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Defense Intelligence Agency

S-022,019-04	04 March 2004
(U) Iraq: Implications of Releasing LTG Amir No. 32)	Hamudi Hasan Al-Sadi (Black List
This paper implications and custody BL #32, LTG Amir Hamudi Hasan A	responds to an OSD request regarding of releasing l-Sadi.
S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR) Lieutena Hamudi Hasan Al-Sadi possesses extensive,	ant General (Doctor Engineer) Amir
ntelligence, and result of his detention.	essential elements of as the
S.// Given no	o information regarding the conditions
f any, for his release, or regarding plans for contro	

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(U) In his memoir, *The Greatest Threat*, p. 81, Mr. Richard Butler, Chief UNSCOM inspector, stated the following about the Iraqi BW program:

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"We reviewed all this in a technical-level meeting I attended with UNSCOM experts and the Iraqis in charge of the biological weapons program. I then discussed the issue in a private session with Aziz. In the technical meeting, the Iraqi in charge, General Amir Sadhi, had told me that the reason their biological weapons program had been so 'tiny and ineffective' was that Iraq had lacked the expertise to make it better (clearly implying that they would have happily made it bigger and better if they could). He was lying about the scope of the program, of course, and his audacity in frankly admitting that he wished it had been greater was appalling."

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) Al-Sadi acknowledges that	his
Ţ	oresence outside Iraq, and nto his own future plans.	his family wealth are variables that Al-Sadi mig	ht factor
	into mis own future prans.		
		ismatic, and is uncompromising in his position w	He
I	ntelligence Community w	In this regard, a number of loose ends rewould like to resolve with respect to his statemen	ts.

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