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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP BAGHDAD, IRAQ APO AE 09342

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013

5 June 2004

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| MEMORANDUM FOR: ATTENDEES OF IC LEAD | DERSHIP VTC | | | |
| SUBJECT: Joint Intelligence Debriefing Centre Co | irrent Capabilities | | | |
| 1. Following discussions at the Pol/Mil team meet the tasking on the resources of the Joint Intelligence I the following information from (JIDC loading and the resources they have to address them. I 4 th June 2004) 252 active SDR's that it can be reasonal many of these SDR's are for multiple sources so, in resources they have to address them. In the June 2004 active SDR's that it can be reasonal many of these SDR's are for multiple sources so, in resource that many SDRs are interviews to answer a single SDR. These are predomit to organizational structure and operating procedures. | Debriefing Centre (JIDC), I have gleaned Collection Manager) as to the current SDR in summary, there are currently (as of noon, ably expected to collect against. However, reality this would entail 374 debriefings. | | | |
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| 3. The situation above does not allow time for drafting IIRs resulting from the interviews which take far more time than the interviews themselves. If you factor this in, then the number of interviews conducted must be reduced dramatically. As previously stated, these figures are current today, should any further SDRs be submitted, then they too will have to be factored into the equation. This statement does not take into account the situation regarding War Crimes issues or the priority system employed at the ISG, which by their very nature impose further restrictions on debriefing operations. | | | | |
| | Political/Military Team SIA | | | |
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