successes with the intelligence they were producing. It seemed to me that at that point morale improved. In October and November, the JIDC received 25 additional interrogators from INSCOM; they were formalizing interrogation plans and holding weekly targeting meetings and JIDC update briefings with the Tiger Teams; the Magistrate Cell and medical team were in place and it started to look and operate more like a JIDC. In response to a question about whether I thought soldiers were disciplined or not, when I walked through the JIDC it seemed to me that soldiers were disciplined and adhering with Army policies, military customs and courtesies, etc. My expectations were that there were some variations across the board based upon the different units the soldiers came from.

In response to a question about whether it would surprise me to know that some M1 soldiers were involved with detainee abuse, I said yes I was surprised. To the question as to how it could have happened I said I did not know - prior to consolidating operations at Abu Ghraib there were three facilities run by three battalions in the brigade and I believed that the soldiers were trained and that those facilities ran without incident. So I did not understand how the same soldiers could have behaved so differently after relocating to Abu Ghraib.

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STATEMENT OF

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

When asked if there was anything I wanted to bring up that the interview did not address, I explained my understanding that the MP Brigade retained control of the access in and out of 1A and 1B throughout the 205th's tenure at Abu Ghraib.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

This statement was taken by MG Fay, the procedure 15 Investigating Officer on Thursday May 13th at 1330 hours at the Darmstadt Legal Center, building 4006, Darmstadt Germany. I swore to the statement at the 205th MI Brigade Headquarters, building 1031, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Wiesbaden Germany on May 19th at 1530 hours.

////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

1. _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE

BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19th day of May, 2004

at Bldg 1031 WAAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART. 136 UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

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