

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1" or Linked To Source(s): (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview Notes 7/12/05" - 96 of 7882 (1.2%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones

Created: 2/25/2009 3:36:20 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, because he used to work at Hostage Rescue Team (which, like Behavioral Analysis Unit is part of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, he knew (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who used to be a Hostage Rescue Team guy, and knew the names of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 11:30-12:04
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said when he first started his HQ position he reported to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who was within Counter Terrorism Division - FBI and then to Andrew G. Arena, and then Pasquale D'Amuro	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 15:00, 15:56, 16:04
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was present at a VTC at which the military claimed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had agreed to its interrogation plan for (b)(1) (b)(1) using "Fear Up" and "U.S. Army (b)(5) tactics against him -- when it fact it had disagreed (b)(1) said it might have been at the same VTC at which he stated the Department of Defense had not obtained intell from (b)(1) (b)(1) beyond what Federal Bureau of Investigation had obtained using tradiotnal law enforcement tactics, or a different one.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 43:55-45:30
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said at some point (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) expressed concern about where they thought the Department of Defense's interrogation of (b)(1) (b)(1) may have been heading, or the amount of pressure they believed Department of Defense was going to apply to this detainee, could have been problematic.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 47:55-48:15
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that it was not Federal Bureau of Investigation policy to put detainees through sleep deprivation, so we don't do it and we don't participate in it if others do it.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 56:20
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(B) says that "participation," for purposes of the rule that Federal Bureau of	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	<p>Determined Investigation does not participate in interrogation tactics beyond what it is authorized to do, means "sitting in the room, participating in the interrogation, posing questions." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says "I guess" it also means sitting in the observation room, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) observations of interrogation of (b)(1) were strictly to try to exert a moderating influence, a "safety net," to say, stop, this isn't working."</p>	I at 56:30-57:16
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says, at some point, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) bowed out of the Department of Defense's interrogation of (b)(1) saying, in effect, "if you guys want to do business this way, we are not going to be a part of it."</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 57:25
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says his opinion is that the aggressive techniques are not effective b/c the detainee will tell you what you want to hear to remove the stress, strain, discomfort.</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 59:20
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) wanted to know what he (and others) should do when they were exposed to these techniques, and he said that Andrew G. Arena and he traveled to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and spoke to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) possibly (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was there as well, and Andrew G. Arena's advice was, don't participate, can give advice on what has worked in the past for Federal Bureau of Investigation and provide behavior analysis of what is going on -- this could include a judgment of "is he is being forthright or is he lying? --" but beyond that, stay away from it. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said exactly where the line falls in terms of even that level of participation may be up to the individual, how to apply the general "do not participate" policy.</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:06:54 - 1:08:05
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was read 018223 (think this is not the right bates), an e-mail from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in which (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) wrote: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was advised of the above [the plan to take (b)(1) to (b)(1) and subject him to 20-hour interrogation sessions] and asked to provide guidance to us as the Defense Humint Services wanted us to be part of the interrogation teams. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said as long as there was no 'torture' involved that we were within our guidelines (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) actually encouraged us to be a part of this as we would be able to provide Headquarters (FBI) with 'updates' of what was happening. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he thought he had given (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) guidance to that effect.</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:09:00 - 1:09:52.
To Be Determined	<p>(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that "it would be nice to have something in writing" from an under secretary of Defense that a particular interrogation technique is truly authorized, but the issue becomes the relationship with the military if the Federal Bureau of Investigation</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:12:06 - 1:13:03

	always asks for written proof that a technique is authorized. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said Federal Bureau of Investigation is trying to foster good relations and partnership with the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies and it is a fine line to walk if Federal Bureau of Investigation is perceived as "telling" on these other entities.	
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says you have to recognize "where the US was" at the time (b)(1) was being interrogated: he said that in response to Pearl Harbor the US dropped atomic weapons on Japan; in 9/11, the US lost about the same number of lives. So you have to put yourself in the position of where the USG was at the time. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that people were trying to do what was right at the time, but what was right at the time may not be right today, and we should recognize that.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:14:10-1:14:40
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says, in reference to 018228 (email from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) re. interrogation of (b)(1) that details "sleep deprivation, loud music, bright lights, and "body placement discomfort"), that he believed all these techniques were approved by Donald Rumsfeld (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he may have seen the authorization in writing or may have learned this during a meeting with Andrew G. Arena and either Michael E. Dunleavy or General Geoffrey D. Miller were present, during which Andrew G. Arena expressed his dissatisfaction or disapproval of some of these methods, and the Commanding General said we'll just agree to disagree, and that "I have my marching orders from the Secretary of Defense, you've got your orders from the Attorney General, we are all here to try to win the war on terrorism so we are going to try to play fair in the sandbox."	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:15:40-1:17:55
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) raised a legal concern via an e-mail he sent to me and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:18:11
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he is familiar with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) "Legal Analysis" document. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he recalls that the plan was to try various things and then if it didn't work to move on to the next category.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:20:45, 1:21:18
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not recall what we told (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in response to his concerns other than, if there is a plan in place, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) then declined to elaborate because of classification issues, specifically (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:24:00, 1:25:10, 1:26:42
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes that, in response to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Legal Analysis Memo,	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview

Determined	which contained an urgent request for guidance, we talked to him and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) about it, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) met with David Nahmias and asked him to tell him what was considered torture under the Constitution, and he said he may have shared with David Nahmias (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Legal Analysis or the actual interrogation plan for (b)(1)	1 at 1:22:27-1:23:50
To Be Determined	(b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, in response to his request to David Nahmias to define what is torture under the Constitution (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes David Nahmias may have said "cruel and inhumane" though (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not recall exactly what he said. The conversation would have been as a side bar during a meeting to discuss something else, and the conversation would have been like, David Nahmias asked (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) what was going on at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) would have mentioned the issues raised by (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and asked, what is Department of Justice's position? Can you get with Department of Defense OGC on this? It would be nice to clarify this, etc. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) think he may have given Nahmias a copy of the plan and that David Nahmias may have approach (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) or Department of Defense OGC with this.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:31:30 - 1:34:40
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, in sum, he did receive statements of concerns from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and others; the advice back was, don't participate in non law enforcement techniques; then (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) received from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) concerns that went beyond that, namely, what do we do when we are exposed to these techniques? (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he would then raise those concerns with Andrew G. Arena and David Nahmias -- is this something we need to be concerned about? And the answer back was uniformly, stay away from that, and we'll take it up with the Department of Defense's general counsel's office -- specifically, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks, within SOLIC -- Special Operations Low Intensity Conflicts.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:35 - 1:36:05, 1:36:38
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he conferred with Marion E. "Spike" Bowman regarding certain issues, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks he spoke more with Department of Justice (pz -- David Nahmias) than Marion E. "Spike" Bowman.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:37:10-1:37:30
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) assumed that Andrew G. Arena would have shared these issues with the AD (Pasquale D'Amuro), who had the discretion to decide to share them with the Director.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 1:38:00 - 1:38:35
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said there may have been a couple of meetings on (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Determined	(b)(1) at which (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was present. The meetings were not designed to be about (b)(1) interrogation tactics, but about what investigative info we had on him.	I at 1:38:55 - 1:39:25
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he didn't think (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) knew about the particular interrogation tactics used against (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:39:57
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was aware of the use of some tactics that were more aggressive than the Federal Bureau of Investigation would have used, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have raised these issues with Department of Defense OGC.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:40:23
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) attended some meetings related to detainee policy.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:40:49
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says Nahmias and I were in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) were there, and they may have raised their concerns with David Nahmias directly	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 1:44:06
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) recalls video teleconference discussing (b)(1) interrogation plan and David Nahmias was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba participating in the video teleconference from there. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that during the video t/c, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) presented the the Department of Defense's plan. Central Intelligence Agency OGC was present via video. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Pentagon also present (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) maybe (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Dr (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) gave an explanation of all the information he got using his interrogation practices (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) speaks up and says, "look, everything you've gotten thus far is what Federal Bureau of Investigation gave you on (b)(1) from its paper investigation. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the conversation got heated, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he agreed with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) both that the info he presented was given to him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that his methods were not effective, not providing positive intell. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the meeting ended because of the controversy. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says Nahmias agreed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's position about what were effective interrogation tactics and what would be the most useful should there be any legal process, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks Nahmias said so during the video teleconference.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview I at 1:44:30 - 1:47:15 - 1:48:10, 1:49:00- 1:49:35
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes the issue of whether certain of the proposed interrogation	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview

Determined	techniques were lawful was not discussed during the video telephone conference.	I at 1:51:15
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes (b)(1) could eventually be tried in a US	(b)(6),(b)(7) Interview
Determined	courtroom and these methods would be a huge problem legally because they were coercive.	I at 1:54:40
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he saw General Geoffrey D. Miller's signature of (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Determined	(b)(1) interrogation plan, so he had some comfort it was all authorized, but he thought that was pretty suspect to have a two star general sign off on the plan that, realistically, would have gone to the Donald Rumsfeld to approve.	I at 1:56:55 - 1:59:00
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he made David Nahmias aware of the details of the proposed harsh	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Determined	interrogation plans for (b)(1) and that David Nahmias said, don't participate, but you can still stay there.	I at 1:59:25
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he recalls email from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to him (No. 018154).	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
Determined		I at 2:01:33
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the reference in 018154 to his meeting at 16:00 is a meeting between	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview
Determined	and David Nahmias and possibly Andrew G. Arena to discuss the situation involving the interrogation of (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) view was that, if the Federal Bureau of Investigation pulled out of all involvement with the interrogation of (b)(1) it may as well leave U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba altogether.	I at 2:02:40, 2:04:50
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said David Nahmias told him that the information about who (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
Determined	(b)(1) (b)(5) and the question was whether there was any interest in prosecuting this guy, and the answer back was that there was no interest in ever prosecuting this guy, he would never see the inside of a courtroom.	I at 2:06:00 - 2:08:05
To Be	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says David Nahmias told him he raised the issue of the lack of efficacy of	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview
Determined	Department of Defense's interrogation plan of (b)(1) to DOD-OGC, that more effective methods should be used, and the answer back was that he is Department of Defense's detainee, Federal Bureau of Investigation is a guest at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has expressed its view, and Donald Rumsfeld will decide how to proceed because, ultimately, (b)(1)	I at 2:08:55-2:11:15

	(b)(1) belongs to him and Department of Defense, not John Ashcroft and Department of Justice.	
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said David Nahmias told him David Nahmias also raised these concerns about the methods Department of Defense used on (b)(1) up the chain," but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) does not know the details of those communications -- to what level, and where it went.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:12:46
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the IP for (b)(1) calling for rapport-building, gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation only five days to do the rapport building before moving on to phase II -- (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said this was "ridiculous." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he wanted military to know it would take more time.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview Notes 7/12/05 at p. 19
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he forwarded various info to Marion E. "Spike" Bowman re. Department of Defense techniques	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview Notes 7/12/05 at p. 20
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explained that, contrary to his questionnaire answers, he had been deployed about ten times overseas zones at which detainees were being held from 7/2002 to 12/2004. He said he could obtain exact info by reference to his travel vouchers at a later time.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:15:32
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he was involved in forwarding questions to be asked of detainees to US intelligence agencies, which would then ask the questions, and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, because of classification issues, he couldn't say whether those questions were posed during interrogation sessions at which coercive tactics were used.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:18:00 - 2:19:00
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that the policy "is and was" that if any Federal Bureau of Investigation employee observed unlawful abusive or coercive interrogation, he or she should tell their supervisor of a problem. He also said that, if someone came to him with such a concern, he certainly passed it on to his superiors or David Nahmias because it wasn't his position to filter such concerns, but rather to be a messenger.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:22:00, 2:25:10
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he was not aware of any written policy governing what Federal Bureau of Investigation employees were supposed to do if they observed detainee treatment that was inappropriate until the May 19 2004 EC, but that in meetings with Frankie Battle and T.J. Harrington, he was also told bring those things to their attention.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:22:00, 2:26:00-2:27:12
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he answered "do not recall" for some of his responses to the questionnaire, including 19, because a truthful answer went beyond the "secret" and there	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:33:00

	was no room to indicate that on the form.	
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he had weekly meetings with David Nahmias from about May 2002, when (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) first took this position, to 2003. The general purpose of these meetings was NOT to discuss treatment of detainees, but rather, to ensure Department of Justice was in the loop on intell developments from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detainees that could affect possible criminal prosecutions or ongoing criminal investigations in the US. Andrew G. Arena was in these meetings. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 2:49:00 - 2:50:00, 3:08:45
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided to David Nahmias, in addition to the 11/22/02 EC, earlier e-mails from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) setting out his concerns, in the Federal Bureau of Investigation weekly meetings with David Nahmias. Department of Justice, either Nahmias or (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had liaison with Department of Defense, and they would have provided this info to Department of Defense. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said there was no follow up with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) contemporaneous of the sort that took place in the Spring of 2004 (he was interviewed, etc), because there was no directive from the Department of Justice or from Office of the General Counsel - FBI to go back and do such follow up. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, probably what triggered the follow up in the Spring of 2004, was that the Abu G scandal made people think about what had been going on back in 2002 and made the light bulb go off and made people realize, "hmm, that could be problematic." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) also said he asked David Nahmias what Department of Defense's response was about the concerns in (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) emails and EC, and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could not recall David Nahmias's response. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) later said he did not think he ever got any info back from David Nahmias or (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) "OK, Federal Bureau of Investigation, here's your marching orders," but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was certain Department of Defense was made aware of the concerns.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 2:53:00 - 2:54:35, 2:55:20, 3:05:50, 3:12:40
To Be Determined	In response to question about Office of the Inspector General's possible recommendations coming out of the review, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says it would greatly help Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Defense if someone would clearly and specifically define what is torture, what is inhumane, what is cruel, etc.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 3:04:00
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he thinks David Nahmias mentioned to him that Department of Justice had prepared something in writing to Department of Defense about interrogation tactics -- along the lines of some of these things we think do not need to be going on, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 3:14:25

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is not sure.	
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says there were guidelines governing sleep adjustment/disruption for use at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says this was common knowledge	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 3:33:35-3:34:40
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he observed (b)(1) via video when he was in isolation in the Navy brig, and he was hallucinating from the lack of any human interaction.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 3:36:15
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, once (b)(1) was moved out of the Navy Brig, he was put into (b)(1) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) went to (b)(1) and they decided to use a softer approach.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 3:44:00
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said Federal Bureau of Investigation had learned some significant info about (b)(1) and had a keen interest in him; as soon as that happened, he became an "icon" at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and other entities wanted to interrogate him for their own reasons. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he was told, after the fact, that (b)(1) was taken up in a helicopter and threatened to be pushed out if he didn't admit to being Al Qaida and describe his cell -- in a plan approved by General Geoffrey D. Miller -- and (b)(1) urinated and defecated on himself. Thinks (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have later told him, no, it didn't happen, though they may have taken him in a helicopter and flew him around	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 3:47:12 - 3:50:00
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he believed they did shave (b)(1) head and beard as part of his interrogation. [LMB question - Who is "they"?]	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:08:48
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says someone may have described to him a situation in which a female interrogator showed her breast to a detainee or putting it on or around a detainee. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) guesses because she thought it would cause the detainee mental discomfort. [LMB questions - What is "it"?; Where?] (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have mentioned that to Frankie Battle or someone else; it could have been done to (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:10:10 - 4:11:40
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that someone told him that someone had taken Wesson oil, claiming it was pig's oil, and rubbing a detainee with it because the detainees' hated anything coming from a pig. [LMB question - Where?]	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:12:10
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he did not believe Department of Defense would have had any authority (b)(1)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:14:20

	(b)(1)		
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that Office of the Inspector General really should interview (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) not just because (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) had grave disagreements with, but in the interests of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice and the 240 million people who live in this country.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:16:00 - 4:18:30
	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that there was no "dissension in the ranks" between Counter Terrorism Division - FBI and Military Liaison and Detainee Unit in . There was a "gallant effort at cooperation" between the two units. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said, in trying to do the right thing to handle the situation. For example (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he thinks after (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) wrote his 11/22/02 EC, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) told him the people to whom (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) should send it	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:28:50
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said certain Behavioral Analysis Unit agents were more excitable, like (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) would check in with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) when (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) received info from Behavioral Analysis Unit folks to see what (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) take was, as Behavioral Analysis Unit worked for (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:29:30
	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he had daily interaction re. these issues with Frankie Battle, who succeeded Raymond S. Mey. who succeeded Arthur M. Cummings, who succeeded Andrew G. Arena. The two individuals who had the most knowledge were Frankie Battle and Andrew G. Arena.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:32:10 - 4:34:11
	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said his first AD was Pasquale D'Amuro, who probably had the most intimate knowledge of his successors; he was followed by Larry A. Mefford, John S. Pistole, and then Gary M. Bald. After Pasquale D'Amuro, John S. Pistole had the next most knowledge and had more continuity because he was DAD under Larry A. Mefford and Pasquale D'Amuro.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:36:20 - 4:37:25
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he had pretty regular interaction with T.J. Harrington; (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said T.J. Harrington was in the loop of most of the things that happened. [LMB question - Where?]	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:37:29 - 4:37:56
	To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) knew a lot about these issues, at least from the time he started, so other things he just had learned about afterwards. [LMB question - Where?]	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:38:00

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he believed that some of his ADs or the DAD briefed Robert S. Mueller, III on some of these issues. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says Chuck Rosenberg, who was special assistant to Robert S. Mueller, III, may have "hit me up" a few times for info for Robert S. Mueller, III.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:39:15
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he interacted with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) on a regular basis. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he may have had one or two meetings where Michael Chertoff was present, at which Alice Fisher was also present. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was friendly with Alice Fisher. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he never briefed her on interrogation tactics or policies, but may have spoken with her one time about how Michael E. Dunleavy was running U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and, does he know what he is doing. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks Alice Fisher may have gone to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba once.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:40 - 4:43:30
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he thinks the USG has done the best it can under the circumstances (of dealing with the detainees).	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:47:25
To Be Determined	Re the May 10, 2004 e-mail from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Ding Laura Parsky, David Nahmias, Alice Fisher & Bruce Swartz, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the e-mail might be a little misleading in that it could be read to suggest that the four were all in weekly meetings on these issues; (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said David Nahmias was the one he met with frequently, could have been weekly, Alice Fisher on occasion attended the International Terrorism Operations Section I meetings, maybe (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) also attended and others from Department of Justice CT, and Bruce Swartz went with David Nahmias and I to the Policy Coordinating Committee detainee policy meetings at the National Security Council. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the issue detainee treatment never arose during these meetings, but rather, informally, in the car on the way over, for example. In response to question whether Policy Coordinating Committee detainee policy meetings would have been the forum for ironing out the dispute between FBI/DOJ and Department of Defense re. treatment of detainees, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said, no, those meetings were for other issues like foreign policy -- how get detainees to go to other countries, to get them to build prisons for them..	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 4:49:45 - 4:53:00
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that Federal Bureau of Investigation had never done anything like U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. -- Federal Bureau of Investigation sitting in front of captured real live terrorists. Also different because military detainees in that, no lawyer present, fresh off the battlefield, but still doing what the Federal Bureau of Investigation had	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 5:11:08 - 5:13:45

	always done. Also, big difference in that DOJ/FBI interviews normally done in context of possible criminal trial; not so military.	
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he thought a lot of SACs looked at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as a way to get their new agents a crash course in interrogation and terrorism. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 5:15:30
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that he, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sat down and drafted the 5/26/04 EC. He said it was drafted in response to questions "what are we allowed to do and not do?" post Abu G becoming public. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said there was a specific incident or person asking questions. After looking at the 5/19/2004 EC, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he "believed" the 5/26/04 EC was in response to the 5/19 "because there were some people who came out..." [pz: I question belief here because I think there are drafts of the 5/26 EC that pre-date the 5/19 EC; the 5/26 EC does not cite, quote, or discuss the 5/19 EC, nor set out guidance for how to apply or interpret the 5/19 EC, and I doubt there would have been time for read the 5/19 ec, communicate concerns about it, and for a new ec responsive to those concerns be drafted by 5/26. I think the 5/19 and 5/26 ECs were different branches off the same tree.] (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) could not recall what needed clarification from the 5/19/2004 EC.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 5:19:10
To Be Determined	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) aware that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was involved in some program. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he decided to pull him back home because he was concerned with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) well being, as other Federal Bureau of Investigation employees had called me and told me they were also concerned. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) interview I at 5:40:00
??/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said his understanding from HQ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was that Robert S. Mueller, III visited U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in early 2002 and was very unhappy with the way it was organized and structured, as it was being administered from the Miami Field Office, so Robert S. Mueller, III decided that it could be better managed out of Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ so that, per (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Robert S. Mueller, III could "have his hand on the pulse of the operation." (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explained that Robert S. Mueller, III wanted to be able to have immediate access to info and get answers to his questions re. U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba quickly, and that he sometimes would stop by the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba task force and ask "what's going on at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba" -- couldn't do that if things were run out of Miami. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I 17:13-17:35, 18:25, 18:44, 22:08-30.
??/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the other individuals in the Director's office who were involved were	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview

	Pasquale D'Amuro, Chuck Rosenberg (now in the DAG's office, then Special Assistant to Robert S. Mueller, III).	I 21:25- 21:40
??/??/2002	(PS) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he then asked for the calling card platform of Mohammed Atta and his calling card had made calls to the 9/11 financier, right around the time (b)(1) flight arrived, then another right right (b)(1) was stopped by INS -- calls from a pay phone 40 feet away. In sum, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explains how he basically discovers several links between (b)(1) and the hijackers.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 28:00 - 30:58
??/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that, as a result of determining (b)(1) connection with 9/11 plot, his stock "rose higher than anyone else at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 31:16
05/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that on 5/2002 he took a HQ position in Counter Terrorism Division - FBI to help organize investigative efforts at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, replacing (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who had served TDY. He said this was initially called the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba task force and roughly eight months later Military Liaison and Detainee Unit was organized and structured.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 14:06; 15:25
07/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says that in July 2002, he received a call from INS, which had been working with Criminal Justice Information Services Division in analyzing fingerprints, telling him that there is a detainee -- (b)(1) -- in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba who tried to enter the country through Miami in August 2001. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) found this disturbing -- this detainee had come through Orlando, like many of the 9/11 hijackers, so I asked for the travel pattern of several of the hijackers and found that it matched what (b)(1) had done per his travel documents.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 26:09, 26:43,
07/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was back and forth to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba repeatedly within the time period from July 2002 to September 2002.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 41:00
08/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he collected sufficient info that he made a presentation to the Director's Office re. (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he then tells U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC, either (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) or (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and directed him to share the info with military counterparts (Gen. Dunleavy not Gen. General Geoffrey D. Miller.). That was about 1 week after the Director presentation.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 31:56, 32:25, 34:52-35:04

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	<p>08/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says in Aug 2002, there were only a few agents in Afghanistan. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) came to me and asked if it was worth it to have agents there. I said yes. He met with Pasquale D'Amuro and Andrew G. Arena and they decided I should go with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to do an evaluation and we came back with yes, we should be there. We gave a written document to Pasquale D'Amuro, maybe even a note. *</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 5:28:22 - 5:30:05
	<p>09/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says the military's initial response to learning about the identity of (b)(1) was to increase the pressure on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to get info from him.</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 39:45
	<p>09/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during the August-September, 2002 time period [pz: timeframe seems wrong -- he said it was AFTER Gen. MillerG took command], with David Nahmias, for a presentation of updated intelligence obtained from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- Gen General Geoffrey D. Miller and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who ran the interrogations function at the time in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and David Nahmias in the back -- to the Pentagon (with Dr. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(1) via videophone. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) claimed to have obtained intelligence using the Department of Defense's new interrogation tactics, when in fact he was just repeating info Federal Bureau of Investigation already had obtained using investigative tactics. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 41:20 - 43:52
	<p>09/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said so during the VTC and things got somewhat heated. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said the way the military increased pressure on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to get info out of (b)(1) was by giving it a deadline for "getting the job done or we're moving in," i.e., get info or the military was taking over interrogation of (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said ultimately we were guests at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they were military detainees, we were there to gather intelligence and trying to produce fruitful information for our investigations in the US, and so, ultimately Department of Defense took control of his interrogation</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 47:20 - 47:44.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	<p>09/??/2002 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that as soon as the military knew of (b)(1) keen interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the military wanted to take a more aggressive approach to interrogating him and use interrogation methods on him that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believed, and that Behavioral Analysis Unit and Headquarters (FBI) believed, might produce information that was unreliable and what he, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believed would</p>	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview at 46:00 - 46:42

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

	probably be a problematic to use at a military tribunal or Article 3 prosecution.	
10/??/2002	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that he recalled speaking "a couple of times" by telephone to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and recalled receiving e-mails from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advising him of observations of the interrogation of (b)(1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled receiving 10/1/2002 e-mail from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (018224), which details the plan to put him back into (b)(1) and conduct 20-hour day interrogation sessions with successive teams of Defense Humint Services interrogators. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he believed he had advised Andrew G. Arena about the Behavioral Analysis Unit's concerns about the Department of Defense's methods, and that Behavioral Analysis Unit would back out of any participation in the interrogation plan, just continue to advocate for a rapport-based approach.	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Interview I at 48:20 - 50:15, 51:15-51:50
10/??/2002	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) says (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a task force member with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in San Francisco, was placed in a cell nearby to (b)(1) in (b)(1) as an undercover agent posing as a detainee (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a Christian Lebanese native Arabic speaker.	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Interview I at 52:22, 53:38
10/??/2002	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that, in response to concerns communicated from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and others to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and then from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to Headquarters (FBI), that Headquarters (FBI) was concerned and adamant that Federal Bureau of Investigation will not engage in any kind of tactics that go outside of the normal practices we would use in the US, and that was pretty much what we told all agents. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said we were there doing things we do in the US or outside the US -- there was no revision to Federal Bureau of Investigation policy about interviews. We were told to stay away from any tactics that were questionable, regarding what Department of Defense was doing, we were told not to participate in that.	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Interview I at 53:55 - 54:45
10/??/2002	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that Andrew G. Arena was concerned that the interrogations in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were not producing results that were conducive to investigations (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he and Arena were aware that Department of Defense was "putting these guys through sleep deprivation."	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Interview I at 55:15 - 55:35
11/??/2002	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he recalled receiving 000091 (11/22/02 EC). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the OSC at the time it was written. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that he discussed the contents of the EC, as well had on going dialogue re U.S. Naval Base	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Interview I at 2:41:40- 2:46:10

	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba issues generally, with Andrew G. Arena most, but also Larry A. Mefford and John S. Pistole	
11/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, in response to 000091, he believed David Nahmias took up the issues with DOD-OGC to ask if Department of Defense was going to investigate allegations of any inappropriate interrogation tactics. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that he may have given a copy of this EC to David Nahmias or discussed its contents with him, or that Andrew G. Arena may have done so. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he recalled deciding upon notifying Nahmias of the EC during a conversation with Andrew G. Arena. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) also said he was confident David Nahmias was aware of the details of the observations set out in the 11/22/02 EC – specifically sleep deprivation, duct tape on an individual's mouth, loud music, bright lights, growling dogs. "Oh yeah, Dave knew that." (b)(5)	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 2:47:20 - 2:48:13, 2:48:45, 2:56:30- 2:57:32
11/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) say (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) or someone from Behavioral Analysis Unit told him that one of the planned or actual techniques applied to (b)(1) was simulated drowning. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he told David Nahmias about this at the time, October-November 2002 timeframe. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) made it clear to David Nahmias that this was something that needed to be addressed, among other reasons, so that we could determine if Department of Defense was authorized to do this. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks Andrew G. Arena was aware of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) concerns about this particular technique and that he raised it with David Nahmias. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said he believed David Nahmias or someone else in the Department of Justice would contact Department of Defense to follow up with this. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said there was a sense of urgency in addressing this concern because we didn't believe it was appropriate.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 3:35:10, 3:37:32 - 3:41:00
11/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that, at some point, the (aggressive) interrogation of (b)(1) stopped. (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks the concerns about his interrogation reached Paul Wolfowitz or Donald Rumsfeld and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) thinks the concern was that, because this was being brought up by the Department of Justice, is the Federal Bureau of Investigation watching us?, and so that is when (b)(1) got pulled out of the Navy Brig and put into (b)(1). (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said it may have been coincidental, but it seemed to him that the aggressive interrogation tactics stopped in	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview 1 at 3:41:30 - 3:42:35, 3:45:25-3:46:08

	connection with Department of Justice raising concerns. Timeframe is about Oct-Nov. 2002	
12/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said it was roughly Dec. 2002 - Jan. 2003 that the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Task Force became Military Liaison and Detainee Unit. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 23:56
12/??/2002	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said it was around the time Military Liaison and Detainee Unit was formed that the following personnel changes were made: Pasquale D'Amuro was promoted to EAD of Counter Terrorism Division - FBI; Larry A. Mefford became AD for Counter Terrorism Division - FBI; Arthur M. Cummings replaced Andrew G. Arena as the Section Chief. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) transferred to Germany, ultimately replaced by Michael J. Heimbach (now section chief of International Terrorism Operations Section I).	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 24:05 -24:50
Tue 11/25/2003	Re. 11/25/2003 EC, documenting (b)(1) "helicopter ride," (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) says he may have known that a female TDY agent from Tampa FL (named (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)) had learned about the incident and started to write it up, and that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have advised (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to write it up in a more clear version and put it into an EC. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) said that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) came to him and said she was upset because (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) did not want her to do the EC, but (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) told her to go ahead and put down whatever she thought was appropriate on the EC.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 3:51:41-3:55:45, 4:26:32
Tue 07/12/2005	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) say (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is Federal Bureau of Investigation Point of Contact/liaison with (b)(1). (b)(1) says he sits over at (b)(1) HQ and reports to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI AD Willie T Hulon. *	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview I at 5:45 - 6:06
Fri 11/11/2005	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) explained he met with (b)(1) and Federal Bureau of Investigation POC with the (b)(1) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to prepare for his Office of the Inspector General interview.	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Interview at 5:15