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| | "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the we threats before they emerge." | orst |
| | President George W. Bush (during a spring 2002 address to West Point graduates) | |
| | Executive Summary | |
| | Problem: | |
| | In the War on Terrorism, the USG has detained or are planning to detain numerous unlawful combatants (DUCS) whom we believe have direct knowledge of Al-Qa'ida's plans to harm the United States and its citizens. These DUCS have varished skills in countering interrogation ranging from no training to highly sophisticated train counter-interrogation. Direct access to these DUCS provides the USG with a united opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence to disrupt Al-Qa'ida's plans, and confirm their worst threats before the threats emerge. The Directorate of Science and Technology's Office of Technical Service (OTS) stands ready to assist CTC with developing and deploying an advanced interrogation capability to exploit DUCS in currently in custody as well as future detainees. | ied aining que |
| | Requirement: | |
| : | The USG needs to obtain a higher volume of relevant, actionable intelligence from DUCS, and to obtain this intelligence faster than current capability permits. If cannot exploit DUCS faster than current capability permits, then we risk missing hi valuable, time sensitive intelligence that could prevent another disastrous terrorist at against the Homeland. The recent Pedilla apprehension validates the logic of our proposal. | we ghly |
| . · | In our discussions with CTC, the number of currently held DUCS and those are being targeted for capture is substantial and beyond the Agency's current capaci exploit. In addition to the referenced request from CTC/ Appendix A contain additional listing of terrorists who believe have actionable intelligence and thus methreshold for interrogation now. | ty to ns an |
| | OTS Action: | |
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The Office of Technical Service and the Directorate of Science and Technology stands ready to assist CTC with developing, training and deploying the advanced interrogation capability outlined in this document. Specific support includes:

- Assisting CTC's Renditions Group (CTC/RG) to develop an interrogation program;
- Facilitating the smooth transfer of OTS/OAD's interrogation support to CTC/RG;
- Identifying staff officers who have the skills to perform interrogation; and
- Provide long-term assistance by performing

on DUCS.

Legai:

(Principles and guidelines for our authority to conduct interrogation)

Policy Issues:

(Suggested level of briefing, update DOI's and public policy)

Due to the potential legal, policy and political issues associated with CIA conducting interrogation, this function should be centralized within CIA. CTC/RG was recently tasked by C/CTC to take the lead on interrogations. The Agency's authority for interrogating DUCS under CIA control derives from our mandate to collect actionable intelligence. An updated DOI outlining the DO's authorities, including those delegated to the COB, should be a made a priority.

Our baseline guidance defining acceptable interrogation techniques originates with the legal interpretation outlined above and DoD/JPRA's training MO. Part of JPRA's formal policy is to have a qualified SERE Psychologist monitor the interrogation process to insure an interrogator does not exceed his/her authorities. Proper training on the legal and policy issues associated with the Agency's interrogation program must be made mandatory for all officers associated with this effort: Ensuring that an interrogator does not exceed the policy constraints or the legal definition of torture must be a primary management focus. Specific targets for our interrogation teams will be those DUCS who use resistance and counter-interrogation techniques, and whom we believe possess specific, time sensitive threat information against the United States, its citizens, and other countries.

Capability:

CTC, with the assistance of the Office of Medical Services, Office of Security, Office of Technical Services and various Mission Support Offices employs a highly talented team that is currently interrogating a senior Al-Qa'ida terrorist Abu Zubaydah;

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| Zubaydah is employing refined-counter-interrogation techniques. CTC's team is implementing SERE based individualized psychological pressures to counter Zubaydah's resistance, with some success, to obtain the actionable intelligence from him. The team expects that another six months will be needed to fully debrief Zubaydah. The resources dedicated to this task are substantial and include the following: interrogators; | SERE based individualized psychological pressures to counter Zubaydah's th some success, to obtain the actionable intelligence from him. The team nother six months will be needed to fully debrief Zubaydah. The resources | |
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| training program provide our officers with some experience in Al-Qa'ida's | am provide our officers with some experience in Al-Qa'ida's | ٠. |
| counter-interrogation techniques as well as emphasize the fundamentals of developing an interrogation plan. The broad strategy of any interrogation plan begins with isolating the | | |
| DUCS; assessing individual DUCS' vulnerabilities; building an interrogation plan based | | |
| then executing the interrogation (which may last several months). Appendix B outlines a recommend curriculum. | | |
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| | Current and projected requirements indicate that at least two additional |
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| | interrogation teams are needed to work against those DUCS trained in |
| | counter-interrogation methods. Each CIA team will receive the interrogation |
| | |
| | methodology training and will deploy to the field together. Since the interrogation |
| | methodology and psychological pressures used against each DUCS is individually |
| | tailored, the skills possessed by experienced SERE psychologists and interrogators will |
| | be key to designing each individualized interrogation strategy. The personnel comprising |
| | each team will come from CIA's staff officer and contractor base. The core and matrixed |
| | team compositions are: |
| | |
| | Core Team |
| | Team Chief (Dual Role of COB when deployed) |
| | SERE trained psychologists with resistance to interrogation |
| | expertise |
| | • interrogators |
| • | |
| | At least FBI Special Agent to assist in the interrogation process |
| | (this SA should receive training in CIA's methodology prior to being |
| | deployed with the team) |
| | Physician |
| | Physician Assistance |
| | |
| | Officer's Matrixed into the Core Team* |
| | |
| | •interpreters (if required)** |
| | Office of Security Officers** Andrew |
| | Subject matter experts - Analysts |
| | • staff communications officers |
| | admin/logistics officer |
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| | CIA needs to train in interrogation methods, to give our forward deployed |
| | officers the skills required to triage DUCS by recognizing advanced counter-interrogation |
| | resistance techniques, and to interrogate those terrorist suspects or DUCS who are |
| | employing low-level resistance techniques. At first, assigned to areas where DUCS |
| | could be detained would be the first to receive this training. Eventually, all should |
| | receive this same training. CTC is working with DoD/JPRA to training the next |
| | group of officers deployed to in basic interrogation techniques. To ensure |
| | that the interrogation standards used by individual officers and the teams are consistent, |
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| one entity should manage the training. We recommend that CTC/RG mana training. | ge the | |
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| This memorandum was coordinated with CTC/RG, CTC/UBL, CTC | C/I canl OMS | |
| the Office of Security and DST/Legal. | O/Legal, Olvis, | • |
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Appendix B

Curriculum

Sources: Jim Mitchell, PhD Bruce Jessen, PhD Tate, Inc. DoD/JPRA

- 1. All members should first be trained to resist interrogation. This would provide team members with perspective on what it is like to be held captive and provide them with experience using the techniques likely to be employed against them. In essence, this would provide a users perspective. In my view, this block should include a classroom portion and a lab where team members could gain experience applying these techniques in a realistic, but safe, controlled environment. The topics covered should include a review of resistance techniques, strategies for employing these techniques, the psychological aspects of captivity, methods of covert communication used in captivity situations, and assessing captors.
- 2. Members should then be familiarized the specific resistance strategies and techniques likely to be employed by al-Qa'ida. This block of training would draw on what we know from captured manuals and our experience here. It would include a review of the strategies and techniques included in their training programs, psychological aspects of their resistance training, and the influence of Arab culture on the employment of resistance techniques.
- 3. Members should also be trained to recognize and develop countermeasures for resistance techniques. This block would build on previous training and focus on strategies and techniques for assessing the vulnerabilities and strengths of individual detainees, developing interrogation strategies tailored to the vulnerabilities, strengths and resistance strategies employed by specific detainees, the effects of different questioning techniques on resistance, use of psychological pressures, and assessing the effectiveness of countermeasure efforts.

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| | Appendix C |
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| • | Roles and Responsibilities: |
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| • | Toom Chief The team ship Swill be removed to few the assembly served and |
| | Team Chief - The team chief will be responsible for the overall management and |
| | supervisory duties for the team and, when deployed, will act as Chief of Base for the |
| • | interrogation facility. The Team Chief is responsible for the interrogation plan. |
| • | |
| | SERE Psychologists – The SERE Psychologist will be responsible for: |
| | Assessing the psychological profile of the detained unlawful combatant |
| | and will develop, direct and monitor the psychological pressures placed upon the |
| | subject. |
| | Assist the COB with conducting mission shift briefs |
| - | Instruct interrogators on implementation of the psychological pressures |
| | associated with the interrogation plan |
| | |
| | Conduct daily mission briefs with and submit daily on the |
| | behavior of the subject |
| | |
| | Interrogators — The interrogators will be responsible for: |
| • | Interrogating the subject based upon the interrogation plan |
| | Make recommendations to the team to enhance the interrogation plan |
| | Draft the intelligence collected during the interrogation |
| | |
| | FBI Special Agent – The SA will be responsible for: |
| • | Conducting any law enforcement related interrogations of the subject |
| | Be an impartial observer from another USG agency |
| | As needed, conducts interrogations related to collecting actionable |
| | intelligence and then drafts the intelligence collected during the session |
| • | mremberice sugmen disits me mienisence conected dating me session |
| | 7. Title 1. 1 |
| | ,Physician - The physician will be responsible for: |
| | Monitoring and providing medical care to the subject at the level |
| •• | necessary to maintain the subjects health. |
| • | Provide medical care to the team, as necessary |
| | Provide medical consultation to the team |
| | • |
| | Physician Assistant - The physician Assistant will be responsible for: |
| | Assisting the Physician with the duties described above |
| | During the absence of the physician, provide care to the subject and the |
| | team. |
| | , bounds |
| | Interpretary. The Interpretary will be recognished for |
| | Interpreter – The Interpreter will be responsible for: |
| | Interpreting all dialog between interrogators and subject as well as guard |
| | staff and physician |
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