INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

21FEB07

CONTROL: 03JAN07-24IZ-0002-7HMA

V/ABDAL, AHMAD KHALAF /CIVILIAN M/W/FNIZ/N//01JAN47/SYRIA

RESULTS OF INTERVIEW OF DETAINEE # (b)(2)

1. On 04Jan07, at approximately 1209, Reporting Agent (RA) interviewed Detainee (b)(2) in interrogation box 3, Regional Detention Facility (RDF), Al Asad, Irag, pertaining to his knowledge of V/ABDAL's death. Detainee (b)(2) shared a cell with V/ABDAL. Detainee (b)(2) ppeared to be in good health and spoke freely with no apparent reservations. Present during the interview was interpreter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) CIV. SSN: (b)(6),(b)(7)(and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)USMC, SSN: (b)(6),(b)(7)(HUMINT Exploitation Team 10, RDF, Al Asad, Irag.

2. Detainee (b)(2) stated he had been V/ABDAL's cellmate for about 4 or 5 days and the last time he saw V/ABDAL was on 03Jan07, about 20-30 minutes after lunch, as he was being taken to interrogation. Detainee(b)(2) stated V/ABDAL appeared to be walking normal and did not appear to have any injures or sick other than a slightly blushed face. Detainee (b)(2) advised V/ABDAL always ate his food. Detainee (b)(2) informed RA he believed V/ABDAL always ate his food. Detainee (b)(2) informed RA he believed V/ABDAL was taking blood pressure medication, however the only time V/ABDAL ever complained of any ailment was the night of 02Jan07, when he complained that his head hurt for which V/ABDAL was given two (2) pills (NFI). Detainee (b)(2)opined that V/ABDAL was lonely, maybe sad and that he appeared to think a lot.

REPORTED BY: (D)(6),(b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT OFFICE: NCIS AL ASAD, IRAQ

Page 1 LAST (b)(6), V2 LNY

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ACLU-RDI 5744 p.1

Exhibit (24)

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

21FEB07

CONTROL: 03JAN07-24IZ-0002-7HMA

V/ABDAL, AHMAD KHALAF /CIVILIAN M/W/FNIZ/N//01JAN47/SYRIA

RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (b)(6).(b)(7)(C) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIRE DEPARTMENT

1. On 03Jan07, at approximately 1843, Reporting Agent (RA) responded to the Al Asad Surgical Hospital pertaining to the death of V/ABDAL. RA collected contact and biographical information of the four (4) Al Asad firefighters who responded to treat/assist V/ABDAL at the Regional Detention Facility. Al Asad. Iraq. The firefighters were: Department of Defense (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SSN (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SSN (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB (b)(6),(b)(7) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB:(b)(6),(b)(7) Information was collected so further interviews would be conducted at a later date.

2. On 05Jan07, at approximately 1140, Reporting Agent (RA) interviewed (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) CIV, Al Asad Fire Department, Iraq, pertaining to the death of V/ABDAL. (b)(6),(b) was the lead firefighter that responded to the Regional Detention Facility (RDF), Al Asad, on the afternoon of 03Jan07. Prior to RA's interview of (b)(6),(b he prepared a typed statement of the events. RA swore (b)(6),(b) to the statement and(b)(6),(b signed it in RA's presence, Enclosure (A) pertains. (b)(6),(b)(informed RA at approximately 1740, on 03Jan07, the fire department received the call from dispatch about a possible cardiac arrest at the RDF. $(\underline{b})(\underline{6})(\underline{b})$ stated Al Asad firefighters $(\underline{b})(\underline{6}),(\underline{c})$ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) an((b)(6),(b)(7)(C) responded with him to the an((b)(6),(b)(7)(C) responded with him to the scene.(b)(6),(b)(said when he arrived at the RDF there was a total of about 6 people inside the interrogation box. (b)(6),(b) remembers seeing an HM1 (NFI) in the box but does not remember the individual's name. He remembers a corpsman was doing chest compressions on V/ABDAL and there was a GySgt giving rescue breaths with a mouthpiece.

3.(b)(6).(b)(informed RA the HM1 told him their Automated Electronic Defibrillator (AED) could not get a shock on V/ABDAL and they don't carry a razor. (b)(6).(b)told everyone to keep providing CPR while he hooked up the fire departments AED to the RDF's cables. Once connected, the fire departments AED would not shock. (b)(6).(b) stated he started to 'package' V/ABDAL, meaning put him on a board and strap him down for transport, so that he would be ready to go to the hospital when the ambulance arrived. (b)(6) (h) told RA during CPR they checked V/ABDAL's pulse on his neck and arm with no noticeable results.

4. (b)(6),(b) reported that after V/ABDAL was 'packaged' he got a call on the radio from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WSI fire, who advised he went to the South Side Medical Clinic (which is the closest medical clinic with an ambulance to the RDF) to ask when the ambulance was going to respond. According to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) stated that the South Side Medical Clinic does not respond to the RDF and Fire Dispatch told him

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03JAN07-2412-0002-7HMA

SUBJ: V/ABDAL, AHMAD KA AF /CIVILIAN U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

the earliest an ambulance could get out to the RDF from the Al Asad Surgical Hospital would be 15 minutes. (b)(6),(b) stated fifteen minutes would have been to late for V/ABDAL so he made the decision to transport V/ABDAL to the hospital.

5. (b)(6),(b) stated that a marine SSgt informed him the RDF had a high back High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) they could use to transport V/ABDAL.(b)(6),(b)(reported that a GySgt (NFI) gave rescue breaths and the corpsman named (b) (NFI) provided chest compressions during transportation. (b)(6),(b) related that he has responded to approximately 30-40 situations like this one in his career and in his opinion he believed V/ABDAL had a heart attack.

ENCLOSURE(S) (A) Written statement prepared by (b)(6),(b) 3Jan07

REPORTED BY: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) , SPECIAL AGENT OFFICE: NCIS AL ASAD, IRAQ



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AL ASAD

Date: 3 January 2007

(b)(6),(b)(7)(

Captain Al Asad Air Base Fire Station II WSI Fire & Emergency Services - Iraq APO, AE 09333

Subject: Statement on Medical Run

Sir or Made

(b)(7) 40 hrs the B1 Fire Alarm Communications Center (Dispatch) was notified via the DSN line of a detailed in the Regional Detention Center (RDF) that was in cardiac.arrest. At 1740 hrs medical was notified that they were needed at the RDF (BDOC had to make contact with medical the phone number that we had was not working) At 1740 hrs the Heavy Rescue truck with myself $FR(\underline{b})(\underline{6}), (\underline{b})(7)$ [FF] ($\underline{b})(\underline{6}), (\underline{b})$ and FF ($\underline{b})(\underline{6}), (\underline{b})(7)$ (on board was in route to the RDF. At 1743 hrs we were on scene at the RDF upon arrival we found an approximately 50 year old man unresponsive with Navy Corpuman, and Marine personnel administering CPR. The AED did not are an effective shock do to the man's hairy chest. We had no way to shave him. At approximately 1744 hrs ($\underline{b})(\underline{6}), (\underline{b})(7)$ (C) WSI Fire) heard the call over the radio and walked into the South Side Medical Clinic to help speed up the response of the ambulance. He was informed that they did not respond to the RDF and he relayed that information to me. At 1744 hrs Fire Dispatch notified me that it would be 15 minutes for an ambulance. At some point and time in all this my crew had already packaged the patient for transport. I said over the radio to dispatch that we did not have 15 min. At that time one of the Marine SSGT said that they had a high back HMMWV so I made the determination to put the patient in the back of the HMMWV with he 3 personnel still administering CPR. At 1748 hrs we (Heavy Rescue) escorted the HMMWV with lights and airen's to the Base Hospital we sum on scene at the hospital at 1750 hrs we unloaded the patient carried him inside and medical staff took $(\underline{b})(\underline{6}), (b)$



INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

21FEB07 .

CONTROL: 03JAN07-2412-0002-7HMA

V/ABDAL, AHMAD KHALAF /CIVILIAN M/W/FNIZ/N//01JAN47/SYRIA

RESULTS OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

FIREFIGHTER

1. On 03Jan07, at approximately 1843, Reporting Agent (RA) responded to the Al Asad Surgical Hospital after a detainee (V/ABDAL) from the Regional Detention Facility (RDF), Al Asad, Iraq, was transported there in cardiac arrest. Al Asad Firefighter personnel assisted with the transport of V/ABDAL to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, RA obtained the biographical information of the four {4} Al Asad firefighters that responded to assist V/ABDAL. The firefighters were: Department of Defense (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SSN (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OB (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOB (D)(0),(D)(15N (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OB (b)(6),(b) (7)(C) (c) DOB (D)(0),(b)(7)

2. On 05Jan07, at approximately 1210, Reporting Agent (RA) interviewed (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOD Firefighter, Al Asad Fire Department, Iraq pertaining to his knowledge of the death of V/ABDAL. (b)(6),(b)reported he was on duty the afternoon of 03Jan07 and responded to the incident. (b)(6), related he is prior service U.S. Marine Corps and has been a civilian firefighter for approximately 4 months. (b)(6),(b)advised he has never responded to a cardiac arrest. (b)(6),(b) informed RA he did not interact with V/ABDAL during the incident.

3.(b)(6).(b) reported the fire department received a call of a patient, in apparent cardiac arrest, at the Regional Detention Facility (RDF) Al Asad.(b)(6).(b) stated he and other firefighters responded to the RDF and when they arrived, he remembers seeing about 7 or 8 people on the scene, and that a couple of Marines and a Corpsman were doing Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) on V/ABDAL.(b)(6).(b) reported the RDF's Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) failed to respond because of the hair on V/ABDAL's chest.(b)(6).(b) indicated the fire departments AED failed to respond for the same reason.

4. $\binom{(b)(6),(b)}{(7)(C)}$ tated the South Side ambulance would not respond to the RDF and the A1 Asad Surgical Hospital ambulance would take at least 15 minutes to get on scene so $\binom{(b)(6),(b)(7)}{(b)(7)(c)}$ (lead firefighter) and another corpsman decided to transport V/ABDAL to the hospital. $\binom{(b)(6),(b)(6),(b)}{(c)(c)}$ reported V/ABDAL was loaded into a high back High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and transported to the hospital. No further information was obtained.

REPORTED BY: OFFICE:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) NCIS AL ASAD, IRAQ

SPECIAL AGENT

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Exhibit (26)

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

21FEB07

CONTROL: 03JAN07-2412-0002-7HMA

V/ABDAL, AHMAD KHALAF /CIVILIAN M/W/FNIZ/N//01JAN47/SYRIA

RECIEPT OF FIRE DEPARTMENT INCIDENT REPORT

1. On O6Jan07, at approximately 1544, Reporting Agent (RA) obtained a copy of the Fire and Emergency Services Standard Operating Procedure incident # B01_000665_03, for the 03Jan07, incident involving the death of V/ABDAL. The report was obtained from (b) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Airfield Services Officer, G4, 3rd Marine Air Wing (Forward), Al Asad, Iraq, Enclosure (A) pertains. According to the run sheet, Fire Alarm Communications Center (Dispatch) was notified at 1740, that a detainee was in cardiac arrest at the Regional Detention Facility (RDF). Upon arrival at the scene, Navy Corpsmen were providing CPR. V/ABDAL was transported to the base hospital and arrived at 1750.

ENCLOSURE (S)

(A) Fire and Emergency Services Standard Operating Procedure/03Jan07

SPECIAL AGENT

REPORTED BY; (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OFFICE:

NCIS AL ASAD, IRAQ

(b) (c) / V2 LNY Page 1 LAST

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ACLU-RDI 5744 p.6

Exhibit (27)

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FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE	
24 November 2004 SOP No. 4A	
Alarm System Provided: Ycs No X Type of System: N/A	
Alarm System First Indicator of Fire: Yes No X	
Operated at Fire: Yes No X	
Alarm System Connected to Fire Alarm Communication Center: Ne X	
Narrative: At 1740 hrs B01 Fire Alarm Communications Center (Dispatch) was notified via DSN	
phone line of a detained in the Regional Detention facility (RDF) in cardiac arrest. At 1740 hrs Heavy Rescue 201 responded. At 1743 hrs Heavy Rescue 201 on scene with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) establishing command. Upon arrival Navy Corpsman from the RDF had already started CPR. The Corpsman had	
attempted to shock once but could not get an effective shock. At 1744 hrs command was advised by Dispatch that an ambulance was 15 minutes away from the RDF At 1747 hrs it was determined the	
patient could not wait 15 minutes for the arrival of the ambulance, thus the patient was packaged for transport. At 1747 hrs patient was placed in the back of a high back HMMWV. The HMMWV was	
escorted by Heavy Rescue 201 to the base hospital. At 1750 hrs the patient and emergency personnel	
arrived at hospital. The patient was turned over to hospital medical staff. At 1807 hrs Heavy Rescue 201 departed the hospital and back in service.	
Distribution List:	
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(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	
Fire Control Operator on Duty (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Signature:	
Assistant Chief on Duty: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	
Fire Chief:	
Signature:	
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ACLU-RDI 5744 p.10

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (OPEN)

04JAN07

DEATH (II)

CONTROL: 03JAN07-2412-0002-7HMA

V/ABDAL, AHMAD KHALAF /CIVILIAN M/W/FNIZ/N//01JAN47/SYRIA A/KHALAF'ABD, AHMAD// A/KHALAF, SHABAHMAD// A/MASHADAL, AHMED KHALAF ABDAL//

COMMAND/3RD BATTALION, 14TH MARINES/81233

MADE AT/24IZ/AL ASAD (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

NARRATIVE

1. This is a reactive investigation being conducted to document the events surrounding V/ABDAL's death at the Regional Detention Facility (RDF) aboard Al Asad, Iraq. No statues apply at this time.

2. On 03Jan07, at approximately 1810,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7), USMC, Camp Ripper, Al Asad, Iraq, advised a detainee had died during an interrogation with a Human Exploitation Team (HET) member. Upon arriving at the Al Asad Air Base Hospital, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)MC, USN, advised V/ABDAL died in his opinion due to cardiopulmonary arrest. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C stated he noted no external injuries to V/ABDAL but did report V/ABDAL may have had ribs broken during Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). Interviews were conducted with hospital, fire rescue and RDF Marine personnel who attended to V/ABDAL. Photographic documentation was taken of the death scene and of V/ABDAL at the hospital and Mortuary Affairs. Statements were obtained from the HET interrogator, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)Linguist, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who were prese USMC, and the who were present when V/ABDAL collapsed.

3.(b)(6), and (b)(6),(b) ated V/ABDAL never indicated he was in pain or feeling ill during the interrogation.(b)(6),(nd(b)(6),) indicated after approximately thirty minutes into the interrogation V/ABDAL appeared to have fainted (b)(6), and (b)(6), reached out to steady him then (b)(6)laid him on the ground on his left side while (b)(6), went to get help. (b)(6 noted V/ABDAL was grinding his teeth at one point in the interrogation (b)(6),(b) tated V/ABDAL was "snoring" when he collapsed. Two videotapes of the interrogation were seized and reviewed with no discrepancies noted from (b)(6) and (b)(6),(b) statements. This investigation remains open pending autopsy results from Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

ACTION

Page 1

R.0023B: Request attendance and documentation of V/ABDAL Autopsy at Dover Air Force Base. Photograph's and preliminary findings were provided to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)via electronic means. For any questions please contact case agent at DSN 318-3411-303 and/or (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) acemnf-

ACLU-RDI 5744 p.11

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