

28 January 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for
Operations/Counterintelligence

FROM:



SUBJECT: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

1. (S) The scope of this investigation was to determine the cause of the November 2002 death of Gul RAHMAN, a member of Hezbi Islami, who was being detained at an

COBALT

prison facility known to CIA personnel as RAHMAN had been undergoing interrogation by CIA personnel,

COBALT

Information contained in this report regarding the background of as well as the treatment of detainees at is provided for background and context as it relates to the investigation of the death of Gul RAHMAN. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review, survey or inspection of the operational procedures at

COBALT



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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

COBALT

BACKGROUND ON

COBALT

2. (TS) [] is a prison located []

This prison, which became operational on [] September 2002, is designed to house high value terrorist targets during the screening and interrogation phase of their detention, and is viewed by [] Station as critical to Station's efforts to exploit these targets for intelligence and imminent threat information.^{2 3 4} [] was set up with isolation of the detainee being the primary goal. Each detainee's interaction with the outside world was intended to be limited to brief contact with the guards and more extensive contact with his CIA interrogators. This allows CIA personnel to control almost all aspects of the detainees' existence.⁵

COBALT

3. (TS) The construction of the prison was funded by CIA []

There are 20 cells located inside the prison [] The cells are stand-alone concrete boxes. []

[] All cells have a metal ring

- | | | |
|---|-----|-------------------------|
| 1 | [] | Sep 2002 (Attachment 1) |
| 2 | [] | Sep 2002 (Attachment 2) |
| 3 | [] | May 2002 (Attachment 3) |
| 4 | [] | Jun 2002 (Attachment 4) |
| 5 | [] | Jun 2002 (Attachment 5) |
| 6 | [] | Jun 2002 (Attachment 6) |
| 7 | [] | Oct 2002 (Attachment 7) |

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attached low to the wall to which prisoners are secured. Four of the cells have high bars that run between two walls to which prisoners can be secured. These four cells are designed for sleep deprivation.

The cellblock windows are covered with two coats of black paint and heavy curtains making the cellblock completely dark. Stereo speakers in the cellblock play constant music to prevent communications between detainees.^{8 9}

4. (TS) The prison is protected by guard force.¹⁰ guards protect the exterior of the facility guards are stationed in the interior of the building and handle the prisoners. interior guards are present almost constantly.

According to Station personnel, although the prison guards lack significant training, all are very professional in their duties. No station officer has ever witnessed or documented an instance of prisoner mistreatment by guard or witnessed any animosity by the guards toward the prisoners. No interrogator has ever seen or documented signs of physical abuse on any of the prisoners.

8	May 2002 (Attachment 8)
9	Oct 2002 (Attachment 9)
10	Jun 2002 (Attachment 10)
11	Sep 2002 (Attachment 11)
12	Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)
13	Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)
14	Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)

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According to COS [] the guards are very professional []

CIA Staff
Officer

For the most part, the guards are unaware of the identities of the prisoners. According to [] in some instances the prisoners have told the guards their identities []

¹⁵ According to [] the guards are not privy to information derived from the interrogations of the prisoners.¹⁶

COBALT

5. (TS) Since the establishment of [] Station has made an effort to provide training to the guards []

COBALT

With no exception, individuals interviewed stated that the guards treated prisoners well and "by-the-book," following all [] directions regarding the treatment and handling of prisoners. On [] June 2002, two and a half months prior to [] receipt of its first prisoner, Station cabled Headquarters outlining the need to provide comprehensive training to the [] guards in regard to their safe and secure handling of the prisoners, []

On [] June 2002, Headquarters concurred in principle with the need to adequately train []

On [] June 2002, Station sent a cable []

¹⁵ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

¹⁶ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)

[] Oct 2002 (Attachment 7)

[] Jun 2002 (Attachment 5)

[] Jun 2002 (Attachment 16)

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to Headquarters requesting that Headquarters identify staff personnel or independent contractors who could provide the training [redacted]²⁰ On 3 July 2002, Headquarters cabled [redacted] and notified them that they were still attempting to identify a training program, but had been unable to do so thus far.²¹ Some time between 3 July 2002 and 18 August 2002, the idea of using the US Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel to provide training to the [redacted] guard force was suggested. On [redacted] August 2002, [redacted] Station sent a cable to Headquarters stating the following regarding the guard force:

[redacted] Request update on the status of BOP personnel TDY [redacted] to train the [redacted] guards and prison staff. Station believes this training will be essential. given the near certainty that we will be called to account for our efforts at some future date; either within the USG or to the international community (through the ICRC.)" ²²

Some time between [redacted] September and the arrival of the first prisoner on [redacted] September 2002, [redacted] Station utilized its own resources to provide initial training for the interior [redacted] guards.

Station provided training to the guards on how to handle, move, restrain prisoners, lock them in cells, and handle them safely and securely.

[redacted] Between [redacted] August and [redacted] September 2002, Headquarters was able to make arrangements with the BOP to provide training in [redacted] guard force at [redacted] On [redacted] September 2002, [redacted] cabled Headquarters and noted that they looked forward to receiving a timeline for the TDY of BOP personnel

COBALT

²⁰ [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 17)

²¹ [redacted] Jul 2002 (Attachment 18)

²² [redacted] Aug 2002 (Attachment 19)

²³ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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indicating "sooner is better."²⁴ On [] November 2002, [] BOP officers arrived in [] and trained the [] guards from [] November. BOP instructors trained [] guards in restraint techniques, escort procedures, security checks, entrance procedures, cell searches, watch calls, and patdown searches. BOP also made a number of recommendations to improve the security of the prison.²⁵

6. (TS) [] prison guards are [] highly cooperative with [] personnel.

²⁸ The guards [] do whatever they are told to do by [] personnel, and often will not do anything until told to do so by [] personnel.²⁹ All activities that Station officers wish to undertake at the facility are fully supported and rapidly carried out by the guard force. [] stated, that although they will do anything he asks of them, nothing prevents the guards from taking independent action. If a guard noticed that a prisoner was cold, he could give the prisoner a blanket.³⁰ That said,

CIA Staff Officer

CIA Staff Officer

CIA Staff Officer

[] believed that the guards would take no independent action at that prison without permission from []. [] the [] guards [] does not want any of the prisoners to die, no matter how good or bad they are. He told the guards that this (ensuring the well being of the prisoner) was their responsibility.³¹ According to [] Station has recently made an effort to instill this responsibility in the guard force by appointing one of the

[] (Attachment 20)

[] (Attachment 21)

²⁶ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)²⁷ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

[] Sep 2002 (Attachment 11)

²⁹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)³⁰ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)³¹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 22)

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guards responsible for detainee safety. This particular guard, [] has been identified by Station personnel and BOP personnel as one of the best [] guards.³²

7. (S) Heating and cooling are problematic at the prison facility. There is no insulation in the building and no central heating or cooling. []

[] The facility is hot in the summer and cold in the winter. There are ceiling fans that help cool the facility in the summer. According to [] in late September 2002, Station purchased 10 electric heaters that were delivered in early October 2002. Five of the electric heaters were placed in the administrative section of the prison and five were placed in the guard shacks. They could not place any of the electrical heaters in the prisoner housing area []

CIA Staff
Officer

[] In mid-October 2002, five gas heaters were purchased and delivered sometime shortly thereafter. All five gas heaters were placed in the guard towers. In early November 2002, five more gas heaters were purchased and delivered at a later date. These heaters were placed in the housing area of the prison. These heaters were in place prior to RAHMAN's death. On [] November 2002, the day of RAHMAN's death, five more gas heaters were ordered and set up in the housing area circa [] November 2002. On [] November 2002, 15 more gas heaters were ordered and set up sometime in December 2002. Some were used to replace broken heaters.³⁴ According to [] there are approximately 15 gas heaters currently set up in the prisoner housing area.³⁵ [] has now placed a thermometer inside the housing area []

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OfficerCIA Staff
Officer

³² Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
³³ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
³⁴ Lotus Note from [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 23)
³⁵ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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CIA Staff Officer

[redacted] stated that he has requested that the guards record the temperatures in the housing area each day.³⁶

COBALT

8. (S) From the conception of [redacted] Headquarters and [redacted] Station have made efforts to ensure the physical health of the detainees. On [redacted] June 2002, [redacted] Station cabled Headquarters and stated the following:

"Station can support initial, non-emergency medical treatment with use of Station medics. [redacted]"

[redacted] Station has requested that a small medical room be constructed [redacted], so that detainees may receive medical care via visiting medical personnel within the facility."³⁷

³⁶ Interview of [redacted] 19 Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
³⁷ [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 24)
³⁸ [redacted] Jul 2002 (Attachment 25)

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[REDACTED]

Note: CIA was already funding the operation of the facility to include all prison expenses.

10. (S) According to [REDACTED] a CIA medical officer TDY to [REDACTED], at the end of August 2002, [REDACTED] had agreed to provide [REDACTED] physician to examine the prisoners. As of [REDACTED] November 2002, [REDACTED] has failed to do so. As a result, Station assumed by default the responsibility of taking care of the prisoner's health care needs. [REDACTED] stated that he first visited [REDACTED] on COBALT November 2002, shortly after his arrival for his second TDY to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that if a prisoner becomes ill, he and another Station medic go to [REDACTED] COBALT and treat them. [REDACTED] stated that his guidelines for treating the prisoners were vague and needed to be further defined. [REDACTED] stated that he called the Acting Chief of the Office of Medical Services, [REDACTED] (OMS [REDACTED]) and asked for guidance. [REDACTED] was told, "the Hippocratic Oath states that if someone is sick, you treat them."⁴⁰

11. (S) [REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] November 2002, provides a detailed outline of Station's medical support to the detainees at [REDACTED]. The cable is quoted below in its entirety: COBALT

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] STATION MEDICAL SUPPORT TO
DETAINEES [REDACTED]

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

[REDACTED] Aug 2002 (Attachment 26)

⁴⁰ Interview of [REDACTED] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)

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2. [] STATION MEDICAL PERSONNEL PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIA RENDITIONS AND [] DETAINEE PROGRAMS. [] MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE ALL [] PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS OR NURSE PRACTITIONERS. ONE TO TWO [] PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TDY [] AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

3. [] STANDARD RENDITION PROCEDURE REQUIRES THAT ONE MEDICAL OFFICER PARTICIPATE IN ALL RENDITIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THREEFOLD. FIRST, TO ENSURE THAT THE DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE ANY ITEMS CONCEALED ON HIS PERSON WHICH MIGHT BE USED AS A WEAPON (THROUGH A COMPLETE FULL-BODY AND CAVITY SEARCH). SECOND, TO DETERMINE THE INITIAL MEDICAL CONDITION OF THE DETAINEE; AND THIRD, TO STABILIZE THE CONDITION OF THE DETAINEE DURING THE RENDITION - INCLUDING SEDATION IF NECESSARY.

[] STATION MEDICAL PERSONNEL ALSO PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAL SUPPORT ON AN AS-NEEDED BASIS. THIS TYPICALLY CONSISTS OF TREATMENT FOR ACUTE MEDICAL PROBLEMS AND FOLLOW-UP TREATMENT FOR PRE-EXISTING MEDICAL CONDITIONS.

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COBALT

THE

COBALT

LAST REGULAR ASSISTANCE VISIT TO [REDACTED] WAS CONDUCTED FROM [REDACTED] NOVEMBER 2002. THE NEXT PLANNED VISIT WILL BE DURING [REDACTED] WEEK OF NOVEMBER 2002. BASED ON THE LAST VISIT, FOLLOW-UP CARE WAS PROVIDED TO SEVERAL INMATES FROM [REDACTED] NOVEMBER 2002.

COBALT

DURING THE MOST RECENT

SCHEDULED VISIT TO [REDACTED] DETAINEES WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS DIABETICS WERE TESTED FOR BLOOD SUGAR LEVELS (WHICH WERE NORMAL), [REDACTED] DETAINEE WITH A VARIETY OF PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS WAS PRESCRIBED FIVE DIFFERENT MEDICATIONS, AND SEVERAL DETAINEES WERE

COBALT

PRESCRIBED MILD PAIN RELIEVERS. URINE TESTING OF THE INMATES INDICATED ALL OF THE [REDACTED] DETAINEES WERE

COBALT

RECEIVING SUFFICIENT NOURISHMENT AND HYDRATION. ALL OF THE DETAINEES AT [REDACTED] (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GUL RAHMAN) HAVE BEEN FULLY COOPERATIVE WITH THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR HEALTH AND WELFARE. THE ONE EXCEPTION, GUL RAHMAN, WOULD ONLY STATE THAT "THANKS TO GOD, ALL IS WELL" IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING.

12. (S) Additionally, prisoners with significant health problems are not accepted at [REDACTED] During a proposed rendition of a detainee with a [REDACTED] condition, [REDACTED] Station provided the following guidance: "If Subject does have a significant [REDACTED] condition, Subject should not be transferred to [REDACTED] Appropriate specialized medical care is not available [REDACTED] No unlawful enemy combatant with pre-existing medical conditions can be brought to [REDACTED] If there is reason

COBALT

COBALT

COBALT

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to believe that Subject has a [] condition, he should be transferred []

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

COBALT

13. (S) [] was constructed as a result of shortcomings in the handling of detainees []

[] was designed to isolate and enhance control over the prisoners.⁴²

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CIA Staff
Officer

14. (S) [] a [] Officer, is responsible for detainee affairs at [] Station, and is viewed by Station management and personnel as the "site manager." [] arrived in [] on [] August 2002.

CIA Staff
OfficerCIA Staff
Officer

Prior to his arrival in [] [] did not know he would be responsible for detainee affairs. [] stated that he learned that he would have this responsibility approximately three days after his arrival in []

CIA Staff
Officer

[] had no prior experience in interrogation or prison operations prior to his arrival in [] aside from four days as a detainee during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training []

CIA Staff
Officer

According to [] this training provided him with some understanding as to how prisoners would react to various handling, treatment, and interrogation methods.

COBALT

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Officer

[] was approximately one month short of being operational at the time of [] arrival. In addition to assuming control over the final construction details of []

CIA Staff
Officer

COBALT

[] was also responsible for coordinating interrogations [] and coordinating renditions of high and medium value terrorist targets throughout []. In conjunction with his []

Oct 2002 (Attachment 28)
Apr 2002 (Attachment 29)

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COBALT

CIA Staff Officer

duties as [] "site manager," [] was responsible for devising the operating procedures for [] These COBALT procedures concerned the handling and treatment of prisoners and the operation of the facility.⁴³

15. (S) John B. Jessen (known by the name Bruce), a Psychologist who works for CIA as an independent contractor, and is involved in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques with high value targets, spent two and a half weeks at [] from early-to mid-November 2002. Jessen worked directly with [] on

CIA Staff Officer

RAHMAN and other detainees at [] Jessen has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology, and spent 20 years on active duty with the US Air Force as a Psychologist. After his retirement from the Air Force, Jessen spent eight years as a DOD civilian Psychologist. During his tenure with the Air Force and DOD, Jessen worked on captivity related issues. While on active duty, he served as a Psychologist with the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. While employed as a civilian with DOD, Jessen was the Senior Psychologist for the SERE program. Jessen was able to observe

COBALT operations at [] and had discussions with [] regarding methods of handling, treating, and interrogating prisoners. Jessen also made some recommendations to [] to improve operations at the facility. Jessen stated COBALT

CIA Staff Officer

[] did a great job setting up [] Jessen described [] as being very bright, motivated, and possessing good intuition. Jessen said [] was doing a great job with the guard force. [] was very level headed and acted in a measured manner. Jessen said the atmosphere of the facility was excellent for the type of prisoners kept there - "nasty, but safe." Jessen commented that although [] had never worked in this line of business prior to arriving in [] he did not see any

CIA Staff Officer

"hiccups" in security or prisoner safety. Jessen commented that he would be pleased to work with [] in the future, and believed that [] should be a member of []

CIA Staff Officer

⁴³ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)⁴⁴ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

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16. (S) Although [] does not have a written set of Standard Operating Procedures (a flaw noted by Jessen), [] has established a standard method of operation. For security reasons, prisoners are brought to the facility with their hands and feet shackled. Blindfolds are placed over their eyes and a hood is placed over their heads. Ear plugs are also placed in their ears. This is done so that prisoners have no knowledge of where they are being housed, cannot hear what is being said around them, and have no idea if they are alone or with other prisoners. Additionally, it prevents any form of communication between prisoners. Prisoners are handled by guards in complete silence. Hand signals are used by the guards to communicate with each other. Prisoners are dressed in sweatsuits and adult diapers. The diapers are used for sanitary reasons during transportation, and as a means to humiliate the prisoner. When prisoners are delivered to their cell, one hand or foot is shackled to the wall. This is done for the safety of the guard. Later, the manner in which a prisoner is shackled is based on his level of cooperation and the danger he presents to the guards. However, all prisoners are shackled in some manner. If they are not shackled to the wall, their hands and feet may be shackled. If a prisoner is uncooperative, or presents a significant physical threat to the guards, he may be shackled in a "short chain" position. This method was taught to the guards by BOP instructors as a safer alternative to hog-tying prisoners. Hog-tying prisoners has resulted in a number of deaths in the US, and the "short chain" method is safer for the prisoners while still providing a higher degree of safety and security for the guards. In the "short chain" method, the prisoner's hands are shackled together as are his feet. Then a short chain is used to shackle the hands to the feet. This keeps a prisoner's hand shackled within several inches of his feet. The prisoner's feet are then shackled to the wall. This provides for the maximum degree of control over the prisoner while allowing for prisoner safety.⁴⁵

CIA Staff Officer

⁴⁵ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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17. (S) Prior to the guards' departure from the cell, the hood, blindfold, and ear plugs are taken from the prisoner. Prisoners are housed in total darkness. [redacted] stated that this is done for a couple of reasons. [redacted] stated that he wanted to disorient prisoners so they didn't know if it was day or night. [redacted]

CIA Staff
Officer

Additionally, music is played in the prisoner housing area 24 hours a day. This is done to prevent prisoners from communicating with each other.⁴⁶

18. (S) Sleep deprivation is also used to enhance successful interrogation. The decision to use sleep deprivation is made by the individual CIA officer who is working with a particular prisoner. When sleep deprivation is utilized, the prisoner is chained by one or both wrists to a bar running across the ceiling of the cell. This forces the prisoner to stand. [redacted] stated that he consulted with Jessen and was told that no prisoner should undergo more than 72 hours of sleep deprivation because lucidity begins to decline and questioning become ineffective.⁴⁷ During our interview with Jessen, he stated that sleep deprivation could be used indefinitely without harming the prisoner; however, you could not chain him overhead indefinitely.

CIA Staff
Officer

19. (S) Often, prisoners who possess significant or imminent threat information are stripped to their diapers during interrogation and placed back into their cells wearing only diapers. This is done solely to humiliate the prisoner for interrogation purposes. When the prisoner soils a diaper, they are changed by the guards. Sometimes the guards run out of diapers and the prisoners are placed back in their cells in a handcrafted diaper secured by duct tape. If the guards don't have any available diapers, the prisoners are rendered to their cell nude.⁴⁸

CIA Staff Officer

⁴⁶ Interview of [redacted]

Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁴⁷ Interview of [redacted]

Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁴⁸ Interview of [redacted]

Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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20. (S) Prisoners' cells are austere. A prisoner begins his confinement with nothing in his cell except a bucket used for human waste. Prisoners are given rewards for cooperation. Rewards can consist of a light, "foamies" for the prisoners' ears (blocks out the music), a mat to sleep on, extra blankets, etc. Additionally, a luxury room has been built which has a light, a rocking chair, a table, and carpeting on the floor. Prisoners are not punished for lack of cooperation. Instead, rewards that they have received for cooperation are taken from them if they become uncooperative.⁴⁹

21. (S) When guards move prisoners from their cell to the interrogation room, usually [] guards enter the cell with a flashlight. A hood is placed over the prisoner's head and he is lead to the interrogation room in shackles. The guards do not speak to the prisoners and all communication between the guards is completed with hand signals. Once the detainee is placed in the interrogation room the guards depart, and the hood is removed by [] personnel. Every effort is made to ensure that the only person a detainee communicates with is his CIA interrogator.⁵⁰

DEATH OF GUL RAHMAN

22. (S) Gul RAHMAN was a Hezbi Islami official from Wardak province, Afghanistan, who was known to interact with and support Al Qa'ida. He was known to be a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abu Abd Al-RAHMAN Al-Najdi.

Jessen stated that []

Station

CIA Staff Officer

⁴⁹ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)⁵⁰ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)⁵¹ Alec [] Oct 2002 (Attachment 31)⁵² Alec [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 32)⁵³ [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 33)

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was very optimistic that they had somebody who was going to have some good information.⁵⁴

23. (S) RAHMAN was apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan on [] October 2002, during an early morning raid

⁵⁴ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)
[] Oct 2002 (Attachment 34)

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[Redacted]

27. (S) On [Redacted] November 2002, Headquarters agreed in
transferring him to [Redacted]

COBALT

[Redacted]


56 [Redacted] Oct 2002 (Attachment 34)
57 [Redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 35)
58 Alec [Redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 36)
59 Alec [Redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 37)

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29. (S) Later that day, RAHMAN [redacted] were flown from [redacted] where they were subsequently transferred to [redacted].⁶¹ Upon RAHMAN's arrival at [redacted] he was given a physical examination and all of his personal clothes and effects were removed. He was dressed in standard prison garb and placed in a single cell.⁶² [redacted] described the standard prison garb as a sweatshirt and sweat pants. RAHMAN was also wearing an adult diaper that was placed on him in [redacted]. This is done because prisoners are not allowed to use bathroom facilities on the airplane during rendition, and later as a means of humiliation. According to standard operating procedures, one of RAHMAN's hands or feet would have been shackled to the wall when he was placed in his cell. According to [redacted] the physical examination of RAHMAN took place in [redacted]. [redacted] stated that there are a number of reasons for the physical examination. One reason is so that Station can conduct a body cavity search to ensure the prisoner is not carrying a weapon or some other substance. The second reason is so that Station can ensure that the prisoner is in good enough condition to travel and be housed at [redacted]. Lastly, [redacted] indicated that the physical examination serves to document if a prisoner has been beaten or traumatized. The person conducting the

⁶⁰ [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 38)

⁶¹ [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 39)

⁶² [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

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CIA Staff Officer

CIA Staff
Officer

physical exam would note such observations. [] also indicated that the prisoner would be photographed. A search of cable traffic related to RAHMAN found no record of any reporting indicating that any injuries or health conditions were noted. [] stated that they keep no medical records on the prisoners and the digital photographs taken of RAHMAN at rendition have long been overwritten.^{63 64}

COBALT

CIA Staff
Officer

30. (S) According to Jessen, he was at [] in early November 2002, in conjunction with the interrogations of a few other prisoners. Although Jessen's recollections were fuzzy, Jessen recalled that he might have been present during the first interrogation of RAHMAN at [] COBALT Jessen recalled that [] approached him, and they discussed strategies to use during his interrogation.

CIA Staff
Officer

Jessen stated that he believes [] conducted the first interrogation, and he watched from behind the lights. Jessen stated that they talked afterwards and collaborated on some approaches he might want to take.⁶⁵

CIA Staff
Officer

31. (S) Cable traffic reflects that on [] and [] November 2002, [] and Jessen interrogated RAHMAN. The cable goes on to state that despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, RAHMAN maintained a high interrogation resistance posture and continued to deny that he was RAHMAN, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His resistance posture suggested a sophisticated level of resistance training. The cable cited several examples of his interrogation resistant behavior:

- o Remained steadfast in outright denials (ignored obvious facts).
- o Was unresponsive to provocation.
- o Claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)
- o Complained about poor treatment.

CIA Staff Officer

⁶³ Lotus Note from [] to [] Jan 2003 (Attachment 41)⁶⁴ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)⁶⁵ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

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- o Complained about the violation of his human rights.
- o Remained consistently unemotional, calm, and composed.
- o Blatantly lied while attempting to appear sincere in his desire to cooperate.
- o Consistently used his cover story.
- o Displayed no anxiety (calmly picked at his skin/nails during confrontations with damning evidence against him.
- o Was unfazed by physical and psychological confrontations.⁶⁶

COBALT 32. (S) Cable traffic reflects that sleep deprivation for RAHMAN began almost immediately after his arrival at [REDACTED] Jessen stated that he believed that RAHMAN's sleep deprivation started from the beginning. CIA Staff Officer According to [REDACTED], RAHMAN's clothes were taken from him at this point, and he was left wearing a diaper. During the period of sleep deprivation, RAHMAN's arms were shackled to a bar that ran between the walls of the cell. This prevented RAHMAN from sitting down.^{67 68}

COBALT 33. (S) During the first few days of RAHMAN's incarceration at [REDACTED] cable traffic also reflects that he received a cold shower. During our interview with [REDACTED] he indicated that RAHMAN received a cold shower because the water heater was not working. Jessen stated that he was deliberately given a cold shower as a deprivation technique. Cable traffic tends to support Jessen's statements. Jessen stated that after RAHMAN received the cold shower, he saw RAHMAN standing with the guards. Jessen stated that RAHMAN was shivering and showing early signs of hypothermia. Jessen instructed the guards to provide RAHMAN with a blanket, which they did.^{69 70} CIA Staff Officer

34. (S) Cable traffic also reflects that during his first two days of incarceration, RAHMAN underwent "rough

⁶⁶ [REDACTED] Nov 2002 (Attachment 33)

⁶⁷ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

⁶⁸ Interview of [REDACTED] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁶⁹ Interview of [REDACTED] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁷⁰ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

CIA Staff Officer

CIA Staff
Officer

treatment." [] stated that they occasionally pushed and shoved RAHMAN while he had a hood over his head to disorient him and scare him. Jessen described witnessing what he termed "a rough takedown." Jessen stated that when a detainee is strong and resilient, you have to establish control or you are not going to get anywhere. So you try different techniques to try to get him to open up. One of them is rough threatening treatment. The treatment is never to the point that you hurt the prisoner physically, you simply want to instill fear and despair in the prisoner. [] came up with the idea of the hard takedown and asked Jessen for his thoughts. While Jessen has not used this technique at facilities at which he has worked, and had never seen one conducted, he thought it was worth trying. According to Jessen, there were approximately [] CIA officers from the [] team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of RAHMAN's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to "get down." They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. Jessen stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). RAHMAN did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on RAHMAN's body after his death. RAHMAN had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, RAHMAN was returned to his cell and secured. Jessen stated that [] may have spoken to RAHMAN for a few moments, but he did not know what [] said. Jessen stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to "give them something to think about."^{71 72}

CIA Staff
OfficerCIA Staff
Officer⁷¹ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)⁷² Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

COBALT

35. (S) On [] November 2002, [] Station forwarded a cable to Headquarters indicating that to date, RAHMAN had provided no information to his interrogators. He still refused to admit his true name was Gul RAHMAN. He appeared somewhat fatigued relative to his appearance upon arrival at [] and remained resolutely defiant as interrogators attempted to obtain information from him. Station believed that physical pressure was unlikely to change RAHMAN's attitude; but alternative psychological pressures may have more success. []

CIA Staff
Officer

36. (S) On [] November 2002, Station Officers [] Jessen, [] again met with RAHMAN. "RAHMAN had spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold conditions with minimal food or sleep. RAHMAN appeared incoherent for portions of this session, but was completely lucid by mid-session."⁷⁴ During this session, RAHMAN finally admitted that he was indeed Gul RAHMAN. []

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Nov 2002 (Attachment 42)

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Nov 2002 (Attachment 43)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

[redacted] cable detailing this session reads as follows:

COBALT "Assessment: RAHMAN was finally showing the results of his stay at [redacted] during this session. While he was still clearly resisting, we believe he may have chosen to compromise somewhat in exchange for improved conditions. However, it was also possible that RAHMAN was so fatigued that he was unable to consistently stay with his cover story even if he wished to do so. During portions of interrogation, RAHMAN was confused as to his location, and the passage of time. At other times he would forget what he had been asked [redacted] would have to recapture his attention. It is difficult to know precisely how much of his behavior was feigned and how much was a result of his physical and psychological condition; however, IC Jessen's impression was that he continues to use 'health and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his resistance posture. After the session, RAHMAN was afforded some improvement in his conditions. Interrogators plan to reinterview RAHMAN on [redacted] November."⁷⁵
CIA Staff Officer

37. (S) [redacted] and Jessen both attributed this small interrogation breakthrough to the pressure techniques used on RAHMAN. Jessen stated that he believed RAHMAN would have never made the admission without the pressures placed on him. Jessen stated that he considered RAHMAN's

admission of his identity as a breakthrough but did not believe that RAHMAN had been "broken." Jessen stated that he believes RAHMAN made a compromise. He knew he was in trouble and knew we had a lot of evidence that he was RAHMAN. Jessen believes that RAHMAN knew that he could give up his identity and possibly get a little better treatment, but still protect the information that was important to him.^{76 77}

⁷⁵ [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 43)

⁷⁶ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

⁷⁷ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

38. (S) On [] November 2002, Headquarters requested that psychologist ICs Jessen and James E. Mitchell conduct a psychological assessment exam of RAHMAN to determine which interrogation measures would be required to render RAHMAN compliant. The cable stated that Headquarters was motivated to extract any and all operational information on Al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from RAHMAN. The cable noted that it was the assessment of the debriefers that RAHMAN may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induce him to comply.

[] Headquarters requested that the results of the examination be sent to Headquarters where a determination on the course of action could be made.⁷⁸

39. (S) On that same day [] November 2002), Jessen conducted a psychological captivity assessment of RAHMAN. Jessen found that RAHMAN was able to accurately describe the circumstances, time, and location of his capture he was able to identify those captured with him. He was slow to answer some questions, which Jessen attributed to fatigue and active resistance. He was able identify all members of his family, their ages, and places of birth. Questions that were non-sensitive to his resistance posture were answered quickly and accurately. Sensitive questions yielded stalling and prevarication. Throughout this evaluation and the six interrogation sessions Jessen participated in up to that point, Jessen saw no signs of psychopathology. RAHMAN did feign incoherence and profound confusion at times, but would immediately revert to a coherent dialogue when it was in his best interest. Jessen assessed RAHMAN as being of above average intelligence. Jessen stated that RAHMAN was a mentally stable individual exhibiting extraordinary resilience in his ability to withstand the vicissitudes of captivity and persist in

⁷⁸ Alec [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 32)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

an effective resistance posture. There was no indication that RAHMAN suffered from any psychopathology nor that he would be profoundly or permanently affected by continuing interrogations, to include HVT enhanced measures.⁷⁹

40. (S) In the last paragraph of Jessen's mental examination report, Jessen recommended an interrogation plan for RAHMAN. The last paragraph of the cable reads as follows:

"Interrogation Plan Recommendation: Because of his [RAHMAN's] remarkable physical and psychological resilience and determination to persist in his effective resistance posture, employing enhanced measures is not the first or best option to yield positive interrogation results. In fact, with such individuals, increasing physical pressures often bolsters their resistance. The most effective interrogation plan for Gul RAHMAN, is to continue environmental deprivations he is experiencing and institute a concentrated interrogation exposure regimen. This regimen would consist of repeated and seemingly constant interrogations (18 out of 24 hours per day). These interrogations should be coordinated and present with the same set of key subject areas. Interrogators should have the flexibility and insight to deviate with the Subject when he begins to move in a desired direction. It will be the consistent and persistent application of deprivations (sleep loss and fatigue) and seemingly constant interrogations, which will be most effective in wearing down this Subject's resistance posture. It will be important to manage the deprivations so as to allow Subject adequate rest and nourishment so he remains coherent and capable of providing accurate information. The station physician should collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve this optimum balance. It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before significant movement occurs."⁸⁰

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80Nov 2002 (Attachment 44)
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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

41. (S) On [] November 2002, [] Station Medical Officer, [] examined Gul RAHMAN and found no health problems.⁸¹

CIA Staff
Officer

42. (S) The afternoon of [] November 2002, was the last time [] saw RAHMAN alive. At that time, [] assessed RAHMAN to be in good overall health. [] noted that RAHMAN had small abrasions on his wrist and ankles as a result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened, and his hand restraints were removed when RAHMAN was returned to his cell.⁸² According to [] RAHMAN had complained that he was cold, so [] gave him a sweatshirt.⁸³

CIA Staff
Officer

43. (S) According to [] Guard [] RAHMAN was fed at 2100 on [] November 2002. Because prisoners are fed one large meal a day, and because of RAHMAN's actions on the following day, this is the last meal RAHMAN consumed prior to his death.⁸⁴

44. (S) According to [] RAHMAN was fed again at 1500 on [] November 2002.⁸⁵ According to numerous sources, when the guards gave RAHMAN his food, he threw the plate, waterbottle, and waste bucket at the guards. He began yelling at the guards, repeating his threat, last stated approximately one week prior, that he knew their faces and he would kill them when he got out of the prison. As a result of his violent behavior, [] ordered that the guards put RAHMAN's hand restraints back on to prevent him from taking any other violent actions.⁸⁶ The guards proceeded to shackle RAHMAN to the wall of his cell in a short chain position. (In the "short chain" method, the prisoner's hands are shackled together as are his feet. Then a short chain is used to shackle the hands to the

CIA Staff
Officer

⁸¹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)

⁸² [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

⁸³ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁸⁴ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)

⁸⁵ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)

⁸⁶ [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

feet. This keeps a prisoner's hand shackled within several inches of his feet. The prisoner's feet are then shackled to the wall). The only clothing being worn by RAHMAN at this point was the sweatshirt given to him by [] the day before. RAHMAN was nude from the waist down. RAHMAN had been nude, with the exception of a diaper for most of his incarceration. There is uncertainty as to when RAHMAN's diaper had been removed. As of approximately 1500 on [] November 2002, RAHMAN was shackled in a sitting position on bare concrete while nude from the waist down. The manner in which he was shackled prevented him from standing upright.

CIA Staff Officer

45. (S) The [] guards made their normal rounds to check on the prisoners on [] November 2002, at 2200 and 2300. The guards did not enter RAHMAN's cell, but visually inspected him from the outside using a flashlight.⁸⁷ According to [] guard [] he and [] checked RAHMAN's cell at 0400 on [] November 2002. [] stated that they looked into his cell and whistled. RAHMAN was sitting in his cell, alive and shaking.⁸⁸ At 0800, [] guards [] made the rounds to check on the prisoners. According to the guards, RAHMAN was alive, sitting on the floor and shaking. [] noted that RAHMAN's eyes were open and blinking. [] said RAHMAN's shaking did not seem unusual because all of the prisoners shake.⁸⁹ According to [] guard [] he checked RAHMAN's cell at 1000. He noted that the prisoner was lying on his side. [] tapped the door with his nightstick; however, the prisoner did not move. At that point, [] sought out [], a CIA TDY'er who was at [] to debrief other detainees.⁹⁰

COBALT

46. (S) According to interviews conducted with [] Agency personnel present at [] when RAHMAN's body was discovered, [] were []

COBALT

⁸⁷ [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

⁸⁸ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)

⁸⁹ Interviews of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)

⁹⁰ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)

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COBALT

all at [] to interrogate other prisoners. At approximately 1000 on [] November 2002, one of the guards walked up to [] and informed him that one of the prisoners was not moving. The [] officers went with the guard to RAHMAN's cell. The guard unlocked the cell and opened the door. RAHMAN was lying motionless on his right side with his hands and feet shackled together and his feet shackled to the wall. There was a small amount of blood coming from his nose and mouth. RAHMAN was clothed in a sweatshirt but had no pants. [] noted that the only things in his cell were an empty red waste bucket, and a food tray with a small piece of bread on it. [] stated that there was rice strewn all over cell. [] entered the cell and checked RAHMAN's pulse. When he could not find a pulse, he began CPR chest compressions. With each chest compression, [] noted that more blood would come from his mouth and mucous from his nose. [] returned to the area where interrogations are conducted and called one of the Station medics on the radio. [] also tried to contact [] but he could not find him. Station medic [] stated that he received the radio call, but it was very cryptic. [] stated that he did not know why he was being summoned to [] [] stated that he and [] (the other Station medic) grabbed their medical bags, obtained transportation, and traveled to []^{91 92 93 94}

COBALT

COBALT

47. (S) When [] noted that CPR was unsuccessful in reviving RAHMAN, he ordered that the cell be sealed until the doctor arrived. [] arrived 30-45 minutes later. Upon arrival, Station personnel greeted [] and informed him that a prisoner was dead. [] went to RAHMAN's cell and found him lying on his side. [] examined RAHMAN's body and rolled it on both sides. [] stated that there was no evidence that the prisoner had been abused and no evidence of a cause of death. [] noted that the blood coming

- ⁹¹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)
⁹² Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 46)
⁹³ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 47)
⁹⁴ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

from the nose and mouth was dark and inconsistent with a wound to that area. [] estimated that RAHMAN had died within the past few hours.^{95 96}

CIA Staff Officer

48. (S) [] noted that they found it unusual that the [] guard commander was not present at the prison at the time of RAHMAN's death. The interior prison guards live inside the prison and rarely leave. When [] questioned the guards about the Commander's absence he was told that the Commander was at [] [] said he heard second hand that the guards told [] or [] that the Commander had a family emergency.^{97 98}

49. (S) It is important to note that during this investigation several officers made reference to an unexpected temperature drop [] immediately prior to RAHMAN's death. The following are the Accuweather temperatures [] during the month of November 2002:

50. (S) No photographs were taken at the scene of RAHMAN's death. Later that evening, [] delivered a freezer to the facility and RAHMAN's body was frozen until investigating personnel could arrive to conduct an autopsy.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)
⁹⁶ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)
⁹⁷ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)
⁹⁸ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 46)
⁹⁹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

AUTOPSY

51. (S) Dr. [] conducted an autopsy on RAHMAN on [] November 2002. His findings are presented in his report entitled, "Final Autopsy Findings, CASE # []" which is attached to this report. In summary, Dr. [] listed the cause of death as "undetermined." [] stated, however, that it was his clinical impression that RAHMAN died of hypothermia.¹⁰⁰

52. (S) [] stated that hypothermia is a diagnosis of exclusion. In essence, other potential causes are ruled out one by one until you are left with no other possibility. [] stated that he conducted a full anterior neck dissection. [] found no evidence of hemorrhage in the tissue, muscles, and cartilage around the neck and no evidence of damage to the Hyoid bone. Injuries such as these are common in cases of strangulation. [] examined the soft tissue on the inside of the mouth and found no evidence that pressure was placed over the mouth as is common in cases of smothering. There was no trauma to the teeth. The head and skull were examined and displayed no evidence of facial or skull fractures and no blood in the anterior chambers of the eyes. [] examined the chest, trunk, abdomen, and genitals and found no evidence of trauma. RAHMAN had abrasions to both wrists and ankles, but there was no evidence of infection. RAHMAN had a number of scrapes on his shoulders, legs, and hips; however, there was no bruising around the abrasions suggesting that there was no blunt force trauma.¹⁰¹

53. (S) The toxicology was conducted by the [] []. The toxicology included testing for all of the classic poisons to include cyanide. Additionally, they tested for substances used in truth serums and found no evidence of toxic substances. During the autopsy, [] specifically looked for injection marks on the body and searched for pill fragments in the mouth and stomach and found no indication that he had ingested any pills or received any injections.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Final Autopsy Findings, [] (Attachment 48)

¹⁰¹ Interview of Dr. [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)

¹⁰² Interview of Dr. [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

54. (S) In making the clinical diagnosis of death by hypothermia, [] based his conclusion and the clinical environment in which RAHMAN was found and the information compiled during the investigation. [] based his conclusions on the following factors

- o RAHMAN's urine had high catecholamine levels, which is consistent with hypothermic deaths.
- o RAHMAN was seen shivering for a number of hours immediately prior to his death.
- o The environment in which he was housed was extremely cold. On the night of his death, the outside temperature was 31 degrees. The prison facility is not insulated.
- o RAHMAN had not eaten in approximately 36 hours. No food was found in his stomach during the autopsy. RAHMAN's glycogen levels would have been depleted. Glycogen is a fuel source used by the body to stay warm.
- o RAHMAN was unclothed from the waist down and was in direct contact with cold concrete. Direct conduction is a significant cause of heat loss in the body.
- o RAHMAN was chained in a short chain position. This prevented him from standing up and moving around to warm his body.
- o RAHMAN was dehydrated which is a contributing factor to hypothermia.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Interview of Dr. [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence developed during the course of this investigation suggests the following:

- o There is no evidence to suggest that RAHMAN's death was deliberate.
- o There is no evidence to suggest that RAHMAN was beaten, tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered.
- o Hypothermia was the most likely cause of death of Gul RAHMAN.
- o His death was not deliberate, but resulted from his incarceration in a cold environment while nude from the waist down, and shackled in a position that prevented him from moving around to keep warm. Additionally, this kept him in direct contact with the cold concrete floor leading to a loss of bodyheat through conduction.
- o Gul RAHMAN's actions contributed to his own death. By throwing his last meal he was unable to provide his body with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his violent behavior resulted in his restraint which prevented him from generating body heat by moving around and brought him in direct contact with the

concrete floor leading to a loss of bodyheat through conduction.

Attachments
As stated

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Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADDO/CI

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1. [redacted] Sep 2002
2. [redacted] Sep 2002
3. [redacted] May 2002
4. [redacted] Jun 2002
5. [redacted] Jun 2002
6. [redacted] Jun 2002
7. [redacted] Oct 2002
8. [redacted] May 2002
9. [redacted] Oct 2002
10. [redacted] Jun 2002
11. [redacted] Sep 2002
12. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
13. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
14. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
15. Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002
16. [redacted] Jun 2002
17. [redacted] Jun 2002
18. [redacted] Jul 2002
19. [redacted] Aug 2002
20. [redacted] Sep 2002
21. [redacted] Nov 2002
22. [redacted]
23. [redacted]
24. [redacted] Jun 2002
25. [redacted] Jul 2002
26. [redacted] Aug 2002
27. [redacted]
28. [redacted] Oct 2002
29. [redacted] Apr 2002
30. Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003
31. ALEC [redacted] Oct 2002
32. ALEC [redacted] Nov 2002
33. [redacted] Nov 2002
34. [redacted] Oct 2002
35. [redacted] Nov 2002
36. ALEC [redacted] Nov 2002
37. ALEC [redacted] Nov 2002
38. [redacted] Nov 2002
39. [redacted] Nov 2002
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41. [redacted]
42. [redacted] Nov 2002
43. [redacted] Nov 2002

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- 44. [redacted] Nov 2002
- 45. [redacted] Nov 2002
- 46. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 47. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 48. Final Autopsy Findings, [redacted]
- 49. Interview of Dr. [redacted] Dec 2002
- 50. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 51. Gul Rahman Autopsy Photographs

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