

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)
(b)(7)(c)[redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

02/12/04 12:22 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: [redacted] Re: RE: RE: RE: Case Number [redacted]

I agree that it makes sense to interview the returning [redacted] personnel before we interview any [redacted] personnel. The [redacted] guys had the most exposure on a daily basis to what the [redacted] personnel did, and where they went, and I think we need that information before interviewing the [redacted] personnel.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[redacted]
02/23/04 11:59 AMTo: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April

Thanks again for briefing the new [redacted] and [redacted] last week. We received positive feedback from them - they clearly felt that the briefings were relevant and interesting.

We are now preparing the schedule for the next round of on 7 April. I have already reserved the [redacted] room for that day. We would like to start with the [redacted] legal brief at 1300 followed by [redacted] from 1400 to 1500. How does your schedule look for that day?

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

02/08/04 08:18 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted]

[redacted]
Because [redacted] did not receive the last two [redacted] messages (based on the error/failure notices), I left him a voicemail message on [redacted] to advise him that [redacted] and I are going to [redacted] at the invitation of CID to do a joint interview. I left him your name and number in the event he wants further information.
[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~

~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)

3 February 2004

To:

cc:

Subject: [redacted] FW: Case Number [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

> -----
 > From: [redacted]
 > Sent: Tuesday, February 03, 2004 3:14:23 PM
 > To: [redacted]
 > Cc: [redacted]
 > Subject: RE: Case Number [redacted]
 > Auto forwarded by a [redacted]
 >


[redacted]
 I realize that in your note below you mention you have not had a chance to write up your conversation with [redacted] however, did [redacted] at any time provide you or anyone else with a statement or any other written documentation? If so, can you send it to us ASAP? The version we are hearing from [redacted] does not support what [redacted] told you about [redacted] and the [redacted] personnel. [redacted] is here at our request for the moment, but I am not certain how long he will remain in our area before he goes back out overseas or returns to his home state.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
 Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 7:17 AM
 To: [redacted]
 Subject: Re: Case Number [redacted]


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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)
 (b)(7)(d)



[Redacted]
 5 February 2004

To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: [Redacted] FW: RE: Case Number [Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

> -----
 > From: [Redacted]
 > Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:22:03 AM
 > To: [Redacted]
 > Subject: FW: RE: Case Number [Redacted]
 > Auto forwarded by a [Redacted]
 >
 >
 >
 > -----

> From: [Redacted]
 > Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:22:03 AM
 > To: [Redacted]
 > Cc: [Redacted]
 > [Redacted]
 > Subject: RE: RE: Case Number [Redacted]
 > Auto forwarded by a [Redacted]
 >
 > [Redacted]

We would like to take you up on your offer to obtain a written statement from [Redacted] ASAP. Could you send it to us on my [Redacted] account and also to [Redacted] in the event we are at [Redacted] when you send it? We interviewed [Redacted] and he denied witnessing or being a party to [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Could you please send us copies of the statements rendered by [redacted]
[redacted] So far we have statements rendered by [redacted] and text
from [redacted] but not his actual statement. Did [redacted] render a statement?
If so, we would like to get a copy of his statement as well.

When are [redacted] scheduled to return to [redacted]
We are in contact with [redacted] and plan to travel to [redacted]
on Monday, 9 February 2004, to interview [redacted] Any chance [redacted]
[redacted] have returned to [redacted]

Regards,
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 2:57 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Re: RE: Case Number [redacted]
Importance: High

[redacted]
I took a verbal statement from him. I will attach a copy of the
report. It will tell you what the other guys from [redacted] had to say
also. If you need a written statement let me know, and I will get it
ASAP.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
From: [redacted]
Date: Tuesday, February 3, 2004 11:14 pm
Subject: RE: Case Number [redacted]

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~~SECRET//X1~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

03/22/04 10:57 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Call from [redacted] Army CID POC

[redacted] called this morning. His main telephone number in [redacted] is [redacted]. [redacted] said that he will try to get a cellular telephone and provide that telephone number to us because it will be easier for us to reach him on his cell.

[redacted] said he has been incommunicado because he was stuck in a tent in the desert. He returned to the US on 16 March 2004 and is just now trying to get back up to speed. He has read our [redacted] messages, but said it is a lot to digest -- he will reread them and work through all of our questions. He will look into locating the [redacted] people we want to interview, however, he said they are likely on 30 days of home leave.

[redacted] is willing to return to [redacted] for the interviews that OIG plans to conduct. He said he should be through with his home leave by 12 April 2004. I told [redacted] we would prefer to work with him in [redacted] given his experience and involvement in this case; however, that is a decision for his management. He said he would talk to his management.

I told [redacted] that we have tried to locate [redacted] but to date have been unsuccessful. [redacted] said [redacted] appears to be based out of [redacted] -- he is going to pursue that lead further.


I mentioned to [redacted] that our [redacted] system is not working as well as we would like, but that we would check another terminal daily to ensure we are getting his messages. His [redacted] address at [redacted] is the same as the one he used in [redacted].

Follow-up telephone call from [redacted]. After his initial call [redacted] called back and asked about our travel to [redacted]. I did not get specific over the unsecure telephone line, but sent him a [redacted] message with more info. He said his management supports his travel to [redacted].

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//XI~~

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(b)(6)



OIG Investigations Staff


03/22/04 11:29 AM



To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] Search




At your convenience, could you please run the name [redacted] and let me know what his status/clearances are? He may be a current FBI body with access to CIA facilities. Thank you,



~~CONFIDENTIAL//XI~~

~~SECRET~~





03/22/04 02:03 PM


To:

cc:

Subject:

Request Submission

The request submitted  has been successfully submitted. For more information, please follow this link -> 

If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database -> 

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SECRET//X1

VISIT CERTIFICATION REQUEST

(COLLATERAL CLEARANCES AND/OR SCI ACCESSES)

SUBMITTED

Requester
Directorate DCI
Office OIG

Phone
Date 03/22/2004

#	Name	SSN	Org	Affiliation
1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	Dci/Oig	Government
2	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	Dci/Oig	Government

GLNCS/ Accesses Required	INCLUDE ALL CLEARANCES ON FILE (ESPECIALLY TS SI TK GAMMA HCS)		
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
Site of Visit	<input type="text"/>	Date of Visit From	04/12/2004
Point of Contact	Deputy Chief/Support	Date of Visit To	04/19/2004
Phone	<input type="text"/>		
COTR			

Purpose of Visit	consultations/interviews
Comment	<input type="text"/>


Comments	<input type="text"/>
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CONFIDENTIAL//X1

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(b)(6)

[Redacted]

OIG Investigations Staff

03/29/04 11:53 AM



To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: [Redacted] - clearances and status of Ft. Campbell personnel

[Redacted] called with the following today:

His cell is [Redacted]. He is going on leave tomorrow (Tuesday, 3/30), but we can call him anytime. He will need our flight information if things work out for him to travel commercially with us.

[Redacted] said his management would like a CIA [Redacted] request justifying his travel with us so that he can fly commercial. He said this is best for a number of reasons, including the fact that if he travels on a military flight through Germany he may get bumped and is likely to wait days for a flight [Redacted].

The [Redacted] should be addressed to [Redacted]

I told [Redacted] we would need his clearances, including SCI accesses he might have passed to CIA [Redacted]

[Redacted] I called [Redacted] number and [Redacted] answered. He said the request to pass any SCI accesses begins with him. He will get back to me to let me know if [Redacted] even has SCI. If he does, I asked [Redacted] to have the military fax the following to CIA: Name, SSN, Clearances including SCI, POC name and number (me), and dates of visit, which he said is normally one year.)

[Redacted] said that the military personnel that returned to Ft Campbell are going on leave for a month as of 19 April. He said they return 11 June (he probably meant 11 May, but I did not catch the discrepancy at the time). I told him we would work through him after we return from [Redacted]. [Redacted] said that [Redacted] is the Battalion Adjutant (phonetic) and POC--nevertheless, I said we'd work through [Redacted] since he would likely travel to Campbell with us.

CONFIDENTIAL//X1

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

03/30/04 10:16 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: Re: Changes to Flight Arrangements [redacted]

I called [redacted] this morning and here's the scoop:

- I gave him our current flight itinerary (as documented in your note below).
- I asked [redacted] to reserve his flights, but hold off on paying for them until we have a green light on our end that he can fly in/out [redacted] with us.
- I told him [redacted] had called [redacted] and [redacted] had said he would make sure [redacted] can fly commercial by working through the bureaucracy on his end.
- I asked [redacted] if he planned to fly with a weapon. He said they normally do and they simply get country approvals. He said, however, that he does not have to fly with a weapon. I suggested he should look into getting a weapon from his folks at our destination. I told him that carrying a weapon on commercial flights would raise our profile, and that I could not guarantee that he could get transportation on the aircraft on the last leg of our trip.
- [redacted] asked that, if possible, we could have our folks make his hotel reservations in [redacted] and at our destination. Worst case, we need to give him the name of the hotel in [redacted] so he can make his own reservations. He does not want to stay across town if he can stay at the same hotel. He also said that, worst case, he can find somewhere to bunk at [redacted] if our folks won't accommodate him.
- [redacted] said this case is very high profile for his organization and he thinks that can help in terms of transportation at [redacted]. He said he believes there are three suburbans at [redacted] which we can use in [redacted] (not outside).
- He asked about body armor. I told him our folks would likely give us (Agency officers) body armor. Guess we will cross that bridge when we get there.
- He asked if we would be staying/restricted inside [redacted] and I told him we did not yet know the answer to that question.
- [redacted] will fly from [redacted] on 12 April. He will see if he can work it out to meet with us at our HQS that day. If not, we will hook up at [redacted] in plenty of time before the flight to discuss anything that needs to get discussed before we board the plane.
- [redacted] asked if his clearances were going to be an issue. I said I had spoken to someone at [redacted] who planned to fax his clearances to our organization at the Secret Level, minimum. I asked [redacted] to do whatever he can to expedite that as we had not yet received that fax.

[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General
[redacted]



03/30/04 09:37 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Changes to Flight Arrangements

Hello, [redacted] I'd like to let you know about some changes in some of our flight arrangements, in case you want to change yours as well.

[redacted] booked [redacted] on a different flight than mine departing [redacted], so she had a 2 hours 40 minutes layover in [redacted] instead of a seven hour layover. That seemed more reasonable, so I changed my flight reservation from [redacted] to match hers.

The [redacted] flight from [redacted] remains unchanged.

For some reason, [redacted] changed the flight from [redacted] on 19 April, and it departs at 0610 vice 0805. (The flight number also changed.) As a result of arriving earlier in [redacted], we were able to get an earlier [redacted] flight departing [redacted]


All of this means that we are traveling as follows:

flight	departs	date	time	arrives	date	time
--------	---------	------	------	---------	------	------

[redacted]						
------------	--	--	--	--	--	--

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)[Redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

03/30/04 10:28 AM

To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] clearances -- status per Army

FYI:

I just spoke to [Redacted] [Redacted] explained to him what [Redacted] had told me about [Redacted] clearances (see note below). [Redacted] said that [Redacted] is mistaken and that [Redacted] should have TS. He will talk to [Redacted] directly and see if they can get this matter cleared up. I asked him to impress upon [Redacted] the need to fax [Redacted] clearances over today, if possible, so that we can get a cable out to the field ASAP.



----- Forwarded by [Redacted] on 03/30/04 10:26 AM -----

[Redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

03/29/04 11:56 AM



To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted] clearances -- status per Army

I spoke to [Redacted] [Redacted] said [Redacted] had TS granted in 1998, which was good for five years. His clearances lapsed in 2003. He is cleared only to the Secret level and he has no SCI clearances. I asked [Redacted] to pass that information official to OS via fax [Redacted] I also told him what information he needs to include (Name, SSN, dates of visit, clearances, my info as POC, etc.) He said he would likely get that done today.

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03/31/04 09:35 AM

To:







cc:

Subject:




Request Submission

The request submitted for   has been successfully submitted. For more information, please follow this link -> 

If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database -> 

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~**VISIT CERTIFICATION REQUEST**

(COLLATERAL CLEARANCES AND/OR SCI ACCESSSES)

SUBMITTED

Requester
 Directorate DCI
 Office DCI/IG

Phone
 Date 03/30/2004

#	Name	SSN	Org	Affiliation
1	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	ARMY	Government
2	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	Cia/Fbis	Government

GLNCS/
 Accesses
 Required

INCLUDE ALL CLEARANCES ON FILE (ESPECIALLY TS SI TK GAMMA HCS). INCLUDING TOP SECRET FOR SEE NOTE. BELOW.
 THE ARMY INITIALLY CERTIFIED CLEARANCES AT THE SECRET LEVEL
 HOWEVER

FT. BELVOIR

ADVISED OIG THAT THE ARMY WOULD CERTIFY HIM AT TOP SECRET ON 30 MARCH 2004.
 PLEASE CONTACT ON BEFORE SENDING A CLEARANCE CABLE IF
 THE ARMY HAS NOT PASSED HIS TS CLEARANCES.

Site of
 Visit

Date of
 Visit From

04/12/2004

Point of
 Contact

Deputy Chief Of Support

Date of
 Visit To

04/19/2004

Phone

COTR

Purpose
 of Visit

Accompanying CIA/OIG to for consultations/interviews. Please
 reference the sent out with and clearances ☐

Comment

Special Agent and Agency Staff employee are working/supporting
 CIA/OIG. Please send a Visit Certification containing clearances for
 these two travelers named in this request. Please info OIG on the
 cable. Thank you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//XT~~

	Comments

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//XT~~

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~AIUO~~

(b)(3)

[redacted]
Investigations Staff/OIG

04/02/04 12:04 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: CID documents re death of general [redacted]

Thank you. Should we come get them?
Original Text of [redacted][redacted]
[redacted]
04/02/04 10:18 AMTo:
cc:

Subject: Re: CID documents re death of general [redacted]

[redacted] received the documents this morning. They will be hand-delivered to you today.

Original Text of [redacted]

[redacted]
Investigations Staff/OIG

03/29/04 03:16 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: CID documents re death of general [redacted]

Thank you.
Original Text of [redacted][redacted]
[redacted]
03/29/04 02:58 PMTo:
cc:

Subject: CID documents re death of general

[redacted] located what may/may be the documents CID provided to [redacted] several months ago relating to the death of the former Iraqi general last November. [redacted] will send copies back to Hqs, [redacted] will then forward them to the OIG.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~AIUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ALUO~~



(b)(3)



OIG Investigations Staff

04/05/04 02:08 PM




To:

cc:

Subject: Cancellation of Flights

[redacted] and I have flights reserved for travel to [redacted] on 12 April (next Monday) and return flights from [redacted] on 19 April. Our trip has been postponed. Would you please cancel our reservations. Thank you very much,



UNCLASSIFIED//~~ALUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~[redacted]
04/07/04 08:07 AMTo: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April [redacted]

Good morning,

I just confirmed that the [redacted] Conference room is reserved for your presentations this afternoon. This morning, I will test the overhead computer projector to make sure it is functioning for your powerpoint.

[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

DOJ [redacted]
[redacted]

02/24/04 12:43 PM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: Re: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April [redacted]

Works for me. thanks for being so accommodating. [redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

[redacted]
02/24/04 12:05 PMTo: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April [redacted]

New/improved proposed schedule:

[redacted] 1200-1300

break for lunch 1300-1400

[redacted] : 1400-1500

Is this convenient for both of you?

[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

02/24/04 08:11 AM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: IC class #14 : legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April

hmm. Wednesday afternoons are REALLY bad for me--I skipped an [] last week to be there at 1300. Any chance I can present at noon, then take the lunch break at 1300? then I could squish it in. If not possible, I'll just send apologies again to the []

Original Text of []

DO/ []

02/23/04 03:05 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: IC class #14 : legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April

I have put it on my calendar. [] Would you rather go first or second?

Original Text of []

02/23/04 11:59 AM

To:
cc:

Subject: IC class #14 : legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April

Thanks again for briefing [] last week. We received positive feedback from them - they clearly felt that the briefings were relevant and interesting.

We are now preparing the schedule for the next round of on 7 April. I have already reserved the [] conf. room for that day. We would like to start with the [] legal brief at 1300 followed by [] from 1400 to 1500. How does your schedule look for that day?

[]

[]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET//XI~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

04/16/04 10:20 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] clearances

[redacted]

I wanted to close a loop with you regarding [redacted] clearances.

When we last spoke the military had perm certed [redacted] for Secret, but not TS; however scattered castles reflected he had TS. You might recall, I spoke to [redacted] and she said they would perm cert him to the Agency for TS. Do you know if in fact the military ever did send that fax/perm cert to your office for TS for [redacted]? Thank you,

[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

[redacted]
04/05/04 11:39 AMTo: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: VISIT CERTIFICATION

Hi [redacted]

Below is a copy of the cable for [redacted] and [redacted]. The [redacted] Let me know if you have any additional questions.

[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

~~SECRET//XI~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
20 April 2004
Please respond to
[redacted]

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] FW: Hotel Reservations for trip to [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

> From: [redacted]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2004 11:22:28 AM
> To: [redacted]
> Cc: [redacted]
> Subject: Hotel Reservations for trip to [redacted]
> Auto forwarded by a [redacted]
> [redacted]

I made reservations for you for our trip to [redacted] next week. Please contact the hotel and provide them with a credit card number to guarantee your room if you plan to arrive after 1800 hours. Here is the information on the reservations:



Confirmation Numbers:



Check-in is on Sunday, 25 April 2004; Check out is on Thursday, 29 April 2004. [redacted] and I have already guaranteed our rooms for late arrival. We will likely check in around 1900 hours, assuming we get tickets on the

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flight that lands around 1730 hours.

I requested a non-smoking room for you at Government rate (\$55/night). They did not ask which government agency we are affiliated with so I did not provide that information. Safe travels and see you in

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290421(b)(1)
(b)(3)[redacted]
DCI/OIG/INV


04/21/04 06:35 AM

To:
cc:

Subject: OIG Interviews

[redacted] By now I am sure that [redacted] has briefed you on discussions held with [redacted] concerning our need to interview [redacted] prior to [redacted] departure from CONUS on or about 7 May. Given [redacted] concerns, the suggestion was made to OIG that it might be prudent for [redacted] to be move to the DC area for interviews, with [redacted] taking the lead on arrangements. Do we need to meet to further discuss specifics/arrangements/timing? Please advise and thanks for your assistance, [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290421

~~SECRET//20290420~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)[Redacted]
DCI/OIG/INV

04/26/04 06:20 AM

To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel File [Redacted]

Super...thanks.

Original Text of [Redacted]

[Redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

04/23/04 04:18 PM

To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel File

[Redacted] as of COB on 23 April, the OPF for [Redacted] had not arrived yet, but you might find it on my chair next week, assuming that [Redacted] receives it from HR. I did not find any show-stoppers in his security file this morning.

----- Forwarded by [Redacted] on 04/23/04 04:15 PM -----

[Redacted]
DCI/OIG/ [Redacted]

04/21/04 08:06 AM

To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel File [Redacted]

File has been ordered.

[Redacted]
Original Text of [Redacted][Redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

04/20/04 02:28 PM

To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: Request for Official Personnel File

[Redacted] on an urgent basis, please obtain for me the Official Personnel File of the following CIA employee:

~~SECRET//20290420~~

~~SECRET//20290420~~

Name:
SSN:
AIN:
EOD:

I would like to review this file as part of our preparations for interviews related to INV case

Many thanks,

~~SECRET//20290420~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

04/05/04 12:17 PM

To: [redacted]

cc:

Subject: Hotel Reservations

Hotel:

[redacted]

[redacted] Confirmation number: [redacted]

[redacted] Confirmation number: [redacted]

We are confirmed to stay at the [redacted] from 12 April through at least 16 April. We have to check in before 6 pm on the 12th of April or else guarantee our arrival with a credit card to hold our rooms. These are standard rooms vice "suites." I took from the reservationist that the rooms have no refrigerators, but are non-smoking.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/04/04 08:28 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] interpreter

I left [redacted] a message asking him to try and set up an interview with [redacted] for Tuesday afternoon, May 11th.

If we are able to get [redacted] on the calendar for an interview we would likely fly out Monday night or Tuesday morning and catch a flight back to VA on Wednesday morning.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290504(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(d)

[Redacted]

OIG Investigations Staff

05/04/04 09:01 AM

To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]
Subject: [Redacted]

I just got off the phone with [Redacted]. He returns from his leave on Monday night (5/10) so he is good to travel Tuesday/Wednesday to interview [Redacted], assuming [Redacted] is available. He'll work the [Redacted] issue today, including trying to get a hold of [Redacted] (to get [Redacted] number) and [Redacted]. I also passed along the [Redacted] information [Redacted] brought back from [Redacted] after [Redacted] told me he had had no luck reaching [Redacted] through his contact.

I told [Redacted] you, [Redacted] had sent a message to the field exploring the possibility of going to [Redacted] the week of the 17th of May. That works for him; he will not take any action pending a response from the field.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290504

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~(b)(3)
(b)(6)[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/04/04 11:17 AM

To: [redacted]

cc:

Subject: [redacted]

[redacted] called and said he spoke to someone at [redacted] who is in the US and they told him they need [redacted] full name or [redacted] to find him. [redacted] called [redacted] and left a message asking him to check his records; no luck with [redacted]. His next step is to call the woman who works for [redacted]. Stay tuned...

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ATUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

05/04/04 01:09 PM

To: Scott W. Muller/STF/AGENCY@DCI
cc:

Subject: FYI -- Human Rights Watch Letter to Dr. Rice, May 3, 2004

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

United States: End Abuse of Detainees in U.S. Custody

Human Rights Watch Letter to National Security Advisor

(Washington D.C., May 3, 2004) -- Human Rights Watch sent a letter today to U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, urging the United States to take nine specific steps to address the systemic problem of detainee abuse by the U.S. military and intelligence personnel operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations around the world. See letter below.

--

May 3, 2004

Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20504

Dear Dr. Rice:

It is becoming clear that the ill treatment and torture of prisoners by the U.S. military in Iraq were not limited to isolated incidents, but reflected, in the words of the U.S. army's own inquiry, "systemic and illegal abuse of detainees." The brazenness with which the U.S. soldiers involved conducted themselves suggests they thought they had nothing to hide from their superiors. The reported role of U.S. intelligence officers in encouraging such treatment to "soften up" detainees for interrogations, combined with earlier reports of similar abuses in Afghanistan, suggests a much wider problem that must be addressed.

The acts described in the investigative report written by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, including beatings, repeated sexual abuse and humiliation, and threats and simulation of rape and of torture by electric shock, violate the Geneva Conventions and could constitute war crimes. They clearly contradict President Bush's pledge on June 26, 2003 that the United States will neither "torture" terrorist suspects, nor use "cruel and unusual" treatment to interrogate them,

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

as well as the more detailed policy on interrogations outlined that day by Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes. It should also now be beyond doubt, as we have repeatedly argued, that such conduct damages the reputation of the United States and its ability to advance the rule of law around the world.

We welcome reports that the Defense Department is now examining the interrogation practices of military intelligence officers at all U.S.-run prisons in Iraq, not just Abu Ghraib. But this does not go nearly far enough to reverse the extraordinary harm these abuses have caused. We strongly urge the administration to take the following steps:

1. Launch an investigation into interrogation practices wherever detainees are held around the world, whether the facilities are run by the U.S. military or the Central Intelligence Agency - and make the results public. The reports from Iraq suggest a systemic problem involving the intelligence community, not just the military police officers on the scene. Any inquiry that focuses solely on Iraq and exclusively on the practices of the U.S. military, without also encompassing the U.S. intelligence community as a whole, will be woefully incomplete.
2. Prosecute any military or intelligence personnel found to have engaged in or encouraged any acts amounting to torture or inhuman treatment. Some of the abuses described in Gen. Taguba's report clearly rise to this level. In such cases, administrative penalties are not enough to ensure accountability for serious mistreatment and to send a clear signal that such abuse will not be tolerated.
3. Ensure that all interrogators working for the United States, whether employees of the military, intelligence agencies, or private contractors, understand and abide by specific guidelines consistent with the policy outlined by DOD General Counsel Haynes last year, which prohibited interrogation methods abroad that would be barred in the United States by the 5th, 8th, and/or 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Geneva Conventions. Such guidelines should be publicly available. They should prohibit some of the techniques of stress now apparently permitted by a reported "72-point matrix" used by U.S. interrogators, including extended sleep and sensory deprivation and forcing detainees to assume painful positions, in addition to the other forms of humiliating and degrading treatment that have been reported in Iraq, such as holding detainees nude. U.S. Army field manuals do contain prohibitions against cruel and inhuman treatment in interrogations, but it is unclear if CIA interrogators operate under any similar guidelines, or how the more specific policy outlined by DOD last year was communicated to personnel in the field. It is also unclear whether adherence to such policies is the subject of routine, frequent monitoring by supervisory officials. Whatever such practices may be, events in Iraq make clear that ongoing monitoring of interrogation and detention practices is inadequate.
4. Grant the International Committee of the Red Cross access to all detainees held by the United States in the campaign against terrorism throughout the world, whether held in facilities run by the U.S. military or intelligence services, or nominally held by other governments at the behest of the United States. The United States should not be operating undisclosed detention facilities to which no independent monitors have access.
5. Make public information about who is detained by occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and why, and enable families of detainees to visit their relatives. Even with internal safeguards, incommunicado detention is an invitation to abuse.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

6. Videotape all interrogations and other interaction with detainees so responsible personnel understand that there will be a record of any abuses. These videotapes should be regularly reviewed by supervisory personnel to ensure full compliance with interrogation and detention standards in U.S. and international law.

7. Release the results of the investigation the Defense Department conducted into deaths in custody of two detainees held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Reports we've received that criminal prosecutions have been foregone in lieu of quiet disciplinary action.

8. Pay restitution to detainees found to be victims of torture or inhumane treatment.

9. Ensure that private contractors working for the United States in military or intelligence roles operate under a clear legal regime so that they can be held criminally responsible for complicity in illegal acts.

We hope you will agree that the revelations from Iraq call for dramatic, and systematic, changes in the treatment of prisoners held by the United States around the world, both to ensure compliance with U.S. legal obligations, and to repair the damage these abuses have caused to the credibility of the United States.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Roth
Executive Director

Tom Malinowski
Washington Advocacy Director

cc: Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence

Related Material

Iraq: U.S. Prisoner Abuse Sparks Concerns Over War Crimes

Press Release, April 30, 2004

Prisoner abuse: What about the other secret U.S. prisons?

Commentary, May 4, 2004

From: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/03/usint8523.htm>

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10118-3299 USA

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~AIUO~~

Inspector General

05/04/04 02:13 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: CID Contact Names and Numbers

Per your request

Major General Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division
Command (USACIDC)

Mr. Assistant Chief of Operations, USACIDC,

CW5 Chief of Current Operations, USACIDC

CW5 Chief of Intelligence Division, USACIDC

is aware that Mr. Helgerson will be going to the SSCI tomorrow afternoon. He is also aware that Mr. Helgerson might be calling him.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~AIUO~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290505~~

[Redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

05/05/04 10:57 AM

To:

cc:

Subject: Phone Conversation with [Redacted] 5 May 2004



(C) I just spoke with [Redacted] and gave him the flight reservations for the [Redacted] trip. He proposed coming up here the week before the trip in order to discuss trip details, the interviewees, and the interviews. He will try to fly to Dulles on Wednesday, 12 May, so that he can visit our office on the 13th and at least part of the 14th. He will fly home on the 14th.

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290505~~

~~SECRET//20290224~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

04/30/04 04:22 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: Re: OIG Support to Army CID [REDACTED]

The litigation team is [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Original Text of [REDACTED]

DC/OIG/INV

04/16/04 01:01 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: OIG Support to Army CID

[REDACTED] Greetings.

(8) INV continues to support Army Criminal Investigation Division in investigating the death of Iraqi detainee Abid Hamad Mahawish Al-Mahalawi on 26 November 2003. An Army pathologist has ruled the death a homicide and Army CID's investigation has implicated U.S. military personnel as being likely responsible. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Anticipating a likely future military legal proceeding that could draw in Agency [REDACTED] information, would you like to assign an attorney who we can bring up to speed on particulars?

~~SECRET//20290224~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290517~~

□-----
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)



[Redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff
05/17/04 11:52 AM

To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]

Subject: Request to review a security file

[Redacted]

I would like to review a security file on [Redacted] if one exists. I understand that this individual may be in process for employment as a staff employee, IC, or as a contact employee [Redacted]. I do not have his SSN or an AIN. He was born [Redacted]. Thank you,

[Redacted]

Reference [Redacted]



~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290517~~

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

OIG Investigations Staff

05/07/04 07:39 AM



To:

cc:

Subject: [Redacted] access to HQS

I submitted a request to get [Redacted] into the HQS compound from 5/12-5/14 with a "no escort" badge and general parking on the parking deck. Although he is not scheduled to come in until 5/13, I added an extra day just in case.

[Redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290510(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
 Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

 05/10/04 08:34 AM

 To:
 cc:
 Subject: and Case

(C) FYI, [] called this morning to check on the status of arrangements for the imminent TDY related to this case. He asked if any problems had arisen, and I said no. He asked about responses to our cable last week, for example concerning hotel arrangements, and I told him that we had received a response affirming that we have hotel rooms. I told him that [] could come into our office as soon as Wednesday afternoon, and asked him how much we could give [] to read. [] responded that we ([] you, and me) could sit down with [] "investigator to investigator" and discuss his needs and preferences. [] noted that [] is cleared and can read through the case file, but [] added that [] may not want to be exposed to everything in the file because [] could be called to testify about what he learned from the file. If [] does not want to read the entire file, he instead could ask us ([] you, me) questions that we would answer. [] anticipated being able to meet with us and [] Thursday morning (13 May), but he also said [] could come into the office Wednesday afternoon if you and I wanted to meet with [] sooner than Thursday to discuss how [] wants to proceed with getting oriented on the case. I also told [] that [] thinks she can visit us on Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday afternoon to learn more about the case.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//20290510

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ALUO~~

☐ (b)(3)

[redacted]
06/01/04 05:44 PM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: NEW: phone list - [redacted]

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 06/01/04 05:44 PM -----



05/28/04 07:17 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]

Subject: NEW: phone list - [redacted]

The [redacted] is located in [redacted]. I am attaching our new phone list. The best way to reach me is to page me.

Thanks

[redacted]



phone list.doc

Original Text of [redacted]



05/27/04 03:46 PM


To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: phone list - [redacted]



phone list.doc

UNCLASSIFIED//~~ALUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290608~~



[Redacted]

DCI/OIG

[Redacted]

06/08/04 11:00 AM

To: [Redacted]

cc:

Subject: Re: Request for Training Records



[Redacted]raining_report.do



[Redacted]training_report.do

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290608~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~(b)(3)
(b)(6)**REQUEST FOR VISITOR - NO ESCORT REQUIRED**Status: *Sent to VAC***VISIT Information**First Day of Visit in
MM/DD/YY format : 07/29/2004Last Day of Visit if more
than one day: 08/06/2004

Building of Visit:

Parking Needed :

General Parking - Parking Deck

SPONSOR/ORIGINATOR Information

Name of Sponsor:	<input type="text"/>	Sponsor's AIN:	<input type="text"/>
	(First Name, Last Initial)		
Sponsor's Directorate or Office:	DCI	Non-secure Phone (no hyphens):	<input type="text"/>
Sponsor's Office:	OIG	Secure Phone:	<input type="text"/>
Badge #:	<input type="text"/>		
Originator of Request:	<input type="text"/>	Originator's Secure Phone:	<input type="text"/>
ASO:	<input type="text"/>		
Purpose of Visit:	coordination/consultations on joint project		

VISITOR(S) Information~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Do you want to limit the viewing of this document to you,
your ASO, CIC, and the VAC?: No

Is this an URGENT Request that must be processed
within four working hours?: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Acceptable identification is: 1) US Passport; 2) US state or federal issued driver's license; 3) US military ID.

	Last Name	First Name	MI	Suffix/Rank	IC Badge	IC Agency	Country Code	SSN (no hyphens)	Representing
1					NO		USA		US Army CID
2							USA		
3							USA		
4							USA		
5							USA		

General Comments:

Approved By:	
Approved On:	07/28/2004 04:28:29 PM


Authority to Solicit SSN

To request a visitor without supplying a social security number you must submit a hard copy request to your Visitor Access Unit (VAU). Call [] for more information. The authority for soliciting the Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397. Disclosure of the SSN is voluntary, but failure to disclose it may result in delay or denial of visitor's access to Agency facilities. The SSN will be used to identify the visitor precisely within the Agency's access approval system.



Obsolete Previous Editions

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)~~SECRET~~

Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General



05/11/04 07:55 AM



To:

cc:

Subject: FYI: Request Submission

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 07:55 AM -----



05/11/04 07:53 AM



To:

cc:

Subject: Request Submission

The request submitted for [redacted] [redacted] has been successfully submitted. For more information, please follow this link ->

If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database ->

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//20290511~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(d)

[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/11/04 11:23 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: Requested Photograph

[redacted]
Thank you for the photo of [redacted] You have been most helpful. Regards,

Original Text of [redacted]

[redacted]
Office of the Chief/Special Operations Group [redacted][redacted]
Title: Executive Secretary

05/11/04 11:18 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Requested Photograph

Here is the photo you requested. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

[redacted]
----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 11:17 AM -----

05/11/04 11:16 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] scanned picture

~~SECRET//20290511~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290506~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/11/04 11:39 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Photos for [redacted] TDY (Set 1 of 2)

Here's one of two [redacted] containing photographs that [redacted] may need in [redacted]


I am sending them to you folks in the event I am TDY if and when [redacted] call to ask for them. These photos will need to be sent to [redacted] via [redacted]

Please check to make sure you can open/access the photos and let me know if you have any problems.

Thank you,

[redacted]

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 11:31 AM -----



05/07/04 06:16 AM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: Request for photographs [redacted]

Attached are the photos you have requested. We have no photo on file for [redacted] I apologize for not getting them to you yesterday.



[redacted]



[redacted]

Original Text of [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290506~~

~~SECRET//20290511~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(d)[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/11/04 11:40 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Requested Photograph

Here is the second lotus note with the third photograph. Please check to make sure you can open/access the photograph. Thank you.

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 11:39 AM -----

[redacted]
Office of the Chief/Special Operations Group [redacted][redacted]
Title: Executive Secretary


05/11/04 11:18 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: Requested Photograph

Here is the photo you requested. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.



----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 11:17 AM -----

[redacted]

[redacted]



05/11/04 11:16 AM

To: [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] scanned picture

~~SECRET//20290511~~

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(b)(3)

05/11/04 07:02 PM

To:
cc:

Subject: AP: CIA Role in Abuses 'Not Fully Clarified' at Hearing

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/11/04 07:02 PM -----

05/11/04 06:51 PM

To:

cc:

Subject: AP: CIA Role in Abuses 'Not Fully Clarified' at Hearing

^Senior officials disagree over key questions about Iraqi prisoner abuse<

^Eds: SUBS 7th graf pvs, The Defense ..., to CORRECT to Fox News Radio's "Tony Snow Show," sted Fox News<

^With BC-Prisoner Abuse-Excerpts, BC-Abuse-Taguba-Scene<

^AP Photos GH102-103, 107, 112, NY123<

^By ROBERT BURNS=

^AP Military Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) _ The Army general who investigated prisoner abuse in Iraq disagreed sharply Tuesday with a top Pentagon civilian about who was in charge of the Abu Ghraib complex where the mistreatment occurred. In a daylong hearing jolted by news of the beheading of an American in Iraq, the two also differed on the key issue of responsibility by higher-ups.

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba told the Senate Armed Services Committee that military police who acted improperly did so "of their own volition." Several senators, however, questioned whether those low-ranking soldiers would have created the sexually humiliating scenarios by themselves.

Indeed, the committee's chairman, John Warner, R-Va., said it was his understanding that some of the photos, such as one showing an Iraqi prisoner with women's underwear covering his head, were to be shown to prisoners' families "by way of threat unless he came forward with some valuable information."

The hearing unfolded less than two weeks after photos circulated around the world showing Iraqi prisoners forced by their American captors to assume sexually humiliating positions.

It also took place on a day when an Islamic militant Web site showed pictures of the apparent beheading of an American civilian in Iraq in retaliation for the prison abuse.

Vice President Dick Cheney questioned whether additional photos of prisoner abuse ought to be released to the public, declaring, "It's not just a matter of, sort of whetting people's appetites to see sensational stuff here."

The Defense Department is going to make the material accessible

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to Congress, "but then there will have to be a decision made what and at what point any additional photos are released to the public," Cheney told Fox News Radio's "Tony Snow Show."

Taguba said that when control of the prison was turned over to military intelligence officials, they had authority over the military police who were guarding prisoners.

But Stephen Cambone, the Pentagon's undersecretary for intelligence, said that was incorrect, that authority for the handling of detainees had remained with the MPs.

That difference underscored the confusion that surrounds the abuse controversy as military investigators attempt to determine if blame should be assigned to more than the 13 soldiers now reprimanded or charged with criminal violations.

It also highlighted an unresolved question linked to Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, who visited Iraqi prisons in early September, shortly before the reported abuses took place. The question is what Miller meant when he recommended, at the time, that military police become actively involved in "setting the conditions" for successful prisoner interrogations.

Some of the seven MPs who have been charged with abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib have said they believed they were acting on orders from military intelligence personnel who wanted prisoners "softened up" to make them more compliant in interrogations.

Cambone told the committee that Miller meant the MPs should be "collaborating" with the military intelligence soldiers responsible for the interrogations. For example, Cambone said, the MPs could help by telling the interrogators what the prisoners were saying in their cells.

The idea, he said, was to build teamwork between the interrogators and the prison guards. Miller and others made it clear, he said, that all prisoners were to be treated humanely.

But Taguba said involving MPs in "setting the conditions" for interrogations not only violated Army regulations, but also opened the door for possible misunderstanding on the part of MPs who are trained to keep prisoners safe and secure.

"Senators ... are in a virtual state of shock about the beheading," said Warner, recalling earlier concerns that the prisoner abuse could lead to retaliation.

Maj. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, chief of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Warner "there has been an increase" in threats in the days since the publication of photographs.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., asked Taguba whether he agreed with the conclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross that coercive practices such as holding prisoners naked for extended periods had been used in a systematic way.

"Yes, sir," Taguba replied. "Based on the evidence that was presented to us and what we gathered and what we reviewed, yes, sir."

He said that investigations, which are not yet complete, have identified seven MPs and as many as 17 of their supervisors directly or indirectly involved.

The question of CIA involvement arose but was not fully clarified.

Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the Army's intelligence chief, testified that CIA officers "visited the facility and talked to prisoners" at Abu Ghraib. He added that he knew of "no wrongdoing on their behalf."

In his testimony, Taguba said the decision last November to take tactical control of Abu Ghraib prison away from the 800th Military Police Brigade and give it to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade meant the MPs believed they were taking orders from military intelligence.

Cambone, however, said that move did not give military intelligence authority over the MPs, nor did it change the rules governing the activities of either the MPs or the interrogators.

Either way, Cambone told the panel that troops in Iraq were

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under orders to abide by the Geneva Conventions, which dictate terms for humane treatment of wartime prisoners.

"An order to soften up a detainee would not be a legal order, would it?" asked Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan.

"No sir," replied Lt. Gen. Lance F. Smith, deputy director of the U.S. Central Command.

Taguba stressed that his investigation produced no evidence that an MP was ordered to use inappropriate means in handling detainees.

"I would say they were probably influenced by others but not necessarily directed specifically by others," he said. He suggested the MPs were in some way led to believe they could use more coercive methods, either by military, CIA or civilian contractor interrogators.

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05/11/04 07:06 PM

To: [redacted] Buzzy

Krongard/STF/AGENCY@DCI [redacted]

John L.

Helgerson/STF/AGENCY@DCI [redacted]

Scott W.

Muller/STF/AGENCY@DCI John A. Rizzo/STF/AGENCY@DCI [redacted]

cc: [redacted]

Subject: AP: Cambone Asked About CIA Role in Abuses

^Abuse photos were aimed at pushing prisoners to talk, senator says<

^Eds: Adds quotes, detail in final drafts<

^AP Photos GH102-103, 107, 112, NY123<

^By PAULINE JELINEK=

^Associated Press Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. military personnel took photos of Iraqi prisoners in sexually humiliating poses in an apparent effort to obtain leverage for future interrogations, a leading senator said Tuesday.

"They staged those photographs, which I understand were going to be shown to the prisoners' families by way of threats unless he came forward with some valuable information," said Sen. John Warner, R-Va., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"The plot is thickening," Warner added as he presided over a daylong hearing into prisoner abuse. The hearing was jolted by the release of a video, posted on an Islamic militant Web site, that showed the apparent beheading of an American civilian in Iraq.

"So we tell you that the dignity of the Muslim men and women in Abu Ghraib and others is not redeemed except by blood and souls," said one of the executioners.

Testifying before the panel, the Army general who first investigated abuse in an Iraqi prison said the mistreatment resulted from faulty leadership, a "lack of discipline, no training whatsoever and no supervision" of the troops.

Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba also left open the possibility that members of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as armed forces personnel and civilian contractors were culpable in the abusive treatment of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison.

"A few soldiers and civilians conspired to abuse and conduct egregious acts of violence against detainees and other civilians outside the bounds of international laws and the Geneva Convention," he said.

From the time that photos of abuse surfaced, administration officials have expressed concern about possible harm to Americans in Iraq and other nearby countries.

"Senators ... are in a virtual state of shock about the beheading," Warner said after returning to the committee hearing from the Senate floor.

In response to a question, Gen. Ronald L. Burgess told Warner "there has been an increase" in threats in the days since the prisoner abuse became known.

Throughout the day, senators pressed Taguba and other witnesses to learn whether senior officers or military intelligence personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison had known of, authorized, suggested, or otherwise been involved in the abusive treatment of prisoners by military police.

"I cannot help but suspect that others were involved," said

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Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine. "That military intelligence were involved or people further up the chain of command in suggesting to these guards specific types of abuse that were designed to break these prisoners."

Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the top intelligence officer in the Army, said her logic was sound, but he added, "The difficult part is to find out who told whom what to do."

A few moments later, Warner interrupted to say that he agreed with Collins, particularly that the poses seemed designed offend Muslims.

"These youngsters didn't understand the nuances of Muslim culture. ... They staged those photographs, which I understand were going to be shown to the prisoners' families by way of threats unless he came forward with some valuable information," Warner said.

Earlier, Taguba testified that the photographs were taken by the personal digital cameras of U.S. personnel.

Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, told the panel that personal "photographing, filming and videotaping" of prisoners of war was strictly prohibited.

Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., challenged Taguba on his statement that Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski of the 800th Military Police Brigade bore responsibility for a breakdown in discipline that led to abuse.

Taguba testified that tactical control of the Abu Ghraib facility had been taken away from Karpinski and turned over to a military intelligence colonel. Karpinski retained control over other Iraqi prisons in her command, and Taguba conceded that they remained largely free of abuse.

Karpinski, a general in the Reserve, has been suspended and issued an official letter of admonishment in connection with the abuse. She has not been charged.

Questions about ultimate responsibility for control of the prison also produced a disagreement between Taguba and Cambone.

Taguba said that control had been turned over to military intelligence officials.

Cambone said that was incorrect, and it resided with the military police.

In a further disagreement, Taguba said it was against Army rules for intelligence troops to involve MPs in setting conditions for interrogations. Cambone said he believed it was appropriate for the two groups to collaborate.

Taguba also told the committee his investigation had not found "any order whatsoever, written or otherwise," that directed the military police to cooperate with intelligence forces at the prison.

Left unresolved was the central question of what Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller meant in recommending, shortly before the abuses occurred, that military police become involved in "setting conditions" for the successful interrogation of prisoners.

Cambone insisted it meant only that MPs tell the interrogators what the prisoners had been saying in confinement and otherwise "collaborating" with the interrogators. Taguba said he believed it meant applying more coercive techniques to prisoners prior to their interrogations.

Regardless of any disagreements, Cambone and others told the panel that troops in Iraq were under orders to abide by the Geneva Conventions, which dictate terms for humane treatment of prisoners.

"An order to soften up a detainee would not be a legal order, would it?" asked Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kansas.

"No sir," replied Lt. Gen. Lance F. Smith, the deputy director of the U.S. Central Command.

Taguba told the panel that his investigators had been told about participation by "other government agencies or contractors" in the abuse.

Other government agencies is a euphemism for the CIA.

Cambone, too, was asked whether he had any knowledge of CIA

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involvement in the abuse at Abu Ghraib.

"There were people brought by agency personnel to that place. ... There may have been interrogations conducted by the agency personnel while they were there," he said.

The hearing took place while Senate leaders sought access to photos and videos of abuse not yet made public. Officials said the plan was for all senators to have access to the material.

In Geneva, the International Committee of the Red Cross said U.S.-led coalition intelligence officers had told it that up to 90 percent of Iraqi detainees were arrested by mistake.

A 24-page Red Cross report also cited abuses, some "tantamount to torture," including brutality, forcing people to wear hoods, humiliation and threats of imminent execution.

APTV 05-11-04 1701EDT<

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Office of Inspector General

05/13/04 11:26 AM

To:

cc:

Subject: ISRAELI IRAQ PRISON TORTURE CONNECTION: WHO IS JOHN ISRAEL?

----- Forwarded by [redacted] on 05/13/04 11:26 AM -----



05/13/04 08:57 AM

To:

cc:

Subject: ISRAELI IRAQ PRISON TORTURE CONNECTION: WHO IS JOHN ISRAEL?

<http://www.antiwar.com/justin>

Who is John Israel?

TEXT:

<http://www.antiwar.com/justin>

Who is John Israel?

He could be one of the secret masterminds behind the Abu Ghraib outrage

The blithering, the blathering, the pontification, and the grandstanding b that about describes the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the Abu Ghraib filth-fest. The Democrats were so hot to link Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directly to the scandal, and the Republicans were so busy defending their man (and the war) that neither bothered much to mention the key culprits, as identified in the Taguba report:

"I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of M[military] I[intelligence] personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz (sic), and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability."

Even when General Taguba went up to Capitol Hill and testified, along with the shifty-eyed undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Stephen A. Cambone, the senators spent so much time listening to the sound of their own voices, and scoring brownie points off one another, that the subject of the "private" contractors and the intelligence community's involvement in all this only came up briefly, like lightning illuminating a cloud-clogged sky. It came up at the start of the hearing, but Senator John Warner, who even looks

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like a hawk b the beakish nose, the hooded eyes, the predatory glint in his eye b approached the subject gingerly:

SEN. WARNER: "I ask the same question to you. In simple laymen's language, so it can be understood, what do you think went wrong, in terms of the failure of discipline and the failure of this interrogation process to be consistent with known regulations, national and international? And also, to what extent do you have knowledge of any participation by other than U.S. military, namely Central Intelligence Agency and/or contractors, in the performance of the interrogations?"

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, as far as your last question, I'll answer that first. The comments about participation of other government agencies or contractors were related to us through interviews that we conducted. It was related to our examination of written statements and, of course, some other records. With regards to your first question, sir, there was a failure of leadership..." The media has focused on this last phrase, probably because it not only seems to indict Rumsfeld but also because it's a made-to-order headline. But the first part of Taguba's answer is the most pertinent. Warner, obviously not eager to have the general go into detail in public, then answered his own question, referring to the over 1,000 pages of documentation submitted to the committee. In short, the answer to the senator's question was clearly yes, and the details were to be found in the classified documents that only members of the committee and other privileged characters would read. So they blithered, and they blathered, and struck poses, and not until it came Senator Daniel K. Akaka's turn was any further light shed on the dark corners of this investigation. The Hawaii Democrat looked affable enough, and he was smiling, but his questions, when they came, cut straight to the heart of the matter:

SENATOR AKAKA: "General Taguba, in your report you reference the lack of supervision over U.S. civilian contractor personnel, third country nationals and local contractors within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During your investigation, did you determine how many civilian contract personnel were working there? Who supervised these individuals? And can you describe what you observed in terms of type of access these individuals had to the detainee areas?"

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, we did not make a determination of how many civilian contractors were assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and operating at Abu Ghraib. I personally interviewed a translator and I also personally interviewed an interrogator, both civilians, contractors. There was also a statement, and substantiated by the witnesses that we interviewed, of another translator, a third-country national in fact, that was involved. And there was another third-country national who was acting as a translator for the interrogators that was involved in one of the interrogation incidents where dogs were used. Their supervision, sir, from the best that we could determine or discern from the information that we gathered, was they were under the supervision of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, the JIDC, who is then under the supervision of one, a lieutenant colonel, who was also supervised by the brigade commander, the MI brigade commander. That was the chain, sir." Third country nationals, eh? So what third country are we talking about? Britain? Canada, perhaps? I guess we can probably rule out Monaco. The only translator identified in the Taguba report is John Israel, supposedly a "contract translator" employed by the Titan Corp. Mr. Israel is furthermore described as not having a security clearance, an unusual condition for someone in his position b unless, of course, he's not an American, in which case it would be perfectly understandable.

So far, very interesting. But then it got even more interesting:

SEN. AKAKA: "General Taguba, your report finds that two contractors were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Were either of these contracted personnel supervising soldiers or in a position to direct soldiers to take specific actions?"

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, they were not in any way supervising any soldiers, MP or otherwise. However, the guards, those who were involved, looked at them as competent authority as in the manner by which they described them, as the MI or by name or by function."

A reasonable interpretation of Taguba's somewhat garbled answer is that, yes, the MPs and soldiers who committed sadistic outrages against detainees acted under the influence and at the instigation of those they believed to be intelligence officers, some of whom were "third country nationals."

Senator Akaka follows up with a question for Secretary Cambone: "What kind of training," he wanted to know, "did the U.S. civilian contractors have prior to going to Iraq?"

The look on Cambone's face made the whole dreary procedure worth it, I thought his eyebrows were going to fly right off.

It is no secret that the Israelis have been "advising" the Americans on how to run the occupation: after all, they have so much experience in the matter, and are more than eager to impart their hard-won expertise. The methods employed by Israeli security forces are quite different from those utilized by the U.S. military: the use of "limited" torture is okay by them, and the Palestinians are no strangers to the sort of treatment meted out to the inmates at Abu Ghraib. So when Senator Akaka asked Cambone what kind of training the contractors had received, my first thought was: The very best!

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The Mossad is rightly feared throughout the Middle East, and the world, as the most ruthless (and daring) intelligence agency of them all. Only the KGB ever rivaled its reputation. That they would not hesitate to employ the sort of interrogation methods used to "soften up" the prisoners of Abu Ghraib is beyond dispute: just ask the Palestinians b and Human Rights Watch. That we have imported them, along with their methods, into Iraq seems altogether likely. But, hey, wait a minute, how is it that American soldiers were taking orders from civilian contractors, never mind "third country nationals"? Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) cleared that up when he put the question to Taguba pointblank:

SEN. GRAHAM: "Part of the defense that we're going to be hearing about in these court martials is that the people that we're charging are going to say this system that we see photographic evidence of, was at least encouraged if not directed by others. Do you think that's an accurate statement?"

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, I would say that they were probably influenced by others b "

SEN. GRAHAM: "Okay b "

GEN. TAGUBA: " b if not necessarily directed specifically by others."

As U.S. and, in all likelihood, Israeli intelligence officers looked on approvingly, Trailer-Park Lyndie and her ex-prison guard boyfriend, with the active collaboration of the other MPs, systematically abused and degraded the inmates. So much of this nightmare scenario b the hooded prisoners forced to engage in behavior looked on with utter horror in Muslim society b seems like such a gift to Osama bin Laden that the revelation of Israeli involvement gives the whole affair a surreal quality.

For the role of CIA overseer, I nominate Steven Stefanowicz, the 34-year-old ex-Navy reservist, now a civilian interrogator supposedly employed by CACI International, who emigrated to Australia, before 9/11, and worked in "information technology" in the city of Adelaide, where b he says b he became engaged to be married. As detailed in my last column, Stefanowicz alleges he underwent a transformation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and returned to the U.S. determined to get in on the fight, though in what capacity was never quite clear. Now it turns out he had bragged to his friends that he had joined the CIA, according to a piece in the Philadelphia Daily News:

"The Philadelphia-area native at the center of the Iraq torture scandal has reportedly told friends he wants to get out of there right away and return to Australia, where he claimed three years ago he was joining the CIA. 'It's safe to say I've seen enough for a lifetime here in Iraq, and it's definitely time to come home,' Steve Stefanowicz reportedly said in an e-mail to a friend in the southern Australian city of Adelaide. He apparently meant Adelaide and not Telford, the Montgomery County, Pa., suburb where he was reared.

"Meanwhile, another Australian friend told the Daily News in an e-mail that in fall 2001 'Steve announced to all of his friends that he was leaving Adelaide to return to America to work for the Central Intelligence Agency.'"

Alas, the Australians don't seem all that eager to have him. Justice Minister Chris Ellison said Stefanowicz "would not be welcome in Australia," according to the Herald Sun newspaper:

"We do not hold Australia out as a haven for anyone who has broken the law and is trying to evade it," Senator Ellison said. He said he was not aware of the details of the case but Australia would be prepared to help the U.S. in any investigation into Mr. Stefanowicz. 'We would receive any request for assistance sympathetically,' he said."

Yeah, well if I were Senator Ellison I wouldn't hold my breath. This is one refugee from the law that many in Washington would just as soon see the back of. The same goes for the mysterious John Israel, about whom next to nothing is known b except that, according to the London Telegraph,

"Mr. Israel has left Iraq while Mr. Stefanowicz is 'on leave' pending inquiries

that could lead to criminal charges being brought against them."

Mr. Israel has skipped town for parts unknown, and Stefanowicz is trying to get to Australia, where he supposedly is going to marry a woman he describes as his fianc(e). Except that she isn't. This news story describes Joanna Buttfeld as an "former girlfriend" coming to Stefanowicz's defense. Another Australian account also refers to their relationship in the past tense, and cites this very interesting tidbit from Ms. Buttfeld:

"Mr. Stefanowicz had refused to discuss details of his life as a U.S. Army reservist, she said. 'We both made a conscious decision not to talk about it because there was so much he couldn't talk about,' she said. 'It was the source

of some frustration. He'd say, 'I can't talk about that.'"

For a CIA guy, however, he sure sounds like a bit of a loser, and not exactly low-profile. His Australian friends are coming out of the woodwork, and talking to the newspapers:

"The events of 9/11 had nothing to do with his motivation to return to the U.S.," South Philadelphia native Sam Krupsky, now an executive with the Australian Rail Track Corp., wrote [to the Philadelphia Daily News]. "He was out of work and out of luck, and left because he had no prospects here."

"b&Krupsky, the Australian rail-track worker who was born in Philadelphia and who moved to Adelaide in the mid-1970s to play semi-pro basketball, cast doubt on Stefanowicz's skills. 'Steve tried hard for a couple of months to find a job

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here, but was always unsuccessful because he kept freaking out all of his potential employers," Krupsky wrote. He said Stefanowicz had boasted to friends on his arrival in Australia that he'd turned down a job offer from the CIA. After 9/11, did he take them up on their offer b and proceed to "freak out" his new employers to a degree that not even the catty Krupsky could have imagined?

If Stefanowicz is employed by the CIA, then he certainly didn't try to keep it very secret. He was very visible, even prior to his notoriety, due to the efforts of his mother who founded a chapter of the Blue Star Mothers in their home town, and was featured on the DoD's "Defend America" website, invoking her

son as a kind of patriotic model. In the wake of the scandal, a number of accounts have been published of his early history and the course of his career, both here and in Australia. We know he graduated from Souderton Area High School in 1988, and that, in 1998, he joined a Naval Reserve program. We also know that, for whatever reason, after 9/11 he quit his job in Australia as an "information technology recruiter" and went back to the U.S., where he volunteered for active duty. The Washington Post reports that "he served in Muscat, Oman, for most of 2002, and his rank is listed as intelligence specialist 3rd class. Stefanowicz, who received a number of military awards, including a medal for meritorious service, left his last post, at Willow Grove, Pa., last September." Friends of the family say he became a civilian to take a job with CACI. Of the key role Stefanowicz played in the torture chambers of Abu Ghraib, the Taguba report is unequivocal. According to General Taguba, Stefanowicz:

"Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by 'setting conditions' which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse." However, the General gets a bit murky when it comes to detailing the specifics against John Israel, who, in addition to not having a security clearance, is found to have

"Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements." And that is it.

While we know plenty about Stefanowicz, what's extremely odd is that nothing comparable has come out about the other civilian contractor named by General Taguba as having "direct or indirect" responsibility for the Abu Ghraib house of horrors. We don't know how old "John Israel" is, where he lives, where he

was born, or what he looks like b nothing.

We don't even know where he is. All we know is that, according to the Telegraph, he's flown the coop. Gee, I'll bet Army Specialist Jeremy Sivits, who faces court martial, a stiff jail sentence, and worldwide calumny as the "torturer of Abu Ghraib," wishes he could do the same.

If the Israelis are involved in this maelstrom of evil to some extent, then the U.S. is taking the fall for them. Just as Sivits and the others are taking the fall for the intelligence officers who directed the Abu Ghraib horror show b and are so far getting away with reprimands, and relative anonymity.

b Justin Raimondo

Looks like the Israeli association to the intelligence/torture is completely being white-washed for Israel (read former Republican Congressman Paul Findley's 'They Dare to Speak Out' book to see why) as the following article

(URL) also conveys how closely tied the US is to Israeli 'anti-terror' tactics:

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=3446

Israeli link possible in US torture techniques

By Ali Abunimah

Special to The Daily Star

Tuesday, May 11, 2004

In exchange for interrogation training, did Washington award security contracts?

NEOCON PENTAGON OFFICIAL CLASHES WITH GENERAL TAGUBA:

<http://www.itszone.co.uk/zone0/viewtopic.php?t=15305>

Is Israel behind the orders for the tortures in Iraq?:

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
UNCLASSIFIED

<http://www.itszone.co.uk/zone0/viewtopic.php?t=15215>

Israeli lessons for the US in Iraq:

<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C182D988-28E3-4D48-ADFC-F15D6509B0EC.htm>

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[redacted]
OIG Investigations Staff

05/14/04 02:57 PM

To:

[redacted]

cc:

Subject: Hotel info for [redacted] in [redacted] 17-19 May 2004

If you need to reach [redacted] or me in [redacted] here is our Hotel information:

[redacted]

Confirmation No. for both rooms: [redacted]

Check in: 17 May 2004

Check out: 19 May 2004

[redacted] cell: [redacted]

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~~SECRET//X1~~

[redacted]
C/CIC [redacted]

01/29/04 02:14 PM



To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]

Subject: Interview Report for your Review

[redacted] please review for accuracy. Make all changes in bold print. Thanks - [redacted]




[redacted] 28Jan04.do

~~SECRET//X1~~

☐ (b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290618~~



[Redacted]
DCI/OIG [Redacted]

[Redacted]



06/18/04 08:57 AM

To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Check Out Notice For File [Redacted]

Please see below.

----- Forwarded by [Redacted] on 06/18/04 08:54 AM -----

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



06/17/04 07:02 AM

To: [Redacted]
cc: [Redacted]
Subject: Check Out Notice For File [Redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



[Redacted] is being processed for checkout.

The file is due back: 07/08/2004
It must be ordered from the Records Center. You will be notified
when it has been received. It will take a few days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20290618~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(d)

Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General



06/22/04 03:34 PM

To: [redacted]
cc: [redacted]
Subject: [redacted] Tentative Interview/Travel Plans, as of 21 June 2004

(U//~~FOUO~~) FYI, I spoke yesterday with CID Special Agent [redacted] [redacted] said he was in the process of thinking about when to conduct [redacted] additional interviews [redacted] was interested in knowing if [redacted] had been successful in reaching someone [redacted] I told him that [redacted] had discovered that [redacted] will be out of the United States until May 2005. [redacted] also discussed other potential interviewees. He said the most significant news he had was that [redacted] personnel will not return [redacted] until circa 14 July 2004; he expects that their first day back in their offices will be 19 July. [redacted] also said that the [redacted] people will [redacted] in theory will be available to be re-interviewed.

On the basis of all the information available to him and his own schedule, [redacted] foresees the following:

- an interview [redacted] as early in the week of 12 July as possible, if [redacted] can set one up;
- interviews of [redacted] during the week of 12 July;
- interviews [redacted] during the week of 26 July.

[redacted] offered to have OIG personnel take part in some or all of these interviews. I told him that I am available but not toward the end of the week of 12 July.

[redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~AIUO~~



DO

06/23/04 04:07 PM

To:

cc:

Subject: Re: OIG's Tasking Memo re: Detainee Abuse Allegations 

I believe that my previously provided response, included (I believe) in the General Counsel's response 
 was complete.

If you believe otherwise, please provide me with some indication of what you believe I have overlooked.

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~~SECRET//20290630~~[Redacted]
DCI/OIG/INV

06/30/04 10:35 AM



To: [Redacted]

cc: [Redacted]

Subject: [Redacted] Alleged Abuse Case

In case you want to update the [Redacted] on case [Redacted] IG, [Redacted] was briefed on the case in his office this morning by the undersigned. [Redacted] also attended. An MFR regarding the briefing will be placed in the case file.

~~SECRET//20290630~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)[redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

07/01/04 11:16 AM

To: [redacted]

cc:

Subject: CID SA [redacted] Evolving Plans



(U//~~FOUO~~) FYI, today I spoke with CID Special Agent [redacted] to discuss his interviewing and travel plans. [redacted] told me that he had received a phone call from [redacted] of the [redacted]. According to [redacted] said that [redacted] personnel will return from block leave on 6 July vice 14 July. Given this change, [redacted] now intends to visit [redacted] circa 11-14 July; he will talk with [redacted] next week (hopefully as early as the 6th) to discuss the availability and willingness of [redacted] personnel to be (re)interviewed. [redacted] said he also will ask [redacted] if the two soldiers ([redacted] and [redacted] who refused to speak with us ([redacted] and me) during our earlier trip will now make themselves available to be interviewed, either by [redacted] and me, or by me without [redacted] (This raises the question of having a second CIA/OIG investigator travel with me should any of the military personnel decide to talk to CIA but not to CID, so that there would be two investigators in the room during any interviews.) [redacted] thought that some members of [redacted] might be willing to be (re)interviewed now, given how developments turned out on another matter, although he also said he could spin a scenario in which nobody in [redacted] would want to be interviewed by anyone at all, given all the press attention and the looming charges against Army personnel at [redacted]. [redacted] said that he is planning tentatively to travel during the period 25-28 July to [redacted] to interview [redacted] and to [redacted] to interview [redacted] and [redacted] and meet with the military prosecutor.

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~(b)(3)
(b)(6)

[redacted]
Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General

07/06/04 03:18 PM

To: [redacted]

cc:

Subject: FYI [redacted] and [redacted] Interviews



(U//~~FOUO~~) CID Special Agent [redacted] just called to say that he heard from [redacted] officer [redacted] [redacted] said that [redacted] told him that [redacted] personnel indeed are back at [redacted] this week, but they may be deployed elsewhere (i.e. overseas) as early as next week. [redacted] therefore may try to travel to [redacted] this week to talk with [redacted] personnel before they depart CONUS. [redacted] said he would let me know what [redacted] tells him in a follow-up phone call [redacted] is planning to make to [redacted] concerning the availability of [redacted] personnel.

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